Leakage Conversion For Training Machine Learning Side Channel Attack Models Faster

Recent improvements in the area of Internet of Things (IoT) has led to extensive utilization of embedded devices and sensors. Hence, along with utilization the need for safety and security of these devices also increases proportionately. In the last two decades, the side-channel attack (SCA) has become a massive threat to the interrelated embedded devices. Moreover, extensive research has led to the development of many different forms of SCA for extracting the secret key by utilizing the various leakage information. Lately, machine learning (ML) based models have been more effective in breaking complex encryption systems than the other types of SCA models. However, these ML or DL models require a lot of data for training that cannot be collected while attacking a device in a real-world situation. Thus, in this thesis, we try to solve this issue by proposing the new technique of leakage conversion. In this technique, we try to convert the high signal to noise ratio (SNR) power traces to low SNR averaged electromagnetic traces. In addition to that, we also show how artificial neural networks (ANN) can learn various non-linear dependencies of features in leakage information, which cannot be done by adaptive digital signal processing (DSP) algorithms. Initially, we successfully convert traces in the time interval of 80 to 200 as the cryptographic operations occur in that time frame. Next, we show the successful conversion of traces lying in any time frame as well as having a random key and plain text values. Finally, to validate our leakage conversion technique and the generated traces we successfully implement correlation electromagnetic analysis (CEMA) with an approximate minimum traces to disclosure (MTD) of 480.