A PRAGMATIC ANALYSIS OF WISH IMPERATIVES

by

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ABBREVIATIONS

ACC: Accusative case marker

DAT: Dative case marker

IMP(B): Conjugational imperative form of the auxiliary "kureru"

IMP(B+P): Conjugational imperative form of the auxiliary "kudasaru"

IMP(NEG): Negative imperative marker

IMP: Conjugational imperative form of a verb

LOC: Locative case marker

NEG: Negation

NOM: Nominative case marker

OBL: Oblique case marker

TOP: Topic case marker

ABSTRACT

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A word or a linguistic construction can mean various things depending on the context. The imperative is a representative example of such a construction and can express a variety of illocutionary forces such as COMMAND, REQUEST, ADVICE, and more (Quirk et al., 1985, Huddleston et al., 2002).

However, although there are many studies that comprehensively deal with the imperative or individual illocutionary forces of it (e.g. Lakoff, 1966, Ljung, 1975, Davies, 1986, Wilson & Sperber 1988, Han, 2000, Takahashi, 2012, Jary & Kissine, 2014), there is no such study that shows a possible overall process of how we would interpret an imperative to reach a certain illocutionary force when it is uttered. Without such a shared process, we cannot explain why we can communicate using imperatives without misunderstandings. Thus, this process needs to be investigated.

Another problem regarding imperatives is the treatment of non-directive uses of imperatives such as "Have a good day". The illocutionary force of this imperative would be called GOOD WISH and regarded as a conventional use of imperatives (Davies, 1986). However, it has not been clearly explained why we would choose the imperative construction to express wishes. If this kind of wishes expressed in the form of the imperative are actually a use of imperative, then there should be some reason and motivation for it.

The main purposes of this study are to provide (1) a schema of how one would typically reach the interpretation of WISH when hearing an imperative and (2) an account of such use of imperatives as WISH. In this study, examples of imperatives in two non-cognate languages are used for the analysis in the hope to substantiate the credibility of the schema and the account: Japanese and English. Based on the analyses on the imperative and individual illocutionary forces that have been presented in the literature combined with my own analysis, a schema is proposed that illustrates how one would typically reach PRIVATE WISH, the state of affairs of which is deemed to be desirable mainly for the speaker, and GOOD WISH, the state of affairs of which is deemed to be desirable mainly for the addressee. Then, an account for the use of PRIVATE WISH and GOOD WISH is provided. Specifically, the use of imperatives as WISH is an analogous use of prototypical imperatives; people would use the imperative construction to express their strong desirability, and to build and maintain a good relationship with others.

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

What a syntactic construction can deliver is not limited to "the only one putatively corresponding meaning" but also many other. One of the typical examples is the English imperative construction, which usually takes the form of a verb phrase without inflection and often without an explicit subject. When hearing the word *imperative,* one tends to think of a sentence such as "Get out of here!". The intention and interpretation of this utterance, or the illocutionary force, of this imperative would be construed as COMMAND or ORDER by the addressee and is putatively one of the most typical meanings of imperatives.[1] However, there are many other illocutionary forces derivable from imperatives. Here are some examples from Quirk et. al. (1985, p. 831-32).

ORDER/COMMAND:	Fire! (*fire* as a verb)
	Make your bed at once.
PROHIBITION:	Don't touch.
REQUEST:	Shut the door, please.
PLEA:	Help!
ADVICE:	Take an aspirin for your headache.
	Lock the door before you go to bed.
WARNING:	Look out!
	Be careful!
	Mind your head!

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[1] To distinguish between illocutionary forces and the words themselves, I will henceforth indicate illocutionary forces in capitals.

SUGGESTION:	Ask me about it again next month.
	Let's have a party.
INSTRUCTION:	Take the first street on the left.
INVITATION:	Make yourself at home.
	Come in and sit down.
OFFER:	Have a cigarette.
GRANTING PERMISSION:	Help yourself.
GOOD WISHES:	Enjoy your meal.
	Have a good time.
IMPRECATION:	Go to hell!

Note that there is possibly a countless number of illocutionary forces depending on how one names them. Thus, these illocutionary forces are just some examples that are often used in the literature on imperatives. As we can see from the examples above, whereas an imperative can have typical illocutionary forces such as COMMAND or REQUEST, it can also have relatively minor illocutionary forces, e.g. GOOD WISHES and IMPRECATION, which some people would not even recognize as imperatives.

Many researchers have tried to account for the broad range of illocutionary forces that an imperative sentence can deliver by creating a comprehensive semantic and pragmatic generalization (Lakoff, 1966, Ljung, 1975, Davies, 1986, Wilson & Sperber, 1988, Nitta, 1990, Nitta et al. 2002, Han, 2000, Takahashi, 2012, Jary & Kissine, 2014). Despite all the research on imperatives, there is little research found that focuses on how one interprets an imperative as a certain illocutionary force in a certain context. . The studies above do not focus on how a certain illocutionary force is interpreted by the hearer. One possible reason why they do not focus on

how interpretation of imperatives would work is that the number of potential illocutionary forces

is infinite, as illocutionary force is a label for the intention of a speaker and the assumption that

an addressee believes the speaker to have (Green, 1996). Besides, each illocutionary force such

as COMMAND, SUGGESTION, PROHIBIITON, REQUEST, and so on is not intrinsically

coded into the predicate of an imperative but is pragmatically reasoned out by the hearer.[2] To put

it in another way, the selection of an illocutionary force made by the hearer may be different

from individual to individual and from context to context. However, when we hear or see an

imperative, we are often in agreement about the interpretation of its illocutionary force, which

means that there must be some general agreement between interlocutors on what is being

communicated. Otherwise, there will always be a misunderstanding in interpretation, which will

lead to miscommunication. How is this possible? There should be typical patterns or conditions

where most, if not all, people interpret an imperative as conveying a certain similar illocutionary

force by reasoning based on the context.

In this study, the focus will be on the illocutionary force called WISH and I will propose

a schema of how one tends to reach the interpretation of an imperative as WISH. The reason why

WISH imperatives have been chosen for this analysis is two-fold: (1) It has not been fully

explained why we would use the imperative, rather than other sentence types (such as the

declarative), to express one's wish or how the wish interpretation is reasoned out by the hearer.

(2) As WISH imperatives may not be considered typical imperatives, the identification of

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[2] I use the words *addressee* and *hearer* for different purposes. An *addressee* is a person, thing, or imaginable entity with whom the speaker intends to identify as the subject of an imperative, while a *hearer* is someone who hears or sees the imperative utterances (or sentences in text). The addressee can be the hearer, but it is not always the case. For example, we are all hearers, because we see many imperatives objectively on this paper but not addressees, as we are not the target people of imperatives.

pragmatic conditions would be relatively more straightforward, not involving relationships among interlocutor(s).[3] In addition, special attention will be paid to the imperatives of GOOD WISH. They are somehow treated as an exception to the pragmatic and semantic accounts of the English imperative because they are highly conventionalized and do not require specific actions like other WISH imperatives (Davies, 1986, Imai, 2001, Jary & Kissine, 2014). It is undeniable that many GOOD WISH imperatives in English are somewhat conventionalized. However, in the process of the conventionalization, there must have been some reason why the imperative construction was selected. For this study, not only English but also Japanese imperatives will be used in the hope of substantiating my analysis and schema.

Research Background

Before everything, it is necessary to define what imperatives in this study mean and overview previous research to clarify the contributions and issues.

In order to distinguish between WISH and GOOD WISH, I will use the term PRIVATE WISH for WISH imperatives other than GOOD WISH. Additional explanation of how they differ and the reason why they should be treated separately will be given later in Chapter 3. To briefly explain, PRIVATE WISH is a kind of illocutionary force of WISH the state of affairs of which is desirable and beneficial for the speakers themselves and GOOD WISH for the addressee(s). When there is no need to distinguish between GOOD WISH and PRIVATE WISH, as they have several properties in common, I will use WISH referring to these two as an inclusive term.

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[3] Although I used the word "interlocutors", WISH imperatives sometime do not have the target addressee present.

Definition of English imperatives and the scope for this study.

The word *imperative* is used in many ways, even when the reference is narrowed to the linguistic term in English. For the purposes of this thesis, I would like to employ Jary and Kissine's (2014) definition of imperatives, which focuses more on the function of imperatives than our intuitive understanding. They state, "We define the imperative as a sentence type whose sole prototypical function is to perform directive speech acts" (p. 10). As is often the case, different sentence types can function as directives and when some expressions have become conventionalized, we may take them for "imperatives". For instance, in English, "can you ~", "will you ~" and other similar expressions are conventionally used to ask someone to do something, i.e. as directives. But these are interrogatives and their sole prototypical function is not to direct someone to do something. Thus, expressions such as "can you ~" do not fit the definition proposed by Jary and Kissine (2014).

In addition, you can express an order by performative verbs such as *order* and *command* as in "I order you to do this job". However, the directive sense in this case does not come from the construction of this sentence but from the property of the verb *order*. The construction itself is the declarative and its sole prototypical function is not directive either.

Based on Jary and Kissine's (2014) definition, there seems to be only one suitable construction in English. Here are the characteristics of English imperatives proposed by Davies (1986):

1: Optionality of subject, along with restrictions on what subjects are possible.[4]

2: Lack of tense inflection.

3: The necessity for *do* with negation or emphasis, even with *be* or auxiliary *have.*[5]

Furthermore, I hereby stipulate that the *let's* construction and imperatives with coordinate conjunctions (often called *imperative-like conditionals: ILCs,* c.f. Davis (1986), Ham, (2000), and Takahashi (2012) for more information and analyses) are beyond the scope of this study.[6]

Definition of Japanese imperatives and the scope for this study.

There is a reason for using Japanese imperatives for the analysis in this study; given that Japanese and English are very different from each other in terms of origin, language structures, sociolinguistics, and many other aspects, it can support the claim that it is not a mere coincidence that imperatives can be used to express wishes. Before everything, however, we must decide what criteria to use to define "imperatives" in Japanese because it can be problematic to compare different languages in meaning due to translation validity. That is, words or expressions in one language that are considered equivalent to their counterparts in another language cannot completely be identical.

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[4] For PRIVATE WISH imperatives such as "Don't rain tomorrow", there seems to be no possible overt subject. The idea of "optionality" is somewhat debatable.
[5] As for auxiliary *do*, it is also debatable if this *do* can be used for all the imperatives for emphasis. Bolinger (1977) states that imperatives in present perfect with auxiliary *do* sound more unusual but that they are not impossible. Here are some examples he listed (p. 170).
    Please do have made that call by six o'clock.
    Please, do have made the effort at least once!
[6] Here are some examples of the imperative-like conditionals from Davies (1986, p.162):
    Ask him a question and you get no answer.
    Buy from that shop and you'll regret it.
Their behavior is not entirely in accord with non-coordinated imperatives, and there is no conclusive analysis on whether ILCs are imperatives or not.

Japanese imperative constructions.

According to the definition proposed by Jary and Kissine (2014) above, interestingly, Japanese has at least several imperative constructions. The use of different types of imperative constructions is often affected by politeness, gender, personality, relationships between conversation participants, and so forth. Here is a list of imperatives and their characteristics:

Table 1: Types of Japanese imperative constructions

Imperative Types	Explanation	Characteristics
Conjugational Imperative	Conjugational imperative form of verbs	The most "imperative-like" imperative Very strong tone
Verb in TE form + 'kure'	'Kure' = conjugative imperative form of the auxiliary verb 'kureru'	'Kureru' is essentially equivalent to 'give' in English Indicates some benefit from the giver
Verb in TE form + 'kudasai'	'Kudasai' = conjugative imperative form of 'kudasaru'.	'Kudasai' is the polite version of 'kure' Often used as a request
Bare verb form + 'na'	'na' = negative imperative particle	The verb part is the bare form of a verb
TE form of verb (Connective form of a verb)	The connective form of verbs.	When used in this form without anything connected, it can express directives

Some supplementary explanation must be added to this table. First, "TE-form" found in the left-most column is a conjugational form of verbs with which you can connect verbs, adjectives, and sentences. In English, "and" is normally used to connect two verbs or other linguistic items without conjugation but Japanese needs conjugation to connect verbs and other predicates. This is called the TE-form after its pronunciation.[7] We can view it roughly as "a connective form". Interestingly, when this connective form, or the TE-form, is used alone without any verbs connected, it can give rise to a directive reading depending on the context and/or the tone of the speaker.[8] This is probably the most common and neutral directive among Japanese people. However, this TE-form's prototypical function is not the directive use but connecting verbs and other linguistic items, which does not fit Jary and Kissine's (2014) definition. Because of this connecting function and the use of the TE-form as a directive, sometimes it is hard to tell whether a verb in the TE-form at the sentence-final position is intended to be directive or the item that was supposed to come after the TE-from is just omitted. For these reasons, we will not use this form for this study.

Also, we need an additional explanation for the auxiliary "kureru". First, "kureru" roughly means "to give" in English but when it is used as an auxiliary with the main verb preceding it, the combination of "a verb in the TE form + kureru" implies that the agent of the main verb is not you and that you are getting some benefit from that verb. To illustrate this, take the examples below.

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[7] The conjugated verbs and adjectives in this form always have *-te* or *-de* at the end; hence the TE-form.

[8] It is sometimes said that "-kure" or "-kudasai' is omitted after a verb's TE form and directive force comes from here. However, we will not look into this point.

a. Kyoo   kaimono-o   suru.

  today   shopping-ACC   do

'(Someone or I) will shop today.'

b. Kyoo   kaimono-o   site-kureru.

  today   shopping-ACC   do-(give)

'(Someone other than the speaker) will do my shopping today.'

(And the speaker is getting benefit from it.)

In the first example, the state of affairs is neutral without "kureru" and we cannot even know

who the agent of the sentence is without context. Nevertheless, we can tell from the second

sentence with "kureru" that at least the person who is going to shop is not the speaker and that

the speaker is getting some benefit. [9]

"Kure" is the conjugative imperative form of "kureru". So, "kureru" = "kure (but in the

imperative from)". "Kudasaru" is the polite form of "kureru" and "kudasai" is its conjugative

imperative form of "kudasaru". Hence, "kudasaru" = "kudasai (but in the imperative form)".

Therefore, you can think of this in the following way: "kure" = "kudasai" = the conjugative

imperative form of auxiliaries that represent that the speaker is getting some benefit from the

state of affairs denoted in the main verb.

One of the reasons why Japanese has more imperative forms may be that auxiliaries in

Japanese are derived from verbs and they can conjugate to the imperative form. Some of English

auxiliaries are derived from verbs too. The auxiliaries, *be* and *have,* are available for imperatives

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[9] The beneficiary of the state of affairs of the main verb can be speaker's in-group members too
such as family. However, we are not going to look into this point.

but not modal auxiliaries such as *will*, *can*, *may*, and so on. Therefore, in a sense, the first three imperative types in the table can be regarded as one imperative construction.[10]

Another reason, which is more significant, is that Japanese is a very politeness-sensitive language. I assume that most Japanese speakers would feel the third type of imperative in the table would be distinct from the first two because the first two sound somewhat more vulgar or manly and thus more impolite in many contexts. Because of its polite tone, on the other hand, although the function of it is equated with imperatives, people would consider "a verb in the TE form + kudasai" as a requestive form rather than the imperative. As a matter of fact, this distinction makes difference in choosing which imperative type people would use and thus in the interpretation of the illocutionary force of an imperative too. This is the reason why three conjugative imperatives are introduced separately here.

Japanese imperative examples.

Now, let us see some examples of Japanese imperative sentences. We saw many possible illocutionary forces of English imperatives introduced by Quirk et. al (1985) above. This seems applicable to Japanese imperatives too. I will use "IMP" for the bare verb conjugational imperatives (the first one in the table), "IMP(B)", as B stands for *beneficial*, for "a verb in the TE form + kure (the second one in the table)", and "IMP(B+P)", as P stands for *polite*, for "a verb in the TE form + kudasai (the third one in the table)". Also, the negative imperative, which is achieved in "a bare verb + na", is represented as "IMP(NEG)". "ACC" represents the accusative case marker, "TOP" the topic case marker, and "NEG" negative.

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[10] Nevertheless, Japanese still has several different imperative forms. One example is verb stem + 'nasai'. However, I am not going to go for the details here.

ORDER/COMMAND: Ute!

shoot-IMP

'Fire!' (*fire* as a verb)

PROHIBITION: Sawaru-na.

touch-IMP(NEG)

'Don't touch.'

However, for some illocutionary forces, different imperative forms seem to have different

degrees of acceptability.

REQUEST: ?Doa-o   simero.

door-ACC   shut-IMP

'Shut the door.'

PLEA: ??Tasukero.

help-IMP

'Help!'

Tasukete-kure/-kudasai.

help-IMP(B)/-IMP(B+P)

'(Please) help!'

SUGGESTION: ??Sore nituite-wa   raigetu   kike.

it   about-TOP   next month   ask-IMP

Sore   nitsuite-wa   raigetsu   kiite-kudasai.

it   about-TOP   next month   ask-IMP(B+P)

'Ask me about it again next month.'

As was explained above, the auxiliary "kureru" implicitly indicates who the giver or receiver of the action of the preceding main verb is. This seems to cause different preference of different imperative forms for certain illocutionary forces. But again, there must be some individual preference as well as influence of contextual, prosodic factors.

Literature Review

There are many studies on the imperative. Having gone through the definitions of imperatives in this study, we will now overview major studies and see their contributions and what problems these studies have.

Syntactic approaches.

Lakoff (1966) argues that a syntactic property of a verb determines whether the verb can be used for imperative sentences or not. According to him, if a verb is a stative verb such as *be*, then it is not suitable for an imperative. However, Ljung (1975) provides a counter argument against Lakoff (1966) and claims that it is not the verb's property but the addressee's controllability over the given state of affairs of an imperative that determines the acceptability of imperatives. If the entire predicate of an imperative is controllable, then it is +CONTROL. If not, it is -CONTROL. Here are some examples from Jjung (1975, p. 133-134).

(1)   a. *Fall!

       b. Fall on your knees!

       c. *Be a girl!

       d. Be a good girl!

As is clearly shown, (1a, b) and (1c, d) respectively use the same verb, but vary in acceptability, which contradicts Lakoff's (1966) argument. In (1b), it is easy to understand what the address is

supposed to do, whereas it is not in (1a) unless it is uttered in a specific situation. Similarly, although it is hard to make out what the addressee should do upon hearing (1c), the addressee of (1d) can do something to "be a good girl". Ljung (1975) also claims that controllability need not be absolute like in example (1d), where the interpretation of being a good girl is variable from individual to individual. Controllability does seem to be an important factor for the felicity of imperative sentences. He presents some evidence that acceptability of an imperative is contingent on the interpreted meaning rather than the verb itself.

If +CONTROL is the only element of an acceptable imperative, however, the following imperatives should not be appropriate, but they are.

(2)   a. Have a good time.

b. Sleep well.

c. Get well soon.

These imperatives' illocutionary force is typically interpreted as GOOD WISH. In general, whether or not one has a good time is not controllable. Neither is if one can have a good sleep controllable but dependent on physical and psychological conditions. In fact, imperatives with the WISH illocutionary force make it difficult to draw a clear, easy generalization of imperatives. We can see from these examples that we need more detailed explanation than ±CONTROL for the use of imperatives.

Acceptance of possibility's realization.

One of the accounts covering all the illocutionary forces above is provided by Davies (1986). While accepting the idea of controllability, she regards imperatives as the presentation of a possibility. According to her, "the speaker who utters an imperative which represents a

proposition p is conventionally assumed to accept p's being made true" (p. 49). Her analysis of negative imperatives involves the following two points (p.72):

- I [the speaker] do not accept (I reject) the possibility of P[roposition]'s becoming true.

- I accept the possibility of not P's becoming true.

With Davies's account, it is now possible to motivate (2a-c). Though they are not controllable and there are degrees of possibility, it can be said that (2a-c) all have the possibility of becoming true. However, Davies (1986) actually treat imperatives with the illocutionary force of GOOD WISH as somewhat exceptional because they are highly conventionalized, and the addressee cannot take an active action to bring about the proposition made in the GOOD WISH. This account, in fact, can hurt her own generalization by admitting some exceptions.

Moreover, if the felicity condition of imperatives is just acceptance of a proposition's being made true, there needs another account of the difference between imperatives and other sentence types, e.g. declaratives, as most things expressed in imperatives can be done with declaratives as well. We can say "it is possible (not possible) that…" instead of using imperatives to express mere acceptance of possibility.

(3)   a. Have a nice day.

        b. It is possible that you will have a nice day.

        c. Don't be shy!

        d. I do not accept the possibility that you will be shy.

Aside from this, PRIVATE WISH imperatives, though not GOOD WISH, can be found easily.

      (4)   Don't rain tomorrow!

As another example, imagine that a speaker has a cat in his house and has been out all day. In front of his door, he says:

      (5)   Please don't have made a mess.

(4) and (5) are felt to be different from (2a-c) in that they are not conventional, which implies that the imperatives with WISH-kind of illocutionary forces do not have to be constrained to purely conventional expressions. Furthermore, since (2a-c) and examples like (4) and (5) are often included in the same category, there should be something in common in those examples. Thus, it is also a goal of this study to find out what is common and different between GOOD WISH and PRIVATE WISH imperatives.

Directive force and prototype of imperatives.

Since the concept of acceptance of potentiality as the imperative's felicity condition is too board and not plausible, now researchers seem to take different stances and claim that there are prototypical imperatives that have directive force encoded within. This view seems to be dominant at the moment in the literature at least on English imperatives. Among representative studies in this vein are Han (2000), Takahashi (2012), and Jary and Kissine (2014). Han claims, for example, that if there is no directive force in the imperative and directive force arises from inference, then we cannot explain why many languages have some morphosyntactic forms particular to directives. This is very convincing. However, then, what about imperatives that do not seem to have directive force, that is, imperatives that do not require the addressee to perform specific actions such as GOOD WISH imperatives? According to Han (2000), this is where pragmatics comes in and plays a role; he believes that imperatives have indirect speech acts just

as other linguistic constructions do, and that many non-directive illocutionary forces would come about from Gricean inference. He made an analysis on GOOD WISH that this use of imperatives may be to perform the speech act of wishing as an indirect speech act if it is known that the hearer does not have control over realizing the state of affairs in the imperative. Nevertheless, he admits that this kind of pragmatic inference process is "beyond the scope of this work" (p. 169).

Takahashi (2012) takes a similar stance to Han (2000) in that prototypical imperatives have directive force and analyzes imperatives from the cognitive linguistic point of view. He also shows a somewhat suspicious attitude toward research on individual illocutionary force. For example, while admitting the usefulness in characterizing imperatives in pragmatic terms, he argues, "one would be faced with some serious difficulty, since in the majority of cases, there is no one-to-one correspondence between imperative utterance and illocutionary act category" (p. 68).

At the same time, he introduces a notion that he invented called "Force Exertion" for his own analysis. It consists of six pragmatic/contextual parameters that make a numerical analysis possible. By using this Force Exertion, Takahashi claims that we can analyze imperatives objectively and judge the prototypicality of them. Consult the following table taken from Takahashi (2012, p. 77).

Table 2: Major criterion for the imperative prototype from Takahashi (2012)

Force Exertion	HIGH	LOW	ZERO	M. LOW	M. HIGH
(i) DESIRE	[+2]	[+1]	[0]	[−1]	[−2]
(ii) CAPABILITY	/	[+1]	[0]	/	/
(iii) POWER	/	[+1]	[0]	[−1]	/
(iv) COST	[+2]	[+1]	[0]	/	/
(v) BENEFIT	[+2]	[+1]	[0]	[−1]	[−2]
(vi) OBLIGATION	[+2]	[+1]	[0]	[−1]	[−2]
Total score:	[+10] ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ [−7]				

The larger total score you get for an imperative, the more prototypical the imperative would be. And based on its prototypicality, we can narrow down likely illocutionary forces. Consult the figure below taken from Takahashi (2012, p. 85).

Prototypicality: ~~~~LESS PROTOTYPICAL ~~~**MORE PROTOTYPICAL**
Ilocutuonary   *IRONY*   *REQUEST*
Acts: *WARNING*   *SUGGESTION*   *O R D E R*
            THREAT   *P E R M I S S I O N*
            DARE   *C O N D I T I O N*

Figure 1. Illocutionary acts of imperatives located on the scale of Force Exertion from Takahashi (2012)

Although unique and ingenious, his approach has some problems. First, though this approach is useful in determining prototypical or non-prototypical imperatives, it cannot identify specific illocutionary forces. For example, even if an imperative is determined as prototypical with Force Exertion, we do not know what the imperative is intended to mean from the value calculated. It may be ORDER or REQUEST. The identification of these illocutionary forces cannot be done from the calculated value. If an imperative is determined as "non-typical" with

Force Exertion, we now know it is non-prototypical but cannot judge whether it is GOOD WISH or another minor illocutionary force from the value that Force Exertion calculated. Takahashi (2012) holds that it is very difficult or impossible to pin down a specific illocutionary force, but I take a different stance. Naturally, it can be assumed that there are some overlaps in interpretation of illocutionary forces of imperatives. However, when a certain illocutionary force is intended by the speaker, we would normally interpret it as the speaker intended without a major misunderstanding. Thus, I would like to find out how this interpretation would work in this study.

Moreover, Takahashi's (2012) parameters have another issue. As you can see from the table above, each parameter takes a number on a scale of the interval of one, but it is not justified that each parameter has the same amount of difference. Is ±0 in POWER in the table the same as ±0 in CAPABILITY? For example, suppose that imperatives with the GOOD WISH interpretation would take zero for CAPABILITY. This zero is totally different from zero in POWER, where the speaker asks his or her coworker, who is regarded to be almost equally powerful to the speaker, to do something with a REQUEST imperative. POWER here means social power of the speaker over the addressee, and so it has nothing to do with CAPABILITY at all, for example. In other words, when a WISH imperative takes zero for CAPABILITY and a REQUEST imperative takes zero for POWER, this same value (namely zero here) would make a huge difference in interpreting an imperative. Therefore, using the same interval values for different parameters and add them up to calculate the overall value would not work for analyzing individual illocutionary forces.

Furthermore, some parameters seem to be somewhat redundant. For instance, if POWER is estimated to be +1, then it would entail a high value in OBLIGATION too in most

cases because one is obligated to comply with socially powerful people in general. These instances show that while Takahashi's (2012) approach is intriguing and useful to determine prototypicality of imperatives, it is not suitable and sufficient for an analysis on the interpretation process of individual illocutionary forces.

Above all, to use Takahashi's (2012) Force Exertion requires us to know a lot about the context where an imperative is uttered, including the interlocutors' relationship, social power, what kind of situation they are in, and so forth. Then, if that much of contextual information is already available at hand, it would be highly likely that we can reach a certain illocutionary force interpretation or at least narrow down most likely illocutionary forces without relying on a numerical value calculated by Force Exertion.

Summary of literature review.

We have seen the major research on imperatives so far. Here is a summary of the contributions that have been made and issues that are yet to be worked on.

- There are some factors that are deeply related to the felicity conditions of the imperative such as controllability and potentiality. Yet, these factors do not seem to be relevant to illocutionary forces such as GOOD WISH.

- It is argued by Davies (1986) that GOOD WISH is highly conventionalized. However, it does not seem all WISH imperatives are conventionalized like GOOD WISH. In addition, though some WISH imperatives may be an indirect speech act, there has not been any analysis on the motivation of the use of imperatives as wishes.

- GOOD WISH and other WISH-like imperatives seem to have some properties in common but we do not know what makes the difference between them.

- There seem to be "prototypical imperatives" and "non-prototypical imperatives", but this distinction is not very useful in analyzing individual illocutionary forces.

As we can see from this summary, each individual illocutionary forces of an imperative have not been investigated very much and the use of imperatives as WISH needs to be justified in some way. In order to fully understand imperatives as WISH and how they would arise from prototypical imperatives, it will be effective to look closely at conditions under which one tends to interpret imperatives as WISH.

Research Questions

With the introduction provided above, here are the research questions of this thesis:

- What are the pragmatic conditions under which one normally reaches the interpretation of PRIVATE WISH?

- Why would we use imperatives to express PRIVATE WISH rather than other constructions?

- What are the differences between PRIVATE WISH and GOOD WISH?

- How conventional are GOOD WISH imperatives?

- Why do we use imperatives to express GOOD WISH and is it the same reason as the use of PRIVATE WISH?

I am going to try to answer these questions from pragmatic perspectives analyzing both English and Japanese imperatives.

This thesis consists of four chapters. We have already seen most of Chapter 1. In Chapter 2, I will mainly investigate PRIVATE WISH. I will present a schema of how one tends to get to the interpretation of PRIVATE WISH and try to analyze why imperatives can be used to express one's wish. In Chapter 3, the focus will be placed on GOOD WISH imperatives. The schema

introduced in Chapter 2 will be revised to show how one tends to get not only to PRIVATE

WISH but also to GOOD WISH and try to justify the motivation for the use of imperatives as

GOOD WISH. Chapter 4 is a conclusion.

CHAPTER 2: PRIVATE WISH

Introduction

In this chapter, I will demonstrate how one would interpret imperatives as PRIVATE WISH using a schema I propose. First, I will provide examples of WISH imperatives and some of the issues surrounding them. Then, I will provide the schema and explain the presuppositions for an imperative to stand and the conditions for the addressee or hearer to reach PRIVATE WISH interpretation. Here are the presuppositions: hypotheticality and desirability. Here are the conditions: (clear and unclear) achievability and very strong desirability. Finally, I will try to give a possible account for why one would choose imperatives to express wishes.

Overview of WISH Imperatives

First, we will look at an overview of WISH imperatives. The following are examples of imperatives that may be categorized as WISH. ACC in (6a) represents the accusative case marker and LOC in (8a) the locative case marker. (6a-c) are parallel to (7a-c) and (8a, b) to (9a, b).

(6)   a. Ii   jikan-o   sugosite-kudadai.

          good   time-ACC   spend-IMP(B+P)

       b. Yoku   nete-kudasai.

          well   sleep-IMP(B+P)

       c. Hayaku   yoku   natte-kudasai.

          soon   well   become-IMP(B+P)

(7)   a. Have a good time.

       b. Sleep well.

       c. Get well soon.

(8)   a. Jigoku-ni   otiro!

          Hell-LOC   fall-IMP

       b. Zetuboo   site   sine!

          Despair   do   die-IMP

(9)   a. Go to hell! (Quirk et al., 1985, p. 832)

       b. Despair and die! (Imai, 2001, p. 89)

(6a-c) and (7a-c) would be called GOOD WISH. (8a, b) and (9a, b) would be called

IMPRECATION. Seemingly, these are merely different in good-will or ill-will and so there is no

substantial difference between them. However, IMPRECATION is closer to PRIVATE WISH

rather than GOOD WISH. As a reminder, PRIVATE WISH is a type of WISH, where the state of

affairs denoted in the imperative is deemed to be desirable mainly for the speaker rather than the

addressee. The speaker is deemed to desire the state of affairs in IMPRECATION and thus

IMPRECATION is of PRIVATE WISH kind. If the state of affairs in a WISH imperative is

desirable and beneficial rather for the addressee than the speaker, it would be likely to be felt to

be GOOD WISH.

       In English, imperatives in the present perfect form and those with no addressee present are

also often included in the WISH category. [11] (4) and (5) are repeated here as (10a, b) respectively.

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[11] Not all the present perfect imperatives refer to events in the past. Here is an example.
    Do have checked the facts before you start accusing people. (Davies, 1986, p. 16)

(10)   a. Don't rain tomorrow!

        b. (The speaker has a cat in his house and has been out all day. He is about to

          open the door and says)

        Please don't have made a mess.

        c. (A widow says in the very front of her husband's tombstone)

        Oh darling, please come back to me.

(10 a-c) also would be categorized in PRIVATE WISH rather than GOOD WISH, as the wishes

expressed in these examples are deemed desirable mainly for the speaker. Wilson and Sperber

(1988) use the terms of *audienceless cases* and *predetermined cases*. (10a-c) would be

categorized as audienceless imperatives and (10b) would be categorized as a predetermined

imperative. Audienceless imperatives are the ones that have no targeted addressees present with

the speaker at the moment of utterance. Predetermined imperatives are the ones where the states

of affairs in the imperatives have already happened or not happened while the speaker has not

found the results yet. For example, in (10b), the cat may have or not have made a mess by the

time of the utterance and the speaker has not verified it yet. In this case, the state of affairs of

(10b) can turn out to be true or false. This is why this kind of imperatives may be called

predetermined imperatives. An inclusive term, ABSENT WISH, is sometimes used for these

kinds of imperatives as well where there is no target addressee (Kaufman 2012, p.136). As these

categorizations suggest, imperatives do not always require an addressee(s) present, and can even

refer to something that may have already happened in the past just like (10b). (10a), for example,

cannot even take any agentive addressee at all.

PRIVATE WISH imperatives in Japanese.

One might claim that the interpretation of imperatives as wishes like above cases is just a

mere coincidence and applies only English. However, cross-linguistic evidence seems to cast a

doubt on this claim. In Japanese, too, it is totally acceptable to express wishes in the form of the

imperative. The sentence-final particle "yo" below is used to mitigate harshness of the

imperatives (Bunt, 2003, p. 179).

(11)   a. Asita-ha   ame   furu-na yo.

           b. Asita-ha   ame   fura-naide-kure yo.

           c. ?Asita-ha   ame   fura-naide-kudasai yo.

            tomorrow-TOP   rain   (a) fall-IMP(NEG)

                                          (b) fall-NEG-IMP(B)

                                          (c) fall-NEG-IMP(B+P)

        'Don't rain tomorrow!'

(12)   (The same situation as (10b))

           a. Onegaidakara, tirakasite   naide   iro yo.

           b. Onegaidakara, tirakasite   naide   ite-kure yo.

           c. ?Onegaidakara, tirakasite naide   ite-kudasai yo.

            please   mess up   without being (a) stay-IMP

                                            (b) stay-IMP(B)

                                          (c) stay-IMP(B+P)

        'Please don't have made a mess.'

(13) (The same situation as (10c))

    a. #Anata,   onegaidakara watasino tokoro-e   kaettte koi.

    b. #Anata,   onegaidakara watasino tokoro-e   kaette kite-kure.

    c. Anata,   onegaidakara watasino tokoro-e   kaette   kite-kudasai.

      darling,   please   my   place-to   return (a) come-IMP

                                                        (b) come-IMP(B)

                                                        (c) come-IMP(B+P)

      'Darling, please come back to me.'

Based on Example (11-13), we can see that it is possible to express wishes in the form of imperatives in Japanese as well, though there are some different degrees of acceptability depending on the imperative types. However, this would be largely due to socio-pragmatic factors. For example, among (11a-c), (11c), which is IMP(B+P), would be conceived as a little questionable because the speaker does not have to use the polite form as there is no addressee present; hence, the speaker does not have to be polite or formal, though (11c) is still possible. The same goes for (12c). The intended addressee for (12a-c) is the speaker's cat and the speaker does not have to show respect to the cat, though, again, (12c) is still possible. On the contrary, among (13a-c), only (13c) seems to be socio-pragmatically acceptable and (13a, b) would be very odd. This is because the speaker is a widow, a female person, and it is widely acknowledged that women tend not to use the conjugative imperative form of verbs in Japanese, i.e. IMP and IMP(B) because of the association of masculinity that IMP has (Murakami, 1993, Nitta, 2003). Of course, some women do use these conjugative imperatives too. However, the endearment "anata (darling)" is most likely used to refer to the husband and thus used almost exclusively by women. Therefore, it does not go along with the use of IMP and IMP(B), which are associated

with masculinity and this generates conflicts, resulting in oddity for (13a, b). This suggests that if the endearment "anata" is replaced with another one that is used by men or both sexes, then (13a, b) would be possible too.

Issues and questions about PRIVATE WISH imperatives.

Imai (2001) points out that imperatives like PRIVATE WISH imperatives are mainly used for soliloquy. He also claims that these kinds of PRIVATE WISH imperatives belong on the periphery of utterances because we may not be making true communication by means of these imperatives and we may not even utter them (we may just think these in our minds). While his observations are insightful, we need to take into account the following two things: Firstly, as a matter of fact, people accept PRIVATE WISH imperatives that are characteristic of self-talk. Naturally, not all sentences in the imperative form can be accepted even when you are talking to yourself.[12] Secondly, and most importantly, why would we choose imperatives to express wishes even when we do not have addressee(s) present? What functions do PRIVATE WISH imperatives serve? My conclusion is that imperatives are used to express strong wishes by exploiting some prototypical characteristics of imperatives in an analogous way. As one uses imperatives to verbally achieve his/her goal through someone else, PRIVATE WISH imperatives are chosen as if they would do the same thing, even though they would change nothing in reality.

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[12] Bolinger (1977) made an interesting experiment on imperatives in a self-talk in the present perfect form. He gave a passage in which there was a present perfect form imperative with no addressee present to twelve English native speakers and asked some questions. Only three marked the present perfect imperative unusual. Moreover, even these three subjects did not judge it as non-English. See Bolinger (1977, p. 169-170) for details.

Schema for PRIVATE WISH Imperatives

From this section on, I will try to answer the first research question by examining and demonstrating the conditions in the schema that I am going to show. Here is the first research question.

- What are the pragmatic conditions under which one normally reaches the interpretation of PRIVATE WISH?

Again, the term "PRIVATE WISH" is used to distinguish it from GOOD WISH. The proposed schema of how people would reach the interpretation of PRIVATE WISH is outlined below in Figure 2.

Figure 2. Schema of how to reach the illocutionary force "PRIVATE WISH"

This is how one would typically reach interpretation of PRIVATE WISH imperatives when an imperative is uttered in a natural conversation (or found in text), though some revision will be made to the schema in Chapter 3. Here is an illustration of how it would work.

Example: Don't rain tomorrow! (PRIVATE WISH)

Presupposition A: When this imperative is uttered, the state of affairs in it is supposed to be hypothetical. Go to Presupposition B.

Presupposition B: When this imperative is uttered, the state of affairs in it is supposed to be desirable. (However, this condition will be revised in Chapter 3.) Go to Condition C.

Condition C: The hearer reasons that achievability for the state of affairs in this imperative is not obvious. (As a matter of fact, because of absence of the agentive addressee, we can assess no achievability at this point.) Go down to Condition D.

Condition D: It is hard for the hearer to reason out another interpretation that is willfully achievable for this imperative. Hence, it is deemed that achievability is zero for the state of affairs in this imperative. Go down to Condition E.

Condition E: The hearer assumes that the speaker has a very strong desire for the state of affairs to the extent to utter this PRIVATE WISH imperative. The condition is met. Go up and we have reached the PRIVATE WISH interpretation.

Keep in mind the following three things. (1) This is an attempt to show how one would

"typically" reach a certain illocutionary force. (2) The order of conditions is not random. One

may suspect that we can shuffle the order of the conditions, but if we do, the schema will become

more complicated. This will be even more obvious after this schema is revised in Chapter 3.

Provided there is a mental process like the schema, the less complicated the better in general. (3)

The presuppositions and conditions here are necessary but not sufficient conditions; that is,

although other sentence types, such as declaratives and optatives, can also express hypothetical

and desirable states of affairs, they are not imperatives. On the contrary, if an imperative is

interpreted as PRIVATE WISH, then the states of affairs denoted in that imperative must be

hypothetical, willfully unachievable, and strongly desirable.[13]

[PRIVATE WISH imperatives → Hypothetical $\wedge$ Unachievable $\wedge$ Strongly desirable] =

Always true

[Hypothetical $\wedge$ Unachievable $\wedge$ Strongly desirable → PRIVATE WISH imperatives] = Not

always true

Our ultimate goal is to create a schema that can also cover absolute and sufficient conditions to

reach the interpretation of PRIVATE WISH when an imperative is uttered. However, in order to

do so, other factors, such as the background of the speaker (and the addressee, if any) and

contexts where the speaker has reached to utter the imperative utterance, must be included in the

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[13] It will turn out that one can exploit the desirability condition to generate some implicature. We
shall return to this point and some revision will be added in Chapter 3.

schema. At this point, I am incapable of providing such a schema and will leave it for future research.

In the following sections, I will identify and examine the presuppositions for prototypical imperative sentences to stand (Presupposition A and B in Figure 2), and then the conditions where the interpretation of an imperative starts to diverge for PRIVATE WISH (Conditions C, D, and E in Figure 2).

First, I would like to start with the presuppositions that are applicable to all prototypical imperatives. I assume, as some other researchers claim (Takahashi, 2012, and Jary & Kissine, 2014), there must be some features in prototypical imperatives rather than there being absolute semantic generalizations that are applicable to every single imperative utterance. As for prototypical imperatives, when people hear "Do this job" and "Have a nice day", most would judge the first one as prototypical and the second one as less prototypical. Takahashi's (2012) Force Exertion introduced in Chapter 1 is a good device to judge prototypicality of imperatives. In addition, if we assume that there were some absolute characteristics that are common in *every single* imperative, we will always end up hitting a deadlock. In other words, we will find that there are always some outlier imperatives that do not align with the semantic generalizations, such as WISH, which does not have directive force. Therefore, it is more plausible and convincing to assume that there are "prototypical imperatives" and that we draw many other "non-prototypical imperatives" from them.

Let us turn to the presuppositions now and I will demonstrate how each presupposition condition works in the following sections. The first is "hypotheticality", which I consider one of the most prototypical features of imperatives.

Hypotheticality

Many researchers acknowledge the futurity of imperatives. In this respect, we can distinguish between the use of declaratives and imperatives; while declaratives can be used to refer to things in the past, imperatives cannot express things in the past of which the speaker already knows the result.

(14) a.   *Do your homework yesterday!

      b.   *Be careful two days ago.

      c.   You did your homework yesterday.

      d.   You were careful two days ago.

This futurity is in effect in Japanese imperatives too. (15a, b) are parallel to (14a, b).

(15) a.   *Kinoo   syukudai-o   siro/site-kure/site-kudasai.

              yesterday   homework-ACC   do-IMP/IMP(B)/IMP(B+P)

      b.   *Futukamae-ni   ki-o   ukero/tukete-kure/tukete-kudasai.

              two days ago-on   care-ACC   put on-IMP/IMP(B)/IMP(B+P)

However, we saw (5), where the speaker expressed his/her wish for the thing that has already happened, i.e. whether the cat made a mess or not. This seems to mean that imperatives can refer to an event that may have or have not happened in the past as long as the speaker has not found out the result. In the literature, such words as "futurity", "hypotheticality", "possibility", and "potentiality" are often used. However, what these three words exactly mean is naturally not the same and we need to scrutinize the characteristics of the futurity of imperatives. In my conclusion, I claim that *hypotheticality* is the most appropriate to describe one of the prototypical features of imperatives and that futurity, possibility, and potentiality are not accurate to cover every single imperative.

I argue that there are three types of imperatives in terms of hypotheticality and its similar terms: *Type 1*, which is both achievable and possible to happen, *Type 2*, which is not achievable but possible to turn out to be true, and *Type 3*, which is neither achievable nor possible to turn out to be true. PRIVATE WISH falls into either Type 2 or Type 3. In the following subsections, I will explain why with examples.

The relation between achievability, potentiality, and hypotheticality.

In Presupposition A in Figure 2, I claim that the hearer believes the states of affairs described in imperatives are recognized as hypothetical by the speaker. To explain this, let me introduce one of the most seemingly plausible semantic generalizations made by Wilson and Sperber (1988). They claim that imperative sentences are specialized for describing states of affairs in worlds as both potential and desirable (p. 10). They use the term "potential" instead of "hypothetical" or another similar term. Generally speaking, this notion of potentiality seems accepted in the literature (Davies, 1986, Dominicy & Franken, 2001, Takahashi, 2012, and Jary & Kissine, 2014). However, I argue that the word "potential" is somewhat misleading and insufficient to capture all the imperatives if we take something potential as something achievable or even possible to happen in the future. Even though there is no explicit definition of "potential" in their article, Wilson and Sperber (1988) seem to identify potentiality with achievability to some extent. They state that analysis of imperatives must make reference to achievability and desirability (p. 10). In addition, when they are talking about the difference between hortatives and optatives, they claim that only hortatives involve beliefs of potentiality and that one cannot exhort to bring about states of affairs that one knows to be unachievable (p. 12). Judging from these statements, there seems to be a confusion between potentiality and achievability.

Three types of imperatives.

To clarify this confusion, let me introduce a new account for potentiality of imperatives. I claim that there are three types of imperatives in terms of achievability and potentiality. See examples below. (10b) is repeated here as (14b) in the same contexts.

(16)   a. Move your car.

        b. Don't have made a mess.

Normally, we assume that the addressee of (16a) can bring about the expressed state of affairs. It is clearly potential and achievable, barring unusual circumstances. I call this type of imperatives *Type 1*.

As for (16b), it is unambiguous that the expressed state of affairs is willfully unchangeable because the state of affairs in (16b) is an event that may or may not have taken place in the past. However, this kind of imperatives can be accepted only when the speaker has not yet verified the result. Thus, the state of affairs of (16b) is, strictly speaking, possible to turn out to be true but willfully unachievable. Nevertheless, because the speaker's wish can still turn out to be true, we could say that the speaker regards the state of affair as still potential, or possible to happen. At this point, we can already see a clear difference between achievability and potentiality; that is, potentiality does not always mean achievability. In regard to this point, Dominicy and Franken (2001) argue that when the speaker utters an audienceless or predetermined imperative, he/she is presumed to desire something which is not only *logically possible*, but also *physically or causally possible* (p.273). This account can cover (16b). (16b) is, thus, potential but not achievable and I call this type of imperatives *Type 2*.

How about (10c), which is repeated here as (17) below?

(17)   Oh, darling, please come back to me.

In the case of (17), it goes without saying that no one has control over life and death, and the widow (the speaker of (17)) probably is not thinking that her dead husband would come back in any way.[14] This utterance is most likely to be interpreted as a mere display of her very strong desire or sorrow. Thus, (17) is neither achievable nor potential (i.e. not logically and physically possible to happen) but it is just hypothetical. I call this type of imperatives *Type 3*. To sum up, we can obtain the table below.

Table 3: Imperative types in terms of achievability and potentiality

The State of Affairs Expressed in an Imperative			
Type of imperative	Achievability	Potentiality	Example
Type 1	+	+	(16a)
Type 2	−	+	(16b)
Type 3	−	−	(17)

In order to include all the imperative types, *potential* is not the right word to use because of Type 3, where the speaker regards the state of affairs as not potential but just hypothetical.

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[14] We cannot completely deny that she seriously believes that her dead husband would come to life with some magical, supernatural power. But in that case, the illocutionary force of this imperative may not be felt to be PRIVATE WISH anymore because of achievability or potentiality.

And this is why the term "hypothetical" is preferred; anything that is regarded as not true at the moment of the utterance of an imperative is hypothetical to the speaker.[15]

Note that if something is achievable, then it is always potential and hypothetical because being achievable presupposes that the state of affairs can be, but has not yet been, carried out by some agentive entity. In addition, if something is potential, it is always hypothetical because something potential presupposes that the state of affairs has not happened yet. Then we have established the following: Achievable ⊂ Potential ⊂ Hypothetical.

Here is a picture to illustrate this relation as a summary.

Figure 3. Relation of the three types of imperatives

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[15] Usually one would not say, "move your car" when it has already been moved, but if the speaker did not know the fact at the moment of his utterance, that is, if it is unverified, the speaker can still say that.

        A: Hey, move your car. It is in my way.
        B: I moved it minutes ago.

In this case, the state of affairs in A's imperative will never happen because it has already happened; hence not potential at all.

Now that we have seen the relationships among achievability, potentiality, and hypotheticality, let us apply this to WISH imperatives. (16b)("Don't have made a mess.") and (17)("Darling, please come back to me.") would be interpreted as PRIVATE WISH imperatives and they are indeed hypothetical, where the states of affairs expressed in (16b) and (17) are not true at the moment of utterance. Note that most of prototypical imperatives, such as COMMAND or REQUEST, would fall in Type 1 imperatives, because there is no point uttering unachievable imperatives if the speaker wants the addressee to do something.

Desirability

In Presupposition B in Figure 2, when a prototypical imperative is uttered, it always involves desirability. This condition will be revised later in Chapter 3, but let us turn to this condition as it is for the time being. As was seen in the previous section, Wilson and Sperber (1988) include in their generalization another important belief that seems to be involved in all the prototypical imperatives: desirability. They regard this desirability as a source of directive force of the imperative. According to them, "the notions of achievability and desirability are there from the start, as part of the meaning of imperative sentences themselves" (p. 10). As has been explained, the idea of "achievability" is not inherent in all imperatives, but it is one of the characteristics that prototypical imperatives would share. Nonetheless, I am largely in accord with their idea of imperatives having desirability. Take the following for example.

(18)   a. Move your car.

         b. I want you to move your car.

The ultimate purpose of (18a, b) may be the same. Although it would not be called directive, (18b) can behave like directive because we would reason out the speaker's intention that he or she wants the addressee to move the car from the desirability found in the verb *want,* and because a sentence like (18b) is highly conventionalized to direct someone to do something[16]. The same effect can be confirmed in Japanese as well.

(19)   a. Kuruma-o   (i) ugogakse.

                       (ii) ugokasite-kure.

                       (iii) ugokasite-kudasai.

        car-ACC   (i) move-IMP

                       (ii) move-IMP(B)

                       (iii) move-IMP(B+P)

     'Move your car.'

    b. Kuruma-o   ugokasite-hosii.

      car-ACC   move-want

      'I want you to move your car.'

Though (19b) is not as conventionalized as its English equivalent (18b), the addressee can pragmatically infer what the speaker intends easily and, ultimately, (19a, b) would achieve the same goal just like the English examples. (18a, b) and (19a, b) demonstrate how directive force and desirability are closely connected. Thus, it can be argued that prototypical imperatives must have desirability and that directive force may come from this desirability.

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[16] This applies to many other linguistic forms such as modal auxiliaries as in "You must move your car now".

Achievability

Achievability, controllability, agentivity, non-stative verbs, capability, dynamicity, and many other terms in this vein have kept appearing in the literature on the imperative from a very early stage and are often listed as another prototypical feature of imperatives (Lakoff, 1966, Ljung, 1975, Hamblin, 1987, Wilson & Sperber, 1988, Nitta, 1990, Nitta et al., 2002, Takahashi, 2012, and Jary & Kissine, 2014). For example, Jary and Kissine (2014) state that the situation type denoted by an imperative must be dynamic and that statives are not permitted (p. 77). The general notion behind all these terms that represent "dynamicity" is that the addressee of an imperative can willfully achieve the state of affairs expressed in the imperative.

However, this notion of dynamicity (and so on) is not found in some imperatives like PRIVATE WISH imperatives. Now, we will direct our attention to the specific contexts under which one tends to reach an interpretation of PRIVATE WISH. Note that I will keep using *achievability* to represent all of the terms above related to agentivity and dynamicity, where one can willfully achieve some act denoted in an imperative.

Clear achievability and pragmatic assessment of achievability.

In Condition C and D in Figure 2, I claim that when the hearer can immediately think of or pragmatically reason out the achievability for the state of affairs denoted in an imperative, it is very likely that the hearer interprets the illocutionary force of the imperative as something other than PRIVATE WISH. We will go through each condition later in this section, but first let me clarify *achievability* in this study. Achievability represents the perceptional degree pragmatically estimated by the addressee(s) or the hearer(s) with which they determine whether there are some actions for realization of the state of affairs expressed in the imperative. When achievability is obvious, it means that the addressee or the hearer can immediately think of actions for realization

of the state of affairs without much pragmatic effort (Condition C is satisfied here). When it is

not obvious, however, that means that it requires the addressee or the hearer of some mental,

pragmatic inference, and then they may have to think about possible actions for realization. And

if the addressee or the hearer can think of another interpretation and if it is achievable, Condition

D gets satisfied here. When the addressee or the hearer assesses achievability to be extremely

low or completely zero, then the imperative is likely to be felt more toward PRIVATE WISH

(though we move on to Condition E and it must be satisfied). To further clarify this concept of

achievability, we shall look at specific examples in the following sections.

Case 1: Imperatives with clear achievability.

According to Condition C in Figure 2, if one can think of actions to realize the state of

affairs expressed in an imperative with little inferential or pragmatic effort, achievability will be

assessed to be high and the imperative is very unlikely to be interpreted as PRIVATE WISH. To

understand PRIVATE WISH imperatives better, we will first see how pragmatic assessment

works for non-WISH imperatives. Take the imperative below for instance. (20) is equivalent to

(21).

     (20)   Mado-o   akero/akete-kure/akete-kudasai.

            window-ACC   open-IMP/-IMP(B)/IMP(B+P)

     (21)   Open the window.

In (20) and (21), it is clear that the addressee can take specific actions to realize the

expressed state of affairs; e.g. go to the window, raise the arm, unlock the widow, slide the

window, etc. Actually, the addressee would not even think of these separate steps and directly

reach the interpretation of what he/she has been told to do, that is, open the window. In this case,

achievability would be assessed to be very high with little pragmatic inference or with no

inference at all, barring unusual circumstances (for instance, the window is broken). Most imperatives with such illocutionary forces as COMMAND, REQUEST, ADVICE, and so on would meet this condition.

Note that even when the hearer assesses the achievability to be high, it does not necessarily mean that they will do it or choose to do those actions for realization. In addition, high achievability does not guarantee that the addressee can immediately achieve the state of affairs in the imperative. For example, the addressee of the imperative sentence, "Climb Mt. Everest", can assess achievability without any pragmatic inference. However, it is not easy at all for ordinary people to do this, let alone the most skillful climbers. Thus, if the speaker said this kind of "obviously impossible imperatives" with the addressee present, then the addressee and hearer would take it as a joke in a proper context. Suppose that the interlocutors are lay-climbers and have just reached the top of a not very high mountain. See the following conversation.

(22)   A: I feel like I can climb any mountain now!

B: Oh really? Climb Mt. Everest then!

In this case, Speaker B's imperative would be taken for a joke but not for PRIVATE WISH at all. Or one would not utter such imperatives out of context in the first place.[17] A possible mechanism of this case or jokes in general is that the speaker believe that the addressee cannot do the state of affairs expressed in the imperative and that the hearer believes that the speaker believes this.

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[17] In addition, it is doubtful whether the speaker has desirability for the state of affairs in (22). Thus, it is not prototypical and such an imperative would give rise to an implicature.

Case 2: Imperatives with unclear achievability.

According to Condition D in Figure 2, if one can think of actions to realize the state of affairs expressed in an imperative with pragmatic inference, the imperative is likely to be considered achievable and hence is unlikely to be felt to be PRIVATE WISH. To explain Condition D, look at (23a-d)

(23)   a. Be a man!

        b. Don't be sad.

        c. Win $60,000 for an extra $1.10. (Huddleston et al., 2002, p. 933)

        d. Speak a new language after as little as eight weeks. (Davies, 1986, p43)

Generally speaking, one cannot achieve "to be a man" if you are a woman and the state of affairs in (23a) is already the case if you are a man.[18] As for (23b), you cannot control your emotions like being sad as it naturally comes from your inside. Imperatives like (23c, d) are often called ADVERTISEMENT in the literature. If I could get $60,000 for an extra $1.10, I would be more than desperate to do so but whether I win $60,000 or not is, unfortunately, both out of my control and highly unlikely. If the state of affairs in (23d) was real, I should not have been suffering from and struggling with English like I do now. However, hearing the imperatives in (23a-d), normally we would not construe them as PRIVATE WISH imperatives and would understand that what is literally expressed cannot be directly achieved. However, the addressee would pragmatically reinterpret (23a), for instance, as "act like a socially-considered-typical man" or, in

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[18] It is possible for a woman to become a man in such a case as she legally changes her sex in court. In such a case, one would contextually reinterpret (23a) to that effect.

a very specific context at a bar, as "drink up!"[19] The addressee may reinterpret (23b) as "try to stop crying" or "pretend to be happy". The key to analyzing these examples successfully is the possibility of other interpretations, or re-interpretations. Hamblin (1987) presents a notion he calls "the addressee-action-reduction principle", where he argues that the meaning of any imperative can be split out in plain-predicate agentives (p. 58). Although it is important to be cautious about paraphrasing because it is almost impossible to paraphrase a sentence without any resulting difference in meaning, there seems to be no problem in applying this principle to the imperatives in (23a) and (23b). Huddleston et al. (2002) analyzes (23c) saying, "while it suggests that winning is subject to your control, that is not in fact so (we may assume): what is subject to your control is just paying the extra \$1.10" (p. 933). Davies's (1986) analysis of (23d) is that this imperative is used to attract people's attention but do not have a commanding force, serving as just an informative function (p. 43). Hence, a possible reinterpretation would be like something in line with "Join our language-learning program (and possibly, you will be able to speak another language in eight weeks)."

Why and how would this pragmatic reinterpretation take place? Because of the prototypical function of the imperative, it is assumed that the addressee is expected to fulfill the state of affairs expressed in an imperative in most cases. However, in case that the state of affairs expressed by the predicate of an imperative does not seem to be achievable at a glance, there is no other way left for the addressee to reach the given goal but to try to pragmatically infer what was meant and try to achieve the reinterpreted imperative. Here is an example to illustrate this.

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[19] When the speaker says (23a) to a male person, it does not meet Presupposition A, namely hypotheticality. Moreover, it is doubtful whether Presupposition B is met or not. However, because of reinterpretations like these, (23a) would be regarded as hypothetical and desirable. This suggests that pragmatic reinterpretation is also working for Presupposition A and/or B. However, we shall not dig into this point as is irrelevant to PRIVATE WISH.

When a recipe instructs how to cook rice, you probably would not see an instruction like "Just get the rice done" but find more specific steps such as "Take the amount of rice you want, put it into a pot, fill it with Xml. water per Xgr. rice" and so on. But if you were camping in a group and your leader told you "Get the rice done!", then you would do such things as on the recipe one by one to fulfil your leader's order. The same logic would work when you hear an imperative whose state of affairs is not directly accomplishable. In short, normally, the addressee of an imperative, whether directly or indirectly, is expected to try to achieve the state of affairs given in the imperative.

In the same vein, Wilson and Sperber (1988) divides imperatives into two types: Serious/literal imperatives and non-serious/non-literal imperatives. They use "build your own road through your life" as a non-serious imperative and claim that one may obtain implications such as "Do not follow the lead of others", "Make up your own mind what to do and where to go", "Plan your life", and so on (p. 15). However, what they would call "serious imperatives" would sometimes need pragmatic inference and reinterpretations as well for realization of the state of affairs. This kind of reinterpretation and pragmatic inference are very often involved in understanding imperatives just like other sentence types. Even in the case of "Move your car", the addressee knows that he or she has to first walk to their car, then turn on the car, press the accelerator with right pressure, and so on, though he or she would not think this way.[20]

To sum up, in cases like the ones in (23a-d), the addressee normally reinterprets the imperatives when the states of affairs expressed in them are seemingly unachievable. As a result,

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[20] I would rather claim that non-serious/non-literal imperatives should be used in the sense of implicational imperatives. That is to say, if an imperative does not meet some prototypical semantic feature and reinterpretation does not even work either, then the hearer pragmatically infers some implicational meaning in it, which is not normally directive. We will return to this in Chapter 3.

the hearer assesses the achievability based on their pragmatic inference. However, all of this may depend on the addressee's ability to infer and, mainly, the context.

Case 3: Imperatives with little achievability.

From this subsection to the end of Achievability Section, we are going to see imperatives that would be construed as WISH type imperatives. In this subsection, we will examine imperatives with little achievability. First, we will look at imperatives that may have an addressee with no clear possible actions for realization.

After analyzing (23a-d) above, it is understood that the illocutionary force of an imperative is not felt to be WISH even when the expressed state of affairs is not seemingly directly achievable. In this case, usually the addressee or hearer would pragmatically reinterpret an imperative and take other actions so that they can make what is said come true. How about GOOD WISH imperatives? (6a-c) are repeated here as (24a-c) and (7a-c) as (25a-c). (24a-c) are parallel to (25a-c).

(24)   a. Ii   jikan-o   sugosite-kudadai.

             good   time-ACC   spend-IMP(B+P)

          b. Yoku   nete-kudasai.

             well   sleep-IMP(B+P)

          c. Hayaku   yoku   natte-kudasai.

             soon   well   become-IMP(B+P)

(25)   a. Have a good time.

          b. Sleep well.

          c. Get well soon.

When hearing these imperatives, what would the addressee think of to bring about these states of affairs? For (24b) and (25b), one may do some exercise so as to fall asleep well, and another would have a nightcap, but most people would not reinterpret (24b) and (25b) in such ways barring very specific contexts. It seems that there are few specific things, if any, to do to willfully make them happen, compared to imperatives with other illocutionary forces. In other words, we have very few or no options for reinterpretation with pragmatic assessment for (24a-c) and (25a-c). (8a) is repeated here as (26).

(26)   a. Jigoku-ni   otiro!

          hell-LOC   fall-IMP

          'Go to hell!'

We could say that one can commit suicide to achieve (26), but this is neither necessary nor sufficient, since, first of all, it is hard for the addressee to reinterpret what "Jigoku-ni otiro ('Go to hell')" is intended to mean by the speaker. Hence, the addressee would have no way but assess the achievability to be very low.[21]

Incidentally, as an interesting example, there is another illocutionary force "HEALING" named and introduced by Schmerling (1982, p. 211).

(27)   Walk! (An utterance as a healing ritual to a patient whose legs are paralyzed.)

The paralyzed patient (addressee) could have a medical treatment to try to heal the paralysis, but the speaker is clearly not telling the patient to do this; the speaker is trying to make the state of affairs in a HEALING imperative come true right away with some magical, supernatural power, leaving the addressee no room to infer any actions for realization of the state of affairs. In this

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[21] IMPRECATION imperatives like this do not necessarily require the addressee. One can think of it or say in mind. This is also parallel to PRIVATE WISH.

sense, I would categorize HEALING as a subcategory of WISH. Interestingly, it seems possible

to use an imperative in the same way in Japanese too, though IMP(B) and IMP(B+P) sound odd.

This oddity may come from the fact that the speaker is "ordering" the patient's legs rather than

the patient him/herself.[22]

(28)   Aruke! /[?]Aruite-kure! /[??]Aruite-kudasai!

          Walk-IMP/Walk-IMP(B)/Walk-IMP(B+P)

          'Walk!'

 As we saw, the example imperatives in this section do not seem to be achievable at a glance or

with pragmatic inference, even though there are the target addressees present in the conversation.

This means that even when the addressee is there if the addressee or hearer cannot think of some

specific or abstract actions for realizations of the state of affairs denoted in the imperative, then

the interpretation of the imperative would become prone more toward WISH.

Case 4: Imperatives with an addressee with no achievability assessed.

          There are cases where achievability is pragmatically assessed to be completely zero but

where there is an intended addressee present. Kaufmann (2012) provides an example (p.137).

Imagine a child showing up in front of her father with a guilty expression on her face, which

does not augur well. The father in this context says (29) ((30) is a Japanese translation).

(29)   Please don't have broken another vase!

(30)   Onegaidakara, hokano   kabin-o   watte-naide-kure-yo.

          please   another   vase-ACC   break-NEG-IMP(B)

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[22] In this sense, we could say that (27) and (28) do not have an agentive addressee because legs
do not have their own will.

In (29) and (30), there is the target addressee, viz. the child. However, it is hard for the hearer to assess achievability for the state of affairs in the imperative, because it may have or have not happened in the past just as in the case of (5), where the speaker is worried about whether his cat has made a mess or not while he was out. Thus, whether the targeted addressee is present with the speaker at the moment of an imperative utterance is not a conclusive factor for the hearer to interpret an imperative as PRIVATE WISH.

Case 5: Imperatives with no addressee present (hence, no achievability).

If an imperative does not have the target addressee present, the illocutionary force of the imperative would be almost always interpreted as PRIVATE WISH. This is because the hearer pragmatically infers that the state of affairs expressed in PRIVATE WISH imperatives will never be willfully achieved due to the absence of an entity who can take action for realization; hence, there is zero achievability assessed. Take the following imperative of an audienceless imperative for example ((11) is repeated below as (31)).

(31)	a. Asita-ha	ame	furu-na yo
	b. Asita-ha	ame	fura-naide-kure yo
	c. ?Asita-ha	ame	fura-naide-kudasai yo
	tomorrow-TOP	rain	(a) fall-IMP(NEG)
			(b) fall-NEG-IMP(B)
			(c) fall-NEG-IMP(B+P)

‘Don’t rain tomorrow!’

In (31), there is no target addressee and so there is no achievability to willfully change the weather, which means that there are no possible actions for realization at all, though the state of affairs in (31) may still turn out to be true as was explained in an above section (Type 2

imperative). One might claim that the speaker may be intending some supernatural entity to be the addressee of (31). That might be possible. However, it does not make any difference in this argument about who the speaker intends in mind to be as the addressee. That is because the addressee is not physically present at the moment of the utterance with the speaker, and thus non-achievability has already surfaced. To begin with, it is actually very odd to assume some supernatural entity to be the subject of "Don't rain tomorrow", because, normally, the verb "rain" can only take "it" as its subject. No agentive entity can be the addressee of (31). Here is another interesting case provided in Kaufmann (2012, p.137).

(32)   (On one's way to a blind date)

        Please be rich!

In (32), the speaker has a certain person in his/her mind but, again, it does not affect the interpretation of the imperative as PRIVATE WISH since the date who the speaker is going to be meeting is not present with the speaker yet at the moment of the utterance, and, hence, no achievability can be assessed.

Predetermined imperatives like (5), where the speaker is concerned about his cat, also normally follow this pattern, leaving no achievability over the event that may or may not already happened in the past. Of course, in these cases, the speaker cannot impose his or her authority on anybody and thus it becomes difficult to understand these imperatives to be instances of COMMAND, which is normally performed through authority, status and/or other power.[23]

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[23] When the speaker gets into her car and mutters:
        Start, damn you. (Wilson and Sperber, 1988, p. 6)
This imperative is not felt to be WISH as much as other WISH imperatives but rather felt to be COMMAND or ORDER even though there is no "human being" to realize the expressed state of affairs. However, this is because the speaker anthropomorphizes his or her car and exerts his or her authority and power as the owner of the car.

Priority to prototypical conditions: achievability and hypotheticality.

How about the case where the speaker has just met the date for the first time and says (32) to the date? Considering all the analysis so far, the date being rich seems hypothetical to the speaker, the assessed achievability seems to be little, and let us suppose that the speaker has desire for the date being rich. Why would (32) not be felt to be PRIVATE WISH in this context? (32) can be even unacceptable to some people if we suppose there is the addressee present. As for this case, there are a couple of possible reasons. First, because the addressee is present with the speaker, there is more possibility that (32) gives rise to agentive interpretation. In other words, some achievability could be reasoned out by the pragmatic assessment. Because of this, (32) could allow some interpretation such as "Get rich in the future", for example. In fact, it is possible to say (32) in the meaning of "to become rich" in some situations. For instance, parents may say (32) to their kids as a joke or possibly PRIVATE WISH. If parents say (32) in their mind or without kids being present as a self-talk, then the PRIVATE WISH interpretation could arise.

The verb *be* in English has several different readings, one of which represents the current state of something or someone and another a future state as in *become/turn out to be.* The reading of (32) as a PRIVATE WISH imperative refers to the current status of the date and the reading of (32) with the date present would be interpreted to refer to a future state. This distinction would be explained more clearly by comparison to Japanese equivalents of the verb *be*. Because Japanese does not have one specific verb that is completely equivalent to English *be*, several different verbs must be used for each reading of *be* in English. DAT in (33) is the dative case marker.

(33) a. Okanemotide   (i)[?]are!

                           (ii) atte-kure!

                           (iii) atte-kudasai!

     rich   (i) exist-IMP

                           (ii) exist-IMP(B)

                           (iii) exist-IMP(B+P)

   '(Currently) Be rich!'

     b. okanemoti-ni   (i) nare!

                           (ii) natte-kure!

                           (iii) natte-kudasai!

     rich-DAT   (i) become-IMP

                           (ii) become-IMP(B)

                           (iii) become-IMP(B+P)

   '(In the future) Be rich!'

(33a, b) are both translated to "Be rich!" despite the fact that the verb of each is not the same.[24]

The Japanese verb *aru* (used in the conjugative imperative form in (33a-i) and the TE-form in

(33a-ii, iii)) is equivalent to "current be" or "to exist" and *naru* (used in the conjugative

imperative form in (33b-i) and the TE-form in (33b-ii, iii)) is used roughly equivalently to

"future be", or "to become". As these examples show, "Be rich" with or without the addressee

present can generate two differing readings.

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[24] The bare conjugative imperative (IMP) "are (current *be* in Japanese)" in (33a) would have a somewhat different nuance without the context. It sounds like a "slogan" or "proverb", probably because of the lack of the sense of benefit.

Another reason why (32) sounds odd with the date present is that, in order to successfully say (32) for an agentive reading, the speaker must have a belief that the date is not rich at the moment of the utterance of (32). The speaker is deemed not to know that unless they have already talked about it before they meet in person. Chances are that the date is actually rich and it does not make sense to say (32) to someone who is already rich barring the case such as the speaker is by far richer than the date. This means that the speaker has to ensure hypotheticality to license the validity of (32) to order, request, plea, or suggest the date to be rich due to the conditions of prototypical (or non-WISH) imperatives we have seen so far.[25] If the speaker already knows the date is not rich, then, the speaker can say (32) but it will probably be taken as agentive and thus as a joke in this situation. In this case, the situation requires the speaker to be already fairly close to the date or to be very audacious, though this is a completely different kind of matter.

On the other hand, when the speaker intends (32) to be a wish, it basically means, "I hope it will turn out that you [the date] are rich" and thus this state of affairs in this wish must be hypothetical to the speaker, regardless of the actual date's financial status. This analysis shed light on another aspect of interpretation of imperatives; when an imperative is uttered with the addressee present, agentive interpretation, which is a characteristic of prototypical imperatives, would be preferred, given hypotheticality guaranteed. Let us call this "Agentivity Constraint". In order for an imperative to be construed as PRIVATE WISH when the target addressee is present with the speaker by rejecting this constraint, the imperative must require a context where the addressee or the hearer would assess achievability as very little or zero like the case of (29).

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[25] (32) can be interpreted as WISH with the date present if it is an utterance in the speaker's mind just as in a novel, for example, as long as hypotheticality is secured.

Problem about Agentivity Constraint regarding GOOD WISH.

One of the reasons why we may feel that GOOD WISH is somehow different from PRIVATE WISH (including audienceless and predetermined imperatives) may be found here; while GOOD WISH imperatives normally have the targeted addressee(s) present, many PRIVATE WISH imperatives are never achieved agentively or willfully, due to absence of the addressee(s). GOOD WISH imperatives clearly go against "Agentivity Constraint". Therefore, it could be argued that GOOD WISH can have a little more achievability than PRIVATE WISH. Concerning this point, Bolinger (1977, p 166) actually demonstrates this and points out that even GOOD WISH imperatives could be felt as COMMAND under particular circumstances.

(34)   a. Sleep well—mind you, now, I mean it!

              b. Get well—that's an order!

The first half of (34a, b) are normally construed as GOOD WISH imperatives, but the added parts make them sound like COMMAND. This is because we now feel some compliance to follow and achieve what is said in (34a, b), as the added parts give the nuance of ordering. [26] This "GOOD-WISH-LIKE COMMAND" interpretation will never happen when there is no addressee(s) in the first place. More discussion on GOOD WISH will be done in Chapter 3.

Strong Desirability

So far, I have demonstrated how assessment of achievability of the denoted state of affairs in an imperative affects the interpretation of it. However, it should be noted that we cannot always use an imperative as a wish, despite the fact that, as we saw above, some

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[26] (34a, b) can sound jokingly as well according to how one says them. There are many other factors that affect people's interpretations of imperatives, such as facial expressions, prosody, pitch, and so forth. However, we do not look into these factors in this study.

imperatives can be allowed even when there is no achievability pragmatically estimated by the hearer. Take (35) for example.

      (35)   Don't rain tomorrow!

If the speaker says this the day before an important baseball game to which he has been looking forward, this sentence is very natural. However, the speaker would not even bother to say (35) if "tomorrow" is not a very important day for him or her, despite the fact that the state of affairs in (35) is hypothetical and can possibly be regarded as somewhat desirable by the speaker. I assume that this has to do with the degree of desirability that the speaker has.

      In Condition E, I argue that for an imperative to be interpreted as having PRIVATE WISH illocutionary force, it has to involve the speaker's very strong desire. The desirability of an imperative has different degrees, just as achievability has various degrees. However, in most cases of WISH, in particular, of PRIVATE WISH, the speaker puts very strong desire into his or her imperative utterances; otherwise, there is no use uttering an imperative, especially when the speaker is not with the target addressee at the moment of the utterance, as in audienceless cases or predetermined cases, for instance. See the examples below to illustrate this. POS in (36b) below represents the possessive case marker. (36a, b) and (37a, b) are parallel to each other.

      (36)   a. #Ame-ha   doodemo ii-kedo   onegaidakara   furanaide-kure-yo.

              rain-TOP   whatever fine-though please   fall-NEG-IMP(B)

          b. #Sonnani juuyooja-nai-kedo,   anata,   onegaidakara

                 watasi-no   tokoro-ni   kaette kite-kudasai.

             that much important-NEG-though   darling,   please

                me-POS   place-LOC   return come-IMP(B+P)

(37) a. #Please don't rain tomorrow, though I don't care.

b. #Oh darling, please come back to me, though it's not so important to me.

Examples (36a, b) and (37a, b) do not make sense at all unless they are uttered in a comedic or farcical play. This would be because the added non-imperative parts contradict very strong desirability that PRIVATE WISH would have. Therefore, interpretation of an imperative as PRIVATE WISH is highly likely to involve very strong desirability;[27] if there is no strong desirability in an imperative with no achievability assessed, the speaker just would not bother to verbalize it. The judgement of this strong desirability is very subjective and very dependent on the context. However, there is an assumption that when an imperative is actually interpreted as PRIVATE WISH, then there must have been a context where the speaker came to the point to verbalize it and that the hearer also shared that context. On the contrary, if the addressee or hearer does not share this kind of context, what would happen is that they would seek for a reason why the speaker said that and that they pragmatically infer that context.[28]

As for GOOD WISHES, we do not know how strong the desire actually is because, as many researchers point out, they are quite conventionalized and can be used even when the speaker does not wish very strongly. In this respect, too, GOOD WISH does not completely square with PRIVATE WISH. This point will be discussed in Chapter 3.

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[27] This condition of strong desirability seems to apply to anthropomorphized cases. The sentence below makes no sense in a normal situation.
    #Start, damn you, though I don't care.
When one uses an imperative to some inanimate object or an animal, rather than a person, it can be interpreted as a display of a very strong emotion of the speaker, which is often associated with anger, frustration, sadness, joy and so on.
[28] Sometimes, the reason why the speaker say PRIVATE WISH may be that he/she wants the hearer to listen to them and wants to share the story in search of advice, consolation, sympathy, and so on.

Analysis on Using Imperatives as PRIVATE WISH

We have thus far seen all the presuppositions and conditions under which the hearer of an imperative, (not necessarily the addressee) construe it as PRIVATE WISH. However, it is still not manifest why imperatives are used in this way, and one may still be in doubt that PRATIVATE WISH imperatives happen to be just the same form as the imperative and its meaning, or illocutionary force, happens to be PRIVATE WISH. In the following section, I will try to answer one of the research questions listed above. I repeat it here.

- Why do we use imperatives to express PRIVATE WISH rather than other constructions?

In the following sections, I will provide an account for this question and give some rationale for the account. Then, I will apply the presuppositions and conditions of the schema to some actual PRIVATE WISH imperative sentences. Finally, I will summarize Chapter 2, going over the schema introduced at the beginning of this chapter. My account is that PRIVATE WISH imperatives are an analogous use of prototypical directive imperatives to express the speaker's strong desirability as if PRIVATE WISH imperatives would help make the desired state of affairs come true.

An analogous use of prototypical imperatives.

As was stated above, prototypical imperatives seem to have directive meanings such as commands and have the target addressee present as the agent who realizes whatever state of affairs denoted in the imperative. However, when PRIVATE WISH illocutionary force is reasoned out, usually the hearer can think of few, if any, actions to make the expressed state of affairs occur, or there may not be even a target addressee at all, which practically means uttering PRIVATE WISH imperatives affects nobody and changes nothing in reality. Using imperatives

to express wishes is seemingly completely futile in these cases. Moreover, as we will see below, it is possible too to express wishes with other linguistic constructions such as declaratives or optatives. So, why would we say something that will not change anything knowing this futility, and why would we sometimes select the imperative construction to do this when we can show our wishes in other sentence types as well? The key to these questions is the combination of strong desirability and an analogous use of the prototypical, fundamental imperative sentence.

Essentially, people realize desired states of affairs on their own when they can do it. However, when they cannot do it on their own or when it is more convenient or efficient to make other people do it, they can do so by using imperatives.[29] Thus, it is reasonable to assume that we have this concept in mind: "Imperatives = an indirect (verbal) means to realize desired states of affairs through other people". In example (5) (repeated as (38a) below), however, while knowing that the speaker's cat is not in place to make the state of affairs happen, the speaker selected the imperative sentence, as if the cat or utterance itself could do something to affect the result. To put it simply, because of prototypical directive function of imperatives and the speaker's very strong desire, imperatives sentences are chosen as if it would actually realize the state of affairs in an imperative just like COMMAND or ADVICE imperative would do. This can be clearly illustrated by comparing wishes in the declarative and the imperative. Although declaratives can also express a wish, there must be some difference between a wish expressed by imperatives and that by declaratives. If they expressed exactly the same thing, there would not have to be two ways to express the same thing.

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[29] Of course, there may be other reasons to use imperatives as well such as showing the speaker's authority or emotion.

(38)   (In the same situation as (5), where the speaker has been out all day and say in front of the door)

a. Please don't have made a mess.

b. I hope my cat hasn't made a mess.

Although these sentences essentially express the same wish, the speaker in (38b) seems to show his/her wish somewhat objectively. The speaker does not necessarily seem to be trying to willfully achieve or change something. On the other hand, the wish in (38a) sounds stronger, more emotional, and more subjective because the speaker chose to use the imperative construction, which is typically a verbal means to willfully achieve something desirable for the speaker through others. Hence, the wish in (38b) is felt to be stronger than the wish in (38a). Therefore, I analyze this in the following way; normally, the combination of hypotheticality, desirability, and achievability would generate directive force. However, PRIVATE WISH imperatives lack achievability and would lose directive force. However, the very strong desirability compensates for the lack of achievability and justifies the use of it even when it does not have any practical effect on reality. This use can be utilized mostly because we all know when and how prototypical imperatives are used. These PRIVATE-WISH-kinds illocutionary forces are, in other words, a result of exploitation of prototypical imperatives without noticing this exploitation. Here is an illustration of the analysis.

Figure 4. Analogy of prototypical imperatives

As the Japanese examples in the previous sections show, the analysis provided so far is applicable not only to PRIVATE WISH imperatives in English but also to those in Japanese. This suggests that PRIVATE WISH imperatives are not a mere coincidence and that the same or a similar pragmatic logic for the interpretation of imperatives as PRIVATE WISH may be working. This may also lead to potential universality of pragmatic reasoning for illocutionary forces that imperative sentences have regardless of languages.

Application of the conditions to actual imperatives.

In this subsection, I will demonstrate how the schema works. Here is the chart again (repeated as Figure 5 below).


Figure 5. Schema of how to reach the illocutionary force "PRIVATE WISH"

We will start from Presupposition A. (Example 1 is the same one done when the schema was first introduced above.)

Example 1: Don't rain tomorrow! (PRIVATE WISH)

Presupposition A: When this imperative is uttered, the state of affairs in it is

supposed to be hypothetical. Go to Presupposition B.

Presupposition B: When this imperative is uttered, the state of affairs in it is

supposed to be desirable. (However, this condition will be

revised in Chapter 3.) Go to Condition C.

Condition C: The hearer reasons that achievability for the state of affairs in this

imperative is not obvious. Go down to Condition D.

Condition D: It is hard for the hearer to reason out another interpretation that is

willfully achievable for this imperative. Hence, it is deemed that

achievability is zero for the state of affairs in this imperative. Go

down to Condition E.

Condition E: The hearer assumes that the speaker has a very strong desire for

the state of affairs to the extent to utter this PRIVATEWISH

imperative. The condition is met. Go up and we have reached the

PRIVATE WISH interpretation.

Example 2: (The speaker has a cat in his house and has been out all day. He is about to

open the door and says) Please don't have made a mess! (PRIVATE WISH)

Presupposition A: When this imperative is uttered, the state of affairs in it is

supposed to be hypothetical. Go to Presupposition B.

Presupposition B: When this imperative is uttered, the state of affairs in it is

supposed to be desirable. (However, this condition will be

revised in Chapter 3.) Go to Condition C.

Condition C: The hearer reasons that achievability for the state of affairs in this

imperative is not obvious. Go down to Condition D.

Condition D: It is hard for the hearer to reason out another interpretation that is willfully achievable for this imperative. Hence, it is deemed that achievability is zero for the state of affairs in this imperative. Go down to Condition E.

Condition E: The hearer assumes that the speaker has a very strong desire for the state of affairs to the extent to utter this PRIVATE WISH imperative. The condition is met. Go up and we have reached the PRIVATE WISH interpretation.

Summary of Chapter 2

As a summary of Chapter 2, I would like to go over the chart presented above.

1. Presupposition A: We have seen that the felicitous imperatives require hypotheticality. There are three types of imperatives in terms of hypotheticality. Type 1 imperatives have both achievability and potentiality, Type 2 imperatives are possible to turn out to be true but impossible to willfully achieve, and Type 3 does not have either achievability or potentiality but merely hypothetical. Because Type 3 is a superset of Type 1 and Type 2 imperatives, all imperatives are said to be hypothetical.

2. Presupposition B: The state of affairs expressed in an imperative must be desirable. Desirability does seem to be deeply related to felicity of imperatives and it might be a possible source of directive force. However, as was stated in the above section, Presupposition B will go through a major change in Chapter 3.

3. Condition C: If the state of affairs expressed in an imperative is obviously achievable for the addressee, then the imperative is very unlikely to be interpreted as WISH. If Presupposition A, B, and Condition C are all met, there is no reason to take the imperative as WISH because it is

expected that the addressee will actually bring about the state of affairs.

4. Condition D: If the state of affairs expressed in an imperative is not literally or clearly achievable at a glance, then the hearer tries to pragmatically infer what the imperative is intended to mean from the context and common sense. And if the hearer succeeds in reasoning out the intention of the imperative and hence achievability, then the hearer's interpretation of the illocutionary force will be unlikely to be WISH for the same reason explained in Condition C.

5. Condition E: When one interprets an imperative as PRIVATE WISH, it is deemed that the state of affairs in the imperative must involve very strong desirability of the speaker; otherwise, the speaker would not have chosen the imperative construction to express his/her wish.

    When an imperative does not meet Condition C and D, then it means that the hearer could not pragmatically reason out an achievable action for realization of the state of affairs of the imperative. That is, zero achievability. At this point, in order to be interpreted as wishes, imperatives must have very strong desirability, because the speaker has to have some reason or motivation to utter a virtually meaningless imperative, as PRIVATE WISH imperatives do not affect reality at all, as no one can bring it about. Also, given Presupposition A and B are met, it is presumed that no one would utter an imperative that meets none of C, D, or E.[30]

In addition to the schema, I also provided a possible explanation and motivation for why imperatives can be used to express one's wish. The use of PRIVATE WISH imperatives is an

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[30] There may be an imperative that meets none of Condition C, D, and E. However, it must be intended to be a joke or nonsense if it ever exists. Nonetheless, I have not found such an imperative so far.

analogy of the prototypical imperative as a virtually vain attempt to realize the desirable states of

affairs in the imperatives, regardless of its achievability or potentiality. This analysis is a great

deal applicable to imperatives in Japanese. This means that the use of imperatives as PRIVAE

WISH would not be arbitrary and that the entire analysis of the imperatives in this study thus far

may show some potential universality for pragmatic reasoning.

CHAPTER 3: GOOD WISH

Introduction

In Chapter 2, we examined three pragmatic characteristics that are prototypical of imperatives: namely, hypotheticality, desirability, and achievability. However, we have also seen that imperatives whose illocutionary force is interpreted to be PRIVATE WISH do not seem to align with the third condition. That is, given hypotheticality and desirability, when the hearer assumes that there are no actions for realization of the state of affairs of an imperative, the imperative is most likely to be interpreted as PRIVATE WISH. At the same time, we have also seen some issues related to GOOD WISH. This illocutionary force, GOOD WISH, does not always seem to completely square with PRIVATE WISH. Let me summarize the issues we have come across thus far.

- GOOD WISH is said to be so conventionalized that the usefulness of analysis on GOOD WISH for imperative research may be questionable.

- GOOD WISH imperatives normally have the target addressee(s) present with the speaker. In spite of this fact, normally, agentive interpretations would not be reasoned out for the states of affairs in GOOD WISH. In other words, even though there is leeway for a GOOD WISH imperative to be construed as achievable and so as another illocutionary force, usually it is not construed in such a way.

- In terms of desirability, we are not certain whether there is as strong desirability involved in GOOD WISH as in PRIVATE WISH.

All these suggest that GOOD WISH might as well be treated somewhat differently from PRIVATE WISH and that it needs more detailed investigation.

In Chapter 3, we are going to focus on GOOD WISH imperatives. In particular, we are going to delve into the following three things that were introduced as the last three research questions in Chapter 1. I repeat them below.

- What are the differences between PRIVATE WISH and GOOD WISH?

- How conventional are GOOD WISH imperatives?

- Why do we use imperatives to express GOOD WISH and is it the same reason as the use of PRIVATE WISH?

My answers to the research questions are as follows:

- The most important difference between PRIVATE WISH and GOOD WISH is that while the states of affairs denoted in PRIVATE WISH imperatives are deemed to be intrinsically desirable mainly for the speaker, those in GOOD WISH are deemed intrinsically desirable mainly for the addressee. In addition, because of its interpersonal-oriented nature, GOOD WISH does not require as strong desirability as PRIVATE WISH would do.

- It is undeniable that there is conventionality in GOOD WISH to some extent, but GOOD WISH imperatives are not completely frozen. Moreover, the interpretation of imperatives as GOOD WISH is not unique to English but Japanese too can express GOOD WISH in the imperative forms and GOOD WISH in Japanese are not as conventionalized as in English.

- The use of imperatives as GOOD WISH would be an analogous use of PRIVATE WISH and it functions as an interpersonal-oriented device rather than directive; PRIVATE WISH is used to express the speaker's very strong desire. By analogy to it, the speaker can express his/her care and attention to the addressee through GOOD

WISH imperatives as if the denoted states of affairs in GOOD WISH were very desirable not only for the addressee but also for the speaker.

As was done in Chapter 2, I will first provide a schema of WISH imperatives, but it is modified this time from the one provided in Chapter 2. The schema delineates how one would reach GOOD WISH in addition to PRIVATE WISH. I will then provide supplementary explanations for the added parts of the schema and illustrate how the new conditions work. Then, we will see conventionality and its related issues of GOOD WISH imperatives. Finally, I will provide a possible account for the use of imperative as GOOD WISH in detail. On the next page is the modified schema.

Figure 6 Schema of how to reach PRIVATE WISH and GOOD WISH

Here is an illustration of how this schema would work:

Example: Have a good day. (GOOD WISH)

Presupposition A: When this imperative is uttered, the state of affairs in it is

supposed to be hypothetical. Go to Condition B.

Condition B: The hearer reasons that the state of affairs in this imperative is not

desirable mainly for the speaker. Go down to Condition F.

Condition F: The hearer reasons that the state of affairs in the imperative is desirable

mainly for the addressee. Go down to Condition C.

Condition C: The hearer reasons that achievability for the state of affairs in this

imperative is not obvious. Go down to Condition D.

Condition D: It is hard for the hearer to reason out another interpretation that is willfully

achievable for this imperative. However, it is not impossible as there is the

target addressee present with the speaker. Hence, it is deemed that

achievability is little for the state of affairs in this imperative but not

completely zero. Go down to Condition G.

Condition G: The state of affairs in the imperative is generally considered intrinsically

desirable. Go up and we have reached the interpretation of GOOD WISH.

As a reminder about this schema, keep in mind the following three things. (1) This is an attempt
to show how one would "typically" reach a certain illocutionary force. (2) The order of
conditions is not random. (3) The presupposition and conditions here are necessary but not
sufficient conditions.

Close Observation on Desirability

As was stated in Chapter 2, we will further scrutinize desirability of imperatives in this chapter. Look at Condition B in the modified version of the schema. In Figure 2 in Chapter 2, Condition B was Presupposition B and was not a two-way node. However, it has become a condition and a binary node in Figure 6 above. There are roughly three types of imperatives in terms of desirability: First, desirable for the speaker. Second, desirable for the addressee. Third, no desirability. PRIVATE WISH imperatives would be mostly included in the first category and GOOD WISH imperatives in the second category. In the following subsections, I will provide more detailed observation and explanation about these different desirability patterns, nature of desirability, and what would happen when there is no desirability involved in imperatives.

Different desirability.

In Chapter 2, I quoted Wilson and Sperber (1988) and, based on their analysis, I argued that prototypical imperatives always involve desirability and that directive force possibly comes from desirability. However, I did not clarify for whom the states of affairs expressed in imperatives are desirable. It is not surprising that some researchers believe that the beneficiary of prototypical imperatives is the speaker rather than the addressee (Nitta 1990, Murakami, 1993, Takahashi, 2012). However, it is a characteristic of human language use that we change and expand prototypes to generate other meanings and uses. As for desirability, Wilson and Sperber (1988) point out another very significant thing, which I think is their most important contribution. They explain that desirability in imperatives does not necessarily always pertain to the speaker but also the addressee. For example, they regard REQUEST and COMMAND as desirable from the speaker's viewpoint and ADVICE and PERMISSION as desirable for the addressee.

In a similar vein, Davies (1986) argues that there are imperatives that show pure indifference and lack of opposition of the speaker of an imperative (p.42).

(39)　A: I'm going to ask your wife to dance.

　　　B: Ask her then. It doesn't bother me.

In (39), though the state of affairs in Speaker B's imperative does not seem to be desirable for Speaker B, we can tell that Speaker A actually has desirability for the state of affairs in B's imperative from his or her utterance.[31]

Let us look at PRIVATE WISH, IMPRECATION, GOOD WISH, and HEALING here. (40a-d) are parallel to (41a-d)

(40)　a. Asita-ha　　　　　ame　furu-na yo. (PRIVATE WISH)

　　　　　tomorrow-TOP　　　rain　fall-IMP(NEG)

　　　b. Jigoku-ni　otiro! (IMPRECATION)

　　　　　hell-LOC　fall-IMP

　　　c. Ii　　　　jikan-o　　　　sugosite-kudadai. (GOOD WISH)

　　　　　good　　　time-ACC　　spend-IMP(B+P)

　　　d. (as an utterance in a healing ritual to a paralyzed patient)

　　　　　Aruke! (HEALING)

　　　　　walk-IMP

(41)　a. Don't rain tomorrow!

　　　b. Go to hell!

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[31] We would most likely interpret the imperative as PERMISSION.

    c. Have a good time.

    d. Walk! (As an utterance in a healing ritual to a paralyzed patient)

When we hear these imperatives, most people would think that the states of affairs in (40a, b) and (41a, b) are mainly desirable for the speaker and those in (40c, d) and (41c, d) are desirable mainly for the addressee. As was stated in the introduction of this chapter, this is the biggest difference between PRIVATE WISH and GOOD WISH. The states of affairs in GOOD WISH are generally considered good and beneficial for the addressee but not necessarily for the speaker. We can now see more clearly that, in terms desirability, IMPRECATION is more toward PRIVATE WISH and HEALING is more toward GOOD WISH as the state of affairs in IMPRECATIONN is a display of the speaker's malicious wish that will only benefit the speaker while the state of affairs in HEALING is, no matter how supernatural and unrealistic, the speaker's good wish that will benefit the addressee.[32] Naturally, we can also assume that the speaker of a HEALING would get some benefit if the state of affairs miraculously happened. However, the fact that the speaker is doing a healing ritual, genuinely or ostensibly, for the addressee gives us a sense that the state of affairs in HEALING is mainly for addressee at least on surface.

Objectivity of desirability.

   Before we move on, I would like to further discuss desirability. Interestingly, Wilson and Sperber (1988) put GOOD WISH in the first group of imperatives, which is a group of imperatives in favor of the speaker. More specifically, they argue that GOOD WISH is

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[32] Actually, we can mutter or think of IMPRECATOIN imperatives without the addressee present, which would be so in most cases. It also strikes us that IMPRECATION is closer to PRIVATE WISH.

"understood as indicating that the state of affairs described is desirable from her [speaker's] own point of view". On the other hand, they also state that illocutionary forces such as ADVICE and PERMISSION are "desirable not from her [speaker's] own point of view but from her [speaker's] hearer's. In short, Wilson and Sperber treat GOOD WISH separately from ADVICE and PERMISSION in terms of desirability. Clearly, their categorization and my categorization in the schema are not in accord, because I categorize these three illocutionary force in the same group in terms of desirability. So, I need to justify my stance. I argue that GOOD WISH should be categorized in the "addressee-favored imperative" group as well as ADIVE and PERMISSION.

I surmise that why Wilson and Sperber (1988) include GOOD WISH in the first group is that, though they did not explicitly say, all we can do is only infer what is desirable and what is not for the addressee from the common sense or the context where the conversation is taking place. I assume this is why they used the phrase "desirable from her [speaker's] own point of view" to justify their categorization. That is, they consider that the states of affairs in GOOD WISH imperatives are judged desirable by the speaker rather than the addressee. Let us take their position for now. However, if their view was appropriate, then ADVICE and PERMISSION might as well be categorized in the first group of imperatives as well as GOOD WISH and, as a result, there would be no categorizations as to desirability. This is because the speaker cannot be completely sure of what the addressee considers desirable for the states of affairs expressed imperatives. This is so even when an imperative is interpreted as ADIVICE or PERMISSION. For example, you would advise your friend, "Take a flu shot" because it is in general regarded as good to be free from the influenza. However, the speaker's friend may not see it as desirable if he hates a flu shot, for instance. PERMISSION is more obvious in that it is presumed that the

addressee has shown some desirability for a certain state of affairs by means of asking or some gestures. And the speaker gives the addressee the green light. However, it is still based on the speaker's belief that the addressee wants a certain state of affairs gathered from the addressee's utterances, behavior, personality, etc. Seen this way, there is no substantial difference between ADVICE, PERMISSION and GOOD WISH as desirability in the states of affairs expressed in these imperatives is based more or less on inference or belief the speaker or hearer has for the addressee. It is even more so if we, the third-party people, hear or see imperatives from outside of the conversation without a certain amount of context just as we are doing in reading this thesis.

Having said that, I argue that GOOD WISH should be categorized in the address-favored-imperative group because it is in general deemed that the states of affairs in imperatives interpreted as GOOD WISH as well as ADVICE and PERMISSION are desirable mainly for the addressee rather than the speaker. This is why Condition B in the schema is a binary branch and ADVICE, PERMISSION, and GOOD WISH are on the same side; we would reach those illocutionary forces when the states of affairs are "deemed" desirable mainly for the addressee.

It is very important for us to note that, naturally, there are situations where the states of affairs denoted in imperatives happen to be deemed desirable for both the speaker and the addressee and that the proportion of desirability for the speaker to the addressee is not clear-cut 10:0 or 0:10. For instance, if the speaker of a GOOD WISH imperative is very close to the addressee in such a relationship as a parent and a child, then it is possible that the parent would bear sincerely very strong desire for the state of affairs in the GOOD WISH imperative. In this kind of cases, GOOD WISH begins to sound like PRIVATE WISH as well, especially with

"please" added.[33] Now, the speaker can mutter it or think of it with or without the addressee present just like PRIVATE WISH. (42) and (43) are parallel to each other and the sentence-final particle "yo" in (43) below works to mitigate harshness of imperatives.

(42) (To the speaker's hospitalized child for a serious illness as a self-talk)

Please get well soon, honey.

(43) Onegaidakara hayaku yoku (i) $^?$nare-yo.

(ii) natte-kure-yo.

(iii) $^\#$natte-kudasai-yo.

please soon well (i) become-IMP

(ii) become-IMP(B)

(iii) become-IMP(B+P)

In Japanese, IMP(B+P) sounds very strange but this is just because parents do not usually use the polite form to their children. As a reminder, however, the schema I am explaining is an ideal model of how one would pragmatically interpret imperatives.

No desirability.

Though this is a little off track, I would like to briefly touch upon the case where there does not seem to be any desirability involved in imperatives. As Wilson and Sperber (1988) claim, it seems that most imperatives with a variety of illocutionary forces involve some desirability. Again, we human beings cannot help but generate other meanings by exploiting

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[33] "Please" is very compatible with WISH-type imperatives. I suspect that this has to do with the speaker's achievability or controllability over a certain state of affairs. If it is out of the speaker's control, "please" seems to work well. That may explain why "please" is also very compatible with interrogatives to ask someone to do something because it is the addressee who decides to do the asked act or not.

prototypical characteristics or meanings of linguistic items. In Condition F, if there is no desirability found in an imperative, we would reason out an implicational interpretation for the imperatives. One of the possible illocutionary forces of imperatives in this kind of case would be THREAT & DARE. See the example below. A sentence-final particle "zo" in (44) is used for emphasis. (45) is an English version of (44)

(44)	Ippo-demo	tikazuite	(i) miro. [34]	Utu-zo.
			(ii) #mite-kure.	Utu-zo.
			(iii) #mite-kudasai.	Utimasu-yo.[35]
	one step-even	get close	(i) see-IMP	shoot
			(ii) see-IMP(B)	shoot
			(iii) see-IMP(B+P)	shoot(P)

(45)   Get any closer. I'll shoot you.

Imperatives like (44) and (45) would be called THREAT & DARE in the literature on imperatives. Hearing (44) and (45), the addressee would reason out that the state of affairs expressed in the imperative is not desirable for the speaker from the following utterance. Since the speaker is deemed to be emotional and, more importantly, not getting any benefit from the states of affairs in (44), IMP(B) and especially IMP(B+P) would be unacceptable. However, the type of reinterpretation for (44) and (45) is not the kind that we saw in Chapter 2. What the speaker intends here is the opposite of what is said, namely "Don't get any closer". It should be noted that the states of affairs expressed in (44) and (45) are deemed undesirable not only for the

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[34] Refer to Takahashi (2012) for more detail on "V-te-miro (try to V)" imperatives in Japanese.
[35] Because of the polite form used in the imperative, the latter sentence has also become polite for coherence.

speaker but also possibly for the addressee given the consequence of the second sentence.[36] This

means that practically, there is no desirability found in this situation. Actually, it is rather

"undesirability" than "no desirability".

And this "undesirability" seems to be used in both Japanese and English. Here are some

more examples of this kind of undesirable imperatives. (Some of the examples below are quoted

from Murakami (1993).)

(46)   a. Dooni-demo   nare!

            whatever-even   become-IMP

            'So be it!'

        b. Baka-o   ie.[37]

            stupid-ACC say

            'Don't be silly.' (Literally, "Say stupid things.")

        c. Tell me about it. (As "I already know it.")

        d. Ask me another! (As "I don't know.")

The states of affairs expressed in (46a-d) do not mean their literal meanings. Normally the

reinterpreted meanings are not deemed something desirable for the speaker but opposite. For

example, (46a) is a conventionalized phrase that people say over something that they cannot

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[36] See the following example from Davies (1986, p.42)
        A: I'll tell Mother if you don't stop it.
        B: Go and tell her then. I don't care!
In this case, A seems to have desire for the state of affairs in B's imperatives but it is deemed to
be undesirable for B, as Mother might come and punish B, for example. Thus, it is hard to
determine if this is a case of PERMISSION or THREAT & DARE. The interpretation as
THREAT &DARE may requires "undesirability" rather than "no desirability", where the state of
affairs in an imperative works adversely to the speaker.
[37] One can say, "Baka-o iuna ('Don't say stupid things.')" too.

control.[38] The speaker of (46c) does not want to hear more from the addressee and virtually means, "Don't tell me about it". Just as irony expresses the opposite of the state of affairs of something, the same logic seems to be in function in THREAT & DARE and (46a-d) interpretations. The speaker says undesirable things by using imperatives, which prototypically involve desirability. We can do this feat owing to the fact that we implicitly know imperatives are used for something desirable. Though we have seen only two languages, it is possible to think that there may be some pragmatic universal behind the use of imperatives as THREAT & DARE as well. This kind of use of imperatives seem to be very conventionalized and I suspect that this has to do with "unprototypicality". The more prototypical the use of a linguistic item is, the more flexibility it can have. On the contrary, the less prototypical the use of a linguistic item is, the less flexibility it would have (or it gets frozen).

Wilson and Sperber (1988) use the term "threats and dares" for imperatives like (44) and (45) and give their own example sentence. However, as Dominicy and Franken (2001) also points out, Wilson and Sperber (1988) do not analyze or even categorize this use of imperatives at all in terms of desirability, though they do all the other illocutionary forces they provide. This suggests that their argument of desirability is not applicable to all the existing imperatives and that desirability should be regarded as a feature of prototypical imperatives rather than a semantic feature that pertains to every single imperative.

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[38] (44a) does not even require the target addressee. This suggests that Condition C and D (about achievability) can be inserted under "No desirability" too in the schema just like the cases where there is desirability. In a sense, (44a) could be called "undesirable wish'. However, I will not dig into this here.

Summary of desirability.

I would like to summarize this subsection of desirability by answering one of the research questions. Here is the research question repeated.

- What are the differences between PRIVATE WISH and GOOD WISH?

Answer: There are two directions of desirability, one of which goes toward the speaker and the other toward the addressee. Basically, the states of affairs in PRIVATE WISH imperatives are deemed desirable mainly for the speaker and mainly for the addressee in GOOD WISH imperatives. However, this desirability is not always a clear-cut distinction and there are cases that the states of affairs in imperatives are desirable for both the speaker and the addressee. Moreover, if there is no desirability or there is even undesirability in an imperative, people would reason out implicatures in those imperatives and the illocutionary force of THREAT & DARE or some opposite interpretations would arise.

Achievability

Now, let us get back to the original track to GOOD WISH. If Condition F is met, that is, if the state of affairs in an imperative is deemed desirable mainly for the addressee, then we reach Condition C and D in the schema. These conditions are the same as the ones introduced in Chapter 2. If the hearer can think of actions for realization of the states of affairs in imperatives with little pragmatic inference, it is unlikely for the imperatives to be perceived as GOOD WISH. If the state of affairs in an imperative is not seemingly achievable, then the addressee or hearer would search for another achievable interpretation and if they can successfully find one, then it would not be likely to be construed as GOOD WISH. What is different here from Chapter 2 is that in case that the hearer can think of actions for realization, which means that there is achievability, major candidates for potential illocutionary forces would be different from the

ones in Chapter 2, where the desirability goes toward the speaker. In the cases where the states of affairs in imperatives are more in favor of the addressee, imperatives tend to be interpreted as ADVICE, PERMISSION, OFFER, RECOMMENDATION, and so forth.

Little achievability

If Condition C and D are not satisfied, then it means that the hearer could not assess achievability for the state of affairs in an imperative. However, there are cases where the hearer would assess not completely zero but a little achievability. We touched upon this in Chapter 2 but let us see what little achievability was as a reminder. Imperatives we have been seeing in this chapter are basically desirable for the addressee. That implies that these addressee-favored imperatives would be uttered when there is the target addressee with the speaker in the conversation in most cases. Therefore, it is possible that people would interpret these addressee-favored imperatives as somehow achievable even when it is hard to think of some actions for realization of the states of affairs in imperatives like GOOD WISH. I will repeat Bolinger's (1977) examples introduced in Chapter 2 to illustrate this situation (p.166).

(47)　a. Sleep well—mind you, now, I mean it!

　　　b. Get well—that's an order!

The first part of (45a, b) would be construed as GOOD WISH themselves, but the latter halves give us an impression that these GOOD WISH would be somehow willfully achievable. It is easy to say imperatives in the same vein in Japanese too. The sentence-final particle "na" in (46a) is used for emphasis mostly by men (Bunt, 2002, p177).

(48)　a. Yoku　　　nero-yo.　　Honki-dakara-na!

　　　　well　　　sleep-IMP　　serious-being so

　　　'Sleep well. I'm serious!'

b. Yoku   nare-yo.   Kore-wa   meireida-zo!

well   become   this-TOP   order

'Get well. This is an order!'

This kind of "WISH-LIKE-COMMAND" would be impossible in PRIVATE WISH, especially when there is no addressee present, because achievability for audienceless imperatives, for example, must be zero. On the other hand, GOOD WISH imperatives almost always have the target addressees, and so we cannot assert that the hearer would infer that there is completely zero achievability for GOOD WISH. Therefore, I would like to claim that GOOD WISH imperatives, unlike most PRIVATE WISH imperatives, have a very little achievability rather than "no achievability". Nevertheless, GOOD WISH imperatives are an interpersonal-oriented device to maintain or improve the relationship between the speaker and the addressee. Hence, it is more favorable for the speaker to have the target addressee present. We will delve into this point in a later section.

Intrinsic Desirability

If Condition C and D in the lower side of the schema have not been met, then we will reach Condition G. In Condition G, I claim that the states of affairs expressed in GOOD WISH must be objectively and intrinsically desirable for the addressee. This condition may sound obvious and common sense, but it is a little tricky. As was discussed in a previous section, what is desirable is very subjective and all the speaker and the hearer can do is just infer what is desirable for the addressee. Regarding this point, Dominicy and Franken (2001) provide a very acute analysis. Even when the speaker says, "Get well soon", this may not be desirable from the addressee's point of view if the addressee wants to die for some reason. Or the addressee may not want to get well soon because he/she wants to stay in bed and to have more rest away from

work. However, when we hear "Get well soon" without these kinds of context, we would interpret it as GOOD WISH because the interpretation is dependent not on what the addressee wants but on what is believed to be objectively desirable for the addressee. If the speaker somehow knew that the addressee does not want to get well soon, the speaker would say something different such as "Go ahead and die" or "Rest as much as you want".

On the contrary, contextually inferred desirability is not necessarily desirable for everyone. If the speaker knew that the addressee wants to die and go to hell and said, "Die and go to hell", for instance, this imperative would not be interpreted as GOOD WISH even though the state of affairs of this imperative is desirable for the addressee. Rather, it would be interpreted as something like PERMISSION or ADVICE.[39] Hence, as natural as its name sounds, GOOD WISH must be intrinsically desirable.

Why the hearer would interpret "Get well soon" as GOOD WISH would be that there is an assumption that being healthy is generally thought of as intrinsically desirable for everyone. And this is also why people can say GOOD WISH imperatives without any context where the speaker does not know what the addressee desires at heart. The concept of "intrinsically desirable" would include "wellness, safety, longevity, enjoyment, pleasure, happiness, success" and this sort of concepts and statuses.

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[39] One may not be able to say, "Die and go to hell" in this situation in the first place because the state of affairs in this imperative is not willfully achievable. Also, it must be very strongly desirable for the speaker for the imperative to be construed as PRIVATE WISH. Rather one would say "Then, kill yourself, if you really want" in this situation as ADVICE or PERMISSION.

Conventionality of GOOD WISH

In the above sections, I argued that the states of affairs in GOOD WISH requires little achievability and intrinsic desirability for the addressee. Then, one may come up with this question: Can we make GOOD WISH imperatives freely if all the conditions are met? Or, are they constrained very much by conventionality? In the following section, we will check one of the research questions repeated below.

- How conventional are GOOD WISH imperatives?

In the following, I will argue for the position that although GOOD WISH imperatives seem to be constrained by conventionality to some extent and this seems to be true for both English and Japanese, GOOD WISH imperatives are not completely frozen. Moreover, there are many imperatives that have not been considered as GOOD WISH in the literature so far but that can be construed as GOOD WISH if we examine them according to the conditions in the schema.

Data of GOOD WISH imperatives.

Generally speaking, it is recognized that GOOD WISH imperatives are somewhat conventionalized (Davies, 1986). This is undeniable. However, as Jary and Kissine (2014) point out, they are not completely frozen. Here are some examples from Jary and Kissine (2014, p. 66).

(49)   a. Have a nice day/holiday.

        b. Enjoy the film/the game.

        c. Enjoy!

As we can see from (49), objects of the verbs "have" and "enjoy" here are not fixed and "enjoy" does not even have to have an object in GOOD WISH. These instances can be expressed in Japanese as well, but they do not sound as fixed as English. As a matter of fact, there is a specific

way to express good wishes in Japanese that is not in the form of the imperatives. What is very

important here, however, is that good wishes can be expressed in the form of imperatives too,

which implies that people *can purposefully choose* the imperative constructions to express

GOOD WISH rather than they *must use* the way that is used to express GOOD WISH because of

lack of options.[40]

(50) a. Yoi   itiniti-/kyuujitu-o   (i) [??]sugose.

                                          (ii) sugosite-kure.

                                          (iii) sugosite-kudasai.

      good   a day/holiday-ACC   (i) lead-IMP

                                          (ii) lead-IMP(B)

                                          (iii) lead-IMP(B+P)

      'Have a good day/holiday.'

      b. Eiga-/siai-o   (i) [??]tanosime.

                            (ii) tanosinde-kure.

                            (iii) tanosinde-kudasai.

      movie/game-ACC   (i) enjoy-IMP

                            (ii) enjoy-IMP(B)

                            (iii) enjoy-IMP(B+P)

      'Enjoy the film/the game.'

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[40] The way mentioned here to express good wishes is achieved in the "noun phrase +ACC" form. This form seems more conventionalized than GOOD WISH imperatives.

  (i)   Yoi itiniti-o!   (ii)   *Yoi eiga-o!
            good a day-ACC!   good movie-ACC

(i) is grammatical but (ii) is not.

c. (i) ^{??}Tanosime!   (ii) Tanosinde-kure!   (iii) Tanosinde-kudasai!

   (i) enjoy-IMP   (ii) enjoy-IMP(B)   (iii) enjoy-IMP(B+P)

   'Enjoy!'

Note that the verb-conjugative imperatives ((i) of each) in (50a-c) sound odd as GOOD WISH.

They may sound like something achievable such as COMMAND or ADVICE. This may

exemplify that Agentive Constraint, where agentive readings are preferred with the target

addressee present, may be in effect. Nevertheless, (50a-c) in the form of IMP(B) and IMP(B+P)

are acceptable as GOOD WISH. Here, the notion of "benefit (B)" plays a very important role.

GOOD WISH imperatives in Japanese seem to behave as if they were desirable for the speaker

and as if not only the addressee but also the speaker were getting some benefit from the state of

affairs denoted in GOOD WISH imperatives. We will discuss this point later in a following

section.

   In addition, there are imperatives that have not been recognized as GOOD WISH in the

literature on the imperative before but that can sound like GOOD WISH without any context.

(51)   a. Take care.

       b. Be safe.

       c. Stay healthy.

       d. Don't get a cold.

       e. Do your best!

       f. Hang in there.

These imperatives have not been introduced as GOOD WISH in the literature as far as I know.

However, we might feel that they could be categorized as GOOD WISH because it is hard to

come up with particular actions to realize the states of affairs in (51a-f) and they can be all considered intrinsically good for the addressee.[41] However, these imperatives would be also construed as other illocutionary forces in some specific situations. For example, "Be safe" may be interpreted as "Use the seatbelt" or "Take the safer way" in some context. Therefore, the determination of illocutionary forces is very difficult without contexts and this may be why researchers have not introduced these imperatives as GOOD WISH.

Conventionality or some other constraint?

We have just seen that GOOD WISH imperatives are not fully conventionalized and there are more of other imperatives that can be recognized as GOOD WISH that have not been treated so before. However, there are some imperatives that seem to meet all the conditions to stand as GOOD WISH but unacceptable. Here are some modified examples from Davies (1986, p 57).

(51)   a. ??Succeed in your business!

b. ?Feel better soon. (c.f. Get well soon.)[42]

These are impossible in Japanese as well. "de" in (51a) is an oblique case marker that expresses a place or a means. OBL is used for this. Also, NOM is the nominative case marker.

(52)   a. ??Bijinesu-de   (i) seekoosiro.

(ii) seekoosite-kure.

(iii) seekoosite-kudasai.

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[41] There is an idiom, "Break a leg" and this would be interpreted as GOOD WISH as well though the literal meaning of it is not intrinsically good. However, this is a case that is completely frozen and it is not appropriate to apply the analysis to this.

[42] It seems that "Feel better" is used as GOOD WISH in the U.S. but is new and very colloquial. Here is an example from Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA).

Have a speedy recovery, buddy. Feel better, Al.

business-OBL   (i) succeed-IMP

(ii) succeed-IMP(B)

(iii) succeed-IMP(B+P)

'#Succeed in your business.'

b. ?Hayaku   motto kibun-ga   yoku (i) nare!

(ii) natte-kure!

(iii) natte-kudasai!

soon   more   feeling-NOM   well (i) become-IMP

(ii) become-IMP(B)

(iii) become-IMP(B+P)

'Feel better soon!'

The contents of these imperatives seem to be willfully unachievable and intrinsically desirable

for the addressee. Nonetheless, none of the imperatives in (51) and (52) seem very appropriate as

GOOD WISH.[43] As we saw in *No desirability* section above, this might have to do with the fact

that GOOD WISH imperatives are far from prototypical uses of imperatives. If we consider

prototypical imperatives unmarked, then WISH imperatives would be regarded as marked and

they would be used in niche ways.

Summary of conventionality of GOOD WISH imperatives.

In summary of this section, we have to admit that GOOD WISH imperatives seem to

have limited flexibility. At the same time, GOOD WISH imperatives are not completely frozen.

Nor do they pertain only to English but also Japanese, and this suggests that the use of

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[43] (52b-i) could be interpreted as PRIVATE WISH or HEALING with exclamation depending on
the situation of the utterance.

imperatives as GOOD WISH is not just an arbitrary convention. Also, there are other imperatives that have not been recognized as GOOD WISH but that can be seen as GOOD WISH when we think about the conditions introduced in the schema.

Reason and Motivation for the Use of Imperatives as GOOD WISH

In this section, I will offer a potential answer to the last research question of this study. I repeat it here.

- Why do we use imperatives to express GOOD WISH and is it the same reason as the use of PRIVATE WISH?

In Chapter 2, I proposed a possible account for the use of imperatives as PRIVATE WISH. PRIVATE WISH and GOOD WISH are similar in several respects. Therefore, we can presume that possible reasons and motivations for the use of imperatives as GOOD WISH would be somewhat related to those for PRIVATE WISH. However, I assume that their purposes are not completely the same. Why would we use imperatives to say something willfully unachievable that is not even mainly for yourself but for others? Was it a mere coincidence that the imperative construction was chosen to express good wishes in the course of history? I argue that the use of GOOD WISH imperatives is an analogous use of PRIVATE WISH imperatives and an interpersonal-oriented device that people use to show their (possibly ostensive) attention and care for others as if they have as strong desire for the states of affairs in GOOD WISH as they do for PRIVATE WISH.

Process of analogy.

First, I would like to explain a potential process of this analogy. Let me quote Lakoff (1987) about conventionality here:

There is nothing "mere" even about historical relics. When categories are extended in

the course of history, there has to be some sort of cognitive basis for the extension. And

for them to be adopted into the system, that is, "conventionalized", they must make

sense to the speakers who are making these innovations part of their linguistic system,

which is, after all, a cognitive system. (p. 111)

Lakoff calls this process Motivated Convention (p. 107). I assume that the use of GOOD WISH

imperatives is a sort of Motivated Convention. I argued in Chapter 2 that we would reach the

interpretation of PRIVATE WISH when an imperative lacks achievability given very strong

desirability and that the use of PRIVATE WISH is an analogous use of prototypical imperatives.

GOOD WISH seems to share a property with PRIVATE WISH. GOOD WSIH lacks

achievability too. In addition, PRIVATE WISH requires very strong desire of the speaker to the

extent where the speaker utters an imperative that is virtually futile in reality. If one uses an

imperative that lacks achievability and that is desirable more for the addressee like GOOD

WISH, then that imperative may be able to give the same impression about desirability as

PRIVATE WISH would do by analogy. Here is an illustration of this process.


Figure 7. Analogy of prototypical imperatives and PRIVATE WISH

Looking at the figure, we notice that GOOD WISH is two steps farther from prototypical imperatives. PRIVATE WISH and GOOD WISH share a property that they lack achievability but the direction of desirability that GOOD WISH has is aimed more for the addressee. I suspect that this "distance" could explain the limited flexibility of GOOD WISH imperatives. As we have seen so far, while PRIVATE WISH seems more flexible than GOOD WISH and we can make a wide variety of PRIVATE WISH imperative sentences with a wide variety of verbs as long as the conditions are met, GOOD WISH does seem to have some conventionality and one cannot make GOOD WISH imperatives very freely even when all the conditions for GOOD WISH seem to be satisfied.

Motivation of the use of imperatives as GOOS WISH.

If GOOD WISH is a sort of Motivated Convention, then we would like to know what the motivation would be like. Though I have mentioned this point above, I will further explain a possible motivation for the use of imperatives as GOOD WISH and provide rationale for it in this subsection.

Suppose that the state of affairs expressed in GOOD WISH were very strongly desirable for the speaker just like PRIVATE WISH. Then, by saying GOOD WISH to the addressee, the speaker can show his/her care and attention to the addressee and the imperative form can help emphasize how strong it is. As an ideal result, GOOD WISH can work as an interpersonal-oriented device to maintain a good relationship or make it even better between the speaker and the addressee. In the schema, PRIVATE WISH requires very strong desirability for the speaker to utter an imperative that will change nothing in reality due to lack of achievability. However, strictly speaking, GOOD WISH does not require it. For example, we can say "Have a good day" to those about whom you do not care very much or to even those who you hate at heart as long as

you are trying to establish or maintain a good rapport with them or just to be civil. This means that it is unclear how much desire you actually have for the states of affairs expressed in GOOD WISH imperatives. But it is not crucial. This is just because GOOD WISH is used more for an interpersonal purpose, and by using GOOD WISH, we can, ostensibly or truly, show our care and concerns as if we think that the state of affairs in GOOD WISH is as desirable for us as for the addressees and as if we are hoping the state of affairs will happen to the addressees.

There are two rationales for this analysis. First, as we saw above, there are three types of desirability: desirability for the speaker, desirability for the addressee, and no desirability. While you can show pure lack of desirability in imperatives with such illocutionary forces as PERMISSION or ADVICE, GOOD WISH seems to encode some desirability not only for the addressee but also for the speaker ((39) is repeated here as (53)). (54a-d) and (55a-d) are equivalent to each other.

(53)   A: I'm going to ask your wife to dance.

B: Ask her then. It doesn't bother me.

(54)   a. Yoi   jikan-o   sugosite-kudasai.   Hontooni soo negatte-imasu.

good time-ACC   spend-IMP(B+P)   really   so wish-being

b. Hayaku   yoku natte-kudasai.   Hontooni   soo   negatte-imasu.

soon   good become-IMP(B+P)   really   so   wish-being

c. #Yoi   jikan-o   sugosite-kudasai. Sugosite   hosiku-nai   desu-kedo.

good time-ACC   spend-IMP(B+P) spend   want-NEG   though

d. #Hayaku yoku   natte-kudasai.   Son-nano mi-taku-nai   desukedo

soon   good   become-IMP(B+P)   like that   see-want-NEG   though

(55) a. Have a good time. I do wish that for you.

b. Get well soon. I do wish that for you.

c. #Have a good time, though I don't want you to.

d. #Get well soon, though I hate to see you fine.

In (53), Speaker B seems neutral about desirability for the state of affairs in the imperative and so the interpretation of it would be something like PERMISSION. In (54a, b) and (55a, b), the speaker emphasizes that he/she sincerely wish the addressee the states of affairs in the imperatives. However, (54c, d) and (55c, d) sound very odd or even unacceptable. This is probably because the first part of (55c, d) and (55c, d), which looks like GOOD WISH, contradicts the latter part that indicates that the speaker actually does not want the states of affairs of the first half of sentences to happen. That is, GOOD WISH imperatives presuppose the speaker's desirability for the states of affairs. Note that this presupposition does not guarantee that the speaker desires it from the bottom of his/her heart.

The other rationale comes from a cross-linguistic observation. We have seen that Japanese too can express GOOD WISH in the form of imperatives. What is important about this is that when imperatives are used to express GOOD WISH, IMP(B) and IMP(B+P) are by far more preferred than the bare verb conjugational imperative form, or IMP. As a reminder, (B) in IMP(B) represents "beneficial" and (B+P) "beneficial + polite". Using the auxiliary verb, "kureru", with another main verb preceding the auxiliary, you can indicate that you get some benefit from an action of other people. To illustrate this, consult the examples below (repeated from Chapter 1).

(56)　a. Kyoo　　　　　　kaimono-o　　　　　suru.

　　　today　　　　　　shopping-ACC　　　do

　　'(Someone or I) do homework today.'

　　　b. Kyoo　　　　　　kaimono-o　　　　　site-kureru.

　　　today　　　　　　shopping-ACC　　　do-(give)

　　'(Someone other than the speaker) will do my shopping today.'

　　　(And the speaker is getting benefit from it.)

In (56a), the state of affairs is neutral without "kureru (B)" and we cannot even know who the agent of the sentence is without context. But we can tell from (56b) with "kureru (B)" that at least the person who is going to do the shopping is not the speaker and the speaker indicates that he/she is getting some benefit.

　　　Let us return to the main argument. See the examples below and preference for IMP(B) and (B+P). I repeat (50) here as (57).

(57)　a. Ii　　　　　　itiniti-/kyuujitu-o　　(i) $^{??}$sugose.

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　(ii) sugosite-kure.

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　(iii) sugosite-kudasai.

　　　good　　　a day-/holiday-ACC　(i) lead-IMP

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　(ii) lead-IMP(B)

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　(iii) lead-IMP(B+P)

　　'Have a good day/a holiday.'

　　　b. Eiga-/Siai-o　　　　　　(i) $^{?}$tanosime.

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　(ii) tanosinde-kure.

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　(iii) tanosinde-kudasai.

movie-/game-ACC   (i) enjoy-IMP

(ii) enjoy-IMP(B)

(iii) enjoy-IMP(B+P)

'Enjoy the film/the game.'

c. (i) $^?$Tanosime!   (ii) Tanosinde-kure!   (iii) Tanosinde-kudasai!

(i) enjoy-IMP   (ii) enjoy-IMP(B)   (iii) enjoy-IMP(B+P)

'Enjoy!'

What these examples and preference for IMP(B) and IMP(B+P) mean is that the speaker indicates that he/she is getting some "benefit" from the states of affairs denoted in GOOD WISH imperatives in Japanese, even though those states of affairs would not directly benefit the speaker at all in reality.[44] Of course, the states of affairs in GOOD WISH may work in favor of the speaker as an incidental result or they may be desirable also for the speaker if the speaker and addressee are very close like a family. Nonetheless, preference for IMP(B) and IMP(B+P) for GOOD WISH imperative in Japanese seems to support the idea that GOOD WISH imperatives work as an interpersonal-oriented device to help build and maintain a good relationship between interlocutors.

To sum up, the use of imperatives as GOOD WISH would be an analogous use of PRIVATE WISH imperatives. However, their functions seem different. By using the imperative form, the speaker can show his/her (possibly ostensive) desire for the state of affairs in GOOD WISH and, consequently, GOOD WISH imperatives work as an interpersonal-oriented tool to establish, maintain, or even boost a good relationship between the speaker and addressee.

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[44] The Japanese phrase, "otame gokasi (ostensive kindness)" depicts this situation very well.

Application of the Conditions to Actual Imperatives

Just as Chapter 2, in this section, I will apply the presupposition and the conditions in Figure 6 to imperatives and demonstrate how the revised schema operates. Below is the schema repeated as Figure 8.


Figure 8. Schema of how to reach PRIVATE WISH and GOOD WISH

Example1: Have a good day. (GOOD WISH)

    Presupposition A: When this imperative is uttered, the state of affairs in it is

        supposed to be hypothetical. Go to Condition B.

    Condition B: The hearer reasons that the state of affairs in this imperative is not

        desirable mainly for the speaker. Go down to Condition F.

    Condition F: The hearer reasons that the state of affairs in the imperative is desirable

        mainly for the addressee. Go down to Condition C.

    Condition C: The hearer reasons that achievability for the state of affairs in this

        imperative is not obvious. Go down to Condition D.

    Condition D: It is hard for the hearer to reason out another interpretation that is willfully

        achievable for this imperative. However, it is not impossible, as there is the

        target addressee present with the speaker. Hence, it is deemed that there is

        little achievability for the state of affairs in this imperative but not

        completely zero. Go down to Condition G.

    Condition G: The state of affairs in the imperative is generally considered intrinsically

        desirable. Go up and we have reached the interpretation of GOOD WISH.

Example 2: Enjoy the film. (GOOD WISH)

    Presupposition A: When this imperative is uttered, the state of affairs in it is

        supposed to be hypothetical. Go to Condition B.

    Condition B: The hearer reasons that the state of affairs in this imperative is not

        desirable mainly for the speaker. Go down to Condition F.

Condition F: The hearer reasons that the state of affairs in the imperative is desirable mainly for the addressee. Go down to Condition C.

Condition C: The hearer reasons that achievability for the state of affairs in this imperative is not obvious. Go down to Condition D.

Condition D: It is hard for the hearer to reason out another interpretation that is willfully achievable for this imperative. However, it is not impossible, as there is the target addressee present with the speaker. Hence, it is deemed that there is little achievability for the state of affairs in this imperative but not completely zero. Go down to Condition G.

Condition G: The state of affairs in the imperative is generally considered intrinsically desirable. Go up and we have reached the interpretation of GOOD WISH.

Example 3: Walk! (HEALING) (An utterance as a healing ritual to a patient whose legs are paralyzed.)

Example: Have a good day. (GOOD WISH)

Presupposition A: When this imperative is uttered, the state of affairs in it is supposed to be hypothetical. Go to Condition B.

Condition B: The hearer reasons that the state of affairs in this imperative is not desirable mainly for the speaker. Go down to Condition F.

Condition F: The hearer reasons that the state of affairs in the imperative is desirable mainly for the addressee. Go down to Condition C.

Condition C: The hearer reasons that achievability for the state of affairs in this imperative is not obvious. Go down to Condition D.

Condition D: It is hard for the hearer to reason out another interpretation that is willfully

achievable for this imperative. However, it is not impossible, as there is the

target addressee present with the speaker. Hence, it is deemed that there is

little achievability for the state of affairs in this imperative but not

completely zero. Go down to Condition G.

Condition G: The state of affairs in the imperative is generally considered intrinsically

desirable for the addressee. Go up and we have reached the interpretation

of GOOD WISH. (However, because of the special situation of the healing

ritual, the illocutionary force of this imperative would be called HEALING

in the literature.)

Example 4: Take care/Be safe/Stay healthy/Don't get a cold/Do your best/Hang in there

(possibly GOOD WISH depending on the context).

Presupposition A: When this imperative is uttered, the state of affairs in it is

supposed to be hypothetical. Go to Condition B.

Condition B: The hearer reasons that the state of affairs in this imperative is not

desirable mainly for the speaker. Go down to Condition F.

Condition F: The hearer reasons that the state of affairs in the imperative is desirable

mainly for the addressee. Go down to Condition C.

Condition C: The hearer reasons that achievability for the state of affairs in this

imperative is not obvious. Go down to Condition D.

Condition D: It is hard for the hearer to reason out another agentive interpretation for this

imperative unless there is a specific context that can allow the hearer to

reason out an agentive interpretation. Let us suppose that such a context has not been given. Then, it may be hard for the hearer to reason out some actions for realization of the states of affairs denoted in these imperatives. As there is the target addressee with the speaker, it is deemed that achievability is not completely zero but little for the states of affairs in these imperatives. Go down to Condition G. (In the case where the hearer is given a sufficient context to reason out another interpretation that is achievable, we would reach other illocutionary forces than GOOD WISH such as ADVICE.)

Condition G: The states of affairs in these imperatives are generally considered intrinsically desirable. Go up and we have reached the interpretation of GOOD WISH.

Example 5: Get any closer if you dare. Then I'll shoot you. (THREAT & DARE)

Presupposition A: When this imperative is uttered, the state of affairs in it is supposed to be hypothetical. Go to Condition B.

Condition B: The hearer reasons that the state of affairs in this imperative is not desirable mainly for the speaker. Go down to Condition F.

Condition F: The hearer reasons that the state of affairs in this imperative is not desirable mainly for the addressee either. This means that there is nothing desirable in the state of affairs in this imperative. That is, no desirability. Because this does not align with the prototypical feature of desirability of

the imperative, one would reason out some implicature. In this case, a likely interpretation would be THREAT & DARE.

Summary of Chapter 3

As a summary of Chapter 3, let me recapitulate the revised or newly added conditions, conventionality of GOOD WISH imperatives, and my account for the use of imperatives as GOOD WISH.

1. Condition B (revised): In this chapter, we saw that there are three types of desirability: desirability for the speaker, desirability for the addressee, and no desirability. If the hearer of an imperative assumes that the state of affairs in an imperative is desirable and beneficial mainly for the speaker, the route in the schema goes toward PRIVATE WISH. If the hearer assumes that the state of affairs in an imperative is desirable and beneficial mainly for the addressee, the route in the schema goes toward GOOD WISH. If the hearer assumes there is no desirability, that would generate some implicature. However, the distinction between the types of desirability is not always clear and there are imperatives the states of affairs of which are desirable and beneficial for both the speaker and hearer. In this kind of case, the interpretation of illocutionary force can be divergent.

2. Condition F: When the hearer reasons that the state of affairs in an imperative is not desirable mainly for the speaker, then the hearer explores for other possibilities. Naturally, the next target is the addressee. If the state of affairs is deemed desirable and beneficial mainly for the addressee, then the hearer moves on to Condition C and D, where achievability is of main concern. However, if the hearer cannot find any desirability for the state of affairs in the imperative, then it would generate some implicational interpretations such as THREAT & DARE and other "opposite-meaning" interpretations.

3. Condition C and D: These conditions are also in operation in the route to GOOD WISH in the schema. Basically, there is no new addition to these conditions. However, likely illocutionary force candidates in this lower route would be different from ones in the upper route when achievability is assessed. Those would be ADVICE, OFFER, PERMISSION, and so on.

4. Condition G: Naturally, but importantly, in order for an imperative to be construed as GOOD WISH, the denoted state of affairs must be objectively and intrinsically desirable and beneficial for the addressee. Desirability is a very subjective concept, and all we can do is infer what the addressee may want from the context and/or common sense. Because of this, the addressee's context-specific-desirability does not always match what we generally think is desirable and imperatives with such context-specific desirability would not be construed as GOOD WISH. Therefore, the states of affairs expressed in GOOD WISH should be objectively and intrinsically desirable.

In addition to the revised schema, I also provided an observation on how conventional GOOD WISH imperatives are and a possible account for the use of imperatives as GOOD WISH. GOOD WISH imperatives do seem to have conventionality to some extent, but they are not completely frozen. This conventionality might be explained by the distance between prototypical imperatives and GOOD WISH imperatives. In addition, GOOD WISH does not pertain only to English but also Japanese.

As for possible reasons and motivations for the use of GOOD WISH, I argued that GOOD WISH is possibly an analogous use of PRIVATE WISH as both share lack of achievability. Since PRIVATE WISH is used to show the speaker's very strong desire, we can express care and concern for others by GOOD WISH imperatives as if we have very strong desirability for the

states of affairs in GOOD WISH as an analogy to PRIVATE WISH, though GOOD WISH

imperatives can be "fake". After all, though, the use of imperatives as GOOD WISH is an

interpersonal-oriented tool rather than a directive like a prototypical imperative or a display of

one's strong wish or emotion like PRIVATE WISH.

CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSION

Summary of Findings

In this chapter, I will summarize my arguments and points of this study.

Schema of PRIVATE WISH and GOOD WISH.

One of the main purposes of this research was to propose a model that would explain how one would reach the interpretation of PRIVATE WISH and GOOD WISH upon hearing an imperative. Because there are various factors involved in interpreting an imperative as having a certain illocutionary force, it is hard to make such a model. And it seems that no researcher has made such an attempt to the best of my knowledge. I hope, therefore, that my attempt of making such a model has contributed to research on the imperative and the field of pragmatics. As for the presupposition and the conditions in the schema, since they were all provided in the summary of each chapter, I will explain them briefly.

Roughly, the speaker has to believe that the state of affairs in an imperative must be hypothetical when uttering it and the hearer takes it so. This is a presupposition rather than a condition. The next feature of prototypical imperatives is desirability whereby the route to specific illocutionary forces starts to diverge. There are mainly three types of desirability: desirability mainly for the speaker, for the addressee, and no desirability. One more feature of prototypical imperatives is achievability. When it is deemed that achievability for the state of affairs of an imperative is little or zero and that the state of affairs is very strongly desirable for the speaker, then, the interpretation of the imperative is most likely to be PRIVATE WISH.

On the other hand, when it is deemed that achievability for the state of affairs of an imperative is little and that the state of affairs is intrinsically desirable mainly for the addressee, the interpretation of the imperative is most likely to be GOOD WISH.

Moreover, when an imperative is uttered but one cannot reason out desirability in that imperative, that is, no desirability, chances are that that imperative would generate some implicational interpretation such as THREAT & DARE.

Accounts for the use of imperatives as PRIVATE WISH and GOOD WISH.

I have also provided potential reasons and rationales for the use of imperatives as PRIVATE WISH and GOOD WISH. The former would be an analogy of prototypical imperatives. As prototypical imperatives are used to achieve something desirable for the speaker through someone else, PRIVATE WISH imperatives would be used in such a manner too. However, the most important difference between prototypical imperatives and PRIVATE WISH imperatives is that the states of affairs denoted in PRIVATE WISH imperatives will never be willfully done by someone else due to lack of achievability. Hence, the function of the PRIVATE WISH, if any, is to display the speaker's very strong desire as if the PRIVATE WISH imperatives would bring about the denoted state of affairs just as prototypical imperatives would.

The use of imperatives as GOOD WISH would be an analogy of PRIVATE WISH. Note that it can be said that it is an analogy of prototypical imperatives as well because PRIVATE WISH is an analogy of prototypical imperatives. That is, GOOD WISH is an analogy of another analogy. What is shared in GOOD WISH and PRIVATE WISH is that both lack achievability. This gives imperatives a sense of wishes because there is no agentive action that can be done for the states of affairs expressed in imperatives. What is different between PRIVATE WISH and GOOD WISH, however, is that while PRIVATE WISH imperatives would merely express the speaker's strong

desirability, GOOD WISH imperatives would be employed more for interpersonal purposes; by using a WISH imperative the state of affairs of which is desirable and beneficial mainly for the addressee, the speaker can express his/her care and attention to the addressee as if they have as much strong desirability for the state of affairs as PRIVATE WISH.

In addition, in order to reinforce my arguments, both Japanese and English have been used in this study. We have seen that both languages, which are putatively very different and unrelated from each other in terms of constructions and history, can be used to deliver PRIVATE WISH and GOOD WISH in the form of the imperative. This suggest that there should be reasons and motivations for the use of imperatives to express wishes, which leads to some potential universality of pragmatic reasoning regardless of languages.

Limitations and Further Research

Limitations and future research possibilities are often related to each other. I will briefly mention limitations and further research possibilities regarding this study. First, the schema is an ideal model that would work well only in theory at this point. Most of examples are separated from the real world examples and, moreover, there is always subjectivity in people's judgement that would affect the interpretations of imperatives. Therefore, some empirical study would help validate and reinforce potential credibility and usefulness of this study. For example, we could make a survey where we provide detailed contexts and imperative sentences and ask participants to choose or write down their interpretations that best describe the given imperatives. Then, we can compare what the schema predicts and what the participants actually judged. Research using corpora would be effective too.

In addition, it should be possible to extend the schema, for instance, by adding more detailed conditions of how one would decide to use imperatives as WISH and conditions to reach

other specific illocutionary forces such as COMMAND and REQUEST. Although there must be some overlaps among interpretations of illocutionary forces just as claimed in Takahashi (2012), there must be also some tendencies where one would interpret an imperative as COMMAND rather than REQUEST and vice versa.

Finally, what is most interesting and linguistically significant would be application of this schema to imperatives of other languages than Japanese and English. I do not assume that all of the illocutionary forces and analyses that have been presented in this study will *perfectly* pertain to all languages. However, it would be very interesting to see how much the findings of this study can be applied to other languages and how universal this schema could be.

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