KANT AND HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHICAL THIRDS: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON EXPLAINING APPEARANCES

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
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A Dissertation

Submitted to the Faculty of Purdue University

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Philosophy

West Lafayette, Indiana

May 2020

THE PURDUE UNIVERSITY GRADUATE SCHOOL
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ABSTRACT

Explaining appearances, the problem of specifying the relation between empirical appearances and abstract concepts, continues to confound scholars. Most thinkers concentrate on the terms to be related, as opposed to the structure of how the connection is to be made. Instead, I argue that the important focus should be on the third position that is required to connect the terms. Kant and Hegel both employ philosophical third positions, imagination and self-conscious explanation, respectively, to relate the sensibility and the intellect in the operation of cognition to explain appearances. Their accounts explain appearances by indicating how sensory representations that appear in perception are to be subsumed into abstract yet objective concepts.

At the heart of explaining appearances is the problem of time. For Kant, the linchpin is that the understanding must unify time with the categories for any appearance to appear. For Hegel, knowing is a self-developing process, which as processual, is necessarily temporalized. Time (as history) becomes a philosophical object, and both the form and the content of experience are temporalized. It is precisely the problem of time that requires the specification of a philosophical third position to explain appearances, and ultimately deliver the higher-stakes objective conditions of knowing. Kant and Hegel treat the problem of time differently, but both specify a third position to relate determinate content and abstract form. For Kant, the imagination mediates between the sensibility and the understanding. For Hegel, self-conscious explanation provides intelligibility between external appearances and mental structures (concepts). Kant's conditions for object recognition involve the logical forms of judgment and the categories, and Hegel's objective conditions for all knowing integrate difference, necessity, otherness, and infinity in the movement of the Concept (a thinking substance and its object).

In Chapter 1, I introduce the topic and the three main formulations of the explaining appearances problem. First is Kant's "Letter to Herz" specification as to the agreement between sense representations and abstract concepts. Second is the contemporary Conceptualism debate's formulation of the connection between non-conceptual sensibility and conceptual understanding. The Conceptualism debate is an argument about the degree to which the Kantian faculties of intuition (sensibility), imagination, and understanding incorporate conceptual content (the categories). *Conceptual* means conceptually-determined content per the involvement of the categories (the pure concepts of the understanding that Kant articulates (§10, B106, 212)). Third

is the more general formulation of the Humean dilemma addressed by Hegel as the relation of determinate content and abstract form, which is a format that can be sufficiently resolved.

In Chapter 2, I argue for a conceptualist reading of Kant's account of explaining appearances. I resolve some much-debated ambiguities that arise in §26 and the B160 note. The central issue in explaining appearances for Kant is the generation of the *a priori* unity of space and time, per the formal intuition of space and time as specified in §26 and the B160 note. I frame my argument in terms of the Conceptualism debate (the extent to which Kant's notion of intuition is category-determined and how this influences the unicity of time and space). I conclude that the explaining appearances problem cannot be fully resolved when specified as the Kantian "Letter to Herz" problem of how agreement is possible between sense representations and abstract concepts. Solution is possible, though, when the explaining appearances problem is recast as the Humean dilemma of the relation between determinate content and abstract concepts.

In Chapter 3, I discuss how for Hegel, Kant fails to sufficiently surmount the problem of time (the conflict between time-bound intuitions and atemporal concepts). I argue that Hegel's advance is to specify the understanding conceiving of itself under the concept of infinity (universality), which allows the integration of appearance and concept in the process of consciousness's self-determination. I resolve the subjective conditions problem (the challenge of individual consciousness having only subjectively-applicable operations) that arises in Hegel's account with a *Bildung*-based reading of the Consciousness chapter, that does not rely on consciousness's progression to Self-Consciousness or external terms.

In Chapter 4, I argue that a recurrent theme extending across Kant and Hegel's work regarding critical time enables the substantive progress that ultimately resolves the explaining appearances problem. Kant's Transcendental Aesthetic is the critical time formulation that brings time and space into subjectivity, as opposed to space and time being objective external facts. Hegel further incorporates time into subjectivity by defining history as a philosophical object, again, rather than as being external objective facts. In the same kind of structural move (internalization) that Kant and Hegel make with *time*, Hegel also brings the activity of *explanation* into subjectivity, as opposed to explanation being an external objective scientific process. Explanation is redefined as an agential self-conscious activity, whose validity (truth determination) is a function of consciousness's own satisfaction with the explanation, not with regard to some external metric. Self-conscious explanation resolves the explaining appearances

problem by providing the objective conditions for *all* knowing (through the movement of the Concept in its principles of difference, necessity, otherness, and infinity) as opposed to merely the objective conditions for object recognition as Kant supplies. The result is a shift from representational thinking to conceptual thinking (and epistemology to phenomenology).

The important stakes of this work are that the explaining appearances problem is resolved. The solution reveals an even more crystallizing result of this analysis. This is that beyond what can be regarded as the already stunning importance of Kant's Transcendental Aesthetic in bringing time and space into subjectivity, as opposed to time being seen as objective external facts, which Hegel also similarly extends by rendering history as a philosophical object, the even more important critical benefit stemming from the Transcendental Aesthetic is as follows. The Transcendental Aesthetic forces the thinking of the conditions of possibility of experience, which also forces the thinking of the conditions of possibility for objects of experience. The implication is that there is no experience, or objects of experience, without the Transcendental Aesthetic. (Self-conscious explanation is just one of consciousness's objects, in its phase of evolving from consciousness to self-consciousness.) The Transcendental Aesthetic not only brings time and space into subjectivity, it enables the conditions of possibility of all experience and all objects of experience. This formulation leads directly into Hegel's articulation of the Concept as the persistent structure of the conditions of possibility for all experience and for all objects of experience. My overarching claim is that there is no Hegel without Kant, in the sense that there is no Hegelian Concept without the Kantian Transcendental Aesthetic. Hence, the Transcendental Aesthetic should be seen as a superlative critical time formulation that not only cannot be collapsed into the Transcendental Logic as some revisionist scholars propose, but whose greater philosophical import should be emphasized and further developed.

Bibliographical Note

All *Critique of Pure Reason* citations refer to the Guyer translation.

Kant, I. (1998, 1781). *Critique of Pure Reason*. Ed./Trans. P. Guyer, A.W. Wood. Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press.

All *Phenomenology of Spirit* citations refer to the Miller translation.

Hegel, G.W.F. (1977, 1807). *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Trans. A. V. Miller. Oxford UK: Oxford University Press.

CHAPTER 1: EXPLAINING APPEARANCES

Introduction

Explaining appearances, the problem of specifying the relation between empirical appearances and abstract concepts, continues to confound scholars. Most thinkers concentrate on the terms to be related, as opposed to the structure of how the connection is to be made. Instead, I argue that the important focus should be on the third position that is required to connect the terms. Kant and Hegel both employ such "philosophical thirds," imagination and self-conscious explanation respectively, to relate the sensibility and the intellect in the operation of cognition to explain appearances (Figure 1). Their accounts explain appearances by indicating how sensory representations that appear in perception are to be subsumed into abstract yet objective concepts.

Figure 1. Kant's Third: Imagination and Hegel's Third: Self-conscious Explanation.

Examining Kant's notion of *imagination* and Hegel's concept of *self-conscious explanation* indicates similarity and difference. Both are idealist (mind-based) accounts of how concepts and appearances are related, as opposed to empiricist accounts that attempt to obtain verification of phenomena between mind and world. I highlight how both accounts require mindedness but in different ways. Kant's is a transcendental representational philosophy that retains the separateness of the subject from its object of knowing. Hegel's is a phenomenological conceptual philosophy of the subject and object joined in on-going process of self-determination and truth specification. Kant's transcendental unity of apperception demands the conscious entity of an "I think" to unify appearances in accordance with concepts. Hegel's consciousness must become self-conscious to think about its own act of thinking as the locus of constructing a valid connection between appearances and mental constructs. Kant's unitary "I think" draws from the transcendental unity of apperception, whereas Hegel's consciousness (that becomes spirit) is already part of a recognitive society of "we think." The notion of the philosophical third highlights the contrast between the two thinkers in regard to the explaining appearances problem

in that whereas Kant's *imagination* mediates between sensibility and understanding, Hegel's *self-conscious explanation* moves beyond sensibility and understanding to self-consciousness.

Central to both Kant and Hegel's accounts are the themes of synthesis, understanding, and unconditioned knowledge (objective knowing). The terms function differently for the two thinkers. For Kant, synthesis (the joining of two terms) operates via the imagination to connect the faculties of the sensibility and the understanding. For Hegel, synthesis is the sublation that relates the initial thesis and its negation in a larger position that is not simply a logic of inversion. Kant differentiates between analytic truths and synthetic truths, and Hegel between analytic necessity and synthetic necessity. The understanding is the seat of cognition for both Kant and Hegel. However, whereas for Kant, the imagination mediates the capability of the understanding, for Hegel, the shape of the understanding evolves as consciousness becomes self-conscious. I indicate how imagination and explanation function as philosophical third positions for Kant and Hegel, and how this relates to their notions of synthesis and understanding.

The larger theme implicated by the explaining appearances problem is the objective conditions of knowing. Both Kant and Hegel think unconditioned knowledge is possible, but in different ways. Using the philosophical principle of objectivity, I interrogate the claim of unconditioned knowing. Both thinkers argue that their theory is objectively valid. For Kant, the categories and the logical forms of judgment constitute the objectively valid conditions of the possibility of knowing, but are restricted in scope to object recognition. Hegel too thinks that he has specified the objective conditions for knowing, in a much grander sense, for *all* kinds of knowing (not just object recognition), in the form of the concept (or Notion) that joins the subject and the object to obtain truth (ultimately, valid reasons for thought and action). I discuss how the philosophical third positions of the two thinkers function in their respective arguments to instantiate the possibilities for unconditioned knowing.

A further consideration at the heart of explaining appearances is the problem of time. For Kant, the linchpin is that the understanding must unify time and space with the categories on an *a priori* basis in order for any appearance to appear. Consciousness unifies the synthetic *a priori* unity of time in a minded operation. For Hegel, knowing is the process of self-determination, which as a process, necessarily has its own temporality. The concept or Notion (a thinking mind contemplating external objects and its own processes) is temporalized and knowing is itself temporal. The main advance of Hegel regarding temporality is that temporalized self-

determination (individual and collective) indicates that history is a philosophical object. He says that "History is a conscious self-mediating process - Spirit emptied out into Time."[1]

Critical Time

This work highlights the need for a philosophical third position to resolve the explaining appearances problem, and further how this relates to time. I posit a new term, *critical time*, as the notion of temporality functioning in an argumentative sense beyond the primary notion of time as the dynamical elapsing of *chronos* (clock time) and *kairos* (lived time). Some examples of critical time include Kant's pure intuition and formal intuition of time, and Hegel's notion of history as a temporalized philosophical object. Critical time is often implicated in the operation of the philosophical third position.

This critical sense of time is a persistent theme throughout the *Critique of Pure Reason*, and the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Time determinations are central to Kant's main arguments (elaborated in detail in the Appendix). A repetitive motif is that *pure* formulations (related to space and time) condition *empirical* formulations (related to the appearance of objects). For Hegel, critical time is not as pronounced, but is likewise crucial to completing key arguments in the explaining appearances problem. Two of the critical time positions in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* are that *spirit* is *time* (spirit embodies the world-historical social practices that elapse processually over time), and ultimately in absolute knowing, that *spirit* as *concept* annuls time, meaning spirit is no longer subject to the world-historical constraints of time as it attains objectivity. I show how critical time formulations function structurally to complete Kant and Hegel's arguments.

Overall, I substantiate the thesis that the relation between empirical appearances and abstract concepts, per Kant and Hegel, requires each to formulate a philosophical third position to resolve the argument. I demonstrate how these elements operate, particularly in regard to the themes of synthesis, understanding, and unconditioned knowledge, in Kant's notion of imagination and Hegel's concept of self-conscious explanation.

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[1] Hegel, 1807, §808, 492.

Explaining Appearances according to Kant and Hegel

Kant and Hegel's accounts of explaining appearances, respectively, rely on imagination and self-conscious explanation. For Kant, imagination is the faculty (capability) of the productive imagination that is implicated in the *a priori* synthesis of time and space into which objects appear and can be subsumed under concepts in accordance with the categories. For Hegel, self-conscious explanation is the faculty of self-conscious explanation in which there is a thinking mind contemplating itself and its own processes as to what counts as valid explanation for recognizing an appearance as a concept. The key difference in the two accounts is that Hegel's is a three-tier model of knowing and Kant's is two-tier (Figure 2).

Conceptual Knowing (a thinking mind and an object brought together in a unity)

Hegel: *Self-conscious explanation* mediates between thinking and the object of thinking (three-tier model of knowing: consciousness reflecting on its own thinking about the relation between appearances and mental structures)

A. Hegel

Self-Consciousness [Consciousness [

Self-conscious Explanation:

Thinking
reflecting on its own thinking

Appearances ↔ Mental structures "Concepts"

③
②
①

Hegel: objective conditions of all knowing: difference, necessity, otherness, infinity

Representational Knowing (thinking based on representation)

Kant: *Imagination* mediates between representations and concepts (two-tier model of knowing: consciousness reflecting on the relation between sensibility and understanding)

B. Kant

Consciousness [

"I think" (Transcendental Unity of Apperception)

Sensibility (Representations) ← Imagination → Understanding (Concepts)

②
①

Kant: objective conditions of object recognition: quantity, quality, relation, modality

Figure 2. Objective Conditions of Knowing according to Hegel and Kant.

Kant has a representational account of explaining appearances. There is a consciousness, an "I think" (the transcendental unity of apperception), which provides continuity such that appearances can be run through and gathered together into a representation that can be

recognized as an object per the categories and the logical forms of judgment. The two stems of knowledge are invoked, sensibility and understanding, the primary faculties or capabilities, and also the faculty of the imagination which facilitates the operation of joining the sensibility and the understanding through time consciousness and spatial awareness such that objects can be recognized. Every empirical object appears in space and time, as a condition for then being subsumed under a concept.

Hegel has a conceptual or phenomenological account of explaining appearances. A clarification regarding the use of the word conceptual is as follows. The main point is that Kant's account is representational while Hegel's is conceptual. Although the term concept is amply associated with Kant's philosophy (input from the sensibility is subsumed under concepts in the process of recognizing an object), concept in the Hegelian sense refers to the more robust notion for Hegel of Concept, Notion, or Idea, which is the complex formulation of a thinking mind contemplating itself and its processes as it apprehends objects. In this sense, Kant's account is (and cannot but remain) representational and Hegel's is conceptual, or phenomenological. Hegel's phenomenological account is seen in that there are three-tiers in the model of knowing: the appearances and mental entities themselves, a consciousness thinking about these terms, and self-conscious awareness of this.

Explaining Appearances and the Humean Dilemma

Though age-old, the most immediate source of the problem of explaining appearances can be pinpointed as the "Humean dilemma." The Humean dilemma asks about the relation between determinate content and abstract form. Within this problem frame, the issue to explain is the operation of the further notion of "Humean diversity." Humean diversity is concerned with accounting for the observed differences in the objects of appearance in the world, as both the successive instances of appearance, and the different properties of objects such as those relating to space and time, and distance and motion. Hume indicates that "we have a distinct idea of several different objects existing in succession, and connected together by a close relation; and this to an accurate view affords as perfect a notion of diversity."[2] However, the issue is that "we are not able to find anything invariable and uninterrupted to justify our notion of identity."[3]

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[2] Hume, (2015, 1739-1740), *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Book I, Part IV, VI, Item 6.
[3] Ibid.

The problem for Hume is that we look at a distant mountain, look down at our tea cup, and look back at the mountain. It seems like the same mountain, but there are no grounds for claiming that it is identical across perceptions. Our impressions are merely a disconnected bundle. Kant addresses himself to the issue of picking out particular objects, as received in the Humean dilemma. Kant accepts Hume's claim that, based on the impressions alone, there is no way to claim that any two representations are of the same object. Hence, Kant specifies a consciousness, an "I think," or a transcendental unity of apperception, to solve this problem by providing a continuity of identity in the receiver of the apperceptions across the successive impressions. The diverse impressions can be linked because they all occur in one mind.

Kant refines the form of the Humean dilemma he considers more broadly in the *Critique of Pure Reason* into what can be termed the "Letter to Herz" problem (Table 1). The "Letter to Herz" problem is articulating how there can be agreement between sense representations and abstract concepts. Kant's answer is the two-stems of knowledge, sensibility and understanding, operating through the imagination. However, ultimately I argue that Kant cannot see his full result due to the way that he has framed the problem. The issue cannot be solved when specified as Kant's "Letter to Herz" problem of how agreement is possible between representations and abstract concepts because this is all still in the representational domain. The explaining appearances problem can be resolved when it is recast as Hegel's full-blown Humean dilemma of the overall relation between determinate content and abstract concepts.

Table 1. Explaining Appearances and the Humean Dilemma.

Argument position	Argument focus
"Letter to Herz" problem (Kant)	Agreement between representations and abstract concepts
Humean Dilemma (Hegel)	Relation of determinate content and abstract form

I argue that for Kant, the integration of the sensibility and the understanding cannot be performed from the two-stem theory of knowledge (or the Conceptualism debate that I engage), as he formulates the problem. This is because the opposition is between the two intransigent binary positions of the sensibility and the understanding in which the former does not quite fit into the latter. Neither domain exhausts the other. This results from the problem of time in that intuitions in sensibility appear in a specific time and space, whereas concepts in understanding are eternal and atemporal. A reformulation appealing to another register, such as universality, is

needed to overcome the problem of time, which prevents Kant from integrating sensibility and understanding. Looking ahead to Chapter 2, some thinkers such as Heidegger read Kant as having an impulse towards specifying an atemporal synthesis ("syndosis") which would be a move in the right direction, but I argue that there are not enough conceptual resources indicated in Kant's work directly to complete this formulation. Solving the explaining appearances problem for all knowing beyond mere object recognition as offered by Kant requires Hegel's bigger move of the understanding conceiving itself (not only the world and its object, but itself as its object) under the concept of infinity (universality). This resolves the problem of the Humean dilemma through the more complicated construction of self-conscious explanation.

The Concept of Experience: Hume, Kant, and Hegel

The explaining appearances problem is within the larger context of the notion of experience. Object identification is one activity in the concept of experience. Hume, Kant, and Hegel all conceive of experience differently, in an increasing continuum of involvement and self-agency. Whereas for Hume, experience is merely received sense impressions, Kant and Hegel develop much more involved processual third positions that involve action-taking to mediate between the determinate and the abstract in their concepts of experience (Table 2).

Table 2. The Concept of Experience: Hume, Kant, and Hegel.

Philosopher	Concept of Experience	Agency
Hume	Pure receptivity	Passive
Kant	Synthesis, production of unities, acts of consciousness	Active
Hegel	Complex internally-determining structure of the Concept	Very Active

For Hume, as the baseline, experience is essentially pure receptivity. Impressions are passively received into awareness. For Kant, experience is synthetic. Experience is produced by the mind. The consciousness is active in generating unities and synthesis. The mind constitutes objects as an act of consciousness. However, for Kant, experience is an activity between a subject and an object, in which the subject constructs the objects. The result is that consciousness remains in an epistemological frame and cannot extend beyond such a subject-object split. The Kantian model is still representational knowing even though there is a consciousness (an "I think") that is subsuming intuitions under concepts. Hegel's model of conceptual knowing is a

completely different ontological situation. Whereas for Kant, the task is the subject undertaking the activity of object constitution, for Hegel, the focus is the bigger ontological question of self-consciousness engaged in the activity of creating its own dynamic reality in an immanent and expansionary manner. The shape of the different Concepts, and what is considered to be the subject and the object of knowing, persistently change and evolve in the Hegelian model.

In Hegel's notion of experience, the trajectory toward greater action and agency is extended in that experience is a complex internally-developing structure. The form and the content, and what consciousness takes experience to be, are a dynamic and progressive formulation. Through experience, consciousness determines itself, its processes, and its objects. By specifying a self-aware internally-determining structure, Hegel gets beyond the subject-object split. In the notion of the concept, specifically the concept of experience, consciousness considers its own processes and what it is for an object to be for it in these internal processes. The concept is the composite of a thinking mind and an object, and in this way the subject and the object are part of one process and the subject-object split is dissolved.

This indicates more generally how Hegel's philosophy is an ontological phenomenological position that starts to overcome the merely epistemological stance that restrains Kant. Hegel moves beyond the subject-object distinction by integrating them in the notion of the concept (and particularly the concept of experience). Further, overcoming the subject-object split with an ontological phenomenological formulation is related to another landmark claim of Hegel's. The claim is that substance is subjectivity. There is an identicality between substance and subject. Unpacking this claim, the idea is that substance has subjectivity to the extent that it is a self-developing process; substance is self-overcoming and self-determining. As Hegel defines, experience is the "dialectical movement which consciousness exercises on itself and which affects both its knowledge and its object" (§86).[4]

Conclusion

The conceptual arc of this work treats the themes of how the explaining appearances problem is resolved by Kant and Hegel by specifying philosophical third positions, by appeal to

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[4] In the Introduction to the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel defines experience: "Inasmuch as the new true object issues from it, this dialectical movement which consciousness exercises on itself and which affects both its knowledge and its object, is precisely what is called experience [*Eifahrung*]." (*Phenomenology of Spirit*, §86, 55).

critical time, and extended into the broader context of the concept of experience and the objective conditions of knowing. The further stakes of this work are that explaining appearances is a central problem in the overall philosophies of Kant and Hegel which must be resolved in order to fully elaborate their positions of representational epistemology and ontological phenomenology.

CHAPTER 2: KANT'S IMAGINATION

The "Transcendental Æsthetic" is a work of such extraordinary merit that it alone would have been sufficient to immortalize the name of Kant (Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Idea*, 31)

Introduction

The explaining appearances problem is the central focus of this dissertation's inquiry. I assert that how the problem of explaining appearances is framed necessarily directs its study and resolution. There are three different formulations of the explaining appearances problem (Table 3). My overall position is that despite providing many significant advances in critical philosophy, Kant does not sufficiently resolve the explaining appearances problem due to the way it is specified. Kant articulates the explaining appearances problem as what I call the "Letter to Herz" problem. The "Letter to Herz" problem is to establish "the ground of the relation between the concept and the object" of representation. This means explaining how agreement is possible between abstract concepts and representations, both of which are mental phenomena. Kant outlines the problem in a 1772 letter to his colleague Marcus Herz as follows.

> Kant says that "the key to the whole secret of metaphysics" (10:130, 132) is to answer the question "What is the ground of the relation of that in us which we call [intellectual] "representation" [(concept)] to the object" of empirical appearance (10:130, 132); "whence comes the agreement that intellectual representations [concepts] are supposed to have with objects [mental representations of empirical appearances]" (10:131, 133).[5]

In contemporary Kant scholarship, the explaining appearances problem is reformulated slightly in the Conceptualism debate. The Conceptualism debate reconstitutes Kant's agreement between abstract concepts and representations as the attempt to connect (what is assumed to be) non-conceptual sensibility with conceptual understanding. This formulation does produce some productive movement on the explaining appearances problem. However, it is the more substantial reframe in the larger scope of the philosophical trajectory of problems tackled by Kant and Hegel, which is the naming of the Humean dilemma, that actually allows resolution.

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[5] Kant, "Letter to Herz 1772," *Correspondence* (1999), 10:130-10:131, (pp. 132-3).

The Humean dilemma is the more general formulation of investigating the relation between determinate content and abstract form. The point is that the problem formulation governs the scope, possibility, and direction of resolution. My main overall argument is that Kant solved more than he thought, but was unable to realize this because of the problem formulation, but that ultimately, complete resolution is possible with the Humean dilemma format, via Hegel.

The mobilization that allows the shift in the problem framing is from empirical to ontological. The juggernaut of intransigence between the two equally valid faculties of cognition, sensibility and understanding, is difficult to overcome since both are essential. However, seen as a relation of determinate content and abstract form changes the register of the problem from empiricism to ontology in that both parts (form and content) can be seen as constitutive of the whole of thinking. This point is distinct in sharpening the canonical understanding of the shift from Kant's transcendental epistemology to Hegel's ontological phenomenology.

Table 3. Formulations of the Explaining Appearances Problem.

Position Name	Position Focus
Kant's "Letter to Herz" problem	Agreement between representations and abstract concepts
Conceptualism debate	Connection between non-conceptual sensibility and conceptual understanding
Humean dilemma	Relation of determinate content and abstract form

Kant's frame of explaining appearances: the "Letter to Herz" problem

In more detail, Kant's answer to the "Letter to Herz" problem of relating representations to concepts is through a two-stem theory of knowledge proposed in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (CPR). He posits that cognition is jointly comprised of sensibility (related to appearances) and understanding (related to concepts). The two stems necessarily operate together since "without sensibility no object is given, and without understanding no object is thought." This is why "thoughts without content are empty, and intuitions without concepts are blind" (A51/B75, 193-4). However, the open questions are two-fold: how the two stems of knowledge are interrelated in cognition, and the degree to which sensibility is (maximally) configured by or at least (minimally) conducive to conceptuality such that impressions may be brought under concepts.

Within these two questions, there are two sets of philosophical issues that can be identified as being at the heart of the explaining appearances problem as undertaken by Kant. First and most broadly, there is the problem of time. In the Kantian model of explaining

appearances, the problem of time is that intuitions in sensibility appear in time and space (any object appears in spatially and temporally), whereas concepts are atemporal (and aspatial). Since the temporal properties of the two faculties, sensibility and understanding, are mismatched, Kant introduces another faculty, imagination, to mediate between the two, and makes a number of time determinations in the course of the book. The bigger question underlying the problem of time in sensibility and understanding is how there can be an *a priori* unity of space and time into which objects appear. The *a priori* unity of space and time means having space and time as continuous wholes in the mind into which objects appear, and as a precondition for objects being able to appear. The question is how the continuous homogenous wholes of space and time are generated in the mind as a precondition for appearances.

The problem of how time and space as continuous homogenous wholes in the mind are generated is one of the relation between givenness and unification. The extreme positions in the continuum of givenness and unification are either that time and space are given as wholes, or that time and space are unified into wholes by the mind. Since Kantian philosophy is a transcendental idealism, the unification is suggested to take place in the mind, but this claim is contentious. Questions arise as to specifically how time and space are unified into wholes, and the role of synthesis as the action for unification, which may or may not be conceptually-determined.

Regarding Kant and the external world, it should be clarified that although the operations of Kant's transcendental idealism take place in the mind, Kant's philosophy does require the existence of an external world. It is just that for Kant, it is impossible to ever know the external (noumenal) world directly or obtain any kind of epistemological verification regarding claims about it. All we can know is the internal (phenomenal) world. The distinction is between the world of phenomenal appearance and that of noumenal reality. This leads to Kant's claims regarding the point that we cannot know the "thing in itself," but only our representations of it as an object of experience (he says that "we can have cognition of no object as a thing in itself, but only insofar as it is an object of sensible intuition, i.e. as an appearance" (Bxxvi, 115)).

The second set of philosophical problems inherent to the explaining appearances problem concerns the role of the faculties of sensibility and understanding, and imagination. I argue that the problem of time (temporal differences between sensibility and understanding) forces Kant to specify imagination as a mediating third term between them, and constantly expands the role of the imagination as the "time faculty." The role of the imagination balloons during the course of

the *Critique of Pure Reason* to posit time determinations that address these temporal problems. Whether such an expanding role for the imagination is warranted, and the interrelation of the faculties of sensibility, understanding, and imagination, is taken up in the Conceptualism debate.

The Conceptualism Debate

I investigate the problem of explaining appearances through the Conceptualism debate because it provides a convenient lens for crystallizing the issues. The Conceptualism debate is an argument about the degree to which the Kantian faculties of intuition (sensibility), imagination, and understanding incorporate conceptual content (the categories). *Conceptual* means conceptually-determined content per the involvement of the categories (the pure concepts of the understanding that Kant articulates (§10, B106, 212)). There is a rich literature with different lines of argument addressing the philosophical issues in the explaining appearances problem.

The central issue in this investigation is providing an account of how the *a priori* unity of time and space is produced. There are a wide range of scholarly interpretations as to which faculties are related in generating the *a priori* unity of space and time, and as to the role of conceptuality in this activity (Figure 3). My view is the position labeled as "Kant," which is that generating the *a priori* unity of space and time is a conceptual activity, and that all three faculties are involved (and should be seen as interacting together as part of a whole, as opposed to attributing certain functions to one or two faculties acting in isolation as scholars argue).

Figure 3. The Conceptualism Debate: Interpretations of Faculties and Degree of Conceptual Content involved in Producing the *a priori* Unity of Time and Space.

Ultimately, I assert that irrespective of the degree of givenness that seems to be supplied in the world (or in the interaction with the world), for human experience, there is a consciousness necessarily unifying any sort of givenness. I investigate different arguments, but my central view is that any form of unity and synthesis will involve a consciousness producing the unification and synthesis that is in accordance with the categories, and that unification and synthesis are therefore a conceptual activity. I substantiate the position that Kant's notion of synthesis is conceptual, in all situations and all determinations, especially with regard to space and time and the generation of the *a priori* unity of time and space (time and space as homogeneous wholes into which objects appear). I consider and dismiss interpretations of non-conceptual synthesis as helpful precursors but as unconvincing. This is because the apparatus of the Kantian system cannot work if there is a special dispensation for some sort of non-conceptual synthesis. Time determinations are a central feature throughout the *Critique of Pure Reason*, which is always and necessarily produced in a synthesis according to the categories, through the faculty of the imagination as a mediating third position between sensibility and understanding. I argue that the upshot is that space and time are their own *pure intuitions* and *formal intuitions*, but are produced in the same way as any other element in the Kantian system, in consciousness per a rule-governed synthesis, and must be produced this way to be coherent with the rest of the system. As humans, we may be biased because time and space seem so foundational in configuring our lived experience of reality, but in the Kantian system, time and space are mentally produced just as any other element, but first, as the precondition for all other elements.

Chapter Organization

The focus of this chapter is Kant and the problem of explaining appearances. The generation of the *a priori* unity of space and time is the central concern. The heart of the argument related to the generation of the *a priori* unity of time and space is Kant's substantive advances that result in the culmination of the Transcendental Deduction (the B Deduction), in §26. In a famous footnote at B160, Kant discusses the pure *forms of intuition* of time and space and posits the *formal intuition* of time and space as a revision to the Transcendental Aesthetic. Hence, it is important to understand the argument configured by the new term, the *formal intuition* of space and time, as specified in §26 and the B160 note. I engage the Conceptualism debate to frame my investigation, as a contemporary and diverse discussion of these issues. The

Conceptualism debate is various positions about the extent to which Kant's notion of intuition (and imagination) is category-determined (understanding is assumed to be category-determined), and how this influences the *a priori* unity of time and space.

The argument of this chapter proceeds as follows. I support a conceptualist reading of the *Critique of Pure Reason* and the problem of the *a priori* genesis of the unity of time and space through a detailed engagement with Kant and conceptualist and non-conceptualist thinkers. I start with Heidegger as a strident non-conceptualist and invoke Weatherston as a foil, and then look at other scholars who have examined these issues through the lens of Heidegger on Kant, particularly regarding the topic of the *a priori* unity of space and time. I engage a variety of conceptualist and non-conceptualist positions as important additional illuminations towards resolving the problems. These include views from Longuenesse, Allais, Waxman, Makkreel, Onof & Schulting, Derrida, and Adorno.

First in Section 1, I elaborate the critical problems raised by §26 and the B160 note as the crux of the generation of the *a priori* unity of time and space. In Section 2, I discuss Heidegger as an important thinker in the areas of time and temporality, with extensive work regarding Kant (lecture courses, two books, and over 1,000 pages of commentary[6]). Heidegger's view is one of the best-known non-conceptual positions regarding the unity of space and time, encapsulated in the term *syndosis* (a non-conceptual synthesis). In Section 3, I invoke Weatherston as a conceptualist counterparty to Heidegger, probing the same issues at the same depth and proposing the opposing position of a category-determined *a priori* unity of space and time that does not involve imagination (reproductive or productive).

In Section 4, I provide more context regarding the Conceptualism debate and the issues of §26 and the B160 note, through Onof & Schulting. They have extensively surveyed scholarly interpretations of the B160 note and themselves propose a third position, a non-conceptual unity of space and time in the vein of Heidegger, but which (like Weatherston) is not rooted in imagination. In Section 5, I widen the field to discuss other scholars who comment substantially on Heidegger's formulation of syndosis in relation to Kant and figure into the Conceptualism debate. In Section 6, I provide my own conceptualist argument and interpretation of §26 and the B160 note. In Section 7, I consider the broader stakes of the Conceptualism debate, and then

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[6] Golob, 2013, 345.

conclude about how this inflects into the explaining appearances problem, especially in the context of setting up the next chapter which turns to Hegel.

Explaining Appearances and the *A Priori* Unity of Time and Space

In Kant's theory of explaining appearances, the generation of the *a priori* unity of space and time is the central concern, which is configured by the new term and clarification of the *formal intuition* of space and time as specified in §26 and the B160 note. I argue that the straightforward reading in line with Kant's intent is one that flows closely from the third paragraph of §26 which contains the main argument, and which the note is footnoting. The argument is that space and time are themselves intuitions with manifolds that must be unified *a priori* in accordance with the synthesis of all apprehension, which necessarily stands under the categories. Since all appearances are in space and time, the manifold of empirical appearances must be in agreement with that of space and time, namely structured in accordance with the categories, and since space and time are synthesized in accordance with the categories, so too are all empirical representations. The imagination is defined as "an effect of the understanding on sensibility" (§24, B152, 257), by which synthesis in accordance with the categories connects the two faculties of the sensibility and the understanding. However, precisely how this effect operates, and the specific role of the faculty of the imagination is disputed.

Kant's argument at the end of §26 is that the "synthetic unity" of "all apprehension" is "in agreement with the categories, applied to our sensible intuition" (§26, B161, 262). Kant concludes the Transcendental Deduction saying that "consequently all synthesis, through which even perception itself becomes possible, stands under the categories" (§26, B161, 262). Therefore, the main thrust of the "standard" reading of §26 is the view that the understanding has a substantial role, and that there is a wide range of situations as to which the "category-determined synthesis of the understanding" might apply. (At one extreme of the Conceptualism debate discussed later, there is the view that all intuition and perception are category-determined, and that there is no room for any kind of intuition that is not category-determined).

On this "standard" reading of §26, the aspects of the B160 note that need to be explained target what seems to be a paradox. On the one hand in the main text of §26, Kant is specifying a larger role for the understanding, but on the other hand in the B160 note, he seems to be saying that the understanding is also *not* involved in certain ways. On this view (of an increased role for

the understanding in the main text of §26), there are two points to be explained in the note. These are first, the unity that "precedes all concepts" (e.g. categories) and second, the unity of the *a priori* intuition of space and time that "belongs to space and time" themselves and "not to the concept of the understanding," since "the understanding determines the sensibility." The question is how it is that "the formal intuition gives unity of representation" that the "mere form of intuition" cannot, yet apparently does so without involving the categories (i.e. "precedes all concepts"). Further, there is opacity regarding the role of the understanding and the categories in the unity of the *a priori* intuition of space and time since the main text of §26 seems to be clear that the *a priori* unity of space and time is produced through a synthesis of apprehension that falls under the categories, yet the note refers to space and time being "first given as intuitions" that do not belong to "the concept of the understanding." I frame my argument around the critical issues I identify as arising in §26 and the B160 footnote (Table 4). The text of the note is reproduced below along with the text that it is footnoting (the emphasis is Kant's).

> We have **forms** of outer as well as inner sensible intuition *a priori* in the representations of space and time, and the synthesis of the apprehension of the manifold of appearance must always be in agreement with the latter, since it can only occur in accordance with this form. But space and time are represented *a priori* not merely as forms of sensible intuition, but also as intuitions themselves (which contain a manifold), and thus with the determination of the unity of this manifold in them (see the Transcendental Aesthetic).* (§26, B160, 261).

> *Space, represented as **object** (as is really required in geometry), contains more than the mere form of intuition, namely the **comprehension** of the manifold given in accordance with the form of sensibility in an **intuitive** representation, so that the **form of intuition** merely gives the manifold, but the **formal intuition** gives unity of the representation. In the Aesthetic I ascribed this unity merely to sensibility, only in order to note that it precedes all concepts, though to be sure it presupposes a synthesis, which does not belong to the senses but through which all concepts of space and time first become possible. For since through it (as the understanding determines the sensibility) space or time are first **given** as intuitions, the unity of this *a priori* intuition belongs to space and time, and not to the concept of the understanding (§24). (§26, B160, 261)

Table 4. Critical Questions posed by the §26 B160 note.

	Critical Questions
1.	To what is "this unity" referring?
2.	How could "this unity" precede all concepts?
3.	How could "this unity" presuppose a synthesis which does not belong to the senses but through which all concepts of space and time first become possible?
4.	What is the synthesis being referred to in Question 3?
5.	How does the understanding determine sensibility?

Heidegger's Non-conceptual Syndotical Unity of Space and Time

As the first step in staking out the different positions in the Conceptualism debate, I invoke Heidegger as one of the strongest non-conceptual views. Heidegger has an extensive body of work focusing on Kant. There are two central texts, a lecture course, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* (1927-28), and a monograph, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* (1929), sometimes referred to as the *Kantbuch* (Kant book). Most notably, Heidegger posits the notion of *syndosis* (the non-conceptual synthesis of the *a priori* unity of space and time) in the *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*. He does not mention *syndosis* in the 1929 book, but does discuss other terms related to synthesis, namely sensibility-based *synopsis* and *synthesis* in general.

Heidegger's interaction with Kant on the topic of temporality is contentious due to the degree to which he motivates the Kantian positions for his own project. On the one hand, Heidegger derives inspiration from Kant. He says that his investigation into a critical sense of time is heavily inspired by Kant as "the first and only person who has gone any stretch of the way towards investigating the dimension of Temporality."[7] On the other hand, Heidegger quickly motivates Kant's formulations into his own. His notion of temporality can be criticized as being too focused on the finitude of the subject (*Dasein*) and as not having a sufficient connection to the more universal sense of time that Kant characterizes.[8] This section elucidates the relationship between Kant and Heidegger on the topic of time in the context of explaining appearances, specifically Heidegger's account of how the *a priori* unity of space and time arises, and its relation to the Conceptualism debate.

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[7] Heidegger, *Being and Time* (2002), 45.
[8] Alweiss, 2002, 117.

Heidegger thinks that §26 and the B160 note are crucial to Kant's program of explaining appearances and clarifying the intuitions of time and space, and "should not be ignored."[9] Heidegger's motivation in engaging this debate is to counter the "Marburg position" held by neo-Kantians (particularly Natorp) that the Transcendental Aesthetic should be collapsed into the Transcendental Logic. In particular, Heidegger aims to argue against Natorp's claim that the B160 note "proves that space and time originate out of thought."[10] Instead, Heidegger substantiates an argument through the B160 footnote that the *formal intuition* is derivative of and depends on the *form of intuition* as a precondition. I argue that although Heidegger's conclusion is valid (indeed the Transcendental Aesthetic cannot and should not be collapsed into the Transcendental Logic), his line of argumentation is not (the position that there is a non-conceptual synthesis of the *a priori* unity of time and space).

Heidegger's argument relies on the claim that "the formal intuition is not an original representation but a derived one."[11] He thinks that the pure form of intuition cannot be dissolved or downgraded, and therefore concludes overall that the Transcendental Aesthetic could not be collapsed into the Transcendental Logic. (Heidegger uses the terms "form of intuition" and "pure intuition" interchangeably, meaning the pure forms of the intuition of time and space that Kant elaborates in the Transcendental Aesthetic.) Argumentatively, it is not clear that a derivative claim alone would be less valid than a foundational claim, but this is the way Heidegger thinks, here and in general across his work, that the more originary, primordial situation is the most valid. However, I argue that there are other stronger reasons that the Transcendental Aesthetic cannot be collapsed into the Transcendental Logic based on Kant's central claim of time and space being the crucial *a priori* conditions for a mind to have any apperceptions at all.

The suite of critical problems Heidegger identifies as being relevant from §26 and the B160 note are as follows. The main situation is the one concerning "this unity" that "presupposes a synthesis which does not belong to the senses, but through which all concepts of space and time become possible." This is important because for Kant it is "through this synthesis, [that] space and time are first given as intuitions." The crux of problem is that "the unity of this *a*

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[9] Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* (1927-28), 91.
[10] Weatherston, 53 citing Heidegger citing Natorp: Paul Natorp, *Die logischen Grundlagen der exakten Wissenschaften* (Berlin and Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1910), 276; cf. reference in Martin Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, 91 (132).
[11] Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* (1927-28), 91.

priori intuition belongs to space and time, not to the concept of the understanding," as is the usual assumption with synthesis. Thus, Heidegger seeks a formulation of a synthesis which does not belong to the senses, in which the *a priori* unity of the intuition of space and time belong to space and time themselves, and not to the understanding.

Heidegger notes a number of ways that readers might be led astray by Kant. The central problem is "this unity" that "presupposes a synthesis which does not belong to the senses." On the one hand, Kant's text is "ambiguous" for Heidegger because it is not clear where such a synthesis might belong, if not to the senses.[12] Readers might falsely assume that given Kant's two-stem theory of knowledge (sensibility and understanding), a synthesis not belonging to the sensibility would necessarily belong to the understanding. On the other hand, another incorrect surmise would be considering Kant's "three fundamental sources of knowledge," which are sensibility, imagination, and understanding as the sources of cognition (A Deduction, A115, 236). In the triumvirate structure, there are three possibilities, sensibility, imagination, and understanding. Therefore, a synthesis that "does not belong to the senses" and does not belong to "the concept of the understanding" might belong to the imagination.

On this point, I am in opposition to most Kant interpreters, who locate Heidegger's syndosis in the faculty of the imagination. Most Kant interpreters take Heidegger's more well-canvassed "*Kantbuch*" (*Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, 1929) as the reference for this, but I assert that this is not his position in earlier book specifying and discussing syndosis (*Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, 1927-28). In the *Kantbuch*, indeed, much of the discussion is about "The Transcendental Imagination as the Root of Both Stems" of knowledge (sensibility and understanding) (*Kantbuch*, vii). Heidegger discusses the role of the imagination in regard to temporality at length and at one point poses a conditional premise "If the transcendental imagination as the pure formative faculty in itself forms time" (*Kantbuch*, 192). Many scholars take this to mean that Heidegger is locating syndosis (the primordial non-conceptual synthesis of time) in the faculty of the imagination.

However, staying within the earlier position specifying syndosis, although there is a special kind of "transcendental synthesis of the imagination" which configures other aspects of time and space (in the Figurative Synthesis in §24 and the Schematism), this is not the synthesis

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[12] Ibid., 92.

of the originary unity of time and space that Kant is articulating in §26 and the B160 note.[13] Heidegger does not consider "a synthesis which does not belong to the senses" to be one that moves farther along the trajectory towards the imagination and the understanding. Instead, Heidegger goes the other direction and names the pre-sensory originary synthesis of time and space he sees in Kant's text as *syndosis*.

Heidegger's characterization of the originary synthesis of syndosis is as follows. The aim of §26 and the B160 note, per Heidegger, is for Kant to clarify that the notion of "this unity" already lies in the "content of the pure intuitions" of space and time as specified in the Transcendental Aesthetic.[14] The "content" of the pure intuitions of space and time has "this unity," a primordial and originary unity of space and time, which Kant sets forth in the Transcendental Aesthetic (albeit indirectly and as clarified in §26). On Heidegger's view, in the §26 B160 note, Kant states explicitly that he has already dealt with this unity, "which precedes all concepts and all determinations of understanding and which lies in intuition itself, in the aesthetic and has attributed this unity to sensibility, i.e., to pure intuition as such."[15] The clarification of the §26 B160 note is for Kant to say that he attributed "this unity to intuition itself (i.e., to its content, to the pure manifold)," even though this unity *as unity* presupposes a "synthesis" which is not further elaborated in the Transcendental Aesthetic.[16]

Heidegger correctly thinks that confusion arises because Kant uses the word "synthesis" to mean various different kinds of syntheses. Hence, it is necessary to distinguish the relevant kinds of syntheses. Heidegger thinks that with "this unity of the originally one wholeness, Kant associates an original synthesis, which he sometimes designates explicitly as syn-thesis, as a putting together."[17] However, the problem is that the expression "synthesis" is not only ambiguous, but also often used by Kant precisely when he does not mean "a putting together and gathering together by the positing, thetic spontaneity," but rather when he means "a putting together which he understands more as an intuiting together, i.e., as letting-be-encountered."[18] Heidegger understands at least two kinds of synthesis being delineated. First, there is the (more

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[13] Heidegger points out that the "transcendental synthesis of the imagination" is a "synthesis *of* apprehension" which means "synthesis *in the mode of* apprehension" as an imaginative synthesis in accordance with the categories (i.e. not an originary synthesis of space and time per the Transcendental Aesthetic). Ibid., 231.
[14] Ibid., 92.
[15] Ibid., 92.
[16] Ibid., 92.
[17] Ibid., 92.
[18] Ibid., 92-3.

familiar) running through and "gathering together" synthesis undertaken by the understanding, which takes multiple sense impressions in thetic (thesis-oriented) spontaneity to subsume representations under concepts. Second, there is another kind of synthesis that is a "putting together" out of a "letting-be-encountered" that is an "intuiting together." Heidegger notes that by the latter form of synthesis, Kant "actually means synopsis, an original giving-together, i.e., to let the together be encountered out of a unity."[19] There is an originary unity that precedes, that is given, which is encountered. This "letting-be-encountered already in advance out of a unity holds together more originally than any subsequent holding together of what was previously scattered about" (the usual kind of synthesis of the understanding).[20]

For Heidegger, the notion of synopsis indicates evidence that Kant thinks that there is a kind of unity that is an originary wholeness that precedes and is given. However, synopsis does not go far enough on Heidegger's view. He says that the problem is that "the expression synopsis is misleading, as if the manifold of pure space and pure time is only given in their one wholeness when I intuit this manifold together sequentially."[21] Instead of having to intuit the manifold together sequentially, which would already be after the fact, Heidegger seeks a more originary given wholeness of the unity of time and space. This is conveyed in the Transcendental Aesthetic, as the "pure intuition is an advance unifying giving together of the pure manifold of space and time."[22] The important point is that "there is in this intuition an original togetherness whose unity is not the connecting of what is scattered, is not a synthesis."[23] Heidegger names this originary unity as syndosis. He says that "By this syndosis, which belongs to unity as wholeness, space and time are first of all given as intuitions, i.e., as what is purely intuited."[24] The critical upshot is that "this syndosis belongs to space and time [themselves] and not to the concept of understanding."[25] The idea is that space and time as pure intuitions are syndotical, which means that "they give the manifold as an original togetherness from unity as wholeness."[26]

Heidegger thinks that Kant's critical contribution regarding the *a priori* unity of time and space is establishing a different kind of unity and synthesis that is more originary than the

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[19] Ibid., 93.
[20] Ibid., 93.
[21] Ibid., 93.
[22] Ibid., 93.
[23] Ibid., 93.
[24] Ibid., 93.
[25] Ibid., 93.
[26] Ibid., 93.

synthesis of the understanding and the synopsis of the senses. Heidegger thinks that this form of originary synthesis is already present in Kant, not one that Heidegger is inventing (he sees himself as merely naming the synthesis that Kant deploys but does not label separately). Kant invokes "this unity," which in Heidegger's terms is the "originally one wholeness that Kant associates with an original synthesis."[27] The "original synthesis" of syndosis is even more fundamental than the synthesis that belongs to the faculties of the understanding and sensibility, and belongs to space and time themselves.

At the heart of the difference between Kant and Heidegger is how they take the genesis of the wholeness of space and time. The question is the degree to which the wholeness of space and time is given and recognized by the mind or produced by the mind. Heidegger takes Kant's position to be that the *a priori* unity of space and time "is in itself a whole and is not first put together empirically."[28] The originary "unity is fundamentally not a product of a subsequent unification," but "rather this whole is a one, *by itself* and *prior to* the parts."[29] For Heidegger, this is the result of the §26 B160 note and why this clarification is so important. However, Kant is not explicit here about the genesis of the wholeness of space and time. Scholars more readily take the Kantian wholeness of space and time to be generated through a minded process, citing the Schematism in which Kant says that the "successive addition of one homogeneous unit to another to generate [the whole of] time" (Schematism, B182, 274). There is more support for Kant's view to be that time and space are assembled empirically (per the Schematism clarification), and thus the stronger argument regarding Kant's intent does not support Heidegger's claim of a new term, an originary unity (syndosis), that precedes the work of the sensibility and the understanding in recognizing an *a priori* given unity of time and space.

Heidegger's Position: Syntheses of Understanding, Synopsis, and Syndosis

This section discusses in more detail the three kinds of synthesis that Heidegger sees as operating in Kant's text. These are synthesis, synopsis, and syndosis. First is the "regular" and "thetic" (thesis-based or purpose-driven) synthesis of understanding. Second, there is synopsis, which draws information exclusively from the senses. Third is syndosis (Heidegger's term),

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[27] Ibid., 92.
[28] Ibid., 92.
[29] Ibid., 92.

which is the originary one wholeness of time and space. Heidegger thinks the issue is that Kant failed to specify what he meant more clearly in §26 and the B160 note by "this unity" which "presupposes a synthesis which does not belong to the senses, constituting an *a priori* intuition that belongs to space and time." Heidegger claims that he is merely trying to elucidate what Kant meant, and not add anything new or purport to see aspects in Kant's work that are not there.[30] Heidegger thinks that the problem is that Kant uses the term "synthesis" indiscriminately to mean different *kinds* of syntheses, and that such an important and diverse action should be accurately labeled as to how it is being deployed.

To some degree, Heidegger has a good point. Kant does indeed specify different *kinds* of synthesis. One example is Kant indicating a general synthesis and a pure synthesis, and another example is the "regular" synthesis and the sensory synopsis. Setting forth the general synthesis and the pure synthesis in §10, Kant defines synthesis "in the most general sense" as "the action of putting different representations together with each other and comprehending their manifoldness in one cognition" (§10, B102, 210). Kant further clarifies that "such a synthesis is pure if the manifold is given not empirically but *a priori* (as is that in space and time)" (§10, B103, 210). Kant is clearly specifying the definition of two *kinds* of synthesis, one that is general, and one that is specific to space and time, and operates differently, and has a manifold that is given on an *a priori* basis. However, Kant does not indicate, and there is plenty of room for interpretation, as to whether the categories (and the whole B Deduction), are involved in the process of synthesis when the manifold is given *a priori* as in the case of space and time (this is what Kant seems to clarify in §24 and §26, although Heidegger as a non-conceptualist does not agree that the categories are involved in the *a priori* unity of time and space).

I rehearse the important developments of Heidegger's argument here in more detail to demonstrate what he is trying to achieve with the formulation of syndosis. Heidegger starts by elaborating the idea of there being different *kinds* of synthesis in Kant's text (Table 5). As mentioned, Heidegger says that the expression "synthesis" by itself is not only ambiguous, but is

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[30] Scholars have two main complaints about Heidegger's formulation of syndosis and his argument in general. One is that Heidegger is self-serving in his interpretation of Kant, using the analysis to support his own finitude-based temporality. The other is that it is inaccurate and unhelpful to specify "syndosis" as a term that does not appear in Kant's work directly. On the first point, Heidegger's critical argument is strong enough to be taken as genuine in trying to oppose the Marburg position of collapsing the Transcendental Aesthetic into the Transcendental Logic, irrespective of whether there are other motivations in the background. On the second point, it does seem that coining a new term when interpreting a philosopher's work could be a bit tricky, especially if the term is seen as being superfluous (as Longuenesse indicates for example (Longuenesse (*Kant and the Capacity to Judge* (1998), 224-5).

also used by Kant when he does not mean the "putting together and gathering together" of a thetic synthesis of understanding, but rather when he means a "*putting* together which he understands more as an *intuiting* together, i.e., as letting-be-encountered out of a unity."[31] Heidegger thinks that Kant designates this second kind of synthesis as *synopsis* (a non-conceptual synthesis conducted by the senses). Kant does specify synopsis explicitly, discussing the "synopsis of the manifold *a priori* through sense," which is in line with Heidegger's characterization (A Deduction, A95, 225).[32] For Heidegger, synopsis is important because it precedes the synthesis of the understanding in "thetic spontaneity."[33] Synopsis is a "letting-be-encountered already in advance out of a unity that holds together more originally than any subsequent holding together of what was previously scattered about."[34] (Heidegger discusses synopsis in more depth in the *Kantbuch*, pp., 99-102, similarly emphasizing its importance.)

Table 5. Three Kinds of Synthesis: Comparison of Syndosis, Synopsis, and Synthesis.

	Syndosis	Synopsis	Synthesis
Definition	An *a priori* unity of time and space that arrives in consciousness and is not "intuited together sequentially"	The merest of precepts given in sensibility	Putting together as the action of putting representations together into one cognition
Kant's view	Not called out separately, would be conceptual (formal intuition)	Non-conceptual (A95, 225)	Conceptual (B151, B161)
Heidegger's view	Non-conceptual	Non-conceptual	Conceptual

However, Heidegger thinks that synopsis is not enough. For Heidegger, the problem is that in synopsis, "the manifold of pure space and pure time is only given in their one wholeness when I intuit this manifold together sequentially."[35] Heidegger therefore thinks that an additional formulation is needed to specify "space and time as pure intuitions that give the manifold as an

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[31] Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* (1927-28), 92-3.
[32] Kant mentions synopsis very few times (particularly as compared with the workhorse notion of synthesis). Synopsis appears in Kant's discussion of the three original sources (capacities or faculties of the soul) which contain the conditions of possibility for all experience: sense, imagination, and apperception. Upon these faculties are grounded (1) the synopsis of the manifold *a priori* through sense; (2) synthesis of this manifold through imagination; finally (3) the unity of this synthesis through original apperception (A95, 225). Kant does not say a lot about it, merely referring to the "synopsis of the manifold *a priori* through sense," which is in line with Heidegger's characterization. There is an activity happening through sense, synopsis, which results in an *a priori* manifold, without determination by concepts. Synopsis is also mentioned in Kant's discussion of the three original faculties that are the conditions of possibility for all experience (A95, 225), that proceeds and is configured into the three-fold synthesis of cognition (A98, pp. 228-30).
[33] Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* (1927-28), 93.
[34] Ibid.
[35] Ibid.

original togetherness from unity as wholeness."[36] The issue is how the originary manifolds of space and time are produced such that other appearings can then appear in (pre-existing) time and space. This is a confusing move of Heidegger's because Kant too seems to see this problem and resolves it in §26 by clarifying that space and time are "themselves intuitions (which contain a manifold)" which is unified per the "synthesis of all apprehension" and necessarily "stands under the categories" §26, (B161, 261-2).

The distinction is that whereas Kant tilts toward a category-determined synthesis for the *a priori* unification of space and time, Heidegger directs the solution to a more fundamental formulation in the other direction, even farther away from category-determined synthesis (which he thinks is derivative and not fundamental or preceding). To some extent, it could be argued that Heidegger and Kant are naming the same thing, which is the *a priori* unification of space and time in a synthesis. Heidegger labels the synthesis *syndosis* and thinks it is non-conceptual and more originary than consciousness "intuiting the manifold together sequentially" (or as Kant says in the Schematism, creating a "representation that summarizes the successive addition of one (homogeneous) unit to another" (Schematism, B182, 274)). Kant appears to label this synthesis (that provides the *a priori* unification of time and space) as the *formal intuition* of time and space, which is conceptual and category-determined, and most importantly, requires a consciousness to perform the unification.

Kant clarifies in §15 that any unity requires unification (by a mind). Kant says that "all combination is action of the understanding; the combination of a manifold can never be contained in the pure form of sensible intuition" (§15, B130, 245). This means that for Kant, unification is always a minded operation involving the categories (this is what "combination as an action of the understanding" indicates). There is no *a priori* unification that is not performed as a category-based minded operation for Kant. For Heidegger, though, whereas the *formal intuition* specified in §26 may be a combination, the *pure intuition* (*form of intuition*) in the Transcendental Aesthetic is not. Heidegger's argument is that the *formal intuition* is a derivative operation of the understanding which comes after the originary synthetic *a priori* unification of space and time in the Transcendental Aesthetic. Heidegger is a careful reader of Kant, and sees Kant's proposal in §26, However, since Kant's formulation is category-based, for Heidegger it is derivative as opposed to preceding and originary, and therefore does not solve the problem of

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[36] Ibid.

obtaining an *a priori* unification of time and space that is already in effect in order that concepts may be applied by the understanding. Heidegger is trying to articulate this more originary preceding position with the notion of *syndosis*.

There are two issues of contention between Heidegger and Kant. One is that for Heidegger, any activity involving the understanding cannot precede, it can only be derivative. Kant, though is trying to say (in the B160 note) that he meant that in fact, the understanding can precede and is already necessarily part of the operation of the *a priori* unification of space and time discussed in the Transcendental Aesthetic (and that without the work of the understanding on the manifold of sensibility, there would be no unity). The second issue between Heidegger and Kant is the notion of givenness. For Kant, the *a priori* manifold is given, but in itself has no unity. Receptivity (sensibility) and spontaneity (understanding) operate together such that "the form of intuition merely gives the manifold, but the formal intuition gives unity of the representation" (§26, B160, 261). Ultimately consciousness produces the unity (there is no unity without consciousness performing the unification). For Heidegger, though, there is some degree of givenness of the world with which consciousness [*Dasein*] interacts without having to unify. One of the best examples of the given "wordliness of the world" for Heidegger is the "the clearing" which is revealed (unconcealed) to *Dasein* under certain conditions and aletheia (unconcealed truth) is possible. There is some access to the external world for Heidegger, but not for Kant. For Kant, there is no "clearing," there is nothing that consciousness does not intuit and produce for itself (with the understanding (spontaneity) acting on the manifold of sensibility (receptivity)). In Heidegger's positing of *syndosis*, the critical question is the relation between consciousness and givenness (i.e. to what extent consciousness is producing the conditions of possibility of experience and to what extent they are given), versus Kant's view that ultimately everything in consciousness is produced by the understanding acting on the sensibility.

Unfolding the heart of the argument in more detail, the critical issue at stake for both Heidegger and Kant is the *a priori* unity of space and time. The question is how the unification occurs. The answer is that space and time are unified, through some sort of relationship between givenness (sensibility's receptivity) and unification (understanding's productive spontaneity and application of the categories in a rule-determined synthesis, also in some sort of connection with the productive imagination). The specifics of the unification and the interaction between givenness and consciousness differ by interpreter. In §26 (including the B160 note), Kant

supports the category-determined unification of space and time (even in the Transcendental Aesthetic), whereas Heidegger leans more on the givenness of syndotical unity (prior to the "synthetic unity of concepts"). Explaining the note, it is possible to see that both Heidegger's notion of the syndotical unity of space and time and Kant's idea of the category-determined unity of space and time could have a way of "belonging to space and time" in the sense that space and time are unified as their own unities (whether via concepts or not). However, Heidegger's unity is non-conceptually-determined and Kant's is category-determined (conceptual).

Here is the full text of the passage in which Heidegger posits syndosis (to specify the *a priori* unity of space and time that consciousness does not "intuit together sequentially").

> Pure intuition is an advance unifying giving together of the pure manifold of space and time. There is in this intuition an original togetherness whose unity is not the connecting of what is scattered, is not a synthesis. But even the expression "synopsis" is misleading, as if the manifold of pure space and pure time is only given in their one wholeness when I intuit this manifold together sequentially. Even this would be only a synthesis. Hence, we need here another expression, namely *syndosis*. [Syndosis means] to give along with, give together, give something along with something else; connection. Space and time as pure intuitions are syndotical, meaning thereby that they give the manifold as an original togetherness from unity as wholeness. By this syndosis, which belongs to unity as wholeness, space and time are first of all *given* as intuitions, i.e., as what is purely intuited, while the unity which belongs to syndosis - and thus this syndosis or synopsis itself - belongs to space and time and not to the concept of understanding. This means that the unity of syndosis is not the unity which belongs to the synthesis of understanding in concepts, i.e., categories. Rather, the synthetic unity of concepts, i.e., categories, presupposes this original, intuitive, syndotical unity. (Heidegger, 1927-28, 93)

The first point of clarification implied by Heidegger's formulation of *syndosis* is that syndosis is part of pure intuition, and is non-conceptual and precedes the activity of the understanding. The two questions arising from the characterization of Kant's and Heidegger's positions are resolved. Regarding the interrelation of givenness and consciousness, in Heidegger's specification of *syndosis*, it is clear that consciousness is unifying the givenness. The *a priori* unity of space and time is not merely (or completely) given to consciousness in *syndosis*. Syndotical synthesis is a unification performed by consciousness. However, the distinction is that the whereas the *a priori* unity of space and time for Heidegger (via syndotical synthesis) is non-conceptual, for Kant (via formal intuition) it is conceptual. Further, since

Heidegger's syndotical synthesis does not involve concepts, it can be queried how, in fact, consciousness performs this unification, what the 'rules' would be if the categories and the logical forms of judgment are not involved in a rule-governed synthesis. There is little structure or criteria available to support and derive an alternative answer (and indicate its universality). Heidegger's response might be that consciousness simply performs the unification out of a given togetherness and a letting-be-encountered together. Even for Heidegger, some kind of an act of consciousness is required to recognize or perform the *a priori* unification of space and time. The operation of unification is non-conceptual for Heidegger and conceptual for Kant, but the outcome (the *a priori* unity of space and time) is the same.

The other question is whether what Heidegger labels syndosis is identical to what Kant specifies as pure synthesis. They are similar, however for Kant, a pure synthesis may involve the categories, but not for Heidegger in syndosis. Although the two formulations pertain to the "manifold not being given empirically but *a priori* (as in the case of space and time)" (§10, B103, 210), the way Kant and Heidegger understand the term "synthesis" is different. Kant's notion is that synthesis is "the action of putting different representations together with each other and comprehending their manifoldness in one cognition" (§10, B102, 210). For Heidegger, synthesis is more fluid, and includes more givenness that is unordered, a "letting-be-encountered already in advance out of a unity" and "an original togetherness from unity as wholeness."[37] Heidegger is aiming to oppose the thetic (conceptual) synthesis with the syndotical unity that belongs to space and time themselves, as he takes to be indicated in the §26 B160 note.

Heidegger's formulation of syndosis and the related argument solve the problems as he has characterized them from the §26 B160 note (Table 6). Heidegger explains that "this unity which does not belong to the senses" belongs to space and time themselves. By "this unity," Kant is invoking, in Heidegger's terms, the "originally one wholeness that Kant associates with an original synthesis."[38] This "original synthesis" is even more fundamental than the synthesis that belongs to the senses; it belongs to space and time themselves. The "original synthesis" is also prior to the "regular" thetic synthesis. Whereas the thetic synthetic unity belongs to the concept of understanding, syndotical synthetic unity belongs to space and time. Heidegger refers to these two positions (even though both involve different kinds of synthesis) as first, "synthetic

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[37] Ibid.
[38] Ibid., 92.

unity" (to designate the general kind of synthesis involving the concepts and the understanding), and second as "syndotical unity" (to indicate the special kind of synthesis involved in producing the *a priori* unity in the pure intuitions of space and time). A further claim of Heidegger's is that the originary syndotical unity preconditions the general synthetic unity.

Table 6. Heidegger's Answers to the Critical Questions posed by the §26 B160 note.

	Questions	Answers
1.	To what is "this unity" referring?	Originary syndotical unity of time and space (form of intuition) as articulated in the Transcendental Aesthetic
2.	How could "this unity" precede all concepts?	The syndotical unity belongs to the *a priori* intuitions of space and time as wholes and is non-conceptual; syndotical unity is a synthesis of the imagination and prior to concepts, as opposed to the thetic or general synthetic unity of concepts performed by the understanding
3.	How could "this unity" presuppose a synthesis which does not belong to the senses but through which all concepts of space and time first become possible?	The originary unity of time and space presupposes a syndotical synthesis which belongs to time and space themselves, through which all delimited concepts of time and space become possible
4.	What is the synthesis in Question 3?	Syndotical synthesis
5.	How the understanding determines sensibility?	Sensibility and understanding become unified through the "common root" of synthesis in the unification of syndosis and synthetic combination in knowledge as "thinking intuition"

Analysis of Heidegger's Position

The important practical stakes of Heidegger's syndosis formulation are in the form of a delimitation argument for geometry, which implicates a broader related argument for the conceptualization of parts and wholes. Having posited syndosis, Heidegger mobilizes the formulation to consider geometrical objects. He thinks that the *pure intuition* is the original wholeness of time and space, and that the *formal intuition* is time and space as delimited into a specific geometrical object (the §26 B160 note begins with "Space, represented as object (as is really required in geometry)." Heidegger argues that space as one wholeness (from the Transcendental Aesthetic) precedes any specific delimitation into a geometrical object. He says that in the formal intuition of "geometry, pure space properly becomes object of a comprehension - space as what is viewed in pure intuition initially in a non-objective way as *one wholeness*."[39] For Heidegger, syndosis is the originary unity of space and time, and precedes all

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[39] Ibid.

determinations by the understanding, which come later, to instantiate geometrical objects (the whole of "pure space becomes [delimited] as an object of comprehension").

Heidegger's delimitation argument for geometry (the understanding delimits geometrical objects out of the wholeness of pure space) is an example of his broader argument about parts and wholes. For Heidegger, the originary whole (of whatever quantity) precedes, and becomes delimited into specific instances in a minded operation. Heidegger's "whole that becomes pieces" claim about space is at odds with the notion of space that Kant develops in the B Deduction and the Schematism as a "parts that become whole" phenomenon through the cognition of construction. The Schematism discusses the "successive addition of one homogeneous unit to another to generate time" (Schematism, B182, 274). §24 describes how "we cannot think of a line without drawing it in thought…successively determining inner sense" (§24, B155, 258). However, it is already clear that Heidegger's view will be one of preferencing the more originary unity of one whole space, as the problem he tries to overcome by specifying syndosis is that space and time as *a priori* unities that are required to precede as that in which any other appearings can appear in time and space. For Heidegger, this establishes space and time more fundamentally than elements which consciousness must "intuit together sequentially" to comprise a manifold. Heidegger's point is clear, but in contravention to the way Kant specifies how the whole of time and space is generated, in a mind-based construction.

Heidegger raises a good point, though, namely whether the one wholeness of time and space implicated in the Transcendental Aesthetic vanished in Kant's later time determination arguments about the successive assembly of "parts" of time into a whole made in the B Deduction and the Schematism. The most defensible answer is that any geometrical object could be said to represent or contain within it the pure form of the spatial whole as the condition of possibility for its existence. Another possible answer is that in the B Deduction, elaborating more of the details of how space operates in cognition (in the theme of CPR's overall progression from abstract to concrete), indeed the Transcendental Aesthetic is revised as space is clearly understood in the Figurative Synthesis of the Imagination (§24) and the Schematism as an assembly of pieces. A further argument is that for the operation of cognition, it can be cashed out that it simply does not matter if there is one whole space in apprehension, because the only kind of space relevant for the conditions of experience is the kind of space that is assembled by

consciousness as homogeneous units placed sequentially after one another.[40] The point is that Heidegger's view (space as whole delimited into parts) differs from Kant's view (in the B Deduction and the Schematism as parts of homogeneous space assembled into the whole in the cognition of space through construction).

The final part of Heidegger's syndosis argument suggests that there is a "common root" of synthesis that pertains to the different kinds of synthesis. Heidegger claims that not only does Kant fail to adequately delineate the different kinds of synthesis, but also that they have a common root (which is not surprising as Heidegger often aims at a more foundational originary position). Heidegger thinks that under the notion of synthesis, Kant brings together "a series of quite different phenomena without differentiating them sufficiently from one another and without allowing them to emerge from their common root."[41] Under the general notion of synthesis, Heidegger thinks that Kant consolidates at least three different kinds of synthesis (different from syndosis, synopsis, and synthesis as clarified earlier). These three kinds of synthesis are the *syndotical unification* (unity as the original oneness of wholeness), the *synthetic combination* (the "regular" unity as categorical concept of possible connection in judgment), and also the unification of these two positions, *syndosis and synthesis*, together in knowledge as "thinking intuition."[42] Heidegger sees a synthetic unity of syntheses. The point is that Heidegger wants to argue that all of the different kinds of synthesis have a common root with a basis in an intuitive form of thinking (thinking intuition). I take the effect to be that Heidegger indicates a helpful consolidated model for understanding Kant's diverse operations of synthesis. Kant does not specifically designate such a "common root," but does frame the different kinds of synthesis as emanating from the general definition of synthesis as "the action of putting different representations together with each other and comprehending their manifoldness in one cognition" (§10, B102, 210).

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[40] There are diverse views on Kant's parts-whole argument for space and time. For example, on the one hand, Bergson critiques that Kant's regarding "both time and space as homogeneous" (*Time and Free Will*, 233) means that he "did not notice that real duration is made up of moments inside one another" (*Time and Free Will*, 232). If Kant's notion of time only consists of homogeneous units being added to one another sequentially, it precludes there being a more durational sense of time in which moments overlap; Kant's time is quantitative not qualitative; only Chronos (clock time) not Kairos (opportune time). On the other hand, Adorno agrees with Kant's assembling pieces of space into a whole argument, that "the general representation of space is formed by adding together existing spaces so that they fit together. There is nothing further to be said about it; it really is a matter of this additive process" (Adorno, 229).

[41] Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* (1927-28), 95.

[42] Ibid.

Overall, the critical contributions of Heidegger's syndosis argument are as follows. First, Heidegger clarifies a robust view of the definitions and the scope of the key temporal and spatial terms that are under-specified by Kant - the *form of intuition* and the *formal intuition*. Second, he separates the notions of unity and synthesis, and clarifies different kinds of unity and synthesis, including with a new term, syndosis. This is useful because the assumption when interpreting Kant might be that unity and synthesis are lumped together, and that unity presupposes synthesis and that synthesis presupposes conceptual-determination. However, Heidegger distinguishes unity and synthesis, and promotes the idea of there being different kinds of unity and synthesis. Third, Heidegger contributes practical conceptual resources regarding a formulation of how space becomes delimited into a specific representation of space as a geometrical object.

Completing his own agenda, Heidegger supplies what he thinks is an adequate argument to oppose the "Marburg position" of neo-Kantians such as Natorp who want to collapse the Transcendental Aesthetic into the Transcendental Logic. Heidegger claims (contra Natorp) that "space and time do not originate out of thought,"[43] but rather through the pure intuition of time and space (as specified in the Transcendental Aesthetic), unified in an *a priori* syndotical synthesis. Heidegger grounds his position on the claim that "the formal intuition is a derived representation, not an original representation."[44]

In fact, supporting Heidegger's point, it is true that the *formal intuition* is only mentioned once, very briefly in the Transcendental Logic (and the whole of CPR), in a footnote (the §26 B160 footnote), whereas pure intuition (the *form of intuition*) is elaborated extensively in several pages in the Transcendental Aesthetic (§1-8). I believe this point already signals the extent and breadth of the Transcendental Aesthetic, and that it could not possibly be subsumed by the Transcendental Logic. Heidegger's further argument is not required to substantiate the point, and as I mentioned, derivative positions are not necessarily invalid. Heidegger, though, pursues his argument that the formal intuition, which gives determinate time and space, is conditioned upon and presupposes the original syndotical unity of time and space as given in the pure intuition. Since the formal intuition is a derivative of the pure intuition, it is essentially invalidated on

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[43] Natorp claims that the B160 note "proves that space and time originate out of thought" (Weatherston, 53 citing Heidegger citing Natorp: Paul Natorp, *Die logischen Grundlagen der exakten Wissenschaften* (Berlin and Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1910), 276; cf. reference in Martin Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, 91 (132)).
[44] Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* (1927-28), 91.

Heidegger's view because it does not precede. Heidegger is correct though, that Kant "never intended to dissolve the Transcendental Aesthetic into the Transcendental Logic."[45] Heidegger continues to elaborate his argument, primarily based on the reasoning rehearsed here, and also by citing other Kantian works and correspondence (such as the *Prolegomena*, and Kant's review of Kastner's *Abhandlung*).

A final point is that many scholars misread Heidegger's account of syndosis as being rooted in the faculty of the imagination. They are steered off course by Heidegger's framing comment: "But this negative statement that the unity does not belong to the senses or to sensibility is ambiguous, since, on the one hand, unity can belong to understanding or, because Kant speaks of three fundamental sources of knowledge, to the power of imagination."[46] Since "this unity" does not belong to sensibility, or to the understanding, and because Heidegger mentions the "power of the imagination," uncareful readers assume it to be rooted in the imagination. However, Heidegger's (and Kant's) point is that "this unity" belongs to "space and time" themselves, as I argued previously. For Heidegger, the point is that such a synthesis (syndosis) is extra-faculties or pre-faculties, prior to the involvement of the faculties (whether sensibility and understanding, or sensibility, imagination, and understanding). The primordial syndosis, although involving some degree of mindedness to recognize the letting-be-encountered out of the originary togetherness, precedes the substantial involvement of the faculties, and in any case is not rooted in the imagination. Heidegger says a formulation more primordial than synopsis is required, and synopsis only involves the sensibility (not the imagination or the understanding). Hence Heidegger specifies syndosis. The imagination already involves the categories and conceptual content, which is anathema to Heidegger in seeking an even more primordial and originary formulation of a synthesis such as syndosis. Even though Heidegger refers to "the power of the imagination," it is in the context of the "ambiguity" in Kant's text, and not at all part of the characterization of syndosis. However, scholars widely take syndosis (incorrectly) to be rooted in the faculty of the imagination, including Weatherston and Onof & Schulting, whom I discuss subsequently as foils to Heidegger.

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[45] Ibid., 95.
[46] Ibid., 92.

Weatherston's Category-determined Unity of Time and Space

In this section, I introduce Weatherston as a strong proponent of conceptualism to counterweight Heidegger's non-conceptualism. Weatherston is also distinctive in having an atypical view that there is an effect of the understanding on sensibility without involving the imagination. This is in strident contrast to the constantly increasing role of the imagination to address the problem of time in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (CPR), which is taken up by most interpreters. Weatherston is a useful foil since his expounded view provides a clean look at the role of the understanding, and because the lack of involvement of the imagination in determining the unity of space and time seems so patently wrong in a reading of CPR. My reading and the standard reading of CPR is that the faculty of the productive imagination is involved in time determinations (most notably in the §24 Figurative Synthesis of the Imagination and the Schematism), which determine the *a priori* unity of space and time. Weatherston seems to read Kant compartmentally as opposed to cumulatively, which could explain the characterization of only seeing the operation of understanding in §26 determining the unity of space and time, without the time determinations of the productive imagination in §24.

The important part of Kant's argument for Weatherston is at the end of the B Deduction, in §26 (at the end of the third paragraph), where Kant claims that "everything that is to be represented in space and time must agree…with the synthesis of all apprehension…and all synthesis…stands under the categories" (§26, B161, 262). Indeed this is how Kant concludes the weighty portion of CPR that is the Transcendental Deduction, and the key denouement. It is also true that imagination is not referred to directly in §26 as the crescendo of the argument (there is only a minimal reference at the end of the B160 note to §24). However, since §24 explains "the synthesis of the manifold of sensible intuition" (§25, B151, 256) through the Figurative Synthesis of the Imagination, and §26 discusses time and space as "intuitions themselves (which contain a manifold)" (§26, B160, 261), imagination would be attributed, and in any case not claimed to be absent from, the operation of the synthesis of all apprehension in accordance with the categories described in §26. For Weatherston, though, it is only the understanding in the end.

Weatherston's Position on §26 and the B160 Note

Weatherston is cognizant of the issues I mention in interpreting §26 and the B160 note. He suggests a simple repair to explain the "precedes all concepts" problem inherent in the note (Table 7). This is to read the text as "precedes any *derived* (empirical) concept,"[47] but not preceding the pure concepts of the understanding. Adding this clarification to Kant's text, Weatherston's reading of the note would be that "the unity of the formal intuition precedes any *empirically-derived* concepts of things in space and time, and presupposes a synthesis of the understanding which does not belong to the senses through but which all concepts of space and time first become possible." I think this is a useful and accurate clarification of Kant's intent.

Regarding the next ambiguity in the note, Weatherston's opinion is that the unity referred to in "this unity" is the unity of the formal intuition of time and space. On his view, the unity of the formal intuition can (and must) precede all concepts in the sense of taking "concept" as referring to the derived concepts of things *in* space and time, not the originary intuitions of space and time. The originary formulation of time and space must be "prior to" any specific concept of things in space and time. The first claim, that "this unity" refers to the formal intuition of space and time is the usual reading of the note (Heidegger's reading is idiosyncratic in claiming that "this unity" refers to the pure intuition of space and time). However, Weatherston, Heidegger, and Kant agree that the unity of space and time must be prior to appearances in space and time.

Considering the synthesis which "this unity" presupposes that does not belong to the senses, Weatherston has a matter-of-fact view. Per Kant's two stems of knowledge theory, a synthesis which does not belong to the senses would necessarily belong to the understanding. Weatherston's argument for how "this unity" presupposes a synthesis which does not belong to the senses, but through which all concepts of space and time first become possible is as follows. He thinks that "the understanding appropriates the conditions of sensibility in the formal intuition through a synthesis of the understanding which is the mechanism that gives space and time as unified sensible representations."[48] What differentiates Weatherston's view is that he constantly emphasizes a connection between intuition and understanding that does not rely on the imagination (the power of the receptive or productive imagination).

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[47] Weatherston, *Heidegger's Interpretation of Kant: Categories, Imagination, and Temporality* (2002), 65.
[48] Ibid., 66.

Through "this synthesis of the understanding," relying on a unity which does not belong to the senses but rather the understanding, the crux of Weatherston's argument is the claim that the faculty of imagination is not needed for the unity of intuition and thought because this is produced out of the interaction of these two equally original faculties on their own. His view is that Kant connects the unity of intuition with the unity of apperception directly through the categories (directly in the sense of not needing the imagination but not that the understanding acts "directly" on sensibility for it can only act indirectly). According to Weatherston, Kant sets up his system such that the understanding can take the conditions of sensibility into itself in a way that allows the understanding to apply its laws to anything that appears in sensibility.[49] This is a rule-governed synthesis argument in that the categories are involved in determining everything (exemplar of the strong view of the Conceptualism debate that does not allow for any kind of determination that does not involve the categories).

For Weatherston, the unity of the formal intuitions of space and time is different from the unity of empirical objects in space and time. This is because the unity of objects in space and time requires the (empirical) concept of an object in intuition in order to unify the synthesis of the manifold. Formal intuitions, however, relate directly to apperception (by connecting the sensibility and the understanding through the categories because the categories are involved in all synthesis). Since the unity of space and time as formal intuitions precedes any (empirical) concept of an object in space and time, this is how the synthetic unity belongs to space and time themselves and not to the understanding (even though the understanding is involved in the synthesis via apperception and the categories).

Weatherston's argument provides one answer to the question of how the understanding determines the sensibility, which is exclusively through the categories (contrasting with Longuenesse for example, who thinks that understanding determines sensibility through the Figurative Synthesis of the Imagination (as discussed by Kant in §24, B152, 257)). Weatherston's evidence is Kant's indication in §26, right after the note, that "all synthesis…stands under the categories" (§26, B161, 262). Since all synthesis is subject to the categories, Weatherston thinks that "the categories can be identified as the formal basis of that synthesis that brings the conditions of receptivity into the formal intuitions of space and time."[50]

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[49] Ibid., 65.
[50] Ibid., 63-4.

This is not a conflict Weatherston thinks, because categories are "not themselves concepts of objects,"[51] but as Kant clarifies in §24, "mere *forms of thought*, through which alone no determinate object is known" (§24, B150, 256). Weatherston is not wrong in that Kant's key message in §26 is that "all synthesis…stands under the categories" (§26, B161, 262), but a more nuanced reading is warranted that involves the role of the imagination in time determination.

       Weatherston's argument hinges on the distinction between "empirical concepts of objects" and categories as "pure concepts" or "forms of thought" (this is what allows him to see the categories (as the pure concepts) doing so much critical work on their own that they are able to connect the receptivity of sensibility with the spontaneity of understanding. Terminology is crucial to understanding Kant, and Weatherston's reliance on terminology raises the issue that due to terminology conflation, commentator views may be in less conflict than it seems. It is not that parallel terminology would render the arguments identical, but rather that thinkers determine their views based on what they take the terminology to mean. For example, a big portion of the conceptualism debate focuses on what scholars take the terms "conceptual" and "non-conceptual" to mean. Heidegger complains that Kant uses the terms "unity" and "synthesis" to mean different things. Heidegger (and others) could likewise grumble that Kant uses the term "concept" indiscriminately across CPR as he does in the note ("precedes all concepts"), which might variously refer to empirical concepts (as Weatherston clarifies), the pure concepts of judgment (categories), and the "concepts of space and time" (§26, B160n, 261).

Table 7. Weatherston's Answers to the Critical Questions posed by the §26 B160 note.

	Questions	Answers
1.	To what is "this unity" referring?	The formal intuition of space and time via the understanding
2.	How could "this unity" precede all concepts?	The unity of the formal intuition is prior to all *empirical* concepts of objects, but not prior to the *a priori* intuitions of time and space, which are category-determined
3.	How could "this unity" presuppose a synthesis which does not belong to the senses but through which all concepts of space and time first become possible?	Through the understanding: the understanding appropriates the conditions of sensibility in the formal intuition through a synthesis of the understanding which gives space and time as unified sensible representations. The pure intuitions of space and time presuppose the action of the categories
4.	What is the synthesis in Question 3?	A synthesis of the understanding
5.	How does the understanding determine sensibility?	The understanding determines sensibility in the formal intuition through a synthesis of the understanding which gives space and time as unified sensible representations through the categories

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[51] Ibid., 64.

The upshot for Weatherston is that there is a unity of intuition and thought (sensibility and understanding) produced on an *a priori* basis that is synthetic and original, in the synthetic unity of space and time as formal intuitions. This is how the unity of space and time as formal intuitions produce the unity of intuition and thought (by the argument of both being synthesized in accordance with the categories, space and time most fundamentally (i.e. precedingly)). For Weatherston, no third entity (such as the "mediating representation" of the imagination as the "third thing" (Schematism, B177, 272) is necessary (imagination, whether as syndosis (per Heidegger) or figurative synthesis (per Longuenesse)) because the understanding determines the sensibility (acting indirectly but without the imagination).

Weatherston's Critique of Heidegger

Recapitulating the positions, Heidegger's syndosis (the syndotical synthesis) is an *a priori* unification of space and time that is non-conceptual (not determined by the categories). Weatherston's account of the unification of space and time is rooted in the formal intuition as a category-determined synthesis of the understanding acting on the sensibility that "does not require a third faculty of imagination from which to spring."[52] Since Weatherston sees the unity of intuition and understanding produced through the categories ("all synthesis stands under the categories" (§26, B161, 262)), his main disagreement with Heidegger is that he thinks that Heidegger needlessly specifies syndosis as an externally-contrived mechanism for the unity between sensibility and understanding.

Weatherston reads Heidegger accurately, and overall, disagrees with his position. Weatherston first quibbles with the foundation of Heidegger's argument. Weatherston thinks that Heidegger's view requires a "tortuous" reading of the B160 note when a straightforward one would suffice, such as his own "less violent" interpretation.[53] The distinctive aspect of Heidegger's approach is that Heidegger sees the "unity" discussed in the note as relating to the *form of intuition*, not the *formal intuition*. Indeed, many scholars analyzing the B160 note focus on "this unity" as pertaining to the *formal intuition*, rather than the *form of intuition*. One reason this makes sense is because *formal intuition* occurs for the first time in the note as a new term with which Kant is trying to clarify that the representations of space and time are [formal]

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[52] Ibid., 66.
[53] Ibid., 54.

"intuitions themselves (which contain a manifold)" (§26, B160, 261). Weatherston disagrees with Heidegger's reading on the grounds that the basic grammar of the sentences in the note suggest that the "this" of "this unity" would not refer to any unity other than the one mentioned so far, namely that of formal intuition.[54] Since Kant says in the B160 note that "this synthesis is the means by which the *understanding* determines the sensibility," it would be far more natural to claim that the note discusses the unity of formal intuition than to claim that it discusses a unity of the form of intuition which Kant does not mention otherwise.[55] From a literal perspective, this is true, and exactly why scholars scratch their heads as to what Kant means by "this unity."

Weatherston's next problem with Heidegger's argument is Heidegger's use of the terms synthesis and unity. Weatherston does not agree with Heidegger's liberal reinterpretation of the word synthesis to mean a non-conceptual syndosis when it is clear that Kant intends (and states) synthesis to imply conceptual content.[56] Weatherston has a valid complaint. The "standard" interpretation of Kant is that synthesis is necessarily category-determined and therefore involves conceptual content (as described in the main text of §26 and in Weatherston's refrain of Kant's key message in §26 that "all synthesis stands under the categories" (§26, B161, 262). However, there is some wiggle room as this point is exactly one of contention for scholars, and the focus of my analysis, which is regarding how the *a priori* unity of space and time is conceptually-determined. It is not clear to what extent the categories apply to the pure synthesis Kant distinguishes in §10 in which "the manifold is given not empirically but *a priori* (as is that in space and time)" (§10, B103, 210). My view is that of the "standard" reading (which is in line with Weatherston on this point), that the pure synthesis is also a category-determined synthesis, and the whole point of the §26 B160 note is to clarify this.

Weatherston also disagrees with Heidegger's claim that there are different kinds of unity as syndotical unity and synthetic unity. Weatherston's line of reasoning runs as follows. In the B160 note, Kant does not describe how unity might pertain to the *form of intuition*, and only mentions unity (on Weatherston's reading) in relation to the *formal intuition*: "the *form of intuition* merely gives the manifold, but the *formal intuition* gives unity of the representation." Heidegger and Weatherston read Kant's lack of explicitation in different ways. Weatherston

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[54] Ibid., 53-4.
[55] Ibid., 54.
[56] Ibid.

takes it to be "strong evidence for the position that Kant does not attribute any unity to the form of intuition."[57] Heidegger, on the other hand, finds a more nuanced view that unity would have to necessarily be part of the form of intuition. For Heidegger, the unity of representation given by the *formal intuition* "is not a unity which would be added to a manifold without unity," and is "a synthetic unity which is only possibly on the basis of a syndotical unity, which is given in intuition as such."[58] (Most scholars would also see the form of intuition as a unity, though the degree to which the unity is conceptually-determined is unsettled).

Weatherston thinks that the "unity of intuition" Kant alludes to in the Transcendental Aesthetic (the original unities of time and space) is the "same unity" that the B160 note attributes to the act in which the understanding determines the sensibility.[59] This is the position that the formal intuition is already in the Transcendental Aesthetic (which Longuenesse also supports). Weatherston discusses that in the B160 note, Kant says he attributes "this unity" to sensibility in the Transcendental Aesthetic, when in fact, it presupposes a synthesis that does not belong to the senses. For Weatherston, therefore, the presupposed synthesis that does not belong to the senses belongs to the understanding. Further, Weatherston thinks that there is just one kind of unity. On Weatherston's view, one either accepts Heidegger's (incorrect) reading that there is a syndotical unity in the *form of intuition*, or that there is a (category-determined) synthetic unity in the *formal intuition* which extends back to the "original oneness of space and time" described in the Transcendental Aesthetic.[60]

Weatherston's main critique of Heidegger is that Heidegger's formulation of syndosis is superfluous since Kant has already included the operation or function that syndosis fulfills (i.e. the *a priori* unity of space and time), and an auxiliary specification with a new term (syndosis) is irrelevant. Weatherston thinks that Heidegger, in his effort to counter the neo-Kantian argument, is too aggressive in trying to distinguish between the faculties of sensibility and understanding in his support of the Transcendental Aesthetic. For Weatherston, "Heidegger's greatest error in his interpretation of the note to §26 was his excessive zeal in separating thought and sensibility."[61]

[57] Ibid., 57.
[58] Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* (1927-28), 94.
[59] Weatherston, *Heidegger's Interpretation of Kant: Categories, Imagination, and Temporality* (2002), 58-9.
[60] Ibid.
[61] Ibid., 65.

The result is that Heidegger's "overwrought argument misses Kant's own solution to the question of how intuition and thought combine to make experience possible."[62]

Weatherston thinks that Heidegger starts down the wrong path by trying to counter-argue the "neo-Kantian dissolution of sensibility into the understanding" by divorcing these two faculties in such a way that they require "an independent faculty of imagination as the "root" of these faculties in order to unify them again."[63] For Heidegger, this necessitates the division of "synthesis" into several different acts of combination (the syndotical unity and the synthetic unity), and the attribution of unity to the form of intuition. However, all of this is unnecessary and departs too far from what Weatherston sees as Kant's intention.

Weatherston's central argument is that per the main text of §26 ("all synthesis stands under the categories" (§26, B161, 262)), the unity of the sensibility and the understanding "does not require a third faculty of imagination from which to spring."[64] This is because "if Kant is right in claiming that the unity of intuition and thought is produced out of the interaction of two equally original faculties, then a proof of their ultimate unity in a third faculty is neither necessary nor possible."[65] On Weatherston's view, there is no need to posit syndosis to unify intuitions *a priori* because Kant has already clarified how the categories bring about this unity.

Weatherston also thinks that Heidegger's attempt to establish a "common root" of synthesis to connect the faculties of the sensibility and the understanding is an unnecessary and unwarranted addition.[66] Weatherston explains this as Heidegger's being so focused on opposing neo-Kantianism that he tries to import another new thought to signify the original character of the unities of sensibility and understanding, rather than see the already-existing fundamental connection between them indicated by Kant.[67] For Weatherston, there is no need to appeal to an exogeneous "common root" to connect sensibility and understanding. He sees Kant as already resolving this problem by specifying the role of the categories as the fundamental connection that relates the two faculties (that does not require the Kantian imagination much less the Heideggerian "common root"). For Weatherston, the categories provide the essential connection between the unity of intuition and the unity of apperception.

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[62] Ibid., 66.
[63] Ibid., 65-6.
[64] Ibid., 66.
[65] Ibid.
[66] Ibid., 53.
[67] Ibid., 65.

Analyzing Weatherston and Heidegger together: both see Kant's focus on Unity

Considering Weatherston and Heidegger together, despite the discrepancies, the high-level point is that the overall result of their two positions is the same. They both take Kant's goal to be establishing the *a priori* unity of space and time. The main difference is in their accounts of how this *a priori* unity is produced. For Heidegger, the *a priori* unity of time and space is generated as a non-conceptual synthesis of syndosis before the intrusion of the faculties of sensibility and understanding. For Weatherston, the *a priori* unity of time and space is produced through an operation of the understanding on the sensibility through the categories.

Weatherston's main point is claiming that the *a priori* unity of space and time precedes all empirical concepts in intuition. In fact, this is *functionally* equivalent to Heidegger's syndosis, which also argues for a foundational unity of space and time that precedes all empirical concepts in intuition. The result of both formulations is similar, the difference is that Heidegger's unity of space and time is not category-determined whereas Weatherston's is. Another similarity between Heidegger and Weatherston is that the imagination is not involved. This is notable because for both, it is a view that cleanly excerpts Kant's constant ballooning of the power of the faculty of the imagination in the course of CPR to solve problems that arise in regard to time. Instead a concise derivation of the *a priori* unity of time and space is proposed by both Heidegger and Weatherston, differing only as to whether the unity is conceptual or not. The key point is that both Weatherston and Heidegger (and also Kant) recognize the need for space and time as *a priori* unities that precede the appearance and unification of empirical objects.

Onof & Schulting's Non-conceptual Unity of Space and Time

With Heidegger and Weatherston framing the corners of the Conceptualism debate (with a non-conceptualist standpoint and a thoroughly conceptualist view, respectively), in this section, I introduce Onof & Schulting. These authors published a lengthy article (58 pages, 2015) that attempts to provide a comprehensive discussion of the different interpretations of §26 and the B160 note. I motivate the landscape of readings to inflect into the Conceptualism debate regarding the issue of how the *a priori* unity of time and space is produced. Onof & Schulting propose their own position that is a third and different view from the two discussed so far (Heidegger's non-conceptual syndotical unity of time and space and Weatherston's category-

determined unity of time and space). Onof & Schulting's view is in some sense a hybrid that includes both Heidegger's notion of a non-conceptual syndotical unity (contra Weatherston), but one in which the role of the imagination is muted (like Weatherston).

For Onof & Schulting, the key critical issue arising from the note is explaining the "unity of space" [and time].[68] The two thinkers map scholarly views regarding this topic (Table 8), organizing positions into different conceptualist and non-conceptualist views regarding the unity of space and time. Recapitulating, the *conceptualist* position would generally argue for the presence of some degree of conceptual content in the formulation of the explanation of how the unity of space and time occurs. It is no surprise that Heidegger is labeled as a "radical" non-conceptualist with his off-book proposal of syndosis. Weatherston is in the "strict" conceptualist camp (that the understanding not only co-exists with but determines the sensibility).

Table 8. Map of scholarly positions regarding the "Unity of Space" (Onof & Schulting, 12).

Conceptualist about the Unity of Space		Non-conceptualist about the Unity of Space	
Strict: Cohen, Dufour	*Broad:* Longuenesse, Friedman	*Orthodox*: Falkenstein, Melnick, Allison, Fichant, Onof & Schulting	*Radical:* Heidegger

On Onof & Schulting's own non-conceptualist view of the unicity of space, they think that the key problem from the note is explaining how the unity of space presupposes a synthesis.[69] (For Kant, in the note, the unity of space "presupposes a synthesis, which does not belong to the senses but through which all concepts of space and time first become possible"). The issue for Onof & Schulting is how the non-conceptual unity of space could be claimed to presuppose a synthesis, since for Kant, synthesis is typically taken to involve conceptual unity (the operation of the categories).[70] Onof & Schulting see Kant as answering this somewhat, in the Transcendental Deduction (§24) and the Schematism, but not fully providing an explanation to the "requires a synthesis" problem.[71] For Onof & Schulting, this requires the specification of a non-conceptual synthesis, as Kant indicates that "does not belong to the senses." Onof & Schulting think Heidegger resolves this, by articulating how there can be a non-conceptual synthesis, in the form of the syndotical synthesis.

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[68] Onof & Schulting, 12.
[69] Onof & Schulting, 27.
[70] Ibid., 23-4.
[71] Ibid., 24.

However, Onof & Schulting do not think this non-conceptual synthesis can be rooted in the imagination (they misread Heidegger as locating syndosis in the imagination) since the imagination is already conceptual (they correctly cite Kant saying that "all formal unity in the synthesis of the imagination is grounded upon the categories" (A Deduction, A125, 241)).[72] Thus, Onof & Schulting say that they support "Heidegger's account insofar as he does not speak of the imagination's role."[73] (Notably, on this parameter, this is also the accurate reading of Heidegger, and Weatherston's view, that the imagination is not involved in the *a priori* unity of space and time.) For Onof & Schulting, this is a puzzle, though, since the non-conceptual synthesis does not belong to the senses (per the note), or the imagination (which is conceptual), or the understanding (which is conceptual). Thus, Onof & Schulting develop a view that locates the non-conceptual synthesis of the *a priori* unity of space and time in the *operation* of the understanding. This view requires them to have a non-conceptual operation of the understanding that nevertheless takes place in the understanding. They specify a non-conceptual synthesis of the formal intuition that is "taken" by consciousness as a conceptual synthesis. This is their rationale for why Kant goes to the trouble of specifying the formal intuition in the B160 note.

Onof & Schulting see Kant's notion of the formal intuition as a special kind of synthesis that is non-conceptual but nevertheless allows consciousness to "take" space and time as a [conceptual] synthesized unity. (This view is similar to Longuenesse's (that there is some kind of pre-conceptual synthesis that is nevertheless received by the conceptual understanding), but Longuenesse employs more finesse and support via Kantian argumentative resources.) The problem is that somehow space and time need to be unified, but in a way that does not oppose the conceptual operation of the understanding. Onof & Schulting root the subtle task of interpreting the formal intuition in the Transcendental Unity of Apperception. They see the formal intuition as a special kind of synthesis that is required "to grasp the unicity of space as a unity" and that "the role of the Transcendental Unity of Apperception" is to bring this synthesis under its domain.[74] Through the action of consciousness (the Transcendental Unity of Apperception), space and time are non-conceptually conceived and taken as a unity.

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[72] "On them [the categories] is grounded, therefore, all formal unity in the synthesis of the imagination" (A125, 241).
[73] Onof & Schulting, 32-3, n42.
[74] Ibid., 29.

The important result is that consciousness "takes" space and time as a synthesized unity, into which empirical appearances can be received. Onof & Schulting clarify that "although what Kant refers to in the second sentence of the footnote is the unicity of space, this is only to remind us that it is only "*insofar* as it is grasped by the understanding, the unicity of space presupposes a synthesis" that is conceptually-determined.[75] Specifically, "the unicity of space has a function in discursive knowledge through the grasping of this unicity of space by the understanding as a unity for the understanding, which grasping involves a [category-determined] synthesis."[76] This is Onof & Schulting's account of how the formal intuition constitutes a non-conceptual synthesis that consciousness nevertheless "takes" as a [conceptual] synthesized unity.

Consciousness "grasps" the unity of space and time as a synthesis, which as a synthesis falls under the categories, and is therefore congruent with the understanding. However, the formal intuition is itself a special kind of non-conceptual (or pre-conceptual) synthesis, on Onof & Schulting's view. In this way, both Onof & Schulting and Longuenesse see the form of intuition and the formal intuition as being non-conceptual. However, the difference is that for Longuenesse, the operation of the formal intuition is already in the Transcendental Aesthetic via the figurative synthesis of the imagination, whereas for Onof & Schulting, the operation of the formal intuition is in the understanding via the Transcendental Unity of Apperception.

Onof & Schulting's Critique of Heidegger

Onof & Schulting's broad-brush characterization of Heidegger's position is generally accurate, but there are some inconsistencies and inaccuracies in their account. They begin their account correctly, with Heidegger arguing that the unity of space and time involves a synthesis. Then as many scholars, they incorrectly indicate Heidegger's position being that since the synthesis cannot belong to the senses, and since it is not conceptual, it must therefore be assigned to the imagination.[77]

But then, Onof & Schulting are inconsistent. They have two strange sentences in which they see Heidegger attributing syndosis to sensibility, not imagination. Onof & Schulting say that "Heidegger (1995) introduces a new term *syndosis* which represents a function of the faculty of

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[75] Ibid.
[76] Ibid.
[77] Ibid., 24, n29, citing Heidegger, Kantbuch (German edition), 1991, 142.

sensibility."[78] They then start to be on the right track in saying that "Heidegger does however argue for a synthetic unity, one of a sort that is not due to the imagination, let alone the understanding, in an illuminating section of his lectures on Kant's CPR (Heidegger, 1995) devoted to our footnote."[79] In the Onof & Schulting article, these are both general references to the German edition of *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*), buried in footnotes, without page citations, which they otherwise tend to include.[80]

However, in their main account of syndosis, Onof & Schulting flip back to the unity being rooted in the imagination, which is more in line with the usual but inaccurate reading of Heidegger's view. Onof & Schulting say that Heidegger claims that "the ground of the unity of space is located in an autonomous faculty of imagination."[81] Onof & Schulting correctly read Heidegger as referring to *syndosis* as a more precise term than *synopsis*, since synopsis still suggests that "I intuit the manifold together one after another."[82] Syndosis, by contrast, signifies the already-togetherness of the given manifolds of space and time in that "this unity of the syndosis is not the unity, which belongs to the synthesis of the understanding in concepts, that is, to the categories.[83] Onof & Schulting correctly pick up on Heidegger's noting that the syndotical unity is a precondition for the thetic unity of the understanding ("the synthetic unity of concepts, of categories, presupposes the former originally intuiting syndotical unity"[84]).

Onof & Schulting's Non-conceptual Unity of Time and Space

Onof & Schulting's earlier (mis)characterization of Heidegger's syndosis as belonging to sensibility is all the stranger because they say they support "Heidegger's account insofar as he does not speak of the imagination's role,"[85] suggesting that the two earlier references, without

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[78] Ibid., 24, n29.

[79] Ibid., 32-3, n42.

[80] Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* (1927-28), 92. Onof & Schulting consolidate Heidegger's view from his two books, but this does not explain the inconsistency in Onof & Schulting's article. There does not seem to be an obvious or known change in Heidegger's views between the two books, and Heidegger is covering different topics in the lecture course (the Kantbuch) and the monograph (*Phenomenological Interpretation of CPR*). In any case, the more likely explanation for the inconsistency in Heidegger's position is escaping detection in the article review process.

[81] Onof & Schulting, p. 25, and repeated again on p. 26.

[82] Ibid., 32-3, n42.

[83] Ibid., 32-3, n42.

[84] Ibid., 32-3, n42, citing Heidegger, 1995, (the German edition of *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*), 135.

[85] Ibid., 32-3, n42.

page references, and buried in footnotes, might be errors. Onof & Schulting's main view is that although they are sympathetic to Heidegger's notion of a non-conceptual syndotical unity, they object to Heidegger's claim that the imagination is involved (which is produced by their misreading of Heidegger – syndosis is not located in the imagination). Onof & Schulting think that Heidegger is right that "the givenness of the unicity of space and time is a necessary condition for the possibility of the function of combination carried out by the Transcendental Unity of Apperception, in the sense that combination requires combinability in the given."[86]

However, Onof & Schulting (misreading Heidegger) think that where Heidegger places an "overinflated status on the tripartite division sensibility-imagination-understanding,"[87] and consequently, imagination. The problem is that (on Onof & Schulting's view), imagination is already conceptual. Even in the A Deduction (before the position that "all synthesis stands under the categories" (B161) in §26 and the figurative synthesis operating to produce the unity of time and space in §24), Onof & Schulting argue that Kant specifies that imagination is category-determined. Kant says that "all formal unity in the synthesis of the imagination is grounded upon the categories" (A125, 241).[88] The imagination's synthesis is therefore governed by the categories, and hence by the understanding and the Transcendental Unity of Apperception (A Deduction, A119, 238) (through which any given manifold acquires objective status).[89]

Therefore, Onof & Schulting support a notion such as syndosis that constitutes a non-conceptual *a priori* unity of space and time, but see it located in the formal intuition as a special [non-conceptual] operation of understanding as described above, not imagination (as they misread Heidegger). Like Weatherston, Onof & Schulting critique Heidegger's use of imagination, though for different reasons. On Weatherston's view, the imagination is superfluous because the categories directly link the understanding and the sensibility ("all synthesis stands under the categories" (§26, B161, 262)). On Onof & Schulting's view, the imagination cannot be involved in the non-conceptual syndotical unity because imagination is already conceptual (correct). On Onof & Schulting's view, Heidegger would need to explain how syndotical synthesis is carried out by imagination, yet is non-conceptual.

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[86] Ibid., 32-3, n42.
[87] Ibid., 25.
[88] "On them [the categories] is grounded, therefore, all formal unity in the synthesis of the imagination" (A125, 241).
[89] Onof & Schulting, 25.

Analysis of Onof & Schulting

Although I attribute what seems to be an inconsistency in Onof & Schulting's account to unintended error in that they sometimes refer to Heidegger's syndosis being carried out in sensibility, there is another reading of this idea. The issue is that Heidegger is not fully explicit as to which faculty syndosis belongs, and scholars sometimes attribute syndosis to imagination and other times to sensibility. There are grounds for both positions in Heidegger. On the one hand, indeed Heidegger does not explicitly specify whether syndosis belongs to sensibility or imagination. The usual scholarly position is to attribute syndosis to imagination since Heidegger frames the problem issuing from the B160 note of the "unity (that does not belong to the senses) can belong to understanding or, because Kant speaks of three fundamental sources of knowledge, to the power of imagination."[90] On the other hand, when Heidegger specifies syndosis, he says "by this syndosis, which belongs to unity as wholeness, space and time are first of all *given* as intuitions, i.e., as what is purely intuited, while the unity which belongs to syndosis - and thus this syndosis or synopsis itself - belongs to space and time and not to the concept of understanding."[91]

Hence, first, Heidegger does not make it explicit whether syndosis belongs to sensibility or imagination, and second, on Heidegger's account mentioning both, there could be grounds for attributing syndosis to sensibility or imagination. Makkreel (discussed later) also has an alternative and broader view of the placement of syndosis as mainly being in sensibility. The upshot of Heidegger's lack of clarification is that scholars locate Heidegger's syndosis in different ways, usually as part of the imagination, but sometimes in the faculty of sensibility. However, I argue for a different position, that syndosis is pre-faculties.

Overall, Onof & Schulting have a reading that is closer to Kant's than Heidegger's. They take "Kant's singular achievement" to be making sense of "the role of the non-conceptual in knowledge and assigning it a role in the constitution of the *a priori*,"[92] through the specification of the formal intuition in the B160 note. They conclude that Heidegger's analysis "is questionable as an interpretation of Kant's text," and is "not attractive as an account of Kant's project as a whole."[93] This is even though they invoke the non-conceptual *a priori* unity of space

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[90] Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* (1927-28), 92.
[91] Ibid., 93, emphasis mine.
[92] Onof & Schulting, 26, n34.
[93] Ibid., 26-7.

portion of Heidegger's view as being quite similar to their own (albeit with different genesis). Onof & Schulting see Heidegger's motivation narrowly, as employing "Kant as a forerunner of his notion of finitude."[94] They think that Heidegger wants to deny transcendence (the ability to know timeless truths) to *Dasein* (human beings) since they are determined by finitude. Indeed, if this were Heidegger's only aim (which I have argued elsewhere that it is not and that opposing the Marburg school is his primary but non-exhaustive aim), it would seem to be at odds with Kant's program of transcendental idealism. Kant is constantly specifying transcendental formulations (which can be seen as "objective truths") that attempt to overcome the "Letter to Herz" problem of how the subjective conditions of thinking can be objectively valid.

Onof & Schulting's answers to the critical questions posed by the B160 note are indicated below (Table 9). Regarding "this unity" which "presupposes a synthesis that does not belong to the senses," Onof & Schulting make a further clarification that is useful, and relates to their nuanced "taking as" view of the formal intuition ("taking" the *a priori* synthetic unity of space and time as non-conceptual). The important distinction is that the unity can *presuppose* a synthesis without having to *produce* the synthesis. The point is that "to presuppose" does not mean "to be generated by," but rather in this case, simply to be "justified by."[95] This unity (the *a priori* unity of space and time) need not produce the synthesis that does not belong to the senses, but can be conditioned by it. Therefore, Onof & Schulting take "presupposes a synthesis that does not belong to the senses" to mean "the grasp of the unicity of space [and time] by the faculty of understanding."[96]

Table 9. Onof & Schulting's Answers to the Critical Questions of the §26 B160 note.

	Questions	Answers
1.	To what is "this unity" referring?	The formal intuition (as the non-conceptual *a priori* unity of space and time)
2.	How could "this unity" precede all concepts?	The unity is non-conceptual and thus precedes all concepts
3.	How could "this unity" presuppose a synthesis which does not belong to the senses but through which all concepts of space and time first become possible?	The formal intuition presupposes a non-conceptual synthesis that allows the understanding to grasp the unity of space and time, "taking" the *a priori* unity of space and time as synthesized unities that make possible all concepts of space and time
4.	What is the synthesis in Question 3?	The synthesis of the formal intuition
5.	How does the understanding determine sensibility?	With the categories (conceptually)

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[94] Ibid., 24.
[95] Ibid., 27.
[96] Ibid., 28.

Conceptualism Positions regarding the Unity of Space and Time

So far, this analysis has distinguished marquis positions in the Conceptualism debate, which is the argument about the degree to which the Kantian faculty of intuition (sensibility) involves conceptual content (the categories). The central issue is providing an account of how the *a priori* unity of time and space is produced. On one extreme, there is Heidegger's non-conceptual syndotical unity of time and space. On the other extreme, there is Weatherston's category-determined unity of time and space. Then there is a somewhat centrist view from Onof & Schulting that includes both Heidegger's notion of a non-conceptual syndotical unity (contra Weatherston), but one that does not involve the imagination (like Weatherston). The overall issue is crystallized as to how to have some sort of non-conceptual content as an initial position (sensibility) that is nevertheless subsumed into a conceptual format (understanding). Longuenesse proposes a more nuanced centrist version and is discussed next. Many other scholars are also implicated in the Conceptualism debate and develop views that engage a critique of Heidegger's formulation of syndosis. The most substantial arguments are discussed here, which are those from Longuenesse, Waxman, Derrida, Adorno, and Makkreel. Scholars in the analytic philosophic trajectory also comment on Kant and Heidegger, mostly in a negative way that does not extend or resolve the issues.[97] A map ordering the different scholarly positions by their views as to the predominant faculties involved and the degree of conceptualism regarding the *a priori* unity of time and space appears in Figure 4.

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[97] Emblematic of the analytic philosophy critique of Heidegger on Kant is an article by de Boer & Howard (2018) who specifically take aim at Heidegger. They argue that Heidegger's reading is less original than is often assumed and that it unduly marginalizes the critical impetus of Kant's philosophy. On the first claim, the authors think Heidegger is less original because he is indebted to other scholars (such as Cohen and Wundt) regarding the methodological distinction between ground and grounded (p. 1), although any philosopher is always working in a long-existing lineage. On the second claim, the argument is that CPR's critical importance is diminished by Heidegger's failure to recognize what the authors take to be Kant's project, which is trying to identify the principles of experience and mathematico-empirical cognition (p. 2). This claim is hard to substantiate as Kantian scholars would not necessarily focus on (or care about) Heidegger's reading. Further, specifically opposing de Boer & Howards, argument, the core problem that CPR addresses, for Kant and for Heidegger, is the issue that "mathematico-empirical" principles on their own cannot give a full account of experience.

	Thinker(s)	Faculty Involved	Conceptual/Non-conceptual
1.	Heidegger	Pre-faculties	Non-conceptual
2.	Weatherston	Understanding	Conceptual
3.	Onof & Schulting	Understanding	Mainly non-conceptual
4.	Longuenesse	Imagination	Mainly non-conceptual
5.	Waxman	Imagination	Conceptual
6.	Makkreel	Sensibility	Non-conceptual
7.	Derrida	Imagination	Conceptual
8.	Adorno	Imagination	Non-conceptual

Figure 4. Conceptualism interpretations of the *a priori* unity of time and space.

Longuenesse: Logical Forms of Judgment and Figurative Synthesis

Longuenesse and Heidegger are two thinkers in the Conceptualism debate that are most aligned in their positions. Heidegger supports a non-conceptualist view and Longuenesse one that is nuanced, with both conceptual and non-conceptual aspects. Considering the landscape of positions and the key considerations upon which they differ, Heidegger thinks that the *a priori* unity of time and space is established through a syndotical (non-conceptual) synthesis that precedes the involvement of the faculties. Weatherston instead argues that the *a priori* unity of time and space is generated through a category-governed synthesis performed by the understanding (without the involvement of the imagination). Onof & Schulting suggest that the *a priori* unity of time and space is produced in a non-conceptual synthesis generated through the formal intuition as received by the Transcendental Unity of Apperception, through which it then becomes conceptual. Longuenesse has a similarly complex view about content that originates as non-conceptual but that can later be absorbed as conceptual. For Longuenesse, the *a priori* unity of time and space is produced by the §24 *figurative synthesis* of the imagination (as an effect of

the understanding on sensibility, but not exclusively as an action of the understanding), and although is in accordance with the categories, is non-conceptual (pre-discursive).

Heidegger and Longuenesse differ in two ways regarding the Conceptualism debate. First, Heidegger does not think that the categories are in any way related to the originary one wholeness of time and space that is synthesized in syndosis, whereas Longuenesse has a more detailed position. For Longuenesse, although the categories are not directly involved (and thus the unity of time and space is pre-conceptual), the work of the imagination (and therefore the categories) is involved. It is precisely the mechanism of the figurative synthesis of the imagination by which sensory content can be received that is pre-conceptual, but necessarily structured in accordance with the categories such that it can be later subsumed by judgments.

Longuenesse frames the activity of the figurative synthesis of the imagination as "the *effort toward judgment* affecting inner sense."[98] The benefit of Longuenesse's formulation is that it does not emphasize the strident opposition between sensibility and understanding as do other articulations, but rather provides more depth to explaining the interrelation between sensibility and understanding, and imagination, as faculties working together within consciousness in the overall operation of cognition. Longuenesse's view regarding the categories (§§9-10) is that there is a pre-conceptual synthesis, namely a synthesis of intuitions that brings them into a unity, in order that they can be taken as individuals (unified particulars) that stand under the categories (and thereby be subsumed by universals). It could be critiqued that Longuenesse's "pre-conceptual synthesis of intuitions that brings them into a unity" seems to be identical to Heidegger's "syndosis," and although they perform the same function, Longuenesse's formulation is more credible because its stays within Kantian terminology and arguments.

Longuenesse's view closely adheres to Kant's §24 sense of the figurative synthesis determining the *a priori* unity of space and time. Longuenesse says that the figurative synthesis of the imagination produces "the intuitive unity of space and time, in which appearances are given prior to any discursive judgment [e.g. non-conceptually]," but nevertheless in "accordance with the categories."[99] This accordance is in such a way that the "intuitive unity" is in *a priori* agreement with the categories, ready to be reflected under the categories (the pure concepts of the understanding) through empirical intuition. Space and time are (intuitively) synthesized such

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[98] Longuenesse, *Kant and the Capacity to Judge* (1998), 243.
[99] Ibid., discussing Kant §24, B152, 257.

that they can be (discursively [conceptually]) reflected under empirical concepts according to the Transcendental Logical forms of judgment.[100] Longuenesse refers to the *a priori* unity of space and time as "intuitive unity" (not a wholly separate terms such as syndosis) to distinguish the operation of the figurative synthesis that is pre-conceptual, though in line with the categories.

The second difference between Heidegger and Longuenesse is that Longuenesse thinks that both the *pure intuition* and the *formal intuition* are non-conceptual [pre-conceptual], for the same reason of being configured by the (pre-conceptual but nevertheless in accordance with the categories) figurative synthesis of the imagination (which is why Kant makes a point of referring to §24 at the end of the §26 B160 note). This is at odds with most other interpretations, in which interpreters take the *formal intuition* to be conceptual and dispute whether the *pure intuition* is conceptual or not. The usual interpretation is that the point of the *formal intuition* is that Kant needs a conceptual specification related to the *a priori* unity of time and space (as configured in the Transcendental Aesthetic). For Heidegger, the pure intuition is non-conceptual and the formal intuition is conceptual. Heidegger's argument stresses that the formal intuition has lower standing because it is a derivative of the pure intuition, as a result of the category-determined synthesis of the understanding (which has practical operations such as delimiting the one wholeness of space into geometrical objects). Longuenesse though maintains that both the pure intuition and the formal intuition are pre-conceptual.

However, Longuenesse does agree with Heidegger that "this unity" in the B160 note is referring to the *form of intuition* (pure intuition), in the sense of the form of intuition having its "own brand of pre-conceptual unity."[101] Longuenesse correctly reads Heidegger's position of "this purely intuitive unity" being distinct from the unity of formal intuition, which is determined by concepts. Heidegger thinks that the formal intuition is a concretion and only concerns *conceptualized* spatiotemporal representations, most notably mathematical constructions. Longuenesse, however, reads the B160 note directly and literally on this point, that formal intuition *precedes all concepts.* For Longuenesse, the pure intuition and the formal intuition are identical, and thus both are non-conceptual (and preceding all concepts by being determined by the figurative synthesis of the imagination but yet being in accordance with concepts).

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[100] Ibid., 243.
[101] Longuenesse, *Kant and the Capacity to Judge* (1998), 224-5.

Longuenesse takes Heidegger's "common root" argument seriously. Longuenesse understands Heidegger's view to be that the unity of pure intuition (the form of intuition) is the result of a transcendental synthesis of imagination that, far from being the "effect of the understanding on sensibility" (Longuenesse's view), is more pronounced as the "common root" of both intuition and understanding. It is no surprise, then, that Heidegger distinguishes pure intuition (the intuitive unity resulting from transcendental imagination alone (Longuenesse also sees Heidegger locating syndosis in the imagination)) from formal intuition (which he interprets as conceptual production, and thus the result of the collaboration of intuitive unity and intellectual unity). This is why Heidegger specifies the syndotical unity as the unity of the form of intuition and [regular] synthetic unity as the unity of acts of the understanding. For Longuenesse, though, pure intuition and formal intuition are one and the same intuition, produced by the *figurative synthesis* as an effect of the understanding on sensibility.[102]

Longuenesse's view of the identicality of the pure intuition and the formal intuition (and that both are pre-conceptual) relates to her broader view of what is happening in the B Deduction as a two-fold movement involving both the sensibility and the understanding. Longuenesse sees the Transcendental Logic, with the forms of judgment and the figurative synthesis of the imagination as the "two pillars of the B Deduction."[103] These allow the faculties to operate together to indicate the objective validity of the categories and how they relate to a sensible given.[104] Longuenesse explains that "the categories are *a priori* applicable to the objects of empirical intuition because these objects, insofar as they are apprehended in space and time, are (intuitively) synthesized in such a way that they can be (discursively) reflected under empirical concepts according to the forms of judgment in the Transcendental Logic."[105] The upshot is a two-fold view in which the non-conceptual content of receptivity and the conceptual content of spontaneity are joined by the figurative synthesis of the imagination.

The critical benefit of Longuenesse's position for Heidegger is that his view cannot be so easily dismissed. Scholars might reject Heidegger's proposal of syndosis on the grounds that it is not a term that Kant actually uses, and because it seems to be at odds with Kant's work in a number of ways, including by ignoring Kant's own account (if fragmented and underspecified)

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[102] Ibid., 225.
[103] Ibid., 211.
[104] Ibid., 211-12.
[105] Ibid., 243.

of the *a priori* unity of time and space. The point is that Longuenesse is attempting to get at some of the same aspects as Heidegger, namely that there is a pre-conceptual unity of time and space. The difference is that Longuenesse substantiates the position directly from Kant's formulations. Arguably, Heidegger via Longuenesse opens the way for Onof & Schulting and other scholars to also agree with Heidegger's general notion of the non-conceptual *a priori* unity of time and space, but defend it more rigorously. The strength of Longuenesse's position suggests that Heidegger has the right inclination, although perhaps the wrong argument, and thus bears examination. Summarizing the aspects that Longuenesse adds, these are supplying the analytic details in the Kantian text that support a more nuanced version of the *a priori* unity of time and space as the intuitive unity of time and space generated by the figurative synthesis, that is non-conceptual but yet in accordance with the categories.

Allais and the Conceptualism Debate: Intuitions are Conceptual (but not Exhaustively)

The headline and general position in the Conceptualism debate is that although intuitions (even intuitions, not only judgments) are conceptual (category-determined), it is not possible to rule out some role for non-conceptual content in intuition. The argument is that intuitions are generally conceptual (which is in line with the "standard" reading of Kant that I have been elaborating as the category-determined synthesis of the understanding acting on the sensibility), but there could also be room for non-conceptual content in intuition. Intuitions are mainly conceptually-determined, but there could be a role for non-conceptual content too. For Allais and the conceptualism debate, the salient point is that the possibility of non-conceptuality, although minor, cannot be ruled out definitively.

Allais is a prominent scholar in the contemporary conceptualism debate (oriented in the analytic tradition), and provides level and unbiased commentary. Allais characterizes the conceptualism debate as "the debate as to whether Kant has some kind of non-conceptualism" in his formulations (in the *Critique of Pure Reason*).[106] The debate turns on a view "regarding *conceptualism about intuition*, namely as to whether Kant thinks that intuitions are mental representations that could be presented to us whether or not we have the ability to apply concepts."[107] According to Allais, the nuance of "the central debate is about whether intuitions

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[106] Allais, 2016, 4.
[107] Ibid.

are independent of concepts."[108] The relevant contextualization of the conceptualism debate for this analysis is the degree of conceptual content in the *a priori* unity of time and space.

For Allais, there is (correctly) considerable room for interpretation regarding Kant's meaning. This can be seen in the example of perception and intuition. On the one hand, "Kant asserts that perception depends on the application of concepts (in favor of conceptualism about perception), but that having objects presented to us in intuition does not (supporting the non-conceptualist view)."[109] However, Allais also thinks that scholars make a good case for not reading Kant's texts as saying what they appear to assert explicitly. For example, it is unresolved in Kantian scholarship as to what Kant means by perception, and whether perceptual content is conceptual or not.[110] The important point for the argument here is that the wider world of Kant scholarship (particularly engaging analytic scholars), provides grounds for a non-conceptualist reading of intuition, which supports the views of Heidegger, Longuenesse, and Onof & Schulting regarding a non-conceptual position of the *a priori* unity of time and space.

Waxman supports Heidegger's spotlighting synopsis and the unity of the form of intuition

Waxman elaborates yet another view regarding Heidegger and the Conceptualism debate. Considering the B160 note, Waxman agrees with Heidegger and Longuenesse (contra most scholars) that "this unity" refers to the unity of the *form of intuition* rather than the unity of the *formal intuition.* This is because the unity provided by the formal intuition has already been described,[111] in fact, just previously in the text that the note is footnoting. Waxman proposes his own elaboration regarding the forms of intuition as "the *innate non-representational faculty ground* of space and time, the peculiar constitution of human receptivity that determines imagination to synthesize apprehended perceptions in conformity with the forms of synthesis, space and time."[112] The important point is that even in the pure intuition of space and time in the Transcendental Aesthetic, there is conceptual alignment in that the "peculiar constitution of human receptivity" allows for the "imagination to synthesize" in accordance with the categories. Waxman's characterization, despite using different terminology (and weighty terms such as

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[108] Ibid., 5.
[109] Ibid., 4.
[110] Ibid., 24.
[111] Banham, 13.
[112] Waxman, 1991, 95.

"innate" and "faculty ground"), seems to be in line with Longuenesse's, that there is a moment of pre-conceptual intuition in receptivity that is nevertheless brought under conceptuality in the synthesis of the imagination. Despite the "innate and non-representational faculty ground," any involvement of the imagination is necessarily conceptual for Waxman. This is why Waxman rejects Heidegger's notion of syndosis, arguing that it is not possible to obtain the *a priori* unity of time and space without a (necessarily conceptual) synthesis of the imagination. However, Waxman does embrace synopsis as a form of synthesis that is non-conceptual.

The value of Heidegger for Waxman (and later Makkreel) is in drawing attention to synopsis. For Waxman, synopsis has critical importance for Kant because it is "the only element of representation that is unambiguously credited to sense, *in specific distinction from imagination/spontaneity*."[113] Synopsis does not involve the imagination, whereas "in virtually every other case, Kant's distinctions are between sense and (discursive) understanding, with the result that imagination [i.e. conceptuality] ends up on both sides of the divide."[114] Unpacking this argument, Waxman thinks that imagination is [equally] "on both sides" of Kant's usual discussions of sensibility and understanding. This is not "above" as the "common root" as Heidegger argues, and is also opposed to Weatherston, for whom imagination is not present, and not relevant. For Waxman, the advance is that "Kant credits *synopsis* exclusively to receptivity (scrupulously denying any role to the apprehending imagination)," specifying synopsis as being "prior to and independent of apprehension."[115] The implication is that synopsis allows for the possibility of non-conceptual content, in the exclusive operation of the senses without the influence of the imagination and the understanding. Heidegger and Waxman highlight the same need for a pre-conceptual synthesis, although for Heidegger, synopsis is not originary enough as it still involves the faculty of receptivity. Makkreel also takes up the idea of Kant's synopsis having greater critical importance than is usually attributed, though for other reasons.

Overall, Waxman appreciates Heidegger's views as providing novel considerations in Kantian scholarship (particularly in highlighting synopsis, and the argument that "this unity" in the B160 note refers to the unity of the form of intuition). However, like Weatherston and Onof & Schulting, Waxman does not agree with Heidegger's conclusions. Waxman does not see the

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[113] Ibid., 209 (and 209, n17).
[114] Ibid.
[115] Ibid., 186-7, 209, n17.

need to formulate syndosis (despite proposing his own unnamed formulation as an alternative). Even more than supporting the benefit of syndosis, Waxman wants to argue against Heidegger's interpretation of Kant's theory of imagination on the grounds that (as others also complain) Heidegger does not provide a textual basis for his claim of the identification of imagination as the "common root" of sensibility and understanding.[116] Indeed it is true that this is a Heideggerian hermeneutics not discussed directly by Kant.

Makkreel: Basing Syndosis in the Reproductive Synthesis of the Imagination

Makkreel has a distinct position in wanting to place Heidegger's formulation of syndosis in the context of the reproductive imagination in the A Deduction (as opposed to the productive imagination in the B Deduction or a more fundamental pre-faculties position as I argue). Makkreel supports the aim of "pure receptivity of Heidegger's syndosis," that is without the involvement of the synthesis understanding.[117] Makkreel thinks that Heidegger could locate syndosis in the reproductive imagination, where it would be non-conceptual (involving receptivity, but not spontaneity (the active use of the categories)). Makkreel agrees that Heidegger thinks this is not possible since Heidegger sees synopsis as already being conceptual, because "surveying the manifold sequentially" implies [conceptual] "synthetic activity."[118] However, for Makkreel, Heidegger might be less contentious if syndosis could be located in the non-conceptual domain of the reproductive synthesis of the imagination in the A Deduction. Heidegger would likely resist this proposal since he thinks that receptivity (intuition) is already conceptual and the reproductive imagination would certainly be conceptual. The point of syndosis for Heidegger is specifying a more originary giving together of time and space.

Makkreel provides some additional context to support this position. Regarding Kant's project of establishing a unity between the sensibility and the understanding, Makkreel (like many interpreters) cites Heidegger's argument that the transcendental imagination is the "common root that unites sense and understanding as the two stems of experience."[119] Elaborating this point, in a review essay on Heidegger's *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*,

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[116] Ibid., 1991, 15.
[117] Makkreel, *Imagination and Interpretation in Kant: The Hermeneutical Import of the Critique of Judgment* (1990), 23.
[118] Ibid.
[119] Ibid., 21.

Dieter Henrich argues that for Kant, the common root is in principle unknowable, and even in the first edition of the *Critique*, cannot be identified with the imagination or any other faculty.[120] Therefore, the line of reasoning would be that any "common root" would be non-conceptual since it is unknowable. This provides more grounds for the notion of syndosis as non-conceptual because a more rigorous position for non-conceptualism is substantiated. For Heidegger, the non-conceptual syndotical unity and the conceptual synthetic combination are unified per the non-conceptual common root of synthesis that they both share, and this is through the imagination. I am not persuaded by Makkreel's view, but the argument is coherent and provides another account of how there could be a syndotical unity that is non-conceptual (by rooting it in the reproductive imagination).

Derrida and the *tertium quid*: Imagination as a 'Third' Position

Waxman's argument starts to render the background issue of the ontological status of the imagination and its role as a third position between sensibility and understanding. Scholars see the imagination in Kant's account in different ways; as being equally-weighted on both sides with the faculties of sensibility and understanding (Waxman), more heavily weighted as the common root of the two terms gesturing toward a more fundamental position (Heidegger), overemphasized (Onof & Schulting), irrelevant (Weatherston), and underrealized (Makkreel).

Is a "thick" or "thin" notion of the Kantian imagination more accurate? On the one hand, a "thick" notion of the productive imagination can be substantiated as a kind of "super faculty" that has elements of both sensibility's receptivity and understanding's spontaneity, and even more, since the imagination is also responsible for the time determinations that underlie the conditions of possibility of experience, knowledge, and reason. On the other hand, a "thin" notion of the productive imagination can also be argued, as conducting a mere bridging function between sensibility and understanding. My view is that although the imagination's role balloons as Kant continues to elaborate time determinations, and Kant refers to the imagination as a faculty ("the empirical faculty of productive imagination" (Schematism, B181, 273)), the ontological status of the imagination cannot rival that of the two-stem heavyweights that comprise cognition, sensibility and understanding. Imagination is a crucial facilitator and faculty,

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[120] Ibid.

but not a stem of knowledge. In spite of the imagination not being a full-fledged third in the particular case of Kantian cognition (on my view), I believe that substantiating the third position is important as a philosophical project. Derrida has an argument for the status of the Kantian imagination as a full-fledged and equally-weighted third position.

For Derrida, the question of the relation of the intelligible and the sensible is one of "thinking an exorbitant middle."[121] Derrida draws from language in the Schematism, in which Kant says that the "Transcendental Schema" is a "third thing" that stands as a "mediating representation" that is "intellectual on the one hand and sensible on the other" (Schematism, B177, 272).[122] Derrida indicates that for "Kant, imagination is precisely the third term," such that "in the end everything we have said about the [Kantian] system comes down to a question of the third" position, since "the third term is the mediator that permits synthesis."[123] All this is true.

The critical benefit of "third terms" for Derrida, is that they "participate in the two terms of an opposition at the same time."[124] Sensibility and understanding are the two opposing terms for Kant, with imagination on both sides. This explains, Derrida thinks, "why Kant can maintain that the imagination already intervenes in perception (and so is a judgment of the senses), and [also] that synthesis is not acquired from experience" (and so is a judgment of the understanding).[125] The important upshot for Kant, Derrida notes, is that "synthesis in general is the result of the imagination (A78/B103)."[126] This is correct, Kant indicates exactly this, that "synthesis in general is…the mere effect of the imagination…without which we would have no cognition at all" (§10, B103, 210). Hence, Derrida sees the imagination as the "third" position through which sensibility and understanding can operate together to produce the figurative synthesis of the imagination that conditions all experience. Derrida is agreeing with Longuenesse, that the figurative synthesis of the imagination is the mechanism for joining non-conceptual receptivity (what Derrida calls "a judgment of the senses") and conceptual

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[121] Derrida, 2001, 153.
[122] Kant's full text in the Schematism is as follows. "Now it is clear that there must be a third thing, which must stand in homogeneity with the category on the one hand and the appearance on the other, and makes possible the application of the former to the latter. This mediating representation must be pure (without anything empirical) and yet intellectual on the one hand and sensible on the other. Such a representation is the transcendental schema." (Schematism, B177, 272)
[123] Derrida, Ibid., 5.
[124] Ibid., 75.
[125] Ibid., 153.
[126] Ibid., 153.

understanding ("a judgment of the understanding"). Derrida's contribution is to specifically call out the role of the philosophical third position (imagination) in performing this critical work.

The importance of a philosophical third position is clear for Derrida. In his deconstructive philosophy, he wants to bring visibility to the hidden side of binary pairings (such as speech and writing, male and female, and presence and absence). The substantiation of a third position helps in two ways. One is by offering a mediation between the two opposing binaries (the third position has the mobility to "participate in the two terms of an opposition at the same time"). The other is by diminishing the focus on a binary pairing by having three terms (one does not just consider the either-or pairing of A or B, but has the wider tableau of a choice of options between A, B, and C). Derrida is motivating his position of the *tertium quid* with the Kantian imagination as a resource. As I alluded to earlier, the extent to which this is justified in the *Critique of Pure Reason* could be critiqued, but not the endeavor of articulating the philosophical third position.

Derrida also develops a Kantian-inspired articulation of temporality, based on the conditions of possibility and impossibility (in space and time) for events to arrive. Kant is not a thinker of "the event," but is a thinker of the conditions of possibility; Derrida is a thinker of "the event." Derrida deploys the contingency of the event as a philosophical third position to extend Heidegger's formulation of temporality (as a non-linear ecstatical unity in which living forward into the futural reaches back to the having-been to constitute a making-present (*Being and Time*, §69, 416)) into a successor position that supplies a more universal sense of time beyond the constraints of *Dasein*'s finitude (per Alweiss's critique of Heidegger[127]).

Adorno's Excess of Content over Form in the relation of Understanding and Sensibility

Adorno is important in providing an opposing position to Heidegger's, and taking up Kant, but in a different trajectory, in the critical theory tradition of the Frankfurt School. Adorno acknowledges that both he and Heidegger speculatively "extrapolate" the Kantian program for their own purposes.[128] Adorno and Heidegger are often at odds with one other. Considering the Kantian-type conditions of possibility of experience, for example, Adorno disputes Heidegger's insistence on facticity and *Dasein*'s temporality of finitude.[129] Whereas everything in modernity

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[127] Alweiss, 2002, 117.
[128] Adorno, *Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* (2002), 35.
[129] MacDonald & Ziarek, *Adorno and Heidegger: Philosophical Questions* (2007), 2-5.

is covered over with instrumental reason for Adorno, even art, Heidegger sees possibilities for *Dasein* not to be disenfranchised as standing reserve but rather choosing to live authentically into finitude. Overall, Adorno resists Heidegger on this basis.

In an emblematic demonstration of opposition to instrumental reason, Adorno (unlike other scholars), reverses the order of the *Critique of Pure Reason* in his lecture course. Adorno considers the Transcendental Aesthetic as the last topic, not the first. Adorno wants to oppose Kant's position in which the "Transcendental Aesthetic is made to precede the Transcendental Logic as a kind of fundamental stratum of knowledge."[130] Instead, Adorno thinks that this rigid disjunction is "untenable and that the Transcendental Aesthetic should be seen as a function of the Transcendental Logic."[131] This is a similar position to the Marburg recommendation to collapse the Transcendental Aesthetic into the Transcendental Logic. Adorno discusses the Transcendental Aesthetic as the last topic in the lecture series to subvert the order and to emphasize the "problem in the arrangement of the chapters" in the *Critique of Pure Reason*.[132] It is not Adorno's intent, but reordering the chapters in the *Critique of Pure Reason* has the helpful effect for this analysis of reducing the conflict presented by the §26 B160 note in that it is not necessary to wonder if the note overwrites or merely clarifies the Transcendental Aesthetic because the Transcendental Deduction would now be preceding the Transcendental Aesthetic.

Beyond wanting to destabilize non-critically assessed order as a general principle (an anti-instrumental reason strategy) and oppose an over-inflated value being placed on the Transcendental Aesthetic, Adorno (exemplar of his own strategy of the negative dialectics of simultaneously presenting an apparently conflicting position) also acknowledges that the Transcendental Aesthetic is "one of the most inspired insights of the entire *Critique of Pure Reason*."[133] For Adorno (as also the primary thought for most interpreters), this is because Kant is the first one to realize that "the position with space and time is quite different" from that of the "concept to the individual items of which it is composed."[134] Adorno agrees with Kant's characterization that individual spaces do not relate to the pure intuitions of space and time in the same way that instances are subsumed under concepts. On the issue of the genesis of the whole

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[130] Adorno, *Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* (2002), 233.
[131] Ibid.
[132] Ibid., 232.
[133] Ibid., 227.
[134] Ibid., 229.

of space, Adorno (contra Heidegger) assumes the notion of space expounded by Kant in the B Deduction and the Schematism as the "additive process" of the successive assembly of homogeneous units of space.[135] Adorno takes Kant's articulation to be that "the general representation of space is formed by adding together existing spaces so that they fit together."[136]

Related to this work's investigation of the interrelation of sensibility and understanding, Adorno has an important argument for a "difference of weighting" that favors the content of concepts over the form of intuition.[137] Adorno frames his argument in terms of form and content, as the pure *forms* of intuition and the *content* of empirical concepts (which can be read as being parallel to sensibility and understanding). However, this asymmetric weighting is at odds with Kant's own claim at the beginning of the Transcendental Logic that "neither of these properties is to be preferred to the other (sensible intuition or understanding)" as the two sources of our cognition (Transcendental Logic, B75, 193). Adorno's argument for over-weighting is that "forms are mediated by contents and cannot be conceived in their absence," whereas the converse is not true (both premises of which could be critiqued).[138] More supportable is Adorno's thought that "the contents contain a reference to something that is not fully coextensive with the form."[139] Adorno's point is that the imbalance or "antithesis of form and content stands in need of mediation."[140] This view supports the argument of this analysis as to the role of the imagination as the mediating term between sensibility and understanding. However, just as Heidegger may be using Kant to substantiate his notion of finitude, so too it could be critiqued that Adorno is using Kant to support his own program of negative dialectics and aesthetic theory in which the form and content relation is a prominent exploration.

The upshot of Adorno's argument is the irreducibility of sensibility and understanding (as form and content). Irreducibility is the same motif seen in the Conceptualism debate, although running in the opposite direction, in that it is not possible to rule out non-conceptual content in intuition. Brandom likewise advances an irreducibility argument of there being some portion of

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[135] Kant indicates that the whole of time is comprised as the "successive addition of one homogeneous unit to another to generate time" (CPR, Schematism, B182, 274).
[136] Adorno, *Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* (2002), 229.
[137] Ibid., 233.
[138] Ibid., 233.
[139] Ibid., 233.
[140] Ibid., 229.

"representing" that is not fully reducible to "representation"[141] in the Kantian system (similar to Adorno's claim that conceptual content exceeds representational form). The underlying philosophical problem is that of the notion of excess, remainder, or supplement, and the irreducibility of two domain-specific positions such as form and content, or sensibility and understanding, which remain in need of mediation by a third term.

Contemporary Kant scholarship: Conceptualism, Sensibility and Understanding

The question of the relation between sensibility and understanding ensues as a lively and unsettled problem in contemporary Kant scholarship. Longuenesse's view is prominent, and has provided an intricate account that resolves many issues with the two-pronged argument that features the Transcendental Logical forms of judgment and the figurative synthesis of the imagination. Longuenesse's position is that "the conscious *effort toward judgment*, that is, the transcendental unity of self-consciousness, is what makes possible consciousness of an objective temporal order."[142] Other scholars analyze Longuenesse's view (distinguishing similar positions (Fichant, 1997)) to which Longuenesse responds (2005[143])), as well as provide more distant critique (Addison, 2015), but the position remains one of the strongest interpretations.

Another group of positions includes those from scholars such as Conant who argues that a deep foundational unity exists between sensibility and understanding (that each faculty depends on its relation to the other to be the sort of faculty that it is in a finite rational being such as ourselves), while other scholars maintain that the two faculties are separate and distinct.[144] Likewise, the "Marburg position" that Heidegger opposes continues in various current instantiations in the conceptualism debate, and in general about questions concerning the relation between the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Transcendental Logic.[145] I think the prominence of the Transcendental Aesthetic forever prohibits its collapse into the Transcendental Logic.

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[141] Brandom, *Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment* (1994), 617.

[142] Longuenesse, *Kant and the Capacity to Judge* (1998), 395.
[143] Longuenesse, *Kant on the Human Standpoint* (2005), 64-78.
[144] Golub, 2017.

[145] Golub, 2016, 28.

My Argument for the Conceptualism Debate and the §26 B160 Note

Having examined a full range of the landscape of conceptualist and non-conceptualist interpretations of the generation of the *a priori* unity of time and space, in this section, I argue for a conceptualist reading, and answer the critical questions raised by the note (Table 10). I agree with Heidegger and other scholars (Longuenesse and Onof & Schulting) that §26 and the B160 note are crucial. However, I argue that the upshot of §26 and the B160 note is to further underline the unity of space and time as *a priori* syntheses in accordance with the categories, not to open the way for a special class of non-conceptual synthesis that applies to time and space (as Heidegger supports). Indeed, time and space are important, originary, foundational, and produced *a priori* as the condition of possibility for empirical experience. That is why time specification is a major theme throughout the *Critique of Pure Reason* (for example, in the Transcendental Aesthetic, the A Deduction (A110), the B Deduction (§24, §26), the Schematism, the Analogies of Experience, and the Refutation of Idealism). However, space and time are not a special class of entities with separate constitutions in this sense, they are merely first, and as such, in fact help *define* how synthesis according to the categories operates in the intuitions of empirical objects appearing in time and space (I take this to be the main argument of §26).

I argue that the footnote should be seen as exactly that, as a footnote that provides clarification to the main argument in the body of the text that it is modifying. This does not diminish the value of the note, but rather argues for seeing the note in its larger context. The note should be read together with the surrounding argument in §26, not isolated in interpretation as many scholars indicate. The main argument in §26 is that space and time are themselves intuitions with manifolds that need to be unified *a priori* in accordance with the synthesis of all apprehension, which necessarily stands under the categories. Since all appearances are in space and time, they must be in the same structure as space and time, namely be structured in accordance with the categories, and since space and time are synthesized in accordance with the categories, so too are all empirical representations.

The obvious questions are what the note adds and whether it is necessary. The note introduces a new term, *formal intuition*, that Kant builds into identicality with the idea of the *a priori* unity of space and time as representations synthesized in accordance with the categories. The text directly preceding the note specifies an important new clarification that not only are space and time represented as manifolds (the manifold of sensible intuition is synthesized by the

figurative synthesis of the imagination in §24), but space and time are represented as [formal] "intuitions themselves (which contain a manifold)" that need to be synthesized *a priori* in accordance with the categories ("see the Transcendental Aesthetic"). Further, time and space do not simply arise, but rather they are "represented" as intuitions themselves, where representation connotes conceptuality. However, on Kant's part, by saying "see the Transcendental Aesthetic" just before the note, he may realize that, in fact, this is not quite what the Transcendental Aesthetic suggests, so the point of the note is to clarify his revised intention for the Transcendental Aesthetic. This is to include space and time as not merely *forms of intuition* but as *formal intuitions* which involve the productive imagination (§24) and the understanding (§26) to produce the *a priori* unity of space and time that is synthesized in accordance with the categories as the condition of any object appearing.

I assert that the objective of the note is to connect both the Transcendental Aesthetic and §24 to §26. It is necessary to relate the Transcendental Aesthetic (pure intuition) and §24 (figurative synthesis) to the categories (§26), now that space and time are clarified as being represented as intuitions themselves that need to be unified in a synthesis that is in accordance with the categories (§26). The core issue is the categories, exactly how and to what degree the categories are involved, in the pure intuition (specified in the Transcendental Aesthetic) and the formal intuition (specified in §26). The considerable range of scholarly opinions about this is developed in this analysis. The issue (of the involvement of the categories) was not raised sharply enough in the figurative synthesis of the imagination (§24) to require additional elaboration (which is why Longuenesse has a nuanced interpretation of the figurative synthesis as allowing non-conceptual determination that is nevertheless in accordance with the categories). However, now that Kant is strongly arguing the connection between the categories, space and time, and all experience in §26, it is necessary to clarify the argument in more detail, and this is the critical work that the note aims to achieve. The synthesis of *all* apprehension falls under the categories in §26, which is much more than merely the synthesis of time and space being determined in accordance with the categories in §24. For Kant, the substantial expansion in the reach of the argument is what prompts the clarification related to the Transcendental Aesthetic, but does not in any way invalidate the Transcendental Aesthetic.

More specifically, the issue (how the categories are involved in the determination of the *a priori* unity of space and time) arises from the argument in §26 that all experience is subject to

the categories (because all experience is in space and time which are themselves governed by the categories). Now that "all synthesis of apprehension falls under the categories" in §26, Kant has to partially restate the Transcendental Aesthetic to clarify how the categories are involved, which is through the formal intuition (he names *formal intuition* as a new term for this affordance).

The structure of the note is one sentence to posit formal intuition and its role, and two sentences to link the figurative synthesis of the imagination from §24 to the Transcendental Aesthetic and the §26 argument. The first sentence of the note clarifies a point from the sentence preceding the note that "space and time are not merely forms of sensible intuition, they are *formal intuitions*." The additional specification of "formal intuition" helps give the full weight of synthesis according to the categories to space and time as formal intuitions. As Kant says in the first sentence of the note, the form of intuition is merely the "comprehension of the manifold given in accordance with sensibility," but the formal intuition "gives the unity of representation," which involves the figurative synthesis of the imagination (§24) and synthesis according to the categories (§26). The second two sentences of the note further contextualize how the work of the figurative synthesis of the imagination (§24) connects the Transcendental Aesthetic and the formal intuition (through an *a priori* synthesis in accordance with categories stressed in §26).

Below is the text from the §26 and the B160 note, and my suggested clarifications to the note for its improved interpretation along with a conceptualist reading of Kant's intent.

> We have forms of outer as well as inner sensible intuition *a priori* in the representations of space and time, and the synthesis of the apprehension of the manifold of appearance must always be in agreement with the latter, since it can only occur in accordance with this form. But space and time are represented *a priori* not merely as forms of sensible intuition, but also as intuitions themselves (which contain a manifold), and thus with the determination of the unity of this manifold in them (see the Transcendental Aesthetic).* (§26, B160, 261).

> *Space, represented as object (as is really required in geometry), contains more than the mere form of intuition, namely the comprehension of the manifold given in accordance with the form of sensibility in an intuitive representation, so that the form of intuition merely gives the manifold, but the formal intuition gives unity of the representation. In the Aesthetic I ascribed this unity merely to sensibility, only in order to note that it precedes all concepts, though to be sure it presupposes a synthesis, which does not belong to the senses but through which all concepts of space and time first become possible. For since through it (as the understanding determines the sensibility) space or time are first given as intuitions, the unity of

this *a priori* intuition belongs to space and time, and not to the concept of the understanding (§24). (§26, B160, 261)

*Space, represented as object (as is really required in geometry), contains more than the mere form of intuition, namely the comprehension of the manifold given in accordance with the form of sensibility in an intuitive representation, so that the form of intuition merely gives the manifold, but the formal intuition gives unity of the representation. In the Aesthetic I ascribed this unity (the unity of the formal intuition) merely to sensibility, only in order to note that it precedes all (empirical) concepts, though to be sure it (the unity of the formal intuitions of space and time) presupposes a synthesis (in accordance with the categories), which does not belong to the senses but (the productive imagination) through which all concepts of space and time first become possible. For since through it (the figurative synthesis) (as the understanding determines the sensibility) space or time are first given as intuitions, the unity of this *a priori* intuition belongs to space and time (as representations), and not to the concept of the understanding (§24). (§26, B160, 261)

In first sentence of the note, Kant clarifies that space as object contains both form of intuition (which gives the combination of the manifold from sensibility [from the Transcendental Aesthetic and §24] and formal intuition (which gives unity of representation, presumably in accordance with the categories [as elaborated in §26 in the main text before and after the note]). Therefore, "this unity" in the second sentence is most logically referring to the only unity mentioned so far, the one in the first sentence, which is the unity of the formal intuition (the unity of the representation of time and space given in the formal intuition). The note builds toward an identicality of terms, that of the formal intuition and the *a priori* unity of space and time as representations synthesized in accordance with the categories.

How "this unity" of the formal intuition could "precede all concepts" can be seen in the way Weatherston suggests in that the *a priori* unity of space and time precedes all *empirical* concepts. The most straightforward reading would be that space and time are synthesized in accordance with the categories, and this precedes and conditions all empirical concepts. A subtler reading is in the vein of Longuenesse's argument that the *figurative synthesis* allows non-conceptual effects of the understanding on sensibility that are nevertheless determined "in accordance with the categories." On this reading, space and time are synthesized "in accordance with the categories," but are not category-determined themselves, and thus precede all concepts (pure and empirical). Onof & Schulting's reading is similar to that of Longuenesse in the way

that the *a priori* unity of space and time is a special kind of synthesis that is non-conceptual yet is "grasped" by the understanding as being in accordance with the categories (e.g. conceptual).

The last part of the note can be explained as "the unity of this *a priori* intuition belongs to space and time [as representations], and not to the concept of the understanding." The unity belongs to space and time themselves as representations, not to understanding, sensibility, or even imagination. In fact, all three faculties are needed to produce the unity (sensibility in the Transcendental Aesthetic (pure intuition), the productive imagination (through which all concepts of space and time first become possible (§24)), and understanding (synthesis according to the categories (§26)). However, the *a priori* unity of space and time "belongs to" space and time as representations. The way that the understanding determines sensibility is through the figurative synthesis of the imagination (§24) and the categories, as the synthesis of all experience falls under the categories (§26).

Table 10. Kantian conceptualist Answers to the Critical Questions of the §26 B160 note.

	Questions	Answers
1.	To what is "this unity" referring?	The unity of formal intuition (the unity of the representations of space and time given in the formal intuition)
2.	How could "this unity" precede all concepts?	The *a priori* unity of space and time precedes and conditions all empirical concepts; also since space and time are representations not concepts, they always precede and condition all concepts
3.	How could "this unity" presuppose a synthesis which does not belong to the senses but through which all concepts of space and time first become possible?	The *a priori* unity of space and time presuppose a synthesis (the figurative synthesis) that does not belong to the senses but to productive imagination as the mechanism through which all concepts of space and time first become possible
4.	What is the synthesis in Question 3?	The figurative synthesis of the imagination is the synthesis in which all concepts of space and time first become possible
5.	How does the understanding determine sensibility?	Through the figurative synthesis (§24) and the categories, "all synthesis stands under the categories" (§26, B161, 262)

The Conceptualism Debate and its Implications

In this section, I deploy the arguments I have established in the course of this analysis to the context of the Conceptualism debate to argue for a conceptualist reading of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. I argue that this hews most closely to Kant's work, both literally as written, and in intent. A conceptualist position supports the idea that the content of thought is conceptually-determined, meaning in accordance with the Kantian categories, even from the very beginning, in the most mere of apperceptions. To specify clearly what a conceptualist reading means, the physical object of a chair can be considered. I have in my mind an impression of that chair, a

representation of an empirical appearance. The conceptualist position is that the impression in my mind is represented according to the categories.

The conceptualist reading is part of the bigger context of the explaining appearances problem in which Kant is trying to solve the "Letter to Herz" problem. Kant says that he thinks "the whole secret of metaphysics" is to establish "the ground of the relation between the concept and the object" of representation.[146] The problem is explaining how agreement is possible between abstract concepts and representations. This is *not* how agreement is possible between abstract concepts and external objects. Kant's advance is to respecify the epistemological debate to focus on the requirements of internal alignment between concept and representation, not of trying to obtain verification between the internal mind and external objects. For Kant, we can never know anything of the external objects in the noumenal world, only of our internal objects in the phenomenal world. Kant's issue is not correspondence between the mind and the world, but rather specifying the structure of the conditions of possibility for experience and knowledge. The "Letter to Herz" problem is establishing "the ground of the relation between the concept and the object" of representation, which will allow Kant to explain how agreement is possible between abstract concepts and determinate representations.

Kant tackles the "Letter to Herz" problem of relating concepts to representations through a two-stem theory of knowledge, positing that cognition is jointly comprised of sensibility (related to appearances) and understanding (related to concepts). The two stems necessarily operate together since "without sensibility no object is given, and without understanding no object is thought." This is why "thoughts without content are empty, and intuitions without concepts are blind" (A51/B75, 193-4).[147] The conceptualism debate asks the question of when and how conceptual content enters the picture. Understanding is certainly conceptually-determined, but it is not clear if sensibility is conceptual, and also the imagination, in its reproductive and productive aspects, which connects sensibility and understanding.

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[146] In detail, Kant, "Letter to Herz 1772," *Correspondence* (1999), 10:130-10:131, (pp. 132-3). Kant says that "the key to the whole secret of metaphysics" (10:130, 132) is to answer the question "What is the ground of the relation of that in us which we call [intellectual] "representation" [(concept)] to the object" of empirical appearance (10:130, 132); "whence comes the agreement that intellectual representations [concepts] are supposed to have with objects [empirical appearances]" (10:131, 133).

[147] All Kant references are to Kant, I. (1998, 1781). *Critique of Pure Reason*. Ed./Trans. P. Guyer, A.W. Wood. Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press.

The two main positions in the conceptualism debate are those that strongly support some part of cognition being non-conceptual or pre-conceptual, and those that are mostly conceptual but do not rule out the possibility of there being some sort of non-conceptual content, particularly on the central issue of how the *a priori* unity of space and time occurs. My view most closely follows what I take hermeneutically to be Kant's. My argument is to support a conceptualist reading in three steps. First, I highlight the key moments in Kant's argument and answer some unsettled questions. Second, I consider the rationale of the non-conceptualist position. Third, I examine potential objections to a conceptualist reading.

Kant's central argument in favor of Conceptualism

The heart of Kant's argument connecting sensibility and understanding occurs in the last part of the Transcendental Deduction (the B Deduction), particularly in §24 and §26. The phase of the argument is that Kant has established the subjective conditions of thinking. This is how there is a cognitive entity, an "I think" that produces a cognition of an object, and operates through the transcendental unity of apperception by synthesizing manifolds of intuition and making logical judgments by applying the categories. However, the open problem is how the subjective conditions of thinking can be objectively valid. Objective validity means that the overall human mode of thinking is a certain way, not that the structure of each person's thinking is different. Part of Kant's claim about how sensibility and understanding are connected is that they are related in an objectively valid manner, and that this is a general condition for all of human experience and object recognition.

The topic is how objects that seem to be in the world are apprehended. Kant's argument is that in order for objects to appear, they must appear in space and time, and not just in isolated moments of space and time, but in a space and time that is continuous. How does a continuous space and time arise? We produce it. The mind produces a continuous space and time as a precondition for apprehending objects in space and time. There must be a synthetic *a priori* unification of space and time in order for objects to appear in space and time. Continuous space and time are a synthetic unity, produced by the mind in a synthesis that unifies space and time into a continuous manifold in which appearances of objects can occur. The question is how the synthetic *a priori* unity of space and time occurs. Interpretations differ about the definition and operation of these terms. What is synthesis, how does it occur, and are there multiple kinds of

synthesis? Likewise, regarding unity, what is the difference between synthesis and unity, how does unity occur, and are there multiple kinds of unity? Are synthesis and unity conceptual?

The arguments in §24 and §26 provide answers to these questions. For Kant's purposes here, there is just one kind of synthesis and unity, and the terms are synonymous. Unification occurs through a synthesis, which is necessarily conceptual. The constant tension between the two stems of knowledge, sensibility and understanding, is that both are necessary for cognition. Categories on their own are empty, a mere rule set, forms of thought without application. For cognition, the categories of the understanding must be applied to sensible intuitions, but how does this happen? Since all intuitions occur in space and time, the first explicitation needs to explain how the categories apply to space and time. This happens in the specification of the figurative synthesis of the imagination in §24.

In the *figurative synthesis* of the imagination, the understanding acts on the pure forms of intuition (space and time) such that they are unified into a manifold. Kant says that in the *figurative synthesis*, the "transcendental unity [of space and time] is thought in the categories" (§24, B151, 256). The figurative synthesis is the action of the understanding operating on the pure intuitions of space and time in sensibility to unify them into a manifold. The mere "forms of intuition (space and time) do not have the combination of the manifold, apperception (the action of the understanding), under the categories, performs the combination, and unifies the manifold of intuitions" (§24, B154, 258). Any action of understanding necessarily involves the categories.

Whereas an *intellectual synthesis* is merely a combination operating within the understanding and has an empty product, the *figurative synthesis* of the imagination is the action of the understanding on the pure forms of intuition (space and time), which begins the argument of how sensibility and understanding are connected. Kant's argument in §24 is that the figurative synthesis (the transcendental synthesis of the imagination) brings space and time under the categories. The result is that the unification of space and time allows the categories to be applied to sensibility. Kant's method is to progressively elaborate how sensibility is brought under the categories. The categories are linked to space and time in §24 and then to all appearances in §26. The reason the imagination is necessary is to produce succession. This is because the "imagination is the faculty for representing an object even without its presence in intuition" (§24, B151, 256). To obtain succession, it is necessary to have the power of the imagination, to recall representations of objects that are not currently present, so that when drawing a line for example,

it makes sense that this point is in succession with the last points. Drawing a line is a category-determined operation of the understanding. As Kant says, "we cannot think of a line without drawing it in thought" (§24, B154, 258).

The argument in §26 extends the argument in §24 with a clarification that space and time are in fact themselves intuitions with manifolds that need to be unified *a priori* in accordance with the synthesis of all apprehension, which necessarily stands under the categories. Since all appearances are in space and time, they must be in the same structure as space and time, namely structured in accordance with the categories. Because space and time are synthesized in accordance with the categories, so too are all empirical representations. Kant is quite clear that "all synthesis stands under the categories" (§26, B161, 262). The synthesis of *all* apprehension falls under the categories in §26, not only the synthesis of space and time as clarified in §24.

The problem under investigation is how the categories apply to intuitions in an objectively valid manner. This is answered in that the categories, which are objectively valid forms of judgment, standard rules, are needed to produce the synthetic *a priori* unity of space and time (unifying space and time into a manifold) in §24, and similarly all empirical appearances in §26. However, a new issue arises in that the claims in §24 and §26 about the synthetic *a priori* unity of space and time necessarily falling under the categories as an operation of the understanding seem to be inconsistent with the Transcendental Aesthetic which specifies space and time as pure *a priori* forms of intuition. In the Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant says that "space and time are the pure forms of intuition, cognized *a priori* before all actual perception" or operation of the understanding (B60, 168). The question is how the claims in §24 and §26 should be interpreted in regard to the Transcendental Aesthetic. Does the Transcendental Deduction overturn the Transcendental Aesthetic or merely provide a revisionary clarification? My view is the latter, that Kant is constantly revising his views in CPR, and that the Transcendental Deduction should be read as a clarification of the Transcendental Aesthetic to specify that the understanding, synthesis, and the categories are involved, even in the first moment of pure intuition.

Realizing the discrepancy with the Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant issues a famous footnote at §26 B160 to informs the potential conflict between the Transcendental Deduction and the Transcendental Aesthetic. The note introduces a new term, *formal intuition*, which Kant builds into identicality with the idea of the *a priori* unity of space and time as representations

synthesized in accordance with the categories. The text directly preceding the note specifies the important new clarification that not only are space and time represented as manifolds (the manifold of sensible intuition is synthesized by the figurative synthesis of the imagination in §24), but space and time are represented as formal "intuitions themselves (which contain a manifold)," which therefore need to be synthesized *a priori* in accordance with the categories. On this point, Kant says "see the Transcendental Aesthetic." However, by saying that, Kant apparently realizes that in fact, this is not what the Transcendental Aesthetic suggests. The note clarifies Kant's revised intention for the Transcendental Aesthetic. This is to include space and time as not merely *forms of intuition* but as *formal intuitions* which involve the imagination (as specified in §24) and the understanding (per §26) to produce the *a priori* unity of space and time synthesized in accordance with the categories.

The note is comprised of three sentences. The first posits formal intuition and its role, and the other two integrate the figurative synthesis from §24 with the Transcendental Aesthetic and the §26 argument. The first sentence clarifies a point from the sentence preceding the note that "space and time are not merely forms of sensible intuition, they are *formal intuitions*." The additional specification of "formal intuition" helps give the full weight of synthesis according to the categories to space and time as formal intuitions. The note provides a through line between the Transcendental Aesthetic and §24 and §26. It is necessary to relate the Transcendental Aesthetic (pure intuition) and §24 (figurative synthesis) to the categories (§26), now that space and time are clarified as being represented as intuitions themselves that need to be unified in a synthesis that is in accordance with the categories (§26).

My view is that the *Critique of Pure Reason* is conceptual. The result of rehearsing the key arguments in the Transcendental Deduction that connect sensibility and understanding is to indicate that the whole of Kant's argument is conceptually-determined. Why specifically does Kant's account indicate conceptuality? First, in §24, Kant is explicit that the "transcendental unity [of space and time] is thought in the categories" (§24, B151, 256). Second, the ontological status of space and time is boosted in §26 such that space and time are themselves identified as intuitions, not merely as a property of other intuitions, and contain their own manifold, which is necessarily synthesized in accordance with the categories. Third, the §26 argument that empirical appearances are synthesized in accordance with the categories depends on the precondition that space and time too are synthesized in accordance with the categories: both space and time and

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empirical appearances are necessarily intuited in the same conceptually-determined structure. Fourth, Kant's Transcendental Deduction arguments help to demonstrate that his own view of synthesis and unification is that they are conceptual. Any synthesis is an act of the understanding that necessarily involves the categories. For Kant, synthesis and unification are synonymous, and conceptual. The conceptualism debate hinges on the interpretation of the B160 note, and the issues it crystallizes, namely whether or not the synthetic *a priori* unity of space and time is conceptually-determined. Although there is an "effect of the understanding on sensibility" through the categories (§24, B152, 257), it is unclear precisely how this effect operates to relate the two faculties of sensibility and understanding, and how imagination is involved.

Rationale for Non-conceptualism

This section considers the rationale for the non-conceptualist view. The two main positions in the conceptualism debate are those that support non-conceptualism, and those that are mostly conceptualist but differ regarding when and how conceptual content enters the picture, between sensibility, imagination, and understanding. The non-conceptualist position tries to substantiate there being some sort of non-conceptual content in the operation of cognition. The question is why anyone would support non-conceptualism when Kant's account appears to rest so clearly on the conceptually-determined action of the understanding on sensibility, and his specification of the categories. One explanation is the bigger philosophical problem in the background of how one takes the relation between givenness and unification. This is the difference between the degree of givenness that seems to be presented in the world, and the degree to which there is a consciousness that unifies givenness. Kant's view is that any form of unity and synthesis necessarily involves a consciousness producing the unification in accordance with the categories. Other thinkers are not in accord with Kant's transcendental idealism, and see more of a role for givenness, and consciousness's discovery and volitionary or propitious employ of givenness. For Kant, there is nothing in cognition that is not unified. For other thinkers, there is more conditionality regarding unification.

Scholarly views in the conceptualism debate can be understood in terms of how thinkers read the *Critique of Pure Reason* as a whole, particularly regarding how inconsistencies are to be treated. My view is that the book is a constantly revisionary project. I believe the work should be seen as a whole, and that inconsistencies are sublated, meaning that the intent is preserved while

being revised into final positions. Earlier positions are not overturned but revised. Related to this revisionary stance, I also think that the book should be read thematically as consistently progressing from the more abstract to the more concrete in the course of the work. Seeing the text as an abstract-to-concrete progression cashes out many issues with inconsistency and repetition inherent in Kant's work. He typically starts by specifying the broadest, most abstract, seemingly least concrete formulations, and then determines them more precisely in application to the specific problems of the conditions of possibility for experience. The pure formulation precedes and conditions the empirical formulation. This method is called Kant's "general logic." He announces that his method is to first elaborate a "general logic which abstracts from all content of cognition" (§10, B102, 210).

The non-conceptualist motivation can be understood in the context of the abstract-to-concrete progression because these views are characterized by wanting to protect the intent and arguments of earlier formulations in the book (particularly in the Transcendental Aesthetic and the A Deduction). The most prominent example is that the non-conceptualist view often wants to hold onto the initial formulations of space and time as pure forms of intuition that are not conceptually-determined in the Transcendental Aesthetic. This view sees space and time as an originary one wholeness. On this view, the original wholeness of space and time is a precondition for being able to cognize drawing a line or assembling contiguous spaces into one space, as opposed to Kant's later concretized revision which is the opposite (B179, 273).

A second rationale for the non-conceptualist position is that in fact, Kant does specify different *kinds* of synthesis. The general definition of synthesis is "the action of putting different representations together with each other and comprehending their manifoldness in one cognition" (§10, B102, 210). In the A Deduction, Kant discusses *synopsis* as a special kind of synthesis performed by the senses, the "synopsis of the manifold *a priori* through sense" (A95, 225), which is presumably at this phase of the argument, non-conceptual. Kant also distinguishes that the notion of *pure synthesis* applies to space and time, as opposed to the general synthesis which applies to empirical representations. The pure synthesis applies when "the manifold is given not empirically but *a priori* (as is that in space and time)" (§10, B103, 210). The question is to what extent synopsis and pure synthesis would later come to be seen as conceptual per the Transcendental Deduction revisions. The consistent conceptualist reading would be that all of early formulations that seem to be non-conceptual when specified, become conceptual as revised

in the B Deduction. This includes the pure forms of intuition of space and time as expounded earlier, and also synopsis and the pure synthesis of space and time. On the opposing view, Heidegger proceeds even further into non-conceptualism by labeling the pure synthesis *syndosis* to distinguish it from the already non-conceptual synthesis of the senses, *synopsis*.

A third motivation for the non-conceptualist position is a "have your cake and eat it too" position. This is the idea that although content from intuitions is non-conceptual, it is nevertheless pre-conceptual in the sense of being in a structure that can be later subsumed under the categories in the process of judgment. Longuenesse is of the view, for example, that both the form of intuition (in the Transcendental Aesthetic) and the formal intuition (in the B Deduction) are pre-conceptual in this manner. The argument rests on there being two phases of cognition, one of intuiting and one of judging. First there is the pre-conceptual operation of the figurative synthesis of the imagination, and then the application of the categories in operation of the Transcendental Logical forms of judgment. The argument is that "the intuitive unity of space and time" is non-conceptual, but nevertheless given in "accordance with the categories."[148]

At a gross level, being uncharitable to the sophistication and nuance of extensive scholarly work on these topics, a counterargument to the "cake" argument can be posed as the "duck" argument. This is the argument that whatever eventually looks like a duck and quacks like a duck, is really a duck. Both sensibility and understanding are functions of the mind operating in the act of cognition. Conceptualism is constantly lurking in the background prefiguring even purported non-conceptual content such that it eventually comes under the categories. Pre-conceptual content that is nevertheless in a structure that is conducive to conceptuality and later brought under conceptuality could really be called conceptual. The hair-splitting between phases of cognition is useful for some arguments but does not disturb the main argument here supporting a conceptualist reading of the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

On my Kantian view, ultimately non-conceptualist views can be dismissed because they will all have to eventually necessarily allow conceptualist content. I support a conceptualist view that Kant intends the *Critique of Pure Reason* to be comprehensively conceptual, with conceptually-determined content resulting from the action of the understanding on sensibility through the imagination, as the condition of possibility for experience and knowledge. My view

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[148] Longuenesse, *Kant and the Capacity to Judge* (1998), 223, discussing Kant §24, B152, 257.

is different than other strongly conceptualist readings in that there is no role for the imagination in these views. These positions tend to be at the summary level, focusing exclusively on the central objective of the *Critique of Pure Reason* as being related to the conditions of possibility for judgment. Guyer, for example, discusses the Transcendental Logical forms of judgment component of the B Deduction but not the figurative synthesis of the imagination which I take to be necessary for completing the B Deduction argument. Similarly, Weatherston thinks that the *a priori* unity of space and time is generated through a category-governed synthesis exclusively performed by the understanding, without the involvement of the faculty of the imagination or its time determinations.

The weaker or medium-strong conceptualist positions tend to engage a comprehensive reading of the text (meaning take the text as a whole in configuring their arguments). Those that discuss the B160 note often immediately cite the Transcendental Aesthetic and proceed along a trajectory in favor of there being some sort of non-conceptual content due to the primacy of the pure intuition in the Transcendental Aesthetic. However, this misses the overall argument progression in the *Critique of Pure Reason* and especially the advance of the B Deduction in two ways. First, the footnote should be seen as exactly that, a footnote providing clarification to the text it is footnoting. The note should be read together with the surrounding argument in §26, not isolated in interpretation and quickly linked back to the Transcendental Aesthetic. The main advance of the preceding argument in §26 is that space and time are "intuitions themselves (which contain a manifold)." In fact, the note extends, space and time are not merely forms of intuition (which contain a manifold), but "formal intuitions that give the unity" of the manifold. Space and time contain a manifold, that is unified, per a category-determined synthesis. Space and time are themselves full-fledged standalone intuitions that are synthetic *a priori* unities produced in a category-determined synthesis by an effect of the understanding on sensibility.

Second, the note mentions not only the Transcendental Aesthetic but also §24, suggesting that §26 and the note are a continuation of the argument in §24. This is confirmed in that they concern progressive formulations of the same topic, namely clarifying how space and time as synthetic *a priori* unities are formed by the mind. In §24 space and time fall under the categories, and in §26 space and time are further clarified and raised in ontological status to themselves being standalone intuitions with their own manifold requiring a synthetic *a priori* unification.

Objections to Conceptualism

This section explores how a conceptualist reading of Kant's position might be destabilized. The conceptualist claim is that understanding, imagination, and sensibility are conceptually-determined. The greatest risk to this argument is the dependence on the increasingly expanding role of the imagination as the necessary mediating function between sensibility and understanding. The imagination is the key operator in the background at the heart of the arguments in the entirety of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. In the A Deduction, the reproductive imagination is a necessary component of the three-fold synthesis of cognition. There is the synthesis of apprehension in the intuition, the synthesis of reproduction in the imagination, and the synthesis of recognition in the concept (A98, pp. 228-30). The *reproductive* imagination is invoked in the A Deduction. In the B Deduction, a new *productive* power of the imagination is defined in the figurative synthesis which unifies the manifolds of space and time in accordance with the categories. Kant cannot link sensibility and understanding without the imagination. This should be a worry because the ontological status of the imagination is unclear. In the Schematism, he indicates that imagination is a faculty, but also, sensibility and understanding remain the heavyweight stems of cognition.

I think that there are three worries. First, imagination is not merely playing a mediating role between sensibility and understanding but is in fact the linchpin that allows the argument to function. Second, Kant's project may be weakened by constantly having to expand the power of the imagination to solve critical problems in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Third, there is a question about the validity of the solution method if a new power can always be defined for a mediating intermediary. The scope of the imagination is potentially unlimited. Indeed, the role of the imagination does continue to grow, as the Schematism is declared to be a direct "product of the imagination" (B179, 273), whose aim is to describe "a general procedure" for the operation of the imagination (B180, 273).

The more important issue that considering the status of the imagination raises is the question as to whether the "Letter to Herz" problem is actually solvable. Kant assumes sensibility and understanding can and should be related, but perhaps they cannot. Pushing the imagination to connect sensibility and understanding might be overwrought. There is no guarantee that the "Letter to Herz" problem is solvable. Kant feels compelled to unify sensibility and understanding but is quite happy to let the noumenal and phenomenal world split persist. In

fact, I think that the expanding role of the imagination as the mediating force between sensibility and understanding is not really a worry because it can be cashed out with an incommensurability argument. Sensibility and understanding are two functions of the mind, both necessary for cognition, that operate in different ways. In a complex entity such as the mind, a function such as the imagination that integrates irreducible aspects would be expected. Even if the role of the imagination were invalidated, the conditions of possibility for cognition and experience could still be extrapolated from sensibility and understanding alone.

One effect of seeing the *Critique of Pure Reason* as being completely conceptual is that the Kantian system becomes a totality. The risks become those of a totalized system, including the issue of whether remainders (exceptions) can unravel the system. One remainder is the possibility of non-conceptual content, but that has been previously cashed out in ultimately coming under conceptuality. However, is there some bigger appeal that underlies the non-conceptualist view? Could the non-conceptualist view be sentimentally-inspired or critically useful as a totalization-resisting mechanism? Brandom and Adorno's views specifically call out the remainders that are not being included in the Kantian system. For Brandom, "representations" do not capture everything that happens in the mental process of "representing."[149] For Adorno, there is an excess of the content of a concept over the form of the concept.[150] This is in contrast to the general non-conceptualist view that just wants to leave room open for the possibility of non-conceptual content. However, the remainders argument can be overcome with the same complex system point that defeated the incommensurability argument. In a complex system, just as bridging functions across incommensurable aspects are expected, so too are remainders. Overall, the presence of remainders does not threaten the main logic by which the *Critique of Pure Reason* operates.

Concluding on the Conceptualism Debate

I support the argument that a conceptualist reading of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* corresponds most closely to Kant's intent in the text. The conceptualist view sees all cognitive content as being conceptually-determined through the action of the understanding on sensibility

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[149] Brandom, *Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment* (1994), 617.

[150] Adorno, *Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* (2002, 1959), pp. 229, 233.

through the imagination. The upshot is that a resolution to the "Letter to Herz" problem is obtained within a limited scope in that abstract concepts can be said to be related to empirical representations with objective validity because they are constituted in the same conceptually-determined structure. A composite argument extending from the Transcendental Aesthetic through the Transcendental Logic and the Schematism is substantiated that cognition produces space and time as synthetic *a priori* unities as a precondition for the intuition of empirical appearances. My method is to mobilize the key arguments in CPR supporting the conceptualist position, and consider and dismiss the opposing non-conceptualist view and potential objections to conceptualism. I further substantiate the conceptualist view in suggesting that CPR should be read as a whole that is a constantly revisionary project and an abstract-to-concrete progression. The potential stakes of accepting this conceptualist analysis are that a comprehensive understanding of Kant's project and outcome in CPR is obtained, and further that CPR provides a critical resource for thinking an extended slate of problems related to conditionality, totalization, and mediation. My argument for the unity of space and time, per the conceptualist reading of §26 and the B160 note, contributes to the explaining appearances problem and the larger specification of the objective conditions of knowing.

Space and time require conceptuality but are not reducible to conceptuality

Summarizing my position, I support the weakly conceptualist reading of Kant that does not fully rule out perception in intuition as having some concept-congruent structuring without being fully conceptual. My rationale is provided by two groups of arguments, one supporting a generally conceptualist reading and another simultaneously allowing that there could still be some non-conceptual role for perception outside of the concept judgment machine of cognition.

The first, strongest, and most Kantian argument is that the brain has a pre-existing structure in order to be conducive to receiving input which can be swept up into conceptual understanding through judgment. It does not matter how bare the merest whiff of apperception in receptivity is, the information is coming into the channel of the human brain and will be processed into a concept. Related to this is a second point that in the overall Kantian apparatus, it is necessary to a revisionary view without discarding former pieces of the argument. CPR must be read as a whole to understand its movement. It would be incorrect to overwrite the

achievement of the Transcendental Aesthetic irrespective of however much the formal intuition in the Transcendental Deduction re-clarifies the pure form of intuition.

Although a conceptualist reading is the primary position, it is simultaneously true that some portion of non-conceptuality may not be ruled out definitively. A second group of arguments has to do with the impossibility of fully extirpating a role for perception. There is an irreducibility argument in that space and time, although requiring conceptuality, are nevertheless are not reducible to conceptuality. This excess means that additional explanation is warranted. Support for the irreducibility argument is the point that Kant leaves room open for there to be some extra-conceptual role for perception, even if in general, the information in all perceptions is herded into a concept judgment. This point is substantiated in that Kant seems to acknowledge that perceptual experience, but not conceptual experience, is something that humans share with non-rational animals.

An additional point of substantiation is that Kant knows that the scope of judgment is limited. This is part of the very project of CPR, the critique of pure reason, meaning the reach, scope, and dimensions of that to which pure reason is applicable. Many of the most important forms of judgment involve the art of judgment as opposed to judgment that is a rules-based application of laws as in the §§9-10 categories and logical forms of judgment of CPR. There are limits to the reach of "pure reason," which is the heart of Kant's exploration in CPR. Some of the weightiest issues are a matter of judgment. These problems cannot be determined by rule-governed synthesis but only by the act and art of judging for which there can be no laws. Moral judgment is taken up in Kant's 2nd Critique and aesthetic judgment in the 3rd Critique (in which, notably, time determinations continue to be crucial, for example, in the "purposive estimation of magnitude" in the Analytic of the Sublime (§259, 89)).[151] These kinds of "art of judgment" judgments involve the self, the world, and God, and are not encompassed by rule-governed synthesis of subsuming and intuition under a concept. The point is that Kant is well aware of the domain of situations that do not support conceptuality, and hence room for this domain must be left open in any argument. It is very hard to support a strongly conceptualist claim in the overall project of Kant's critical philosophy.

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[151] Kant, *Critique of Judgment* (1790), §259, 89.

Conclusion

The focus of this chapter is Kant and the problem of explaining appearances, of which the generation of the *a priori* unity of space and time is the central concern, as configured by the formal intuition of space and time as specified in §26 and the B160 note. I undertake a detailed engagement with Kant and a variety of scholars regarding the problem of the *a priori* unity of time and space, articulating several of the major considerations which help to define the conceptualist and non-conceptualist interpretations of CPR. Although scholars provide cogent analysis, the explanations that are in closest alignment with what I take to be Kant's own argument seem to be most accurate. Kant makes a strong case throughout CPR that all synthesis is performed in accordance with the categories. There is no special non-conceptual synthesis as Heidegger, Onof & Schulting, and Longuenesse (in a more nuanced way) suggest. The *a priori* unity of space and time is produced in a synthesis per the categories, which precedes and allows all concepts of space and time, and all experience, to become possible. I argue that Kant's important clarification in §26 and the note is a revision of the Transcendental Aesthetic, but does not reduce its importance. The clarification is that space and time are their own intuitions, meaning having their own manifolds, which are necessarily produced (by understanding which includes the power of imagination through the figurative synthesis) in a category-determined synthesis (the formal intuition), such that, since space and time are their own intuitions, the synthesis belongs to space and time themselves. The upshot is that time and space are their own representations, but they are produced coherently just as any other element of the Kantian system, per rule-governed synthesis that is necessarily conceptual and involves the categories and judgment as the work of the understanding on the manifold of sensibility.

Figure 5. Conceptualism debate: Map of views on the *a priori* unity of time and space.

The philosophical problems discussed in this chapter are the *a priori* unity of space and time (synthesized in accordance with the categories), the relation between givenness and unification (all givenness is unified by consciousness), and the relation between sensibility and understanding, and imagination (all three are necessary for the *a priori* unity of space and time (Figure 5)). I investigate these problems in the context of the Conceptualism debate.

I argue that ultimately, Heidegger's syndosis is not helpful because although there may be different kinds of unity and synthesis, all synthesis is performed in accordance with the categories, and on my view, there is no role for non-conceptual unity. Weatherston has an important critique of Heidegger, and despite being on the right track emphasizing the thorough-going nature of the categories, loses sight of the crucial ongoing time determinations contributed by the productive imagination. I agree with Waxman and Derrida as emphasizing the role of the productive imagination in linking sensibility and understanding.

Onof & Schulting and Longuenesse are distinct in promoting nuanced views whose aim is to incorporate both non-conceptual and conceptual aspects. For Longuenesse (via the productive imagination), the *a priori* unity of time and space is pre-conceptual (since appearances are given prior to discursive judgment), but nevertheless structured in accordance with the categories, for later subsumption by judgments. For Onof & Schulting (via the understanding), the *a priori* unity of time and space is non-conceptual because it is produced as a special kind of non-conceptual synthesis (in the formal intuition) that consciousness nevertheless "grasps" as conceptual (as any synthesis falling under the categories).

Longuenesse and Onof & Schulting accept the "Letter to Herz" problem of trying to connect what they see as non-conceptual sensibility with conceptual understanding. However, although their arguments are more sophisticated than Heidegger's, the point is still the same, namely to try to substantiate some sort of non-conceptual moment in the overall operation of cognition. Both Longuenesse and Onof & Schulting could be cashed out in the sense that conceptualism (categories) is constantly lurking in the background always preconfiguring even purported non-conceptual content since such content is able to come under the categories eventually, in the next moment, in which a judgment is made. Thus, at some gross level, the salient point is that there is no difference in the result between a position of strong conceptualism (everything is conceptual) and that of the categories necessarily prefiguring sensibility (as Longuenesse and Onof & Schulting argue).

On this issue, I argue that the *a priori* unity of space and time is necessarily produced in a synthesis in accordance with the categories (irrespective of whether one agrees with arguments of the unity being initially non-conceptual and later conceptual, ultimately the unity is conceptual). Space and time are their own pure intuitions and formal intuitions, and are produced in the same manner as any other element in the Kantian system (in fact even more so since they are first), in consciousness, per rule-governed synthesis (necessarily involving conceptuality and the categories) as the work of the understanding on the manifold of sensibility. The *a priori* unity of space and time must be produced this way in order to be coherent with the rest of the system and our experience, knowledge, and reason in general. We may be led to think that space and time are different because they seem so foundational to our experience, but they are produced as any other aspect of the Kantian system. There is no special dispensation for a non-conceptual *a priori* unity of space and time.

Implications of the Conceptualism Debate

Expanding the view to consider the implications of the Conceptualism debate, there are two main arguments. One line of reasoning supports a portion of cognition being non-conceptual or pre-conceptual, and the other affirms a mostly conceptual view but does not rule out the possibility of there being some sort of non-conceptual content, particularly on the central issue of how the *a priori* unity of space and time occurs (which is the crux of §26 and the B160 note).

There are two stems of knowledge in Kant's theory, sensibility and understanding, which are respectively related to intuition and concept, and operate through receptivity and spontaneity. The understanding falls completely under conceptualism, but it is not as clear how sensible intuition is related to conceptualism. At the heart of the conceptualism debate is the question of how to think about perception. The issue is that perception is not absent, perception is playing a role in perception, and therefore the conceptualist must account for the role that perception is playing in Kant's theory of cognition.

Intuition breaks down further into receptivity and perception. The question is whether there is some kind of non-conceptualist aspect to Kant's understanding of intuition. This issue is the extent to which intuitions might be independent of concepts. Intuition can be analyzed in the two more detailed operations of receptivity and perception: purely receptive sensibility and more actively engaged perception. The non-conceptualist position is that receptivity may be non-conceptual, and perception may or may not be conceptual. The argument is that there is some ground for a non-conceptualist position, meaning that incoming sensory data is to some degree non-conceptual. The two sharp views are the conceptualist: that even the merest awareness of space requires a manifold which invokes conceptuality (that is unified through synthesis in a consciousness with conceptuality applying the categories to make a judgment), and the non-conceptualist: that some portion of intuition may be non-conceptual.

The Conceptualism debate encompasses a range of analytical and Continental philosophical concerns. There are four main positions: a strong and weak form of both conceptualism and non-conceptualism, generally characterized as follows (Table 11). Those endorsing the strong conceptualist position such as Sellers and McDowell argue that the understanding not only determines all knowing, but also the faculty of the sensibility itself. Those that support weak conceptualism (the view that I am endorsing) such as Pippin and Golob would like to preserve some aspect of the dualism of the faculties of understanding and sensibility. Although the understanding heavily determines knowing as all synthesis falls under the categories, it is not possible to rule out some role for sensibility and the possibility that sensibility has its own forms which organize the way that percepts are received.

The weak non-conceptualist view argued by Hanna, Allais, and McLear suggests that both the understanding and the sensibility provide conscious objective representational content independently. The strong non-conceptualism upheld by Laiho and Tolley is that the sensibility

provides not only the content but also the justification of epistemic beliefs derived from the senses. One difference between weak and strong non-conceptualism is that the weak version does not address the Myth of the Given discussed by Sellars (that nothing can count as conscious objective representational content unless it occurs within the conceptual domain of rationality), whereas the strong version does provide conceptual content (indicating the mind's role in providing givenness).

Table 11. Summary of Positions in the Conceptualism Debate.

Strong conceptualism	Weak conceptualism	Weak non-conceptualism	Strong non-conceptualism
Understanding determines all of knowing and also the faculty of the sensibility	Understanding is significantly involved in determining knowing but it is not possible to rule out a role for sensibility	Understanding and sensibility each provide representational content	Sensibility provides not only the content but also the justification for knowing
Sellers, McDowell	Pippin, Golob	Allais, Hanna, McLear	Laiho, Tolley

Further Stakes of the Conceptualism Debate

The stakes of the Conceptualism debate are two-fold. One vector assesses exactly how much of the cognitive faculty must be brought under the umbrella of rationalism, hence defining the extent of the reach of pure reason as Kant has outlined as the project for CPR. The other trajectory evaluates how much of Kant's overall position may be at risk of unraveling. If there is an insufficient answer to the question of how aspects of intuition may be related to conceptualism, this could weaken Kant's argument. At minimum, the theory of judgment in CPR might need to be clarified or revised in terms of how intuitions are subsumed under concepts. Worse would be if Kant's two-stem theory of knowledge and cognition were substantially weakened. Central to this line of reasoning is the interpretation of §26 and the B160 note, and how the Transcendental Aesthetic is to be treated vis-à-vis the Transcendental Deduction. There is a spectrum of views as to whether the Transcendental Deduction completely rewrites and obviates the Transcendental Aesthetic, at one extreme, or whether the Transcendental Deduction merely provides a clarificatory dimension to the Transcendental Aesthetic, at the other extreme, which is the view I support.

If the Transcendental Aesthetic is overturned, it raises the question of whether it is valid for the Transcendental Deduction to persist on a standalone basis, or whether the whole project

of CPR might be at risk. The opposing views try to argue for invalidating as much ground as possible in the overall project of CPR, and possibly Kant's philosophy as a whole, if even one aspect of the argument is weakened. However, I argue that it does not immediately follow that Kant's overall project would be weakened because the premises do not lead to this conclusion. The opposing argument is that the conceptualist view seems to threaten the coherence of the argumentation in the Transcendental Aesthetic, and therefore the coherence of Kant's broader critical position. However, I have argued that a constantly revisionary reading is compatible with Kant's arguments in the Transcendental Aesthetic and a reading of CPR overall. Taking CPR as a constantly revisionary project does not invalidate the advance of the Transcendental Aesthetic, or render Kant's arguments incoherent, in CPR between the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Transcendental Deduction, or beyond. Kant continues to make clarifications and the overall project of CPR should be taken as a whole.

Resolution of the Problems in the Conceptualism Debate

The high-stakes philosophical point is how aspects of the Conceptualism debate are to be resolved, which is the level at which Heidegger and Hegel are contributing. In the context of the problem of explaining appearances and the objective conditions of knowing, the important result is that Kant actually does provide substantial movement toward integrating the positions of sensibility and understanding. However, Kant cannot see his result due to the way he has framed the problem. The problem cannot be solved when specified as the "Letter to Herz" problem of how agreement is possible between abstract concepts and representations, but can be resolved when cast as the Humean dilemma of the relation between determinate content and abstract concepts. For Kant, the integration of sensibility and understanding cannot be performed from the two-stem theory of knowledge, or the conceptualism debate, as formulated because the opposition is between two intransigent binary positions of sensibility and understanding in which the former does not quite fit all the way into the latter. This is due to the problem of time in that the intuitions of the sensibility always appear in some space and some time, whereas the concept is universal and atemporal. An appeal to another register, such as universality, is needed to overcome the problem of time which prevents Kant from integrating sensibility and understanding. Heidegger's impulse to specifying an atemporal synthesis is heading in the right direction, but there are not enough conceptual resources available in Kant's work to complete the

formulation. It requires Hegel's bigger move of the understanding conceiving itself under the concept of infinity (universality) to reconstitute the problem of the understanding.

Kant, attempting to address the problem of time, must constantly expand the role of the imagination. However, despite these progressive elaborations of the faculty of the imagination as the mediating third between sensibility and understanding, the two terms remain incommensurable due to the intransigence of their temporal properties (the sensibility being rooted in time and the understanding as atemporal). The key moments of the expanding role of the imagination in specifying time determinations can be seen through the reproductive and productive syntheses of the imagination in the A Deduction, the §16 and §24 elaborations of the Figurative Synthesis of the Imagination which provides the *a priori* unification of time, and the Schematism, Analogies of Experience, and Refutation of Idealism. However, no matter how much the role of the imagination balloons in CPR, the problem of integrating sensibility and understanding remains unresolved. Stating exactly what is left open by Kant, it should be acknowledged that Kant is successful within the scope of tangible object recognition. He overcomes the problems he has identified, which are solving the "Letter to Herz" problem and articulating the limits of pure reason. Thus, Kant can be evaluated as succeeding on the project he has set forward for himself as he has conceived it. The issue is that a fuller understanding of the problem provides greater movement, and ultimately, resolution. Hence, overall, Kant succeeds at explaining appearances and specifying the objective conditions of knowing, but only within the domain of recognizing tangible objects. What Kant does not do is integrate the terms, sensibility and understanding, which is what Heidegger attempts unsuccessfully (in the Kantian context) and Hegel surmounts by redefining the problem.

The framing of the explaining appearances problem by the Conceptualism debate already starts to shift the problem, allowing some possibility for non-conceptual content, and recalibrating the issue to the irreducibility of sensibility to understanding. The explaining appearances problem is substantially loosened from an opposition of two equally-weighted terms, sensibility and understanding, to one heavily-weighted term, understanding as the central focus, and a corollary that it is impossible to rule out some role for the sensibility. The consequence of the Conceptualism debate is to respecify the explaining appearances problem in a more approachable way than the critical strategy of other scholars (such as Longuenesse and

Onof & Schulting, though they have different objectives) in which the approach is to focus on a yet-deeper dive into tracing resources through CPR and Kant's broader corpus of work.

I argue that starting to see the explaining appearances problem differently, not as the "Letter to Herz" problem (agreement between abstract concepts and representations) but as the Humean dilemma (relation of determinate content and abstract form) is why Heidegger and Hegel think that Kant solved the problem of explaining appearances to a greater degree than he himself realized. Heidegger and Hegel both locate the problem of explaining appearances within Kant's notion of synthesis. Heidegger labels the term he sees at work in Kant's thought as syndosis. Heidegger sees Kant doing more critical work than Kant realizes, which is accurate, but in the end, Heidegger's argument fails because it departs too far from Kant's ethos, has little philosophical support, and is not an accurate contextualization of the problem. On the other hand, Hegel does provide substantial enough mobilization to a new register with robust conceptual resources to address and resolve the problem. Hegel too analyzes Kant's thinking on the topic of synthesis, but the main movement is that Hegel redefines the explaining appearances problem to focus on the universal. This is the focus of the next chapter.

CHAPTER 3: HEGEL'S SELF-CONSCIOUS EXPLANATION

Hegel was the first to understand consciousness as a social achievement taking place as much outside what is immediately present in the particular mind as found there (Brandom, 2004, *Inquiry*, 252)

Introduction

Hegel's solution to the explaining appearances problem is self-conscious explanation. He understands explaining appearances to involve articulating the relation between empirical appearances and mental structures, the abstract mental structures called concepts in everyday parlance. On the one hand, Kant and Hegel have different solutions to this problem. On the other hand, their arguments are different flavors of the same kind in that both are idealist (mind-based) accounts of how concepts and appearances are related, as opposed to empiricist accounts that attempt to obtain verification of phenomena between the mind and the world. Both accounts rely on mindedness but in different ways. Kant's transcendental unity of apperception requires the conscious entity of an "I think" to unify appearances in accordance with concepts. Hegel has another layer though, in that consciousness must be self-conscious to think about its own act of thinking as the locus of constructing a valid connection between appearances and mental structures. The bigger stakes of Hegel's position of a self-conscious consciousness, acting in line with the objective conditions of knowing, are that he can advance beyond the Kantian individual-constrained "I think" consciousness to a collective "we think" consciousness (objective spirit) that is implicated in well-formed collective sociality.

Self-conscious Explanation as Bildung in the Phenomenology of Spirit

The underlying philosophical theme in the problem of explaining appearances is a theory of knowing, specifically the objective conditions of knowing. This means an account of how the overall human mode of thinking is a certain way. It is not that the *structure* of each person's thinking is different, but only the *contents*. Hegel gets at this objective formulation through his answer to explaining appearances which is self-conscious explanation. *Self-conscious explanation* is a self-aware consciousness assessing and constructing explanatory models of appearances and its own activity. Hegel explains appearances in this way, that appearances and

mental structures (concepts) are related through a self-aware understanding. This is reasonable, however, I posit a potential problem with Hegel's account of explaining appearances, which is the subjective conditions problem. The *subjective conditions problem* is the issue that although Hegel aims to establish the objective conditions of knowing, he does not do so explicitly. Instead, Hegel seems to specify the opposite, the merely subjective or arbitrary conditions of knowing. This is because consciousness is internally-focused, communing only with itself, away from the external epistemological explanatory models of the world. I resolve the subjective conditions problem through a *Bildung*-based interpretation of the necessary relation between the individual and the universal. I invoke interlocutor arguments of Hegel's account of explaining appearances from Hyppolite, Brandom, and Pippin. The commentator arguments corroborate the inherent themes related to form and content, and necessity and difference, but leave the problem unresolved without the application of my *Bildung*-based argument.

The central aspect of Hegel's formulation of self-conscious explanation is consciousness turning inward to focus on itself in that the understanding realizes that its object is itself. Thinking's object is its own thinking, its own constitutive role in determining what is to count as adequate models for explaining appearances and its own activity. Consciousness comes to realize how much it relies on itself in accounting for the nature of things. In the understanding's process of turning inwards to conceive itself under the concept of universality, its own process of self-determination becomes clear. I argue that this process ultimately exposes what can be construed as the four-fold objective conditions of knowing for Hegel, which are difference, necessity, universality and otherness. These are the non-sensible principles that self-conscious explanation deploys internally as the mechanism for distinguishing the objects of experience and explaining appearances, and which further serve as the objective conditions of knowing. The overall stakes of this analysis are that I articulate Hegel's objective conditions of knowing for all knowing, beyond the conditions of knowing for object recognition as Kant supplies.

The background context for the philosophical issues the arise in Hegel's account of explaining appearances as self-conscious explanation is presented in Figure 6. In the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel elaborates a processual account of the self-determination of different shapes of consciousness or spirit (spirit generally means collective consciousness or sociality). The five basic shapes of consciousness or spirit posited in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* are consciousness, self-consciousness, reason, spirit, and absolute spirit. The first chapters

of the book treat consciousness and self-consciousness, and comprise what some interpreters arguably see as an epistemological focus which then shifts into Hegel's ontological position.

In the consciousness chapter, three modes of construing the intelligibility of the world are investigated: sense-certainty, perception, and force and the understanding. The central issue in explaining appearances in the world is the problem of the one and the many. This is how the diversity of encountered appearances is to be held in abstract concepts. In sense-certainty, there are diverse appearances, but no universal concepts (the one is absent). In perception, there are two tiers, diverse appearances and universal concepts, but no link between them. In force and the understanding, there are two-tier models that attempt to relate appearances and concepts but they are empty tautologies that merely recapitulate the situation of difference and do not offer any real explanatory value. It is only in self-consciousness, when the understanding renders the tiers of the one and the many internally, in a mind-based account, that it can productively unify difference into abstract concepts. A parallel theme is that of the subject-object dialectic (distinguished in the Figure as "S" and "O"). The subject and the object remain separated in the external epistemological investigations but become joined once the understanding realizes that its object is its own understanding process.

Figure 6. Hegel's Explaining Appearances: Subject-Object, One-Many, and World-Mind.

Chapter Organization

The conceptual arc of this chapter is as follows. First, in Section 1, I discuss the problem of explaining appearances and Hegel's solution, which is self-conscious explanation. Then in Section 2, I contextualize in more detail how difference is treated and ultimately unified in the

construct of self-conscious explanation. In Section 3, I expand the situation of difference as engaged in the situation of self-conscious explanation to Hegel's general account of difference. Then in Section 4, I posit the subjective conditions problem that arises in Hegel's account of explaining appearances and resolve it with a *Bildung*-based reading that emphasizes a necessary connection between individuality and universality. In Section 5, I debate points from Hegel interpreters Hyppolite, Brandom, and Pippin regarding the themes of difference and necessity that arise in Hegel's account of explaining appearances. I conclude that these views are all insufficient and I support my argument that Hegel's objective conditions of knowing are an enumeration of the non-sensible principles of difference, infinity, necessity, and otherness.

It helps to make a clarification regarding what Hegel means by infinity. In *The Science of Logic*, he indicates that "it is essential to distinguish the true concept of infinity from bad infinity (21.125, 109). He says that "the infinite is the negation of negation, the affirmative, being that has reinstated itself out of restrictedness (21.125, 109), whereas bad infinity is the "perpetual movement between limits (21.222, 192). In the *Logic*, "bad infinity" is a technical term referring to a situation that cycles between limits without being able to negate the negation in an affirmation. In general, and in this analysis focused on the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, infinity should be seen in the sense of conscious being infinite because there is nothing outside of it.

Whereas Kant's conscious is always limited because it is finite (depending on sensory content that is necessarily grounded in space and time), Hegel's conscious is infinite (temporal perdurance is an operating feature of the Concept, but not on the order of the constitutive requirement as for Kant that any appearance occur in time and space). For Hegel in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, externality is finitude. If consciousness is conditioned by something external, it is not unconditioned. Hence, infinity connotes consciousness's awareness that whatever seems to be external to it is actually a product of spirit itself.

Self-Conscious Explanation

Hegel's solution to the explaining appearances problem is self-conscious explanation. As he understands it, the explaining appearances problem involves describing the relation between empirical appearances and mental structures, meaning the abstract mental structures called concepts in everyday parlance. Hegel examines various traditional epistemological models of knowing to see if they might explain appearances and constitute a general theory of knowing.

However, these models all fail because they are of a certain class, which is seeking an external model of explanation, existing out in the world somewhere to be discovered and applied to explaining appearances. The initial hope was that it would just be a matter of finding the right pre-existing model. However, since all of the external models fail on their own terms for different reasons, consciousness eventually realizes that the solution for explaining appearances must be internal, and turns inward to formulate self-conscious explanation. *Self-conscious explanation* is consciousness becoming aware of its own constitutive role in explaining appearances and determining what is to count as a valid explanation.

Consciousness investigates epistemological models for explaining appearances in the areas of sensibility, perception, and understanding (all somewhat parallel to the Kantian sense of the terms), towards the goal of obtaining a general theory of knowing. The epistemological models are solutions of the same *kind*, namely looking for an explanatory model in the external world instead of the internal world, and ultimately do not work from Hegel's perspective. One issue is that all of these models give rise to the inverted world problem. The inverted world problem is the situation that there are two tiers that comprise the explanatory models which are empty tautologies that do not provide any real explanatory value. On the one hand, the abstract level of the explanatory model merely recapitulates or summarizes the empirical regularities at the appearances level, but does not actually explain the source or function of their difference. On the other hand, the abstract level redescribes what happens but does not account for the deeper mechanisms of action as to how or why things occur as they do. Thus, the promise of a higher-level abstraction that reveals one overall governing law to explain appearances is shown to be impossible. The upshot is that there is nothing behind the "curtain of appearances hanging before the inner world" (§165) to provide a satisfactory explanatory model of the world. Since external models fail due to internal inconsistency, consciousness finally apprehends that the only solution must be to turn inward and determine what counts as explanation from an internal perspective.

Hence Hegel's solution for explaining appearances does not arise from finding a better model of an external representational account (a generalization that does more than just redescribe empirical regularities), but is rather the result of shifting the locus of the problem to the internal activity of the understanding itself. Consciousness has a discovery that it is *its own thinking* that provides the necessary connection between appearances and mental structures. Hegel's substantial move is that in *self-conscious explanation*, consciousness is no longer

looking outside itself to find a pre-existing explanatory model of knowing in the world. Instead, having exhausted external possibilities, consciousness turns inward to introspect and come to grasp its own role in actively constituting what is to count as a valid explanation. The illumination is that consciousness has not previously been aware of the extent to which it itself is involved in constituting the explanation of appearances.

I define the term *self-conscious explanation* as a self-aware consciousness assessing and constructing explanatory models of appearances and its own activity. This is a convenient label for Hegel's thought. He refers to "self-consciousness" and "explanation," but not in the joint formulation described here. The two key aspects of self-conscious explanation can be contextualized as follows. The first element is that the object of consciousness is its own thinking. Rather than contemplating an external entity, the object of thought is thought. When consciousness makes this transition, when thinking itself is "finally an object for consciousness," Hegel indicates, "consciousness is thus *self-consciousness*" (§163). Consciousness becomes self-conscious when it starts thinking about its own thinking as an object. The situation is actually more complicated in that in fact, the object of thinking involves the composite entity (a self-determining concept) of a thinking consciousness simultaneously contemplating its own thinking and an external object, and the dialectical movement between the two. Every new object for consciousness implies a newer and larger shape of consciousness to consider this object.

The second aspect of self-conscious explanation is that "The Understanding's 'explanation' [of itself] is the description of what self-consciousness is" (§163). Self-conscious explanation is not merely an activity of consciousness, it is constitutive of consciousness. The understanding's self-understanding or explanation of its thinking activities is *self-conscious explanation* and "supersedes" external epistemological models as a valid explanatory structure. Self-conscious explanation is "the cognition of *what consciousness knows in knowing itself*" (§165). The relevant criterion for adequate explanation (of thinking's thinking about itself) is the "Understanding's self-satisfaction" (§163).

Through the notion of self-conscious explanation, Hegel's account of explaining appearances comes into sharper relief. The constitutive element is the self-conscious activity of thinking, that is thinking contemplating its own thinking. The internal activity of the understanding is the mechanism that generates explanation in that by explaining its own movements, the understanding explains what counts as models for explaining appearances. The

issue is what consciousness *takes* to be a model of explanation that is adequate for explaining its own activities. In the aim of obtaining a general theory of knowing, Hegel's claim is that there must be a self-conscious entity understanding its own processes as to the terms by which it produces, evaluates, and accepts explanatory models. Explanatory models are products of self-conscious explanation. Further, explaining its own processes to itself is part of self-conscious *explanation*. This is what it means to say that thinking is taking its own thinking as its object.

The important consequence of self-conscious explanation is that consciousness achieves self-consciousness by understanding its own activity. Not finding a valid external account of explaining appearances, consciousness moves internally such that the understanding is "communing directly with itself" to determine what constitutes a valid explanation (§163). This requires consciousness to expand its shape into a larger form of understanding that is self-understanding (i.e. the transition from consciousness to self-consciousness in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*). The upshot is that appearances, the objects of experience, can be discriminated and unified into mental structures because there is a mind, a consciousness communing with itself, which assesses and produces what counts as the explanatory mechanism (not a model found in the external world). The stakes are that self-conscious explanation proves to be a strong candidate for a general theory of knowing. However, although self-conscious explanation may implicate a general theory of knowing, there is a question as to whether such a general theory of knowing would be objectively valid or merely subjectively-determined. I call this the *subjective conditions problem* and discuss and resolve it later in this analysis.

The Treatment of Difference in Self-Conscious Explanation

In the previous section, I elaborated that self-conscious explanation is Hegel's account of explaining appearances, and in this section, I describe how it actually operates. The central issue in the explaining appearances problem is the treatment of difference. There is difference in the world of appearance (all manner of external difference in the sense of Humean diversity). Hegel agrees that difference exists in the physical objects in the external reality of the world (and also like Kant, that externally real objects cannot be known directly). In self-conscious explanation, the important action is that the understanding brings the external world of appearance into the inner world of the mind. By relocating appearances (the differences of appearance) internally to the inner world of the mind, the understanding can operate on them in ways that it cannot with

external reality. The understanding has new possibilities for unifying difference when it is rendered internally, connecting force and law, and generating what it considers to be a valid explanation (a self-satisfying explanation).

The transformation is that seen through the internal lens, differences are not really differences. This is because at a higher level, differences can be unified into what Hegel calls pure Concepts. In the frame of the Concept, what seems to be irreducible difference at the level of appearance is actually two moments of the same Concept in its true essence. (*Moment* is a technical term for Hegel that means a necessarily constitutive aspect of a phenomenon, as opposed to a part of a whole which may be optional. Moment derives from Newtonian physics, in which a moment is an expression of a physical quantity involving the product of a distance and another physical quantity, hence accounting for how the physical quantity is located or arranged.) For Hegel, difference in appearance is, "in its essential form, a pure Notion" or Concept (§164). The pure Concepts of things, on Hegel's definition, are comprised of self-contradictory elements. Any pure concept is a dynamic amalgamation of movement and self-contradiction, self-differing and self-identifying, in an ongoing process of self-determination through self-superseding. A concept is a complex and central formulation for Hegel.

Undertaking the activity of self-conscious explanation, the understanding attempts to explain to itself how such apparent difference of appearance is not real (ontological) difference and can therefore be unified. The salient point is that the understanding unifies difference by specifying necessary relations between the parts and the whole of phenomena (§§152-4). By establishing necessary relations between the parts and the whole, the understanding creates a model that it thinks sufficiently unifies difference and explains appearances. The understanding experiences "self-satisfaction" in having performed this internal task of unifying difference, which indicates the validity of such explanation (§163). The justification standard is that the understanding is itself satisfied with the explanatory model it has created. The explanatory model must produce a sense of satisfaction for the consciousness that created it. This formulation of self-satisfaction and self-justification as the acceptance criterion of the formulation immediately raises questions and critique, which I take up in the subjective conditions problem later in this argument. The problem would be that moving internally in self-satisfying explanation does not overcome but merely reconstitutes the two-tier empty tautological models of before.

However, the shift to the internal domain has more robust features than a simple two-tier model of self-satisfying explanation. The method used by the understanding to unify differences and explain appearances does not rely on finding "the shape of a play of Forces" as in traditional external epistemological models. Instead, by relocating difference to the inner world of the mind, the understanding is able to see the play of Forces in its movement and absolutely universal (and necessary) moments. The understanding unifies inner difference and also apprehends the universality in the diverse appearances and play of Forces. Ultimately through this operation, "the Understanding [reaches a moment in which it] experiences only *itself*" (§165). The model is more expansive in that understanding realizes that it too is universal, and when appearances and the self are joined in universality, the understanding experiences only itself as being universal. I unpack and mobilize this argument in more detail in the course of this analysis.

Two-tier external epistemological models: force and law

Backing up a step, the understanding investigates several epistemological explanatory models of the world. Structurally, they are all two-tier models designed to hold both the many instances of the phenomena and the one law that explains them (the problem of the one and the many) (Table 12). These models contain the diversity of appearances at one level (forces) and a single model that explains them at another level (law). An example is the diversity of lightning strikes (the many), explained by the law of electromagnetism (the one). However, ultimately these models do not succeed for reasons of internal inconsistency. They supply only tautological explanations that are not a true explanation because they do not effectively examine and treat the core nature of ontological difference. The traditional epistemological models merely smooth out appearance of difference, with the effect that difference is canceled, not unified.

Table 12. The two-tier structure of Force and Law and the Difference-holding problem.

Law	Abstract Concept	Unified difference	Identity	One	Universal
Force (play of forces)	Instances/Appearances	Expressed difference	Difference	Many	Particular

Hegel emphasizes the importance of the problem of difference in that it extends beyond the force-law structure and as a recurring theme in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* (Table 13).

Difference arises in the world but it is not real difference (inner difference) and is thus immediately canceled and cannot be unified into an abstract entity (concept).

Table 13. Hegel's repetitive structure of Difference arising and canceling (§§152-6, §805).

	Reference	Real difference?	Immediately cancels?	Cancels because
1.	§154 Explanation Force and law	Not real difference because Force and law have the same content and grounds	X	Not real inner difference
2.	§155a Play of Forces (originally from §148)	Not real difference because bare unity of opposite forces (soliciting-solicited, expressing-repressing Force)	X	Not real inner difference
3.	§155b Movement of the Understanding	Real difference is in the Understanding, but not in the thing itself	X	Movement is in the Understanding not in the thing itself
4.	§156 Understanding is a selfsame law of appearance	Real difference is in the thing itself	X	Selfsame identity of identity and difference (self-repelling and self-attracting)
5.	§805 Self-knowing Spirit	Real difference	No canceling	In Spirit, difference is held as the unity of objective truth and the knowing self

For Hegel, the reason that external epistemological models fail is that difference is not treated properly. The epistemological models try to explain diverse forces (the many) with a single law (the one). However, this is not inner difference, so the difference does not count as real difference and is canceled immediately. The solution, Hegel suggests, is to "eliminate the sensuous idea of fixing the differences [in the world of appearance] in a different sustaining element" (a better explanatory model) (§160). The understanding should realize that it is futile to continue to seek an extant epistemological model that can satisfactorily ground difference, because such explanatory models do not exist. Instead, it is necessary for the understanding to reconceive difference such that it is understood as a pure Concept, as inner difference, not as external difference. Difference is an interior property of the Concept (immanent), not an external quality fixed by some other element (transcendent). The Concept is a sophisticated structure that allows for the effective treatment of inner difference as one of its aspects.

Within a Concept, inner difference is the movement of contradictory forces that are both self-attracting and self-repulsing, like the poles of a magnet. The Concept is a unity of itself and

its opposite. Only through this kind of complexity and movement of a self-opposing compositional structure can inner difference be properly said to be a Concept in its own right (the pure Concept of difference). The upshot of difference being a pure Concept is that any pure Concept accesses the domain of universality or infinity of all pure Concepts (the absolute or the unconditioned). Hegel indicates that "Only thus [as the unity of itself and its opposite] is difference as *inner* difference instantiated, as "difference *in its own self*, or difference as an *infinity*" (§160). Only through its incarnation as inner difference can difference be treated appropriately and unified.

The resolution to problem of the tautology of force and law (two-tier external epistemological models that do not explain appearances effectively) is to shift the entire apparatus (of force and law) from the external world into the internal world of the mind. Notably, not only difference, but force and law (and other notions) are taken up internally as pure Concepts thus starting to indicate the broader generalization of the Concept for Hegel. Installing force and law in the internal world of the mind as pure Concepts of their own means that the understanding reinstantiates law as the pure Concept of law. The effect of distinguishing law as a pure Concept is that the location of law becomes internal to the understanding (mind) as opposed to being an explanatory structure existing out in the external world somewhere (world).

The important result for the treatment of difference is that by seeing law as a pure Concept, the Understanding can take up "all of the moments [of difference] of the world of appearance into the inner world" (§161). Through the pure Concept, both force and law can be taken up by the mind. Law as a pure Concept taken up internally by the mind means that the constituents of law, the instances of appearance or difference, can also be taken up by the mind. The location of the one (law) and the many (diversity of appearance) now resides internally in the mind. Once in the mind, specified as the pure Concept of law, the critical tools of the Concept can be applied, specifically to properly recognize and unify difference.

The important elaboration in the definition of the pure Concept is that inner difference is part of its structure. The constitution and unification of difference is part of any pure Concept. Law specified as the pure Concept of law means that law too operates according to the logic of inner difference. The implication is that differences in the world of appearance can be unified since these differences are now internal to the Understanding. The Understanding sees difference as pure difference, which can be unified. The way that the Understanding unifies difference is by

specifying a necessary relation between the instances of difference as parts and wholes of phenomena. The problem is that in the external world of appearance, the moments of difference (for example, those related to space and time, and distance and velocity) do not have more than an "indifferent" relation to one another (§161). However, through the pure Concept of difference, "these indifferent moments are [seen by the Understanding as] a *difference* which is no *difference*, only a difference of what is *self-same*, whose essence is unity" (§161). As inner difference, differences of appearance are seen as part of the same overall phenomena.

The key shift is from the perspective of the world to the perspective of the mind. The effect of bringing difference in the world of appearance into the inner world of the Understanding means that difference can be seen as different moments of the Concept, not as differences in the external world of appearance. Differences in a pure Concept can be unified by the logic of inner difference. This is how the Understanding unifies differences in the world of appearance. The Understanding sees law as a pure Concept and can therefore unify its parts, which are differences in the world of appearance.

Hegel indicates that through "infinity, law completes itself into an immanent necessity" (§161). Through infinity (the unconditioned domain of the pure Concept), law becomes (completes itself into) a pure Concept, with immanent necessity (with the locus of necessary determinations being internal to it). Pure Concepts are self-contained and determine their own necessity, i.e. what counts as necessary relations among their constituent parts. Law as a pure Concept supplies the requisite necessity to unify difference. The source of necessity is the Understanding itself, not an external quantity in the world of appearance. Necessity is found (meaning produced) in the mind, not in the world. Necessity is obtained when the phenomenon of law is raised to the level of the Concept.

The problem of explaining appearances forces consciousness to encounter the Concept. This is important because the pure Concept or "simple infinity" is the "universal blood' of the world and the "essence of life" (§162). As the essence of life, the pure Concept (infinity) has been part of the world of appearance from the beginning, but "it is only in the *inner* world that it first freely shows itself" (§163). It is only when the Understanding takes up "the moments of the world of appearance into the inner world" that the pure Concept becomes visible (§161).

Only "as explanation" in the Understanding's activity of explaining appearances, does the pure Concept stand forth (§163). The "Understanding's explanation" is the activity of unifying

difference in the world of appearance. In explaining appearances, "the *object* of the Understanding is the individual differences in the world of appearance that it unifies (e.g. positive and negative electricity, etc.)" (§163).

Such self-conscious explanation affords great self-satisfaction to the Understanding because in explaining, the Understanding is "communing directly with itself, enjoying only itself; although it seems to be busy with something else, it is in fact occupied only with itself" (§163). In its own inner world, the Understanding experiences only itself as the intelligible process of explaining appearances. The "Understanding's explanation" is satisfying for two reasons. First, the Understanding only needs to consult with itself as to what makes sense, and can stop looking for external explanatory models in the world. Second, force and law have been unified, the one and the many are necessarily connected, difference in the world of appearance has been unified, and appearances are explained. The Understanding is self-satisfied for having solved this problem.

Hegel's Concept of Difference

In the previous section, I elaborate how apperances are explained, with the central aspect being the treatment of difference. For Hegel, appearances are explained by the internal relocation of the force and law structure to instantiate force and law as pure Concepts such that difference as inner difference can be unified. However, what is missing is an explanation of how external difference can be reconstrued as internal difference such that it can be unified, and exactly how this unification takes place. Hence, in this section, I address that open question by expanding from the specific example of difference in the context of explaining apperances to Hegel's general account of difference. Central to the general account of difference is the point that whereas external difference (Humean diversity) is the *appearance* of difference in the external world of appearance, inner difference is the true *essence* of difference in the inner world of the mind. Inner difference (or the interior essence of any concept) is a unity of itself and its opposite. Inner difference has a distinct status in that it is both itself a concept and an attribute of any other concept. Any concept is comprised of a unity of itself and its opposite, of identity ("all that it is") and difference ("all that it is not"). Summarizing, the "all that it is not" part does not mean all of the other objects out in the world, but rather the "not side" that is the inverse of "all that it is" that is here now. The positive and negative sides together comprise the unity of the concept.

Inner difference operates dialectically in that concepts self-determine in a process of self-negating, becoming self-identical, and self-superseding in the movement of difference. This is determinate negation, and more broadly, self-determination.

Inner difference and external difference

By difference, Hegel means inner difference and external difference. External difference is the everyday sense of difference as Humean diversity. This is observed differences in the objects of appearance in the world, successive instances of appearance, and the different properties of objects such as those relating to space and time, and distance and motion.

External difference is the *appearance* of difference, but inner difference is the *essence* of difference. For Hegel, there is an exterior world of appearance, and an interior world of essence. The apparent world of appearance is opposed to the true world of essence. Since appearances cannot be trusted (they might deceive us as Descartes indicates), Hegel thinks that they must be inverted or negated to reveal their true essence. The essence or truth of appearances is what does not appear, hence what appears must be inverted. The true essence of things is the inverse of their appearance. Thus, Hegel specifies inner difference as the "absolute Notion" or "pure Concept" of difference (the pure Concept (any capitalized term for Hegel) refers to the essence of something, not its mere appearance). Inner difference is difference in its true *essence* in the interior world of the mind, the inversion of the mere *appearance* of difference found in the external world. The appearance-essence relation is a key philosophical problem for Hegel. He says at the end of the Introduction that the roadmap for the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is to ultimately reach "a point where appearance becomes identical with essence" (§89). Appearance that is identical with essence signifies "the nature of absolute knowledge itself," which is the objective of the book (§89).

Inner difference is a compound formulation that holds both itself and its opposite in one unity (as a synthesis of its thesis and antithesis) (Figure 7). Not only the notion of inner difference, but any "thing" (i.e. any substantive (noun)) is comprised of a unity of itself and its opposite. Anything that exists, exists as being simultaneously "all that it is" and "all that it is not." This applies equally to inanimate objects and living beings, and tangible and intangible items: rock, rhinoceros, and rhetoric is each a unity of "all that it is" and "all that it is not."

Identity ("all that I am") and difference ("all that I'm not") are part of one integral reality that robustly comprises any substantive.

The positive side ("all that it is") and the negative side ("all that it is not") of any "thing" constitute its fullness and totality (the unity of itself and its opposite). The "not side" is not other objects or material in the world, it is the inverse, non-present, or "not side" of the positive side of "what it is" that is here and visible now. I am a unity of all that I am and all that I am not. "All that I am not" is not other people, it is the "not side" of me. This room is all that it is and all that it is not. "All that it is not" is not the adjacent rooms, it is the "not side" of this room, what this room is not. The "not side" is the inverse shape to the positive side, it is the opposite that comprises the unity of the object.

Figure 7. Hegel's conceptualization of Inner Difference and External Difference.

The concept

Inner difference can be unified because it is the unity of an entity's positive side and negative side, and is an important constituent attribute of any *concept* more generally. In the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel specifies inner difference first, in order to highlight the treatment of difference as a central aspect of the structure of the concept more broadly. Inner difference is a kind of meta-structure or meta-concept since inner difference is both itself a concept, and an attribute of any concept. The concept is a central formulation for Hegel which he refers to as the "pure Concept" or the "absolute Notion" (§160). As alluded to earlier, for Hegel, capitalized terms indicate the true essence and concrete version of the term, and uncapitalized terms are the mere abstraction of the term. For example, the "Understanding" is the full-blown concept of understanding constructed as a unity of itself and its opposite, whereas

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"understanding" is not a well-formed unity of itself and its opposite and is therefore a mere abstraction. (For readability, I simply use the term "concept" since it is not relevant to distinguish between "concept" and "Concept" because Hegel is always meaning "Concept" and that is what I mean by "concept.")

The centrality of the concept cannot be overstated for Hegel as a crucial mechanism allowing the entirety of his philosophy to operate (developed in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807) and extended as the starting frame of the *Science of Logic* (1816)). The concept is a composite of a thinking mind (substance imbued with subjectivity) contemplating an object and its own processes. Hegel says that the concept is "omnipresent" as the "simple essence of life, the soul of the world, the universal blood" of reality (§162). The concept exists in constant flux and the "absolute unrest of pure self-movement," with inner difference as the process for managing this dynamism (§163). An important distinction is that although objects (from rocks to rhinoceri) exist as a unity of identity and difference (all that they are and all that they are not), they only become concepts *for* consciousness when consciousness takes them as concepts.

The concept is a unity of identity and difference, of "all that it is" and "all that it is not." Another way to think about the unity of the positive and negative sides of the concept is as a unity of the forces of self-identicality and self-differentiation, or of forces that are self-repulsing and self-attracting. Hegel says that the concept "is self-*identical*, but is also in itself *different*; it is the selfsame which repels itself from itself or sunders itself into two" (§161). The concept is self-identical and self-differing; self-attracting and self-repulsing; and divides (sunders) itself into two (into its other). This points to the dialectical movement of inner difference, which is a process of channeling the self-repulsing and self-attracting forces of the "unrest of pure self-movement" into a productive self-becoming (in the self-determination of the concept).

The dialectic of inner difference

Self-determination by self-negating, becoming self-identical, and self-superseding

The process of self-determination unfolds as follows. Inner difference functions in a dialectical process, progressing through "the different moments of *self-sundering* and of *becoming self-identical*" in the overall "movement of *self-supersession*" (§162). Operating per the dialectic of inner difference, the concept progresses through the steps of self-negating (self-

sundering), and of becoming self-identical, in a growth process of self-supersession or self-determination. The concept is not just a static unity comprised of itself and its opposite (§160), it moves dynamically to determine itself through the dialectic of inner difference (by self-negating, becoming self-identical, and thus, self-superseding) (§162).

Specifying the dialectical movement of inner difference raises the issue of clarifying two points about otherness and the unification of difference. The first step in the dialectic of inner difference is self-negating (self-sundering). Self-negating means going to a position that is other with the self. In the dialectic of inner difference, "the *relation-to-self* is a *self-sundering*;" the relationship to the self is a relationship of self-negating (§162). The *sundered moments* (moments of self-negation) serve to create "an opposite" or "an other" of the self in the sense that "each moment is in its own self [in its essence] the opposite of itself" (§162). To negate the self is to produce the other of the self. The concept becomes "other" to itself ("becomes its opposite") in its operation (§162) and then absorbs this otherness.

The upshot of self-negation is that it enables the second step of the dialectic to proceed, which is unifying difference and becoming self-identical. Hegel says that "In other words, [the self-negating moment] is not an opposite at all, but is a pure, self-identical essence that has no difference in it" (§162). The opposite is part of the unity. The self-negating moment might *appear* to be a difference, but in its *essence* is inner difference, which is therefore a difference that can be unified into self-identicality with the concept, just as any inner difference. The concept is not "disturbed" by difference, but rather is "every difference" and "supersession," because it unifies difference into itself (§162). Any appearance of difference is really "differences that are none" [are not differences] when seen as inner difference, because differences are unified into self-identicality in the concept (§162). The concept is a juggernaut of identity and difference (and more precisely difference as identity).

Having self-negated, and become self-identical with the negation, the concept has completed this round of the dialectic, and superseded itself by growing into a larger position. The essential moments of "*self-sundering* and of *becoming self-identical*" operate in the overall "movement of *self-supersession*" (§162). The movement of inner difference is sublational, meaning incorporating or unifying the previous position into the subsequent position. The negation creates differences that are unified as inner difference in becoming self-identical, which results in a third and larger position of a self that has superseded its former self. Hence, the

movement of inner difference is also Hegel's account of the production of new objects as discussed in more detail below. Considering the never-ending process of self-negating, self-identifying, and self-superseding, Heidegger comments on the dialectical "restlessness with which *spirit* develops in bringing itself to its concept."[152]

Hegel's account of inner difference as it relates to the concept can be ordered in three phases (Table 14). First is the initial specification of the formulation (§160). Second is the dialectical operation of inner difference (§§161-162). Third is the explanation of how inner difference unifies external difference to account for appearances and the farther consequences of this formulation for consciousness and self-consciousness (§§163-165).

Table 14. Hegel's specification of Inner Difference in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*.

Paragraph	Elaboration of inner difference
Specification of inner difference	
§160	Self-attracting and self-repulsing; itself and its opposite (other) as a unity
Dialectical opration of inner difference	
§161	Self-identicality and self-differing; self-same and self-differing as a unity
§162	Self-sundering (self-negating, self-differing) and self-indentifying in self-supersession
Inner difference unifies external difference	
§163	Consciousness as Understanding operates the dialectic of inner difference to unify Humean diversity and explain appearances, consciousness is "self-satisfied" with the result
§§164-165	Consciousness as Understanding is using the tools of inner difference but fails to realize that they apply to itself too (its own growth and unification); when it realizes this, the shape of consciousness ascends from Understanding to Self-Consciousness

Reflecting on Hegel's elaboration of the self-determination process of the concept, the concept is a structure with a high degree of mobility. The concept is able to self-negate, meaning self-other, or go to a position that is other with itself. This is an adroit mechanism for the ability to get outside itself while still being part of itself. There is an aspect of immanence as the concept self-others on its own terms. Going other with itself means that the concept creates difference, which is then unified into itself, into a bigger position of itself that supersedes its former self. This formulation evokes Spinoza's notion of conatus and Simondon's account of

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[152] Heidegger, *Being and Time* (Trans. Macquarrie & Robinson), §82, 485.

individuation. The three contextualizations (from Hegel, Spinoza, and Simondon) can be seen in the example of the dynamism of an amoeba harnessing nearby molecules as it grows into a larger entity (determining or individuating undetermined substance into itself). Conatus and individuation do not have the self-othering aspect as strongly as Hegel's dialectical movement of the concept, but nevertheless convey the constant movement and self-production of identities.

The key advance for Hegel is to specify the concept as a robust philosophical structure which encompasses many elements (such as the objective conditions of knowing that I elaborate as difference, universality, necessity, and otherness) and serves as a philosophical workhorse. In each expansion in self-determining shape, the entity becomes more universal. Hegel's expansive formulations of the concept and of inner difference are indicative of his bigger project. In just a few words, Hegel succeeds in articulating a universal formulation that he intends for extensive application. Universality is his goal, proposing a general logic, a system of wide application that gets at absolute unconditioned knowing. On the one hand, there are many critiques of the Hegelian aim towards totality and its potential negative effects, for example in social, cultural, and political systems. One the other hand, there is also a sense of Occam's razor in Hegel's formulations. Occam's razor is the premise that the simplest formation may be the best, and Hegel has indeed specified a parsimonious formulation of the concept with wide-ranging reach. Crystallizing Hegel's formulation, "the concept is a unity of itself and its opposite, which self-supersedes by self-negating and becoming self-identical." These seventeen words aim to produce the whole of reality for a self-conscious consciousness (individual and collective), and describe its shape and progression over time. From the compact formulation of the concept, a tremendous degree of expansion is pre-figured. Considering temporality, notably both the snapshot temporality of being and the processual nature of becoming are incorporated in the formulation of the concept.

The generation of new objects

There are two senses in which Hegel's formulation of the concept and of the movement of inner difference contributes to the production of a new object: the concept's process of self-determination, and the excess created in sublation (the antithesis is a progression, not a canceling of the thesis; i.e. a determinate negation (the presence of a new determination as a result of negation)). Even in the weaker sense, any time that consciousness reflects on its object (whatever

its object is), and finds a contradiction, a new object may be created. In the stronger sense of generating a fully-fledged new object, Hegel indicates that the object and the concept can be equated. When he is discussing "the goal" of the book as "knowledge" in the Introduction, he says that the "Notion [concept] corresponds to object and object to Notion" (§80). In the context of consciousness's object, when the objective is knowledge (i.e. most of the time and as the main focus in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*), the concept and the object are equated. Critically, the object should be understood as being imbued with all of the rich features of the concept.

The first sense of the production of a new object is in the concept's self-determination process (Figure 8). The movement of inner difference in any concept is that of going to a position of other with itself in self-negating, then becoming self-identical with the new moment of self-negation as inner difference, of which the overall result is self-superseding by becoming a larger shape as a result of the growth process. Through the self-determining movement of inner difference, the concept harnesses the undetermined and determines it as itself. The formulation is parallel to that of how thinkers such as Spinoza and Simondon characterize the determining of apeiron (undetermined substance) into determinacy through conatus and individuation. Notably, although some scholars focus on negation to the exclusion of other features of the concept, it is not merely the concept's ability to self-negate that produces manifestation (the new), but rather the overall movement of the dialectic of inner difference that includes self-negation and becoming self-identical in the full process of self-superseding (becoming new). This is an advance in Hegel's formulation of the concept, more robustly including being and becoming.


Figure 8. Hegel's Inner and External Difference and New Object Generation.

The second sense of the production of a new object is in the dialectical movement of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. The movement of the dialectic is sublational, meaning

incorporating or unifying the previous position into the subsequent position. Sublation is the process of a position becoming a new and larger position in which the salient kernel of the previous position is preserved in the new and larger entity or unity. The thesis is sublated into the antithesis in the sense that the antithesis is not a mere canceling of the thesis, otherwise it would be a zero-sum exercise. The antithesis produces a sublational excess over the thesis. This is Hegel's conceptualization of change. He says that "we have to think pure change, or *think antithesis within the antithesis itself*, or *contradiction*" (§160). The target is not a simple canceling, but rather the contradiction of "the antithesis of the antithesis," or "the opposite of an opposite" that has "its other present within it" (§160). The "antithesis of the antithesis" is contradicting the method of simple inversion or antithesis with a mechanism for obtaining a larger position that does not simply reverse the initial position. This mechanism is called sublation. Only through the creation of excess in sublation (the production of a new object) can the antithesis succeed in "overarching" the thesis into the bigger unity of the synthesis.

This is precisely the definition of Hegel's notion of experience. He says that "*Inasmuch as the new true object issues from it*, this *dialectical* movement which consciousness exercises on itself and which affects both its knowledge and its object, is precisely what is called *experience*" (§86). There are two aspects to experience. One is the dialectical self-determination process of substance imbued with subjectivity undergoing a self-negating, self-identifying, and self-superseding dialectic. The other aspect is that a new object is created. To fully count as experience, a "new object issues from" this dialectical process.

Concluding on the concept, difference, and the production of new objects

The two senses of the production of new objects are quite similar (through the processes of self-determination and sublation). Both are characterizations of how the dialectic of inner difference functions to produce a new element or excess that is added to an existing structure. The production of a new object is the making of a bigger version of the starting position by creating a new piece that is amalgamated onto the existing formulation (like a snowball rolling down a hill). Notably, the problem of new object generation and the problem of objective knowing have the same structure, namely what counts as "new" or "objective," and to whom, especially when the derivation is within one consciousness. An issue is raised as to how the object counts as "new" or "objective" beyond only being "self-satisfying" to consciousness

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itself. Demonstrating objectivity in the production of new object (in either the concept's self-determination or sublational excess) would seem to be at odds with consciousness's "communing only with itself" in self-satisfied explanation (§163). This point is addressed in the next section.

The Subjective Conditions Problem and the *Bildung* Resolution

In this section, I discuss and resolve what I see as the key challenge to Hegel's account of self-conscious explanation, which is the subjective conditions problem. Hegel's solution to explaining appearances is *self-conscious explanation*, which is a self-aware consciousness constructing and assessing explanatory models, both of appearances and its own activity in explaining appearances. However, in the course of engaging in self-conscious explanation, the *subjective conditions problem* arises. The issue is that in conducting the act of self-conscious explanation, a self-conscious consciousness, by being inwardly focused, only seems to be able to specify conditions of knowing that are subjective (related to itself), which could imperil Hegel's overall aim of elaborating the objective conditions of knowing.

More specifically, the subjective conditions problem can be characterized as follows. Consciousness has shifted its focus to the internal terrain to discriminate objects, and is not employing external factors from two-tier epistemological models because they have been found to be inadequate to the problem of explaining appearances. To judge adequacy in accounting for the deeper mechanisms of action that produce appearances, a self-conscious thinking entity is required. This self-conscious thinking entity communes with itself to determine the terms by which explanatory models of its own thinking and appearances are valid. Due to this focal point on the self, the subjective conditions problem is manifest in that when the object of thinking is consciousness's own thinking, the "Understanding is occupied only with itself" (§163). Hegel indicates that "Although consciousness seems to be busy with something else, it is in fact communing directly with itself, and occupied only with itself" (§163). Thinking becomes internally self-absorbed and seeks self-satisfaction through explanation by assessing the terms by which it evaluates its own explanatory models in its comprehension of the world.

The worry is that with thinking thinking exclusively about itself, thinking might proceed in a way that is only subjective. The problem is how thinking would apply certain principles or concepts rather than others, and in what sense these principles or concepts would be considered to be objective, rather than subjective requirements for knowing. Thinking might navel-gaze into

an infinite regress and become disconnected from the world. Fine-tuning, the *subjective conditions problem* is the challenge that self-conscious explanation does not provide the objective requirements for knowing since there could be an arbitrary application of principles. The conditions of knowing as specified by self-conscious explanation could be merely subjective or arbitrary, and therefore not constitute overall conditions of knowing which are objective or universally applicable.

Objectivity and the objective conditions of knowing

The self-conscious explanation and the subjective conditions problem point to the underlying philosophical theme of objectivity. This is objectivity in the sense of seeking the objective conditions of knowing (that the overall human mode of thinking is a certain way). The important result of solving the explaining appearances problem is elaborating the objective conditions of knowing (for both Kant and Hegel). Hence, the topic of objectivity needs to be considered if the objective conditions of knowing are to be obtained. Kant has a claim to objectivity, by specifying the objective conditions of knowing through the categories as a common set of rules for object recognition. The object that one person recognizes as a chair is likely to be recognized by another person as a chair. There is intersubjective agreement in the normative sense. For Hegel, though, the problem is that consciousness has moved to the internal terrain of self-conscious explanation. The question is the principles or basis upon which consciousness is to distinguish objects and explain appearances, since Kantian-type external principles (the categories and the logical forms of judgment) for unifying objects into concepts are not part of the Hegelian picture.

Indeed, in Hegel's structure, consciousness has rejected external two-tier models of explanation. The rejected models attempt to fix the difference of appearances either on the level of the instances of empirical appearances, or on the level of the intellectual intuiting of what is behind the appearances. Instead, in the internal model, consciousness must have some other means of distinguishing the objects of experience, a set of principles that do not rely on external factors. What are these internal factors or non-empirical principles? What is the mechanism that self-conscious explanation would use to distinguish objects and explain appearances? Hegel refers to this internal basis for distinguishing objects as the non-sensible ground or the unconditioned universal. In a loaded series of claims, Hegel indicates that "Infinity" or "pure

self-movement" has been part of the "*inner* world" from the beginning. "Appearance displays it," but "it is as *explanation* that infinite self-movement first freely stands forth" (§163). The "unconditioned universal is the true object of consciousness" (§132).

The activity of self-conscious explanation grants consciousness access to infinity (the unconditioned universal) which suggests objectivity, but Hegel does not say more specifically what the non-sensible ground or unconditioned universal is that consciousness would use as internal principles to distinguish objects. Therefore, a task in making Hegel more explicit is enumerating the objective conditions of knowing, the principles that are used in recognizing an object that connect to the unconditioned universal. These objective principles of knowing, I claim, are difference, infinity, necessity, and otherness.

Hegel's objective conditions of knowing: difference, infinity, necessity, and otherness

The question is what would count as the objective conditions of knowing for Hegel? The objective conditions of knowing would be that consciousness, engaged internally in self-conscious explanation, would arrive at inferences that are not merely subjective or arbitrary, that could not be otherwise. Is there a list of principles, perhaps analogous to the Kantian categories, that could be used to produce the objective conditions of knowing for Hegel? I think that there is such a list, and that Hegel's objective conditions of knowing are four-fold, based on difference, infinity, necessity, and otherness as the mechanism for differentiating and unifying the objects of experience. My claim is that when consciousness is performing self-conscious explanation in a manner that addresses these four factors (necessity, difference, infinity, and otherness) in the ways that Hegel specifies, objective knowing is the result. The stronger claim is that this form of knowing could not have been otherwise. The weaker claim is that these principles supply the universal structure of knowing (the general form or structure of knowing, not the content).

The critique would be that my list of proposed principles (difference, infinity, necessity, and otherness) counteracts the overarching property of Hegel's philosophy and formulations as being intentionally immanent. The problem with the Kantian categories for Hegel is that they are not immanent. The categories are pre-specified from the outset and circumscribe the kinds of knowing that are possible for consciousness, as opposed to having a consciousness that has openness to determine its own knowing, especially as its shape expands. The point of Hegel's definitions of the concept (the dialectical expansion of subject and object) and of experience

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(creating new objects through the dialectical movement of the concept) is to describe this dynamic and above all immanence in a formulation that is extensible to many future situations.

However, I argue that this potential critique is a chance to distinguish that my list of non-sensible principles is not hard and fast attributes like the categories, but rather philosophical *themes* ("moments" in Hegel's nomenclature) that are likely to be part of what is taken up in any well-formed dialectical knowing. My list of non-sensible principles that constitute the objective conditions of knowing are not pre-determined Kantian categories (for example quantity attributes such as unity, plurality, and totality that hold assumptions about the kind of objects that are to be evaluated (Figure 7)), but rather philosophical aspects that are procedural themes engaged in any dialectic of knowing.

Hegel has said as much himself, that difference, infinity, necessity, and otherness are part of the dialectical movement of the concept, he has just not enumerated them in a table as did Kant (*Critique of Pure Reason*, §10, B106, 212). Hegel makes it quite clear that the point of the concept is to grant access to the universal (infinity), and that the necessary dialectical operation of the concept is to self-negate through otherness in the constitution of the inner difference of the concept as simultaneously everything that it is and everything that it is not. My only advance is to package Hegel's objective conditions of knowing into a structure that is parallel to that of the Kantian categories (Table 15). The key point is that neither Hegel nor I would claim that these principles would not be subject to change over time. These are the principles of objective knowing at present, and that support the entirety of Hegel's work in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, but would always be open to immanent reevaluation. The side by side comparison only makes it more obvious that the objective conditions of knowing are in different registers for the two thinkers, object recognition for Kant, and all knowing for Hegel.

Table 15. Kant and Hegel's Objective Conditions of Knowing.

Construct	Objective Conditions of Knowing	Scope of Application	Reference
Kantian categories	Properties operating in object recognition: Quantity (unity, plurality, totality), Quality (reality, negation, limitation), Relation (inherence, causality, community), Modality (possibility, existence, necessity)	Object recognition Example: "chair"	*Critique of Pure Reason*, §10, B106, 212
Hegelian principles	Themes operating in the Concept (Notion): Difference, infinity, necessity, otherness	All knowing Example: "agency"	*Phenomenology of Spirit*, §160-3, 99-101

Hegel's solution to the subjective conditions problem

Returning to the issue at hand, the subjective conditions problem is not an issue for Hegel because he thinks that he has already solved it with his broad (though vague) formulations. To be fair, given the volume of material and the various registers of conceptual levels covered in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel cannot possibly specify every detail. However the objective conditions of knowing are a crucial enough topic, which propel one of the major transitions in the book, from representational knowing to conceptual knowing (and more extensively epistemological to phenomenological knowing), so arguably require greater elaboration. Hegel thinks that he has already specified the objective conditions of knowing, but I argue that the text is insufficient because objectivity (the objective conditions of knowing) is not made explicit and has to be assumed. Pressing the text to elaborate what would be Hegel's own solution that directly addresses the subjective conditions problem can be developed in three arguments. First is that consciousness's self-absorption is just one element in the broader argument leading to objectivity. Second is that there is a distinction to note between objective form and subjective content. Third is the point that self-conscious explanation must be objective can be inferred because the arguments that depend on it require objectivity.

Consciousness's self-focus is just one element in the broader agential argument

The first arm of what would be Hegel's own argument against the subjective conditions problem addresses the issue of consciousness's self-absorption. The problem is the strange statement about "consciousness being occupied only with itself," which sounds not only subjective but solipsistic. However, consciousness communing only with itself is just one element in the broader argument in which Hegel's overall aim is to establish the objective conditions of knowing. Hegel makes the point sharply about "consciousness being occupied only with itself" for emphasis. The bigger theme is consciousness's shift from seeking explanatory models in the external world to constructing internal explanatory models, and consciousness's becoming aware of its own role in constituting such models. Focusing too much on consciousness's self-absorption would be to miss the overall point of the argument. Although Hegel's wording might suggest a subjective conditions problem, it is only to highlight the crucial aspect of consciousness's new-found role in internal explanation. Consciousness becoming

necessarily engaged in explaining its own thinking is the crucially important factor in explaining appearances. Consciousness must commune with itself to determine what is to count as a valid explanatory model for explaining appearances, and this level of self-awareness is emphasized.

Further, communing only with itself in regard to what is to count as valid explanatory models (taking only its own council in constituting explanatory models), is not myopic and is not necessarily to the exclusion of all of the other parts of consciousness's world, but rather to demonstrate the critical evaluative and agential role that consciousness is playing. The point of consciousness communing with itself is to construct explanatory models that meet the "Understanding's self-satisfaction" (§163) in a non-arbitrary way, not for isolated navel-gazing but in order to deploy consciousness's agency into its greater interaction with the world.

Objective form and subjective content

The second phase of what would be Hegel's own argument against the subjective conditions problem makes a distinction between the form and content of thought. In considering the claim that by engaging in self-conscious explanation, "consciousness is occupied only with itself," a distinction must be made between form and content. The point is that consciousness's self-engagement does not mean that the *structure* of self-conscious explanation is subjective, just the content. Although the *content* of self-conscious explanation is subjectively-derived from consciousness's self-focus, the *form or structure* of self-conscious explanation could be objective. Hegel's requiring a self-consciousness communing only with itself does not say anything about the *structure* of *how* self-consciousness is occupied with itself, which is objective. In fact, it can be argued that it is consciousness's self-focus that supplies the necessary *content* of self-conscious explanation in order to constitute the objective *form* of self-conscious explanation (and thus the objective conditions of knowing).

For Hegel, the non-sensible ground, the non-empirical principles of knowing, are not derived externally from two-tier models, and do not feature empirical sensibility and abstract understanding as for Kant. However, the principles are still objective. The principles are arrived at internally (immanently), and although the content of thinking is subjective and might vary, the form is objective, and is not arbitrary. The Hegelian non-empirical principles fulfill a similar function to the Kantian categories, but are derived immanently within consciousness, not applied transcendently from outside as are the categories and the logical forms of judgment. I posit

Hegel's non-sensible principles of knowing as difference, infinity, necessity, and otherness, in a parallel structure to the Kantian categories that are based on quantity, quality, relation, and modality. The non-empirical principles for Hegel comprise the same kind of set of rules as the Kantian categories, but are derived immanently and apply to all knowing, not only object recognition.

The non-empirical principles of knowing are not merely arbitrary. They are rooted in the world, they are internally-constructed validated explanations of appearances in the world. The inner terrain is not decoupled from the world; an external world is necessary in order to have appearances and understanding. The non-sensible principles are not completely divorced from the faculty of sensibility, they are just not traceable to any particular sense impression (they are universal not particular). The principles have a basis and recognizable determining aspects. Consciousness is not inventing new explanatory models arbitrarily, but rather closely constructing and evaluating models in line with the appearances they are supposed to explain.

The only aspect that has changed in the explaining appearances problem is that the mechanism of what is to constitute valid explanatory models has shifted internally and involves a new level of self-awareness about consciousness's own role in constituting what is to count as explanation. The non-sensible ground is internally-derived principles, but principles that are based on the experience of having appearances and of having evaluated external epistemological models that fail to provide sufficient explanatory value. The location of valid explanation has shifted to consciousness communing with itself, assessing experience self-critically. Consciousness is mediating its own encounter with the world in a more robust sense, not taking experience directly as unmediated (or processed mediately by external models). In self-conscious explanation as the application of the non-arbitrary non-empirical principles of knowing, an additional level of self-awareness in explaining appearances is added to consciousness.

Extending the form and content argument, in Hegel's three-tier model of knowing, the content of thinking's thinking about thinking is not empty. Self-awareness as the new layer in the "three-tier model" of knowing highlights the point that even if consciousness is thinking about its own processes, its own processes themselves have an object or content, which is models of the world or other objects. The structural point is that there is a three-tier model. The three tiers are thinking, thinking about itself, and the contents of this thinking. A two-tier model is only the understanding thinking about content.

A three-tier model has thinking, that is thinking about its process of thinking, about content, and these contents are beyond the internal subjective domain. Therefore, there could be a claim that although the subjective conditions problem arises, the bigger picture is that self-conscious explanation is in service of the assessment of external content. Thinking thinking about itself as its object is only the most proximate object, but the three-tier model is that thinking is thinking about an external object too. There would not be a valid content if thinking were only thinking about the structures of thinking without further content. This is a Kantian-type argument, that content is still necessary; without content, thoughts are empty. Kant's two stems of knowledge necessarily operate together since "without sensibility no object is given, and without understanding no object is thought." This is why "thoughts without content are empty, and intuitions without concepts are blind" (A51/B75, 193-4).[153] Likewise for Hegel, thought has a form and a content, and the form is objective.

Objectivity is inferred since the next parts of the argument require objective form

The third aspect of what would be Hegel's own solution to the subjective conditions problem is that it is possible to infer from how self-conscious awareness functions as the basis for other arguments that it construes objectivity. Objectivity must obtain because it is necessary for the arguments that build on it. Self-consciousness explanation as the objective conditions of knowing is the necessary ground for Hegel's more complex and better-known formulations related to freedom, agency, and mutual recognition. The foundational formulations therefore must be objective because they ground the more complex formulations that are objective.

Another reason that the subjective conditions problem is a form and content problem is that the next formulations in Hegel's argument in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* concern content not form, so a related claim can be made that it must be the case that objective form is established in order for the argument to progress. For example, there must be objective form in the sense of there being objective structures for consciousness in the moment of intersubjective interaction. The intersubjective problems that arise, namely social strife as the misrecognition of the other, are a battle over content (the content of valid life projects and the recognition of a conscious other), not about the structural conditions or the form of the interaction. The form of

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[153] Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*.

interaction is assumed, and assumed to be objective. For example, both parties are immediately quite clear about the structure of the struggle to the death with another self-conscious entity (one party dies) and the structure of the lord and bondsman dialectic (one party dominates). The dispute is about content and the recognition of that content and the other conscious entity, not the form. In fact, the misrecognition problem can only occur because the form of the interaction and the structure of the contention is taken to be objective. Hence, Hegel's claim to objectivity (the objective conditions of knowing) is inferred.

Concluding on Hegel's answer to the subjective conditions problem

Hegel's solution to the subjective conditions problem is that he would see objectivity as having been established, and obviously so. He does not make it explicit as to how self-conscious explanation has objective validity as Kant does with the categories. Hegel's claims make it clear *that* self-conscious explanation is supposed to provide the objective conditions of knowing, but he does not explain *how,* and that is the point of my exercise. The problem with Hegel's answer is that objectivity is assumed and not enumerated. I argue that Hegel needs a stronger argument to specify the objective conditions of knowing in self-conscious explanation because it is crucial to his overall argument and the transition from consciousness to self-consciousness and epistemology to phenomenology. Since Hegel does not specifically elaborate the piece of the argument that supports self-consciousness explanation being the objective conditions of knowing, it must be assumed. Therefore, to strengthen Hegel's argument, a formulation is needed that does not require objectivity to be assumed. I present such a solution that makes objectivity explicit by equating self-conscious explanation with *Bildung* (in which an explicit link between individual consciousness and universality can be made). I develop this solution after articulating the commentator perspective of the subjective conditions problem.

Scholarly solutions to the subjective conditions problem

For Hegel interpreters, the subjective conditions problem is a known issue. Scholars typically have two approaches. One is that they do not take Hegel's point about consciousness communing only with itself seriously and may label it as hyperbole. However, I think that the remark serves as a clue to an important reason why consciousness's self-absorption is necessary,

which is that it is *only* the self-aware, self-communing consciousness which decides what counts as valid explanation. The other scholarly approach to the subjective conditions problem is resolving it with external terms in the subsequent progression of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Two terms in particular produce the requisite objectivity for the objective conditions of knowing in the next chapters, desire satisfaction and the self-conscious other. However, I argue that an immanence formulation that solves the problem in-situ without waiting for the progression of the text and depending on the introduction of external terms is a better formed response.

First, considering desire-satisfaction, the point of "consciousness being occupied only with itself" is to constitute an explanation that meets "Understanding's self-satisfaction" (§163). Scholars read this as Hegel gesturing towards and setting up the next major concept in consciousness's development, desire. Since the understanding's self-satisfaction is the criterion for adequate explanatory models, understanding must be trying to satisfy some kind of desire. Satisfaction is tied to desire, and desire is a quality that is satisfied. Referring to satisfaction implies the satisfaction *of* desire. Consciousness engages in self-conscious explanation in service of desire fulfillment. Desire is always a two-tier structure for Hegel (as emphasized by Butler), comprised of immediate appetitive desire and mediate longer-term goals and projects. The claim for objectivity is that desire satisfaction instantiates the objective conditions of knowing through the mediate level of long-term projects. Since the longer-term desire fulfillment related to projects requires collective sociality, this necessitates and implies an objective understanding about that collective sociality. The argument is that since self-conscious explanation is operated by a consciousness in service of desire fulfillment, objectivity obtains. Collective sociality is required for desire satisfaction (really for both immediate appetitive desire and mediate longer-term project desire) which necessarily requires objectivity, in the form the objective conditions of knowing. If there is desire fulfillment, there is objectivity. If consciousness is oriented to desire fulfillment, objectivity is automatically conveyed. However, although Hegel mentions the understanding's self-satisfaction, he has not yet introduced the term desire, or included the lengthy desire argument in the self-conscious explanation argument as it comes later in the text.

Second, considering the self-conscious other, a similar argument to that of desire can be derived. Since Hegel mentions otherness a few times in the self-conscious explanation argument, scholars take this otherness to mean the self-conscious entity of the human other. The reasoning is, just as in the desire argument, that if there is another self-conscious entity, collective sociality

is implied, and therefore objectivity. That is the scholarly argument for how objectivity is obtained, because a self-conscious other is imported into the self-conscious explanation argument, and therefore the objective conditions of knowing required by collective sociality are also instantiated. However, in defining the pure concept in §160, Hegel appears to be merely meaning the term *other* as the opposite of the object, not as another self-conscious entity (intersubjectivity only arises in the self-consciousness chapter (§166)). Otherness is an aspect of the concept in the object's self-negation to produce a unity of itself and its inversion or opposite (i.e. other), but the intersubjective self-conscious other is not invoked in the self-conscious explanation argument. I posit otherness as one of the four non-sensible principles that structure self-conscious explanation and the objective conditions of knowing. These are difference, infinity, necessity, and otherness, but I mean otherness in the non-conscious sense as the inversion or opposite of the object, not "the other" as another self-conscious consciousness.

Concluding on the scholarly interpretations, the subjective conditions problem is resolved with external terms, desire satisfaction and the self-conscious other, as the mechanisms for obtaining objective validity. However, this can be disputed in that Hegel's formulation of consciousness in self-conscious explanation is only as specified, and does not smuggle in these other weighty terms which clearly arise later in the argument. Scholars attribute objectivity to the inclusion of external terms, but these terms are simply not part of Hegel's argument at this phase.

Hegel makes this clear by indicating that "it is only for us [readers and observing consciousness] that this [larger scope of] truth exists, not yet for consciousness" (§164). A further point is that the scholarly views based on the importation of new terms could be dismissed on the grounds of not being immanent. The Hegelian approach is to solve a problem immanently, and if this possibility is exhausted, not jaggedly appeal to an as-yet undiscussed term, but rather use the immanent failing to change the shape of the problem before proceeding to the next phase in the argument. The stylistic form of Hegel's method is that the next phase addresses the inconsistencies that arise in the previous phase, and does not cover over the problem by redirecting the focus to a new weighty theme such as desire or the intersubjective other. My solution is to propose a *Bildung*-based reading as a well-formed solution that better corresponds to the subjective conditions problem, solving it immanently in the consciousness chapter without relying on external terms or the progressive argument of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*.

Solution: a *Bildung*-based reading overcomes the subjective conditions problem

The problem is that whereas *self-conscious explanation* is a self-aware consciousness assessing and constructing explanatory models of appearances and its own activity, the *subjective conditions problem* arises in that an internally-focused consciousness, communing only with itself, may generate conditions of knowing that are merely subjective, not objective. On the one hand, Hegel's solution to the subjective conditions problem fails because his vague formulations do not make the objective conditions of knowing explicit. On the other hand, scholarly interpretations of the subjective conditions problem also have unacceptable solutions because they rely on external terms (desire and the intersubjective other) and the further progress of the argument in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Therefore, the kind of answer that is needed is one that is immanent and ties self-conscious explanation to objectivity with greater precision and clarity from within the consciousness chapter. The *Bildung* solution I propose does this. I argue that self-conscious explanation is a form of *Bildung*, a process of growth and self-formation. The benefit of equating self-conscious explanation with *Bildung* resolves the subjective conditions problem by explicitly articulating necessity as an objective condition of knowing, in a way that does not rely on external terms, by connecting the individual with the universal, necessarily.

Bildung is a term Hegel uses to mean self-formation; the concretized growth process of cultural self-formation, education, or maturity. Inculcation in normative social practices is the concrete end of *Bildung*. However, Hegel stresses the abstract-to-concrete progression in the realization of a concept. His abstract definition is that "education [*Bildung*]" is "the process whereby individuality is raised by necessity to freedom and the universality of knowledge; subjectivity is educated in its particularity" (PR, §187, 224). The salient aspect of *Bildung* is that particularity is necessarily raised to universality. Further, the kind of universality is the universality of knowledge, and subjectivity is shifted to objectivity.

> But in the very act of developing itself independently to totality, the principle of particularity passes over into *universality*, and only in the latter does it have its truth and its right to positive actuality. This unity is not that of ethical identity, because at this level of division (see §184), the two principles are self-sufficient; and for the same reason, it is present not as *freedom*, but as the *necessity* whereby the *particular* must rise to the *form of universality* and seek and find its subsistence in this form. (*Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, §186, 223-4)

***Bildung* and necessity (the definition of *Bildung*)**

The first arm of the *Bildung* argument is based on parallel definitions. The immediate reaction to the *Bildung* approach might be asking why it has not been proposed already. The main reason is because in the Hegelian lineage, the notion of *Bildung* is usually taken up in the sense of its relation to education (for example, there is a substantial literature regarding *Bildung* in education policy). The first connotation of *Bildung* is in the collective sociality sense of normative social practices. This is *Bildung* as inculcating, schooling, training, and forming an individual for participation in universality in the collective normative practices of society.

However, this argument is different in that I am not invoking the normative social practices connotation of *Bildung*, but rather the literal philosophical definition. Hegel defines *Bildung* as the "process whereby individuality is raised by necessity to the universality of knowledge." What is obtained in the definition is the philosophical configuration of individuality being raised to universality, through necessity. The benefit of working with the definition of *Bildung* is that it can be placed into parallel alignment with the construction of the notion of self-conscious explanation that I have derived from the *Phenomenology of Spirit*.

Gadamer underlines the philosophical interpretation of *Bildung* that Hegel elaborates, indicating the advance. He says that "Hegel has worked out acutely what *Bildung* is," in that "the concept of *Bildung* transcends that of the mere cultivation of given talents."[154] "*Bildung* is being raised to the universal" in order that consciousness may "constitute itself as a universal intellectual being," and the effect of failing to undertake such a *Bildung* would leave one "unformed."[155] The "being of *Geist* (spirit) [thus] has an essential connection to the idea of *Bildung*."[156] This appeal to Gadamer provides greater contextualization and strengthens the claim of the use of *Bildung* in the philosophical sense for necessarily connecting the particular with the universal. In this way of relating the particular and the universal, Hegel constitutes a significant departure from Kant, who does not use the idea or specific term *Bildung* at all, in either sense.

With these grounds, I argue that self-conscious explanation is a form of *Bildung*. This is because self-conscious explanation and *Bildung* have the same terms and construction. *Bildung* is individuality raised by necessity to the universality of knowledge. Self-conscious explanation

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[154] Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 13, 12.
[155] Ibid.; 13.
[156] Ibid.

is self-conscious understanding analyzing its own activity towards the aim of universal knowledge. The primary aspect of both formulations is individuality being raised to universality, necessarily. The secondary aspect of both formulations is also identical, which is that the individual is being raised to universal *knowledge*, and that this is happening *necessarily* (individuality is raised by necessity to the universality of knowledge). The individuality in self-conscious explanation is the self-conscious consciousness. The universality is the "infinity" or unconditioned universal that has been part of the "*inner* world" from the beginning, but first freely stands forth in [self-conscious] *explanation*" (§163). Universal knowledge is the aim of both *Bildung* and self-conscious explanation: the universal knowledge sought in self-conscious explanation is part of the objective conditions of knowing. To achieve this, there needs to be a necessary relation between the individual and the universal. In *Bildung*, individuality is raised by necessity to the universality of knowledge. *Bildung* provides the necessary relation between individuality and universality that self-consciousness requires.

Recognizing self-conscious explanation as a form of *Bildung* solves the subjective conditions problem as follows. The subjective conditions problem is establishing the objective conditions of knowing since because self-conscious explanation is internally-focused, communing only with itself, it is perhaps deriving conditions of knowing that are only subjective or arbitrary. The subjective conditions problem is exactly the type of situation in which *Bildung* is needed, because there is individuality that needs to be raised to universality. Individuality not being raised to universality results in the merely subjective conditions of knowing, whereas individuality being necessarily raised to universality, results in the objective conditions of knowing. *Bildung* obtains the objective conditions of knowing by raising individuality to universality on a necessary basis.

Hence, equating self-conscious explanation with *Bildung* provides self-conscious explanation with a necessary link between individual consciousness and universal knowledge that is objective. Individual consciousness, even though communing directly with itself, is not at risk of producing only subjective or arbitrary conditions of knowing, because it is a *Bildung*, being necessarily raised to participating in the universal as the objective conditions of knowing.

Summarizing the result of the first arm of the *Bildung* argument based on the philosophical definition, *Bildung* and self-conscious explanation are shown to be of parallel structures in their definition. The formulations have the same three elements: individual

consciousness, necessity, and universality. They have the same structure, which is individuality being necessarily raised to universality. Further, they have the same aim, which is connecting the individual to universal knowledge. Since the formulations are the same in elements, structure of operation, and aim, self-conscious explanation can be said to be a form of *Bildung*.

Bildung and self-alienation (the operation of Bildung)

The second arm of the *Bildung* argument is based on the nature of how *Bildung* operates. The first argument considered the definition of *Bildung*, and the second argument examines self-alienation in the dynamic operation of *Bildung*. *Bildung* is based on a dialectical process in which a moment of self-alienation is necessary for *Bildung* to reconcile the individual back with the universal. Self-alienation demonstrates that not only are self-conscious explanation and *Bildung* similar, but it is necessary to recognize self-conscious explanation as a *Bildung* in order to overcome the subjective conditions problem.

In Hegel's formulation, *Bildung* is required to join the subject with sociality to overcome the alienation that occurs as a natural condition of being.[157] Experiencing moments of self-alienation is the precondition for the operation of *Bildung.* The individual must be separated in order to be reunited with the collective. In this context, consciousness communing only with itself can be seen as the necessary separation or self-alienation that must occur for individuality to undertake a journey of growth after which it can be reunited with universality. Self-alienation is built into the structure of self-conscious explanation (through consciousness communing only with itself), and as such, would need a *Bildung* to reunite the individual with the universal. *Bildung* is the necessary process to reconcile the individual consciousness with universal knowledge in self-conscious explanation. "Consciousness being occupied only with itself" is the self-alienation that instigates the *Bildung* dialectic. Rather than posing a problem, consciousness's self-absorption is shown to be the necessary condition for objective knowing. This is how "consciousness occupied only with itself" can be said to be constituting the objective conditions of knowing. This is consistent with Hegel's formulation of consciousness more generally as an entity which is a dynamic living thing that is constantly self-differing, self-alienating, and self-reconciling (§160; §802).

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[157] Sorensen, 62.

Concluding on the second arm of the *Bildung* argument, *Bildung* and self-conscious explanation are similar in operation as a dialectical process of self-alienation and reconciliation between the individual and the universal. Further, in fact, self-conscious explanation must be seen as an operation of *Bildung* that involves requisite self-alienation and reconciliation in order to resolve the subjective conditions problem and produce the objective conditions of knowing.

Concluding on the *Bildung* argument: necessity and objectivity are obtained

Concluding overall on the *Bildung* argument, I have elaborated self-conscious explanation as a *Bildung.* By equating the two terms, *Bildung* and self-conscious explanation, the subjective conditions problem is overcome. This is because self-conscious explanation is, in its philosophical specification, definition, and operation, tied to the universal (objectivity, the objective conditions of knowing). As *Bildung*, self-conscious explanation provides an explicit solution to the subjective conditions problem that does not require outside terms. There are three important results of the *Bildung* argument. First and primarily, objectivity is obtained. Self-conscious explanation as *Bildung* derives what can be properly termed an objective condition of knowing because necessity, a necessary connection between individual and the universal terms, is claimed. Second, the issue with Hegel's solution to the subjective conditions problem is overcome in making the claim to the objective conditions of knowing explicit. Third, the challenge with commentator solutions to the subjective conditions problem is surpassed in not needing to rely on external terms or the further progression of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*.

Recapitulating the progress, the subjective conditions problem is the issue that if consciousness is thinking about its own thinking ("consciousness being occupied only with itself" (§163)), it might do so in a subjective way that cannot be abstracted to the general and objective conditions of knowing. What is needed is an explicit connection to objectivity. *Bildung* provides such an explicit and necessary link between the individual and the universal in the context of knowing. In *Bildung* the connection between the individual consciousness and universality is obtained, which constitutes objective validity. The advance of the *Bildung* argument is that objectivity is explicitly substantiated without reliance on external terms. Objectivity is determined as rooted in the formulation of self-conscious explanation itself.

Objections to the Bildung argument

This section considers and cashes out potential objections to the *Bildung* argument. First is the appeal to exteriority. It may seem like I am using an outside term, *Bildung*, while simultaneously refuting scholarly answers to the subjective conditions problem on the basis that they rely on outside terms (desire satisfaction and the intersubjective other). However, although it is true that Hegel does not specifically call out self-conscious explanation as a *Bildung*, the nature of my claim is different. I am making an identity claim by equating *Bildung* and self-conscious explanation, namely identifying self-conscious explanation as a form of *Bildung*. This is different than the other arguments that import external terms which are separate and distinct.

Another problem could be that I am equating universality and objectivity, when clearly the terms have different meanings. However, the terms are meaning the same thing in this argument, namely pointing to a larger universal or objective conception beyond the individual and subjective. How the terms are defined and functioning specific to the context in the *Bildung* argument is not a problem.

Another kind of critique could be that the *Bildung* solution is not contributing anything new. The *Phenomenology of Spirit* is widely understood to be a *Bildung*, consciousness's or spirit's self-formation process, so I am not contributing anything new. Even though the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is regarded as a de facto *Bildung*, the self-formation process of consciousness as a *Bildung* is not thematized. More importantly, what is novel in my argument is that I specifically align the *philosophical* definition of *Bildung* from the *Elements of the Philosophy of Right* with self-conscious explanation to obtain a necessary relation between the individual and the universal, the important stakes of which are to establish the objective conditions of knowing.

A further objection is related to subjectivity in that there is no "self" or full-fledged subject at this point in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. There is only the situation of consciousness becoming self-conscious. This might mean that self-conscious consciousness is not eligible for *Bildung* because it is not sufficiently formed as a subject for *Bildung* to make sense. However, this argument can be dismissed for several reasons. First, there is no reason there could not be a proto-*Bildung* for the proto-subject if it is a problem that self-conscious consciousness is not a full subject. Second, the status of the subject is irrelevant because the key philosophical terms in the definition of *Bildung* apply irrespective of the degree of formation of the subject; *Bildung* is

the individual necessarily linked to universality. Third, there is the chicken and egg problem in that *Bildung* is needed to form a subject, but if *Bildung* cannot apply until there is a full-fledged subject, then the full-fledged subject would never arise. Therefore, *Bildung* must apply to proto-subjects that are not fully-fledged. Further, it would be strange for *Bildung* to only apply to certain forms of consciousness and not be a universal process for Hegel. Hegel does not delineate a restricted scope for *Bildung* or the possibilities of subject-formation more generally.

Another complaint could be that in *Bildung*, the individual and the universal correspond to the individual person and collective sociality, not to the individual and the universal within one consciousness. *Bildung* is self-formation according to existing normative social practices, and does not apply to internal self-conscious explanation. However, I have already addressed this in that the terms individual and universal are read in their philosophical sense as "the universal," unconditioned, or infinite. This is not a problem for Hegel as terms often have multiple levels of meaning, and particularly an abstract and concrete application in practical deployment. The concretized version of *Bildung* is the normative social practices of forming and shaping subjects, but this does not preclude the abstract engagement of the term as used in this analysis. Although *Bildung* is engaged more practically in *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, in the *Science of Logic*, it is clearly formulated based on the abstract philosophical notion of universality. Therefore, this potential worry can be dismissed. It is not a problem to read the "universal" in *Bildung* as the unconditioned universal intended in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* rather than as the collective sociality mobilized in the *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*.

A final critique could be that my attempt to list the non-sensible principles that constitute the objective conditions of knowing is bringing more determinacy than is warranted to the dialectics and dynamism that drive Hegel's work. However, I am not specifying content, but rather elaborating objective principles and structures, which is not at odds with Hegel's project.

Scholarly responses to the Bildung argument

Next, considering commentator responses to the *Bildung* argument, Hegel might agree with my solution but find it unnecessary since he thinks he has already specified the objective conditions of knowing. He might applaud *Bildung* as a valid demonstration of self-conscious explanation, but think it superfluous. Interpreters Brandom and Pippin might endorse the *Bildung* argument, though for different reasons. For Brandom, the key element in explaining appearances

is necessity and for Pippin, the treatment of difference. Brandom's formulations support structures that create necessity between irreducible yet interoperable elements in Hegel's system, so he might be inclined to accept the *Bildung* argument for this reason. Brandom might also accept the *Bildung* argument because although collective social practices are not part of my use of *Bildung* in self-conscious explanation to resolve the subjective conditions problem, the term *Bildung* favors this expansion, which is likewise conducive to Brandom's philosophy.

Brandom and Pippin are at odds regarding difference. Brandom thinks that difference is irreducibly in the mind and in the world, and Pippin thinks ultimately difference is only in the mind. This dispute flows from their world views about Hegel. On the one hand, Brandom thinks that concept-generation is the driving principle behind Hegel's work. The concept, notion, or idea for Hegel is the unity of a thinking entity and its object; the subject and the object as one unity. On the other hand, Pippin thinks that self-determination is the driving principle in Hegel's work, so he will see difference as sublated into the unity of the object, not kept resident in the subject-object structure of concept and experience. Hence, Pippin might support the *Bildung* argument for a different reason. Since *Bildung* is in some sense the ultimate elaboration of self-determination through self-formation, this is helpful to Pippin since his focus is on the subject and self-determination as the governing principle at work in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Although Pippin sees some of the objectivity issues being cashed out in difference being specified as inner difference in self-conscious explanation, he also supports the argument that Hegel's formulations are vague and could benefit from being more explicit.

Conclusion on the *Bildung* argument, stakes, and further implications

Summarizing the results of this section, the overall topic is Hegel's solution to the problem of explaining appearances, which is self-conscious explanation. Self-conscious explanation is the understanding's self-understanding or explanation of its own machinations. Whilst overcoming fixed epistemological models as a means of explaining the necessary relation between appearances and mental structures, self-conscious explanation also gives rise to the subjective conditions problem. The subjective conditions problem is the issue that if consciousness is exclusively thinking about its own thinking ("consciousness being occupied only with itself" (§163)), it might do so in a subjective way that cannot be abstracted to the general and objective conditions of knowing.

To resolve the subjective conditions problem, I construct an argument equating self-conscious explanation with *Bildung*. The crucial result of the *Bildung* argument is that objectivity is obtained. Self-conscious explanation as *Bildung* generates what can be properly termed the objective conditions of knowing because necessity, a necessary connection between the terms of the individual and the universal is established. The *Bildung* argument is an improved solution to the subjective conditions problem than that provided by Hegel which is underspecified and those from commentators which rely on external terms.

The result of this critical analysis is that necessity is obtained by equating self-conscious explanation with *Bildung*, which answers the subjective conditions problem and contributes to the objective conditions of knowing. The important consequences of the *Bildung* argument are as follows. The *Bildung* argument provides a larger and more comprehensive lens with which to see the problems related to explaining appearances. Considering the philosophical structure of *Bildung* reveals that three of the key themes involved in explaining appearances are in the same form of problem as requiring a necessary link between individual particulars and universality. This particulars-universality structure is expressed variously as the problem of the one and the many (the properties and the whole of an object), appearances and mental constructs, and individual consciousness and universal knowledge. These are all problems in the form of individual particulars being raised to the universal by necessity, in the aim of knowledge. The larger stakes of applying the *Bildung* formulation to the subjective conditions problem are that the overall problem structure of explaining appearances is likewise exposed as a situation of the *Bildung* structure of particularity necessarily raised to universality in the context of knowing. The upshot is that the philosophical notion of *Bildung* contributes to a more precise understanding of the explaining appearances problem because it too is in this structure.

Debate with Hyppolite, Brandom, and Pippin

In this section, I invoke arguments from Hyppolite, Brandom, and Pippin to sharpen the thematization of the constituent issues in the explaining appearances problem for Hegel. Each of these thinkers has a rich and differing account of the explaining appearances problem, but all take the general shape of explaining appearances to be in the structure of a form and content argument. The accounts lend themselves to parallel comparison because they have similar structural aspects regarding analytic and synthetic necessity and empiricism and realism. On the

one hand, Hyppolite is more conceptual, intuitive, and vague than the others, which is useful for comprehending the overall evolution of the understanding. On the other hand, Brandom is so nuanced as to be almost over-determined, and is good to put in conversation with Hyppolite because the two have contrasting methods. Pippin, on the third hand, has a style of thinking that is different from both Hyppolite's and Brandom's. Whereas for Brandom, any point can always seemingly be included as one of two sides of a situation in a bigger synthetic position, for Pippin, any point can be resolved into some sort of black-and-white clarity. Thus, these two are good contemporary interlocutors stylistically, and also argumentatively, as ultimately, they have different points of view regarding explaining appearances, and the related topics of difference and necessity. Hyppolite and Pippin's accounts hew more closely to Hegel's, while Brandom's motivates the text in more expansive ways.

Hyppolite's account of explaining appearances

Hyppolite frames his account of Hegel's explaining appearances as "Explanation: the analytic necessity of law."[158] This is how Hyppolite sees Hegel's initial position, in that explaining appearances is question of an analytic necessity, which then leads to the second position, that explaining appearances is a synthetic (dialectical) necessity. Hyppolite's reading of force and law is that any particular law (e.g. gravitation, electricity) contains a concrete difference (such as positive and negative electricity, or space and time), and that explaining appearances expresses the relation between the two. The concept of the law is called force, and indicates how the terms are necessarily related. However, this necessity is merely an analytic necessity (an empty tautology, a "lifeless unity" as Hegel says (§188)), because we cannot see how there can be any dialectical movement between the two terms, and how either factor can join with the other. In analytic necessity, it is not clear how the factors can be connected such that there could be an identity of "phenomenal identity and reality" (appearance and reality). Therefore to shift the relation between the terms from analytic to synthetic, Hegel specifies the synthetic necessity rather than the analytic necessity of the relation. Hyppolite thinks that the merely analytic necessity of the relation between terms is a problem that neither Hume nor Kant goes beyond, but Hegel does.

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[158] Hyppolite, 129-36.

For Hyppolite, the problem with Hume is that there is difference but not necessity, and the problem with Kant is that there is necessity, but external (analytic) necessity, not internal (synthetic) necessity, and therefore (Hegel's subsequent position) infinite necessity would not be possible. For Hume, there is difference (if terms are not separate, they are not discernable), but not abstraction, and thus seeing a necessary connection between terms is impossible (necessity is an illusion). Kant takes up Hume's notion of diversity, and adds the idea of a relation being infinite, but only as externally to the relation, not internally. The problem, as Hegel points out in the *Jena Logic*, is that "the relation is external to that which is related."[159] The result is that "the relation of diverse substances is not necessary, because this relation is not internal to them."[160] There cannot be a necessary relation between substances unless the relation is internal to them. The consequence of a relation external to that which is related is that it cannot be infinite (which is important because Hegel ultimately wants to specify an infinite unconditional universal). The result is that identity and difference remain external to each other. The relation can shift to become one that is internal to the terms when the terms are the kind of terms that can self-determine and exist in a dialectical relation to each other. Self-determined terms are able to determine themselves and their relations. With self-determined terms, the relation becomes concrete as opposed to abstract, and is not reducible to merely abstract unity or abstract diversity. The relation becomes synthetic as the concrete synthesis of unity and diversity, identity and difference, or as Hegel says, "the identity of identity and non-identity."[161] Synthetic necessity is achieved when self-determined terms establish a relation that is internal to themselves.

The shift from analytic necessity to synthetic necessity occurs in the force and law section of the Force and the Understanding chapter. The notion of the concept, when it is law, is constrained and incomplete. It "does not express the whole phenomenon."[162] The issue is that in force and law, immediacy impedes the analytic relation from becoming synthetic. The laws of nature relate to the "first immediate elevation of the sensuous world to the intelligible."[163] Since

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[159] Ibid., 131, n15, citing Hegel's *Jena Logic*, 48-9.
[160] Ibid., 130, n13, citing Hegel's *Jena Logic*, 48. "The relation of diverse substances is not necessary, because this relation is not internal to them." The English version of the *Jena Logic* says substantially the same, that "The connection of the diverse substances is not a necessity, because they are not connected with respect to themselves" (Hegel, *Jena Logic*, 53).
[161] Ibid., 130, n14, citing that "The first phrase ("the bond of the bond and the nonbond") is from Hegel's *Early Theological Writings*, 312; the second ("the identity of identity and nonidentity"), from Hegel's "Differenz," 77.
[162] Ibid., 131.
[163] Ibid.

the elevation is immediate, it does not express the totality of the phenomenal world. As a result, in law, the phenomenon is not yet posed as phenomenon, but rather as suppressed being-for-itself.[164] This shortcoming appears in that the law has "indifferent difference between its terms," and difference that "lacks necessity."[165] The transformation to the fuller notion of the concept occurs when consciousness introduces "becoming into thought itself," as opposed to "returning to the phenomenon," meaning returning to its object.[166] When consciousness introduces becoming (self-determination) into thought itself, then the phenomenon is posed in its integrity as a phenomenon, in the "complete manifestation of its essence."[167] Hyppolite takes the cue from Hegel in the Preface, that the overall task is to "infuse spirit into the universal as a result of the suppression of determinate and solidified thoughts."[168] Such infusion of spirit into the universal is introducing becoming into thought itself. To do so, consciousness "must think dialectically,"[169] and dynamically in order to overcome determinate and solidified thoughts. Consciousness has not become Spirit yet, so in the Force and the Understanding chapter, Hyppolite sees Hegel as addressing the problem of transitioning from the world of laws ("that immediate and inadequate replica of the phenomenal world") to the world of the concept, which is ultimately, "the absolute concept, infinity."[170]

On Hyppolite's account, the two-tier force-law structure lacks necessity because there is only indifferent difference between the terms, where instead an internal relation between self-determined terms is needed to produce synthetic necessity. Hyppolite thinks that the way Hegel resolves this is through a form and content argument (in which change in form becomes change in content). The argument is that Hegel's account of explaining appearances (in §154) reveals that force and law are the same, that they have "the same content, the same constitution" (there is "no difference in content").[171] However, the benefit of formulating the account of explaining appearances in this manner, with force and law having the same content, opens up dialectical movement on the side of form. Content cannot move so form must, and not the form of the object, but rather the form of the understanding. The task of explaining appearances causes the

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[164] Ibid.
[165] Ibid.
[166] Ibid.
[167] Ibid.
[168] Ibid.
[169] Ibid., 132.
[170] Ibid.
[171] Ibid.

understanding to introspect itself. In explaining appearances, the understanding apprehends the idea that "the difference between understanding and its object … is also a difference of understanding" itself.[172] The form of the understanding must shift in order to understand its object, because all of the other options for movement have been exhausted: content is the same (§154), and there is necessity and movement in the understanding but not in its object (§155), so therefore there must be movement in the understanding itself. The form of understanding (the form of the concept of understanding) shifts in the process of the understanding trying to understand its own process. In attempting to understand its object (the concept of understanding), there is no movement in the object, so the understanding must change its own concept of how it understands its object. The object "how I understand things" is the understanding's object, and the form of the object is transformed since the content of the object remains rigid.

The way that Hyppolite characterizes the movement of the understanding is that "change of form becomes change in content because the difference between form and content is part of the [dialectical] process."[173] Change in the shape of the concept (form) is change in the content of the concept; or really, the two become parties to one dialectical interchange as two parts of one larger domain, with subject-object dualism starting to be dissolved. For Hyppolite, the result is that "analytic necessity, i.e., tautology, becomes a necessity of the content, i.e., synthetic necessity."[174] Analytic necessity becomes synthetic necessity, and delivers the dialectical thought of the "unity of unity and diversity" (the identity of identity and non-identity or difference).[175] Thus, for Hegel, subject-object dualism starts to be overcome as the process of consciousness's knowing becomes dialectical knowledge that is "simultaneously the movement of the thing itself and the movement of our thought of the thing."[176] The subject and the object are constituent elements in the process of knowing. Hence, Hyppolite credits the "difficult transition" from consciousness to self-consciousness as being achieved.[177]

The important result is that the form of the understanding's own concept of the activity of understanding has changed, to knowing as a dialectical process of subject and object. Dialectical exchange is a property of consciousness's own understanding process, and consciousness further

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[172] Ibid., 133.
[173] Ibid.
[174] Ibid.
[175] Ibid.
[176] Ibid., 134, n18.
[177] Ibid., 133.

apprehends the insight that its own shape is not fixed and may continue to evolve. In the Force and the Understanding chapter, consciousness exhausts its search for representational explanations of the world and of knowing. Consciousness realizes that it is consciousness itself that creates the explanation of the world, the self, and knowing (explaining appearances is not found in an external structure like force and law), and that it does so synthetically (dialectically) and necessarily. Hyppolite thinks the advance is that Hegel has raised understanding to reason and rendered the determinations of thought mobile by thinking dialectically.

Hyppolite's account of explaining appearances (invoking the end of §155 and the beginning of §156) resolves some of the key issues in the Force and the Understanding chapter. The overall process is that consciousness experiences the contingency of the laws of nature, and "in seeking their necessity, [eventually] returns from the world to itself" in its account of explaining appearances.[178] At first, consciousness's explanation of these laws is tautological, and reaches a merely analytic necessity. However, that necessity becomes synthetic when necessity appears to consciousness in its own object (itself). Through a change in form, self-determined terms (the understanding and itself as its object) can now exist in an internal relation of synthetic necessity. Explaining appearances is at the heart of the broader transition of consciousness to self-consciousness. The important argumentative development in the Force and the Understanding chapter is that the sensuous world and the extra-sensuous or super-sensuous world, phenomenon and law, identify with each other in the concept, which is the unconditioned universal, and the thought of infinity. Infinity, or absolute concept, "reconciles analytic and synthetic identity, and the one and the many," and "in its object," in itself as its object, "consciousness reaches itself…self-consciousness." [179] The unifying mechanism is infinity.

Summarizing the result, Hyppolite's account of explaining appearances is a form and content argument that explains how analytic necessity becomes synthetic necessity when self-determined terms establish a relation that is internal to themselves, and this is how the understanding becomes the site for changing its own shape, and connecting to infinity.

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[178] Ibid., 118.
[179] Ibid., 119.

Brandom's account of explaining appearances

      Brandom locates his discussion of explaining appearances slightly earlier than Hyppolite's, at the end of §154 and the beginning of §155. In these passages, Hegel indicates that the "process called *explanation*" reveals that "Force is constituted exactly the same as law" (§154), and therefore that the distinction between Force and Law is a "difference that is no difference" (§155). Brandom thinks that Hegel's idealism starts to emerge in the Force and the Understanding chapter since claims can be read at two levels, literally about Newtonian force as science, and symbolically about theoretical entities. Theoretical entities are concepts, particularly in this context, concepts that are related to force, in which force is inferred from its observable expressions (appearances).[180] In the Perception chapter, consciousness's object is universals. In the Force and the Understanding chapter, consciousness's object is theoretical entities (concepts). Unlike universals, concepts are only accessible mentally through inference. Inference is a crucial ongoing theme for Brandom. For example, in developing his doctrine of concepts, which is implicated in explaining appearances, Brandom argues for "privileging inference over reference"[181] as an important shift away from the sedimented debates of referential philosophy. A shift from "beliefs" to "commitments" is another important mobilization for Brandom (thinking "our cognitive comportments in terms of commitments rather than beliefs"[182]), again indicating the principle of the loosening of stricture in favor of greater agency on the part of the entity who is inferring or committing.

      Like Hyppolite, Brandom employs an analytic-synthetic frame to set up his discussion of explaining appearances. He considers the fundamental law F=ma (Force = mass times acceleration, Newton's second law of motion), an area in which debate continues as to whether F=ma is an analytic or synthetic proposition. On the one hand, if F=ma is taken as analytic, then mass and acceleration necessarily comprise force. There is only the appearance of mass and acceleration as being distinct from force. Explanation, by appealing to such an analytic law, seems to be an empty tautology because it explains nothing. The analytic proposition merely states the obvious, the necessary interrelation of elements that only appear to be distinct.[183] On the other hand, if F=ma is taken as non-analytic (e.g. synthetic), if force is not being defined as

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[180] Brandom, 2010, 1.
[181] Brandom, 2000, 1.
[182] Brandom, 2004, 251.
[183] Brandom, 2010, 7-8, Pt 9.

the product of mass and acceleration, then in fact the law might offer some explanatory value. If F=ma were not an empty tautology, it would be possible to learn something from it. However, a synthetic proposition lacks necessity, the alleged necessity of the law, since the elements are not necessarily related. For Brandom, the relevant difference between analytic and synthetic propositions is the status of necessity in that necessity is a feature of analytic propositions but not synthetic propositions.

This is the stark position, that necessity is either cleanly present or absent. The more nuanced situations of reality include parts of both. Brandom sees Hegel asking Hume's question of how it is possible to make sense of "a natural necessity that does not collapse into uninformative analyticity or empirical contingency."[184] The salient question is how necessity can exist in the world, and be productively incorporated into a generalized concept. As a corollary, Hume asks what it means to say that "things are distinct but also necessarily related to each other,"[185] which is the parts-whole question Hegel raises in §§152-3. The issue is how a necessity of relation between terms is to be specified. Brandom thinks that Hegel's discussion of force and law, and explaining appearances, is important precisely because it makes these questions explicit. Hegel's concept of law is finally a formulation in which the Humean problems can be addressed productively. Brandom calls Hegel's notion of law a "superfact," which is a structure that has both "abstract form and determinate content."[186] A law is a structure that instantiates the Humean question of the relation between content that is determinate and form that is abstract. Hegel's force-law structure is a superfact that embodies the Humean problem because it has a composite structure of the two tiers of the abstract form (theoretical entity or concept) and determinate content. Force is an "abstract form" in the sense of holding universal difference, and law is "determinate content" in the sense of holding expressed difference.

Progressing to the next deeper level of the argument, Brandom addresses the Humean dilemma (specifying a natural necessity (determinate content) with a generalized concept (abstract form)) through the themes of difference and necessity. (The general form of the Humean dilemma is the specification of the relation between determinate content and abstract

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[184] Ibid., 8.
[185] Ibid., 8.
[186] Ibid., 6; Pt 6; and 7; Pt 7; Brandom, 2019, 189.

form.) Brandom sees two possible positions related to difference and necessity, either difference is in the mind, or difference is in the world. On the one hand, difference is in the world. The explaining appearances problem prompts the situation in which consciousness realizes that it has artificially divided elements in its apprehension of appearances, and that these elements are necessarily connected in the world. Difference is merely a (false) appearance for consciousness.[187] Consciousness grasps the point that necessity (necessary difference) is in the world, and that consciousness has incorrectly divided the necessity present in the world in its apprehension of appearances.

On the other hand, difference is in the mind. Instead of necessity being a feature of the world (misapprehended by the mind), necessity is a feature of the mind, an aspect of consciousness's formulation of laws and what things are for it. In this sense, necessity is not an element that should be considered as being grounded in what things are in themselves (in the noumenal world), which cannot be ascertained, but as they are in the mind (in the phenomenal world). Necessity resides in the understanding, and its job is to unify appearances that seem to be distinct into a rule or law. On this view, consciousness realizes that the important point is that necessity is located in the mind, not in the world.

However, considering both views together creates a conflict. The issue for consciousness is that the necessity of difference is either in the world or in the mind, which is incompatible, in the sense of consciousness's conceptualization of these terms at this phase of its progression.

Brandom's target is the Humean dilemma (specifying an explanation for determinate content and abstract form), of which the most salient incarnation is the task of explaining appearances. To explain appearances, an account must address the incompatibility issue of whether the necessity of difference is in the world, or in the mind. Brandom thinks that §154 explanation is a crucial formulation for crystallizing this issue. This is because in defining the concept of explanation, necessity becomes, not an abstract form or principle divorced from the determinate accounts of the laws that govern actual appearance, but rather a feature inherent in those laws. Necessity becomes inherent to, and constitutive of law in explanation. Even if difference is canceled immediately in the §154 explanation of Force and law, necessity is present and constitutive of law. In explanation, necessity becomes a feature of law because

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[187] Ibid ., 8.

"*necessitation* is the essence of force."[188] Necessity is the essence of force (concept) and law (the superfact structure that holds both determinate content and abstract form). Necessity is revealed to be an essential feature of force and law in explanation.

For Brandom then, far from being merely an empty tautology, in its most direct engagement with Force and law and explaining difference, Hegel's elaboration of the notion of explanation in §154 is accomplishing the important critical work of demonstrating that necessity is an essential feature of both force and law. Brandom's sense of necessity is different than Hegel's. Hegel situates necessity ("the recital of the moments constituting the cycle of the Necessity" (§154)) in the object. For Hegel, this means that the upshot is that "this necessity is merely verbal" and is "*not* [yet] a difference of the thing itself" (§154). Brandom, though, takes the important point to be not focusing on whether and how necessity is grounded in an object or not, but rather the point that necessity is an inherent feature of both force and law. Whereas Hegel situates necessity in an object, stuck and immobile, for Brandom, this is not the structure of (Hegel's) necessity. For Brandom, necessity does not require an object, necessity is a constituent feature of force and law. Explaining appearances is important because when consciousness realizes that "*necessitation* is the essence of force," it becomes even more incumbent on consciousness itself to engage actively in explaining appearances. Brandom concludes that necessity is in law, force, and the concept (force as concept). The critical result of Brandom's argument is specifying that necessity is an inherent feature of law, which allows him to support the claim that necessitation is the essence of force (law as force), which also applies to the concept (force as concept).

Brandom's theory of concepts

With the clarification of necessity as an essential feature of force, law, and the concept as a base, Brandom expands his argument for explaining appearances by positing his theory of concepts.[189] The core issue to be settled is the incompatibility of whether necessity is in the world or necessity is in the mind. Brandom thinks that this incompatibility is fundamental to how we encounter and make sense of the world (e.g. experientially), not just something that is

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[188] Ibid., 4.
[189] Brandom, 2019, 171-3.

analytically true (e.g. a necessary relation between terms).[190] For Brandom, the necessity incompatibility is a feature of the bigger system of the concept, in which our concrete experience produces the incompatibility.[191] There are two elements in Brandom's theory of concepts.

The first aspect of Brandom's theory of concepts is that concrete experience has two irreducible aspects, perception and inference. They function together in that concepts are produced in concrete experience. Concrete experience is the movement of a concept-producing system (a mind) in response to the immediate deliverances of perception and the mediate deliverances of inference.[192] Concepts are produced jointly, immediately by perception and mediately by inference. Perception and inference are holistically interconnected in concept generation and cannot be reduced to a reflection of either an independent objective reality (necessity is in the world), or an independent subjective reality (necessity is in the mind). Concepts are produced by the mind, irreducibly drawing upon both the world and the mind, in perception and inference, and in objectivity and subjectivity. Brandom's formulation (the joint operation of the immediate deliverance of perception and the mediate deliverance of inference) is in line with Hegel's later articulation in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, in the Absolute Knowing chapter, that "the object is in part determinateness corresponding to Perception, and in part essence or universal corresponding to the Understanding" (§789).

The second aspect of Brandom's theory of concepts is that like perception and inference, form and content are also irreducible features. In the concept, there is a "determinate diversity of content, and a universal unity of necessity as its form."[193] The concept is a structure that resolves the Humean dilemma by holding both determinate content (determinate diversity of content) and abstract form (universal unity of necessity). The dilemma is resolved in the move (or clarification) from "abstract form" to the "universal unity of necessity." Brandom can do this because he previously specified the incompatibility problem as one of necessity. In the process of concept generation, per the irreducibility of perception and inference, necessity is clarified as belonging to both the world and the mind. The concept is produced as a synthetic process between the world and the mind. Thus in the concept, the necessity incompatibility (necessity is in the world or necessity is in the mind) is unified into the "universal unity of necessity." There

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[190] Brandom, 2010, 8.
[191] Ibid.
[192] Ibid.
[193] Brandom, 2010, 8.

is a unity of necessity in the concept in that necessity is in the world *and* necessity is in the mind. Brandom restates the Humean term "abstract form" in this way as "universal unity of necessity."

There is also a second sense in which Brandom might be meaning "universal unity of necessity." This is in that to overcome the incompatibility regarding the location of necessity (necessity is in the world or necessity is in the mind), Brandom is positing that form, the abstract form of the concept, is the location of necessity. Whereas Hegel typically situates necessity in the object or the relation, Brandom locates necessity in the form. The strong reading of Brandom would be that the location of necessity is in the form of the concept, but it is not required to accept that to agree with the lighter reading that necessity is in both the world and the mind (which resolves the Humean dilemma).

The implications of Brandom's theory of concepts for the explaining appearance problem are as follows. First, one result is that enumerating a theory of the concept-producing process (a mind that renders experience intelligible) exposes the issue that the concept itself is a primary philosophical problem, which is as true for Brandom as it is for Hegel. Concepts exist within a bigger system that *produces* concepts and this genesis is a central question. Specific concepts, and also the notion of the concept more generally are moving targets. Concepts change in the evolutionary development process. The shape and notion of what concepts are changes, as well as what constitutes objects for consciousness. For example, consciousness comes to realize that concepts are the kind of thing that might change shape, that form and content are to be understood together, and in general, that a concept's form has a universal unity of necessity and a concept's content has a determinate diversity. Through the notion of the concept, the Humean dilemma is resolved in that there is a dynamic structure for holding both universality and particularity. Any concept may be changing throughout the ongoing dialectical process, in both form and content. Brandom agrees that Hegel thinks that "adequate conceptions of form and content, of identity and difference, cannot be adumbrated in advance of consideration of their role in explicating features of this evolutionary developmental process" of consciousness.[194] Concepts (thought objects) are a much larger mobile entity for both Hegel and Brandom, and are not to be conceived merely in terms of their role in judgment (as per Kant).

A second implication of Brandom's theory of concepts for the explaining appearances problem and the elaboration of Hegel's idealism is the important shift in the direction of the

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[194] Ibid., 4.

focus of consciousness. By orienting itself towards concepts, consciousness changes to take theoretical objects (concepts) to be real, and what is observable to be their (mere) appearance. In consciousness's understanding, thinking becomes more real than the world. Consciousness seeks to explain what is observable in terms of concepts, not vice versa. Consciousness reverses to explain appearance in terms of theoretical objects (concepts), as opposed to explaining theoretical objects in terms of appearance. This mode of explaining appearances "reverses the direction of the inferences by means of which theoretical objects are revealed (appear) to us."[195] Concepts of reality are revealed to us by our mind, not by appearances of the external world. Hence consciousness has moved farther away from a representational view of reality. For Brandom, "to find out about theoretical objects, we draw conclusions from observational premises, but to *explain* what we observe, we draw conclusions from theoretical premises."[196] Explaining appearances is demonstrated as being crucial to our understanding. The duality of perception and inference is required since for Brandom, "reality is inferentially revealed by appearance."[197] The joint operation of perception and inference in a process that generates concepts through experience is irreducible for Brandom. The distinction between appearance and reality is "dissolved" in the sense of the two becoming joined in a compound unity. Appearances are explained by the concept-generation process that involves both perception (sensibility in the Kantian lexicon) and inference (understanding).

A theory of concepts in the Hegelian context must apply to the special case of the infinite concept. Brandom's theory of concepts accommodates the infinite concept with an extension of the form-content argument that he develops from his reading of §154 and his characterization of Hegel's account of explaining appearances. Brandom thinks that in the infinite concept, there is an identity of the subjective and objective aspects of content, but a difference in form between the subjective certainty and the objective truth that can attach to the content. In the infinite concept, there is an identity of content (the content of thought) between its subjective aspect (the activity of thinking) and its objective aspect (what is thought about). As with the notion of explanation as described in §154, there is an identity of content (in §154 specifically between the content of Force and law, and generally in the infinite concept, between the subjective and

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[195] Ibid., 10; Pt 14.
[196] Ibid.
[197] Ibid., 8.

objective aspects of thinking). However, in the infinite concept (unlike in §154 explanation in which there is also an identity of form between Force and law because they have the same ground and constitution), there is a difference in form. In the infinite concept, there is a difference in form between the subjective certainty and the objective truth that accompanies the content of thinking. This difference is the difference between what something is for consciousness, and what it is in itself. Subjective certainty and objective truth are not an identity. Recapitulating, in the infinite concept, there is an identity of the subjective and objective aspects of the *content* of thinking, but a difference in the subjective and objective *form* of certainty or truth that can be attached to the content of thinking.

Brandom's infinite concept formulation of concepts is an extension of his general theory of concepts. The form-content structure of the concept continues to be a crucial explanatory mechanism, even though the infinite concept is arguably different from the general concept that arises in the everyday experience of immediate sensible perception and mediate inferential understanding. However, the similarities in the formulations are clear. Generally in the concept, the content is not shifting, but the form is. Brandom's formulation is more robust than Hyppolite's, but both emphasize the point that form's shape changes while content's does not.

The content position is similar in Brandom's three formulations of the concept (the Humean dilemma, the general theory of concepts per §154 explanation and necessity, and the infinite concept). Tracking this progression, content is "determinate content," then "determinate diversity of content," and then "an identity of the subjective and objective aspects of the content of thinking," all of which refer to what is essentially determinate content. On the other hand, form displays movement in shape and meaning. Form is "abstract concept," then "universal unity of necessity," and then "difference in the subjective and objective form of certainty or truth that can be attached to the content of thinking." This relates to the point I made earlier that a strong reading of the "universal unity of necessity" might suggest that Brandom is locating necessity in the form of the concept, because the form side expands again in the infinite concept to address both objective truth and subjective certainty (necessary difference in form from both the objective and subjective viewpoints). Irrespective of accepting the stronger or weaker reading of Brandom, they both center on the point is that the form-content structure of the concept is a useful critical mechanism for holding the determinate content and abstract form across the dynamism of Hegel's processes of self-determination.

Summarizing, Brandom proposes a theory of concepts to address the Humean dilemma as he sees Hegel addressing which is explaining appearances by specifying a structure that holds determinate content and abstract form. Brandom's theory of concepts is in the structure of a form and content argument that argues for the irreducibility of perception (sensibility) and inference (understanding) in consciousness's process of generating concepts. Brandom's theory of concepts unifies necessity (necessity is in the world and necessity is in the mind), locating a universal unity of necessity in the form of the concept. In concept-generation, a reversal takes place such that the mind explains appearances in terms of theoretical entities (concepts) rather than vice versa, in the concept-generating process in the concrete experience of everyday life. In the special case of the infinite concept, form and content persist as a structure for holding identity and difference, and subjective and objective aspects of the phenomenon. More specifically in the infinite concept, there is an identity of the subjective and objective aspects of the *content* of thinking, but a difference in the subjective and objective *form* of certainty or truth that can be attached to the content of thinking.

Through Brandom's theory of concepts, the Humean dilemma is resolved in that there is a dynamic structure for holding both universality and particularity. The situation is clarified as form having a universal unity of necessity and content having a determinate diversity. The advanced of Brandom in the explaining appearances problem is providing a substantiated means of resolving the Humean dilemma by adding granularity to the form and content specifications. He also brings several weighty terms into one coherent schema; immediate perception (sensibility) and mediate inference (understanding), objectivity and subjectivity, the particular and the universal, and determinate content and theoretical entities. The stakes of Brandom's theory of concepts are that a solid foundation is provided that integrates these terms into one overall argument for explaining appearances.

Pippin's account of explaining appearances

Whereas Brandom scopes downward into the more detailed issues inherent in the explaining appearances problem, Pippin scopes his analysis upward into the positions of realism and empiricism. Pippin discusses Hegel's account of explaining appearances by casting the pairings of terms (Force-law and determinate content-abstract form) more broadly in the frame of the empiricist-realist debate. Pippin's formulation can be seen as being in line with the usual

understanding of empiricism and realism. These are the positions that the only knowable reality is either in the external world (empiricism) or in the internal mind (realism). Pippin thinks that Hegel is trying to provide the sophisticated formulation of a realist explanation for empirical phenomena. Hegel wants to specify the "non-empirical foundations of realism," which are realist principles that do not rely on empiricism yet nevertheless explain empirical phenomena.[198] Pippin regards this task as being the purpose of the Force and the Understanding chapter. He thinks that the chapter is intended for Hegel to cast universals in a more realist kind of way than was possible in the Sense Certainty and Perception chapters, and also to pose modes of systematizing such knowing. Indeed, the relocation of Humean diversity and the concepts of force and law to the internal domain of the mind can be seen as a realist project. However, on Pippin's second point, that Hegel is striving for systematization, although self-conscious explanation is a method, it is not clear that the method is fully systematized, including because of wrinkles such as the subjective conditions problem. Overall, Pippin sees realism as any extra-mental reality that explains the truth of the order of appearances.

The way that Pippin takes Hegel's position of the "non-empirical foundations of realism" as being the necessary conditions of knowing is analogous to Brandom's formulation of the Humean dilemma. Brandom asks how it is possible to have a structure that holds both determinate content (empirical phenomena) and abstract form (realist principles). Pippin likewise sees explaining appearances as the epitome and concrete focal point of questions raised by the Humean dilemma between determinacy and abstraction. For Pippin, the important point is that a system of thought requires non-empirical foundations that are well-formed. He thinks that Kant does not fully or directly address the issue. This is because sometimes Kant dismisses scientific principles as being merely regulative (observable; closer to an empiricist view), but other times hints that such principles are not only explanatory, but constitutive of nature (conceptual; closer to a realist view).[199] Pippin is thus looking for Hegel to substantiate such non-empirical principles of realist knowing to a more specific extent that improves on Kant's formulations.

More broadly, Pippin's stance is that realism refers to any extra-mental reality whose existence explains the truth of the order of appearances. Forces are obvious, but laws understood as some kind of Platonic existences rather than mental creations are also included in this realism.

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[198] Pippin, 137.
[199] Ibid.

Since consciousness has already discovered that the world of appearances is not self-explanatory (two-tier models are empty and merely attempt to fix the difference), realism is the attempt to ground the meaning of appearances in some kind of extra-mental frame. The problem, though, is that insofar as any such extra-mental frame deploys only positive terms, it does not perform the negative work of the mind (the determinate negation which is essential to Hegel's notion of the concept). Hence, realism alone fails in that the real remains unhinged from necessity without the so-called labor of negation. The labor of negation requires an idealist stance that invokes Hegel's notion of the concept which self-negates to self-supersede (this is the labor of the negative). An idealist stance (with well-formed non-empirical foundations of realism) succeeds at explaining appearances through self-conscious explanation, which includes the full-blown labor of negation in the treatment of difference (all that an entity is and all that it is not) in the concept.

For Pippin, the empiricist-realist dilemma is most pronounced in Hegel's account of explanation (§154), where laws in which "force is constituted exactly the same as law" formulate regularities into general laws that are empty tautologies that "say nothing at all" (§155). For the purpose of specifying the non-empirical foundations of realism, §154 explanation is an empty tautology because force and law are faulty. Both force and law are inadequate as realist principles for explaining empirical phenomena. This is because "force is empirically-independent" and "law is empirically-undetermined."[200] Force (concept) is too independent from the underlying empirical phenomena (there is no necessary relation as indicated in §§152-3), and law (with its constant instances of difference) does not have enough determinacy in the underlying empirical phenomena. Pippin thinks that by posing §154 explanation as he does, Hegel is specifying a familiar conflict in that either appearances can be explained, or they cannot. More must have to be at stake in explanation, Pippin thinks, than Hegel merely specifying a mechanism for "redescribing empirical regularities."[201] (In general, Pippin attributes much more intentionality on Hegel's part in setting up the problems and the background structure in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* than do Hyppolite and Brandom.) What Pippin thinks is at stake in Hegel's account of explaining appearances has to do with the bigger issue of there being two main positions. On the one hand, perhaps appearances can be explained with laws that

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[200] Ibid., 136.
[201] Ibid.

have universality and necessity, although there is an unclear connection between law and appearance, and on the other hand, maybe appearances cannot be adequately explained.

For these reasons, Pippin thinks that the issue of explaining appearances indeed creates a challenge for Hegel. The key issue that underlies the two positions is that both realist and empiricist theories generate the problem of an inverted world. On the realist view, if force and law are independent from one another, they simply invert the sensible world into something else (such as the inverted world) and do not explain it. An example of this position for Pippin is Plato's forms ("realist") and Aristotle's objections per there being no necessary connection between forms and empirical phenomena.[202] On the empiricist view, if force and law are not independent, and if the empirical manifold is the sole criterion of knowledge, then the sensible world "inverts itself," but is still unintelligible without the supersensible world.[203] Thus Pippin thinks that neither empiricism nor realism is a sustainable position for Hegel, and in fact that Hegel's motivation is to pose the problem of the inverted world problem in the most "paradoxical way he can devise" in order to draw our attention to that problem.[204] This is how Pippin explains Hegel's strange use of the hyperbole of sweet becoming sour and north becoming south, which has confounded interpreters. Pippin thinks that Hegel's point is to emphasize the untenability of the inverted world problem.

On Pippin's view, Hegel has two progressive resolutions to the inverted world problem, and the empiricist-realist dilemma of explaining appearances and specifying the non-empirical foundations of realism. Hegel's first answer in §160 is that we should give up and "eliminate the sensuous idea of fixing the differences in a different sustaining element."[205] We should accept difference and not attempt to fix it. Thus the empiricist-realist dilemma is resolved by giving up on the idea of fixing, dissolving, or otherwise getting rid of difference. This is a form of an irreducibility argument analogous to Brandom's, but whereas Pippin points to an irreducibility of difference, Brandom points to the irreducibility of the activities of perception and inference in concept-generation. For Brandom, the incompatibility is resolved by incorporating it into a bigger synthetic frame, and for Pippin, the incompatibility is retained in order to highlight the

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[202] Ibid., 138.
[203] Ibid.
[204] Ibid.
[205] Ibid., 139, citing Hegel, §160.

point of the argument. The concept has elements of difference that cannot be integrated. The nature of the concept is that it contains (and is constituted by) conflictual elements.

Hegel's second and more complete answer in §163 is to propose another formulation of explanation. After Hegel has posited the inverted world, and beyond the §160 stance of giving up on fixing the difference, there is a second resolution. To actually address the empiricist-realist dilemma, "an appeal to the non-sensible is required."[206] This means developing a realist formulation that more directly addresses the problem. Empirical accounts of explaining appearances are always subject to failure, as skeptics point out, because they might not adequately explain all possible future occurrences and permutations of the phenomenon. For Pippin, Hegel therefore needs to tilt more towards the realist (and ultimately idealist) position. The resolution is that the understanding provides the required connection between concepts and the sensory manifold. Pippin ultimately sees the empiricist-realist dilemma as a Kantian problem with a Kantian solution (wherein sensibility and intuition are necessarily connected through a self-aware consciousness), even if Kant did not explicitly and fully solve the problem of the non-empirical foundations of realism. Hyppolite echoes this Kantian gesture, as in the discussion of explanation, he says that consciousness realizes that "the philosophic method cannot be only empiricism at the cost of giving up thought."[207] Pippin thinks that the problem of the inverted world emerges from consciousness not realizing the extent to which it relies "on itself" in accounting for the nature of things.[208] Hence, Hegel posits a Kantian solution in the form of a different kind of explanation in §163, in which consciousness is "communing directly with itself" to produce a valid explanation of appearances.[209] This may give rise to other problems (such as the subjective conditions problem) but this kind of self-conscious explanation provides the necessary relation of the sensibility and the understanding that Kant gestures towards through a self-aware consciousness ruminating on the constituent role of its own activities.

For Pippin, appearances are explained by the self-conscious activity of the understanding. Explaining appearances, particularly the essence of appearances as having some degree of unity and order, does not come from a law-like generalization (an external representational account),

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[206] Ibid., 138.
[207] Hyppolite, 131-2.
[208] Pippin, 138.
[209] Ibid.

but rather from the internal activity of the understanding itself.[210] The internal activity of the understanding generates the non-empirical foundations of realism in that by explaining its own movements, the understanding explains appearances. The understanding has achieved some degree of internal self-consciousness since its direction of focus is on itself and its own activity (and since §163 explanation comes after the shift to internality in §§155-6). The upshot is not that consciousness finds a better law (which would still be a representational account of appearance), but rather moves internally to the site of the understanding "communing with itself directly" to change its form of understanding. Thus, the non-sensible foundations of realism are explained in that there is a mind, a consciousness communing with itself, which produces the non-empirical principles of realist explanation (in the form of conceptual principles that explain empirical phenomena).

Pippin also identifies the treatment of difference as the crux of explaining appearances. The basis for consciousness producing the non-empirical foundations of realism is the treatment of difference. For Pippin, Hegel's advance is showing that the work of the understanding is not thinking about the world (apprehending and explaining a representation), but rather thinking about its own activity of thinking. The understanding tests different versions of explaining the external world, but they all fail because they try to hold (fix) difference in a certain way that is contrary to its nature. Therefore consciousness comes to realize that we must "eliminate the sensuous idea of fixing the differences in a different sustaining element."[211] Pippin locates the key transition regarding the treatment of difference between §160 and §163. This is that since difference cannot be held in an external sustaining element, difference must be held internally.

Consciousness concludes that there are "no differences, no possible determinacy, in any manifold of appearances," (e.g. externally), and that the only ground for difference is in "thought itself," (e.g. internally).[212] There is no ground for difference in the world so the only possible ground for difference is in thought. The increasingly self-conscious understanding in §163 communing with itself now apprehends difference within itself. This causes consciousness to conclude that difference is "only thus difference as inner difference, or difference in its own self, or difference as an infinity."[213] This is the right kind of inner difference in its own self (more so

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[210] Ibid., 139.
[211] Ibid., 139; citing Hegel, §160.
[212] Ibid., 139.
[213] Ibid., 139; citing Hegel, §160.

than in §156), in that this kind of difference in its own self is an identity with difference as an infinity (access to the universal is granted). Pippin highlights inner difference and difference as infinity in order to hint at the later position of Absolute Knowing (which is beyond the limitations of subject-predicate grammar), but at this point, consciousness is still looking at difference as an object of judgment (albeit internal judgment), not yet moving together with the object of difference, as it does ultimately, later in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*.

Summarizing, Pippin resolves the empiricist-realist dilemma (the question of the non-empirical foundations of realism: how non-empirical principles can adequately count as explanations of empirical phenomena) with two arguments. First, the dilemma is partially "resolved" by consciousness giving up on trying to fix it (Hegel suggesting in §160 to accept and not fix the difference, in order to emphasize the point that the concept holds conflictual positions of difference). Second, the dilemma is fully resolved through the positing of §163 explanation in which there is a self-conscious understanding communing with itself such that by explaining its own movements, the understanding explains appearances. The active nature of the understanding is the mechanism that provides the requisite connection between sensory perceptions (empiricism) and concepts (realism).

Pippin's version of the empiricist-realist dilemma is similar to Hyppolite and Brandom's accounts that focus on the Humean dilemma (creating synthetic necessity from analytic necessity (Hyppolite) and holding both determinate content and abstract form (Brandom)). For Pippin, the key issue is the question of the non-empirical foundations of realism, namely how realist principles can adequately count as explanation of empirical phenomena. This was unresolved by Kant directly and sufficiently, but is resolved in Hegel's deployment of Kantian ideas. For Pippin (as for Brandom) the treatment of difference is a central issue in providing an adequate account of explaining appearances. Instead of the synthetic approach of perception-and-inference concept-generation that Brandom proposes, Pippin sees resolution in the understanding's realist turn (by explaining its own movements, the understanding explains appearances), which is a more Hegelian-congruent position. Pippin's account is less of a departure from Hegel's own view than Brandom's. The further stakes of Pippin's elaborating a position of the "non-empirical foundations of realism" are that Hegel's account is substantiated with more ground and precision such that critiques of what is sometimes called Hegel's unbridled idealism can be countered.

Summary of advance for explaining appearances from interlocutor positions

In their accounts of explaining appearances, Hyppolite, Brandom, and Pippin all take up Hume's problem formulation, but in different ways. Hyppolite wants to establish an internal relation of necessity between terms. Brandom and Pippin would like to explain appearances, and do so similarly, looking for structures that include both determinate content and abstract form (Brandom), or give an account of the non-empirical (realist) foundations of empirical phenomena (Pippin). Hyppolite's account of explanation is a form and content argument that explains how analytic necessity becomes synthetic necessity when self-determined terms establish a relation that is internal to themselves, and through this process, how the understanding becomes the site for changing its own shape. The problem Hyppolite thinks Hegel is trying to solve is specifying how terms can enter an infinite internal relation of synthetic necessity with each other.

This contrasts with Brandom's account of explaining appearances which depends on a form and content argument to elaborate the generation of concepts. The explaining appearances problem Brandom thinks Hegel is trying to solve is the Humean dilemma of specifying a natural necessity (determinate content) with a generalized concept (abstract form). Brandom explains appearances by the concept-generation process that involves both perception (the determinate diversity of content) and inference (the abstract universal unity of necessity of form). Even though he extends Hegel's position, Brandom's concept-generation can be seen as a form of a Pippin-type "non-empirical foundations of realism" argument because it is a structure that explains appearances as having both determinate content and abstract form.

Pippin provides a more compressed account of Hegel's argument in the Force and the Understanding chapter, and sees Hegel as focusing on the empiricist-realist dilemma of articulating the non-empirical foundations of realism. Pippin's account of explanation is a form and content argument that explains how empirical phenomena can be described by concepts. On his part, the explaining appearances problem Pippin thinks Hegel is trying to solve is specifying the non-empirical foundations of realism (realist principles that explain empirical phenomena). Pippin explains appearances by the self-conscious activity of the understanding providing the required connection between concepts and empirical phenomena in that by explaining its own movements, the understanding explains appearances.

Further stakes for Hegel and Hyppolite, Brandom, and Pippin: Difference

The results of the interlocutor arguments of Hegel's account of explaining appearances are two-fold. First, they resolve the Humean dilemma, and second, they provide important elaborations regarding the themes of form and content, objectivity and subjectivity, and necessity and synthesis. Beyond that, the even more important and subtle point that is corroborated by Hyppolite, Brandom, and Pippin is that the underlying topic of the explaining appearances problem is the treatment of difference. The main distinction between the interlocutor accounts of explaining appearances is the treatment of difference, specifically how Brandom and Pippin see difference (Hyppolite focuses more on necessity and does not himself have a defined position on difference). Whereas Brandom thinks that difference is in the mind and the world, Pippin thinks that difference is only in the mind. For Hegel, Force and law is a structure for holding difference. This means holding universal difference and expressed difference in the composite structure of Force and law as the concept and being of difference, the universality and the particularity of difference (the one and the many of difference). Hegel specifies the difference-holding problem as a parts-whole relation between Force and law, which leaves the problem irresolvable in some ways. The advance of Brandom and Pippin is to respecify the difference-holding problem as a form-content relation between the mind and the world which allows greater resolvability.

Brandom thinks that difference (necessary difference) is in both the mind and the world. Pippin thinks that (ultimately) difference is only in the mind, which is expressly the point of the developments in the Force and the Understanding chapter with explanation, self-communing, and infinity. For Hegel, the progression in the chapter is that consciousness finds that representation-based epistemological explanatory models of the world fail, and so turns its focus and these models inward. For Brandom, the concept-producing system of the mind includes both observation (difference is in the world) and inference (difference is in the mind). Brandom agrees with Hegel (and Pippin) that consciousness relocates the explanatory models of force and law to the internal domain of the mind. However, Brandom thinks that when these models are applied internally, what is found is the irreducibility of difference. Difference is a feature of both the world and the mind for Brandom, and the salient aspect of what the mind does in the treatment of difference is include both forms of difference in its concept-generation process.

The question is how much this difference-holding position is Hegel's and how much it is Brandom's. It is Brandom's Hegel, but maybe not Hegel's Hegel, even if it is what Brandom

thinks is Hegel's position (in the sense of what Hegel intended, articulated, and implicated). However, a competing position is Pippin's Hegel, and Brandom's Hegel is not Pippin's Hegel. Pippin's Hegel hews more closely to the literal Hegel and the points that Hegel states directly. Brandom's Hegel adds more context to Hegel, and motivates the content in a more expansionary way, but cannot really be said to be Hegel's Hegel but rather a departure position. What would Pippin say about Brandom's concept-generating theory? Pippin might not necessarily disagree, but might think that it is not a central Hegelian point (the central point is establishing mind as the ground of difference, as opposed to the world, and progressing to infinity). For Brandom, the concept-generating theory is a central part of his own program (serving as the basis for inferential pragmatism and beyond, in particular to establish and attribute a normative status to laws). This is well beyond Hegel's text. Hence, Brandom has more invested in his argument, and might agree that although his reasoning is Hegel-compatible, it is not literally what Hegel indicates in the text.

What would Hegel say? Hegel's take on this Brandom-Pippin "debate" on the differing positions that difference is in the mind and the world (Brandom) or that difference is only in the mind (Pippin) might be that both are right, but by far the main point is Pippin's (which is Hegel's). Pippin's reading is accurate and emphasizes the key points. It could be asked the extent to which Hegel supports Brandom's claim (that difference is irreducibly in the world and mind) or Pippin's (that difference is only in the mind). Hegel probably has the same thought as Pippin, that while Brandom might be correct, the key point is Pippin's (Hegel's). For Hegel, there is difference in the world, but it does not matter because it is not the right kind of difference. The salient point is that all of the understanding's attempts to explain external difference in the world would only ever be unsuccessful. The result is that explanatory models fail at explaining difference in the world in a way that is relevant to consciousness and the concept. The explanatory models are "successful" only in the sense that since they fail, they have the role of directing the understanding's locus of focus internally to itself, to apply the explanatory models to itself. The important result for Hegel is not the extent to which difference is in the world because consciousness is ultimately looking for an explanation of itself and its own processes (treating inner difference in the mind), and while Brandom's argument might be right, it is peripheral to Hegel's main argument. Brandom is motivating his point for his own critical end, but ultimately it does not support Hegel's argument, as correctly emphasized by Pippin.

A further point about explaining appearances is that a fine-grained distinction emerges regarding difference and sublation. Although Brandom keeps holding all of the differences in progressively larger and more synthetic positions, Pippin and Hyppolite constantly overcome the negated moments of difference in concise sublated positions. These two positions might sound quite similar, but there is a distinction. In Hegel's dialectical *Aufheben*, the negated part is still present (distilled but not evaporated), and that is the whole point, to sublate but retain the salient distinction. However, for practical purposes the synthesis is the operative position. This means that the negated part, despite being present, is no longer accessible. So both formulations are correct. Pippin-Hyppolite's formulation is correct in the sense that the negated part is present but irrelevant because it is inaccessible for the purpose of any future engagement. Likewise Brandom's formulation is correct in that the synthetic position holds all previous positions but only the current synthesis is accessible. The negated part is inaccessible to both Pippin-Hyppolite and Brandom, but in different ways. Thus, in the sense of the non-accessibility of sublated parts, the positions are argumentatively identical. This is relevant in confirming that ultimately, the positions hold difference similarly (intact but inaccessible), despite their different treatments.

Role of interlocutor arguments in the main argument

My main overall argument in this analysis is that Hegel's account of explaining appearances is self-conscious explanation. However, self-conscious explanation gives rise to the subjective conditions problem. The result of the interlocutor arguments is to highlight and corroborate the constituent themes inherent in explaining appearances and the subjective conditions problem, and underline that the issues are not sufficiently resolved without the application of an idea such as *Bildung*. The interlocutors validate the problem, and the *Bildung*-based reading that I propose solves it. The interlocutors provide more granularity in contextualizing the themes of form and content, the treatment of difference, and the relation between universality and particularity. However, although the interlocutor accounts succeed in explaining appearances with form and content arguments that target the Humean dilemma, they do not sufficiently configure a necessary relation between individuality and universality, which is supplied by the application of *Bildung*. The overall role of the interlocutors is to confirm the problem and configure it with greater granularity, but I argue that my use of the *Bildung* argument is necessary to fully specify self-conscious explanation as Hegel's account of

explaining appearances with a necessary relation between individuality and universality which resolves the issues that arise in the subjective conditions problem.

Conclusion: Conditions of Knowing: Difference, Infinity, Necessity, and Otherness

In this chapter, I elaborate Hegel's solution to the explaining appearances problem as self-conscious explanation. *Self-conscious explanation* is a self-aware consciousness assessing and constructing explanatory models of appearances and its own activity. This is Hegel's answer to explaining appearances, namely how appearances and mental structures [concepts] are related. I posit a potential problem with this account, the subjective conditions problem. The *subjective conditions problem* is the paradox that although Hegel aims to establish the objective conditions of knowing, he does not do so explicitly, and seems to specify the opposite, the merely subjective or arbitrary conditions of knowing, since consciousness is internally-focused, communing only with itself, away from the external epistemological explanatory models of the world. I resolve the subjective conditions problem through a *Bildung*-based interpretation in which "individuality is raised by necessity to the universality of knowledge" (*Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, §186, 224). I invoke interlocutor accounts from Hyppolite, Brandom, and Pippin to address these themes, highlighting how they all employ a form-content argument to examine necessity and difference in Hegel's account of explaining appearances. However, although interlocutor accounts confirm the problem and its themes, the *Bildung*-based argument is required to provide a necessary connection between individuality and universality.

The result of this analysis is to support my larger claim that the objective conditions of knowing can be specified for Hegel, as an analogue similar to Kant's logical forms of judgment and categories. The non-sensible principles used in self-conscious explanation provide the basis for the objective conditions of knowing. Hegel's objective conditions of knowing are four-fold: difference, infinity, necessity, and otherness. Whereas Kant's categories are the objective conditions of knowing that pertain to recognizing objects, Hegel's objective conditions of knowing are the objective conditions of knowing for all knowing. All knowing is a more abstract level of knowing, and the important point is that the form or structure of such knowing is objective. Even though the concept is subjectively-derived by individual consciousness, it can nevertheless be argued that there is one universal mode of human thinking.

Summarizing the four-fold objective conditions of knowing I have derived from Hegel, the first is difference. Difference is the concept of inner difference in that any object is conceived as a unity of itself and its opposite (inner difference is that which an object is not). Since difference is itself a concept (a unity of itself and its opposite), inner difference (or any concept) is able to access universality, in which all concepts participate. Infinity is the unconditioned universal, the non-sensible ground that the understanding invokes to produce valid explanatory models. In self-conscious explanation, the key shift is that the understanding conceives of itself too under the concept of infinity, as itself participating in universality. Necessity is the necessary relation between high-stakes terms such as appearance and mental constructs (concepts), individuality and universality, the one and the many, and parts and whole. The definition of *Bildung* supplies the configuration that towards any aim of knowing, individuality is raised by necessity to the universality of knowledge. Otherness is the opposite of the object that figures in the idea that an object is the unity of itself and its opposite.

Hegel's notion of the concept posits and relates the objective conditions of knowing as follows. Inner difference implicates otherness, and necessity between the individual and the universal and the parts and the whole, all of which are under the umbrella of universality. These are the non-sensible principles that self-conscious explanation deploys internally as the mechanism for distinguishing the objects of experience and explaining appearances. The four principles serve as the objective conditions for all knowing. The important stakes of this analysis are that these four principles (difference, infinity, necessity, and otherness) are illuminated as Hegel's objective conditions for all knowing.

Further Implications

A similar thematic progression enables some of the biggest shifts in resolving the explaining appearances problem. In the Transcendental Aesthetic in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant brings time and space into subjectivity as opposed to space and time being objective external facts. Hegel further incorporates time into subjectivity by defining history as a philosophical object, as opposed to external objective facts. In the same structure, Hegel brings explanation into subjectivity rather than being an external objective scientific process. Explanation is redefined as a self-conscious activity, whose validity (truth determination) is a function of consciousness's own satisfaction with the explanation, not per some external metric.

CHAPTER 4: CONCLUDING ON EXPLAINING APPEARANCES

> The step taken by Kant is a great and important one—that is, the fact that he has made knowledge the subject of his consideration (Hegel, *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, 431)

This chapter concludes on Kant and Hegel's accounts of the explaining appearances problem, and is structured as follows. First, I present an argument that first sets forth Kant and Hegel's respective answers to explaining appearances and how these positions unfold into a larger claim of establishing the objective conditions of knowing. I then propose a two-step argument discussing the differences between Kant and Hegel's accounts of explaining appearances. The first leg of the argument centers on how the two thinkers set up the problem of explaining appearances (as the "Letter to Herz" problem for Kant, and as the Humean dilemma for Hegel), and how this impacts the resolvability of the problem. The second leg of the argument expands the focus to the broader philosophies of Kant and Hegel in the epistemological and phenomenological domains, and considers the effects of these models. Finally, I conclude by considering the further implications of this work.

Explaining Appearances and the Claim to Objectivity

The explaining appearances problem (the problem of specifying the relation between empirical appearances and abstract concepts) is one aspect of the more general problem of knowing. For Kant and Hegel, the important consequence of explaining appearances is obtaining the objective conditions of knowing. Both thinkers have a claim to objectivity, in different ways. Objectivity means that the overall human mode of thinking is a certain way, not that the structure of each person's thinking is different.

For Kant, the objective conditions of knowing are the categories and the process of judgment which allow objects to be recognized by subsuming sensory intuitions under concepts with the understanding. For Hegel, the objective conditions of knowing are self-consciousness explanation, meaning a self-consciousness engaged in the self-determining process of the concept in self-negating and self-superseding in accordance with difference, infinity, necessity, and otherness. For Kant, the salient point is that the *a priori* synthetic unity of space and time

allows objects to be recognized. For Hegel, the key is that difference seen as inner difference can be unified and provides the means of explaining appearances. A notion such as *Bildung* that necessarily connects individuality to the universality of knowing is also crucial to objectivity.

Kant and Hegel's claims to objectivity, in that they think they have succeeded in specifying the objective conditions of knowing, are summarized below (Table 16).

Table 16. Kant and Hegel's Claims to Objectivity (the Objective Conditions of Knowing).

	Stance	Consequence
Kant	Sensing objects non-empirically is possible due to time/space consciousness	Subject-object split remains: the focus is a conscious subject that constitutes objects Consequence: representational epistemological frame persists
	Objectivity is vested in the categories, not in real-life objects (things-in-themselves)	
Hegel	Self-conscious explanation is invoked in the self-determination process of the Concept (self-superceding through self-negating)	Subject-object split overcome with substance having subjectivity through self-determination Consequence: epistemological frame overcome with phenomenology, an object is an object insofar as it is an object of being for consciousness
	Objectivity is provided by the objective conditions of knowing operating in the Concept as difference, infinity, necessity, and otherness, and through the being of the object for consciousness	

Kant's central claim to objectivity is the transcendental argument that the conditions of possibility for sensing objects non-empirically are possible due to time and space consciousness. Objectivity is vested in the categories as opposed to real-life objects (things-in-themselves) in the external noumenal world; only the internal phenomenal world can be known. For Kant, though, the consequence of his objective conditions of knowing formulation is that the subject-object split remains. The focus of the critical rational transcendental philosophy is on a conscious subject that constitutes objects. The result is remaining stuck in an epistemological frame that cannot progress beyond the recognition of physical objects, although such object recognition is indeed objective (persistently objective as a structure of human knowing).

For Hegel, objectivity is provided by the objective conditions of knowing as difference, infinity, necessity, and otherness, invoked in the self-determination process of the Notion or the Concept (self-overcoming by self-superseding through self-negating). There is another layer of detail in Hegel's account, not engaged extensively here as it goes beyond the focus on the

explaining appearances problem to the issues of knowing, truth, and objectivity more broadly in the *Phenomenology of Spirit.* This is the point that objectivity is construed through the being of the object for consciousness ("the being of something for consciousness is knowing" (§82)). The point for Hegel is that the conditions of objectivity (what is to count as objectivity) are supplied by the self-determining concept in its dynamic machinations of self-negating and self-superseding. There is a necessary connection of individuality the universality of knowing (supplied through the *Bildung* argument I articulate). The result is that for Hegel, the subject-object split is overcome with substance having subjectivity through self-determination and a link to the absolute (infinity). The further consequence is that Kant's epistemological frame is overcome by Hegel with the ontological phenomenological position, in which an object is an object insofar as it is an object of being for consciousness, and consciousness has determined such objectivity.

Overall, I argue that both Kant and Hegel have valid claims to objectivity, but within domain-specific kinds of knowing. Kant's account is valid for the recognition of physical objects, but does not extend further. Hegel's account, though, supports the objective conditions of *all* knowing, including for intangible "objects" such as justice, equity, and agency.

Resolving the Explaining Appearances Problem

Although Kant solves the explaining appearances problem for object recognition, the reason that his account cannot be deployed for knowing beyond the recognition of physical objects has to do with the way that he sets up the problem. The two issues with Kant's problem formation are that it is too formal, including by being stuck with incompatible time regimes, and that it continues to rely on *verification* between the faculties of knowing instead of merely the *relation* between the faculties of knowing.

The formalism issue is the formal way that Kant has conceived the explaining appearances problem as a necessary invocation of the two stems of knowledge, sensibility and understanding in one minded consciousness (an "I think"). Deleuze nicely frames the problem with Kant's formalism and regulative laws as Kant conceiving of "theory as a court or tribunal" (alluding to Kant's appeal to law and laws early in the *Critique of Pure Reason*), rather than

approaching it as an "inquiry" and a "practice."[214] Part of the reason the "Letter to Herz" formulation is structurally unsolvable for Kant is due to the problem of time. The two stems of knowledge, sensibility and understanding, are binary positions that cannot be integrated due to the problem of time in that sensibility requires temporal specificity and understanding is atemporal. Kant avoids the temporal conflict in object recognition by specifying the figurative synthesis of the imagination as an integrative mechanism. The productive imagination is a general faculty for managing temporal differences between sensibility and understanding, specifically motivated with the time determinations in the Schematism. However, even with the temporal bridging faculty of the imagination, Kant cannot progress beyond object recognition in his transcendental category-based model of knowing.

The verification issue is that Kant understands explaining appearances as the "Letter to Herz" problem which seeks to specify agreement between abstract concepts and sensory representations and not more broadly as the relation between determinate content and abstract form. The trajectory towards resolving the explaining appearances problem (Table 18) invokes Hume, Kant, and Hegel. Although Kant's advance over Hume is denying the verification problem between mind and world (for Kant, the phenomenal mind can never know the noumenal world), Kant still structures the problem as one of verification instead of relation. Kant is still seeking verification between the representation in the mind and the concept in the mind (sensibility and understanding as the two stems of knowing).

Hegel's formulation loosens verification to relation which allows the explaining appearances problem to be resolved. (It should be noted that Hegel hangs on to verification in the mind between the "being of an object for consciousness" and the "being of an object for itself" (§82), but this is in the context of how the mind takes the purposeful use of the object.) Hegel's main argument for explaining appearances is self-conscious explanation, which rests on how the mind takes the relation between determinate content and abstract form. Overall, the way that the explaining appearances problem is resolved is by recasting the Kantian agreement about verification between sensibility and understanding to instead, the relation between determinate content and abstract form. The result is that Hegel can posit an overall theory of the objective conditions of knowing.

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[214] Deleuze, (2001), *Pure Immanence*, 36.

Table 17. Resolving the Explaining Appearances Problem.

Position	Formulation
Empiricism: Hume	<u>Agreement</u> or verification between mind and world, representation and external reality
Epistemology: Kant	<u>Agreement</u> (in the mind) between representations (sensibility) and concepts (understanding)
Phenomenology: Hegel	<u>Relation</u> (in the mind) between determinate content and abstract form

Reformulating the problem would be a start, but in order to provide a comprehensive theory of knowing that does extend to intangible concepts such as "justice," I argue that Kant would need both an account of difference unification and a comprehensive time structure of past-present-future. Kant does not elaborate a theory of difference unification, and does not consider internal or ontological difference to be an issue in the Critique of Pure Reason. Kant is only concerned with difference in the empirical sense of the "numerical difference" of objects, "two drops of water" for example (B319-20, 368). He says that "inner difference (of quality and quantity)" can be abstracted into numerical difference, as "multiplicity and numerical difference are already given by space itself as the condition of outer appearances" (Ibid.).

Locating the Explaining Appearances Problem: Kant's Notion of Synthesis

I root the inextensibility of Kant's model of knowing beyond the recognition of physical objects in the overly-formal problem setup with critical time incompatibilities and the continued reliance on verification. Heidegger and Hegel, however, locate the problem in Kant's notion of synthesis. Both thinkers see Kant as having made more progress than he himself realizes. Heidegger credits Kant with having developed the kind of synthesis that would sufficiently bridge, or rather, more fundamentally pre-exist the interaction of sensibility and understanding, which Heidegger names for Kant as syndosis. However, Heidegger's argument fails because it departs too far from Kant's account and terminology, lacks philosophical support so remains an isolated conjecture, and is not an accurate contextualization of the problem. Instead of turning to a more foundational and primordially-existing position to better connect sensibility and understanding, Kant does the opposite by directing a greater (though not exclusively exhaustive) role to the understanding in incorporating perceptual content and rendering it intelligible.

Hegel also sees Kant making more progress than he realizes, and takes up Kant's work without alteration (unlike Heidegger), but quickly recasts it into his own moves away from Kant. The first encounter is in the Sense Certainty chapter in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Kant starts the *Critique of Pure Reason* with the Transcendental Aesthetic that specifies the pure intuitions of time and space. Hegel reseats this idea into the more generic notion of the "this" which is comprised of the temporal "now" and the spatial "here" (§107, 64). The problem of difference arises for the first time in that "this Now" is different from the Now immediately before and after it. Specifying the basic temporal unit of the Now instead of the pure intuition of time allows Hegel to see that each Now has aspects of both particularity and universality in a way that would never emerge from Kant's formulation. Hegel proceeds to unify difference as the multiplication of Nows (§108, 64) and derives a comprehensive past-present-future time structure.

Despite its advance, Kant's formulation is constrained to the limited retentional structure of the past and the present. Although Kant explicitly deals with succession (the function of the reproductive imagination is to recall images from memory that indicate the successive perceptions of the same object (running through and gathering together "swarm of appearances" (A111, 234) or "unruly heaps of representations" (A121, 239)), but he does not treat the problem of difference or articulate a full-blown past-present-future time structure in his consideration of succession. It is only as a later clarification in the *Critique of Pure Reason* in the Analogies of Experience that Kant distinguishes that the "principles of the determination of the existence of appearances in time are in accordance with all three of its modi: magnitude (duration), succession, and simultaneity" (B262, 319).

Although Hegel complains that Kant's notion of synthesis is not more integrative than a superficial "piece of wood and a leg that might be bound together by a cord" (in the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*), he nevertheless thinks that Kant makes more progress towards a "perceptive understanding" and an "understanding perception" (i.e. a synthetic notion of sensibility (perception) and understanding) than he realizes. Hegel accurately diagnoses Kant as attempting "to show how pure conceptions of the understanding can be applied to phenomena."[215] The problem is how perceptions are to be subsumed under concepts. Kant thinks that the "pure conceptions of the understanding are quite of a different nature from empiric

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[215] Hegel, (1955), *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, 441.

sensuous perceptions."[216] Hegel sees the faculty of the imagination as being part of the understanding (i.e. conceptual) in that for Kant it is "the schematism of the pure understanding, the transcendental faculty of the imagination, which determines the pure sensuous perception in conformity with the category."[217] Hegel notes Kant's advance below.

> [T]he connection of these two is one of the most attractive sides of the Kantian philosophy, whereby pure sensuousness and pure understanding, which were formerly expressed as absolute opposites, are now united. There is present a perceptive understanding or an understanding perception; but Kant does not see this, he does not bring these thoughts together: he does not grasp the fact that he has here brought both sides of knowledge into one, and has thereby expressed their implicitude. Knowledge itself is in fact the unity and truth of both moments; but with Kant the thinking understanding and sensuousness are both something particular, and they are only united in an external, superficial way, just as a piece of wood and a leg might be bound together by a cord. (Hegel, *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, 441)

Hegel thinks that Kant gestures towards a more complete unity (of a "perceptive understanding" and an "understanding perception" that "brings both sides of knowledge into one") than he realizes, but fails because he articulates an external, superficial unity that does not sufficiently bring together sensibility and understanding. Kant "hunts through the soul's sack to see what faculties are to be found there," according to Hegel, but cannot overcome the problem due to the way it is specified.[218] Kant mistakenly thinks that the way to overcome the intransigence between sensibility and understanding is by appeal to a third faculty, imagination, to solve the temporal issues, as he expandingly elaborates the role of the imagination in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. However, this ultimately fails because the answer is not by way of another faculty but through a wholesale respecification of the problem. "Hunting through the soul's sack for faculties" is already a despairing air that indicates defeat in thinking the terms of the problem, and could be read as a pejorative assessment of Kant by Hegel. The biggest issue for Hegel is Kant's failing to think the problem correctly. For Hegel, thinking the problem involves many other weighty issues such as the subject-object relation, the broader notion of the movement of the Concept, and the universal-particular relation (the need for a particular's

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[216] Ibid.
[217] Ibid.
[218] Ibid, 443.

relation to universality). Specifically critiquing Kant's position, Hegel thinks that the "categories are particular"[219] in that they are grounded too much in particularity which prevents their necessary connection to universality.

The general form of the problem is that Kant simply does not get beyond puzzling over the relation between sensibility and understanding, instead of seeing consciousness as a larger entity that integrates input from both faculties. Hegel does have a more robust notion of consciousness. Hegel solves the explaining appearances problem with the move of the understanding conceiving itself under the concept of infinity (universality) to resolve the problem of the Humean dilemma through the more complicated construction of self-conscious explanation in which a self-conscious entity introspects its own processes as part of obtaining a valid explanation of appearances.

Kantian Epistemology and Hegelian Phenomenology

One issue is the explaining appearances problem which is more successfully resolved in Hegel's formulation rather than Kant's. A separate issue is resolving the differences between Kant and Hegel's accounts of explaining appearances. This involves more than the formulation of the problem (which I have argued is solvable when posed as the Humean dilemma (Hegel) but not the "Letter to Herz" problem (Kant)). This section expands the objective conditions of knowing argument elaborated earlier into the full-blown philosophies of Kant and Hegel as a transcendental epistemology and a phenomenology. I propose a two-step argument. The first leg of the argument involves the problem formulation. As I noted, the explaining appearances problem (the problem of specifying the relation between empirical appearances and abstract concepts) is one aspect of the deeper problem of knowing at which the philosophies of the two thinkers attempt to articulate. The second leg of the argument addresses the point that the explaining appearances problem and the objective conditions of knowing are within the bigger context of the overall shift between Kant and Hegel from a transcendental epistemology to an ontological phenomenology, from a representational to conceptual stance, and from a split subject-object to an integrated subject-object (Table 19).

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[219] Ibid., 443-4.

Table 18. Differences between Kant and Hegel's overall Philosophies.

Kant: Epistemology	Hegel: Phenomenology
Transcendental: *a priori* pre-determined conditions of possibility (the categories)	Ontological: immanently self-determining dynamic conditions of possibility
Representational: representations of objects apperceived and subsumed under categories (concepts)	Conceptual: self-determining concept constituted by the unity of a subject contemplating itself, its processes, and what an object is for it
Subject-Object split: the conscious subject constitutes objects	Subject-Object integration: subject and object have a processual relationship: the self-conscious subject recognizes objects of being for consciousness

Kant and Hegel are key figures in bringing about extraordinary philosophical movement in a very short (thirty-year) time period, mainly with the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781) and the *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807). The major shift is between epistemology and phenomenology as a model for a theory of knowing. The first salient difference is the treatment of the subject and the object relation. In the epistemological method, there is a split between the subject and the object. Kant's advance is to instantiate knowing in a conscious subject that has a transcendental unity of apperception (an "I think") that unifies Humean diversity into representations that can be subsumed under concepts. In the epistemological philosophy of Kant, the focus is on the conscious subject who constitutes objects. In the phenomenological philosophy of Hegel, however, there is much more movement in the subject-object relation through the movement of the Concept. For Hegel, the subject and the object have a processual relationship of self-determination. The self-conscious subject only recognizes objects that constitute "objects of being" for consciousness, which means having (existentially) relevant aspects to consciousness's being. This shifts the focus of activity from identification to recognition in the sense of identifying objects versus recognizing worthwhile projects and self-conscious others that eventually constitute a collective "we think" social whole.

Another way of characterizing the philosophical transition between Kant and Hegel is between representational and conceptual knowing. Although Kant relies on "concepts" (knowing is subsuming representations under concepts), the word "concept" has a special meaning for Hegel. There is the Kantian concept and the Hegelian Concept. In the Hegelian sense, the Concept is a self-determining structure that is constituted by the unity of a subject and an object.

More specifically, there is a subject contemplating itself, its processes, and what an object is for it. This is contrasted with Kantian concepts, which remain representational.

A third major difference between Kant and Hegel's overall philosophies of transcendental epistemology and phenomenology has to do with the degree of pre-determined or immanently-arising criteria for determining the process of knowing. Kant's is a critical rational transcendental philosophy through and through. Transcendental means the conditions of possibility for a certain situation. These transcendental conditions are *a priori* pre-determined conditions of possibility (e.g. the categories) that determine the structure and possibilities for knowing before even the merest sensory input is apperceived. The important difference for Hegel is the ontological view of criteria being the immanently self-determining dynamic conditions of possibility. Without externally-applied transcendental conditions of possibility as the initial ruleset, Hegel famously starts in the middle. Truth specification is a trial and error process. Substance imbued with subjectivity as it is (i.e. natural self-determination processes) does not know where to begin on an *a priori* basis, and thus can only "start in the middle" at any arbitrary starting point, and proceeds along, waiting until internal inconsistencies arise and force the conceptual point of evolving to a new model of knowing. Whereas for Kant, the categories and the logical forms of judgment are the conditions for beginning the process of knowing, for Hegel there is no way to know a propitious starting point ahead of time. The only method is to begin, proceed, and learn and finetune along the way. Hegel frames the point that "since the investigation of the faculties of knowledge is itself knowing, it cannot in Kant attain to what it aims at because it is that already."[220] An analogy is cited that whereas Kant's "I think" begins on dry land, Hegel's consciousness always already finds itself swimming and must constitute its reality and rules for its reality "on the fly."

Overall Conclusion

The crystallizing point of this analysis is that beyond the already stunning importance of Kant's Transcendental Aesthetic in bringing time and space into subjectivity, as opposed to being objective external facts (as Hegel does similarly by rendering history as a philosophical object), the even more important critical benefit stemming from the Transcendental Aesthetic is

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[220] Hegel, (1955), *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, 431.

as follows. The Transcendental Aesthetic forces the thinking of the conditions of possibility of experience, which also forces the thinking of the conditions of possibility for objects of experience. The implication is that there is no experience, and no objects of experience, without the Transcendental Aesthetic. The Transcendental Aesthetic not only brings time and space into subjectivity, it enables the conditions of possibility of all experience and all objects of experience. This formulation leads directly into Hegel's articulation of the Concept as the persistent structure of all of the conditions of possibility for all experience and all objects of experience (not merely object recognition). My overarching claim is that there is no Hegel without Kant; there is no Hegelian Concept without the Kantian Transcendental Aesthetic. Hence, not only can the Transcendental Aesthetic not be collapsed into the Transcendental Logic, its greater philosophical import should be emphasized and not diminished.

Further Implications of this Work

There is no shortage of possibilities for engaging with Kant and Hegel. The two thinkers remain superlative in their consideration of a full range of problems that continue as puzzles in philosophical thinking today. The explaining appearances problem (articulating the relation between determinate content and abstract ideas (per the Humean dilemma)) is a weighty situation that has consequences for a general theory of objective knowing, as articulated by both Kant and Hegel. A full suite of philosophical problems is highlighted as a result of Kant and Hegel's specifications of the objective conditions of knowing and resolution of the explaining appearances problem. These issues have to do with methodologies of knowing, and what is taken to be relevant criteria and justification for such models of knowing. Further, the constituent themes involve several other important philosophical problems such as the subject-object relation, the form and content relation, issues of time and space, and the universal-particular problem possibly recast as a parts-whole situation.

Considering future work, the explaining appearances problem results in the asymmetric elucidation of Kant's theory of object-recognition knowing and Hegel's theory of all knowing. Therefore, one trajectory of extension to this work could render a parallel account of Kant's theory of all knowing against Hegel's theory of all knowing. All three Critiques are implicated in Kant's overall theory of knowing. The *Critique of Pure Reason* treats rationality, object recognition, and the logical forms of judgment. The *Critique of Practical Reason* addresses

moral judgment and the problem of knowing self, world, and God. The *Critique of Judgment* discusses aesthetic judgment (the encounter with a new object requiring a new concept), the sublime, and teleological judgment. The hypothesis is that there are many other conceptual resources in Kant's work that could be placed in lineage with those developed by Hegel. The first target would be the parts-whole theory elaborated in the third Critique as a precursor to Hegel's parts-whole theory that overcomes the universal-particular intransigence. Kant is clearly thinking about the problem, he says that "the whole contains the source of the possibility of the nexus of the parts" (*Critique of Judgment*, 235).[221] Likewise, investigation could be extended on Hegel's side, by examining the three faculties Hegel elaborates in "The Doctrine of the Concept" in the Subjective Logic (Volume II) in *The Science of Logic.* The three faculties are the faculty of the concept (understanding), judgment, and (formal) reason (Hegel, 2015, 12.31, 528).

Overall, the further implications of this work are that progress is made in elaborating robust trajectories of argumentation from Kant, Hegel, and interlocutors that address a wide range of philosophical problems that remain perennially open for consideration and advance. These problems consider the relations of interiority-exteriority, change-permanence, subject-object, universal-particular, analytic-synthetic, necessity-contingency, parts-whole, and form-content. (The topics are only listed in binary format to cite the subject areas.) The ongoing contemplation of these problems could help to inform the roadmap of investigation into the next phases of philosophical development in a diversity of areas.

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[221] Kant, *Critique of Judgment* (1952, 1790), 235.

APPENDIX

KANTIAN TIME DETERMINATIONS

Table A.1. Time determinations in the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

1.	§§1-8 (B33-73, pp. 172-92)	Transcendental Aesthetic	"Space and time are the pure forms of intuition" (§8, B60, p. 185)
2.	A103-108 (pp. 232-3)	Transcendental Unity of Apperception (TUA)	Consciousness (transcendental unity of apperception) is required to cognize the unity of space and time
3.	A Deduction	Reproductive and Producitive Imagination	The "productive imagination" is the "transcendental function of the imagination" (A123, p. 240)
4.	§15	Combination is an act of spontaneity (Understanding)	"all combination is action of the understanding, the combination of a manifold can never be contained in the pure form of sensible intuition" (§15, B130, p. 245)
5.	§16	Transcendental Unity of Apperception (TUA) and the "I think"	The "I think" is "an act of spontaneity, i.e. it cannot be regarded as belonging to sensibility" (§16, B132, p. 246)
6.	§18	Relation of manifold of intuition to the "I think"	Time provides the "necessary relation of the manifold of intuition to the one I think" (§18, B140, p. 250)
7.	§20	All intuitions stand under the categories	"all sensible intuitions are subject to the categories" (§20, B143, p. 252)
8.	§24	Figurative Synthesis of the Imagination	Time & space are brought under "the synthesis of the manifold of sensible intuition" (§24, B151, p. 256)
9.	§25	Transcendental Synthesis of the Manifold of Representations	"The I think expresses the act of determining my existence…which is grounded in an *a priori* given form, i.e. time" (§25, B157-8n, p. 260)
10.	§26	Space and time are formal intuitions in accordance with the categories	Time is a "formal intuition that gives unity of the representation" (§26, B160n, p. 261); "all synthesis, even perception, stands under the categories" (§26, B161, p. 262)
11.	B185, p. 276	Schematism (time determinations)	Schemata of *"a priori* time-determinations in accordance with rules" concerning the series, content, order, and scope of time "in regard to all possible objects" (B185, p. 276)
	B182, p. 274	Schematism (the whole of time)	The "successive addition of one homogeneous unit to another to generate [the whole of] time" (B182, p. 274)
12.	A177-218, B219-265, pp. 295-321	Analogies of Experience	The "principles of the determination of the existence of appearances in time, in accordance with all three of its modi: magnitude (duration), succession, and simultaneity" (B262, p. 319)

1. Transcendental Aesthetic: §§1-8 (B33-73, pp. 172-92)

- Pure intuitions of space and time
- Space as the form of outer sense, time as the form of inner sense: "By means of outer sense (a property of our mind) we represent to ourselves objects as outside us, and all as in space. Inner sense, by means of which the mind intuits itself, is a determinate form, under which the

intuition of its inner state is alone possible, so that everything that belongs to the inner determinations is represented in relations of time" (§2, B37/A23, p. 174)

- "Space and time are its [sensibility's] pure forms, sensation in general its matter. We can cognize only the former *a priori*, i.e., prior to all actual perception, and they are therefore called pure intuition (§8, B60, p. 185)

2. Transcendental Unity of Apperception (TUA) (Consciousness) A103-108 (pp. 232-3)

- Consciousness (transcendental unity of apperception) is required for the cognition of even the most basic objective unity of space and time
- "This pure, original, unchanging consciousness I will now name transcendental apperception. That it deserves this name is already obvious from this, that even the purest objective unity, namely that of the *a priori* concepts (space and time) is possible only through the relation of the intuitions to it" (A103, p. 232)
- "This transcendental unity of apperception makes out of all possible appearances that can ever come together in one experience a connection of all of these representations in accordance with laws" (A108, p. 233)
- "The original and necessary consciousness of the identity of oneself is at the same time a consciousness of an equally necessary unity of the synthesis of all appearances in accordance with concepts" (A108, p. 233)

3. A Deduction

- "But only the productive synthesis of the imagination can take place *a priori*; for the reproductive synthesis rests on conditions of experience" (A113, p. 238)
- Productive imagination is spontaneity: "Now insofar as the imagination is spontaneity, I also occasionally call it the productive imagination, and thereby distinguish it from the reproductive imagination, whose synthesis is subject solely to empirical laws, namely those of association, and that therefore contributes nothing to the explanation of the possibility of cognition *a priori*" (§24, B152, p. 257)
- But motion, as description of a space, is a pure act of the successive synthesis of the manifold in outer intuition in general through productive imagination (§24, B155, p. 258)
- "the image is a product of the empirical faculty of productive imagination, the schema of sensible concepts" (Schematism, B181, p. 273)

4. §15 The Combination of the manifold is an act of spontaneity (Understanding)

- "The manifold of representations can be given in an intuition that is merely sensible, i.e., nothing but receptivity. Yet the combination of a manifold can never come to us through the senses, and therefore cannot already be contained in the pure form of sensible intuition; for it is an act of the spontaneity of the power of representation, and, since one must call the latter understanding, in distinction from sensibility, all combination is an action of the understanding, which we would designate synthesis" (§15, B130, p. 245)

5. §16 The Synthetic Unity of Apperception, the "I think"

- "The I think must be able to accompany all my representations…that representation that can be given prior to all thinking is called intuition. Thus all manifold of intuition has a necessary relation to the I think in the same subject in which this manifold is to be encountered. But this representation is an act a of spontaneity, i.e., it cannot be regarded as belonging to sensibility. I call it the pure apperception, in order to distinguish it from the empirical one" (§16, B132, p. 246)
- "…or also the original apperception, since it is that self-consciousness which, because it produces the representation I think, which must be able to accompany all others and which in all consciousness is one and the same, cannot be accompanied by any further representation. I also call its unity the transcendental unity of self-consciousness in order to designate the possibility of *a priori* cognition from it" (§16, B132, p. 247)

6. §18 Necessary relation of the manifold of intuition to the one "I think"

- Time (alone), as inner sense, gives the objective unity that is the means for the necessary relation of the manifold of intuition to the one "I think" (otherwise it is not possible to unify the Humean bundle of unconnected representations)
- "The pure form of intuition in time, on the contrary, merely as intuition in general, which contains a given manifold, stands under the original unity of consciousness, solely by means of the necessary relation of the manifold of intuition to the one I think, thus through the pure synthesis of the understanding, which grounds *a priori* the empirical synthesis" (§18, B140, p. 250)

7. §20 All sensible intuitions are subject to the categories

- "All sensible intuitions stand under the categories, as conditions under which alone their manifold can come together in one consciousness" (§20, B143, p. 252)

8. §24 The figurative synthesis of imagination brings time and space under the categories

- The "transcendental unity [of space and time] is thought in the categories" (§24, B151, 256)
- The figurative synthesis is the action of the understanding operating on the pure intuitions of space and time in sensibility to unify them into a manifold. The mere "forms of intuition (space and time) do not have the combination of the manifold, apperception (the action of the understanding), under the name of the categories, performs the combination, and unifies the manifold of intuitions" (§24, B154, p. 258). Any action of the understanding necessarily involves the categories.
- "That which determines the inner sense [time] is the understanding and its original faculty of combining the manifold of intuition" (§24, B153, p. 257)
- The figurative synthesis of imagination provides "the action of the synthesis of the manifold through which we successively determine the inner sense" (§24, B154, p. 258)

9. §25 Transcendental Synthesis of the Manifold of Representations

- "The I think expresses the act of determining my existence…which is grounded in an *a priori* given form, i.e., time" (§25, B157-8n, p. 260)

10. §26 Space and time are themselves formal intuitions in accordance with the categories

- "Space and time are represented *a priori* not merely as forms of sensible intuition, but also as intuitions themselves (which contain a manifold), and thus with the determination of the unity of this manifold in them" (§26, B160, p. 261)
- "The [pure] form of intuition merely gives the manifold, but the formal intuition gives unity of the representation" (§26, B160n, p. 261)
- "A combination with which everything that is to be represented as determined in space or time [e.g. all representations] must agree, is already given *a priori*…as condition of the synthesis of all apprehension" (§26, B161, p. 262)
- "But this synthetic unity can be none other than that of the combination of the manifold of a given intuition in general in an original consciousness, in agreement with the categories, only applied to our sensible intuition" (§26, B161, p. 262)
- "Consequently **all synthesis**, through which even perception itself becomes possible, **stands under the categories**, and since experience is cognition through connected perceptions, the categories are conditions of the possibility of experience, and are thus also valid *a priori* of all objects of experience" (§26, B161, p. 262)

11. Schematism time determinations (B185, p. 276)

- "There must be a third thing," a "mediating representation" called the "transcendental schema" that allows appearances to be subsumed under the categories (B177, p. 272)
- Time determinations added to the categories regarding the series, content, order, and scope of time (Figure 2). The schemata are "*a priori* time-determinations in accordance with rules," which concern the time-series, the content of time, the order of time, and the sum total of time in regard to all possible objects" (B185, p. 276)
- The whole of time is comprised as the "successive addition of one homogeneous unit to another to generate time" (Schematism, B182, p. 274)

Table A.2. Categories and their *a priori* Time Determinations
(B106, p. 212; B185, p. 276).

Mathematical Categories		Dynamical Categories	
Quantity	**Quality**	**Relation**	**Modality**
The time-series	**The content of time**	**The order of time**	**The sum total of time**
Unity	Reality	Inherence and Subsistence	Possibility-Impossibility
Plurality	Negation	Causality and Dependence	Existence-Non-existence
Totality	Limitation	Community (Reciprocity)	Necessity-Contingency

12. Analogies of Experience (A177-218, B219-265, pp. 295-321)

- "Since time itself cannot be perceived, the determination of the existence of objects in time can only come about through their combination in time in general, hence only through *a priori* connecting concepts" (B219, p. 296)
- "The three modi of time are persistence, succession, and simultaneity" (A177/B220, p. 296). These are the three rules of the temporal relations of appearances, and "precede all experience and make it possible" (A177/B220, p. 296)
- The "three analogies of experience are the principles of the determination of the existence of appearances in time, in accordance with all three of its modi: magnitude (duration), succession, and simultaneity" (B262, p. 319)

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