<b>Theoretical Virtues and Moral Theory Selection</b>

<p dir="ltr">Moral philosophers often use theoretical virtues in order to evaluate and adjudicate between moral theories. Some even use this descriptive fact to justify that moral theorizing is a meaningful and fruitful endeavor. However, the mere fact that theoretical virtues are used to evaluate and adjudicate between moral theories does not justify their use. Furthermore, while the use of theoretical virtues to select between theories is practiced in scientific theory selection, it has not been argued that we should use theoretical virtues for moral theory selection and evaluation. In this dissertation I argue that we can provide justification for the use of theoretical virtues as a means of theory selection and evaluation for normative moral theories. The justification I provide is twofold: First I look to the use of theoretical virtues as they are utilized for theory selection and evaluation in the domain of scientific realism and how they are used in the domain of moral realism. This comparative analysis allows me to draw out the analogous features from both theoretical domains to show that the use of theoretical virtues in normative moral realist theories are justified. Second, I make a general argument regarding theory, the aims of theory, and theoretical virtues. To make this argument I look at two other approaches for moral theory evaluation and reject them. From this argument we see that theoretical virtues are an apt way of adjudicating and evaluating normative moral theories. Together these two arguments give sufficient reason to accept and adopt the use of theoretical virtues for normative moral theory selection.</p>