WITH AND WITHOUT SELF-CONTROL: THE ARISTOTELIAN CHARACTER TYPES OF *AKRASIA* AND *ENKRATEIA*

by

Samuel C. Bennett

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STATEMENT OF COMMITTEE APPROVAL

Dr. Patricia Curd, Chair

Department of Philosophy

Dr. Daniel Frank

Department of Philosophy

Dr. Patrick Kain

Department of Philosophy

Dr. Mi-Kyoung Lee

Department of Philosophy (University of Colorado Boulder)

Approved by:

Dr. Christopher Yeomans

Dedicated to the memories of Steven A. Bennett & Stephen R. Bennett

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ABSTRACT

My dissertation analyzes the overlooked character types of *akrasia* (un-self-control) and *enkrateia* (self-control) in Aristotle's ethics. In Chapter 1, I argue that *akrasia* and *enkrateia* are character types, or settled psychological dispositions, definable in terms of unique un-self-controlled and self-controlled relations to choice-making. In Chapters 2 and 3, I contend that agents do not express these character types only in temperance's practical domain; rather, agents can express *akrasia* and *enkrateia* in any practical domain where one's reason can conflict with one's desire. More specifically, in Chapter 2, I develop a distinction between *strict* forms of the character types, which agents express in temperance's practical domain, and *loose* forms of the character types, which agents express in other practical domains (e.g., in courage's practical domain). In Chapter 3, I draw two lines of psychological justification for the view that *akrasia* and *enkrateia* are wide-ranging character types and respond to some scholarly objections. In Chapter 4, I build an account of ethical practical syllogisms and differentiate them from non-ethical practical syllogisms; I argue that an agent expresses her character type through each feature of an ethical practical syllogism (i.e., not only through the enacted choice that concludes her ethical practical syllogism, but also through the propositions she exercises in it). Finally, in Chapter 5, I construct and analyze loose akratic and enkratic practical syllogisms in a variety of practical domains to show that *akrasia* and *enkrateia* are character types with wide ranges of expression.

INTRODUCTION

Investigating the inferior character types that populate Aristotle's ethical taxonomy helps to demonstrate the ways in which people fall short of becoming good yet nevertheless develop psychological dispositions to choose and act in consistent ways. The goal of this dissertation is to investigate the overlooked character types of *akrasia* and *enkrateia* and to fill in some gaps that Aristotle leaves open because his primary focus is on virtue. Here is a classic case of *akrasia* or un-self-control: an agent knows it is better to avoid the third glass of wine, yet her desire for the wine induces her to drink it anyway, and so she enacts the choice to drink it. Further, here is a classic case of *enkrateia* or self-control: an agent knows it is better to avoid the third doughnut, struggles with her desire to eat it, but nevertheless ends up enacting the choice to abstain from eating the third doughnut. The akratic agent knows what it would be correct to choose and to do, but her relation to affect leads her to choose and perform an incorrect action; the enkratic agent engages in a similar struggle because of her relation to affect, but ends up overcoming it and chooses and performs a correct action.

A kind of extended metaphor may help here: The virtuous character successfully finds her way to the end of a long and winding maze, with its trick corridors and dead ends scattered with other characters who have lost their ways. Among the lost are the akratic (or un-self-controlled) character and the enkratic (or self-controlled) character. The vicious character is lost as well, and most of all. With her back completely turned to the maze from the start, the vicious character never really enters; she has nothing praiseworthy within her that is worth controlling, unlike the akratic and enkratic characters who do. In order to discover the route that the virtuous character takes, it would be of great interest to stop and analyze the akratic and enkratic characters, to investigate their wrong turns, how they became lost, and, in short, what really distinguishes them from the

virtuous character. This is the goal of my dissertation: to investigate the overlooked character types of *akrasia* and *enkrateia* in service of gaining a better understanding of their place in Aristotle's ethical taxonomy of character. In the following paragraphs, I pose the main questions that I address in my work; in each case, I set forth a question and then provide some preliminary answers, more detailed versions of which constitute the work of the chapters that comprise my dissertation.

First: Are akratic and enkratic agents kinds of people who have developed dispositions to lead un-self-controlled and self-controlled lives, or are *akrasia* and *enkrateia* weaker conditions that fall short of counting as stable psychological dispositions? I argue in Chapter 1 that *akrasia* and *enkrateia* are settled psychological dispositions and that it is correct to hold that akratic and enkratic agents are kinds of people who choose and act in consistent ways, that is, akin to the way that virtuous agents are kinds of people who choose and act in consistent ways. I take care to point out that there is a difference between a character type and an action type to avoid making the incorrect claim that an agent's character type determines the sorts of choices and actions she makes in every case. For instance, someone with an akratic character type can perform a correct or virtuous action from time to time, so long as we understand that the agent is not performing a virtuous action *as* the virtuous agent would perform it (for this point, I rely heavily on the three criteria which Aristotle lays out for genuine virtuous choice and action at *NE* II.4 1105a31-33). I conclude in Chapter 1 that *akrasia* and *enkrateia* are character types determined by the relation that agents with these psychological dispositions bear to choice-making, because an agent's relation to choice-making, as Aristotle notes at the outset of *NE* III.2, is what best distinguishes the various character types from one another.

Second: Since *akrasia* and *enkrateia* are character types, to what extent do agents express these character types? Do they only arise in temperance's practical domain[1], or do agents express self-control and its lack in practical domains beyond that of temperance? I devote Chapters 2 and 3 to answering this question, arguing that *akrasia* and *enkrateia* have wide ranges of expression; agents are not limited to expressing these character types only in temperance's practical domain. Aristotle does not have much to say about *akrasia* and *enkrateia* outside of his direct examination of them at *NE* VII.1-10, and in these chapters he primarily considers the character types as agents express them in temperance's practical domain, that is, with respect to the affect of tactile appetite and its attendant pleasures and pains. Nevertheless, I contend in Chapter 2 that a close reading of the end of *NE* VII.4 [1148b10-14] opens the way for a distinction between what I term *strict* and *loose* forms of the character types of *akrasia* and *enkrateia*, where the strict forms are those which agents express in temperance's practical domain with respect to tactile appetite, and the loose forms are those which agents express in other practical domains with respect to their attendant affects.

In Chapter 3, I turn to exploring two psychological justifications for supposing that self-control and un-self-control have wide ranges of expression. For the first psychological justification, I focus largely on Aristotle's remarks at the end of *NE* I.13 [1102b13-21]. In this early chapter, he introduces the character types of *akrasia* and *enkrateia* for the first time, not for the sake of

[1] I clarify what I mean by a "practical domain" in Chapter 1, relying on Aristotle's distinction between affects and dispositions at *NE* II.5, but it will be helpful to sketch what I mean by the phrase here. 'Practical domain' signifies the continuum of character types it is possible for agents to develop with respect a particular affect or set of affects. For instance, temperance's practical domain refers to the set of character types that agents can develop with respect to tactile appetite; agents with the virtue of temperance hold well with respect to this affect, that is, they bear the best possible relation to it. Agents with the vice of self-indulgence, on the other hand, have excessive tactile appetite; they bear one of the worst possible relations to tactile appetite. Agents who have developed all of the other character types in temperance's practical domain (insensibility, strict *akrasia*, and strict *enkrateia*) also bear unique relations to tactile appetite, and for this reason, all of the aforementioned character types are grouped together as belonging to temperance's practical domain.

explaining them directly, but rather as evidence for his view that the human soul is subject to a general functional division between rational and non-rational natures which can either work with or struggle against one another. What is more, Aristotle claims that the rational natures of akratic and enkratic agents' souls are *praiseworthy*, suggesting that their ethical failures reside generally in the non-rational natures of their souls. Yet it is Aristotle's view that a human soul develops as a whole; one nature does not remain stagnant, as it were, while the other develops. So, in Chapter 3, I discuss the functional divisions of the human soul in detail, analyzing the distinction between its rational and non-rational natures and the further sub-aspects that Aristotle holds comprise these natures, in order to show that it is unlikely that agents express *akrasia* and *enkrateia* only in temperance's practical domain. Their souls' natures are generally misaligned, and this is bound to have consequences for the character types such agents express in all of the ethical practical domains, not just in temperance's.

Regarding the second psychological justification for their wide ranges that I present in Chapter 3, I analyze the unity constraint that Aristotle imposes on character virtue. According to virtue's unity constraint, agents who are genuinely virtuous cannot have developed one individual virtue without also having developed all of the others. This constraint requires that an agent who expresses temperance must also be able to express courage, generosity, and all of the other individual virtues when the circumstances arise for them to do so. The unity constraint also requires that agents with character virtue have developed the intellectual virtue of practical wisdom; in effect, character virtue and practical wisdom are mutually dependent. After analyzing virtue's unity constraint, I argue that there must be a similar constraint on the character types of *akrasia* and *enkrateia*, albeit a modified version of the unity constraint, which I call the *duality constraint*. Like virtue's unity constraint, the duality constraint restricts which character types agents can

express in other practical domains if they genuinely express *akrasia* or *enkrateia* in any one of them. Briefly, the duality constraint requires that if an agent genuinely expresses *akrasia* in any one practical domain, then the only character types she can express in the other practical domains are *either akrasia or enkrateia*. Similarly, if an agent genuinely expresses *enkrateia* in any one practical domain, then the only character types she can express in the others are *either akrasia or enkrateia*. To conclude Chapter 3, I respond to some scholarly objections to the view that self-control and its lack have wide ranges of expression.

Third: If *akrasia* and *enkrateia* are character types with wide ranges of expression, then is it possible to explain and describe strict and loose akratic and enkratic choice-making and behavior by means of the model of the practical syllogism? I argue that it is in fact possible to explain and describe them with practical syllogisms and, in Chapter 5, I construct several examples of loose akratic and enkratic practical syllogisms in the practical domains of courage, generosity, the unnamed virtue[2] that has to do with honor, and mildness.[3] I construct and analyze these examples of loose akratic and loose enkratic practical syllogisms in Chapter 5; but in Chapter 4, I first provide an overview of the practical syllogism in general and distinguish non-ethical (or ethically neutral) practical syllogisms from ethical ones. Relying on *De Motu Animalium* 7 [701a7-701b1] where Aristotle gives examples of non-ethical practical syllogisms, and also on *NE* VII.3

[2] This is the lower order virtue that has to do with honor or recognition to which Aristotle devotes the small chapter, *NE* IV.4. In contrast with the higher order virtue of μεγαλοψυχία which relates to great honor and recognition [1125a34-35], the unnamed virtue has to do with small and mid-sized honor and recognition [1125b5]. Late in Chapter 5, I elect to give the unnamed virtue a title for the sake of clearer exposition, and I refer to it simply as "love of honor."

[3] I have selected these practical domains intentionally. I construct and analyze loose akratic and enkratic practical syllogisms in courage's domain to follow up on a response to a view that David Charles expresses (Aristotle's Philosophy of Action) that I first address in Chapter 3. Charles's contention is that Aristotle does not propose a loose form of *enkrateia* in courage's domain in a passage from *NE* II.3 where he proposes that Aristotle would have if there were such a form. I select the remaining three practical domains (generosity's, love of honor's, and mildness's) because Aristotle mentions *akrasia* with respect to their attendant affects in his final remarks at *NE* VII.4. (This is also the passage that I rely on in Chapter 2 for arguing that there is a distinction between strict and loose forms of both *akrasia* and *enkrateia*.)

[1147a24-1147b3] where he provides instances of ethical practical syllogisms, I demonstrate that Aristotle holds that the ethical syllogisms bear a special relation to an agent's character that the neutral ones, *prima facie*[4], do not. The propositions exercised and the enacted choice that concludes an ethical practical syllogism all ultimately derive their ethical value or import from the character type of the syllogizing agent. Continuing this line of reasoning, I show that agents with character types inferior to virtue also enact choices that submit to explanation in the light of Aristotle's model of the ethical practical syllogism. So, Chapters 4 and 5 work together in a progressive fashion, with the former laying the groundwork for the model of the ethical practical syllogism, and the latter applying the model to present evidence that the ethical practical syllogism can describe and explain loose akratic and loose enkratic enacted choices. In Chapter 5, I also address the kind of ignorance that Aristotle ascribes to akratic and enkratic agents, namely *evaluative ignorance*, and how this plays a role in their practical reasoning as explanatory of why they and their practical syllogisms are inferior to virtuous agents and their practical syllogisms.

Before beginning the investigation into the character types of *akrasia* and *enkrateia* according to the plan I have just presented, it is necessary to note that including them as ethical ways of being is, for Aristotle, a somewhat controversial and innovative move. If we consider the view that Plato attributes to Socrates in the *Protagoras*, we find that it rejects the very possibility of *akrasia* and *enkrateia*. My work is not on the historical conversation among Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle regarding whether *akrasia* and *enkrateia* are real, either as conditions or character types. Indeed, I do not say much at all about Aristotle as a thinker who departs from or modifies

[4] It is important to include this disclaimer since it is possible to imagine contextual information that would render the ethically neutral practical syllogisms ethically relevant. Nevertheless, when Aristotle presents examples of the practical syllogism at *De Mot*. 7, he provides no such ethical context, and I propose that this is because he uses them to demonstrate that his model explains how people come to enact choices in general. Further, *De Mot*. is a general text on animal self-movement and not a text that entertains the intersection of character types and self-movement.

the views of his predecessors in the following chapters. Yet the fact that Aristotle does push forward and in some sense against the grain of earlier views is an important consideration to keep in mind and worthy of some attention. I devote the rest of this introductory chapter to showing that Aristotle both clearly sets out to refute Socrates's rejection of these character types and also how Aristotle is careful to preserve the aspects of Socrates's thoughts on the matter which he deems correct.[5]

Evidence that Socrates thought that both *akrasia* and *enkrateia* are impossible can be found in Plato's *Protagoras* and in Aristotle's *NE* VII. Aristotle's primary task in his ethical treatises is to demonstrate how one becomes virtuous, to provide an account of character development his students can heed in their own practical affairs as they aspire to become virtuous for the sake of flourishing; for Aristotle, the inferior character types of *akrasia* and *enkrateia* are the results of improper ethical development and receive little attention. As I proceed to discuss the philosophical context surrounding Aristotle's defense of the reality of akratic and enkratic character types, I show that there are substantial reasons for Aristotle's disagreement with Socrates's character in the *Protagoras*, reasons that follow from Aristotle's view that one's character is not only explained in terms of the rational nature of one's soul, that is, in terms of what one knows. For Socrates, on the other hand, an agent's status as virtuous is directly linked to her knowledge; on his account, virtue is an exclusively intellectual affair, as doing what is virtuous is the result of knowledge of what it is correct to choose and to do. Aristotle rejects this relation between virtue and knowledge [*NE* VI.13 1144b28-30]; he agrees that ethical virtue is in some

[5] This is consistent with Aristotle's own views about how the *endoxa* are to be treated. As McLeod ("Aristotle's Method") correctly writes regarding Aristotle's reviews of *endoxa*, or the views of the many and the wise, "doing so allows him to find and adopt whatever happens to be true in them, and to refute and thereafter avoid whatever happens to be false in them," (14).
McLeod, Owen. (Jan., 1995) "Aristotle's Method." in *History of Philosophy Quarterly*. Vol. 12, No. 1. 1-18

sense dependent on an agent's practical rationality, but an agent's virtue also importantly depends on how she trains the non-rational nature of her soul. So, *akrasia* and *enkrateia* are not just possible character types on Aristotle's rendering, but their reality is an inevitable result of his view that knowledge alone is insufficient for virtue and that the soul is comprised of distinct functional natures that can either align or conflict.

I begin with what Aristotle has to say about Socrates's rejection of *akrasia*, and by extension *enkrateia*, at *NE* VII.2.

> …δεινὸν γὰρ ἐπιστήμης ἐνούσης, ὡς ᾤετο Σωκράτης, ἄλλο τι κρατεῖν καὶ 'περιέλκειν' αὐτην 'ὥσπερ ἀνδράποδον.' Σωκράτης μὲν γὰρ ὅλως ἐμάχετο πρὸς τὸν λόγον ὡς οὐκ οὔσης ἀκρασίας. οὐθένα γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνοντα πράττειν παρὰ τὸ βέλτιστον, ἀλλὰ δι᾽ἄγνοιαν.
>
> …for it would be terrible, as Socrates thought, that with knowledge being in a person, something else strong-arms it and 'drags it around like a slave.' For Socrates altogether used to fight against the view, holding that there is no *akrasia*. He held that nobody acts against what is best while supposing that is what she does, but she acts against what is best due to ignorance. [*NE* VII.2 1145b23-27][6]

In the midst of cataloguing the various puzzles and difficulties surrounding *akrasia* and *enkrateia*, Aristotle tells us not only that Socrates rejects the possibility of *akrasia*, but he also explains why. The Socratic principle that nobody errs willingly disqualifies *akrasia* from ethical consideration since, by definition, an akratic agent willingly enacts a choice that she knows is incorrect. If one permits un-self-control, then one must also attribute inferiority to knowledge and render it conquerable, while on Socrates's view, knowledge always rules; it is not ruled over.

One can look to the *Protagoras*, the dialogue in which Plato shows Socrates arguing with its eponymous sophist over whether virtue can be taught, to find corroboration for Aristotle's representation of his predecessor's view. With roughly ten Stephanos pages to go in an otherwise lengthy text—52 Stephanos pages in total—the framing of the dialogue changes from what has

[6] All translations are my own, unless otherwise noted.

mostly been a direct dialogue between only Socrates and Protagoras. At 352b, Socrates crafts a way to speak with Protagoras indirectly by introducing a whole new group of interlocutors: the majority of people. Socrates asks the sophist:

> πῶς ἔχεις πρὸς ἐπιστήμην; πότερον καὶ τοῦτό σοι δοκεῖ ὥσπερ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἢ ἄλλως; δοκεῖ δὲ τοῖς πολλοῖς περὶ ἐπιστήμης τοιοῦτόν τι—οὐκ ἰσχυρὸν οὐδ᾽ ἡγεμονικὸν οὐδ᾽ ἀρχικὸν εἶναι. οὐδὲ ὡς περὶ τοιούτου αὐτοῦ ὄντος διανοοῦνται. ἀλλ᾽ ἐνούσης πολλάκις ἀνθρώπῳ ἐπιστήμης οὐ τὴν ἐπιστήμην αὐτοῦ ἄρχειν ἀλλ᾽ ἄλλο τι—τοτὲ μὲν θυμόν, τοτὲ δὲ ἡδονήν, τοτὲ δὲ λύπην, ἐνίοτε δὲ ἔρωτα, πολλάκις δὲ φόβον. ἀτεχνῶς διανοούμενοι περὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης ὥσπερ περὶ ἀνδραπόδου, περιελκομένης ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων.
>
> How do you stand with respect to knowledge? Does it look to you just as it does to most people, or in some other way? Regarding knowledge, it seems to the majority of people that it is like this—it is not strong, neither a leader nor a ruler. They do not think of knowledge as being like this. Rather they think that, although knowledge is often in a person, it is not knowledge that rules him, but something else—at one time it is anger, at another it is pleasure, then it is pain, sometimes it is love, often it is fear. Without skill they think about knowledge just what they think about a slave, that it is dragged around by all of these other things. [*Protag*. 352b1-c2]

The similarity between Socrates's language in this passage and the language Aristotle uses to describe Socrates's view in the *NE* passage above is hard to overlook. For instance, the description of knowledge being dragged around like a slave is present in both. We can glean from both texts that Socrates thinks that the opinion of the majority is wrong.[7] He holds that knowledge in a person cannot be dragged around like a slave, and it does not matter what is supposed to be doing the dragging, be it anger, pleasure, pain, love, fear, or any other affect.

There does appear to be one significant difference between the *Protagoras* and *NE* VII.2 passages under consideration. Socrates's character in the *Protagoras* clearly has in mind the dichotomy between one's knowledge and whatever affects or feelings the majority claims are capable of dominating one's knowledge. According to Aristotle's expression of the view, however,

[7] In contrast to Aristotle's treatment of the views of the many when reviewing the *endoxa*, Socrates does not find anything worth salvaging from this opinion of the majority in the *Protagoras*.

the dichotomy is at first between one's knowledge and whatever might be said to overpower it, but the final sentence of the *NE* VII.2 passage above replaces what one *knows* with something weaker, namely what one *supposes*. Aristotle posits that Socrates "held that nobody acts against what is best while supposing (ὑπολαμβάνοντα) that is what she does…" There is certainly a difference between knowing what is best and acting against it, and supposing that something is best and acting against it. Further, if someone proposes that *knowledge* of what is best cannot be overcome by affect or anything else, she does not at the same time have to contend that what one *supposes* is best cannot be overcome. So over the course of Aristotle's review of Socrates's position, his position appears to become stronger. At first, he reports that it is Socrates's view that it is knowledge of the best that cannot be dominated, but shortly after he strengthens the claim, reporting that Socrates thought that one's supposition of what is best cannot be dominated, either.

Perhaps in order to block this worry, Aristotle writes at *NE* VII.3 that the difference between one's firmest opinions and her knowledge is irrelevant for the purposes of inquiring into the possibility of *akrasia*. This might explain why he attributes to Socrates a view concerning the indomitability of both knowledge and supposition in nearly the same breath.

> …ἔνιοι γὰρ πιστεύουσιν οὐδὲν ἧττον οἷς δοξάζουσιν ἢ ἕτεροι οἷς ἐπίστανται. δηλοῖ δ᾽ Ἡράκλειτος
>
> …for some people trust in the things they believe no less than other people trust in the things they know. Heraclitus shows this.[8] [NE VII.3 1146b30-31]

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[8] Aristotle likely has in mind this saying from Heraclitus:

> δοκέοντα ὁ δοκιμώτατος γινώσκει φυλάσσει
> The most notable person knows and clings to what seems to be the case (B28a)

Robinson, T.M. (1987) Heraclitus *Fragments*: A Text and Translation with a Commentary. University of Toronto Press. 25

Aristotle may be invoking this Heraclitean notion that people can be firmly convinced of something to the extent that they claim knowledge of it even when it is a mere appearance.

Taking this claim into consideration, Aristotle emphasizes that it is the strength of the conviction which one acts against, not whether the object of that conviction is what one merely supposes or actually knows, that is relevant for his defense of the reality of *akrasia*. The point Aristotle is making here is this: so long as what someone holds is attended by the same kind of trusting attitude that she has when she knows something, the same kind of phenomenon is present—either way, the akratic acts against what she strongly thinks is best when it comes to choosing and acting. With this claim, Aristotle demonstrates that he is prepared to counter both the weak and strong versions of Socrates's position, proposing that *akrasia* is possible whether it is knowledge or firm conviction of what is best against which an akratic agent chooses and acts.

Let us set aside the distinction between what one supposes and what one knows and assume that Socrates has his sights set on what one knows as indomitable. It should be clear now that according to Socrates, *akrasia*, and by extension *enkrateia*, are impossible ethical phenomena. If an agent knows what it is best to do on Socrates's view, then what results is that she does it; if she fails to do what is best, then it is because she does not actually know what it is best to do. Affect is not stronger than knowledge; it cannot engage in a successful struggle against knowledge, for knowledge is too powerful; *akrasia* is impossible. Likewise, Socrates's view bars *enkrateia* from possibility. For if an agent knows what it is best to do, then what results is that she does it; she does not have to struggle with affect to enact that knowledge, and to admit such a struggle takes place is to admit that affect is able to contend with knowledge. Making ethical space for self-control implies that affect could in principle get the better of knowledge, given the right circumstances, and that the enkratic is a stone's throw away from losing the internal war between knowledge and affect. But if one holds to Socrates' dictum that knowledge in a person is

necessarily indomitable, then such an internal quarrel could not arise; self-control is just as impossible as un-self-control on Socrates's account.

After expressing and explaining Socrates' rejection of the possibility of *akrasia*, Aristotle provides an explanation for why he takes issue with it.

> οὗτος μὲν οὖν ὁ λόγος ἀμφισβητεῖ τοῖς φαινομένοις ἐναργῶς, καὶ δέον ζητεῖν περὶ τὸ πάθος, εἰ δι᾽ ἄγνοιαν, τίς ὁ τρόπος γίνεται τῆς ἀγνοίας.
>
> This [that is, Socrates's] account stands manifestly apart from appearances, and it is necessary to investigate regarding the affect, i.e., if [*akrasia*] is due to ignorance, [and, if so, it is necessary to investigate] what manner of ignorance gives rise to it. [*NE* VII.2 1145b27-29]

He is careful here not to discard Socrates's account entirely. Even though it is greatly at odds with what seems to be true, Aristotle does think that, in a way, Socrates is right to explain un-self-control in terms of ignorance. Where Socrates goes wrong, according to Aristotle, is in explaining *away* lack of self-control in terms of ignorance. On Aristotle's considered view, *akrasia* and *enkrateia* are character types accompanied by ignorance of a certain kind. This ignorance does not bar them from counting as character types any more than the most severe ignorance ascribed to vice bars it from being a character type. The passage under examination ends with Aristotle prescribing a method for advancing the inquiry into *akrasia*'s relation to ignorance: if one wants to explain un-self-control positively in terms of ignorance, then one must look into what kind of ignorance is responsible for it. For Socrates, this would be a puzzling prescription; he might ask, "What do you mean, 'what kind of ignorance'? Ignorance is just a lack of knowledge." In the *Protagoras*, Socrates presents knowledge as indomitable and tethers it to virtue. Either an agent knows what is best, or she does not. If she has knowledge of what it is best to do, then she enacts it; this is Socratic virtue. Anything less is ignorance and badness, for if she lacks knowledge, she also lacks virtue. In contrast, Aristotle does not identify virtue with knowledge or wisdom, but instead holds that virtue depends on, or is accompanied by, one's knowledge or reason.

> Σωκράτης μὲν οὖν λόγους τὰς ἀρετὰς ᾤετο εἶναι (ἐπιστήμας γὰρ εἶναι πάσας), ἡμεῖς δὲ μετὰ λόγου.
>
> Socrates thought that the virtues were reasons (for he thought that they were all knowledge), but we think that the virtues depend on reason. [*NE* VI.13 1144b28-30]

The virtuous person is practically wise; she has the deliberative intellectual virtue of practical wisdom on Aristotle's account. One cannot be virtuous without being practically wise, and one cannot be practically wise without being virtuous [1144b30-32]. The further removed one is from being virtuous, the more removed she is from being practically wise. And since there are several character types inferior to virtue—*enkrateia*, *akrasia*, vice, and perhaps natural virtue—so too must there be rational dispositions or conditions inferior to practical wisdom that accompany these non-rational character types.

This suggests that for Aristotle, ignorance can be said in many ways. He explicitly proposes more than one type of ignorance in the scope of his ethical treatises. In the earlier cited passage from *NE* VII.2, Aristotle writes that affect (πάθος) can give rise to the kind of ignorance responsible for *akrasia* and *enkrateia*, for instance the affects that Socrates catalogues in the *Protagoras* when rejecting the possibility of *akrasia*—anger, pleasure, pain, love, and fear. This akratic or enkratic ignorance is blameworthy insofar as it accompanies the character types themselves, which both turn out to be blameworthy when set against virtue. An agent's unrelenting desire for tactile pleasure, for example, can be a sort of blindness or ignorance, prompting her to struggle to enact her knowledge of what it is best to do. In Chapter 5, I identify this as *evaluative ignorance*, a sort of ignorance distinct from *factual ignorance*. At *NE* III.1, Aristotle writes that factual ignorance is responsible for actions that fall outside of the voluntary; this kind of ignorance is a cause attributed to actions for which agents are neither praised nor blamed. The agent who does not know that I keep salt in a container marked "sugar" does not voluntarily salt her coffee.

Should she complain about the taste, it would be inappropriate to blame her for ruining her own cup. She did not knowingly mix the salt into her coffee. This factual ignorance of the circumstances surrounding one's action—with whom one is interacting, with what one is acting, in what manner one is acting, and so on—is distinct from the evaluative kind of ignorance brought on by an improper relation to affect. Since ignorance comes in different kinds on his view, it is clear why Aristotle is interested in what kind of ignorance one should ascribe to akratic and enkratic agents—an interest that cannot arise on Socrates's account.

Aristotle carefully preserves parts of Socrates's view, specifically regarding *akrasia*'s relation to ignorance, and also shows where Socrates goes wrong in dismissing akratic and enkratic characters from the ethical realm on the basis of their ignorance. Near the end of *NE* VII.3, Aristotle makes a claim about Socrates's view that might seem surprising: Aristotle concedes ground to Socrates's insistence on knowledge's indomitability.

> …ἔοικεν ὃ ἐζήτει Σωκράτης συμβαίνειν. οὐ γὰρ τῆς κυρίως ἐπιστήμης εἶναι δοκούσης παρούσης γίνεται τὸ πάθος, οὐδ᾽ αὕτη περιέλκεται διὰ τὸ πάθος, ἀλλὰ τῆς αἰσθητικῆς.
>
> …it seems that what Socrates was seeking does result. For it is not knowledge in the strict sense in the person when affect arises, nor is it such knowledge that is dragged around by affect, but rather perceptual knowledge. [*NE* VII.3 1147b15-18]

Although akratic and enkratic agents lack practical wisdom, Aristotle holds that the rational natures of their souls are worthy of praise [*NE* I.13 1102b15]. The distinction he draws above between (a) knowledge in the strict (κυρίως) sense and (b) perceptual (αἰσθητικός) knowledge can help us to make sense of what it means for the rational natures of the souls of akratic and enkratic agents to merit praise: they deserve praise for their proper knowledge, but not for their perceptual knowledge. Additionally, this distinction helps to preserve something Aristotle thinks is true in Socrates's estimation of *akrasia*, namely that some knowledge, that is, what is knowledge in the

strict sense, is in fact unconquerable; what one grasps through perception, however, does not pass this indomitability test. Just as Aristotle proposes that ignorance comes in more than one kind, he suggests here that knowledge does, too.

What Aristotle thinks perceptual knowledge to be is an interesting question[9], but of more interest at present is how nicely Aristotle weaves his emendations into Socrates's account. Undoubtedly these changes are incompatible with Socrates's view regarding *akrasia*'s impossibility, given what we can glean from the *Protagoras* and Aristotle's own remarks on Socrates's rejection. Just as suggesting more than one kind of ignorance would have puzzled Socrates's character in this dialogue, so too would have positing more than one kind of knowledge. Aristotle's admiration for his predecessor's understanding of knowledge's relation to affect shines through even as he explicitly develops an alternative understanding. He is willing to admit the correctness of Socrates's view that knowledge in the strict sense is the highest part of a person and that the ruling element cannot be dragged around like a slave, but he is not willing to go so far as to allow that self-control and un-self-control are impossible ethical phenomena because of this; he proposes that perceptual knowledge can be dragged around like a slave. Aristotle is also willing to admit that ignorance is responsible for both lacking self-control and having to control oneself; but he is not willing to admit that it is ignorance *simpliciter* that bars *akrasia* and *enkrateia* from possibility, instead allowing that affect-induced ignorance is characteristic of them as ethical ways of being.

In the *Republic*, Plato attributes a different view to Socrates that does not reject the possibility of either *akrasia* or *enkrateia*, but instead allows both that reason and affect can conflict

[9] In fact, in Chapter 5, I develop a positive account of evaluative ignorance as responsible for akratic and enkratic behavior, and I propose here that evaluative ignorance just is the lack of perceptual knowledge of the sort that Aristotle identifies in the passage under consideration.

and that affect can overcome reason in such a conflict. This recognition gives rise to several questions. (1) Does Plato depict the historical Socrates with the views he truly held throughout the *Protagoras* and the *Republic*? (2) Does Plato weave his own philosophical commitments into Socrates's character's utterances in either or both of the dialogues? A third, more difficult to investigate option is also available: Are some parts of the view in the *Protagoras* and the *Republic* Socrates's, while other parts are Plato's innovations? These questions lead into murky territory; the task of separating the historical Socrates from Plato's characterization of him requires its own book-length investigation. At present, my goal is only to show that Aristotle has in mind to refute the Socratic view that Plato represents in the *Protagoras*. It is worth attending to the alternative Socratic view that Plato depicts in the *Republic* to show how it permits *akrasia* and *enkrateia* in service of concluding with further certainty that Aristotle perceives Socrates's view in the *Protagoras* as the one worth opposing.

At *Republic* IV, Socrates's character famously presents a tripartite model of soul, an account that results in an epistemological view incompatible with Socrates's position regarding knowledge's indomitability in the *Protagoras*. In the *Republic*, Socrates proposes that the soul is comprised of a calculative part, an appetitive part, and a spirited part. The calculative part is the part that reasons and puts things together; it has knowledge as its object. In a well-ordered soul, the calculative rules over the remaining parts which serve and obey it, whereas in a soul that is not well-ordered, the parts can conflict and fight against one another. Socrates explains that the calculative part can come into conflict with the appetitive part beginning at 439c, conversing with Glaucon, in service of demonstrating that the parts are distinct.

> Σ: πότερον δὴ φῶμέν τινας ἔστιν ὅτε διψῶντας οὐχ ἐθέλειν πιεῖν;
>
> Do we say from time to time that there are some people who when thirsty do not intend to drink?

Γ: καὶ μάλα γ᾽, ἔφη, πολλοὺς καὶ πολλάκις.

We do indeed, he said, often about many people.

Σ: τί οὖν, ἔφην ἐγώ, φαίη τις ἂν τούτων πέρι; οὐκ ἐνεῖναι μὲν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ αὐτῶν τὸ κελεῦον, ἐνεῖναι δὲ τὸ κωλῦον πιεῖν, ἄλλο ὂν καὶ κρατοῦν τοῦ κελεύοντος;

So what, I said, should someone say about these people? Shouldn't one say that there is something within their souls driving them to drink, and also something prohibiting them from drinking, this one being different from and strong-arming the one that drives them to drink?

Γ: ἔμοιγε, ἔφη, δοκεῖ.

That's how it seems to me, he said.

Σ: ἆρ᾽οὖν οὐ τὸ μὲν κωλῦον τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐγγίγνεται, ὅταν [439d] ἐγγένηται, ἐκ λογισμοῦ, τὰ δὲ ἄγοντα καὶ ἕλκοντα διὰ παθημάτων τε καὶ νοσημάτων παραγίγνεται;

So doesn't what prohibits these kinds of things come in, whenever it comes in, from calculation, whereas what leads and drags people to do these kinds of things arises on account of affects and sicknesses?

Γ: φαίνεται.

It appears that way.

Σ: οὐ δὴ ἀλόγως, ἦν δ᾽ἐγω, ἀξιώσομεν αὐτὰ διττά τε καὶ ἕτερα ἀλλήλων εἶναι, τὸ μὲν ᾧ λογίζεται λογιστικὸν προσαγορεύοντες τῆς ψθχῆς, τὸ δὲ ᾧ ἐρᾷ τε καὶ πεινῇ καὶ διψῇ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐπιθυμίας ἐπτόηται ἀλόγιστόν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμητικόν, πληρώσεών τινων καὶ ἡδονῶν ἑταῖρον.

So, I said, it is not unreasonably that we expect these to be two and different from one another, addressing the part of the soul with which it calculates as the 'calculative' part, and addressing as non-calculative and 'appetitive' that which loves, hungers, thirsts and gets worked up about the other desires, and is friend of certain satisfactions and pleasures.

This bit of the dialogue opens with the consideration of whether some thirsty people do not want to drink. It is possible to read this example as either ethically neutral or ethically relevant. If read as ethically neutral, then perhaps we are to imagine someone who is thirsty and that what can quench her thirst is readily available, yet she does not wish to drink it, arbitrarily choosing to hold off. If read as ethically relevant, on the other hand, then perhaps we are to imagine someone who

is thirsty but for whom only highly alcoholic or otherwise unhealthy drinks are readily available; she knows it is wrong to drink these things, so she chooses to avoid them. Either way, what Socrates aims to show with the example is that in human souls the calculative and appetitive parts can conflict. What is more, the example shows reason winning out over appetite. Thirst is classed as appetitive and as what leads and drags the person to drink—familiar language from the *Protagoras* and *NE* VII.2 passages considered at the outset of this chapter—while reasoning is described as what prohibits the person from drinking. The part of the soul that has knowledge prohibits the part that chases after pleasures and avoids pains from being the principle or cause of her action. Now this example is not a case where appetite overcomes one's knowledge, so the example does not in itself run counter to Socrates's view in the *Protagoras* that knowledge is indomitable and that *akrasia* is impossible. The example would have to be of someone who drinks even though she knows it is wrong in order to challenge Socrates's position in the earlier dialogue directly, for this would be close to a case of *akrasia* wherein the reasoning part loses its contest with the appetitive one. However, this example from the *Republic* does diverge from Socrates's view in the *Protagoras* since it permits that the reasoning part of an agent's soul can conflict with its appetitive part. So, one could say that Socrates in the *Republic* permits self-control, or *enkrateia*, since he permits a conflict between reason and appetite which reason ultimately wins.

To make the case that Socrates allows for *akrasia* in *Republic* IV, it is necessary to consider his presentation of the third and final part of the soul, the spirited part. This part is said to be distinct from the previous two, and to ally itself with the rationally calculative part in its war against the appetitive part. Socrates introduces the spirited part at 439e by means of a parable about a man who wants to avoid looking at corpses, then succumbs to his desire to look at them, and afterward chastises himself for having looked.

> ἀλλ᾽, ἦν δ᾽ἐγώ, ποτὲ ἀκούσας τι πιστεύω τούτῳ. ὡς ἄρα Λεόντιος ὁ Ἀγλαΐωνος ἀνιὼν ἐκ Πειραιῶς ὑπὸ τὸ βόρειον τεῖχος ἐκτός, αἰσθόμενος νεκροὺς παρὰ τῷ δημίῳ κειμένους, ἅμα μὲν ἰδεῖν ἐπιθυμοῖ, ἅμα δὲ αὖ δυσχεραίνοι καὶ ἀποτρέποι ἑαυτόν. καὶ τέως μὲν μάχοιτό τε καὶ παρακαλύπτοιτο, [440a] κρατούμενος δ᾽οὖν ὑπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας, διελκύσας τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς, προσδραμὼν πρὸς τοὺς νεκρούς, ‘ἴδοὺ ὑμῖν,’ ἔφη, ‘ὦ κακοδαίμονες, ἐμπλήσθητε τοῦ καλοῦ θεάματος.’

> But, I said, having once heard something, I believed it, that Leontius, the son of Aglaion, traveling up from the Piraeus under and outside the northern wall, taking notice of dead bodies lying near the public executioner, at the same time desired to look at them and was annoyed and turned himself away. And up to a point he fought and covered his eyes, but was overcome by desire, widened his eyes, and running toward the dead bodies he shouted, “Behold, you vile spirits, take your fill of the godly, fine view!”

Leontius serves as an example of one whose soul’s appetitive and spirited parts come into conflict with one another. This is not so surprising since the earlier example depicts an agent whose rational and appetitive parts come into conflict; since the spirited part is considered an ally of the rational part, it makes sense that both would share the appetitive part as an opponent. Leontius’s spirited part loses its contest against the appetitive part of his soul. He gives in to his desire to look upon the corpses, and that desire drags him to do what he initially set out to prevent himself from doing. The spirited part of his soul is not defeated to the extent that it is vanquished, for Socrates holds the spirited part responsible for Leontius’s self-chastising after looking at the bodies. One might try to infer from the story that Leontius’s soul has no rationally calculative part or that Leontius lacks the knowledge that would have kept him from succumbing to appetite. But if this is the case, then it is not clear why Leontius would have reason to speak to his own eyes in the condemnatory way that he does after looking. It seems that he does know that he should avoid gawking at the executioner’s work, that spirit tries to come to the aid of reason, but in the end fails to keep Leontius from looking. All the work that his spirited part has left to do in this case is to reprimand his appetitive part. This seems like a case of Aristotelian lack of self-control or *akrasia*: Leontius

enacts a choice that he knows is incorrect, and afterward regrets what he has done.[10] What is more, if Leontius had succeeded in keeping his eyes off the corpses, if spirit had succeeded in defending reason and kept desire from running the show, it would look like a case of Aristotelian self-control or *enkrateia*; despite the contest between his soul's parts, Leontius would have ended up enacting the choice he knew was correct all along. So, Socrates in the *Protagoras* seems to be a thinker distinct from Socrates in *Republic* IV regarding both the issue of whether affect and knowledge can come into conflict and whether affect can defeat knowledge in such a conflict. In the *Protagoras*, Socrates attributes to knowledge such superiority that it cannot even be said to suffer being challenged by affect, let alone lose to it in any conflict. Yet in the *Republic*, Socrates permits that the rational or calculative part of the soul is in fact rivaled by affect, insofar as it is in contest with the appetitive part; further, he permits that the spirited part, a rational ally, can struggle against the appetitive part and lose.

Since Aristotle's remarks at *NE* VII.2 align more closely with Socrates's remarks in the *Protagoras*, it follows that this is the Socratic view which Aristotle intends to refute regarding the impossibility of *akrasia* and *enkrateia*. As I show in the following chapters, not only does Aristotle disagree with Socrates's character in the *Protagoras*, but he develops positive accounts of *akrasia* and *enkrateia* as character types that are defined according to internal conflict between the rational and non-rational natures of human souls. Aristotle's view permits that agents express these character types in any practical domain wherein, because of their improper relations to affect, their desire can struggle against their knowledge. Finally, akratic and enkratic agents enact choices that flow from their character types due to the fraught relation between their souls' rational and non-

[10] Regarding the fact that for Aristotle the akratic agent always regrets behaving badly, see *NE* VII.8 1150b29-31.

rational natures, and we can explain and describe their choice-making and behavior with ethical practical syllogisms.

CHAPTER 1. *AKRASIA* & *ENKRATEIA* ARE CHARACTER TYPES

In this chapter, I argue that *akrasia* and *enkrateia* are character types or psychological dispositions for Aristotle just as the virtue of temperance and the vice of self-indulgence are. That is, *akrasia* and *enkrateia* are character types for the same reasons that temperance and self-indulgence are: they are settled psychological dispositions to choose and perform actions in a consistent manner. An akratic agent is un-self-controlled; she consistently chooses and performs actions which she knows are ethically incorrect because affect competes with her correct reason and pulls her to do so. An enkratic agent is self-controlled; she consistently chooses and performs ethically correct actions even though affect competes with her correct reason and pulls her to choose and act against her knowledge of what is correct. In this chapter, I focus only on *akrasia* and *enkrateia* as agents express them in temperance's practical domain, i.e., in relation to choices and actions having to do with the affect of tactile appetite and its objects. In the next chapter, I develop an account distinguishing strict from loose forms of *akrasia* and *enkrateia*. According to this distinction, agents express the strict forms of the character types in temperance's practical domain and they express the loose forms in other ethical practical domains, for instance, in courage's practical domain. In this opening chapter, I only aim to show that strict *akrasia* and *enkrateia* are character types or settled psychological dispositions, so it is not necessary to justify the distinction between the strict and loose forms just yet. Still, it is worth emphasizing that all references to *akrasia* and *enkrateia* in this chapter, unless I note otherwise, are references to the strict forms of un-self-control and self-control which agents express in temperance's practical domain.

In the first stage of this chapter, I present two opposing views regarding the sorts of ethical phenomena that *akrasia* and *enkrateia* are: (A) the view presented by John Cooper, who treats *akrasia* and *enkrateia* as enduring, well-settled character types, and (B) Audrey Anton's view,

according to which un-self-control and self-control are transitory behavioral phenomena or mere conditions of character. I have chosen these scholars as representatives not because they exhaust the range of views that philosophers can hold about Aristotelian *akrasia* and *enkrateia*; rather, I focus on the views of Cooper and Anton because they represent opposing positions regarding whether self-control and its lack are genuine Aristotelian character types or psychological dispositions. In the second stage of this chapter, I outline the practical domain governed by the virtue of temperance and then compare and contrast the temperate, self-indulgent, akratic, and enkratic character types within temperance's practical domain. I follow Aristotle's method of comparing and contrasting the character types with one another in this way because it offers the most fruitful path for understanding what demarcates them from one another, namely that each is characterized by a distinct relation to choice-making. In the final stage of this chapter, I argue in close agreement with Cooper's view that *akrasia* and *enkrateia* are enduring character types just as temperance and self-indulgence are. That is, I argue in opposition to what Anton's view represents, namely against the proposal that *akrasia* and *enkrateia* are not character types, but rather weaker, unstable conditions of character.

I reach this conclusion by pointing not merely to the externally observable actions the four differently disposed agents perform, but rather by distinguishing the temperate, self-indulgent, akratic, and enkratic agents according to their unique relations to choice-making. For Aristotle holds that an agent's relation to choice-making is most of all indicative of the character type she has developed. This leads to the important insight that, for Aristotle, sometimes an agent can perform an action belonging to a classification that does not align with the character type which she has developed; agents can sometimes perform actions of a type that do not correspond to their character types. So, in the course of evaluating an agent's character type or psychological

disposition, the choices that she makes and her relation to choice-making matter more than the observable actions she performs on Aristotle's view. A proper account of *akrasia* and *enkrateia* as character types ought to show that the agents who have developed them bear a relation to choice-making distinct from the relations that the temperate and self-indulgent agents bear to choice-making; this is what I aim to accomplish in this chapter. Further, this chapter is foundational for the next, in which I argue that it is possible for agents to express self-control and un-self-control in practical domains beyond that of temperance. But first, it must be settled that what I term the strict forms of *akrasia* and *enkrateia* are genuine character types in temperance's practical domain, just as the virtue of temperance and the vice of self-indulgence are.

1.1 Cooper's View

John Cooper takes it for granted that *akrasia* and *enkrateia* are enduring character types. For example, he notes that Aristotle devotes much attention to explaining the mechanism of akratic action rather than the akratic character, but argues that this is because of Aristotle's general interest in the character type of *akrasia*:

> Aristotle's interest in, and discussion of, this sort of action is simply one part of his larger interest in the ongoing psychological condition of a person who is prone to act in uncontrolled ways, on a recurrent basis, *because* of being in that condition; that is, because they are a certain sort of person.[11]

In short, Cooper proposes that Aristotle's focus on akratic action is in service of his further interest in understanding the akratic character type.[12] Cooper's distinction between an akratic character or an un-self-controlled person on the one hand, and akratic action on the other, relies on familiarity

[11] Cooper, John M. (2009) "*Nicomachean Ethics* VII. 1-2: Introduction, Method, Puzzles." in Aristotle: *Nicomachean Ethics* Book VII Symposium Aristotelicum. Ed., Natali, Carlo. Oxford University Press.12 [author's emphasis]

[12] Even though Cooper describes *akrasia* as a "psychological condition," it is not apparent that he has in mind Aristotle's distinction between a condition and a disposition—to which I attend later in this chapter. In other words, Cooper is not here denying that *akrasia* is a disposition, or character type, when he describes it as a psychological condition.

with the distinction that Aristotle draws at *NE* II.4 between the virtuous character type and virtuous action. There, Aristotle responds to an objection to his view that agents become virtuous by doing what is virtuous. The objector's charge is that it seems necessary for an agent to be virtuous already in order for her to perform virtuous actions; if she is already virtuous, then there is no need for her to perform virtuous actions in order to develop the character type. Moreover, if one is not virtuous, then it appears impossible for her to follow Aristotle's proposal for what it takes to develop a virtuous character.

In response to this objection, Aristotle lists three criteria according to which an action an agent chooses and performs counts as genuinely virtuous: (a) the agent must know that her action is virtuous, for instance, that it is a temperate action, (b) she must choose to perform the temperate action for the reason that it is virtuous and temperate, and (c) she must perform the action while being surely and unchangeably [βεβαίως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως ἔχων] the kind of person who chooses and does what is temperate [*NE* II.4 1105a31-33]. Since ἕξις is the nominal form of the active participle ἔχων, another tenable translation of the third criterion for virtuous action is "being surely and unchangeably disposed," to choose and perform virtuous actions, which amounts to having a settled character type to choose and perform virtuous actions on a reliable and consistent basis.

What follows from these criteria is that a chosen action or enacted choice counts as genuinely virtuous when it is chosen and performed as the virtuous agent would choose and perform it; an enacted choice does not count as genuinely temperate if it is not tethered to the kind of person the temperate agent is, i.e., if uninformed by her temperate character. Moreover, the third criterion holds that her virtuous character type is the measure according to which an agent's chosen action counts as genuinely virtuous. Importantly, it is possible for an agent who is not virtuous to choose and perform the same type of action that a virtuous agent performs; however, when a non-

virtuous agent chooses and performs an action of the same type, her enacted choice is not *genuinely* virtuous. Her choice and action may bear resemblance to one that is genuinely virtuous, and so might be classified as virtuous, but on Aristotle's view, it is not genuinely virtuous, for the agent choosing and performing is has not yet developed a virtuous character. When Cooper states that Aristotle is interested in akratic action in service of understanding a kind of person or akratic character, he must have in mind that we can apply the distinction between character type and action type from Aristotle's account of virtuous character and action to akratic character and action; this model should also apply to enkratic character and action.[13] If this is correct, then just as an action's counting as genuinely virtuous depends on the virtuous character or psychological disposition of the agent choosing and performing it, so also does an action's counting as genuinely akratic or enkratic depend on the akratic or enkratic character or psychological disposition of the person choosing and performing it.

A significant consequence of Aristotle's distinction between character types and action types is that agents can perform actions of a certain type without having developed the corresponding character type, as noted above. Aristotle makes this explicitly clear regarding virtuous character and action in the following passage further on in *NE* II.4.

> τὰ μὲν οὖν πράγματα δίκαια καὶ σώφρονα λέγεται, ὅταν ᾖ τοιαῦτα οἷα ἂν ὁ δίκαιος ἢ ὁ σώφρων πράξειεν. δίκαιος δὲ καὶ σώφρων ἐστὶν οὐχ ὁ ταῦτα πράττων, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ οὕτω πράττων ὡς οἱ δίκαιοι καὶ σώφρονες πράττουσιν.
>
> So actions are called just and temperate whenever they are such actions that the just or the temperate person would perform. But a person doing these things is not just or temperate, rather the one doing them in this way and *as* the just and temperate people act is [just or temperate]. [*NE* II.4 1105b5-9]

[13] Cooper does not discuss *enkrateia* explicitly in the passage under consideration. Nevertheless, Aristotle discusses enkratic action on the same terms that he discusses akratic action. So, Cooper's point about Aristotle's focus on akratic action really being a feature of his larger interest in the character type of *akrasia* should also hold for Aristotle's focus on enkratic action as being a feature of his larger interest in the character type of *enkrateia*.

When distinguishing virtuous character from virtuous action, Aristotle holds that non-virtuous agents can perform actions classifiable as virtuous. For instance, an agent may be on her way to developing the specific virtue of temperance, seek out a role model in her community whom she considers temperate, and let the role model's prescription guide her choice and action. The choice she enacts at her role model's instruction is called temperate even though she is not yet a temperate person with the corresponding psychological disposition. What differentiates her from the genuinely temperate agent is the manner in which she chooses and performs the action; the genuinely temperate agent chooses and performs the temperate action as a result of the character type she has developed and habituated, whereas the trainee chooses and performs the virtuous action as a result of following her role model's advice or prescription. Until she develops a temperate character and can consistently enact temperate choices on her own, the trainee does not enact temperate choices *as* the temperate agent enacts them, namely from a firm and settled disposition to choose and perform them reliably.

An example is in order to help make this distinction clearer. Suppose that two agents, Pinot and Grigio, are sitting a few stools away from one another at the bar, that each has the same alcohol tolerance, and that they have accumulated identical tabs after drinking a few beers. Further, suppose that the bartender approaches Pinot and asks whether she would like to order another round. Thinking aloud, Pinot replies, "That's enough for me, I should close my tab," prior to expressing temperance and enacting the choice to refrain from drinking any more. Now Grigio, sitting a few stools away, had not yet determined whether or not he should order another round before hearing Pinot's rationale for abstaining, but he has also been trying to clean up his act, and he recalls that part of his plan involves drinking less than usual. What is more, Grigio has seen Pinot enact the same temperate choice before on similar occasions, and he thinks that those are the

kinds of choices he should be enacting in order to become someone who drinks less and really clean up his act. So, when the bartender makes her way to Grigio and ask whether he would like another round, he replies, following Pinot's example, "That's enough for me, too. I'd like to close my tab." In this example, Pinot chooses to perform the temperate action of her own accord, while Grigio adopts Pinot's choice and action as a model for his. Pinot has something like a temperate character and enacts her temperate choice as a result of having developed that character. Grigio, on the other hand, does not yet have a temperate character, but chooses and performs an action that we can classify as temperate. The manner in which Grigio chooses and performs the temperate action is distinct from the manner in which Pinot chooses and performs hers. The difference between the ways in which Pinot and Grigio choose and perform their temperate actions indicates an important disparity between their characters. Further, it clarifies the sense in which the types of actions that agents choose and perform are not necessarily indicative of the character types that they have developed. For Grigio enacts a choice we might call temperate, even though Grigio is not himself temperate, because he follows the lead of temperate Pinot. Another way of putting this is that Grigio's enacted choice is not *genuinely* temperate, since he does not choose and perform it *as* Pinot chooses and performs her temperate action, for her choice and action follow from her genuinely temperate character.

When Cooper notes that Aristotle is interested in akratic (and enkratic) action because of his primary interest in the akratic (and enkratic) character type, he opens the door to an Aristotelian view of these inferior psychological dispositions that is coordinate with Aristotle's own explicit view regarding virtuous character. In short, if there are genuine akratic and enkratic actions, and Aristotle cares about them because of his interest in the kinds of people or characters who consistently choose and perform them, then the genuine instances of akratic and enkratic enacted

choices must flow from corresponding character types that agents have developed. Further, this sort of analysis is lurking behind Cooper's characterizations of enkratic and akratic agents as "people with more or less permanently, or at least well-settled, divided minds and feelings about the matters that they are enkratic or akratic about."[14] In representing the gulf between their minds and feelings as either permanent or well-settled, Cooper's akratic and enkratic agents have developed characters in a way similar to virtuous agents whom Aristotle describes as "holding surely and unchangeably" as the kinds of agents who choose and perform their respective actions. This does not mean that agents who are not genuinely akratic or enkratic cannot choose and perform actions classifiable as akratic or enkratic. For if *akrasia* and *enkrateia* are genuine character types, then there is surely a distinction between akratic and enkratic character types on the one hand, and akratic and enkratic action types on the other—just as Aristotle distinguishes the virtuous character type from the virtuous action type. Since there is a distinction between, for instance, akratic character and akratic action, there is also a distinction between genuine and non-genuine akratic action; there is the kind that follows from the character type of *akrasia*, and there is the kind that, for example, arises as a result of following the wrong sort of role model's advice. In short, on Cooper's view, *akrasia* and *enkrateia* are ongoing character types from which agents recurrently and consistently choose and perform genuinely akratic and enkratic actions.

1.2 Anton's View

Audrey Anton presents a view about *akrasia* and *enkrateia* which opposes Cooper's, according to which they are not well-settled or enduring character types in contrast to what she calls the "fixed states" of virtue and vice. Someone has a fixed state, she specifies, "when his state contributes to

[14] *Ibid*. 13 [I have replaced Cooper's "self-controlled" and "uncontrolled" with "enkratic" and "akratic" respectively for the sake of consistency.]

his maintaining such a state."[15] For example, virtue is a state from which genuine virtuous choice and action follows, and the consistent enactment of such virtuous choices contributes to the agent's continuance as a virtuous character. Anton considers virtue and vice to be fixed states because they are "self-perpetuating."[16] She views the actions which virtuous and vicious agents consistently choose and perform as preserving and cementing their virtuous and vicious characters into the future and beyond just the moment at which they enact a particular virtuous or vicious choice. On her account, the temperate person, for instance, is such that she chooses and performs temperate actions as a result of the fixed state or character type she has developed, and those temperate enacted choices fan the sails of her temperate character continually in a virtuous direction. Similarly, the vicious, self-indulgent person is such that she chooses and performs self-indulgent actions as a result of her fixed state, and those enacted choices perpetuate her character, ensuring her continual viciousness into the future.

In a footnote, Anton explains in more detail what she means by a fixed state or character type:

> A fixed character state is one that perpetuates itself. The person of such a character acts a certain way consistently. Also, one who is in a fixed state (whether it be vicious or virtuous) has the experience of harmony between his emotions and his reason.[17]

Agents with fixed states perform actions that contribute to the maintenance and stability of those states into the future; this is true for Aristotle, too. Yet according to Anton, *akrasia* falls short of being a self-perpetuating fixed state: "if an akratic man were to fail to do the right thing repeatedly, over time his ability to recognize virtue may atrophy and he could slip into viciousness."[18] Since

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[15] Anton, Audrey L. (2006) "Breaking The Habit: Aristotle On Recidivism And How A Thoroughly Vicious Person Might Begin To Improve." in *Philosophy in the Contemporary World*. Vol. 13, No. 2. 60
[16] *Ibid*.
[17] *Ibid*. 65, fn. 10
[18] *Ibid*. 60 [substituted "akratic" for author's "incontinent"]

an akratic agent consistently chooses and performs ethically incorrect actions, Anton proposes that this is likely to lead an un-self-controlled agent to develop a vicious character down the line, not to perpetuate an akratic character. On her view, the akratic's knowledge that she chooses and performs the incorrect actions vanishes over time after repeatedly enacting such incorrect choices; her awareness of the incorrectness of her behavior dissolves while she nevertheless continues to choose and behave incorrectly. Further, Anton holds that *akrasia* is not a fixed state, but rather a mere state, because the akratic agent "knows too much about the virtues he fails to possess."[19] She explains this position in more detail in the footnote I have cited above, holding that such an agent does not have "the experience of harmony between his emotions and his reason." This explanation supposes that because the akratic agent's knowledge and feelings are disjointed, the agent is pulling herself in two opposing directions, and eventually one has to give way and succumb to the other; on Anton's view, it is the akratic's reason that eventually gives way to her emotion, and she becomes vicious. To sum up, Anton ascribes two features to "fixed states" which un-fixed states lack: first, fixed states are self-perpetuating, and second, fixed states correspond with psychic harmony in the agents who have them.

I propose that Anton's view that *akrasia* (and by extension *enkrateia*) is not a fixed state or character type gives too much weight to the fact that, from a perspective external to the agent choosing and performing the action, the akratic agent's action is indistinguishable from the self-indulgent agent's action. In temperance's domain, for example, both the akratic and the vicious self-indulgent agent end up enacting a choice to wine, dine, or romance more than reason correctly prescribes. To an external observer, both agents would seem to perform the same kinds of actions. According to Anton's view, the akratic who consistently ends up behaving like the self-indulgent

[19] *Ibid*.

agent is likely to become self-indulgent; her actions do not preserve or perpetuate an akratic fixed state, but rather her actions begin to accumulate and propel her toward eventually becoming self-indulgent.[20] Once the akratic agent becomes self-indulgent, then her incorrect actions serve to perpetuate a vicious fixed state or character. Importantly, Anton neglects to discuss the akratic's attitude toward her own actions, which is a significant feature of the akratic's inner life that distinguishes her from the vicious agent, namely that she is full of regret for the choices and actions that follow from her lack of self-control.[21] Further, as I show later, Aristotle thinks that ethical characters are best distinguished according to distinct relations to choice-making, not according to the observable actions which agents with the distinct character types perform. Anton, apparently departing from Aristotle's insistence that choice best distinguishes character types, seems to focus extensively on the observable actions that agents perform and not so much on the characters which choose and perform them.

Anton's Aristotle is interested in *akrasia* as an unfixed state, a transitional character condition that must eventually resolve into a different and distinct state that *is* fixed, in other words, a character type. Her interpretation of Aristotle does not fully deny that *akrasia* has to do with character, but she implies that *akrasia* is a mutable, hollower condition of character while the virtues and vices are full-blown dispositions of character or character types.[22] The akratic agent performs incorrect actions, but Anton does not think that her actions perpetuate an akratic character type: eventually the incorrect actions the akratic performs accumulate and her ethical ailment becomes worse—she develops a vicious fixed state. Even though Anton does not analyze *enkrateia*

[20] Anton does suggest that the akratic could go either way, which is to say that she could become vicious due to her accumulative performance of the wrong actions *or* she could become enkratic. But it is highly unlikely on Anton's view that the akratic agent becomes anything other than vicious of her own accord.
[21] See *NE* VII.9 1150b30-31
[22] I will return to this point later when treating Aristotle's general distinction between dispositions and conditions, onto which I propose that Anton's distinction between "unfixed states" and "fixed states" maps directly.

directly, her view must also disqualify *enkrateia* from being a fixed state or self-perpetuating, and so also disqualify it from being a character type akin to virtue and vice. For the enkratic agent chooses and performs ethically correct actions, actions that are externally indistinguishable from those that the virtuous agent chooses and performs. She experiences an internal struggle between her knowledge and her desire or emotion prior to choosing and acting, yet she consistently performs actions an external observer would not be able to distinguish from those which the virtuous agent performs. In temperance's domain, for instance, the enkratic agent and the temperate agent both enact choices to wine, dine, and romance as reason correctly prescribes. Further, on Anton's account, the enkratic agent would eventually develop a temperate character or fixed state, so long as she consistently ultimately chooses and performs actions that are correct and resemble the temperate agent's choices and actions. Like the akratic agent, the enkratic agent's reason and emotion are disjointed, but unlike the akratic, her feelings consistently lose out to or succumb to what her reason prescribes is correct. This should lead to a similar, albeit inverted, result on Anton's view when compared to the akratic agent; after several instances of her reason defeating her desire, the enkratic would develop a self-perpetuating, temperate fixed state. So, for Anton, neither *akrasia* nor *enkrateia* count as enduring character types; the actions of akratic and enkratic agents do not preserve reliable or stable akratic or enkratic fixed states into the future. On her view, *akrasia* and *enkrateia* are intermediate states or character conditions that eventually resolve into character types that are fixed and self-perpetuating (of which there are only two, either virtue or vice).

It is worth spending some time pointing out that Anton's view that *akrasia* and *enkrateia* fall short of being character types is a feature of her larger project concerning the mutability of character and the criminal justice system. In particular, she seeks to apply Aristotle's model of

character development to the issue of criminal reform and rehabilitation, specifically to the problem of recidivism. She opposes scholarship advancing the idea that character types are immutable for Aristotle. The goal of her work is to preserve an Aristotelian ethical framework against objections that such a framework is incompatible with the contemporary ethical goal of rehabilitating habitual criminals. If Aristotle's character types were immutable, then this would be a happy state of affairs for virtuous agents who would thereby always be virtuous with no capacity to change for the worse. But it would not be good news for vicious agents who would thereby always be vicious with no capacity to change for the better. If we conceive of criminals who consistently return to prison for the same kinds of violent offenses as vicious, and if we agree that vice is a fixed and immutable character type, then we are compelled to believe that reformation of their characters is impossible and that recidivism, for vicious agents, is an inevitability. This is a conclusion that runs counter to views of criminal justice holding that punitive rehabilitation can assist habitual criminals into becoming better people. In short, if Aristotle thinks that character types are immutable, then his ethical account is incompatible with contemporary sentiments about prisoner reform.

In response, Anton presents *akrasia* as an unfixed condition of character, one that the vicious person can develop and pass through on her way to breaking out of her fixed viciousness, in service of arguing for the compatibility of Aristotle's work with the notion of prisoner reform. She writes, "If a thoroughly vicious person were forced or coerced into doing the types of acts that virtuous men perform, with time and repetition he might achieve sufficient habituation to reduce the rigidity of his character."[23] Anton proposes that fixed Aristotelian character types are susceptible to change, but denies that they are susceptible to internal change; the vicious person,

[23] *Ibid*. 61

for instance, cannot motivate herself to change of her own accord. She contends that fixed states are only susceptible to external change, i.e., change owing to force and coercion. The vicious agent, unable to motivate herself internally to change for the better, is not thereby condemned to be vicious forever. This is why Anton is interested in *akrasia* as a condition of character and not as a fixed character type; on her view, forcing or coercing a vicious criminal to perform correct actions will give rise to an akratic experience, wherein she feels pulled to choose and behave differently than she is used to choosing and behaving, thereby destabilizing the rigidity of her vicious character. Such an agent either will perform a sufficient number of correct actions so as to break her fixed vicious state, or she will not respond well to the force or coercion and continue to perform incorrect actions, and so continue to perpetuate her vicious character. Her idea is that *akrasia* is a halfway point between vice and virtue; since it is not a fixed character type, it is susceptible to internal change, and the person who has transitioned into *akrasia* can then make her own choices to act contrary to the vicious pattern of choices she has enacted in her past. However noble this analysis is, I do not think one must hold that *akrasia* (or *enkrateia*) is a transitory condition of character (i.e., deny that is a genuine character type) in order to propose that there are ways to change a vicious agent's character for the better.

Indeed, Gianluca Di Muzio argues for the possibility of Aristotelian character reform without outright denying that *akrasia* or *enkrateia* are genuine character types in the process.[24] Rather than distinguishing character types according to whether they are fixed states or unfixed states, Di Muzio argues that some character types are more susceptible to external change, whereas others are impervious to external change and are only susceptible to internal change. For instance, on his view, both vicious and akratic characters are capable of positive reformation, but his view

[24] Di Muzio, Gianluca. (Aug., 2000) "Aristotle on Improving One's Character." *Phronesis*. Vol. 45, No. 3. 205-219

diverges from Anton's regarding the sorts of change to which the different characters are susceptible. Di Muzio holds that the source of character change for vicious agents must be internal, that is, must come from within the agent. The source of character change for akratic agents, on the other hand, can be either external, for instance, through persuasion or punishment, or internal. Di Muzio's work on Aristotelian character reform does not account for *akrasia*'s mutability by denying that it is a genuine character type or fixed state, but rather by contending that akratic agents have more sources or causes of character reform available to them than vicious agents do. His account substitutes an analysis of various dimensions of mutability for Anton's "fixed state" and "unfixed state" categories, but both seem to capture the same idea, namely that it is easier to reform akratic and enkratic characters than it is to reform virtuous or vicious characters. Di Muzio's view does oppose Anton's regarding the efficacy of external means to reform a vicious agent's character, for Anton thinks that external force or punishment is necessary to break the cycle of a "fixed state," while Di Muzio thinks that vice is impervious to external sources of change and must be changed through internal means. Nevertheless, Di Muzio provides a working rival model of character reform that does not require conceiving of *akrasia* and *enkrateia* as conditions of character or, in general, as psychologically weaker than genuine character types are. To sum up, contending that the character reformation of vicious criminals is possible does not require denying that *akrasia* and *enkrateia* are genuine character types as Anton does.

Cooper's view that *akrasia* and *enkrateia* are character types and Anton's view that they are transitory conditions by no means exhaust the scholarly positions one can take on how to conceive of un-self-control and self-control in Aristotle's ethics. In fact, many scholars pursuing different theses tend to assume, without providing reasons, that self-control and its lack are or are

not character types of a certain sort.[25] Filip Grgic, for instance, claims that to explain *akrasia* properly, one must "include an account of [the akratic's] state, that is to say, an account of a type of person she is. For, *akrasia* is, according to Aristotle, a state (ἕξις) of the soul…"[26] Grgic does not take it upon himself to develop an account along these lines, although he does endorse it from a methodological perspective; his point is rather that a full explanation of *akrasia* would require an in-depth examination of it as a settled state or character type. Gould takes *enkrateia* and *akrasia* to be "deeply rooted dispositions of character," and considers them as character types that pass Aristotle's standards for dispositionhood rather than as mere conditions (διάθεσεις) of character.[27] But she does not fully discuss the reasons why she considers them as such, for the paper in which she makes this claim primarily concerns the issue of why an enkratic agent is not guaranteed to become virtuous.[28] Irwin comments on the beginning of *NE* VII.1 (where *akrasia* and *enkrateia* are first formally introduced for analysis by Aristotle) that self-control and its lack are "conditions between virtue and vice," suggesting like Anton, and unlike Cooper, Grgic, and Gould, that *akrasia* and *enkrateia* are not character types, but rather mere conditions of character.[29] The differences

[25] The positions are many. I include some in the text in what follows, but I provide some others here to give a sense of the variety of positions that scholars have taken on the matter. Anthony Kenny ("The Practical Syllogism and Incontinence") considers *akrasia*'s relation to the practical syllogism, but never clearly treats of *akrasia* as a character type, instead investigating the nature and explanation of akratic action. Hendrik Lorenz ("*NE* VII.4: Plain and Qualified *Akrasia*") considers "what disposition of character constitutes lack of control without qualification," but not for the sake of contrasting *akrasia* with the virtues and the vices; for he is specifically interested in the distinction between qualified and unqualified *akrasia*. (73) Christopher Bobonich ("*Nicomachean Ethics*, VII.7: *Akrasia* and Self-Control") considers *akrasia* and *enkrateia* as "dispositions that are in some way in between fully developed virtue and full-blown vice," but does not differentiate them as dispositions of different kinds or types. (130) Carlo Natali (*Nicomachean Ethics* VII.5-6 Beastliness, Irascibility, *akrasia*") concludes that "Aristotle does not yet have at his disposal the idea of a definite separation between a moral evaluation of the *hexeis*, in the strict sense, and a psychological evaluation,"; his assessment is that Aristotle does not provide enough information for us to tell how *akrasia*, for instance, is a disposition of the same or different kind as the virtues and vices. (127)

[26] Grgic (2002) "Aristotle on the Akratic's Knowledge." in *Phronesis*. Vol. 47, No. 4. 337-8

[27] Gould (1994) "A Puzzle about the Possibility of Aristotelian *enkrateia*." in *Phronesis*. Vol. 39, No. 2. 176

[28] Gould ("A Puzzle…") is skeptical that there is a solution to this puzzle, even in the final remarks of her article. For comparison's sake, it is worth noting that Anton would share in Gould's belief that Aristotelian *enkrateia* should just resolve into virtue, for her analysis suggests that the enkratic agent's repeated performance of the correct actions should result in her habituation and development of a virtuous character.

[29] Irwin, Terence. (1985) Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics. Indianapolis: Hackett. 256

among all of these views suggest it is worth settling the question of whether *akrasia* and *enkrateia* are enduring character types on Aristotle's account. Are *akrasia* and *enkrateia* "permanent" or "well-settled" character types, i.e., psychological dispositions to act against or in accord with knowledge of better courses of action respectively? Or are *akrasia* and *enkrateia* un-enduring conditions of character that must resolve into vice or virtue respectively? I argue in what follows that self-control and its lack are in fact well-settled character types or dispositions and that justification for this claim can be had from Aristotle himself.

1.3 Definitions & Overview

Before proceeding to demonstrate that *akrasia* and *enkrateia* are indeed character types or psychological dispositions in temperance's practical domain, it will be useful to spend some time considering Aristotle's view about what dispositions are in general and how they relate to the human soul. The earliest reference to dispositions in the *corpus* is at the start of *Categories* 8 in Aristotle's account of quality (ποιότης) as one of the ways of being.

> ποιότητα δὲ λέγω καθ᾽ἣν ποιοί τινες λέγονται. ἔστι δὲ ἡ ποιότης τῶν πλεοναχῶς λεγομένων. ἓν μὲν οὖν εἶδος ποιότητος ἕξις καὶ διάθεσις λεγέσθωσαν. διαφέρει δὲ ἕξις διαθέσεως τῷ μονιμώτερον καὶ πολθχρονιώτερον εἶναι. τοιαῦται δὲ αἵ τε ἐπιστῆμαι καὶ αἱ ἀρεταί. ἥ τε γὰρ ἐπιστήμη δοκεῖ τῶν παραμονίμων εἶναι καὶ δυσκινήτων, ἐὰν καὶ μετρίως τις ἐπιστήμην λάβῃ, ἐάνπερ μὴ μεγάλη μεταβολὴ γένηται ὑπὸ νόσου ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς τοιούτου. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀρετή. οἷον ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων οὐκ εὐκίνητον δοκεῖ εἶναι οὐδ᾽εὐμετάβολον. διαθέσεις δὲ λέγονται ἅ ἐστιν εὐκίνητα καὶ ταχὺ μεταβάλλοντα, οἷον θερμότης καὶ κατάψυξις καὶ νόσος καὶ ὑγίεια καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα. διάκειται μὲν γάρ πως κατὰ ταύτας ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ταχὺ δὲ μεταβάλλει ἐκ θερμοῦ ψυχρὸς γιγνόμενος καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν εἰς τὸ νοσεῖν…
>
> When I say quality, I mean that in virtue of which people are called such and such. Moreover, quality is one of the things that are said in many ways. One kind of quality is called a disposition or a condition. A disposition is different from a condition by being steadier and longer lasting. The kinds of knowledge and the virtues are both examples of dispositions. For knowledge seems to be one of the things that are steadfast and difficult to change, even though someone might take up knowledge moderately, indeed unless a great change should originate from

> sickness or some other such thing. Likewise, virtue is also a disposition. For example, justice and temperance and each of the virtues seems neither easily moved or easily changed. On the other hand, the qualities called conditions are those which are easily moved and changed with quickness, for example heat, cold, sickness, health, and all other such qualities. For a person is conditioned in some way according to these sorts of qualities, and she changes quickly, for instance she becomes cold from being hot quickly, or she changes quickly into sickness from being healthy. [*Cat*. 8b25-9a1]

Aristotle considers both *conditions* (διάθεσεις) and *dispositions* (ἕξεις) as ways of referring to one in the same species of quality. However, he distinguishes conditions from dispositions on the basis of their endurance and stability over time. He lists the virtues as examples of dispositions due to their stability and endurance, and he lists sickness, health, warmth, and coolness as examples of conditions because they are fleeting and change easily. Aristotle holds that dispositions are more stable and resistant to change than conditions, yet he also maintains that dispositions and conditions are the same kind or species of quality ["One kind [εἶδος] of quality is called a disposition or a condition."]. So, the difference between dispositions and conditions is not one of kind, but rather a difference regarding the degree of their endurance and whether they are easily or quickly changeable. That Aristotle picks out the same species of quality when he refers to dispositions and conditions is even more evident in the continuation of the *Cat*. 8 passage in which he claims that conditions that have become habitual or "second nature" ought to be called dispositions instead.

> …εἰ μή τις καὶ αὐτῶν τούτων τυγχάνοι διὰ χρόνου πλῆθος ἤδη πεφυσιωμένη καὶ ἀνίατος ἢ πάνυ δυσκίνητος οὖσα, ἣν ἄν τις ἴσως ἕξιν ἤδη προσαγορεύοι.
>
> …unless through a great amount of time some one of these very conditions should happen actually to be second nature and incorrigible, or all together unchangeable, and by this time perhaps we may call the condition a disposition. [*Cat*. 8 9a1-4]

Conditions can become dispositions under the right circumstances, namely if they happen to endure for a long time and become "second nature" to whatever bears the condition. Aristotle provides similar accounts of the distinction between conditions and dispositions at *Metaphysics*

V.19 and V.20, where he presents definitions for each, respectively. In the *Met*. account of disposition, Aristotle explicitly defines it as a *condition* according to which whatever has it holds well or poorly, and further identifies virtue as such a condition [1022b10-15]. The ethical dispositions of character, or character types, considered in this dissertation—virtue, vice, and as I will argue, *enkrateia* and *akrasia* as well—are dispositions of the human soul. Since dispositions are just conditions that stick and are harder to change, it is redundant, and in some sense misleading, to call the character types that agents develop, 'conditions.' There are some conditions that do not become dispositions, but all dispositions are strengthened conditions that have become more stable and resistant to change. With these definitions in mind, it is pertinent that we apply Aristotle's general account of dispositions to the psychological ones that we also call ethical character types.

Let us examine virtue in particular as a disposition of the human soul. Aristotle concludes at *NE* II.5 through a process of eliminative reasoning that virtue is indeed a disposition (ἕξις), and neither an affect (πάθος), nor a power (or capacity) (δύναμις). Aristotle lists some examples of affects: tactile desire (ἐπιθυμία), anger, fear, and so on, and gives them the general definition of "the things (that happen in the soul) to which pleasure and pain attach," [*NE* II.5 1105b21-23]. Aristotle next defines a power (or capacity) as whatever in the human soul is "susceptible to the affects" (παθητικός); that is to say, they are the abilities to feel the affects, [1105b23-25]. Finally, Aristotle says of the human soul's dispositions or character types: "it is in terms of these that we hold well or badly in relation to the affects," [1105b25-28]. Virtue cannot be an affect and it cannot be a capacity, Aristotle argues, because agents are neither praised nor blamed for having feelings or for being able to have them. Agents merit praise for being virtuous, nevertheless, and since dispositions of character, or character types, are praiseworthy or blameworthy, virtue must be a disposition of character or character type.

To claim that virtue is a character type is to hold that it is a psychological disposition in terms of which an agent holds or manages well in relation to the affects. Similarly, to claim that vice is a character type is to claim that it is a psychological disposition in terms of which an agent holds or manages poorly in relation to the affects. Character types are habitual, enduring, settled ways of choosing and performing actions. The virtuous agent consistently chooses and performs genuinely virtuous actions because of the kind of character type or psychological disposition she has developed through her habitual choice and performance of virtuous actions; she manages well with respect to the affects and the pleasures and pains that attach to them, and so she chooses and behaves well with respect to them. The vicious agent consistently chooses and performs vicious actions because of the kind of character type she has developed through habitually choosing and performing vicious actions; she manages poorly with respect to the affects and the pleasures and pains that attach to them, and so she chooses and behaves poorly with respect to them.

So Aristotle makes clear that the virtues and vices are not mere conditions of character, but rather more than that; they are dispositions of character, otherwise known as character types. The position I uphold in this chapter is that *akrasia* and *enkrateia* are also genuine dispositions of character, and not mere conditions of character instead. It is important to apply the distinction between condition and disposition appropriately to the ethical character types. For one must keep in mind that even though Aristotle considers conditions and dispositions to be the same kind or species of quality, they differ with respect to their stability and mutability. So it might be correct to say of some agent that she has a virtuous condition without it being correct to say that she has developed a virtuous disposition; she may not yet be fully virtuous, even if she is pretty well disposed toward the affects and their attendant pleasures and pains. If her virtuous condition is not yet stable and not yet resistant to change, then it is not correct to say that she has a virtuous

disposition or character type. She might be a person who chooses and performs actions classifiable under the virtuous action type even though she has not yet developed the virtuous character type or disposition that gives rise to consistent, reliable, and genuine virtuous enacted choices.

It is in applying the general distinction between disposition and condition to the character types that I propose Anton's and related views go wrong—although not in the sense that it is wrong to apply the general distinction to the character types at all. What I mean is that one can apply the distinction in the wrong way. Rather than recognizing that conditions and dispositions are the same kind of quality, as Aristotle maintains, and rather than noting that dispositions are sturdier and longer-lasting conditions, Anton seems to maintain a stricter conceptual barrier between conditions and dispositions, conceiving of *akrasia*, for instance, as a hollower condition and virtue and vice as sturdier dispositions. Her argument seems to rely on a view that bars ethical conditions from ever counting as or becoming dispositions, but as I have just shown, Aristotle defines dispositions as long-lasting conditions that have become second nature to whatever bears them. So, even if there are akratic and enkratic conditions, this does not mean that there are not akratic and enkratic dispositions, just as there being virtuous conditions does not mean that there are no virtuous dispositions. One must be careful to understand that Aristotle does not only invoke the distinction between condition and disposition to show that conditions are inferior to dispositions in endurance and stability, but also to demonstrate that conditions can, over time, become second nature, at which time it is more proper to call them dispositions.[30]

[30] It is an interesting question whether this process can reverse, that is, whether dispositions can lose their endurance and stability and become conditions. From what Aristotle has to say on the topic, it is clear that, if it is possible for dispositions to revert to the status of less stable conditions, it is a difficult process. For Aristotle describes dispositions as more resistant to change than conditions at *Cat* 8. Nevertheless, he does not describe dispositions as impossible to change in the passage. One place where Aristotle does use the language of changelessness to describe dispositions is in his third criterion for counting an action as genuinely virtuous at *NE* II.4. In addition to requiring that the agent performing the action both knows what she is doing is virtuous and also chooses to perform the virtuous action because it is virtuous, Aristotle also requires that the agent "acts while being firmly and unchangingly disposed," (…τὸ δὲ τρίτον ἐάν καὶ βεβαίως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως ἔχων πράττῃ) [*NE* II.4 1104a32-33].

Now let us look at Aristotle's remarks about *akrasia* and *enkrateia* in service of demonstrating that he thinks that they are stable psychological dispositions rather than merely transitory and hollow psychological conditions. *NE* VII.1 opens with a catalogue of three sorts of character and their opposites:

> μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα λεκτέον, ἄλλην ποιησαμένους ἀρχήν, ὅτι τῶν περὶ τὰ ἤθη φευκτῶν τρία ἐστὶν εἴδη: κακία ἀκρασία θηριότης. τὰ δ᾽ ἐναντία τοῖς μὲν δυσὶ δῆλα. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴν τὸ δ᾽ ἐγκράτειαν καλοῦμεν. πρὸς δὲ τὴν θηριότητα μάλιστ᾽ ἂν ἁρμόττοι λέγειν τὴν ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς ἀρετήν, ἡρωικήν τινα καὶ θείαν, ὥσπερ Ὅμηρος περὶ τοῦ Ἕκτορος πεποίηκε λέγοντα τὸν Πρίαμον ὅτι σφόδρα ἦν ἀγαθός, "οὐδὲ ἐῴκει ἀνδρός γε θνητοῦ πάις ἔμμεναι ἀλλὰ θεοῖο.
>
> After these things, it is necessary to state, making a new start, that there are three types of things connected with character to be avoided: vice, *akrasia*, and beastliness. The contraries of two of these are clear. We call the first contrary, virtue, and the second contrary, *enkrateia*. Against beastliness we would be most appropriate to call its contrary excellence that is beyond our grasp, something heroic and godly, just as Homer makes Priam say about Hector that he was exceedingly good, "neither does he seem to be the son of some mortal man, but rather he seems to be the son of some god." [*NE* VII.1 1145a15-22]

This catalogue makes it clear that *akrasia* and *enkrateia* occupy ethical space distinct from that of virtue and vice; all four share in common that they are ways of being ethically disposed, but being akratic or enkratic are different ways of being ethically disposed than being virtuous or vicious are.[31] Now it is uncontested that Aristotle counts virtue and vice as well-settled character types. So, one could presume that since *akrasia* and *enkrateia* are listed as opposites in this catalogue alongside virtue and vice, that un-self-control and self-control must also count as ἕξεῖς, or dispositions of character. But this move is not warranted, at least not yet, for all Aristotle has said about these pairs of contraries so far is that they are kinds of things to be avoided or pursued that are *connected* with character [περὶ τὰ ἤθη], not that they are all in fact well-settled character types or dispositions.

[31] Beastliness and heroic excellence occupy ethical space distinct from both virtue and vice and also *akrasia* and *enkrateia*.

In more specific remarks concerning *akrasia* and *enkrateia* later in the same chapter, Aristotle appears to corroborate the view that, alongside virtue and vice, self-control and un-self-control are dispositions of character:

> περὶ δὲ ἀκρασίας καὶ μαλακίας καὶ τρυφῆς λεκτέον, καὶ περὶ ἐγκρατείας καὶ καρτερίας. οὔτε γὰρ ὡς περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἕξεων τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ τῇ μοχθηρίᾳ ἑκατέραν αὐτῶν ὑποληπτέον οὔθ᾽ ὡς ἕτερον γένος.
>
> We must speak about *akrasia* and want of patience or daintiness, and about *enkrateia* and patience. For it must neither be held that they are of the same sort as the dispositions of virtue and vice, nor that they are different in kind. [*NE* VII.1 1145a35-1145b2]

Aristotle holds here that there is reason to group virtue, vice, *akrasia*, and *enkrateia* together, but there is also reason to distinguish virtue and vice from *akrasia* and *enkrateia* as pairs of contraries.[32] Nevertheless, this passage by itself also does not warrant the conclusion that *akrasia* and *enkrateia* are psychological dispositions or character types, for even though Aristotle groups them together with the character types of virtue and vice, he also warns his audience against considering them to be identical to virtue and vice. The most that we can conclude from this passage alone is that, in whichever way Aristotle understands vice and virtue to be distinct from *akrasia* and *enkrateia*, his explanation of their difference centers on how they relate to the dispositions of virtue and vice, even if *akrasia* and *enkrateia* should fall short of being genuine

[32] I set aside discussion of "want of patience" and "patience" since Aristotle has very little to say about these conditions of character for the remainder of *NE* VII and beyond. At *NE* VII.7 [1150a32-1150b6] Aristotle distinguishes patience from *enkrateia*, for patience is not the character of one who masters or controls herself, but rather, as some translations posit, the character of one who "endures"; he draws an analogy between winning a war and merely not being defeated in order to drive the point home. The former is supposed to parallel *enkrateia*, while the latter is supposed to parallel patience or endurance. Aristotle also distinguishes want of patience from *akrasia* in the same chapter, noting that one who is not patient is more likely to be affected by pain to avoid certain actions, whereas the akratic is more likely to be affected by pleasure to pursue certain courses of action. Outside of this discussion, Aristotle is silent on these agents who are patient or lack patience. Brown, in her notes on Ross' translation (Aristotle: *The Nicomachean Ethics*), writes that "an important plank in Aristotle's overall account is the distinction he draws between, on the one hand, vice proper and the lesser faults of incontinence (*akrasia*) and softness (want of patience), and, on the other, between virtue proper and the good states which fall short of it, continence (*enkrateia*) and endurance (patience)," (244).

character types themselves. This is clear because Aristotle distinguishes *akrasia* and *enkrateia* from virtue and vice in terms of *having to do with* different dispositions of character.

But "having to do with different dispositions of character" could mean at least two different things. The issue concerns how best to treat "περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἕξεων." First, perhaps *akrasia* and *enkrateia* have accounts or explanations that are connected to different dispositions of character than virtue's and vice's accounts or definitions are (where all four are to be understood as developable character types with their own corresponding accounts or definitions). On this reading, for the accounts of *akrasia* and *enkrateia* to be "connected to different dispositions of character" than the accounts of virtue and vice just means that the former two *are* dispositions of character distinct from virtue and vice. In other words, on this first interpretation, *akrasia* and *enkrateia* belong to the same psychological category that virtue and vice do, but un-self-control and self-control are not identical with virtue and vice; rather, they have their own accounts or definitions. The second possible reading of the text, albeit a perplexing one, imparts the idea that *akrasia* and *enkrateia* are not character types or psychological dispositions, but whatever they are, they are the kinds of things that can be connected with character types, just not connected with the character types of virtue or vice. It is difficult to say, in line with this second interpretation, which dispositions *akrasia* and *enkrateia* would be connected to or "have to do with" if not the character types of virtue and vice; perhaps there are other prominent character types about which Aristotle just never had any inclination to write, although this seems unlikely. The first interpretation is more plausible, the one according to which Aristotle means that *akrasia* and *enkrateia* are character types with different accounts than virtue and vice. The first interpretation is also

preferable, given that it is easier to square with the earlier part of the passage where Aristotle holds that *enkrateia* and *akrasia* are not different in kind (γένος) from virtue and vice.[33]

It is not until *NE* VII.8 that we find direct corroboration that the first interpretation of "περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἕξεων" provided above is not only both plausible and preferable, but also the correct one. For in this chapter, Aristotle clearly identifies *akrasia* and *enkrateia* as ἑξεῖς, or settled dispositions of character.[34] His explicit classification of un-self-control and self-control as character types comes just after a general explanation of the sorts of people akratic and enkratic agents are.

> ἔστι δέ τις διὰ πάθος ἐκστατικὸς παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, ὃν ὥστε μὲν μὴ πράττειν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον κρατεῖ τὸ πάθος, ὥστε δ᾽ εἶναι τοιοῦτον οἷον πεπεῖσθαι διώκειν ἀνέδην δεῖν τὰς τοιαύτας ἡδονὰς οὐ κρατεῖ: οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ ἀκρατής, βελτίων ὢν τοῦ ἀκολάστου, οὐδὲ φαῦλος ἁπλῶς: σῴζεται γὰρ τὸ βέλτιστον, ἡ ἀρχή. ἄλλος δ᾽ ἐναντίος, ὁ ἐμμενετικὸς καὶ οὐκ ἐκστατικὸς διά γε τὸ πάθος. φανερὸν δὴ ἐκ τούτων ὅτι ἣ μὲν σπουδαία ἕξις ἣ δὲ φαύλη
>
> There is an agent driven away from right reason because of affect, an agent whom affect dominates so much that she does not act in alignment with correct reason, but an agent whom affect does not dominate so much that that she is the kind to be convinced that it is correct to pursue such pleasures freely. This is the akratic agent, better than the self-indulgent, and not bad unqualifiedly, for [the akratic agent's] best part, the first principle, is preserved. There is another agent contrary to the akratic, the agent who abides by correct reason and is not driven away from it because of affect. So it is clear from these remarks that *enkrateia* is a good disposition of character and *akrasia* is a bad one. [*NE* VII.8 1151a20-28]

Of note in this passage is that, in the course of presenting his general account of the akratic agent or character, Aristotle finds it useful to contrast her character with the vicious, self-indulgent agent.

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[33] Although Aristotle at *NE* VII.1 claims that *akrasia* and *enkrateia* are not different in kind from virtue and vice, he claims later at *NE* VII.8 [1150b35-1151a1] that *akrasia* and vice are "entirely different in kind" […ὅλως δ᾽ἕτερον τὸ γένος ἀκρασίας καὶ κακίας…]. One can dissolve this apparent contradiction by noting that *akrasia* and *enkrateia* are not different in kind *qua* character types, but rather *qua* curability, which is what Aristotle is discussing at VII.8.

[34] I have tried to reproduce the slow process by which Aristotle "gets to the point" of the question of whether *akrasia* and *enkrateia* are dispositions or conditions. I have mimed Aristotle for two reasons: (1) in order to emphasize that Aristotle is not himself concerned with clearly stating whether they are conditions or dispositions, since he is primarily focused on arguing that it is possible for agents to express un-self-control *contra* Socrates's position in the *Protagoras*, and (2) to survey the justification for *akrasia* and *enkrateia* being character types prior to the "big reveal" here.

It may be tempting to class the akratic and self-indulgent agents together under the same ethical category, for both apparently perform incorrect self-indulgent actions [1151a5-10] (i.e., the actions of both agents may appear to be of the same type to an external observer). But the distinction between character types and action types drawn at the outset of the present chapter when reviewing Cooper's view makes it clear that external observation of an agent's actions is not a foolproof way of determining her character type. Someone who lacks a virtuous character can perform an action classifiable under the virtuous action type, for instance at the guidance or prescription of a virtuous role model, despite not yet having acquired the corresponding character type herself; even though their actions appear the same to an external observer, one of the agents has developed a virtuous character, while the other has not.

Aristotle clearly distinguishes the akratic from the self-indulgent agent on the basis of a psychological difference in the passage above; he does not reduce *akrasia* and self-indulgence to the same character type on the basis of the apparent similarity of the actions which they perform. Aristotle finds it useful to contrast the akratic with the self-indulgent character in order to clarify what *akrasia* is and why it is distinct from vice in terms of a psychological difference. The akratic agent chooses and performs incorrect actions because her relation to affect (πάθος) interferes with her obedience to her own reason's correct prescriptions; it interrupts her from enacting what she knows is the correct choice. On the other hand, the vicious, self-indulgent agent chooses and performs incorrect actions because she is the sort of person to chase after all bodily pleasures freely; she is disengaged from correct reason completely and so enacts the incorrect choice without suffering from any sort of interruption. Since the akratic departs from her own reason's correct orders, this means that she is aware of the demand that such reason places on her if she is to choose and perform the correct action even though she ends up enacting a blameworthy choice; the self-

indulgent agent is worse off than the akratic agent because she is unaware of reason's correct prescription and has lost her best part, her first or foundational principle (ἀρχή).

Similarly, when Aristotle gives his general account of the enkratic agent, he finds it useful to contrast her character with the akratic agent's character in terms of a psychological difference. The conclusion he draws is that both *akrasia* and *enkrateia* are settled dispositions of character, or character types, and that *akrasia* is the inferior of the two. The enkratic, like the akratic, is subject to an internal resistance between correct reason and affect, but unlike the akratic, the enkratic does not depart from her correct reason completely; she ends up choosing and performing what she knows is the correct action despite the internal struggle emblematic of her character type. Importantly, *enkrateia* should not be confused with virtue just because both the virtuous agent and the enkratic agent end up enacting the correct choice; there is also a psychological difference separating the enkratic from the virtuous agent. For unlike the virtuous agent who is subject to no internal struggle between reason and affect, the enkratic agent does in fact struggle with affect prior to enacting the correct choice. So, in addition to (1) the psychological difference distinguishing the akratic character from the self-indulgent character, there is also (2) a psychological difference separating the enkratic character from the akratic character, and (3) another psychological difference separating the enkratic character from the virtuous character. Aristotle points to these psychological differences when setting these character types apart from one another, and not the similarity or dissimilarity of the observable actions which agents with the character types perform, because he thinks that distinct relations to choice-making are the truest marks of what distinguishes the various character types from one another.

Aristotle's method of comparison is fruitful and worth emulating. Setting the character types against one another in terms of the different relations that each has with choice-making

constitutes the best way to get clear on what really separates the four character types from one another. The most general ranking of these character types in terms of ethical value places vice as the worst of them all, *akrasia* as better than vice, *enkrateia* as better than *akrasia*, and finally virtue as the best and most choice-worthy character type. This ranking suggests that in order to carve out an account of *akrasia* as a character type, it will be useful to contrast it first with vice, and then with *enkrateia*; likewise, in order to understand *enkrateia* as a character type, it will be beneficial to set it up against virtue first, and then against *akrasia*. In later sections of this chapter, I follow this model, comparing the character types as Aristotle describes them specifically within temperance's practical domain.

It is useful to say a few words here regarding what a practical domain is before moving forward. By 'practical domain,' I mean a sphere of ethical conduct definable primarily in terms of particular affects; practical domains are populated by character types united by a common relation to particular affects. A practical domain is a sort of continuum of character types which all relate to the same affect and attendant pleasures and pains. I specify practical domains by naming them after the individual virtues that agents can develop within them. For example, for the duration of this chapter, I pay close attention to what I call, 'temperance's practical domain,' which is connected to the affect of tactile appetite. I should note that naming the practical domain after the virtue within it does not entail that temperance is the only character type that agents can develop within this particular practical domain. It is just a convenient way to pick out the domain which I am discussing. Similarly, when referring to 'courage's practical domain' in later chapters, I mean to pick out the continuum of character types possible with respect to the affects which courage involves, namely fear and confidence.

I focus on temperance's practical domain in this chapter because it is the one in which Aristotle maintains that agents express strict (ἁπλῶς) *akrasia*:

> ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἀκρασία καὶ ἐγκράτειά ἐστι μόνον περὶ ἅπερ ἀκολασία καὶ σωφροσύνη, καὶ ὅτι περὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἐστὶν ἄλλο εἶδος ἀκρασίας, λεγόμενον κατὰ μεταφορὰν καὶ οὐχ ἁπλῶς, δῆλον.
>
> It is clear that *akrasia* and *enkrateia* are only connected to the things to which self-indulgence and temperance are connected, and further that a character type connected to other things is another form of *akrasia*, called so according to metaphor, and not strictly. [*NE* VII.5 1149a21-24][35]

The rest of the present chapter will consider *akrasia* and *enkrateia* only as they show up in temperance's practical domain, i.e., in their strict forms. I argue in Chapter 2 that this is not the only domain in which agents express *akrasia* and *enkrateia*, and that in addition to the strict forms of *akrasia* and *enkrateia*, there are also loose forms of the character types, named according to metaphor or inclusive resemblance. Aristotle limits most of his analysis of self-control and its lack to their strict forms or expressions, i.e., as agents express them temperance's practical domain in relation to the affect of tactile appetite, but this does not mean that he conceives that their expressions are restricted only to temperance's practical domain. I hold that strict expressions of *akrasia* and *enkrateia* arise in temperance's practical domain, while genuine loose expressions of the character types arise in the others, for instance in courage's practical domain.

As a preview for why I am eager to suggest that there are genuine, loose expressions of these character types in practical domains other than temperance's, it is helpful to glance at a passage near the end of *NE* I.13, where Aristotle discusses *akrasia* and *enkrateia* for the first time in the ethics, presenting them as evidence that the human soul is functionally divided into rational and non-rational aspects.

[35] Even though Aristotle does not mention explicitly, "another form of *enkrateia*," I propose that he means to extend his point to the character type of *enkrateia*, too. For he refers to both *akrasia* and *enkrateia* at the beginning of the passage and so seems to implicate *enkrateia* in the description that follows.

> ἔοικε δὲ καὶ ἄλλη τις φύσις τῆς ψυχῆς ἄλογος εἶναι, μετέχουσα μέντοι πῃ λόγου. τοῦ γὰρ ἐγκρατοῦς καὶ ἀκρατοῦς τὸν λόγον καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ λόγον ἔχον ἐπαινοῦμεν, ὀρθῶς γὰρ καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ βέλτιστα παρακαλεῖ. φαίνεται δ᾽ ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἄλλο τι παρὰ τὸν λόγον πεφυκός, ὃ μάχεται καὶ ἀντιτείνει τῷ λόγῳ. ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ καθάπερ τὰ παραλελυμένα τοῦ σώματος μόρια εἰς τὰ δεξιὰ προαιρουμένων κινῆσαι τοὐναντίον εἰς τὰ ἀριστερὰ παραφέρεται, καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς οὕτως. ἐπὶ τἀναντία γὰρ αἱ ὁρμαὶ τῶν ἀκρατῶν.
>
> It seems that there is some other non-rational nature of the soul, one that nevertheless somehow participates in reason. For we praise enkratic and akratic people both with respect to their reason and to the aspect of their souls having reason, since it urges them correctly and to the best things. Yet there appears by nature to be something else in them, too, which fights and struggles against reason. For just as one choosing to move her paralyzed body parts to the right moves them in the wrong direction, to the opposite left, so it is with respect to the souls of enkratic and akratic people. For the impulses of akratic people are opposed to one another. [*NE* I.13 1102b13-21]

It would be odd for Aristotle to restrict *akrasia* and *enkrateia* to one particular domain of ethical activity after explaining the character types in terms of the soul's more general arrangement and organization. As Gould says about enkratic action, "the crucial feature is the structure, not the sphere, of the action."[36] I propose that this is true for both akratic and enkratic action, adding that the organization of an agent's soul is responsible for the structure of both akratic and enkratic character types and the enacted choices that follow from them, whether agents express their self-control or un-self-control in temperance's domain or any other. In other words, the crucial feature is not actually the structure of the action, but rather the structure of the soul coordinate with the character type. For now, because Aristotle primarily analyzes self-control and its lack within temperance's practical domain, I follow suit and examine what I call the strict forms of *akrasia* and *enkrateia*.

[36] Gould ("A Puzzle…") 177

1.4 The Practical Domain of Temperance[37]



Figure 1. - Temperance's Practical Domain

Temperance (σωφροσύνη) is one way that agents express ethical virtue. Temperance is the disposition of character whereby an agent holds or manages well in relation to the affect of tactile appetite (ἐπιθυμία) and to the bodily pleasures and pains that arise through touch and follow upon this affect [*NE* III.10 1118a23-26].[38] Since pleasures and pains attach to every affect, then tactile appetite certainly counts as an affect and appears in Aristotle's catalogue of affects mentioned earlier in this chapter at *NE* II.5; tactile appetite leads one to pursue certain touch-based pleasures and avoid certain touch-based pains. Aristotle distinguishes between two sorts of tactile appetite: that which is common to all people, and that which is particular to individuals.

> τῶν δ᾽ ἐπιθυμιῶν αἱ μὲν κοιναὶ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, αἱ δ᾽ ἴδιοι καὶ ἐπίθετοι. οἷον ἡ μὲν τῆς τροφῆς φυσική. πᾶς γὰρ ἐπιθυμεῖ ὁ ἐνδεὴς ξηρᾶς ἢ ὑγρᾶς τροφῆς, ὁτὲ δὲ ἀμφοῖν, καὶ εὐνῆς, φησὶν Ὅμηρος, "ὁ νέος καὶ ἀκμάζων." τὸ δὲ τοιᾶσδε ἢ τοιᾶσδε, οὐκέτι πᾶς, οὐδὲ τῶν αὐτῶν. διὸ φαίνεται ἡμέτερον εἶναι. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ᾽ ἔχει γέ τι καὶ φυσικόν. ἕτερα γὰρ ἑτέροις ἐστὶν ἡδέα, καὶ ἔνια πᾶσιν ἡδίω τῶν τυχόντων. ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς φυσικαῖς ἐπιθυμίαις ὀλίγοι ἁμαρτάνουσι καὶ ἐφ᾽ ἕν, ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖον. τὸ γὰρ ἐσθίειν τὰ τυχόντα ἢ πίνειν ἕως ἂν ὑπερπλησθῇ, ὑπερβάλλειν ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν

[37] Despite the apparent oddity of the following figure, it will become clear that I am committed to what it represents. I hold that self-control and its lack are character types that agents can develop between the virtue and both vices in a practical domain. Since insensibility is a rare vice according to Aristotle, so too are the enkratic and akratic character types that fall between it and temperance.

[38] An interesting feature of Aristotle's presentation of temperance's practical domain that is liable to strike contemporary readers as strange is its connection to specifically *tactile* appetite. The objects characteristic of this domain are food, drink, and sexual activity; only the third of these may seem particularly tactile. Nevertheless, Aristotle insists that, for instance, the self-indulgent agent, has excessive tactile desire for food and drink as well. At *NE* III.10, Aristotle explains with an anecdote: "This is why a certain person fond of eating delicacies prayed for a throat longer than a crane's, indicating that he takes pleasure in the touch," [διὸ καὶ ηὔξατό τις ὀψοφάγος ὢν τὸν φάρυγγα αὑτῷ μακρότερον γεράνου γενέσθαι, ὡς ἡδόμενος τῇ ἁφῇ, 1118a32-34].

> τῷ πλήθει. ἀναπλήρωσις γὰρ τῆς ἐνδείας ἡ φυσικὴ ἐπιθυμία. διὸ λέγονται οὗτοι γαστρίμαργοι, ὡς παρὰ τὸ δέον πληροῦντες αὐτήν.
>
> Of bodily appetites, some appear to be common, while others appear particular and additional. For instance, appetite for food is natural. For all people have an appetite for dry or wet food when in need, sometimes both, and all have an appetite for sex, as Homer puts it, "when young and blooming." But for this food or for that food, not everybody has an appetite, nor do they all have the same appetite. So this kind of appetite appears to be ours in particular. But it is not altogether different, for there is something natural about it. For different things are pleasant for different people, and for everyone there are some things more pleasant than any other chance things. Few miss the mark when it comes to natural appetites, and only in one way, with respect to excess. For eating anything that falls into one's lap or drinking until one is overbrimming is to go beyond what is in accordance with nature in quantity. For natural appetite is for filling up a lack. This is why some are called greedy-bellies, because they fill the belly beyond necessity. [*NE* III.11 1118b8-20]

Aristotle is careful to point out that appetites particular to individual agents are not thereby outside the bounds of nature; it is natural for people to discriminate among dishes and drinks and to find that they have their own affinities. What is not natural, Aristotle holds, is tactile appetite in excess; it is natural to desire up to the point of fulfilling a lack, but to desire any further is to surpass the bounds of "natural quantity."

Aristotle explains that the self-indulgent agent, who has developed the disposition of character to be poorly related to tactile appetite, takes too much pleasure in the sensations that come from eating, drinking, and having sex—self-indulgence is the excessive vice in temperance's domain and an agent with this character type has excessive tactile appetite. This fits with what Aristotle writes is the *only* way for agent's to go wrong with respect to tactile appetite in the passage above, namely by having excessive desire for bodily pleasure. But Aristotle identifies another vicious character type in temperance's domain, the insensible agent, whom he holds can hardly be found. He writes, "lack of sensation such as this is not human," ["οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρωπική

ἐστιν ἡ τοιαύτη ἀναισθησία," *NE* III.11 1119a6-7] [39]. Insensibility is on Aristotle's account a vicious character type in terms of which an agent holds poorly in relation tactile appetite, and in a different way than the self-indulgent agent does, for insensibility is the deficient vice in temperance's domain. The insensible agent, rather than excessively desiring and taking too much pleasure in the sensation of touch, is subject to deficient tactile appetite and takes no pleasure at all, or rather not enough, in the tactile sensations of eating, drinking, and having sex [1119a8-11]. Because the insensible agent takes little to no pleasure in these things, she either has very weak tactile appetite or has extinguished it all together.

One thing that should be clear from this quick overview of the virtue and the two vices in temperance's practical domain is that all of these character types are ways for agents to hold or manage themselves in relation to the affect of tactile appetite, its attendant pleasures and pains, and associated objects. This continuity-of-affect-relation is what explains why Aristotle groups all of these character types together, that is to say, why they all fall into a single practical domain. To consider *akrasia* and *enkrateia* as constituents of the same practical domain is to consider them as character types in terms of which agents manage themselves either poorly or well in relation to the affect of tactile appetite, its attendant bodily pleasures and pains, and the objects that give rise to them. My view is that Aristotle considers *akrasia* and *enkrateia* [40] as ongoing psychological

[39] The sense in which Aristotle calls insensibility is inhuman is interesting, for he seems to be calling insensible agents "plant-like," rather than contending that they are akin to the lower animals. At *NE* III.11, Aristotle clarifies:

> οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρωπική ἐστιν ἡ τοιαύτη ἀναισθησία. καὶ γὰρ τὰ λοιπὰ ζῷα διακρίνει τὰ βρώματα, καὶ τοῖς μὲν χαίρει τοῖς δ᾽ οὔ. εἰ δέ τῳ μηδέν ἐστιν ἡδὺ μηδὲ διαφέρει ἕτερον ἑτέρου, πόρρω ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἄνθρωπος εἶναι. οὐ τέτευχε δ᾽ ὁ τοιοῦτος ὀνόματος διὰ τὸ μὴ πάνυ γίνεσθαι.
>
> For insensibility such as this is not human. For even the other animals distinguish among different foods, and take pleasure in some but not others. If there is anyone for whom nothing is sweet, and who does not differentiate one food from another on this basis, then she is far from being a human. [This character type] has no particular name because agents do not become it very often. [1119a6-11]

[40] To be clear, I mean strict *akrasia* and *enkrateia* here, but, as I have already emphasized, the distinction between strict and loose forms of these character types does not become relevant until the next chapter.

dispositions or character types related to tactile appetite, perhaps more or less susceptible to different sources of change than the virtue and vices of temperance's domain, yet still character types explained not merely by the quality of akratic or enkratic agents' observable actions, but by their distinct relations to choice-making.

One final point before moving on to a comparison of the character types in temperance's domain is that, as strange as it sounds, there should actually be two forms of *akrasia* and two forms of *enkrateia* within this single practical domain. Recall Aristotle's view that the akratic agent is better than the self-indulgent agent because the akratic maintains some relation to her own reason's correct prescriptions, even though both agents perform externally indistinguishable actions. Further, recall Aristotle's view that the enkratic is better than the akratic agent because she chooses and performs correct actions, even though she experiences a struggle with affect just as the akratic does. It is possible to conclude from Aristotle's treatment of *akrasia* and *enkrateia* in *NE* Book VII that these character types must fall somewhere between the virtue of temperance and the excessive vice of self-indulgence in temperance's practical domain.

But if an akratic agent is someone who performs actions externally indistinguishable from the actions which a vicious agent performs, and if there are two vices in temperance's practical domain, then there should also be two distinct akratic character types in the same practical domain. On the one hand, there is the akratic agent whom I have already described, the one who performs actions externally indistinguishable from those which the self-indulgent agent performs. On the other hand, there should be another akratic agent in the same practical domain who performs actions externally indistinguishable from those which the other vicious agent, the insensible agent, performs. In short, there ought to be an akratic agent who leans toward self-indulgence and another akratic agent who leans toward insensibility. The akratic who leans toward insensibility struggles

with deficient tactile appetite which leads her to choose and perform what she knows is the incorrect action of abstaining from tactile pleasures when she should go after them, while the akratic who leans toward self-indulgence struggles with excessive tactile appetite which leads her to perform what she knows is the incorrect action of going after tactile pleasures when she should abstain from them. Moreover, if there are two akratic character types within temperance's practical domain, then there should also be two distinct enkratic character types. For Aristotle notes that an enkratic agent is one who experiences a struggle between her reason and affect yet chooses and performs the correct action. Since the insensible-akratic and the self-indulgent-akratic each struggles with tactile appetite in a different way, then each should have its own enkratic counterpart. On the one hand, there is the enkratic who leans toward insensibility; she struggles with deficient tactile appetite on the way to enacting the correct choice. On the other hand, there is the enkratic who leans toward self-indulgence; she struggles with excessive tactile appetite in the course of enacting the correct choice.

The point that there should be two akratic character types and two enkratic character types within the same practical domain is not one to which scholars have brought attention, and perhaps this is because it seems speculative and Aristotle never discusses *akrasia* or *enkrateia* in relation to insensibility. He likely does not discuss self-controlled and un-self-controlled agents who approach insensibility because he hardly treats the deficient vice of insensibility in the first place, for he views insensibility as an inhuman and rare character type. However, it is important to note that, if *akrasia* and *enkrateia* are character types which agents can develop in practical domains that are not temperance's, as I argue in the next chapter, then other domains whose excessive and deficient vicious characters are not exceedingly rare should include two akratic character types and two enkratic character types. For now, since Aristotle avoids discussing insensibility because

of its rarity, I follow suit and avoid discussing *akrasia* and *enkrateia* in relation to insensibility, too, considering only half, as it were, of temperance's practical domain as I have depicted it in **Figure 1**. For the remainder of this chapter, I devote the following sections to contrasting the distinct character types in temperance's practical domain with one another in terms of their different relations to choice-making in service of justifying the view that *enkrateia* and *akrasia* are enduring and well-settled character types for Aristotle.

1.5 *Akrasia* & Self-Indulgence

Agents who have developed the character types of *akrasia* and self-indulgence perform externally indistinguishable actions, yet Aristotle distinguishes them from one another on the basis of the distinct relations to choice-making (προαίρεσις) peculiar to the kinds of agents who have developed the two psychological dispositions. Aristotle carefully separates his account of strict *akrasia* from that of vice in general at *NE* VII.8:

> ὅτι μὲν οὖν κακία ἡ ἀκρασία οὐκ ἔστι, φανερόν—ἀλλὰ πῇ ἴσως—τὸ μὲν γὰρ παρὰ προαίρεσιν τὸ δὲ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσίν ἐστιν, οὐ μὴν ἀλλ᾽ ὅμοιόν γε κατὰ τὰς πράξεις…
>
> It is clear that *akrasia* is not vice—perhaps it is badness in some way—for *akrasia* goes against choice while vice accords with choice. *Akrasia* is similar to vice, however, with respect to actions… [*NE* VII.8 1151a5-8]

Even though agents who have developed both akratic and self-indulgent characters manage themselves poorly in relation to tactile appetite, and even though both sorts of agents take ethically inferior courses of action, Aristotle distinguishes the agents and their respective character types in reference to the choices the agents make and, in general, their distinct relations to choice-making. This passage might suggest, *prima facie*, that the akratic agent does not make a choice at all, yet I propose that this is not the case. Aristotle is only pointing out that the akratic agent, who sets out to enact the correct choice, ends up enacting a different, blameworthy choice instead; she goes

against what she knows would be the correct choice to enact.[41] He is noting that consistency is characteristic of the self-indulgent agent's choice-making, while it is not characteristic of the akratic agent's. So, while externally, akratic and vicious actions might look the same, what distinguishes them is something internal to the agents; the akratic and the self-indulgent agent's relations to choice-making are different.

At *NE* III.2, having just accounted for the difference between voluntary and involuntary action, Aristotle maintains that choice:

> …οἰκειότατον γὰρ εἶναι δοκεῖ τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ μᾶλλον τὰ ἤθη κρίνειν τῶν πράξεων…
>
> …seems to be most at home in virtue and to distinguish the character types more than actions do… [*NE* III.2 1111b5-6]

The akratic agent has developed a distinct character type from the self-indulgent agent, although both end up choosing and performing externally similar incorrect actions. Character types are best distinguished, according to Aristotle, according to how the agents who have developed the characters make choices. For it is not simply the case that the akratic and the self-indulgent make different choices, but these agents bear different relations to choice-making. Aristotle maintains that *akrasia* is a disposition according to which an agent experiences a conflict between her reason and her tactile appetite because of which she chooses and acts against what she knows is the correct choice to enact [παρὰ προαίρεσιν…ἐστιν]. Vice, on the other hand, is a disposition according to which an agent experiences no such conflict and instead acts in accord with her choice all the way through [κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσίν ἐστιν]. Some examples are useful here for the sake of showing that akratic and self-indulgent actions are not easily distinguished from a bystander's perspective and

[41] For reasons that I will make clear in Chapter 4, it is important to emphasize that the akratic agent abandons what she knows would be the correct choice, i.e., her intention, but she never actually enacts it. At most, she forms a correct intention to choose and perform a correct action, but since she never follows through and enacts it, it does not count as a choice on Aristotle's view. This is the sense in which "*akrasia* goes against choice,": an akratic agent indeed enacts an incorrect choice because of her improper relation to affect, but one that departs from what she knows would be the correct choice to enact in the circumstances.

so that an agent's relation to choice-making, rather than her externally observable actions, is a better indicator of her character type.

If Terry is akratic and Gregory is self-indulgent, then they both end up eating or drinking more than reason correctly prescribes. Beverley, observing the actions that Terry and Gregory perform, is likely to class both Terry and Gregory as self-indulgent, should the observable actions they perform be all that she has to go on. Nevertheless, it can be clear to Terry that his eating too much goes against what he intended to do, indeed against what he knows is the correct choice to enact: to refrain from eating or drinking too much. In other words, Terry the akratic is aware that his action goes against the correct choice he intended to make, whereas self-indulgent Gregory experiences no such conflict between what he knows and what he chooses and does. Gregory, Aristotle maintains, is not aware of his viciousness; vice is the sort of character type that escapes the notice of the agent who has developed it, whereas *akrasia* is not, [ἡ μὲν γὰρ κακία λανθάνει, ἡ δ᾽ ἀκρασία οὐ λανθάνει—*NE* VII.8 1150b36].

I noted earlier that Aristotle holds that the akratic is "an agent whom affect does not dominate so much that she is the kind to be convinced that it is right to pursue such pleasures freely," whereas the self-indulgent just *is* the sort of agent convinced that it is correct to chase after tactile pleasure wherever and whenever she can. The akratic agent departs from what she knows is the correct choice, and she abandons her intention to enact the correct choice prior to making her ethical mistake. The self-indulgent agent, on the other hand, adheres to her choice all the way through. Aristotle corroborates this account at the beginning of *NE* VII.8.

> ἔστι δ᾽ ὁ μὲν ἀκόλαστος, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη, οὐ μεταμελητικός—ἐμμένει γὰρ τῇ προαιρέσει—ὁ δ᾽ ἀκρατὴς μεταμελητικὸς πᾶς
>
> The self-indulgent agent, as it has been said, is not full of regret—for she abides by her choice—whereas the akratic agent is always full of regret. [*NE* VII.8 1150b29-31]

Why is the akratic such as to feel pained and to experience regret after choosing and performing her action, while the self-indulgent agent is not? It must be a consequence of the akratic agent's awareness that she failed to stick to what she knows is correct, for she knows that her desire for tactile pleasure interfered with following through and enacting the correct choice, and hence interfered with her acting in alignment with her own reason's correct prescription. She made an ethical mistake, but she is not so ethically corrupted that she is unaware of her mistake—at least after the fact. When reflecting on the choice that she enacted, the akratic recognizes the discontinuity between her reason and her desire.

This line of thought leads to the final point of contrast I want to draw attention to between the self-indulgent and the akratic agent, namely Aristotle's view that self-indulgence is a continuous (συνεχής) sort of badness (πονηρία) while *akrasia* is not [*NE* VII.8 1150b34-35]. Recalling Anton's construal of *akrasia* and *enkrateia* as character conditions inferior in kind to what she terms the fixed states or character types of virtue and vice, this continuity-of-badness difference between self-indulgent and akratic agents seems, *prima facie*, to corroborate her position. Further, Aristotle maintains that *akrasia* is easier to treat or persuade one out of than self-indulgence on the basis of the former being a non-continuous and the latter being a continuous sort of badness [1151a14]. So, it may seem plausible to conclude, along with Anton, that *akrasia* is a temporary condition of character and not a genuine character type. Nevertheless, it is possible to construe Aristotle's continuity distinction differently. It is more likely that *akrasia* is a non-continuous kind of badness because the akratic agent's initial intention and eventual enacted choice are disconnected from one another; what she knows it is correct to choose and do is disconnected from the choice that she ends up enacting. On this reading—the one that I propose is correct—the point that Aristotle makes when he labels *akrasia* as non-continuous is not that un-self-control is

a transitory character condition, but rather that agents who have developed *akrasia* are characterized by a discontinuity between what they intend do in accord with reason's correct prescription and the choices which they end up enacting after abandoning their initial intentions due to their improper relation to affect. The self-indulgent agent, on the other hand, is not characterized by this kind of discontinuity, for she never abandons any intention to act otherwise in the course of enacting her blameworthy choice. In other words, the self-indulgent agent is not subject to any practical stutter, whereas a defining characteristic of an akratic agent is being subject to such a practical stutter.

Aristotle crafts an analogy with types of sickness or disease to help explain what he means when differentiating *akrasia* from self-indulgence in terms of continuity, and this analogy justifies my interpretation of his continuity distinction. He reports that *akrasia* is akin to epilepsy, whereas self-indulgence is akin to dropsy or consumption [1150b32-34]. The idea that Aristotle imparts here is that the epileptic is not one who has seizures at all moments, but rather suffers from them in bursts at different times throughout her practical life, whereas someone with dropsy suffers from her disease all of the time; for instance, there is no time at which her nose is not bloated. In short, epilepsy is not a continuous illness in the sense that dropsy is. Similarly, the akratic is not one who is, all things considered, committed to choose and act contrary to correct reason, for she knows what it would be correct to choose and to do both before and after enacting her blameworthy choice. She abandons or fails to follow through on her correctly reasoned intention in favor of enacting a blameworthy choice at the time of action. The akratic agent's subsequent regret also makes clear the sense in which her badness is not continuous; for she feels pain at having enacted an incorrect choice that cuts against what she knows her own reason prescribes as correct. A self-indulgent agent, on the other hand, just is inclined to choose and act in a way that correct reason, which she

lacks, forbids; she is unaware of the wickedness of her character or the corruption of her foundational principle. Her badness is continuous, and her lack of subsequent regret bolsters this way of thinking about it.

So, the akratic and self-indulgent characters are distinct not because of the externally observable actions that each performs, which appear indistinguishable to a bystander, but rather they are distinct because of their different relations to choice-making. The akratic acts against what she knows is the correct choice and so what she intends to do, and instead enacts an incorrect choice, and cringes with regret afterward. The self-indulgent agent's action is continuous with her intention and choice all the way through, for she performs the ethically inferior action, yet never abandons any intention to enact a correct choice, and so is not pained by regret in retrospect; she may even delight in her vicious activity. Self-indulgence is a continuous character type because there is no disconnection of the agent's choice from her action; *akrasia* is non-continuous because the un-self-controlled agent is not always convinced that she should pursue tactile pleasures as she does. When it comes time to act, nevertheless, the akratic agent makes ethical mistakes. But this lack of continuity is not such that it disqualifies *akrasia* from being a character type or psychological disposition of the sort that virtue and vice are; rather, this consistent lack of continuity between what she knows is the correct choice—that is, her correct intention—and the incorrect choice she ends up enacting constitutes the enduring akratic character type.

1.6 *Enkrateia* & Temperance

At *NE* VII.9, Aristotle distinguishes strict *enkrateia* from the virtue of temperance to ward off the temptation of considering them as the same character type. This incorrect identification comes about because the actions that enkratic and temperate agents perform are indistinguishable from an external perspective. It is the same kind of mistake that characterizes the misidentification of

akrasia with self-indulgence which I outlined in the last section. For example, suppose that Gwen is temperate and that Stephanie is enkratic, and they both end up eating and drinking to the extent that reason correctly prescribes. Further, Beverley, observing both Gwen and Stephanie, is likely to class both agents as temperate, should the observable actions they perform be all that she has to go on. Yet Aristotle maintains that, while the enkratic and temperate agents both choose and perform correct actions in the domain having to do with tactile appetite, and even though both are in a sense well-disposed toward the affect, Gwen and Stephanie are well-disposed in different ways. He writes that the enkratic agent performs the correct action even though she is subject to unreasonable tactile desires (ἐπιθυμίαι); there is conflict between the enkratic agent's reason and her tactile appetite. The temperate agent, on the other hand, chooses and acts temperately without ever being subject to any conflict between her reason and tactile appetite.

Aristotle explicitly distinguishes the temperate from the self-controlled agent along these lines at *NE* VII.9.

> ἐπεὶ δὲ καθ᾽ ὁμοιότητα πολλὰ λέγεται, καὶ ἡ ἐγκράτεια ἡ τοῦ σώφρονος καθ᾽ ὁμοιότητα ἠκολούθηκεν. ὅ τε γὰρ ἐγκρατὴς οἷος μηδὲν παρὰ τὸν λόγον διὰ τὰς σωματικὰς ἡδονὰς ποιεῖν καὶ ὁ σώφρων, ἀλλ᾽ ὃ μὲν ἔχων ὃ δ᾽ οὐκ ἔχων φαύλας ἐπιθυμίας. καὶ ὃ μὲν τοιοῦτος οἷος μὴ ἥδεσθαι παρὰ τὸν λόγον, ὃ δ᾽ οἷος ἥδεσθαι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄγεσθαι.
>
> Since many things are said due to similarity, it has followed that we speak of the *enkrateia* of the temperate person. For both the enkratic and the temperate are such as not to act against reason on account of bodily pleasures, but the enkratic has while the temperate does not have vile tactile desires. The temperate person is such that she takes no pleasure against reason, whereas the enkratic is such as to take pleasure against reason, but not to be led by such pleasure. [*NE* VII.9 1151b32-1152a3]

Like the akratic agent, the enkratic agent knows what the correct choice is prior to acting, feels the pull of tactile appetite to let go of a commitment to enact it, and really wants to act against what her own reason prescribes is the correct choice. Yet unlike the akratic agent, the enkratic agent is not so poorly related to tactile appetite that she abandons what she knows is the correct choice for

the sake of enacting an incorrect one. The self-controlled agent does, after her reason overcomes affect in her internal struggle, enact a choice superior to the one that the akratic enacts. The temperate agent differs from the enkratic because she experiences no internal conflict to abandon what she knows is the correct choice; her choosing and acting does not suffer interruption due to her relation to tactile appetite at any point in the course of her practical reasoning. The temperate agent's action, what she both chooses to do and does, is superior to the actions that both enkratic and akratic agents choose and perform.

The enkratic and the temperate characters then are also distinguished according to their different relations to choice-making. The enkratic character chooses to act in accord with her correct reason, but her choice conflicts with her desire to act for the sake of gratifying her tactile appetite; she ends up overcoming her desire to act contrary to her reason's prescription, instead remaining committed to and enacting the correct choice after all. The self-controlled agent is subject to a practical stutter, but unlike the akratic agent, she is able to correct the course of her practical reasoning prior to enacting a blameworthy choice. On the other hand, the temperate character chooses in alignment with reason's correct prescription and, since nothing interrupts her from acting on that choice, since she experiences no excessive desire for tactile pleasure, she chooses and acts temperately. She does not merely perform actions that fall under the temperate action type classification, but she chooses and performs temperate actions for their own sakes and from a consistent disposition of character. In other words, the temperate agent performs actions that fall under the action type that corresponds with her character type; she performs genuinely temperate actions.

There is also a difference between the enkratic and the temperate agent in terms of continuity. The enkratic agent is subject to discontinuity, and the discontinuity characteristic of the

enkratic differs slightly from that characteristic of the akratic agent. Unlike the akratic agent, the enkratic agent's initial intention to choose and act correctly aligns with the choice she ends up enacting after her reason wins the internal struggle with affect. For when the enkratic agent's reason struggles with her tactile appetite, she in a sense considers what it would be like to act otherwise than she knows is correct. But she does more than merely consider the possibility of acting otherwise: she is really drawn by her tactile desire to act against her own correct rational prescription even though she does not ultimately do so. While the discontinuity Aristotle ascribes to the akratic agent is one that is easier to describe, given that the choice she enacts actually runs contrary to what she knows is the correct choice and what she initially intends to do, the lack of continuity that attends the enkratic agent is somewhat harder to pin down, given that she does end up enacting what she knows is the correct choice. Yet the enkratic does experience a discontinuity in the passage from intending to do what she knows is correct and actually enacting the correct choice. Her character type's lack of continuity may be very difficult to detect from external perspectives. Unless someone were to interview her in the course of her rational struggle with tactile appetite, there may be no way for an observer to access the fact that she is self-controlled and subject to the pull of affect in the course of her practical reasoning.

Enkrateia, then, is best defined as a character type according to which the agent who has developed it holds fairly well in relation to tactile appetite, but because she still has the wrong desires, she does not hold as well in relation to it as the temperate agent does; the enkratic character type is inferior to temperance on account of the fraught nature of her choice-making. *Enkrateia* is a non-continuous character type because correct action does not follow from the self-controlled agent as fluidly as the temperate agent's correct action follows from hers. The enkratic agent second-guesses enacting what she knows is the correct choice because she experiences desire to

behave contrary to what she knows is correct; the temperate agent acts without so much as a hint of desire to act otherwise and is immune, as it were, from the practical stutter that attends the enkratic agent's behavior.

1.7 Loose Ends – Two Kinds of *Akrasia*?

I have yet to treat one important feature of Aristotle's survey of *akrasia*, namely that he distinguishes between two sorts of akratic agents, the hasty akratic and the weak akratic, on the basis of their different relations to deliberation (βούλευσις) at *NE* VII.7. Both kinds of akratic agents perform incorrect actions and act against their intentions to perform correct actions, so both apparently satisfy the criteria for genuinely expressing *akrasia*. But to what extent the agent is aware she is performing an akratic action at the time she performs it is an empirical question that warrants Aristotle's distinguishing *akrasia* into its hasty and weak sorts. He writes:

> ἀκρασίας δὲ τὸ μὲν προπέτεια τὸ δ᾽ ἀσθένεια. οἳ μὲν γὰρ βουλευσάμενοι οὐκ ἐμμένουσιν οἷς ἐβουλεύσαντο διὰ τὸ πάθος, οἳ δὲ διὰ τὸ μὴ βουλεύσασθαι ἄγονται ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους. ἔνιοι γάρ, ὥσπερ προγαργαλίσαντες οὐ γαργαλίζονται, οὕτω καὶ προαισθόμενοι καὶ προϊδόντες καὶ προεγείραντες ἑαυτοὺς καὶ τὸν λογισμὸν οὐχ ἡττῶνται ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους, οὔτ᾽ ἂν ἡδὺ ᾖ οὔτ᾽ ἂν λυπηρόν. μάλιστα δ᾽ οἱ ὀξεῖς καὶ μελαγχολικοὶ τὴν προπετῆ ἀκρασίαν εἰσὶν ἀκρατεῖς. οἳ μὲν γὰρ διὰ τὴν ταχυτῆτα οἳ δὲ διὰ τὴν σφοδρότητα οὐκ ἀναμένουσι τὸν λόγον, διὰ τὸ ἀκολουθητικοὶ εἶναι τῇ φαντασίᾳ.
>
> Regarding *akrasia*, some is hastiness and some is weakness. For some akratics, having already deliberated, do not stick to the things that were deliberated due to their relation with affect. Yet others, on account of not deliberating, are led by the affects. Just like those who cannot be tickled if they have prepared themselves to be tickled, so too some people perceiving ahead of time and looking ahead awaken themselves and the rational natures of their souls and are not defeated by the affects, whether the object is pleasant or painful. Most of all it is the reckless and impulsive akratics who lack self-control in the hasty way. Sometimes on account of quickness, at other times on account of vehemence, akratic agents do not stick to reason, due to their being disposed to follow appearance. [*NE* VII.7 1150b19-28]

Aristotle marks the difference between the hasty and the weak akratic here according to their distinct relations to deliberation. The weak akratic is one who tries to guard herself against

choosing and performing the incorrect action, deliberating and intending to perform the correct action all the way up until affect proves its hold over her and leads her to enact the incorrect choice at the time of action. She is like an agent who knows someone is about to tickle her and so is able to prepare for it. The hasty akratic, on the other hand, is likewise led by affect to enact the incorrect choice, yet Aristotle explains that the real cause of the hasty akratic's failure to follow through on her initial correct intention is her failure to deliberate. She is similar to an agent who does not know someone is about to tickle her and so gets caught off guard when it happens. Aristotle maintains that the weak akratic acts against what she has deliberated because of affect's pull despite her constant preparation, whereas he holds that the hasty akratic follows affect because she has not deliberated sufficiently prior to the moment of action.

Since the analogy with tickling might be difficult to understand on its face, it is useful to turn to another place in the *corpus* where Aristotle discusses preparing oneself for tickling. At *Problems* 965a11, he investigates why it is impossible to tickle oneself. The reason he posits is that when someone expects to be tickled, it is less surprising; when someone sets out to tickle herself, she most certainly expects it. On the other hand, someone is more likely to break out in laughter when she is tickled and not expecting it. Importantly, Aristotle does not maintain that one who is ready to be tickled is immune from the usual effects of tickling, but merely that the effects of the tickling are more pronounced in the one who does not expect it. Similarly, we might suppose that Aristotle does not suggest that the weak akratic, insofar as she is analogous to the one expecting to be tickled, is immune from what follows from her character type, but that the weak akratic's blameworthy behavior surprises her less than the hasty akratic's behavior surprises her. In other words, the weak akratic is less shocked at her own incorrect choice and action than the hasty akratic is caught off guard by hers.

In the light of Aristotle's overarching theory of deliberation, it might seem that the hasty akratic cannot actually be akratic at all, since he seems to claim that the hasty akratic does not deliberate, and he also holds that there is no choice without deliberation. At *NE* III.3, Aristotle clarifies the relation between deliberation and choice.

> βουλευτὸν δὲ καὶ προαιρετὸν τὸ αὐτό, πλὴν ἀφωρισμένον ἤδη τὸ προαιρετόν. τὸ γὰρ ἐκ τῆς βουλῆς κριθὲν προαιρετόν ἐστιν. παύεται γὰρ ἕκαστος ζητῶν πῶς πράξει ὅταν εἰς αὑτὸν ἀναγάγῃ τὴν ἀρχήν, καὶ αὑτοῦ εἰς τὸ ἡγούμενον, τοῦτο γὰρ τὸ προαιρούμενον.
>
> That which is deliberated and chosen is the same, save that what has been chosen is determinate. For that which is determined by deliberation is that which is chosen. For each person stops seeking how she will act whenever she leads up the first principle into herself, and into the leading aspect of herself, for this is the choosing aspect. [*NE* III.3 1113a2-7]

Deliberation is the activity whereby an agent considers an indeterminate range of possible ways to choose and act, and her deliberation ends in practical determinacy. Deliberation is not the same thing as choosing, even though the result of deliberation is a choice, if she is able to enact it. For reasons that I will make clear in Chapter 4, Aristotle identifies choice with action, with the result that there is no such thing as an un-enacted choice. If an agent fails to enact the result of her deliberation, then it does not count as an Aristotelian choice, but we might call it an intention on which an agent fails to follow through.[42] All of this aside, if it is true that the hasty akratic does not deliberate, then it does not seem that she can even form intentions, let alone follow through on them and enact choices. An agent begins by deliberating first, conceiving of the available practical options before her, and selects one. If all goes unhindered, the agent follows through on the result of her deliberation and enacts a choice. Further, as we have already seen when considering *akrasia*

[42] This is in effect why I have been considering what the akratic knows is the correct choice as an intention she fails to commit to or follow through on in the preceding sections. There is some question as to whether virtuous agents deliberate, since they unfailingly choose and perform the correct action if nothing external prevents them or forces them to do something else.

more generally, Aristotle holds that something can interfere in the course of one's practical reasoning and prevent her from doing what she intends and lead her to enact a different choice; for the akratic characteristically acts against what she intends to do and knows is correct due to the influence of affect.

If the hasty akratic is an agent who has not deliberated prior to acting, then it seems we cannot say about her that she has even formed an intention, let alone made a choice; and if she has not formed an intention, then we also cannot say about her that she lets go of or abandons what she knows would be the correct choice. In short, it does not look as though we can class what Aristotle calls hasty *akrasia* as a real expression of the character type since an agent who forms no intentions and makes no choices does not express a character type, given that character types are psychological dispositions to choose and act in consistent and reliable ways and are best distinguished from one another due to different relations agents have to choice-making. Irwin worries similarly about the hasty akratic, yet he concludes that the worry is easily dissolved: "[The hasty akratic] can make the right [intention] because of his previous deliberation even if he does not deliberate afresh on this occasion."[43] Broadie comments that both kinds of *akrasia* "must involve an abandoned [intention], and therefore (by Ar.'s usual doctrine) a prior deliberation."[44] Following Irwin and Broadie, one can sidestep this issue completely by recognizing that agents can deliberate toward forming intentions or making choices in at least two generally different time frames.

Agents can deliberate both at the moment of action (for instance when the object of tactile appetite is within the akratic's reach) and in the moments, hours, or days prior to the moment of

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[43] Irwin (Aristotle: *The Nicomachean Ethics*) 265 (I replaced, "impetuous incontinent," with "hasty akratic," and, "decision," with, "intention," for consistency's sake.)

[44] Broadie, Sarah & Rowe, Christopher. (2002) Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*: Translation, Introduction, and Commentary. Oxford University Press. 397 (I replaced "decision" with "intention" for consistency's sake.)

action (for instance when the akratic knows that she will attend a feast at the end of the week where objects of tactile appetite will not be scarce). To express weak *akrasia*, an agent must act against the intention she arrives at after deliberating at the moment of action; to express hasty *akrasia*, an agent must also act against an intention that results from prior deliberation, but deliberation that takes place at a time more remote from the time of action. So it is not in fact whether deliberation precedes intending or choosing that distinguishes these kinds of *akrasia*, since all that is intended or chosen is the result of prior deliberation; it is rather the time between their deliberating and their acting that sets them apart. The weak akratic deliberates now, in the face of the fourth glass of wine, and now thinks that it would be incorrect to drink it and intends to abstain, yet tactile appetite pulls her to deliberate afresh and enact the choice to drink it instead. That is, the weak akratic abandons the intention to refrain that she forms just prior to the moment of action. The hasty akratic, on the other hand, deliberated earlier, before facing the fourth glass of wine, and intended at that earlier time not to drink to such excess; she does not newly deliberate to form a correct intention now as affect pulls her to deliberate and enact a blameworthy choice, as the intention she fails to follow through on was the result of much earlier deliberation. In short, it is not the case that the hasty akratic does not deliberate and reach a correct intention at all, but rather that she does not deliberate in this way at the time of action which sets her apart from the weak akratic.

McConnell sees this strategy of differentiating the hasty and weak kinds of *akrasia* according to the time between when their respective agents deliberate and the time of action as essential to preserving Aristotle's claim that the akratic is aware that she is akratic in contrast with the vicious agent who is unaware that she is vicious [*NE* VII.8 1150b36]. The concern is that the hasty akratic cannot be aware that she is akratic in the same way that the weak akratic is aware of her *akrasia*, for the former rushes into her performance of the incorrect action unaware while the

latter takes precautions prior to performing the incorrect action. McConnell writes that "one obvious move to make in order to save Aristotle is simply to posit a time lag and say that the [akratic] is aware of his [*akrasia*] only after-the-fact."[45] Surely this helps to preserve hasty *akrasia* as a genuine expression of the character type, for this line of thought proposes that at the time of action, hasty akratics are not aware they are abandoning the correct intentions, yet afterward they come to recognize their failures.

Interestingly, this way of thinking appears to turn the tables and render weak *akrasia* suspect rather than hasty *akrasia*. For although weak akratics are probably aware after-the-fact that they have acted against their correct intentions, it still seems that they must also be aware of their *akrasia* in some sense prior to the moment of action since they deliberate and choose anew just prior to abandoning the correct intentions. To posit that weak akratics are only aware of their *akrasia* after-the-fact would fly in the face of what Aristotle says about them, namely that they engage in preparatory deliberation. It would be odd for the weak akratic consistently to deliberate for the sake of preparing herself to enact the correct choice if she were unaware before enacting her akratic choice that there is something faulty about her character. Further, the point Aristotle seems to be making with the analogy with tickling is that the weak akratic in some sense prepares herself prior to the contest between her reason and her tactile desire that arises at the moment of action.

McConnell also has something to say on this point and addresses the issue by proposing two senses in which akratic agents might be said to be aware of their *akrasia*: "He may be aware after-the-fact that a particular action was an [akratic] one, and he may be aware in general that he

[45] McConnell, Terrance. (1975) "Is Aristotle's Account of Incontinence Inconsistent?" in Canadian Journal of Philosophy. Vol. 4, No. 4. 640

is disposed to behave [akratically]."[46] In other words, the akratic can recognize that she has acted akratically by reference to a blameworthy choice she has recently enacted, or by reference to the character type she knows she has developed and habituated. The weak one perhaps recognizes more immediately than the hasty akratic that the choice she enacts is akratic, for the fact that she enacted an incorrect choice that is different than the intention she formed just moments ago makes it clearer to her self-assessment what she has just done. She performs the akratic action and is upset with herself immediately afterward. The hasty akratic, on the other hand, is not as quickly aware that her action is akratic, for she has not been spending as much deliberative energy as recently as the weak akratic toward forming the correct intention. Perhaps it does not dawn on the hasty akratic that she actually enacted a blameworthy choice until it is nearly time for her to fall asleep, and she cringes at herself as it crosses her mind that she did in fact act against what she knows is correct. All in all, both the hasty and weak variants are versions of the same settled character type, namely *akrasia*. Both kinds of akratic agents are characterized by a discontinuity between their initial correct intentions and the incorrect choices they eventually enact; it is just that their deliberation transpires in different timeframes and, as a result, they also become aware of their ethical mistakes at different times.

1.8 Conclusion

Akrasia and *enkrateia* are character types, albeit character types clearly distinct from virtue and vice. In order to distinguish them all, one cannot merely point to the externally observable actions agents who have developed each character type performs. For the akratic and the self-indulgent agents, from external perspectives, appear to perform the same incorrect actions; and the same

[46] *Ibid*. 642

goes for enkratic and temperate agents who appear to perform the same kinds of correct actions. Aristotle indicates that the best way to distinguish the character types from one another is according to the variously disposed agents' relations to choice-making. The temperate and self-indulgent agents stick to their choices all the way through their practical reasoning and experience no practical stutter; they experience no internal conflict influencing them to act otherwise than they have chosen. Akratic and enkratic agents, on the other hand, experience internal conflicts between their own correct rational prescriptions and tactile appetite that pull them to enact choices contrary to what they know are the correct choices. Experiencing this conflict to act inconsistently with their ethical knowledge makes the enkratic and akratic characters lack continuity in a way that the temperate and self-indulgent agents do not.

It should now be clear that, since the akratic and enkratic characters are defined in terms of their unique relations to choice-making, and because at *NE* III.2 Aristotle maintains that it is according to choice that we can best distinguish the various character types from one another, *akrasia* and *enkrateia* are enduring character types or psychological dispositions in line with Cooper's view presented at the outset of this chapter. What Anton holds disqualifies *akrasia* and *enkrateia* from counting as character types is actually, according to Aristotle, indicative of the kind of enduring character types that *akrasia* and *enkrateia* are. The fact that they are not continuous certainly makes them different from virtue and vice: virtuous and vicious agents experience a fluid harmony of choice and action that parallels the harmony that obtains between the rational and non-rational aspects of their souls. But that *akrasia* and *enkrateia* are ongoing character types cannot be rejected on the basis of this kind of discontinuity, given that their lack of continuity and internal disjointedness is just what makes them the well-settled character types that they are.

CHAPTER 2. THE RANGE OF AKRASIA & ENKRATEIA

In this chapter, I argue that the character types of *akrasia* and *enkrateia* have wide ranges of expression. Paying close attention to Aristotle's focused remarks at *Nicomachean Ethics* VII.1-10 about these character types, one might conclude that he presents them as having severely limited ranges of expression, i.e. that agents can express them only in temperance's practical domain. If this is so, then agents only express *akrasia* and *enkrateia* in their choices and actions having to do with the affect, pleasures, and pains particular to temperance's domain. According to the view that they have a limited range, *akrasia* and *enkrateia* might retain their status as character types, but only as character types which agents develop and express in temperance's practical domain. I argue that, on the contrary, *akrasia* and *enkrateia* are not restricted to temperance's domain, even though strict use of the terms '*akrasia*' and '*enkrateia*' might exclusively refer to the character types as agents express them in temperance's domain as a result of conventional or colloquial Athenian language use.

I proceed by developing a distinction between *strict* and *loose* forms or expressions of *akrasia* and *enkrateia*, where the strict forms are those which agents express in temperance's practical domain, and the loose forms are those which agents express in practical domains other than temperance's, for instance, in courage's practical domain. At *NE* III.10, Aristotle holds that the objects of temperance, and so also the objects of the vices of self-indulgence and insensibility, are specifically the tactile bodily pleasures and pains. The affect that these pleasures and pains attend is tactile appetite. I hold, as Aristotle does, that the strict forms of *akrasia* and *enkrateia* have to do with tactile appetite, since agents express them in temperance's practical domain. Further, I hold that the loose forms of the character types have to do with the affects connected to the other practical domains. I recognize that Aristotle most often uses the terms '*akrasia*' and

'*enkrateia*' by themselves in an unqualified way to refer to the strict forms of the character types, whereas he tacks on a consistent locution of qualification to the same terms when referring to loose akratic and enkratic agents in other practical domains, for instance: 'akratic with respect to spirit or temper,' in mildness's practical domain or 'akratic with respect to desire for honor,' in the unnamed virtue regarding honor's practical domain, or 'akratic with respect to desire for gain,' in generosity's practical domain [*NE* VII.4 1148b11-14].[47] All of these ways of referring to loose forms of *akrasia* identify them in terms of the affects with which their reason conflicts. I contend that an agent can express un-self-control or self-control in any practical domain wherein her reason can conflict with her desire, for this is the general description that Aristotle provides for *akrasia* and *enkrateia* at *NE* I.13 when providing the overview of the human soul he deems relevant to ethical inquiry [1102b13-21]. I examine the psychological justification for my view about the range of *akrasia* and *enkrateia* in the next chapter in more detail, but it is worth indicating now that all forms of *akrasia* and *enkrateia*, both strict and loose, are expressions of psychological conflict between an agent's soul's rational and non-rational natures. In this chapter, I focus primarily on (1) acknowledging that the words '*akrasia*' and '*enkrateia*' are subject to terminological restrictions and demonstrating how Aristotle navigates this linguistic issue, and (2) arguing that the strict and loose forms of each of the character types are united according to the ontological and terminological relation of metaphor.

After distinguishing strict from loose forms of the character types in the first part of this chapter, I proceed by analyzing the issue of how the loose and strict forms of each character type

[47] In Chapter 5, I construct and analyze practical syllogisms that result in loose akratic and enkratic enacted choices for these practical domains other than temperance's, while in this chapter, I merely argue that Aristotle endorses loose forms or expressions of the character types in these practical domains.

relate to one another ontologically. I argue that, for instance, the strict and loose forms of *akrasia*[48] relate to one another according to metaphor, as Aristotle himself claims, and not according to the relation of homonymy, as it might seem at first glance. I discuss why it is tempting to think that the strict and loose forms of each of the character types are related according to homonymy, but also point out why such a view cannot be true: first, they do not fit with the examples of homonyms which Aristotle provides at the outset of the *Categories*; second, Aristotle never states that the loose forms of *akrasia* are related to the strict form by homonymy, and instead consistently claims that they are related according to inclusive resemblance and metaphor. The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that akratic and enkratic agents can express self-control and un-self-control in many ways, just as virtuous agents can express virtue in many ways and vicious agents can express vice in many ways. Moreover, in the same fashion that virtue and vice serve as general classifications under which to categorize their individual expressions in the various practical domains, so too do self-control and un-self-control serve as general categories under which to classify their individual expressions in various practical domains.

2.1 An Issue of Range

If strict *akrasia* and strict *enkrateia* are indeed character types in the same way that temperance and self-indulgence are (as argued in Chapter 1), are un-self-control and self-control also general character types with wide ranges of expression just as virtue and vice are? When discussing virtue, one may either refer to overall excellence of character, or to a specific excellence such as temperance or courage. The same is true of character vice: calling someone vicious might mean

[48] In order to avoid the problem of finding a way to include '*enkrateia*' into every consideration of both character types, I have opted sometimes to use '*akrasia*' alone. It should be assumed unless otherwise indicated that what is concluded about *akrasia* also follows for *enkrateia*.

that she is subject to overall character corruption, or, more narrowly, it can pick out a single corrupted character type such as self-indulgence or cowardliness. One can then wonder whether Aristotle thinks that *akrasia* and *enkrateia* are character types tethered solely to a specific practical domain, or general character types with more than one expression throughout other practical domains. By '*akrasia*,' must one always mean un-self-control in temperance's domain, or can one also use it more broadly to refer to other forms of lack of self-control? A similar question arises regarding the character type of '*enkrateia*': must one mean only self-control in temperance's domain, or can one also use it more broadly to refer to other forms of self-control?

How we settle this matter is significant for understanding Aristotle's project properly as a contribution to the history of ethics. For instance, those who see in *akrasia* a prototype for what would become known as general "weakness of will," are blocked from adopting Aristotle as a precedent should he have conceived of *akrasia* as a localized character type rather than one which agents can express in many practical domains. For if it turns out that *akrasia* is possible only in temperance's practical domain, then agents could not express it in other domains, for instance, in courage's. This is worrisome for the general "weakness of will" theorist as I have described her because despite her interest in cases where one takes an extra drink even though she knows that she has had enough, the theorist is just as interested in cases where one shrinks away from a threat on the battlefield even though she knows that it is better to stand her ground. This theorist's view is that self-control and un-self-control are general ethical phenomena, and so she might expect them to be general character types for Aristotle, that is, character types with wide ranges of expression, not just character types defined according to agents' internal conflicts and choice-making regarding tactile appetite.

In order to determine Aristotle's view on the range of *akrasia* and *enkrateia*, an appropriate first step would be to look for text that justifies either the wide range or narrow range interpretation. At *NE* VII.5, Aristotle makes a distinction between *akrasia* ἁπλῶς and *akrasia* κατὰ μεταφορὰν that seems promising.

> ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἀκρασία καὶ ἐγκράτειά ἐστι μόνον περὶ ἅπερ ἀκολασία καὶ σωφροσύνη, καὶ ὅτι περὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἐστὶν ἄλλο εἶδος ἀκρασίας, λεγόμενον κατὰ μεταφορὰν καὶ οὐχ ἁπλῶς, δῆλον
>
> It is clear that *akrasia* and *enkrateia* are only related to the things which self-indulgence and temperance are, and that [a character type] related to other things is **another form of *akrasia***, called so by metaphor and not strictly [*NE* VII.5 1149a21-24]

I have rendered "ἄλλο εἶδος ἀκρασίας" as 1) "another form of *akrasia*," though it may also be translated as 2) "a kind other than *akrasia*." The ambiguity of the text contributes to interpretive difficulties, for how one handles the translation here influences whether or not she takes Aristotle to hold that *akrasia*, and so also *enkrateia*, have genuine expressions in practical domains other than that of temperance. If one adopts the first translation as I have above, then it looks as if Aristotle proposes that *akrasia*, and so *enkrateia* as well, has several expressions; the character types show up in other practical domains in addition to temperance's. On this interpretation, one has to account for why Aristotle would attribute "strictly" or "unqualifiedly" (ἁπλῶς) to *akrasia* and *enkrateia* when agents express them in temperance's practical domain, but "loosely" or "by metaphor," (κατὰ μεταφοράν) when agents express them in other domains. Nevertheless, on this interpretation, Aristotle notes that there are two manners in which *akrasia* and *enkrateia* show up in human conduct as character types: first, there are the strict, unqualified forms of the character types that agents express in temperance's domain, and second, there are the loose, qualified forms of the character types that agents express in practical domains other than temperance's. In other words, Aristotle is having it both ways. On this first interpretation, even though *akrasia* and

enkrateia are character types that agents clearly express in the practical domain of temperance, agents can also express them in other domains, for instance, in courage's. Further, on this interpretation, since *akrasia* and *enkrateia* have wide ranges of expression and are not solely tethered to temperance's practical domain, it is left open as a possibility that self-control and un-self-control are general character types with many specific expressions throughout the practical domains, similar to virtue and vice.

Alternatively, if one holds to the second possible translation and the interpretation that results from it, it appears as though *akrasia* and *enkrateia* are in fact tethered solely to temperance's practical domain. If this were the case, there would be no need for either self-control or un-self-control to serve as a general character type, for there would only be one genuine expression of each character type, namely those which agents express in temperance's practical domain. For the sake of clarity, I have reproduced the same passage from *NE* VII.5 with the alternative rendering of "ἄλλο εἶδος ἀκρασίας" as "a form other than *akrasia*" below:

> It is clear that *akrasia* and *enkrateia* are only related to the things which self-indulgence and temperance are, and that [a disposition] related to other things is **a form other than *akrasia***, called so by metaphor and not simply [*NE* VII.5 1149a21-24]

On the interpretation that follows from this translation, the fact that they have to do with distinct affects is apparently enough for Aristotle to justify drawing a sturdier boundary between *akrasia* ἁπλῶς and *akrasia* κατὰ μεταφορὰν than on the preceding interpretation. For the conclusion Aristotle draws on this rendering is that whatever resembles *akrasia* in other practical domains is actually something distinct from un-self-control because it involves an affect distinct from tactile appetite. It is worth pointing out that this is not how Aristotle proceeds when he distinguishes individual virtues or vices from one another; the fact that courage involves affects distinct from tactile appetite does not render courage something distinct from virtue just because it is not

temperance, and the fact that cowardice involves affects distinct from tactile appetite does not render cowardice something distinct from vice just because it is not self-indulgence.

Rather than the distinction arrived at on the first interpretation between strict and metaphorical or loose expressions of *akrasia*, where both forms are genuine expressions of the character types, the second interpretation commits one to a distinction between genuine and non-genuine expressions of *akrasia*. On this second view, agents express *real akrasia* (and so also *real enkrateia*) in temperance's practical domain; character types or similar conditions that show up in other domains, even if they resemble *real akrasia* and *enkrateia* because they involve conflicts between an agent's correct reason and desire, are not genuine or real expressions of the character types, but rather simulacra of them. On this second interpretation, it is poverty of language which explains why we use the same terms, '*akrasia*' and '*enkrateia*' when referring to their simulacra; it is not because self-control and un-self-control are character types which agents can express in many ways, that is, in both temperance's practical domain and in others.

In presenting the issue of the ranges of the character types as I have, I do not mean to suggest that a proper understanding of the ranges of *akrasia* and *enkrateia* is wholly contingent on the translation decision made in the *NE* VII.5 passage under consideration. Rather, I believe that investigating this bit of text in the way that I have reveals a puzzle of alternatives that arises when attempting to make sense of these character types and how they fit into Aristotle's larger ethical account. Here are the available alternatives: either (A) there are several specific ways that agents genuinely express self-control and un-self-control, the character types are not uniquely tethered to temperance's practical domain, and so they are general character types like virtue or vice, or (B) there is only one way of expressing self-control and only one way of expressing un-self-control, both of these expressions arise solely in temperance's practical domain, and so there is no sense in

positing general character types of un-self-control or self-control. For the sake of clarity, I want to emphasize that when I refer to self-control or un-self-control either serving as general character types or not, I mean the same kind of broad role that virtue and vice play with respect to the individual virtues and vices, accounting for their expressions in various practical domains. Virtue serves as a general character type because it can pick out temperance, courage, generosity, and so on; vice serves as a general character type because it can pick out self-indulgence, cowardliness, stinginess, and so on.

The major translators differ on how to render the text in the *NE* VII.5 passage that gives rise to this puzzle of alternatives. Ross has us read: "…what is concerned with other objects is **a type distinct from** incontinence," apparently in alignment with alternative (B).[49] Irwin posits: "…for other things there is **another form** of incontinence."[50] Rowe handles the translation just as Irwin does.[51] These possible renderings in support of alternative (B) rely on the next clause in the passage, and specifically the phrase "by metaphor" (κατὰ μεταφορὰν), as an indication that we are in the territory of Aristotelian homonymy; we might call the "other forms" by the same or similar names, but they do not share real or genuine *akrasia*'s definition. If so, then apparent cases of *akrasia* in domains other than temperance's, whether explicitly translated as "distinct," are counterfeit expressions of *akrasia*; holding to this view commits one to the claim that people just use the same terms to refer to entirely distinct phenomena. In a later section of this chapter, I take up the issue of whether the various expressions of *akrasia* are homonyms and reject the claim in favor of arguing that they are actually related according to metaphor and inclusive resemblance.

Hardie (Aristotle's Ethical Theory) also lends support to alternative (B):

[49] Ross (*Nic. Eth.*). 127
[50] Irwin (*Nic. Eth.)* 107
[51] Broadie & Rowe (Arist.: *Nic. Eth.* Trans., Intro., and Comm.) 197

> Among the 'phenomena' to be considered is the fact that we are prepared to apply the term akrasia simply to those who are induced by carnal desires to stray from their chosen paths, to apply it only in a qualified sense, by a conscious extension or metaphor, to those led astray by desires of other kinds.[52]

He proposes that although the restriction of genuine *akrasia* to temperance's domain "is liable to strike us as perverse," it is in fact Aristotle's view.[53] Yet, a few lines later, Hardie also seems to lend support to alternative (A):

> The second point to make is that Aristotle does not say, or suggest, that the problems raised by incontinent behavior are confined to *akrasia* in its proper or qualified sense. In particular, the questions whether, and in what sense, the incontinent man acts against 'knowledge' may be asked about all kinds of *akrasia* even including the *akrasia* which is a fault (*harmartia*) rather than a vice (*kakia*) (1148 a3). Presumably the answer which is good for *akrasia* in its unqualified sense will be good also, *mutatis mutandis*, for other varieties.[54]

Unfortunately, Hardie does not fully discuss the extent of *akrasia*'s range in his chapter on "Moral Weakness," before moving on to interpretive questions about *NE* VII's other subject matter. Nevertheless, there is an obvious tension between, on the one hand, Hardie's acceptance that genuine self-control and un-self-control are tethered solely to temperance's practical domain, and on the other, his suggestion that Aristotle can apply his explanation of genuine *akrasia* to account for other non-genuine expressions of the character type, or what he calls *akrasia*'s "other varieties." If these other varieties of *akrasia* are not genuine expressions of the character type, then I do not understand why we should suppose that the explanation that Aristotle provides for *akrasia*'s genuine expression should account for apparently non-genuine expressions. One expects that, if there is a sturdy distinction between genuine *akrasia* and its resemblances as Hardie supposes, one according to which the resemblances are non-genuine expressions of the character type, then genuine *akrasia* ought to have a different explanation than its non-genuine resemblances. But this

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[52] Hardie, W.F.R. (1980) Aristotle's Ethical Theory. Oxford University Press. 260-261
[53] *Ibid*. 260
[54] *Ibid*. 261

is not what Hardie contends. So, Hardie apparently lends support to both alternative (A) and alternative (B); but if the alternatives are mutually exclusive, as I propose that they are, then Hardie's view is in danger of being inconsistent.

My aim is to defend alternative (A), namely that agents genuinely express the character types of self-control and un-self-control in both temperance's practical domain and in other practical domains in which an agent's reason can conflict with her desire. I hold that self-control and un-self-control serve as general character types under which to classify their specific expressions and that this view is indispensable to a correct account of how the character types fit within Aristotle's ethical project. I propose that self-control and its lack serve as general character types in the way that virtue and vice do on Aristotle's account—even if for terminological reasons, to which I turn in the next section, the conventions of Athenian language restrict usage of '*akrasia*' and '*enkrateia*' to refer exclusively to their strict expressions in temperance's domain. While supporting alternative (A), I also oppose alternative (B), arguing against the view that the only real or genuine forms of un-self-control and self-control are those that agents develop and express in temperance's practical domain. I argue for the view that *akrasia* and *enkrateia* have wide ranges of expression: in addition to their genuine strict expressions, there are also genuine loose expressions of both character types, and agents express these loose forms in practical domains other than temperance's.

Burnyeat ("Aristotle on Learning to Be Good") seems to be a proponent of alternative (A) when he writes that "there are other sources of [*akrasia*] than the bodily appetites," which he refers to as "unreasoned evaluative responses…in non-appetitive *akrasia*."[55] Yet Burnyeat does not

[55] Burnyeat, Myles F. (1980) "Aristotle on Learning to be Good." reprinted in Explanations in Ancient and Modern Philosophy: Volume II. (2012) Cambridge University Press. 276. [I have replaced "incontinence" with "*akrasia*" for consistency]

provide an argument to justify that un-self-control outside of temperance's practical domain is genuine *akrasia*; he takes it for granted that, since Aristotle devotes *NE* VII.6 to a discussion of un-self-control regarding anger or temper, it must be a genuine expression of the character type as strict *akrasia* in temperance's domain is. Yet, as I examine more closely in the next chapter, not every scholar is apt to accept that *akrasia* regarding anger or temper is a genuine expression of the character type of un-self-control; Sarah Broadie disagrees with this interpretation. So, even though there are scholarly proponents of alternative (A), a sufficient argument remains to be made to justify that it is the correct alternative.

As I explain and develop strict and loose expressions of *akrasia* and *enkrateia*, it is worth noting that at least one other philosopher, Alfred Mele (Irrationality…), also uses the language of "strict incontinence" or *akrasia*, yet in a quite different way than I do. He writes:

> An action A is a *strict incontinent action* if and only if it is performed intentionally and freely and, at the same time at which it is performed, its agent consciously holds a judgment to the effect that there is good and sufficient reason for his not performing A at that time.[56]

What Mele has in mind by distinguishing "strict incontinence" from other sorts of un-self-control is something entirely different from what I mean to invoke by the distinction between strict and loose expressions of the character types of *akrasia* and *enkrateia*. Mele uses the language of "strict incontinence" to describe cases in which agents act against their "better judgment about something to be done *here* and *now*."[57] Opposed to "strict incontinence" according to Mele are expressions of *akrasia* in which agents have a better judgment that they are not consciously holding at the time that they act. Further, Mele has in mind that "strict incontinence" is genuine or real incontinence or un-self-control, while other instances that do not fall under this description are not genuine cases

[56] Mele, Alfred R. (1987) Irrationality: An Essay on Akrasia, Self-Deception, and Self-Control. Oxford University Press. 7 [author's emphasis]
[57] *Ibid.*

of *akrasia*. Perhaps Mele's distinction captures the difference between hasty and weak sorts of *akrasia* that I discussed at the end of Chapter 1 (pp. 74-80); recall that the hasty akratic does not abandon a correct intention that she forms at the time of action, but rather a correct intention she prepared in advance, whereas the weak akratic does form and abandon the correct intention all at the time of action. Both act against their "better judgment" of what they know is best to do, to borrow a phrase from Mele, but the weak akratic is perhaps the more likely of the two candidates to which to attribute Mele's title of "strict incontinence." Nevertheless, regardless of whether Mele's "strict incontinence," maps onto weak or hasty *akrasia*, he clearly uses similar 'strict' language to pick out something different than what I am using it to pick out.

On my account, strict *enkrateia* and strict *akrasia* refer to the character types as agents express them in temperance's practical domain; loose *akrasia* and loose *enkrateia* refer to the character types as agents express them in other practical domains beyond that of temperance. Unlike Mele, I do not maintain that my distinction marks the difference between genuine and non-genuine forms of self-control or un-self-control; for I hold that all of the expressions of these character types, both strict and loose, are genuine forms of *akrasia* and *enkrateia* for Aristotle. Further, unlike Mele, I do not use the distinction between strict and loose expressions of the character types to mark a difference regarding an agent's awareness that she acts akratically or enkratically at the time of action. My understanding of the difference between strict and loose expressions of the character types serves to distinguish their expressions in temperance's practical domain from their expressions in other practical domains.

2.2 A Terminological Restriction

The terms '*akrasia*' and '*enkrateia*' and the character types they are supposed to pick out can come apart in an important way. By this, I mean that it is possible to deny that their terms or names serve

general roles without at the same time denying that the character types themselves serve general roles. Hendrik Lorenz writes in the conclusion of an essay on the difference between what he calls "plain and qualified *akrasia*":

> Aristotle might add that 'lack of control' is—unlike, say, 'virtue'—not a genus term. As a result, to ascribe lack of control to someone, without saying in what particular way he or she lacks control, is not at all to claim, or even to suggest, that they exhibit the complete range of the various forms of lack of control.[58]

Lorenz suggests prohibiting the general use of the terms '*akrasia*' and '*enkrateia*,' and so he apparently opposes alternative (A). But his reason for suggesting the prohibition is not necessarily because there is only one way for agents to express each of these character types; for he goes on to write that there are "various forms of lack of control." So it appears that Lorenz does not really oppose alternative (A). His contention is that '*akrasia*' does not serve as a genus term capable of referring to the several ways that agents can be un-self-controlled. For, as we have seen at *NE* VII.5, Aristotle holds that the word in its strict, unqualified sense refers to the form of *akrasia* that agents express in temperance's practical domain, namely the way of being akratic with respect to tactile appetite. Lorenz suggests that there are other kinds of *akrasia*, but he denies that '*akrasia*' functions as a genus term able to refer to them all. I agree with Lorenz that *akrasia* cannot function as a genus term, and I propose that this is also true about *enkrateia*. To claim that '*akrasia*' is a genus term for the several ways agents can express lack of self-control, Lorenz follows up, "is to show ignorance of, or disregard for, the way the term 'lack of control' is actually used."[59] As examples, he considers the writings of Xenophon and Isocrates, who, Lorenz reports, when using the term '*akrasia*' in their respective works, always refer to lack of control over bodily pleasure

[58] Lorenz, Hendrik. (2009) "*NE* VII.4: Plain and Qualified *Akrasia*," in Aristotle: *Nicomachean Ethics* Book VII, Symposium Aristotelicum. Ed., Natali, Carlo. Oxford University Press. 100
[59] *Ibid*. 101

and pain attendant on the objects of food, drink, and sex.[60] So conventional Athenian use of the terms '*enkrateia*' and '*akrasia*' might refer exclusively to self-control and un-self-control that agents express in temperance's practical domain.

For instance, Book IV of Xenophon's *Memorabilia* recounts a conversation between Socrates and Euthydemus about the value of self-control wherein Socrates discusses both it and un-self-control exclusively in relation to bodily pleasures. Socrates asks Euthydemus:

> ὅστις οὖν ἄρχεται ὑπὸ τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἡδονῶν καὶ διὰ ταύτας μὴ δύναται πράττειν τὰ βέλτιστα, νομίζεις τοῦτον ἐλεύθερον εἶναι;
>
> Do you suppose that such a person is free, the very one who is ruled by and because of pleasures of the body, and because of this is incapable of doing what is best? [Xen. *Mem*. IV.5.3, 1-3]

Socrates's purported use of '*akrasia*' here is reminiscent of the way that Plato presents Socrates's views about *akrasia* in the penultimate arc of the *Protagoras* [352c-358d]. There, Socrates clearly argues against the possibility of *akrasia*, and what is more, against those who contend that it is possible for bodily pleasure to overcome a person's knowledge of what it is correct to do and influence her to perform a blameworthy action. Socrates poses the following question to Protagoras, demonstrating that it is bodily pleasure in particular which he denies has the power of overcoming knowledge:

> πάλιν τοίνυν, ἔφην ἐγώ, εἰ ἔροιντο ἡμᾶς: τί οὖν φατε τοῦτο εἶναι, ὃ ἡμεῖς ἥττω εἶναι τῶν ἡδονῶν ἐλέγομεν; εἴποιμ᾽ ἂν ἔγωγε πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὡδί: Ἀκούετε δή. πειρασόμεθα γὰρ ὑμῖν ἐγώ τε καὶ Πρωταγόρας φράσαι. ἄλλο τι γάρ, ὦ ἄνθρωποι, φατὲ ὑμῖν τοῦτο γίγνεσθαι ἐν τοῖσδε, οἷον πολλάκις ὑπὸ σίτων καὶ ποτῶν καὶ

[60] It is worth noting that Lorenz, when recognizing that there are indeed "various forms of lack of self-control," may be referring to the various ways one can be akratic within temperance's domain alone with respect to different objects; that is, Lorenz might be thinking that an agent can lack self-control over her desire for food, or her desire for drink, or her desire for sex. If this is the case, then Lorenz is no friend of alternative (A), but rather refers to different expressions of self-control within temperance's practical domain when he discusses the variety of *akrasia*'s expressions. However, it is not possible to conclude with any certainty that this is the kind of distinction that Lorenz has in mind, and it seems more likely that Lorenz is invoking a distinction among expressions of *akrasia* outside of temperance's domain rather than inside of it given the thesis he advances.

> ἀφροδισίων κρατούμενοι ἡδέων ὄντων, γιγνώσκοντες ὅτι πονηρά ἐστιν, ὅμως αὐτὰ πράττειν;
>
> So again, I said, if someone were to ask us: "What do you call it, then, that which we call being overcome by the pleasures? I myself would reply to them in this precise way: Listen up. Both Protagoras and I will try to show you. For what else do you mean, folks, when you say that such a thing happens in these cases, for instance when often people are overcome by the pleasantness of dishes, drinks, and sex, recognizing that doing these things is worthless, yet nevertheless do them? [*Protag*. 353c]

These passages provide evidence that there might be terminological reasons barring '*akrasia*' and '*enkrateia*' from serving as genus terms. For Lorenz's claim is that the terms cannot properly serve as genus terms to account for all the kinds of self-control and un-self-control that agents express, for that is not the way that Aristotle's predecessors or contemporaries used them; hence Aristotle's own distinction between strict or unqualified expressions of *akrasia* and *enkrateia* on the one hand, and loose or qualified expressions of *akrasia* and *enkrateia* on the other. So, even if the terms themselves, '*akrasia*' and '*enkrateia*,' are not used in a general way due to the conventions of language at Aristotle's time, the character types the words mean to pick out can still have wide ranges of expression. Distinguishing the terms or words from the character types they refer to is useful for the sake of clarifying my view about the ranges of both self-control and un-self-control. For I claim, just as Aristotle does, that self-control and un-self-control have wide ranges of expression; this is true even if the terms '*akrasia*' and '*enkrateia*,' when used by themselves in an unqualified way, are terms that exclusively refer to the strict forms of the character types.

If Lorenz is correct regarding the ways in which Aristotle's predecessors and contemporaries use the terms, '*akrasia*' and '*enkrateia*,' then in order to refer to self-control and un-self-control as agents express them outside of temperance's practical domain, Aristotle would either have to invent new terms for those expressions, or develop a consistent locution of qualification applicable to the character types' various expressions. Aristotle opts for this latter

strategy as is clear from the following passage at *NE* VII.4 concerning cases of self-control and un-self-control connected to spirit or temper and other affects distinct from tactile appetite.

> …ὑποληπτέον μόνην ἀκρασίαν καὶ ἐγκράτειαν εἶναι ἥτις ἐστὶ περὶ ταὐτὰ τῇ σωφροσύνῃ καὶ ἀκολασίᾳ. περὶ δὲ θυμοῦ καθ᾽ ὁμοιότητα λέγομεν. διὸ καὶ προστιθέντες ἀκρατῆ θυμοῦ ὥσπερ τιμῆς καὶ κέρδους φαμέν

> …it must be held that *akrasia* and *enkrateia* are only those character types connected with the same things as temperance and self-indulgence. Regarding anger, we call them character types according to resemblance. Thus we say, adding on, 'akratic with respect to spirit,' just as, 'akratic with respect to desire for honor,' or 'akratic with respect to desire for gain.' [*NE* VII.4 1148b11-14]

Aristotle furnishes names for loose akratic agents by qualifying them according to the affects particular to whichever domains agents express them in. Further, even though Aristotle does not name any loose enkratics in this passage, it can be assumed that agents with the loose forms are named similarly, for instance, 'enkratic with respect to x,' where x stands in for the affect relevant to the practical domain in which an agent expresses the character type. When agents express the character types in the practical domain of the virtue of mildness (πραότης), the relevant affect is spirit or temper, and so they are called akratic or enkratic with respect to spirit or temper; when agents express the character types in the practical domain belonging to the unnamed virtue that has to do with honor, the relevant affect is desire for honor, and so they are called akratic or enkratic with respect to desire for honor; when agents express the character types in the practical domain of generosity (ἐλευθεριότης), the relevant affect is desire for gain, and so they are called akratic or enkratic with respect to desire for gain.

Nevertheless, someone might note that Aristotle's claim in the passage above that we call the loose forms "character types according to resemblance," is ambiguous and can mean at least two different things. First, Aristotle could mean, as I propose that he does, that the loose forms of *akrasia* and *enkrateia* inherit their names (e.g., *akrasia* with respect to *x*) from the strict forms due to their shared status as expressions of the same general character types; this is why they resemble

one another. Second, Aristotle could mean that the loose forms are not genuine forms of *akrasia* and *enkrateia* at all, even though they bear some similarities to genuine *akrasia* and *enkrateia*. What is at stake is how to understand the resemblance or likeness relation that Aristotle invokes in the passage: does he mean it inclusively or exclusively? If he means that the loose forms of the character types are like the strict forms in an inclusive manner, then he is claiming that they are alike because they are expressions of the same character types. If, on the other hand, Aristotle means that their loose forms are like their strict forms in an exclusive manner, then he is claiming that they bear resemblance to one another but are not necessarily expressions of the same character types.

I propose that Aristotle is making the inclusive claim, rather than the exclusive claim, about loose expressions of *akrasia* and *enkrateia* when noting their likeness or resemblance to the more familiar strict expressions. For if the loose expressions were actually entirely different from the character types of strict *akrasia* and *enkrateia*, and so if Aristotle were making an exclusive likeness claim, then one would have to explain why Aristotle preserves the terms '*akrasia*' and '*enkrateia*,' (albeit with qualifications) when naming the loose expressions, other than for the reason of grouping them together as expressions of the same character types. For this reason is not open to one who thinks that Aristotle is making an exclusive likeness claim. I take up the issue of what Aristotle means by the resemblance claim in more detail in a later section when discussing what he means by the metaphor claim at *NE* VII.5. For now, all I want to say on this point is that Aristotle is up to something similar when making both claims and that we should take Aristotle's statements that the loose forms of the character types get their names by metaphor or resemblance literally. Aristotle does not opt to describe the relation between strict and loose forms of the character types in terms of any of the ontological classifications he introduces at the outset of the

Categories—that is, he never describes their relation in terms of synonymy, homonymy, or paronymy. As I argue later, this is because Aristotle does not think that the strict and loose forms of the character types are related in any of these ways, but rather that the loose forms derive their names from and are related to the strict forms due to the terminological and ontological relation of metaphor.

So far I have shown that it is possible for the character types of un-self-control and self-control to serve as general character types, as virtue and vice do, despite the fact that Aristotle's use of the terms '*akrasia*' and '*enkrateia*' by themselves often refer solely to their strict expressions in temperance's practical domain. My account is similar to Lorenz's in this respect, for I agree that the artifacts of language, the unqualified terms '*akrasia*' and '*enkrateia*' themselves, might be restricted to a narrow range of use (as Aristotle indeed notes). These terms are not genus terms, but rather seem to refer exclusively to self-control and its lack as agents express them in temperance's practical domain. Yet my view diverges from Lorenz's in one important respect, for I maintain that loose expressions of self-control and its lack are genuine expressions of the character types, while Lorenz leaves open that this is not the case: "…lack of control over property, honour, and the like *are not cases of lack of control*, speaking without qualification, though they resemble it by being analogous."[61] Lorenz does not propose that delineating strict from loose expressions is primarily a way of being precise about in which domain some agent expresses *akrasia* or *enkrateia*; rather, on his view, loose expressions of the character types may not be real expressions of them at all. Moreover, the loose forms of the character types merely resemble the strict forms in an exclusive manner according to Lorenz; they are not joined together as expressions

[61] Lorenz 90 [my emphasis]

of the same underlying character types in the way that, say, the individual ways of expressing virtue are joined together under the virtuous character type.

> It is far from clear…whether Aristotle is prepared to accept that there exists a use of the term 'lacking control' such that one can employ that use both in saying that a person lacks control over, say, the pleasure of eating and in saying that someone else lacks control over, say, anger…This leaves no room for a generic use that ranges over both the term's proper domain and other domains into which it might be transferred.[62]

It should be conceded that Lorenz makes a correct and interesting terminological point, one with which I agree and to which I developed the distinction between strict and loose forms of *akrasia* and *enkrateia* in response. However, Lorenz leaves open the possibility that the terminological restriction on usage of '*akrasia*' and '*enkrateia*' maps onto an ontological restriction according to which the loose forms are not genuine forms of the character types. For he maintains that the terminological restriction, for instance that the term '*akrasia*' conventionally refers to an agent's un-self-control over tactile appetite, could parallel a restriction on what counts as a genuine expression of un-self-control. In terms of the puzzle of alternatives, it seems that Lorenz in some sense endorses alternative (A), for he claims that there are "various forms of lack of control," and that he also leaves open alternative (B), since he never wards off the possibility that his terminological point is at the same time an ontological one.[63]

I hold that the character types themselves have genuine loose and strict expressions, even if the terms '*akrasia*' and '*enkrateia*' when unqualified exclusively pick out their strict forms

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[62] *Ibid*. 93

[63] It is worth pointing out now, even though I do not take up the issue until Chapter 3, that Lorenz correctly implies that calling an agent akratic or enkratic does not, and probably cannot, mean that she is thoroughly un-self-controlled or self-controlled. Calling someone virtuous, on the other hand, does mean that she is thoroughly virtuous, i.e., she expresses all of the individual virtues in all of the practical domains, and this is because of the unity constraint that Aristotle applies to the virtuous character type. I argue later that Aristotle is not committed to applying the same unity constraint to *akrasia* and *enkrateia*, but that he is committed to applying a modification of the unity constraint to these character types, a modification which I term the duality constraint which requires, briefly: when calling someone akratic, this entails that she can express *akrasia* in some practical domains and *enkrateia* in others; she can express *akrasia* in temperance's domain and *enkrateia* in courage's, for instance.

which agents express in temperance's practical domain. For "according to likeness," Aristotle in fact permits that there are similar expressions of the character types in other practical domains, and we call them loose *akrasiai* or *enkrateiai*, qualifying them by "with respect to *x*," (where *x* stands in for the proper affect of a practical domain). All of the strict and loose expressions of self-control and un-self-control have in common that they are choice-making pyschological dispositions characterized by conflict between what an agent knows is correct to choose and do and what affect pulls her to choose and do instead. I maintain that just as temperance, mildness, and generosity, and so on are all specific and genuine ways of being virtuous, and just as self-indulgence, irascibility, and stinginess are all genuine and specific ways of being vicious, so too are all of the loose and strict expressions of *akrasia* and *enkrateia* genuine ways of being self-controlled and un-self-controlled, respectively.

It is worth noting before moving on that Lorenz's claim that all of Aristotle's predecessors and contemporaries used '*akrasia*' to refer exclusively to lack of self-control over tactile appetite and sensual pleasure is not unchallengeable. In Book IX of Plato's *Laws*, for example, the unnamed Athenian character refers to a case of lack of self-control over spirit or temper, or, in other words, a case of what I have termed loose *akrasia*.

> ἐὰν δ᾽ ἄρα τις εἰς τοσοῦτον ἀκρατὴς θυμοῦ γίγνηται πρὸς τοὺς γεννήσαντας ὥστε μανίαις ὀργῆς τῶν γεννητόρων τολμῆσαι κτεῖναί τινα…
>
> If someone is so un-self-controlled over her temper against her parents that in the frenzy of her rage she undertakes to kill one of them…[*Laws* IX, 869a]

The unnamed Athenian does not go on to provide a detailed description or analysis of what it means for someone to be "ἀκρατὴς θυμοῦ," nor does he compare or contrast "ἀκρατὴς θυμοῦ" with un-self-control over tactile appetite or sensual pleasure. Nevertheless, this passage provides evidence that among Aristotle's contemporaries and predecessors, at least Plato uses the language of '*akrasia*' in a context that does not pertain to the affect of tactile appetite, but rather to the affect

of spirit or temper. The Athenian Stranger's words lend some justification for disagreeing with Lorenz regarding what it means to "show ignorance of, or disregard for, the way the term 'lack of control' is actually used." For it is possible to see in this passage from the *Laws* a Platonic recognition that agents express *akrasia* and *enkrateia* in more ways than solely with respect to the affect of tactile appetite. That is, Aristotle's depiction of these character types as extending beyond temperance's domain is not entirely unprecedented.[64] Nevertheless, I do want to emphasize the fact that Aristotle does not, as Lorenz seems to suggest, arise from a tradition of philosophers which has never used the term, '*akrasia*,' or its cognates to refer to anything other than lack of self-control over sensual pleasures or tactile appetite. It is still likely that conventional Athenian use of the terms '*akrasia*' and '*enkrateia*' most often refers to their expressions in relation to tactile appetite, and that this is why Aristotle furnishes qualified names for the loose expressions in order to be precise. Even the Stranger in the passage from the *Laws* specifies that he is referring to *akrasia* outside of the domain of tactile appetite with his use of the genitive, 'θυμοῦ.' Yet even if the terms '*akrasia*' and '*enkrateia*,' when unqualified, are conventionally bound to refer to the strict forms of the character types, it does not follow that the ranges of the character types of self-control and un-self-control are subject to similar restrictions.

2.3 'ἁπλῶς' v. 'κατὰ μεταφοράν'

Making my view clear depends importantly on how we understand the opposition between 'ἁπλῶς' and 'κατὰ μεταφοράν' in the passage from *NE* VII.5 that gives rise to the puzzle of alternatives

[64] I do not mean to suggest that the passage shows Plato implicitly condoning an ethical framework in which agents express *akrasia* with respect to various affects, for he could be using the language of '*akrasia*' here to characterize the emotional stress someone would have to suffer in order to go through with the murder of her parents. All that I want to emphasize here is that the passage from the *Laws* provides evidence that Athenian use of the language of *akrasia* may be looser than Lorenz suggests.

(A) and (B) I have been considering. As we have just seen, Lorenz leaves open the possibility that when Aristotle opposes the two terms, he means to distinguish between a genuine instance of something on the one hand, and a non-genuine but somewhat similar instance on the other. To justify this kind of view, one must think that Aristotle sets 'ἁπλῶς' against 'κατὰ μεταφοράν' in the passage to separate real from metaphorical expressions of *akrasia* and *enkrateia* in the same way that a Macintosh apple is an apple *really*, but the "apple of my eye" is an apple according to metaphor. Yet Aristotle does not consistently employs these oppositional terms in order to distinguish real versions or instances of things from non-genuine ones. Aristotle does not often set 'ἁπλῶς' against 'κατὰ μεταφοράν' in the ethical works. Sometimes he sets 'ἁπλῶς' against 'πως' to provide further precision on a topic in a way similar to the English oppositional phrases, 'on the whole,' and 'in a sense,' (e.g., *EE* II.8 1225a12, *NE* II.5 1105b33). In other places, Aristotle uses 'ἁπλῶς' to mean "simply," or "unqualifiedly," (*EE* II.3 1221b7, *EE* II.5 1222a16, *NE* II.3 104b25, *NE* III.1 1110a9, *NE* 1110a18). In these latter contexts, Aristotle is usually distinguishing between what is the case in an unconditional manner from what is the case under certain conditions or with certain qualifications.

However, there are two instructive examples I have found in the ethical treatises, aside from places where *akrasia* and *enkrateia* are under consideration, in which Aristotle does set something said in an unqualified manner against a form of μεταφορά (not necessarily preceded by the preposition κατὰ, though in grammatical cases—like the dative—that preserve the adverbial sense of the prepositional phrase). First, at *EE* II.3, Aristotle opposes 'ἁπλῶς' and 'μεταφορᾷ' while discussing the virtue of κακοπάθεια, or endurance, a virtue unique to the *EE*. He writes that an agent who can endure all kinds of pain has no name unqualifiedly (ἁπλῶς), but by metaphor or transference (μεταφορᾷ) gains the appellation "hard and a sufferer and one who endures," [ὡς μὲν

ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν ἀνώνυμος μεταφορᾷ δὲ λέγεται σκληρὸς καὶ ταλαίπωρος καὶ κακοπαθητικός, 1221a28-31]. Aristotle makes use of the oppositional terms in this case to make clear that a so-called nameless virtue can be furnished with a name due to its likeness to character descriptions or traits that already have names. This use of the oppositional terms 'ἁπλῶς' and 'μεταφορᾷ' at *EE* II.3 aligns with the way I propose that Aristotle uses them at *NE* VII.5. For I have argued that loose *akrasiai* and *enkrateiai* have no unqualified names, but that by inclusive resemblance or metaphor, Aristotle furnishes them with names by means of a special locution of qualification. This does not mean that they are non-genuine or counterfeit expressions of the character types, but rather that the conventional terms available to Aristotle and his audience are insufficient to account for the classification he aims to develop. Aristotle makes use of familiar terms with clear meanings in the *EE* II.3 passage to furnish a name for a virtue which, until he gives it one, bears no conventional title. Since agents who have developed κακοπάθεια are like those who can suffer hardships well, he names these kinds of virtuous agents after hardship sufferers. This is a case where the likeness relation is inclusive, rather than exclusive, and this case mirrors what Aristotle is up to when he names loose expressions of *akrasia* and *enkrateia* according to their likenesses or resemblances to the strict expressions of the character types.

A second place in the ethics where Aristotle employs similar oppositional terms is at *NE* III.6 when discussing courage [1115a14-15]; 'ἁπλῶς' is missing from this instance, but he uses 'κατὰ μεταφοράν' in order to make an exclusive claim regarding a non-genuine or counterfeit instance of courage. He employs this language in the context of clarifying that some people call an agent courageous because she is not afraid of shame, but that calling her so is the result of an incorrect metaphor or faulty resemblance; truly, Aristotle reports that she is not courageous, but rather she is shameless. In this case, Aristotle is explaining that some people mistakenly attribute

courage to agents who only appear courageous, and that when they erroneously call such agents courageous, it is because the agents merely seem courageous.[65] Unlike the case above from *EE* II.3 where Aristotle employs the dative 'μεταφορᾷ' to make an inclusive claim about a so-far nameless virtue, at *NE* III.6, Aristotle uses the prepositional phrase 'κατὰ μεταφοράν' to exclude or disqualify a kind of person from counting as courageous even though someone might mistakenly call her so because of her resemblance to a person who really is courageous.

These examples show us that Aristotle uses similar oppositional terms in some cases inclusively to extend the meaning of a term to cover more cases than it conventionally does, as he does when furnishing a novel name for the virtue of κακοπάθεια; in other cases, he uses the oppositional terms exclusively to restrict the meaning of a term in spite of its liberal employment by others to cover more cases than he thinks it actually does. So, the question before us now is: in which sense does Aristotle set 'ἁπλῶς' against 'κατὰ μεταφοράν' in the *NE* VII.5 passage under consideration? Does he use the oppositional terms in an exclusive manner to set real expressions of *akrasia* and *enkrateia* against non-genuine expressions of the character types? Or does Aristotle employ the oppositional terms to make an inclusive claim, namely that people *usually* use '*akrasia*' and '*enkrateia*' to refer to self-control and un-self-control in temperance's practical domain, while he will go on to extend and modify the terms to refer to other genuine expressions of the character types in other practical domains? This distinction opens up a way of clarifying my disagreement with Lorenz; he leaves open the possibility that Aristotle is making an exclusive claim, whereas I advocate that Aristotle is making an inclusive one.

[65] Nussbaum (Aristotle's *De Motu Animalium*) comments on this passage that "courageous" here is being used "to refer to a man who is not truly courageous, but only has some characteristics in common with the courageous man," (253). Nussbaum, Martha. Aristotle's *De Motu Animalium*. (1979) Princeton University Press.

Another location in the text worth looking at in which Aristotle employs 'ἁπλῶς' is the following claim about *akrasia* at *NE* VII.2

> ἔτι εἰ περὶ πάντα ἀκρασία ἐστὶ καὶ ἐγκράτεια, τίς ὁ ἁπλῶς ἀκρατής; οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἁπάσας ἔχει τὰς ἀκρασίας, φαμὲν δ᾽ εἶναί τινας ἁπλῶς.
>
> Moreover, if *akrasia* and *enkrateia* are connected with all things, who is strictly akratic? For nobody has all of the kinds of *akrasia*, but we do say that there are some who are strictly akratic. [*NE* VII.2 1146b2-5]

Aristotle says here that there is indeed a strict form of *akrasia* (i.e., un-self-control in temperance's practical domain), and that no one has developed all of the individual akratic character types. Aristotle's claim that, "nobody has all of the kinds of *akrasia*," is not worrisome for my view about the range of un-self-control if one recalls the sketch of temperance's practical domain (**Figure 1)** from the preceding chapter.[66] If there are two akratic characters in temperance's practical domain, one whose actions externally resemble the self-indulgent agent's, and another whose actions externally resemble the insensible agent's, then of course nobody can have all of the forms of akrasia; a similar account also holds barring someone from having every form of *enkrateia*. For if there are two akratic character types in temperance's practical domain, then there are also two enkratic agents; although both enkratic agents perform actions that externally resemble the temperate agent's, each one experiences a different struggle between reason and desire. One enkratic agent struggles against excessive tactile appetite, while the other struggles against deficient tactile appetite in the course of enacting the correct choice. In general, it is impossible that an agent could have developed more than one character type in a single practical domain at the same time.

An analogy with vice is helpful here: just as Aristotle holds that nobody has all the forms of *akrasia*, it is likewise true that nobody has all of the vices—even if we are considering an agent

[66] See Ch. 1, Section 1.4, p. 60

who is thoroughly vicious. It will never be true that she has all of the vices, since two distinct vices lie at the extremes of each practical domain. It is impossible for an agent to have developed both of the vices in temperance's practical domain at the same time, i.e., to be both self-indulgent and insensible at once, since the former is characterized by excessive tactile appetite, while the latter by deficient tactile appetite. It is important to recognize that this is an issue entirely distinct from whether a vicious agent can express her vice in several or all practical domains, for instance whether she can be both self-indulgent in temperance's domain and a coward in courage's. I am not denying this. However, what I am pointing out is that, within a single practical domain, agents can only have one character type at any given time. So just as nobody can have all the vices at once, nobody can have all the forms of *akrasia* at once; I think the same holds for *enkrateia*.

Nevertheless, the main reason I draw attention to this passage from *NE* VII.2 is because it confirms that the sense of the 'ἁπλῶς'/'κατὰ μεταφοράν' distinction Aristotle applies to *akrasia* is inclusive rather than exclusive. He recognizes that the terms he has inherited, '*akrasia*' and '*enkrateia*,' are conventionally bound by their reference to tactile appetite, but he also recognizes that there are other forms of *akrasia* in this passage which he does not proceed to disqualify from being genuine forms of the character type. When coming up with ways to refer to loose akratic agents, Aristotle bypasses the terminological restriction by preserving the term, 'akratic,' and qualifying it (e.g., 'akratic with respect to *x*'). Aristotle is claiming in the *NE* VII.2 passage that no agent has all of the forms of *akrasia*, yet there are certainly agents who lack self-control over tactile appetite, and that he will use the term '*akrasia*,' strictly or unqualifiedly, specifically to designate un-self-control when agents express it in with respect to this affect in temperance's practical domain. One can read Aristotle's use of 'ἁπλῶς' in relation to *akrasia* and *enkrateia* consistently as a way of referring to strict expressions of the character types without also denying that the loose

forms of the character types are genuine forms. In short, it is not required that the terminological restrictions on '*akrasia*' and '*enkrateia*," map onto ontological restrictions on the character types of un-self-control and self-control.

So, I hold that strict (ἁπλῶς) *akrasia* refers to lack of self-control in temperance's practical domain, while loose (κατὰ μεταφορὰν) *akrasia* refers to a real expression of the character type an agent expresses in a practical domain other than temperance's, for instance in courage's practical domain; the same distinction applies to the forms of *enkrateia*. The loose expressions get their names from a transference or extension to a new practical domain of the terms that *usually* pick out character types agents express in temperance's practical domain. Aristotle's use of the opposition beween 'ἁπλῶς' and 'κατὰ μεταφορὰν' in his analysis of *akrasia* is similar to his use of the same opposition in at *EE* II.3 when furnishing a name for the virtue of κακοπάθεια; he employs the oppositional terms in an inclusive manner, not to delineate genuine from counterfeit expressions of the character types of un-self-control and self-control.

2.4 Loose & Strict Forms: Homonyms, Synonyms, Paronyms, or Metaphors?

Another way of clarifying my view is to discuss how the strict and loose expressions of *akrasia* and the loose expressions of *enkrateia* are related both terminologically and ontologically. Aristotle gives accounts and examples of homonymy, synonymy, and paronymy in the opening chapter of the *Categories* as not only ways of classifying the relations between terms, but also as ways of classifying the relations between beings. Ward (Aristotle on Homonymy) succinctly accounts for the differences among them:

> Put briefly, homonymy refers to things having the same name and different definition; synonymy, to things having both the same name and the same definition; and paronymy, to terms related by their inflected ending. The bare bones of the three-way account may be set down easily. Yet certain interpretive issues

> concerning the precise lines of the account, as well as the overall scope and nature of *Cat.* itself, remain subjects of debate.[67]

It is easy to think that Aristotle is setting out linguistic or terminological relations and nothing more, yet Aristotle certainly has in mind that when any of the three relations obtains, each one indicates more than linguistic similarity or dissimilarity; each also indicates ontological similarity or dissimilarity. He is interested in the three relations *qua* linguistic insofar as he wants to develop a toolkit for the sake of tracking real ontological relations with precision in his works and his lectures.

It is useful to consider some examples of Aristotle's three kinds of linguistic and ontological relations. 'Bear' may refer to a stuffed animal in my nephew's toy box, or to the quadruped mammal that characteristically hibernates through the winter—these instances give rise to *homonymy*, since both the stuffed animal and the mammal share the same name, yet their accounts or definitions are clearly different. Next, suppose I have a basket of apples, pull two out, and refer to each of them as 'apple'—this is an instance of *synonymy*, for both of the fruits I pull out share the same name and the same account or definition. Finally, the following three sets of coupled terms, 'appetite,' and 'appetitive,' 'medicine,' and 'medicinal,' and '*akrasia*,' and 'akratic,' all count as *paronymous* couples; minor changes and additions to the endings of the first terms in each pair give rise to the second terms, which serve as different parts of speech.[68]

So which of these three relations accounts for the relation between strict and loose expressions of *akrasia* and *enkrateia*? Aristotle considers different agents who lack self-control in the strict and loose senses in the passage from *NE* VII.4 in the following way: on the one hand,

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[67] Ward, Julie K. (2008) Aristotle on Homonymy. Cambridge University Press. 9

[68] My English examples follow the model set by Aristotle's Greek examples: "for instance, 'grammarian' comes from 'grammar,' and 'courageous' comes from 'courage,'" [οἷον ἀπὸ τῆς γραμματικῆς ὁ γραμματικὸς καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀνδρείας ὁ ἀνδρεῖος, 1a14-15].

there is the strict akratic in temperance's domain, and on the other, Aristotle lists three examples of loose akratics, namely the ἀκρατῆ θυμοῦ (akratic with respect to spirit or temper), the ἀκρατῆ τιμῆς (akratic with respect to desire for honor), and the ἀκρατῆ κέρδους (akratic with respect to desire for gain). It is important to repeat that the question before us is not merely, "What is the relation between the terms?", but also, "What is the relation between the various strict and loose forms of *akrasia* as real beings, as dispositions of the human soul?" In other words, the issue is one of figuring out what the relation among the strict and loose forms of *akrasia* and *enkrateia* consists in, not merely an issue of determining the relation among the terms that pick them out.

It seems clear that we can rule out synonymy rather quickly, as Aristotle insists that we provide a consistent locution of qualification when naming the loose expressions of *akrasia*. That is, the strict and loose expressions of *akrasia*, for instance, do not seem to share the same name. The term '*akrasia*' indeed shows up in the names which Aristotle furnishes for the loose forms of lack of self-control, but when Aristotle uses '*akrasia*' by itself, at least in *NE* VII, it refers simply to strict *akrasia*. Further, the accounts or definitions of the various forms of the character type also differ from one another, insofar as Aristotle qualifies the loose forms by reference to the affects proper to the domains in which agents express them. So both the names and the accounts of strict and loose expressions of *akrasia* and *enkrateia* are different. This clearly rules out synonymy and leaves open paronymy and homonymy as explanatory of the relation between the strict and loose forms of the character types. The strict and loose forms of self-control and its lack do not appear to be paronyms, either. To be clear, Aristotle does name the loose forms of both character types after their strict expressions by including '*akrasia*' and '*enkrateia*' in their titles. However, the way in which the loose forms get their names from the strict forms is not quite the same way that 'appetitive' gets its name from 'appetite,' or 'akratic' gets its name from '*akrasia*.' For the change

from ‘ἀκρατῆ’ to ‘ἀκρατῆ θυμοῦ’ lacks the subtlety that accompanies the minor changes in inflected endings that characterize Aristotle’s examples of paronymous terms. So this seems to leave open only homonymy as explanatory of the relation among the strict and loose forms of each character type.

Yet it does not seem likely that they are homonyms, either; at any rate, the thesis that they are homonyms runs into obstacles. If it is true for Aristotle that strict *akrasia* and, for instance, *akrasia* with respect to spirit or temper, are homonymously related, then, following his own definition of that relation, what would unite them as homonyms would be the fact that they share a name, and nothing more. Yet it does not seem right to say that strict and loose akratics share the same name, for as I showed earlier, even though loose forms of *akrasia* derive their names from the strict form, Aristotle differentiates the loose forms—both from other loose forms and from the strict form—by means of a consistent locution of qualification. Since Aristotle furnishes a distinct name for each loose form, and none of the loose forms have the same name as the strict one, it does not seem right to call them homonyms. One might reply that the strict and loose forms of the character types share partial names, since all of the loose forms derive their names from the strict form.

In a claim about *akrasia* in the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle does not distinguish its strict and loose forms by furnishing them with different names: “…there is *akrasia* concerning all of the things which people desire,” […ἔστιν δὲ ἀκρασία περὶ πάντα ὅσων ὀρέγονται, *Rh*. I.12 1372b15-16]. So it appears that Aristotle does refer to the loose forms or expressions of un-self-control as simply ‘*akrasia*’ in cases where he is being less precise about forms of the character type, such as in rhetorical inquiry, and that he provides the locution of qualification (‘*akrasia* with respect to x’) where precision about a certain expression requires it, such as in ethical inquiry; the same goes for

enkrateia's expressions. Moreover, because the terms '*akrasia*' and '*enkrateia*' might be conventionally bound to refer to self-control and un-self-control over tactile appetite, providing the locutions of qualification is necessary, particularly so in ethical inquiry, to indicate to his audience that he means to extend the character types to cover cases of self-control and its lack in practical domains beyond that of temperance. In short, in some cases Aristotle refers to the strict and loose forms of *akrasia* with the same name, and in other case he distinguishes them in a way that leaves them sharing only partial names. Assuming for now that sharing partial names is sufficient to satisfy the terminological part of Aristotle's definition of homonymy, there is a further obstacle in the way of arguing that the strict and the loose forms of *akrasia* are homonyms. If homonyms are supposed to share a name and nothing more, then their definitions or accounts should not share any significant features or aspects. Yet clearly the definitions of both strict and loose expressions of *akrasia* share much in common; they are all expressions of the same sort of psychic struggle between reason and desire, and in each case the only difference depends on which affects are involved. If homonyms are not supposed to share even aspects of their definitions, then the strict and loose forms of *akrasia*, and so also of *enkrateia*, are not homonyms.

However, some scholars have drawn attention to the fact that homonymy understood in the way I have been presenting it up to now might not quite capture all that Aristotle intends to explain by the relation. Ward credits Irwin (Order in Multiplicity…) and Shields ("Homonymy in the Phil. of Aristotle") with showing that Aristotelian homonymy is more complicated than a cursory examination of the relation might suggest.[69]

> For Aristotle states that homonymous things "have only the name in common" (1a1), and this may be read as excluding or not excluding an additional, shared feature. Thus, the phrase "has only the name in common" can be read as meaning:

[69] Shields, Christopher. (1999) Order in Multiplicity: Homonymy in the Philosophy of Aristotle. Oxford: Clarendon Press. & Irwin, Terence. (1981) "Homonymy in Aristotle." In *Review of Metaphysics*. 34. 523-544.

> (1) homonymous things have the name in common *and nothing more* or (2) homonymous things have the same name but not the same definition.[70]

Some scholars have argued that we can understand Aristotle's relation of homonymy to extend more widely than just to cases in which things have common names but have nothing common in definition or account. Homonymy can also cover cases in which two things share the same name *and* share certain aspects, attributes, or features of their definitions or accounts, so long as they do not have precisely the same definition or account. For recall that if two or more things share both the same names and the same accounts or definitions, then they are synonyms on Aristotle's account, and not homonyms.

Turning back to my example of the two possible referents of 'bear,' the hibernating mammal and the stuffed toy, we can already see this sense of "related homonymy" in action. If we add a third possible referent of 'bear,' the case for understanding homonymous terms in this "related" sense, and differentiating related homonyms from accidental homonyms, becomes even clearer: 'bear' can also refer to the verb meaning, "to carry." Now, the stuffed animal and the hibernating mammal have more in common definitionally than either of them has in common with the sense of 'bear' meaning, "to carry." So, the first two 'bears' are related homonyms, while the verb, 'bear,' is accidentally homonymous with the other two 'bears.' To put it differently, borrowing a term from Ward, there are cases of homonymy in which the definitions of the homonyms do not "overlap" at all, and these are cases of accidental homonymy; we can see examples when we say that the term picking out both the hibernating mammal and the verb meaning, "to carry" are accidentally homonymous, or that the term picking out both the stuffed

[70] *Ibid*. p. 16 [Ward's emphasis]

animal and "to carry" are accidentally homonymous.[71] Accidental homonymy, then, captures cases in which things share the same name, but have entirely divergent accounts or definitions.

Yet, as my examples lay bare, there are also cases of "related" homonymy in which the homonyms "possess overlapping features and definitions although they lack identical natures."[72] The hibernating mammal and the stuffed animal certainly do not have identical natures, but parts of their accounts or definitions indeed overlap; they are both furry, for instance, and have two ears, extended noses, and so on.[73] So it is not just the case that the mammal and the stuffed animal have the name 'bear' in common, but they share some features, attributes, and, in short, parts of their definitions or accounts. Ward notes that examples like this one show that, in addition to accidental homonymy, Aristotle's distinctions "allow for related, systematic homonymy."[74] Aristotle's own example of homonymy at *Cat*. 1 seems to be a case of such an allowance; he writes that both a living rational animal and a drawing of a rational animal share the name 'person,' [οἷον ζῷον ὅ τε ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ γεγραμμένον, 1a2-3]. It is clear that the drawing and the animal do not share identical natures, yet it is also clear that their accounts or definitions have some features or aspects in common. In other words, the very case with which Aristotle chooses to exemplify homonymy at the opening of the *Categories* is not a case of accidental homonymy, but rather a case of related homonymy.

In the light of this distinction between the two different sorts of homonymy, one could attempt to advance the thesis that strict *akrasia* and the loose forms of *akrasia* are related homonyms and not accidental homonyms, and hold the same view about the relation among *enkrateia*'s strict and loose forms. For strict and loose *akrasiai* somewhat share the same name

[71] *Ibid*.
[72] *Ibid*.
[73] This is as we should expect, since the stuffed animal is modeled after the real mammal.
[74] *Ibid*.

and have somewhat overlapping accounts or definitions. Their definitions or accounts overlap but are not identical because even though the strict and loose expressions of each of the character types involves psychological conflict between an agent's reason and desire, it is also true that the expressions are connected to different affects and agents express each of their forms in different practical domains. All of the forms of *akrasia* have in common definitionally that each is an expression of psychic struggle between affect and reason's correct prescription, where the agent's relation to an affect leads her to abandon what she knows it would be correct to choose and to do and to enact a different, blameworthy choice. Similarly, all the forms of *enkrateia* have in common definitionally that they are also expressions of psychological struggle between affect and reason's correct prescription, where the agent overcomes her struggle and follows through to enact what she knows is the correct choice. So, someone who wants to argue that the strict and loose forms of each of the character types are related by homonymy appears, *prima facia*, able to do so, as long as she holds that they are systematic, related homonyms and not accidental homonyms.

Yet this revised view that the strict and loose forms of each of the character types are related homonyms rather than accidental ones is not without its own obstacles; I propose that they are not related homonyms, either. If someone argues that the strict and loose forms of either of the character types are related homonyms, then she must concede that they do not quite fit with Aristotle's examples of related homonymy presented at the outset of the *Categories*. First, Aristotle's examples of related homonyms have definitions that do not overlap very much, while the strict and loose forms of *akrasia* and *enkrateia* have definitions that overlap significantly. Second, Aristotle's examples of related homonyms indicate a further ontological hierarchy relation that cannot characterize the strict and loose forms of the character types; for in his example, one of the homonyms is ontologically inferior to the other, whereas the loose expressions of the

character types are not ontologically inferior to the strict forms. After considering these obstacles, it will be clear that the strict and loose forms of each of the character types cannot be related homonyms any more than they can be accidental homonyms. Instead, we must take literally Aristotle's insistence that the strict and loose forms are related by inclusive resemblance and metaphor.

Consider again Aristotle's example of related homonymy at the start of the *Categories*: the drawing of a person and a living rational animal; also reconsider the example which I presented earlier: the stuffed bear and the living bear that characteristically hibernates. Such examples give the impression that related homonyms have definitions or accounts that do in fact overlap, but do not overlap very much. There is a great deal of wiggle room between outright synonymous terms or beings on the one hand, which share the same names and the same definitions, and related homonymous terms or beings on the other, which share the same names and can have overlapping definitions. So long as two or more things share the same name and have accounts that overlap, but are not identical, some have argued that they count as related homonyms. They have contended that things sharing the same name but very little in definition are homonyms, and also that things sharing the same name and very much in definition are homonyms, so long as the overlap in their definitions is not entire.

Nevertheless, Aristotle's own examples of related homonyms suggests that the accounts or definitions of related homonyms do not overlap very much at all. In both Aristotle's example and my own, the related homonyms descriptively have a lot in common; one could presumably describe both of Aristotle's 'people' as bipedal, terrestrial, and rational, and one could presumably describe both of my 'bears' as furry quadrupeds with extended noses. However, in both sets of examples of related homonymy, one of the homonyms is an artifact, while the other is a living,

breathing, ensouled animal. So while in one sense, someone could say a lot of the same things about, for instance, both a drawing of a person and an actual rational animal standing in front of her, it is rather important to point out that, in another sense, their definitions or accounts are vastly different. The one is two-dimensional, forever striking the same pose, on the same clay tablet, stone wall, or papyrus scroll; the other is active, always characterized by some change or movement, in an environment that is also ever-changing. Aristotle's examples of related homonyms suggest that even though related homonyms share some features or aspects of their definitions in common, it is not usually the case that their definitions overlap very much. This does not detract from the real distinction between accidental and related homonymy, but it does suggest that the textbook case of related homonymy is not one where the related homonyms are nearly synonyms, that is, where their definitions are nearly identical. The textbook case of related homonymy is actually one in which the homonyms have definitions or accounts that only somewhat overlap.

If someone were to argue that the strict and loose forms of *akrasia*, for instance, were related homonyms, then she would have to admit that they do not fit Aristotle's paradigm case of this relation, since their definitions or accounts share more in common than they do not. I have maintained that each of the expressions of *akrasia* is definitionally the same, save for the affect that issues the desires that resist reason's correct prescriptions in each case. For instance, strict *akrasia* involves the affect of tactile desire, while the loose forms receive their names in part from the affects they involve, for example, *akrasia* with respect to desire for honor, or *akrasia* with respect to spirit or anger. Since all of these forms or expressions of *akrasia* have definitions that overlap more than they do not, they do not exactly fit Aristotle's examples of related homonyms. A similar view holds for *enkrateia*'s strict and loose forms or expressions; they do not map onto

Aristotle's examples of related homonymy, either, since their accounts overlap more than they do not.

Further, there is a second obstacle related to the fact that the strict and loose forms of *akrasia* and *enkrateia* do not quite fit Aristotle's examples of related homonyms. A drawing of a person is related to a living rational animal in an ontologically inferior way. The animate human being is ontologically superior to the drawing of one in the sense that she is busy being human, fulfilling certain functions that only living rational animals can; the drawing is always a still-life.[75] Aristotle's examples of related homonyms involve the further relation of ontological hierarchy, where one of the related homonyms is ontologically superior to, or a realer version of, the other. Moreover, if Aristotle thinks that this further relation accompanies other cases of related homonymy, then the strict and loose forms of each of the character types cannot be related homonyms. For nowhere does Aristotle write anything that even suggests, let alone indicates, that the loose forms of *akrasia* or *enkrateia* are ontologically inferior to their strict forms in the way that a drawing of a person is ontologically inferior to a living person. Aristotle does endorse a terminological hierarchy regarding the strict and loose forms of *akrasia* and *enkrateia*. He uses the unqualified term, '*akrasia*,' and its cognates to pick out strict un-self-control in temperance's practical domain, whereas he furnishes derivative, qualified names for the loose forms of the character type. Since the loose forms derive their names from the strict forms, there is clearly a terminological, or naming hierarchy, and we might call the strict forms of *akrasia* and *enkrateia* terminologically superior or prior to the loose forms. Yet there is no evidence in the text that an ontological hierarchy runs parallel to this terminological hierarchy; the loose forms of the character

[75] Indirect evidence for this ontological hierarchy relation comes from anecdotal experience with children—when someone points to a drawing or even a photograph of a frog, for instance, and says to a child, "That's a frog," it is not uncommon for the child to reply that it is not in fact a frog, but rather a picture of one.

types are not ontologically inferior to, or less real versions of, the strict forms. In fact, as I have argued in preceding sections, the loose forms of *akrasia* and *enkrateia* are just as genuine expressions of un-self-control and self-control as their strict forms.

What results from these considerations is that any scholar who proposes that homonymy is the ontological relation uniting the strict and loose forms of either of the character types runs into trouble. First, I have shown that she clearly cannot hold that they are accidental homonyms, since the strict and loose forms of *akrasia*, for instance, do not have entirely divergent definitions or accounts; their accounts have features in common, which means that even if they were homonyms, then they would have to be related homonyms. Second, if someone proposes that the strict and loose forms of *akrasia*, for instance, are related homonyms, then she must admit that they do not fit with the examples of related homonyms that Aristotle provides at the outset of the *Categories*. Of the three ontological classifications that Aristotle presents and defines at the beginning of the *Categories*, it is clear that the strict and loose forms of each of the character types are neither synonymously nor paronymously related. Further, in order to argue that they are homonyms, even in the specific sense that they related homonyms, one must ignore certain features of Aristotle's own example of homonymy from the *Categories* to make her case. What is more, Aristotle never claims outright that the strict forms of *akrasia*, for example, are related to the loose forms as synonyms, paronyms, or homonyms. Yet if the strict and loose forms of *akrasia*, and the strict and loose forms of *enkrateia*, are not synonyms, paronyms, or homonyms, then how are they related? That is, should none of Aristotle's three basic ontological classifications capture the way that the strict and loose forms of each of the character types of *akrasia* and *enkrateia* are terminologically and ontologically related, then what could explain their relation?

I propose that the reason why Aristotle never explicitly classifies the ontological relation between the strict and loose forms of either *akrasia* or *enkrateia* in any of the aforementioned ways is because he instead explicitly maintains that the strict and loose forms of *akrasia* are related according to metaphor and inclusive resemblance. At *NE* VII.4 1148b11-14, as I have already shown, Aristotle describes the loose forms of *akrasia* as related to strict *akrasia* in terms of resemblance or similarity (ὁμοιότητα). In fact, Aristotle describes them as related according to resemblance twice in the same chapter; earlier in *NE* VII.4, Aristotle writes:

> τοὺς μὲν οὖν πρὸς ταῦτα παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον ὑπερβάλλοντας τὸν ἐν αὑτοῖς ἁπλῶς μὲν οὐ λέγομεν ἀκρατεῖς, προστιθέντες δὲ τὸ χρημάτων ἀκρατεῖς καὶ κέρδους καὶ τιμῆς καὶ θυμοῦ, ἁπλῶς δ᾽ οὔ, ὡς ἑτέρους καὶ καθ᾽ ὁμοιότητα λεγομένους…
>
> We do not call people strict akratics who go to excess against the right reason that is in them in relation to these sorts of things, but rather, adding on to the title, we call them akratics with respect to money, akratics with respect to desire for gain, akratics with respect to desire for honor, and akratics with respect to temper, but not strict akratics, as they are different and called akratics according to resemblance… [*NE* VII.4 1147b31-35]

So, Aristotle seems to insist on the point that the strict and loose forms of *akrasia* are related according to resemblance. I noted in an earlier section that we have to take his resemblance claim literally, and in particular as inclusive resemblance, especially since he never explicitly uses synonymy, paronymy, or homonymy to describe the relation between *akrasia*'s strict and loose forms. Further, Aristotle not only describes their relation in terms of resemblance, but recall that at *NE* VII.5, he also describes their relation in terms of metaphor. I propose that Aristotle has the same idea in mind when he uses both the resemblance claim and the metaphor claim to describe how the loose forms of *akrasia* are related to the strict form, and further, that we should take both of these claims literally. When Aristotle says that they are related according to metaphor, he is providing a technical specification for the kind of terminological and ontological similarity that the loose forms of the character type have to the strict form.

Aristotle defines metaphor most clearly at *Poetics* 21 and reports that there are four different kinds of metaphor, providing examples of each.

> μεταφορὰ δέ ἐστιν ὀνόματος ἀλλοτρίου ἐπιφορὰ ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ γένους ἐπὶ εἶδος ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ εἴδους ἐπὶ τὸ γένος ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ εἴδους ἐπὶ εἶδος ἢ κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον. λέγω δὲ ἀπὸ γένους μὲν ἐπὶ εἶδος οἷον, "νηῦς δέ μοι ἥδ᾽ ἕστηκεν." τὸ γὰρ ὁρμεῖν ἐστιν ἑστάναι τι. ἀπ᾽ εἴδους δὲ ἐπὶ γένος, "ἦ δὴ μυρί᾽ Ὀδυσσεὺς ἐσθλὰ ἔοργεν." τὸ γὰρ μυρίον πολύ ἐστιν, ᾧ νῦν ἀντὶ τοῦ πολλοῦ κέχρηται. ἀπ᾽ εἴδους δὲ ἐπὶ εἶδος οἷον, "χαλκῷ ἀπὸ ψυχὴν ἀρύσας," καὶ "τεμὼν ταναήκεϊ χαλκῷ." ἐνταῦθα γὰρ τὸ μὲν ἀρύσαι ταμεῖν, τὸ δὲ ταμεῖν ἀρύσαι εἴρηκεν. ἄμφω γὰρ ἀφελεῖν τί ἐστιν. τὸ δὲ ἀνάλογον λέγω, ὅταν ὁμοίως ἔχῃ τὸ δεύτερον πρὸς τὸ πρῶτον καὶ τὸ τέταρτον πρὸς τὸ τρίτον. ἐρεῖ γὰρ ἀντὶ τοῦ δευτέρου τὸ τέταρτον ἢ ἀντὶ τοῦ τετάρτου τὸ δεύτερον.
>
> Metaphor is a carrying over of a name belonging to something else, carrying over either from genus to species, or from species to genus, or from species to species, or according to analogy. By carrying over from genus to species, I mean, for instance, "My ship stands here." For being moored is a particular kind of standing. By carrying over from species to genus, I mean, for instance, "The ten thousand works that Odysseus accomplished." For ten thousand is a species of the genus many, which in this case is used in the place of many. By carrying over from species to species, I mean, for example, "drawing from his soul with his bronze," and "cutting with his long-pointed bronze." For in the first one, the poet uses "to draw water" in the place of "to cut," while in the second she uses "to cut" in the place of "to draw water." Further, both are particular kinds of the genus of taking away. Finally, by carrying over according to analogy, I mean whenever two pairs hold similarly such that the second thing is to the first thing what also the fourth thing is to the third thing, where the fourth thing can take the place of the second thing or the second thing can take the place of the fourth. [*Poetics* 21 1457b7-18]

One striking aspect of Aristotle's account of metaphor is that he identifies it with the carrying over, or transference, of a name, seeming to suggest that it is merely a terminological or linguistic relation. This puts metaphor at odds with synonymy, paronymy, and homonymy, since the latter three are not only linguistic relations for Aristotle, but they are also ontological ones. If metaphor is merely a linguistic or terminological relation, then it is not thick enough to account for the ontological relation between the strict and loose forms of *akrasia* and *enkrateia*.

However, the *Poetics* is not the only treatise in which Aristotle provides an extensive treatment of metaphor; he also gives it ample attention in the *Rhetoric*, where he is less interested

in metaphor's definition, and more interested in its use or function. At III.2, Aristotle notes that one of the uses of metaphor is to furnish names for things that are nameless.

> ἔτι δὲ οὐ πόρρωθεν δεῖ ἀλλ᾽ ἐκ τῶν συγγενῶν καὶ τῶν ὁμοειδῶν μεταφέρειν ἐπὶ τὰ ἀνώνυμα ὠνομασμένως ὃ λεχθὲν δῆλόν ἐστιν ὅτι συγγενές, οἷον ἐν τῷ αἰνίγματι τῷ εὐδοκιμοῦντι "ἄνδρ᾽ εἶδον πυρὶ χαλκὸν ἐπ᾽ ἀνέρι κολλήσαντα." ἀνώνυμον γὰρ τὸ πάθος, ἔστι δ᾽ ἄμφω πρόσθεσίς τις. κόλλησιν τοίνυν εἶπε τὴν τῆς σικύας προσβολήν.
>
> Moreover, to transfer a name when providing names for nameless things, one must not transfer the name from things that are distant, but rather from things that are akin to them and similar, so that it is clear that what is said is similar to it. For instance, in the popular riddle, "I saw a man gluing bronze to a man with fire." For what happened is nameless, but both this and gluing are sorts of putting together. Thus the riddler calls the application of the cupping instrument 'gluing.' [*Rh*. III.2 1405a35-1405b4]

In this sort of use, metaphor is not merely a linguistic relation, for its purpose is to identify or name something that already has being but has not yet been given a name. Prior to the riddle, the process of heating bronze cupping instruments for the medical practice of cupping therapy had no name, but it was nevertheless a process similar enough to gluing, so the riddler carries over the name 'gluing' to refer to it. Metaphor's function or role here is not simply to give an unnamed process a name, but to give it a name that straightaway makes clear to the hearer what the unnamed process is. In this case, the unnamed process and gluing were already alike; the riddler just makes that clear and unlocks their similarity for the hearer by naming the unnamed process after the familiar process of gluing. (I presented a similar case of metaphor earlier when discussing how Aristotle furnishes a name for the virtue of κακοπάθεια at *EE* II.3 by carrying over the title of a familiar character trait.) Nussbaum (Aristotle's *De Motu Animalium*) correctly notes that Aristotle invokes the relation of metaphor "precisely and consistently throughout his work to designate a transfer or extension of a term to an area where it does not strictly apply—a conscious shift away from the

basic ordinary usage."[76] It is my view that, for Aristotle, metaphor is an ontological relation and not merely a terminological or linguistic one.

When someone uses metaphor to provide a name to something nameless, metaphor is not merely a linguistic relation, but also one that can make clear certain definitional similarities that might not have been apparent before. Aristotle uses metaphor in this way to explain the relation between the strict and loose forms of *akrasia* and *enkrateia*. The loose forms are nameless until Aristotle furnishes them with titles, and he names them after the strict forms of the character types, qualifying each one according to the affect its expression involves. In other words, Aristotle transfers the titles *akrasia* and *enkrateia* from their strict, conventionally known forms to the loose, nameless, but real, forms of the character types. Moreover, in terms of the distinctions Aristotle makes at *Poetics* 21, the particular kind of metaphor Aristotle uses to name the loose forms of *akrasia* and *enkrateia* is that which carries over or transfers a name from one species to another species. This is because the strict and loose forms of *akrasia* are all ways of expressing the psychic struggle characteristic of un-self-control, and the strict and loose forms of *enkrateia* are all ways of expressing the psychic conflict characteristic of self-control. It is my view that conventional or colloquial Athenian use of the terms '*akrasia*' and '*enkrateia*' pick out un-self-control and self-control in temperance's practical domain, and further, that Aristotle recognizes expressions of un-self-control and self-control in other practical domains that do not involve tactile appetite. Aristotle names the loose forms after the strict forms, and so the names of the loose forms are derivative, but this does not mean that the loose forms are ontologically inferior to the strict forms; they were just nameless before Aristotle made use of metaphor to furnish them with titles.

[76] Nussbaum (Aristotle's *De Motu Animalium*) 253

Further, Aristotle holds that when someone uses metaphor to furnish a name for something nameless, she must transfer a name to it from something akin and similar in order to make clear to the hearer that the nameless thing is similar to what she claims it is. He exemplifies this constraint at *Rhetoric* III.2 with the gluing example, where the idea is that once the riddler says that the unnamed process is gluing, the hearer straightaway understands what is meant. Aristotle accomplishes this, too, when he names the loose forms of *akrasia* after the strict form; straightaway, the hearer understands that each of the loose forms of *akrasia* are expressions of un-self-control, and agents express each one with respect to whichever affect Aristotle connects it with through the special locution of qualification. Along these lines, I propose that Aristotle explains that the strict and loose forms of *akrasia* and *enkrateia* are related according to metaphor, and not according to synonymy, paronymy, or homonymy. Of the latter three relations, homonymy seems *prima facie* likely, but upon further inspection, the strict and loose forms of the character types do not exactly share a name, and they do not quite map onto Aristotle's examples of homonyms presented at the outset of the *Categories*. Nevertheless, Aristotle insists twice within *NE* VII.4 that the loose forms of *akrasia* are related to the strict form according to resemblance, and he specifies what he means at VII.5 by saying that they are related according to metaphor. This same reasoning also extends to the strict and loose forms of *enkrateia* (even though Aristotle never explicitly states that there are loose forms of *enkrateia*, let alone how they relate to strict *enkrateia*.)

2.5 Conclusion

I have contended that *akrasia* and *enkrateia* are not character types which agents express only in temperance's practical domain; these character types can be connected with affects other than tactile appetite and so agents can express them in other practical domains, for instance in courage's and mildness's practical domains. Further, these character types serve as general classifications,

not only to account for the fact that there are both strict and loose forms of self-control and un-self-control, but also to make sense of how these character types fit into and align with Aristotle's larger ethical program and his model of the human soul. I examined and agreed with Lorenz's view that the words '*akrasia*' and '*enkrateia*' themselves might be limited by conventions of Athenian language use to refer to the strict forms of the character types, so that there might be justification to avoid using those terms without qualification to refer to the character types generally, as Aristotle himself does. Additionally, I emphasized that the terminological scope of the terms '*akrasia*' and '*enkrateia*' does not run parallel to the ontological scope of the character types of un-self-control and self-control. That is, agents express genuine forms of the character types in practical domains that are not temperance's, and these loose forms inherit their names through inclusive resemblance and metaphor. Aristotle endorses a consistent locution of qualification in order to clarify which loose form of *akrasia* or *enkrateia* he is picking out at any given time, for instance, calling agents akratic with respect to x, where x stands in for the affect with respect to which an agent expresses her un-self-controlled character.

Finally, I took up the issue of what the relation is between the strict and loose forms of each of the character types, demonstrating why they must be related according to metaphor, transference, or inclusive resemblance against the possibility that they are systematically related homonyms. Aristotle insists twice within *NE* VII.4 that the strict and loose forms of *akrasia* are related according to metaphor, transference, or inclusive likeness, and I have contended that we must take his insistence seriously. I also showed why claiming that the strict and loose forms of each of the character types are related according to metaphor does not mean that the loose forms are non-genuine forms of the character type. I surveyed some other instances in Aristotle's *corpus* where he uses the language of metaphor to demonstrate that it is a useful relation for furnishing

names for nameless things. The upshot of this chapter is that on Aristotle's account, agents can express self-control and un-self-control in a variety of ways and in relation to more affects than merely tactile appetite, even if the isolated terms '*akrasia*' and '*enkrateia*' exclusively pick out the strict forms of the character types.

CHAPTER 3. *AKRASIA*, *ENKRATEIA*, & THE HUMAN SOUL

After all this distinguishing between terms and the character types that they pick out, one might wonder what the real import of my investigation is. Why is it important that self-control and un-self-control be general character types in the same way that virtue and vice are, capturing their several individual forms or expressions in the various practical domains? I have been arguing that these character types, despite any conventional restrictions that might limit the use of the terms, '*akrasia*' and '*enkrateia*', can be general character types with wide ranges of expression. Just as an agent can express character virtue in various practical domains beyond only temperance's, so too is it possible for an agent to express self-control and its lack in various practical domains other than only temperance's. In this chapter, I consider two general psychological reasons justifying the view that *akrasia* and *enkrateia* have wide ranges of expression, drawing from what Aristotle has to say about the human soul in the ethics. Even though these psychological reasons are not entirely separate from the terminological and ontological reasons for my view regarding the range of *akrasia* and *enkrateia* which I presented in the last chapter, they do provide another vantage point from which to contend that agents express these character types in more domains than merely the one that has to do with the affect of tactile appetite.

First, conceiving of self-control and un-self-control as general character types makes better sense out of Aristotle's treatment of *akrasia* and *enkrateia* outside their direct examination in *NE* VII. For elsewhere, Aristotle discusses the character types as serving a broader role than they could if their expressions were tethered solely to temperance's practical domain. Crucially, he introduces *akrasia* and *enkrateia* for the first time in the ethics at *NE* I.13 as evidence that the human soul is divisible into two functional natures, one rational and the other non-rational, and that these natures can either align or conflict with one another. If self-control and its lack are genuine character types

for Aristotle (as I argued in Chapter 1), then they must be explicable according to particular arrangements of the human soul's two natures and their sub-aspects.[77] Broadie makes this point aptly when reflecting on the fact that Aristotle's catalogue of character types showcases "the variety of intra-psychic combinations that are possible in a bipartite soul each of whose parts may be in a good or a bad condition."[78] For these reasons, in **3.1**, I first set out a general exposition of the soul, its natures, and its sub-aspects consistent with the psychological overview which Aristotle deems relevant to ethical inquiry. Then, I contend that since Aristotle introduces akratic and enkratic agents as evidence that the soul is susceptible to general conflict between its rational and non-rational natures (and, more specifically, conflict between sub-aspects of those two natures), it follows that un-self-control and self-control are general character types with wide ranges of expression.

In **3.2**, I turn attention to a second psychological justification for the wide ranges of *akrasia* and *enkrateia*, focusing on the unity constraint that Aristotle imposes on character virtue and arguing that a modified version of the unity constraint must also apply to the character types of *akrasia* and *enkrateia*. I refer to this modified version of virtue's unity constraint as the *duality*

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[77] Often, scholars refer to the 'parts' of the soul; since the soul is itself not bodily—although without souls, there are no living bodies—there is a sense in which using the language of spatially located 'parts' to refer to the divisions of the soul is incorrect. Johansen (The Powers of Aristotle's Soul) argues that parthood does not have to entail spatial difference, pointing to Aristotle's distinction at *DA* II.2 [413b11-16] between the notion of parts that differ spatially and parts that differ in 'account' (λόγος) (see esp. pp. 47-62). While I find his argument persuasive, Johansen does not say much about the psychic divisions as Aristotle introduces them in the ethical context at *NE* I.13, but rather focuses his investigation into the divisions of the soul as Aristotle presents them in *De Anima*. So, I have elected to use 'natures' to refer to what others have called the soul's rational and non-rational 'parts,' since this is how Aristotle refers to the rational and non-rational divisions near the end of *NE* I.13. (There are some exceptions where I must defer to 'part' language in translation; Aristotle sometimes uses Greek terms that cannot bear any plausible alternative translation.) Additionally, I use 'sub-aspect' to refer to further divisions of the soul's two natures; for the soul's rational and non-rational natures are subject to division themselves according to Aristotle's ethical psychology. So, unless otherwise noted, when I refer to a 'nature' of the soul, I am referring to what others have called the soul's rational or non-rational 'part'; when I refer to a 'sub-aspect' of the soul, I am referring to what others have called a further 'part' of either the soul's rational or non-rational nature.

[78] Broadie, Sarah. (2009) "*Nicomachean Ethics* VII.8-9 (1151b22): *Akrasia, enkrateia,* and Look-Alikes." in Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics Book VII, Symposium Aristotelicum. Ed., Natali, Carlo. Oxford University Press. 159

constraint. It holds that an agent who expresses a form of either *akrasia* or *enkrateia* in one practical domain must express forms of either *akrasia* or *enkrateia* in all of the others. It is crucial to point out that I do not mean that an agent who expresses a form of *akrasia* in one practical domain must also express forms of *akrasia* in all of the others, nor do I maintain that an agent who expresses *enkrateia* in one domain must also express *enkrateia* in all of the others; in short, I do not argue that an akratic agent must be thoroughly akratic or that enkratic agents must be thoroughly enkratic. This would only follow if character virtue's unity constraint applied to the character types of self-control and un-self-control in the same way and without modification. The unity constraint on virtue, and the modified duality constraint that applies to *akrasia* and *enkrateia* are importantly different, but they both fall out of Aristotle's notion that if an agent has developed a character type, then both her soul's rational and non-rational natures are disposed in corresponding ways. Both of these constraints serve to restrict which character types an agent can express in all of the practical domains given the relation that obtains between her soul's two natures. Since a modified version of the constraint applies to self-control and un-self-control, this provides further psychological justification for the view that the character types have wide ranges of expression: *akrasia* and *enkrateia* have both strict and loose forms, and each of the forms is a genuine expression of the character type.

Finally, in sections **3.3** and **3.4**, I take up two scholarly objections to the view that un-self-control and self-control have ranges as wide as I contend. First, in **3.3,** I consider David Charles's view that Aristotle does not permit a loose expression of *enkrateia* in courage's domain on the basis of a passage at *NE* II.3. Charles's objection, if unchallenged, renders suspicious the view that self-control and un-self-control have authentic expressions outside of temperance's practical domain. I demonstrate that his conclusion only follows if one reads the relevant passage from *NE*

II.3 without understanding its proper context. Second, in **3.4**, I consider Sarah Broadie's view that Aristotle restricts genuine expressions of *akrasia* and *enkrateia* to temperance's practical domain because it is a unique ethical failure to mind or care about foregoing the objects of tactile appetite in the course of enacting a correct choice. If Broadie's view is correct, then it also casts doubt on my view that the character types have authentic loose expressions.

3.1 Demonstrating General Conflict in the Soul Requires General Character Types

The account of the human soul that Aristotle offers in the ethical works is imprecise by his own admission—it is only those natures and sub-aspects of the soul which are relevant to ethical and political inquiry that Aristotle encourages the audience of the ethics to investigate [*NE* I.13 1102a5-25]. The most ethically relevant information about the human soul is the distinction Aristotle draws between its rational and non-rational natures, for it is on the basis of that distinction that he differentiates intellectual (διανοητική) virtue from ethical or character (ἠθική) virtue. Of particular interest for my purposes in this section is that in the context of Aristotle's distinction between the soul's rational and non-rational natures at *NE* I.13, he introduces akratic and enkratic agents as evidence for his view of the soul's division into such natures; he posits that un-self-controlled and self-controlled agents are subjects of internal conflict between what their rational natures correctly prescribe and what their non-rational natures desire to choose and to do. Before analyzing what the character types' introduction in this context means for the issue of the ranges of their expression, it is useful first to rehearse Aristotle's taxonomy of the human soul, at least as much as he claims is necessary for the audience of the ethics to know. In addition to distinguishing the soul's rational nature from its non-rational nature, Aristotle holds that these two natures are subject to their own further divisions, which I have elected to call sub-aspects of the two more general psychic natures.

First, I turn to the soul's rational nature and its two sub-aspects. Aristotle labels one of its sub-aspects as scientific (ἐπιστημονικόν); its correlate objects are unchanging, true, necessary things. Agents exercise the scientific sub-aspect when they contemplate the immutable truths of logic, for instance, or the fundamental principles of metaphysics. The excellences or virtues of the ἐπιστημονικόν enable agents who have developed them to be genuine knowers of the most real and changeless objects. Aristotle holds that philosophical wisdom (σοφία) is the foremost intellectual virtue of the ἐπιστημονικόν. He conceives of philosophical wisdom as a combination of two subordinate scientific virtues: intuitive intelligence (νοῦς) and scientific knowledge (ἐπιστήμη).

> …δῆλον ὅτι ἀκριβεστάτη ἂν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν εἴη ἡ σοφία. δεῖ ἄρα τὸν σοφὸν μὴ μόνον τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν εἰδέναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀληθεύειν. ὥστ᾽ εἴη ἂν ἡ σοφία νοῦς καὶ ἐπιστήμη, ὥσπερ κεφαλὴν ἔχουσα ἐπιστήμη τῶν τιμιωτάτων.
>
> It is clear that philosophical wisdom is the most precise of the kinds of knowing, for not only must the philosophically wise person know the things that flow from first principles, but she must also arrive at the truth regarding first principles. The result is that philosophical wisdom is a combination of intuitive intelligence and scientific knowledge; it is scientific knowledge with its head in place, as it were, turned toward the most honorable things. [*NE* VI.7 1141a16-20]

To be philosophically wise, an agent must not only be able to demonstrate her knowledge (which is the proper activity of the intellectual virtue of scientific knowledge), but she also must grasp the truth of the first principles from which such demonstration proceeds (which is the proper activity of the intellectual virtue of intuitive intelligence). Neither intellectual virtue is sufficient by itself for philosophical wisdom. If some agent can grasp a science's first principles, but cannot demonstrate what follows from them, then she has the intellectual virtue of νοῦς, but she lacks ἐπιστήμη. Similarly, if some agent can demonstrate what follows from a science's first principles, yet does not grasp or understand its first principles or axioms themselves, then she has the intellectual virtue of ἐπιστήμη, but she lacks the intellectual virtue of νοῦς. So the ἐπιστημονικόν,

or the scientific sub-aspect of the soul's rational nature, has unchanging objects of knowledge as its domain of exercise; agents who exercise this sub-aspect excellently know the truth about such objects inside and out, and are also capable of demonstrating their complete knowledge of them.

Aristotle's treatment of the ἐπιστημονικόν does not exhaust his account of the soul's rational nature. Aristotle holds that there is a second rational sub-aspect, and he calls it calculative or deliberative (λογιστικόν); it has as its correlate objects changing, contingent, and unnecessary things. Human conduct falls under the province of this rational sub-aspect, for the actions that agents choose and perform do not hold by necessity but are capable of being otherwise. Aristotle clarifies the distinction between changing and unchanging objects, or contingent and non-contingent objects, at *NE* VI.1 when differentiating this second rational sub-aspect from the ἐπιστημονικόν.

> καὶ ὑποκείσθω δύο τὰ λόγον ἔχοντα, ἓν μὲν ᾧ θεωροῦμεν τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὄντων ὅσων αἱ ἀρχαὶ μὴ ἐνδέχονται ἄλλως ἔχειν, ἓν δὲ ᾧ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα. πρὸς γὰρ τὰ τῷ γένει ἕτερα καὶ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μορίων ἕτερον τῷ γένει τὸ πρὸς ἑκάτερον πεφυκός, εἴπερ καθ᾽ ὁμοιότητά τινα καὶ οἰκειότητα ἡ γνῶσις ὑπάρχει αὐτοῖς. λεγέσθω δὲ τούτων τὸ μὲν ἐπιστημονικὸν τὸ δὲ λογιστικόν. τὸ γὰρ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ λογίζεσθαι ταὐτόν, οὐδεὶς δὲ βουλεύεται περὶ τῶν μὴ ἐνδεχομένων ἄλλως ἔχειν.
>
> And let us suppose that there are two parts[79] of the soul having reason, one by which we contemplate as many beings whose first principles are not able to be otherwise, and one by which we contemplate as many beings as are able to be otherwise. If indeed knowledge belongs to things according to some likeness and suitability, then where objects differ in kind, each of the parts of the soul differ in kind concerning the nature of each. Let us call the one rational nature, 'scientific' (ἐπιστημονικόν), and the other, 'calculative (λογιστικόν). For to deliberate (βουλεύεσθαι) and to calculate (λογίζεσθαι) are the same, and no one deliberates concerning things that cannot be otherwise. [*NE* VI.1 1139a6-14]

[79] Here, I have chosen to use 'parts,' since Aristotle at 1139a4 (just two lines earlier) refers to the the soul's divisions as "parts of the soul," (μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς); likewise in the quoted passage itself at 1139a9 he refers to the "pieces" or "constituent members" of the soul (τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μορίων). It is important to note that Aristotle uses 'parts' here to refer to what I have been calling the sub-aspects of the soul's rational nature. Issues like this are why I have chosen to use consistent terminology to refer to the soul's divisions as 'natures,' even though Aristotle himself strays from using the same terms consistently to refer to the same divisions. For notice that one line later in the same passage, Aristotle also distinguishes each of the rational sub-aspects according to their natures [πρὸς ἑκάτερον πεφυκός, 1139a10].

Because Aristotle maintains that the objects of knowledge are divided according to their status as either contingent or non-contingent, he posits that the rational nature of the soul must also be subject to a corresponding division. This is in fact why Aristotle divides the rational nature of the soul into its two sub-aspects; the ἐπιστημονικόν accounts for an agent's capacity to know non-contingent objects, and the λογιστικόν accounts for an agent's capacity to know contingent objects. Someone knows axioms and proofs of geometry in a manner different from how she knows which diet, for instance, best suits her at this time of her life, or the best way to respond to a hostile combatant on the battlefield. Aristotle distinguishes between two sub-aspects of the soul's rational nature to account for distinctions like this which demonstrate that different inquiries and pursuits involve different sorts of knowing. In the way that the ἐπιστημονικόν has the field of unchanging, non-contingent objects of knowledge as its domain of exercise, the λογιστικόν has the field of changing, contingent objects of knowledge as its domain of exercise.

As σοφία is the primary intellectual virtue of the ἐπιστημονικὸν, Aristotle holds that practical wisdom (φρόνησις) is the intellectual virtue of the λογιστικόν. It is proper to understand practical wisdom as excellence at deliberation, or as the intellectual virtue enabling virtuous agents to choose the correct means in order to attain their virtuous goals. Aristotle stresses that the practically wise excel not at just any kind of deliberation toward attaining any goal whatsoever in the following passage.

> δοκεῖ δὴ φρονίμου εἶναι τὸ δύνασθαι καλῶς βουλεύσασθαι περὶ τὰ αὑτῷ ἀγαθὰ καὶ συμφέροντα, οὐ κατὰ μέρος, οἷον ποῖα πρὸς ὑγίειαν, πρὸς ἰσχύν, ἀλλὰ ποῖα πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν ὅλως.
>
> Indeed it seems true of the practically wise person that she is able to deliberate well concerning the things that are good for her and benefit her; yet not for some part of her, such as the things that have to do with her health, or the things that have to do with her strength, but rather she is able to deliberate about the things that have to do with living well in general. [*NE* VI.5 1140a25-28]

Practical wisdom is the intellectual virtue which enables agents to enact the correct choices for the sake of achieving the goal of living their lives well. The practically wise certainly enact correct choices in service of many particular goals, but practical wisdom does not lay claim to any particular domain of choice-making or behavior. If someone is practically wise, she enacts the correct choices in service of attaining particular goals such as health, strength, and so on, but all of her deliberation about how to achieve these particular goals is in service of her highest goal: living a good human life.

Aristotle not only distinguishes two sub-aspects of the soul's rational nature, but he also divides the soul's non-rational nature into two sub-aspects. The first of these non-rational sub-aspects is common to the souls of all living things; it enables the living to take in nutrients, to grow, and to reproduce. There is no virtue or excellence of this non-rational sub-aspect, which Aristotle labels as nutritive (θρεπτικόν); there is usually nothing to praise about someone digesting her dinner, for example, or for being three-and-a-half inches taller today than she was just a few years ago. These are consequences of basic biological activities. So the θρεπτικόν is largely irrelevant to Aristotle's ethical inquiry.

> δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις ἐνεργεῖν μάλιστα τὸ μόριον τοῦτο καὶ ἡ δύναμις αὕτη, ὁ δ᾽ ἀγαθὸς καὶ κακὸς ἥκιστα διάδηλοι καθ᾽ ὕπνον, ὅθεν φασὶν οὐδὲν διαφέρειν τὸ ἥμισυ τοῦ βίου τοὺς εὐδαίμονας τῶν ἀθλίων. συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦτο εἰκότως ἀργία γάρ ἐστιν ὁ ὕπνος τῆς ψυχῆς ᾗ λέγεται σπουδαία καὶ φαύλη, πλὴν εἰ μὴ κατὰ μικρὸν καὶ διικνοῦνταί τινες τῶν κινήσεων, καὶ ταύτῃ βελτίω γίνεται τὰ φαντάσματα τῶν ἐπιεικῶν ἢ τῶν τυχόντων. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἅλις, καὶ τὸ θρεπτικὸν ἐατέον, ἐπειδὴ τῆς ἀνθρωπικῆς ἀρετῆς ἄμοιρον πέφυκεν.
>
> For this part and its power seem to be active most of all during sleep, and the good and bad person are least distinguishable when asleep; whence people say that for half of their lives those who flourish are no different from the miserable. And this follows suitably since sleep is inactivity of those aspects soul by which one is called good or worthless, unless some of the movements to a small extent make it through, and so the dream-images of reasonable people are better than those of any chance people. But this is sufficient treatment of these things, and the nutritive sub-aspect must be dismissed, since by nature it is no part of human excellence. [*NE* I.13 1102b3-12]

The θρεπτικὸν is irrelevant to ethical inquiry in the sense that it is in no way responsible for determining whether someone is praiseworthy or blameworthy. Hence he concludes the passage above by noting that we must dismiss the θρεπτικόν from further consideration in the ethics.

The remaining and relevant non-rational sub-aspect is the seat of desire (and aversion) and he calls this sub-aspect appetitive or desiderative (ἐπιθυμητικόν or ὀρεκτικόν). Even though it is a non-rational sub-aspect, Aristotle holds that it participates in reason, for it can receive and either obey or disobey rational prescription. This sub-aspect can be shaped by correct reason to desire the correct things, in the correct ways, at the correct times, and so on. That is, an agent's soul's λογιστικόν can issue orders to and in some sense rein in her soul's ἐπιθυμητικόν/ὀρεκτικόν. When distinguishing the ἐπιθυμητικόν/ὀρεκτικόν from the θρεπτικόν, Aristotle writes:

> φαίνεται δὴ καὶ τὸ ἄλογον διττόν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ φυτικὸν οὐδαμῶς κοινωνεῖ λόγου, τὸ δ᾽ ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ ὅλως ὀρεκτικὸν μετέχει πως, ᾗ κατήκοόν ἐστιν αὐτοῦ καὶ πειθαρχικόν. οὕτω δὴ καὶ τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τῶν φίλων φαμὲν ἔχειν λόγον, καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ τῶν μαθηματικῶν.
>
> It appears the non-rational nature of the soul is bifurcated, for the plant-like sub-aspect in no way shares in reason, but the ἐπιθυμητικόν (and in general the ὀρεκτικόν) participates somehow in reason, by which it can listen to and obey reason. So indeed it is as when we say that one takes heed of her father or loved ones, and not as when we say that she follows reason in mathematics. [*NE* I.13 1102b28-33]

Unlike the θρεπτικόν, the ἐπιθυμητικόν/ὀρεκτικόν is a non-rational sub-aspect that is relevant to ethical character. Ethical (ἠθική) or character virtue is in fact the excellence of this non-rational sub-aspect. Agents are praised for desiring appropriately and for choosing to act and acting on appropriate desires. Yet, as the passage above makes clear, claiming that the ἐπιθυμητικόν is entirely non-rational gets things wrong: while it is true that Aristotle does not consider the ἐπιθυμητικόν to be a rational sub-aspect, there is nevertheless something rational about it, insofar as Aristotle holds that it "participates somehow in reason," i.e., it listens to or is receptive of reason.

Moreover, Aristotle informs us in this passage that the ἐπιθυμητικόν is one particular way of referring to the more general ὀρεκτικόν, which he also claims, as a whole, participates in reason. At *EE* II.7, Aristotle clarifies that desire (ὄρεξις) is subject to a threefold division:

> ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡ ὄρεξις εἰς τρία διαιρεῖται, εἰς βούλησιν καὶ θυμὸν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν…
>
> But desire is divided into three kinds, into wish, temper, and tactile appetite… [*EE* II.7 1223a26-27]

We can infer that the ὀρεκτικόν is likewise divided into at least three kinds, or that it has at least three ways of being, one of which is as the ἐπιθυμητικόν. So when Aristotle says that "the ἐπιθυμητικόν (and in general the ὀρεκτικόν) participates somehow in reason," he first provides a specification and immediately follows up with a generalization regarding the soul's desiderative sub-aspect's participation in reason. Aristotle's formal position is that the ὀρεκτικόν in general participates in reason, but often he calls it, synecdochically, the ἐπιθυμητικόν.[80]

From the claim that it is receptive of reason, it follows that the ἐπιθυμητικόν/ὀρεκτικόν can either obey or disobey reason. Like a child who receives and hears her parents' commands, the ἐπιθυμητικόν receives reason's prescriptions; what is more, just as a child can obey or disobey her parents' commands, so too can the ἐπιθυμητικόν issue desire in a person that either aligns with or departs from her own rational nature's prescriptions. These are reasons why it is not correct to say that the ἐπιθυμητικόν is entirely non-rational, or completely separate from reason, for it does bear relation to reason. Perhaps it is better to say that the ἐπιθυμητικόν is not the source or origin of anything rational, but Aristotle clearly holds that it has the capacity to receive and respond to the prescriptions of the soul's rational nature. When the non-rational nature of an agent's soul responds

[80] I make this point now in order to forestall objections that the ἐπιθυμητικόν only pertains to tactile appetite, given that I have consistently translated ἐπιθυμία as tactile appetite. To emphasize, my view is that Aristotle thinks that 'ἐπιθυμητικόν' can stand in for 'ὀρεκτικόν,' at least for the purposes of ethical inquiry where the psychological content is less exact. I follow suit for the most part in the remainder of the present work, using 'ἐπιθυμητικόν' interchangeably with 'ὀρεκτικόν.'

obediently and heeds its rational nature's correct prescriptions, the agent desires, chooses, and acts correctly and has a virtuous character. Aristotle also endorses this view about the soul's non-rational nature at *EE* II.1.

> ἐπεὶ δ᾽ αἱ διανοητικαὶ μετὰ λόγου, αἱ μὲν τοιαῦται τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος, ὃ ἐπιτακτικόν ἐστι τῆς ψυχῆς ᾗ λόγον ἔχει, αἱ δ᾽ ἠθικαὶ τοῦ ἀλόγου μέν, ἀκολουθητικοῦ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν τῷ λόγον ἔχοντι
>
> Since the intellectual virtues have reason, these belong to the nature of the soul that has reason, the commander of the soul by which the soul is rational. And while the character virtues belong to the non-rational nature of the soul, they are nevertheless naturally able to obey the part having reason. [*EE* II.1 1220a8-11]

The accounts of the human soul I have just reviewed, gleaned from *NE* I.13, *EE* II.1, and *NE* VI, set forth the basic taxonomy of the soul's natures and their sub-aspects which Aristotle deems relevant to ethical inquiry. I have rehearsed this basic overview of the soul to lay the groundwork for what I want to emphasize next about the character types of self-control and un-self-control. Aristotle introduces *akrasia* and *enkrateia* at *NE* I.13, in the midst of distinguishing the soul's natures and their sub-aspects, as justification for his view that the soul has rational and non-rational natures. He presents them as proof of the soul's functional division into these two natures because akratic and enkratic agents are evidence of internal struggle between rational prescription and non-rational desire.

> ἔοικε δὲ καὶ ἄλλη τις φύσις τῆς ψυχῆς ἄλογος εἶναι μετέχουσα μέντοι πῃ λόγου. τοῦ γὰρ ἐγκρατοῦς καὶ ἀκρατοῦς τὸν λόγον καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ λόγον ἔχον ἐπαινοῦμεν ὀρθῶς γὰρ καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ βέλτιστα παρακαλεῖ. φαίνεται δ᾽ ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἄλλο τι παρὰ τὸν λόγον πεφυκός, ὃ μάχεται καὶ ἀντιτείνει τῷ λόγῳ.
>
> It seems that there is some other non-rational nature of the soul, one that nevertheless somehow participates in reason. For we praise akratic and enkratic people both with respect to their reason and to the aspect of their souls having reason, since it also urges them correctly toward the best things. Yet there appears by nature to be something else in them, too, which fights and struggles against reason. [*NE* I.13 1102b12-17]

Prior to examining these character types in significant detail later on in *NE* VII.1-10, Aristotle here introduces *akrasia* and *enkrateia* as evidence of the major division he draws between the soul's rational and non-rational natures. Further, because such agents demonstrate that the soul has two natures that can either align or conflict, Aristotle can proceed to make use of the two-nature model in order to account for other character types, for instance virtue, in similar psychological terms. It is useful to think of the soul's two natures as capable of being either in or out of tune, that is, either coordinating with one another harmoniously or struggling against one another to different degrees.

Regarding the soul of the virtuous agent, her two psychological natures (and, more specifically, the relevant sub-aspects of these natures) are in tune—the non-rational ἐπιθυμητικόν of the agent's soul listens to and heeds the correct rational prescriptions of her soul's λογιστικόν, just as an obedient child hears and follows her parents' instructions. Aristotle maintains that in the souls of enkratic and akratic agents, on the other hand, the two natures are not in tune. It is emblematic of self-controlled and un-self-controlled agents that their souls' desiderative non-rational sub-aspects conflict with what their deliberative rational sub-aspects correctly prescribe. Aristotle holds that these agents experience an internal struggle between what their reason prescribes that it is correct to choose and to do and what they incorrectly desire to choose and to do. Translated into the terms of Aristotle's psychological taxonomy, an akratic or enkratic agent has an ἐπιθυμητικόν/ὀρεκτικόν that resists or struggles against the correct prescriptions that issue from her own λογιστικόν.

Aristotle writes later in the same chapter that "the impulses of akratic agents are contrary to one another," [τἀναντία γὰρ αἱ ὁρμαὶ τῶν ἀκρατῶν, *NE* I.13 1102b20-21], without specifying any affects or objects peculiar to any practical domains. This general claim suggests that Aristotle has no particular expression of *akrasia* in mind. The "impulses" that Aristotle describes as

oppositional must issue from the λογιστικόν and the ἐπιθυμητικόν (or more generally, the ὀρεκτικόν), respectively, since these are the sub-aspects of the soul that Aristotle claims are capable of conflict. Yet neither of these sub-aspects is tethered solely to the affects or objects of temperance's practical domain. The λογιστικόν can assuredly issue rational prescriptions that have to do with managing tactile appetite and its related objects, but temperance's practical domain is not the only practical domain in which the λογιστικόν issues rational prescriptions. Similarly, the ἐπιθυμητικόν, or ὀρεκτικόν, can assuredly spawn tactile appetite for food, drink, or sex, but tactile appetite and its objects do not exhaust the range of human desire or its objects. If the strict expressions of *akrasia* and *enkrateia* were the only genuine expressions of the character types, then Aristotle could not use them to demonstrate that the λογιστικόν and the ἐπιθυμητικόν/ὀρεκτικόν generally conflict, but he could only use them as evidence that rational prescription can specifically conflict with desires related to the affect and objects of tactile appetite.

Aristotle is able to derive a general ranking of the character types from the view that the soul's two natures can either align harmoniously or struggle with one another cacophonously.

> λόγου δὲ καὶ τοῦτο φαίνεται μετέχειν, ὥσπερ εἴπομεν. πειθαρχεῖ γοῦν τῷ λόγῳ τὸ τοῦ ἐγκρατοῦς—ἔτι δ᾽ ἴσως εὐηκοώτερόν ἐστι τὸ τοῦ σώφρονος καὶ ἀνδρείου
>
> …But this [the ἐπιθυμητικόν/ὀρεκτικόν] also appears to participate in reason, just as we said. At any rate, that sub-aspect of the enkratic agent's soul obeys reason, and that sub-aspect of the temperate and the courageous agent's soul is still perhaps more inclined to obey reason [*NE* I.13 1102b25-27]

Aristotle maintains that the degree to which an agent's character type is inferior to virtue corresponds to the degree to which her soul's ἐπιθυμητικόν either obeys or disobeys the rational prescriptions her soul's λογιστικόν issues. An agent whose ἐπιθυμητικόν always obeys her λογιστικόν's rational prescriptions has a virtuous character, and Aristotle lists the temperate and courageous agents as examples. (It is noteworthy that the inclusion of the courageous agent as an example of a virtuous agent would be strange if Aristotle were considering only character types

that agents could express in temperance's domain. For fear and confidence are the affects that unite the character types in courage's practical domain, not tactile appetite.) Aristotle holds that the enkratic agent's ἐπιθυμητικόν/ὀρεκτικόν follows through on her own reason's prescriptions, and that she enacts a choice in accord with her own rational prescription in the end, but it resists her λογιστικόν's prescription along the way, and so is less in tune with her rational nature than the virtuous agent's ἐπιθυμητικόν/ὀρεκτικόν is in tune with hers. The akratic agent's ἐπιθυμητικόν is most disobedient to the prescriptions of her soul's λογιστικόν, since she is pulled by affect to abandon enacting what she knows is the correct choice and ultimately chooses and performs the incorrect action.[81] An exception to the pattern just outlined is vice, since vicious agents do not act against the prescriptions of their own deliberative sub-aspects; rather, their first principles are corrupted. Aristotle articulates at *NE* VII.8 that akratic agents are not vicious, for those without self-control abandon their correct intentions—what they know it is correct to choose and to do—prior to choosing and performing a blameworthy action instead, whereas the vicious are bereft of such knowledge; they are convinced that they ought to perform vicious actions, and in effect act according to their choices without suffering from any practical stutter [*NE* VII.8 1151a5-25]. So while akratic and enkratic agents have rational and non-rational natures that are out of tune, vicious and virtuous agents have rational and non-rational natures that are harmonious.[82]

[81] Note that this ranking of the superiority and inferiority of character types matches with the one arrived at in Chapter 1, Section 1.3 (p. 57). There, the ranking was done in terms of the differently disposed agents' relations to choice-making. But here, we arrive at the same ranking for psychological reasons, that is, because agents with each of the character types have souls whose rational and non-rational natures are related in distinct ways. This ranking of the character types is similar to one that Dahl (Practical Reason, Aristotle, and Weakness of the Will) provides; he places them on a "continuum" of "practical knowledge," holding that the virtuous agent has "full and complete" practical knowledge (i.e., she is practically wise), where the inferior characters have practical knowledge that is less than full and complete; akratic and enkratic characters are not "sufficiently motivated" to do what they know they should, and this is what makes them less than virtuous. (148).

[82] Indeed, it is common to both vicious and virtuous agents that their souls have non-rational and rational natures that do not conflict but instead align with one another; in the former case, this is because of corrupted first principles, whereas in the latter it is because the agent's soul's ἐπιθυμητικόν is always obedient to the correct prescription of her soul's λογιστικόν.

This general ranking of character types on the basis of the degree to which an agent's ἐπιθυμητικόν/ὀρεκτικόν is obedient to her λογιστικόν is in danger if *akrasia* and *enkrateia* are not character types that agents express in more practical domains than just temperance's. Supposing that the passages in which Aristotle provides a general overview of the soul's taxonomy and the potential conflict between its natures are to be understood only in relation to the strict forms of *akrasia* and *enkrateia* renders the passages too specific to be of much importance. If Aristotle has only strict *akrasia* and strict *enkrateia* in mind in these passages, then his account of possible conflict between the rational and non-rational natures of human souls serves to explain very little, i.e., it serves only to explain self-control and un-self-control over tactile appetite, but no other species of desire. It seems unlikely that Aristotle would rest his general overview of the soul's taxonomy and possible conflict between its two natures on character types with such limited ranges of expression. Moreover, Aristotle notes that it is not merely the ἐπιθυμητικόν that somehow participates in reason, but that the ὀρεκτικόν in general participates in reason. So, even if one were to object to my analysis so far and claim that the ἐπιθυμητικόν only has to do with tactile appetite and its objects, the ἐπιθυμητικόν does not exhaust the range of the ὀρεκτικόν, and Aristotle uses 'ἐπιθυμητικόν' sometimes as a stand-in for the more general ὀρεκτικόν (as is clear from Aristotle's analysis at *NE* I.13 1102b28-33).

So one reason for arguing that self-control and its lack are character types with wide ranges of expression results from considering the psychological overview which Aristotle deems relevant to ethical inquiry and from taking proper account of the fact that Aristotle presents akratic and enkratic agents as justification for his psychological taxonomy. He holds that the soul has two general natures that can either align or conflict, and that their alignment or lack thereof can be explained with more specificity in terms of the relation between the relevant sub-aspects of those

two conflicting natures, i.e., the deliberative rational sub-aspect: the λογιστικόν, and the desiderative non-rational sub-aspect: the ἐπιθυμητικόν/ὀρεκτικόν. Aristotle introduces akratic and enkratic agents at *NE* I.13 in order to demonstrate that the soul does indeed have two distinct functional natures, since in these agents, the two natures are at odds. If the only genuine expressions of self-control and un-self-control were the strict ones in temperance's practical domain, then it would be strange for Aristotle to use character types with such narrow ranges of expression as evidence justifying his general psychological taxonomy. These considerations lend support to my view that self-control and un-self-control are wide-ranging character types with genuine strict and loose expressions. It is not merely tactile appetite that can resist correct rational prescription, but desire in general can come into conflict with what an agent knows is correct to choose and to do.

3.2 The Duality Constraint

At *NE* VI.13 Aristotle imposes a unity constraint on character virtue, holding that agents cannot have developed or acquired any of the individual character virtues—temperance, courage, generosity and so on—independently of one another. If an agent expresses one of the individual virtues, then it is Aristotle's view that she must also express all of the other character virtues. The question I aim to answer affirmatively in this section is whether there is a similar constraint on agents who genuinely express *akrasia* or *enkrateia* in any one practical domain that restricts the character types they can express in all of the others. Aristotle proposes the unity constraint on character virtue largely because of his view that character virtue and the intellectual virtue of practical wisdom are mutually dependent. To call character virtue and practical wisdom mutually dependent means that an agent cannot have a virtuous character unless she also has the intellectual virtue of practical wisdom, and vice versa, that an agent cannot be practically wise unless she also

has a virtuous character. So, part of my inquiry into whether akratic and enkratic agents are subject to a constraint similar to virtue's unity constraint involves investigating whether *akrasia* and *enkrateia* and some rational disposition are mutually dependent in the way that virtue and practical wisdom are. Before arguing that *akrasia* and *enkrateia* are subject to a similar constraint, it is necessary to unpack in more detail what virtue's unity constraint is and what it means for virtue and practical wisdom to be mutually dependent.

I quote the following lengthy passage in full from *NE* VI.13 to demonstrate that Aristotle does indeed hold that character virtue and practical wisdom are mutually dependent.

> δῆλον οὖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι οὐχ οἷόν τε ἀγαθὸν εἶναι κυρίως ἄνευ φρονήσεως, οὐδὲ φρόνιμον ἄνευ τῆς ἠθικῆς ἀρετῆς. ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ λόγος ταύτῃ λύοιτ᾽ ἄν, ᾧ διαλεχθείη τις ἂν ὅτι χωρίζονται ἀλλήλων αἱ ἀρεταί. οὐ γὰρ ὁ αὐτὸς εὐφυέστατος πρὸς ἁπάσας, ὥστε τὴν μὲν ἤδη τὴν δ᾽ οὔπω εἰληφὼς ἔσται. τοῦτο γὰρ κατὰ μὲν τὰς φυσικὰς ἀρετὰς ἐνδέχεται, καθ᾽ ἃς δὲ ἁπλῶς λέγεται ἀγαθός, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται. ἅμα γὰρ τῇ φρονήσει μιᾷ ὑπαρχούσῃ πᾶσαι ὑπάρξουσιν. δῆλον δέ, κἂν εἰ μὴ πρακτικὴ ἦν, ὅτι ἔδει ἂν αὐτῆς διὰ τὸ τοῦ μορίου ἀρετὴν εἶναι, καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἔσται ἡ προαίρεσις ὀρθὴ ἄνευ φρονήσεως οὐδ᾽ ἄνευ ἀρετῆς. ἣ μὲν γὰρ τὸ τέλος ἣ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος ποιεῖ πράττειν.
>
> It is clear from what has been said that it is not possible for someone to be good properly without practical wisdom, nor is it possible for someone to be practically wise without character virtue. Moreover, this point might loosen the objection according to which someone holds that the virtues are separable from one another, saying that the same person is not well-equipped for all of the virtues, so that she will have developed one but not yet another. For this is possible with respect to the natural virtues, but with respect to the virtues according to which someone is called good properly, this is not possible. For at the same time that the one, practical wisdom, is present, all of the character virtues are present. So it is clear that, even if it were not practical, practical wisdom would be needed because it is a virtue of a part[83] of the soul, and further that choice will not be correct without either practical wisdom or character virtue. For character virtue sets the end, while practical wisdom makes people do what forwards the end. [*NE* VI.13 1144b30-1145a6]

[83] This is another instance in which a 'part' of the soul translation is inevitable, if the goal is to produce a close, literal translation of the original text.

Aristotle maintains that if an agent is practically wise, then she must have all of the individual character virtues, and vice versa, if she has all of the character virtues, then she must be practically wise. Moreover, according to virtue's unity constraint, if an agent is genuinely temperate, then we are entitled to conclude that she has also developed or acquired all of the other character virtues. Importantly, the unity constraint does not require that a virtuous agent must express all of the individual character virtues at the same time, but rather that a virtuous agent can express each virtue when the opportunity for expressing it arises. This point of clarification accords with common sense, since, for example, there are circumstances in which an agent can choose and act temperately that do not readily appear to be circumstances that afford her the opportunity to choose and to act courageously; consider someone dining alone. What the unity constraint does require is that an agent with character virtue and practical wisdom is capable of expressing any of the character virtues whenever the opportunity arises and it comes time to act. A virtuous agent dining alone must express temperance and eat and drink as her reason correctly prescribes, and if hostile combatants should descend on the city just after dinner, she must then express courage and face those combatants in battle as her reason correctly prescribes.

It is worth stopping to consider what to make of Aristotle's indication in the passage above that the unity constraint applies to genuine character virtue, but that it does not apply to what he calls the natural virtues. He maintains that an agent can develop or acquire one natural virtue without also at the same time having developed another natural virtue. Aristotle makes this concession because what he terms natural virtue is not the same as proper or authoritative character virtue. He notes that agents "are not called good strictly" because of being naturally virtuous, but they are only good in the truest sense if they have developed proper or authoritative character virtue. It is because natural virtue is inferior to genuine character virtue that Aristotle does not

think that the unity constraint applies to natural virtue. Aristotle accounts for natural virtue at the beginning of *NE* VI.13 as inferior to proper character virtue, explaining that "intelligence," which is an oblique way of referring to the intellectual virtue of practical wisdom, is what the truly virtuous have that the merely naturally virtuous lack.

> πᾶσι γὰρ δοκεῖ ἕκαστα τῶν ἠθῶν ὑπάρχειν φύσει πως. καὶ γὰρ δίκαιοι καὶ σωφρονικοὶ καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι καὶ τἆλλα ἔχομεν εὐθὺς ἐκ γενετῆς. ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως ζητοῦμεν ἕτερόν τι τὸ κυρίως ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἄλλον τρόπον ὑπάρχειν. καὶ γὰρ παισὶ καὶ θηρίοις αἱ φυσικαὶ ὑπάρχουσιν ἕξεις, ἀλλ᾽ ἄνευ νοῦ βλαβεραὶ φαίνονται οὖσαι.
>
> It seems likely to all people that each of the characters belongs to us somehow by nature. For we are just, able to be temperate, and courageous, and we have all the others straightaway from birth. Yet nevertheless we expect that something else is good properly and so we expect that such characters belong to us in some other way. For the natural virtues belong even to children and beasts, but without intelligence the natural virtues seem harmful. [*NE* VI.13 1145b4-9]

How closely the apparent, natural virtues approximate the proper or authoritative virtues is an interesting question, and it is worth pointing out that Aristotle apparently denies that there is anything like natural virtue early on in the ethics.

> οὔτ᾽ ἄρα φύσει οὔτε παρὰ φύσιν ἐγγίνονται αἱ ἀρεταί, ἀλλὰ πεφυκόσι μὲν ἡμῖν δέξασθαι αὐτάς, τελειουμένοις δὲ διὰ τοῦ ἔθους.
>
> Neither by nature nor against nature do the virtues come about, but by nature it is possible for us to receive them, and they are brought to completion by habit. [*NE* II.1 1103a23-26]

Aristotle does not contradict himself with these two claims regarding character virtue and its relation to nature, but rather recognizes that there are simulacra of the virtues, or apparent virtues, on display in the activities and behavior of children and animals. It can be true that apparent, natural virtue comes about by nature in some sense without it also being true that proper virtue comes about in the same way. Considering some examples that accord with Aristotle's account of natural virtue will help to clarify the difference between natural virtue and genuine, proper character virtue.

An unsupervised child who makes his way into the kitchen and accesses the family's fully stocked pantry might surprise his mother when she discovers that he only indulged in a couple of cookies, leaving the rest of the box uneaten; she might be proud and believe that her son is showing signs of having developed the virtue of temperance. Likewise, the family dog who escapes his kennel in the night and upends the trashcan, strewing an assortment of chicken bones across the floor, might surprise his owners when they discover in the morning that the dog did not eat the bones; they might praise the dog for his apparent temperance. Yet neither the unsupervised child nor the trash strewing dog is an example of an agent who has developed the proper or genuine virtue of temperance. Aristotle might call both naturally virtuous, for they have apparently performed temperate actions, but he would not consider them actually virtuous. The souls of non-human animals have no rational natures, and the souls of children have insufficiently developed rational natures, and these reasons account for why such beings are only naturally or apparently virtuous rather than properly so. Neither the child nor the dog has developed the psychological disposition to choose and perform temperate actions on a consistent basis; they merely perform actions that bear resemblance to those that agents with temperate characters reliably choose and perform.

Aristotle bars the unity constraint from applying to the natural virtues because they are not authoritative, true virtues. Those who are naturally virtuous perform actions that externally resemble actions that the properly virtuous choose and perform, but they do not choose and perform virtuous actions *as* those with genuine virtue choose and perform them, for they lack virtuous character types. The distinction between action type and character type that I attended to in Chapter 1 is helpful here[84]: just as an agent training to become temperate but is not yet temperate

[84] See Ch 1, Section 1.1, pp. 32-37

can choose and perform actions that fall under the temperate action type classification, her enacted choices are not genuinely temperate because they do not follow from her own developed character type. Similarly, naturally virtuous children can enact choices that we might classify as belonging to the temperate action type classification, but they are not genuinely temperate enacted choices since the naturally virtuous have not developed an actual temperate character type. The naturally virtuous lack practical wisdom, which not only accounts for why they are merely naturally virtuous rather than properly so, but Aristotle also thinks that it accounts for why agents can have the natural virtues independently of one another. The child who is naturally temperate does not also have to be naturally courageous, for instance; the slightest creak from the closet door at night might inspire him to shiver and flee from his bedroom—in this sense we might call him naturally cowardly. It may be years before he finally overcomes such a fear. Similarly, the naturally temperate dog does not also have to be naturally courageous; he might show signs of over-boldness and viciously bark at passers-by when on walks. So those who express one natural virtue now might not be prepared to express another apparent virtue yet—or ever. This seems to be the point of calling them "natural" virtues; they are at best signs of an early ethical aptitude to choose and behave correctly in human beings (or anthropomorphic descriptions of animal behavior).

Aristotle does hold that the proper or authoritative virtues, on the other hand, are subject to the unity constraint; he maintains that an agent cannot have developed any of them unless she has also developed the intellectual virtue of practical wisdom, and further, if she has developed practical wisdom, then she expresses all of the virtues. This is in fact what Aristotle means when he says that agents with natural virtue lack intelligence and that, as a result, natural virtue can lead to harm. Lacking practical wisdom, agents with natural virtue can understand and set decent goals, but they do not have the intellectual virtue necessary for deliberating correctly and reliably in

service of achieving those goals. Improper deliberation can lead one to miss a goal, and this goal-frustrating feature accounts for the sense in which the natural virtues can be harmful without practical wisdom. For example, the unsupervised child who takes and eats only a couple of cookies from the family's pantry does not indulge in excess of proper quantity, but supposing further that he chooses to eat the cookies over the healthier trail mix on the same shelf of the pantry, then he nevertheless indulges in an improper object of tactile appetite. His apparent temperance only extends along one dimension of true temperance, as it were; he does not over-eat, but he does eat the wrong thing. Also consider the apparently temperate dog; it is still the case that curiosity leads the canine to knock over the trash can and perhaps indulge in sniffing the chicken bones, whereas an agent with true temperance would leave what reason would forbid alone entirely. With this in mind, it becomes easier to understand the sense in which natural virtue is inferior to proper virtue, and why apparently virtuous children, let alone animals, are not subject to proper virtue's unity constraint. It also becomes easier to understand the role that practical wisdom plays in the case of proper virtue when considering how lack of intelligence can lead to harm for those with apparent, natural virtue. After all, having a natural aptitude for something is no substitute for expertise. The unsupervised child upsets a healthy diet and the trash strewing dog comes dangerously close to consuming what would harm her.

Proper virtue's unity constraint is a result of Aristotle's tethering of character virtue to practical wisdom, i.e., their mutual dependence. This means that an agent who successfully becomes virtuous is one who develops both the relevant rational and non-rational psychological excellences. There does not seem to be a priority relation regarding which of the two—either character virtue or the intellectual virtue of practical wisdom—comes first in the course of one's ethical development into a properly good and virtuous agent. In fact, according to Aristotle, one

nature of an agent's soul does not remain unchanged or static while the other develops; as an agent develops capacities as a human being, she develops *both* the rational and non-rational natures of her soul at the same time. Supposing that an agent is developing character virtue, then it must also be true that she is developing or approximating the intellectual virtue of practical wisdom, and vice versa. It is a feature of ethical development and education for Aristotle that an agent who is developing a character type is not merely undergoing non-rational development, but she is also developing rationally.

As Aristotle makes clear at *NE* I.13, his view is that the human soul develops as a whole, although we can mark an agent's developmental progress either non-rationally or rationally and, more specifically, either according to how her ἐπιθυμητικόν/ὀρεκτικόν is disposed or according to how her λογιστικόν is disposed. This means that it is possible to infer something about the rational, deliberative sub-aspect of an agent's soul on the basis of information about her non-rational character type. For instance, if we know that an agent is genuinely virtuous, then we can infer that she is practically wise; further, if we know that an agent is only naturally virtuous, or lacks virtue all together, then we can infer that she is not practically wise. Moreover, it is also possible to infer something about an agent's non-rational character type on the basis of information about her λογιστικόν. For instance, if we know that an agent is practically wise, then we can infer that she has character virtue, and if we know that she lacks practical wisdom, then we can infer that she lacks proper character virtue.

Since it is Aristotle's view that the genuine character virtues are unified, it is sometimes proper to refer simply to ethical or character virtue in the singular rather than to each of the individual virtues such as temperance, courage, justice, and so on. This is because 'virtue' serves as a genus term and covers all of the expressions of character excellence in the various domains.

‘Virtue’ can refer to each individual expression because of ethical virtue’s status as a numerically singular disposition on Aristotle’s account.[85] This follows from what Kosman (The Activity of Being) calls “one of the cornerstones of [Aristotle’s] ontology,” namely “that numerical identity does not entail equivalence of being.”[86] Character virtue is a singular character type numerically, for it is excellence of the non-rational nature of the human soul, specifically the ἐπιθυμητικόν/ὀρεκτικόν when it receives and obeys the correct prescriptions of reason and so is in tune with the soul’s λογιστικόν. Yet character virtue has several ways of being expressed: as temperance, as courage, as generosity, and so on. So while it is appropriate to refer to character virtue as a numerically single choice-making disposition, it is also appropriate to refer to individual character virtues in the plural as different expressions of the numerically singular disposition, or as various ways of correct choice-making and behaving excellently in the different practical domains, and hence of being virtuous. Acknowledging that character virtue is a numerically singular character type with many ways for agents to express it helps further clarify the concept of the unity constraint Aristotle imposes on character virtue. A genuinely virtuous agent must be said to have all of the individual character virtues because character virtue is numerically one but several with respect to being. We can attribute a virtuous character to someone generally, calling her virtuous, and we can also attribute to her the individual virtues as she expresses them in different practical domains in relation to different affects and objects. When an agent holds or manages excellently with respect to tactile appetite and its objects, we call her temperate; when she holds or manages excellently in the sphere of feelings of fear and confidence and their objects,

[85] As Nussbaum (Aristotle’s *De Motu Animalium*) correctly notes, there are many “passages in which Aristotle speaks of a difference in *einai*: *Metaphys*. XI.10 1066a33 where the road up and the road down are said to be one, but different in *einai*; similar remarks at *DA* 424a25 and 425b25 about the actuality of *aesthesis* and of its object; and *Mem*. 450b21, where it is claimed that we can regard the pictured animal either as a likeness or as an animal (‘but the *einai* is not the same for both’)…” (235)

[86] Kosman, Aryeh. (2003) The Activity of Being. Harvard University Press. 89

we call her courageous. On Aristotle's view, we cannot ascribe any of the individual character virtues to an agent without also ascribing all of the others to her, and so not without ascribing general character virtue to her. If an agent is genuinely temperate, then she is also genuinely courageous, generous, mild, and so on. This is part of what it means for character virtue on Aristotle's account to be subject to a unity constraint; it is a numerically singular disposition that agents can develop or acquire, but agents can express it in several ways. Further, because of character virtue and practical wisdom's mutual dependence, we can infer from the fact that an agent is genuinely or properly temperate or courageous, not only that she expresses all of the character virtues, but also that she is also practically wise.

I propose that Aristotle must conceive of and impose something similar to virtue's unity constraint on the character types of self-control and un-self-control. Since they are character types whose accounts are tied to the relation between the rational and non-rational natures of human souls, it follows that there should be some sort of restriction on which sorts of character types akratic and enkratic agents are able to express throughout the practical domains. That is, since the rational and non-rational natures of self-controlled and un-self-controlled agents' souls are out of tune in general, this must have implications for the character types that such agents express with respect to all of the affects in all of the practical domains. However, I do not propose that Aristotle applies the unity constraint to *akrasia* and *enkrateia* in the same way that he applies it to character virtue. The modified version of the constraint that applies to these inferior character types does not require un-self-controlled agents to express un-self-control in every practical domain, nor does it require self-controlled agents to express self-control in every practical domain. My considered view, which will become clear shortly, is the following: if an agent expresses a genuine form of *akrasia* in one practical domain, then she must express *either akrasia or enkrateia* in all of the

other practical domains. Likewise, if an agent expresses a genuine form of *enkrateia* in one practical domain, then she must express *either enkrateia or akrasia* in all of the others.

I hold that something similar to character virtue's unity constraint must apply to self-control and un-self-control due to Aristotle's view that the human soul develops as a whole; at the same time that we can mark an agent's character type according to the relevant disposition of her soul's relevant non-rational sub-aspect, we can also mark an agent's character according to the disposition of her soul's relevant rational sub-aspect. Just as we can infer something about the non-rational nature of an agent's soul from the fact that she is practically wise, so too can we infer something about the non-rational nature of an agent's soul from the fact that she lacks practical wisdom. Similarly, just as we can infer that an agent is practically wise from the fact that she has a virtuous character, so too can we infer something about the rational nature of an agent's soul from the fact that she has an akratic or enkratic character.

I attribute to Aristotle the view that, if an agent genuinely expresses either self-control or its lack in any one practical domain, then the only available character types she can express in the other practical domains are self-control and un-self-control. Someone who genuinely expresses either *enkrateia* or *akrasia* in any practical domain clearly cannot express either virtue or vice in any of the others. First, it is not possible for a virtuous agent to express either self-control or un-self-control in any practical domain, for Aristotle's unity constraint bars such possibilities; a properly virtuous expresses her virtue in every practical domain. So it follows that no agent who expresses *akrasia* or *enkrateia* in any one practical domain is able to express genuine virtue in any other practical domain. Secondly, it is not possible for a vicious agent to express self-control or un-self-control in any domain, either. For recall that Aristotle thinks that vicious agents do not experience any psychological conflict between what their reason prescribes and what they non-

rationally desire; such conflict is exclusively emblematic of self-controlled and un-self-controlled agents. If someone genuinely expresses *akrasia* or *enkrateia* in any one domain, then the only character types available for her to express in the other domains, arrived at through eliminative reasoning, are either *akrasia* or *enkrateia*.

This constraint on the character types of self-control and un-self-control is importantly different from the unity constraint which Aristotle imposes on character virtue. Agents with character virtue cannot express anything but virtue in all of the practical domains, whereas I do not think it follows, for instance, that an agent who expresses strict *akrasia* must only express loose forms of *akrasia* in the other practical domains. She may express a loose form of *enkrateia* in courage's domain with it still being true that she expresses strict *akrasia* in temperance's domain. To be clear, I do not propose that anything bars the strict akratic from expressing loose *akrasia* in courage's domain, but rather that the modified version of the unity constraint does not require her to express *akrasia* in every practical domain just because she expresses it in one of them. There is no necessity—and it is improbable—that a strict akratic agent be thoroughly un-self-controlled (i.e., express *akrasia* in every practical domain). What I am arguing is that both virtue's unity constraint and the modified unity constraint on self-control and its lack have in common that they are restrictions on which character types agents can express throughout the practical domains if they genuinely express a certain character in any practical domain. An agent who expresses virtue in one practical domain can only express virtue in all of the others, while an agent who expresses *akrasia* in one practical domain can only express *either akrasia or enkrateia* in all of the others, and similarly, an agent who expresses *enkrateia* in one practical domain can only express *either akrasia or enkrateia* in all of the others.

Another way of getting my point across is to attend once more to Aristotle's view regarding the alignment, or orientation, of the natures and sub-aspects of the souls of agents who have developed the distinct character types. Recall that both virtuous and vicious agents have souls whose rational and non-rational natures are in tune, whereas both akratic and enkratic agents have souls whose natures are out of tune. The non-rational natures of virtuous and vicious agents' souls receive and obey the instructions or commands of their rational natures without fail; neither experiences any practical stutter when enacting virtuous and vicious choices, respectively. Yet the non-rational natures of akratic and enkratic agents' souls are not as obediently receptive to the commands of their rational natures; it is true about the souls of each of these agents that the ἐπιθυμητικόν/ὀρεκτικόν issues desires that conflict with and resist the rational prescriptions the λογιστικόν issues. The akratic fails to obey and enact reason's correct orders, whereas the enkratic initially resists, but ultimately succeeds in showing obedience to reason and begrudgingly enacts its correct prescriptions.

Since akratic and enkratic agents have souls whose rational and non-rational natures fail to align, neither self-control nor un-self-control can be subject to the unity constraint in same the way that character virtue is. So it is not necessary that a strict akratic agent, for instance, express *akrasia* in all of its loose forms in practical domains other than temperance's; it is likewise not necessary that a strict enkratic agent express *enkrateia* in all of its loose forms. But an agent who genuinely expresses *akrasia* in one practical domain must express either *akrasia* or *enkrateia in all of the others*; likewise, an agent who expresses *enkrateia* in any one domain must express either *akrasia* or *enkrateia in all of the others*. It may sound very strange, but this restriction on which character types self-controlled and un-self-controlled agents can express is, in some sense, what makes them

genuinely self-controlled or un-self-controlled; the restriction tracks which character types an agent can genuinely express given the relation between her soul's rational and non-rational natures.

None of what I have claimed so far rules out the possibility of thoroughly un-self-controlled or self-controlled agents, that is, agents who express forms of *akrasia* in all of the practical domains or agents who express forms of *enkrateia* in all of the practical domains. But these kinds of agents seem improbable, and what is more, at odds with Aristotle's view that "nobody has all of the kinds of *akrasia*," [*NE* VII.2 1146b4].[87] An agent who expresses self-control or un-self-control in any one practical domain cannot genuinely express virtue or vice in any of the others; at best, she expresses *enkrateia* in other domains, and at worst she expresses *akrasia* in other domains.[88] The notion that thoroughly akratic and thoroughly enkratic agents are unlikely accords with common experience. If we reflect on the people in our lives, many of them find some correct actions more difficult to perform than others. Consider someone who can consistently overcome his excessive tactile desire for wine but is also often quick to succumb to his desire to flee from frightening things despite his knowledge that he should withstand them. We can classify this agent as someone who expresses strict *enkrateia* in temperance's practical domain, and we can also classify him as someone who expresses loose *akrasia* in courage's practical domain. It is not impossible for there to be agents whose desire always overcomes their reason in every practical domain, and it is not impossible for there to be agents who always overcome their conflicting desires in every practical domain; in short, I am not denying that there *could* be thoroughly akratic and thoroughly enkratic

[87] Recall that in my earlier treatment of this important claim (See Ch. 2, Section 2.3, pp. 106-107), I pointed out that Aristotle means that agents cannot express all forms of *akrasia* since there are two distinct akratic character types in most practical domains, just as there are two distinct vicious character types. Here, I am making the additional point that Aristotle might mean that nobody expresses *akrasia* in every domain because she may very well express *enkrateia* in others.

[88] It is also possible that akratic agents might from time to time perform correct actions from an external perspective, but this in no way reflects on their actual character types or internal lives of choice-making. That is, such agents might perform actions of a type that do not correspond to the character types they have developed or acquired.

agents. Yet since such agents would be near approximations of vicious and virtuous agents, either always enacting incorrect choices in every practical domain in the thoroughly akratic case, or always eventually enacting the correct choices in every practical domain in the thoroughly enkratic case, they would have to be nearly as rare, if not as rare, as Aristotle thinks that genuine vicious and virtuous agents are.

Some agents might express *akrasia* in more domains than they express *enkrateia*, and other agents might express *enkrateia* in more domains than they express *akrasia*. The extent to which an agent expresses *akrasia* or *enkrateia* in more domains than others on my view depends on the extent of the misalignment of her soul's non-rational and rational natures, i.e., how disobedient her soul's non-rational nature is to the correct prescriptions of its rational nature. It is likely that agents who express forms of *enkrateia* in more practical domains than they express forms of *akrasia* have non-rational natures that are generally more obedient to their rational natures than agents who express forms *akrasia* in more practical domains than they express forms of *enkrateia*. That is, agents who express *enkrateia* in more domains than they express *akrasia* have non-rational natures more aligned with their rational natures than agents who express *akrasia* in more domains than *enkrateia*. These considerations give rise to the idea that there are degrees of out-of-tuneness with respect to the human soul's rational and non-rational natures. The more out of tune an agent's soul's natures are, the more domains she will express forms of *akrasia* in; the less out of tune an agent's soul's natures are (yet still out of tune), the more domains she will express forms of *enkrateia* in.

A consequence of the view I am advancing is the discovery that *enkrateia* and *akrasia* might together be a character type singular in number, although there are several ways for agents to express them, and several combinations of their expressions are possible across the practical

domains. This is another way of describing the modification of virtue's unity constraint that I am proposing; perhaps it is more appropriate to call it a *duality constraint*, since it requires that agents who genuinely express *either akrasia or enkrateia* in any one practical domain must express *either akrasia or enkrateia* in all of the others. What results from this line of reasoning is that when we call an agent self-controlled or un-self-controlled, this does not mean that she is thoroughly enkratic or akratic. Rather, agents who express *akrasia* in more practical domains than they express *enkrateia* merit the general label akratic or un-self-controlled. Agents who express *enkrateia* in more domains than they express *akrasia* merit the general name enkratic or self-controlled. Another way of putting this is to say that, when agents have souls whose rational and non-rational natures are out of tune, the degree to which they are out of tune corresponds to whether we generally refer to them as akratic or enkratic.

Another important feature of the original unity constraint on virtue is that it results from character virtue and practical wisdom's mutual dependence. If someone is genuinely virtuous, then not only must she express all of the virtues, but she must also be practically wise. Yet what can we infer about the rational nature of an akratic or enkratic agent's soul from the fact that her non-rational nature is disposed in a way inferior to that of the virtuous agent? It is crucial to emphasize again that, on Aristotle's view, an agent's soul does not develop one nature at a time over the course of her ethical growth; rather, both the rational and non-rational natures of her soul develop at the same time. In the case of a properly virtuous agent, she develops character virtue while she develops the intellectual virtue of her λογιστικόν, practical wisdom; her rational growth and her non-rational growth are mutually dependent. Similarly, I contend that the soul of an akratic or enkratic agent ought to have a λογιστικόν disposed in some way that corresponds to her non-rational disposition or character type. Enkratic and akratic agents fall short of having the

intellectual virtue of practical wisdom, but this does not mean that their souls' rational natures lack a deliberative disposition entirely. Just as an agent who falls short of character virtue can still have a character type, so too can an agent without practical wisdom still have a λογιστικόν that is disposed in some way. In fact, her λογιστικόν *must* be disposed in some way, or else she does not have a soul of the sort that Aristotle ascribes to human beings. Clearly, we cannot attribute practical wisdom to an akratic or enkratic agent, but we can attribute to her a deliberative disposition that is inferior to practical wisdom.

While Aristotle does not say much about deliberative dispositions or conditions inferior to practical wisdom, at *NE* VI.12 he does differentiate practical wisdom from one inferior deliberative disposition or condition: cleverness (δεινότης). Aristotle accounts for cleverness by noting that it is not the same thing as practical wisdom, but that practical wisdom depends on the power of cleverness. He writes that practical wisdom "is not [a disposition] without this capacity," i.e., cleverness [ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἄνευ τῆς δυνάμεως ταύτης *NE* VI.12 1144a29-30]. This suggests that there is some sense in which cleverness is a deliberative disposition inferior to and yet somehow a part of, or nested within, practical wisdom.

> ἔστι δὴ δύναμις ἣν καλοῦσι δεινότητα, αὕτη δ᾽ ἐστὶ τοιαύτη ὥστε τὰ πρὸς τὸν ὑποτεθέντα σκοπὸν συντείνοντα δύνασθαι ταῦτα πράττειν καὶ τυγχάνειν αὐτοῦ. ἂν μὲν οὖν ὁ σκοπὸς ᾖ καλός, ἐπαινετή ἐστιν, ἐὰν δὲ φαῦλος, πανουργία. διὸ καὶ τοὺς φρονίμους δεινοὺς καὶ πανούργους φαμὲν εἶναι. ἔστι δ᾽ ἡ φρόνησις οὐχ ἡ δύναμις, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἄνευ τῆς δυνάμεως ταύτης. ἡ δ᾽ ἕξις τῷ ὄμματι τούτῳ γίνεται τῆς ψυχῆς οὐκ ἄνευ ἀρετῆς, ὡς εἴρηταί τε καὶ ἔστι δῆλον.
>
> There is indeed a capacity called cleverness, and this is such that it is able to do and happen upon the things that lead to a goal that has been taken up. If the goal is noble, [cleverness] is praiseworthy, but if the goal is vile, then the capacity is blameworthy. This is why we call villains and clever people practically wise.[89] Yet practical

[89] While it may seem strange for Aristotle to say that "we call villains practically wise," it is clear that he means that some people label an efficient villain, say a thief who makes a stable living out of her thievery, as practically wise. In other words, even though a first glance at the passage might lead one to infer that Aristotle is attributing practical wisdom to nefarious agents, Aristotle is merely making a comparative remark to highlight cleverness's likeness to practical wisdom. Those who are in error might mistake cleverness for practical wisdom and falsely claim of clever thieves that they are practically wise.

> wisdom is not this capacity [i.e., cleverness], though practical wisdom is not possible without this capacity. Further, the disposition of practical wisdom does not arise in the eye of the soul without virtue, as we have said before and is clear. [*NE* VI.12 1144a24-31]

Aristotle here describes cleverness as the power to reason about the means necessary to achieve some goal. The goals that agents sets for themselves vary in ethical value or description; if an agent uses her cleverness to achieve a vile (φαῦλος) goal, then her cleverness is worthy of blame, but if she uses her cleverness to achieve a noble (καλός) goal, then her cleverness is worthy of praise. Cleverness is not the same thing as practical wisdom, but, as Aristotle says, practical wisdom *is not* without cleverness. This means that cleverness is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for practical wisdom, and hence for character virtue.

Aristotle posits that character virtue puts the finish on cleverness so that it becomes or develops into the intellectual virtue of practical wisdom.

> ἔτι τὸ ἔργον ἀποτελεῖται κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ τὴν ἠθικὴν ἀρετήν. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ τὸν σκοπὸν ποιεῖ ὀρθόν, ἡ δὲ φρόνησις τὰ πρὸς τοῦτον.
>
> Moreover, proper human function is perfected by practical wisdom and character virtue. For character virtue makes the goal right, and practical wisdom makes the things that lead to the goal right. [*NE* VI.12 1144a6-9]

Agents without character virtue cannot be practically wise, but they can be clever; for cleverness alone does not always "makes the things that lead to the goal right," since agents can employ it to achieve either vile or noble goals. Aristotle's inclusion of cleverness in the ethics suggests that there are indeed deliberative dispositions of the soul's λογιστικόν which are inferior to practical wisdom just as there are character types inferior to virtue. For Aristotle holds that cleverness stands in for, or takes the place of, practical wisdom as the deliberative condition of those who have character types inferior to virtue.

Aristotle conceives of an analogy regarding the relation between cleverness and practical wisdom on the one hand, and the relation between natural virtue and proper virtue on the other at

NE VI.13. It is possible to mistake the former member of each pair for the latter member, but importantly, the former members are inferior to the latter ones. Just as natural virtue is apparent, proper virtue, so too is cleverness apparent practical wisdom. He writes at VI.13 as though the naturally virtuous are clever, just as the properly virtuous are practically wise. However, it does not follow that cleverness only attends natural virtue, even though it does follow that practical wisdom only attends proper virtue. That is, cleverness and natural virtue are not mutually dependent in the sense that they must always be found together in an agent's soul. For we might suppose, although Aristotle does not explicitly mention them, that there are also naturally vicious agents, in addition to the naturally virtuous. A different unsupervised child than the one from my earlier example might infuriate his mother when she finds that he has ransacked the pantry, leaving it nearly empty, apparently signaling that he is self-indulgent. Indeed, when explaining Aristotle's admission that the natural virtues are not subject to genuine virtue's unity constraint, I considered that an apparently temperate child might also be apparently cowardly, and not courageous.[90] So natural virtue and cleverness are not mutually dependent like proper virtue and practical wisdom are, which means that one can expect to find clever agents who are not also naturally virtuous in some practical domain, for example, clever agents who are instead naturally vicious. Moreover, the idea that all clever agents do not have to express natural virtue is consonant with Aristotle's view that clever agents can reason toward achieving blameworthy goals.

Since cleverness and natural virtue are not mutually dependent in the same exclusive sense that proper virtue and practical wisdom are mutually dependent, this means that cleverness can also accompany other character types, for instance *akrasia* and *enkrateia*. I hold that on Aristotle's view, cleverness takes the place of practical wisdom as the disposition of an akratic or enkratic

[90] See Section 3.2, p. 147

agent's soul's λογιστικόν. For Aristotle writes at *NE* I.13 that we praise the rational natures of the souls of enkratic and akratic agents [1102b14-15]. Aristotle cannot mean that self-controlled and un-self-controlled agents are practically wise, for we have seen that Aristotle holds that only agents with genuine character virtue lay claim to the intellectual virtue of practical wisdom. Moreover, Aristotle explicitly rejects the view that akratic agents have practical wisdom at *NE* VII.10 due to the conclusions he draws at the end of *NE* VI, namely that those with practical wisdom by necessity have character virtue [1152a6-9]. It is safe to infer due to the same reasoning that Aristotle also rejects the view that enkratic agents have practical wisdom, even though he does not explicitly make the case in the same passage; any practically wise agent must also have developed character virtue, and self-control is not virtue. So what is there for Aristotle to praise about the rational natures of enkratic and akratic agents' souls if they lack practical wisdom? The answer arrives if we continue reading further into *NE* VII.10.

> τὸν δὲ δεινὸν οὐδὲν κωλύει ἀκρατῆ εἶναι. διὸ καὶ δοκοῦσιν ἐνίοτε φρόνιμοι μὲν εἶναί τινες ἀκρατεῖς δέ, διὰ τὸ τὴν δεινότητα διαφέρειν τῆς φρονήσεως τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις, καὶ κατὰ μὲν τὸν λόγον ἐγγὺς εἶναι, διαφέρειν δὲ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν…
>
> But nothing prevents the akratic agent from being clever. This is why sometimes people think that some akratic agents are practically wise, because cleverness differs from practical wisdom in the manner spoken about in the earlier accounts, and while cleverness approaches practical wisdom according to that account, it is indeed different with respect to choice. [*NE* VII.10 1152a10-14]

Aristotle here directs our attention to his earlier treatment of cleverness and in what manner it is distinct from practical wisdom. It differs from practical wisdom in that cleverness enables agents to deliberate for the sake of achieving either noble or vile goals. When they use their cleverness to choose and to act for the sake of noble goals, their cleverness is worthy of praise; when they use their cleverness to choose and to act for the sake of vile goals, their cleverness is worthy of blame.

Importantly, Aristotle does not write that clever agents are inferior deliberators or calculators when compared to the practically wise—that is, it is not the case that a clever agent is worse at coming up with rational plans for attaining her goals than the practically wise agent. The real distinction that Aristotle draws between the two is that cleverness enables agents to come up with rational plans for attaining either praiseworthy or blameworthy goals, whereas practical wisdom only enables agents to form plans for attaining praiseworthy goals. Clever agents can weigh incorrect alternatives against reason's correct prescriptions when desiring to choose and act otherwise than they know is correct. Since clever agents are not practically wise, and so lack character virtue, their souls' desiderative sub-aspects are out of tune with what their own reason correctly prescribes; they do not unfailingly desire to do what their reason ordains is correct. In the case of *akrasia*, an agent's cleverness enables her to come up with rational plans for achieving two distinct goals, one praiseworthy and the other blameworthy, and her desire pulls her to follow through on the latter plan over the former. In the case of *enkrateia*, an agent's cleverness enables her likewise to come up with rational plans for achieving two distinct goals, one praiseworthy and the other blameworthy, and she certainly desires to follow through with the latter, yet she overcomes her desire and enacts the correct choice in obedience to what her reason prescribes is correct. The akratic agent's cleverness is clearly distinct from the virtuous agent's practical wisdom, but the enkratic agent's cleverness may be harder to distinguish from the virtuous agent's practical wisdom at first glance. Nevertheless, their difference lies in the fact that the clever enkratic agent countenances a feasible plan for achieving a blameworthy goal and desires to follow through on it, whereas the practically wise and virtuous agent only comes up with and desires to follow through on a plan for achieving a praiseworthy goal. Even though the enkratic agent does

not commit to the plan that leads to the blameworthy goal, she nevertheless desires to. A virtuous agent, on the other hand, only desires and plans in accord with her reason's correct prescriptions.

The upshot of this section has been to provide further psychological support for the view that self-control and un-self-control have wide ranges of expression. I have argued that self-control and un-self-control are subject to a modification of the unity constraint that Aristotle imposes on character virtue which I have called the *duality constraint*. An agent who genuinely expresses self-control in any practical domain is only able to express either self-control or un-self-control in all of the others; similarly, someone who genuinely expresses un-self-control in any practical domain is only able to express either self-control or un-self-control in all of the others. Further, I have contended that akratic and enkratic agents must be subject to this duality constraint because the rational and non-rational natures of their souls are out of tune, as Aristotle notes at *NE* I.13, which restrains them from genuinely expressing virtue and vice in all practical domains. I have also called attention to an interesting consequence of investigating the duality constraint and the reasons why akratic and enkratic agents are subject to it: namely the discovery that the akratic and enkratic character types might be together a character type singular in number, and agents can express that singular character type as *akrasia* or *enkrateia*, either strictly or loosely, in all of the practical domains and in a variety of different combinations. When agents express *akrasia* more often or in more practical domains than they express *enkrateia*, they merit the general title of akratic or un-self-controlled; when they express *enkrateia* more often or in more practical domains than they express *akrasia*, they merit the general title of enkratic or self-controlled.

3.3 Charles's Worry

Someone might generally object to my view that self-control and un-self-control have wide ranges of expression by claiming that if Aristotle endorsed such a view, then he would have explicitly

called attention to it somewhere in the ethics. One can meet this concern by recognizing that Aristotle's ethical treatises are not primarily concerned with self-control or un-self-control. They primarily concern virtue and living the best life. What is more, Aristotle's ethical inquiry is not even really concerned with examining what virtue is or defining the best character type; it is a protreptic text meant to guide its audience and facilitate their becoming virtuous.

> …οὐ γὰρ ἵνα εἰδῶμεν τί ἐστιν ἡ ἀρετὴ σκεπτόμεθα, ἀλλ᾽ ἵν᾽ ἀγαθοὶ γενώμεθα, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲν ἂν ἦν ὄφελος αὐτῆς.
>
> …for we are not examining virtue so that we might know what it is, but so that we might become good, since nothing else might be a benefit of it. [*NE* II.2 1103b27-29]

He does not fully deny the importance of studying what virtue is, yet since becoming virtuous is the goal of those who study virtue, what Aristotle is claiming is that knowing the definition of virtue is insufficient for becoming virtuous.[91] This statement of his thesis as virtue-focused clearly does not preclude self-control and un-self-control from showing up in his ethical account, but it does suggest that we should not hold our breath waiting for him to fill in all of the details about these inferior character types. Similarly, one might expect in a recipe to find directions for how to make a dish; some of those directions might describe what would happen if one were to go wrong somewhere along the way. But no chef, neither an expert nor one in training, reasonably expects a recipe to cover in great detail all of the aspects of a wrongly prepared dish, nor to explain all of the possible ways in which one could go wrong in preparing it. Likewise, since Aristotle develops his ethical account with the goal of becoming virtuous in mind, we should not expect him to

[91] In some sense, this is what Aristotle claims at II.4 when differentiating actions that proceed from a virtuous character's ethical practical reasoning from products that proceed from a craftsperson's technical knowledge or expertise [1105a33-1105b5]. He holds that knowledge is sufficient for a craftsperson's successful production of some good, but that knowledge is insufficient for the enactment of a genuinely virtuous choice; in fact, Aristotle claims that knowledge is of relatively minimal importance when contrasted with the requirements that a virtuous person (1) chooses to perform a virtuous action for its own sake and (2) does so from an unchanging, reliable psychological disposition to enact virtuous choices.

describe in great detail the character types of *akrasia* and *enkrateia*. Aristotle's ethical work is not a population record and diagnosis of all possible ethical characters, so we should not expect exact analyses and accounts of the character types inferior to virtue.

The general objection that Aristotle does not explicitly develop a positive account of the wide ranges of *akrasia* and *enkrateia* akin to the one I have presented in this chapter and the last is not actually a strong objection to the view I have advanced. For I have shown that my view about these character types is consonant with Aristotle's textual claims both about self-control and un-self-control, and also character types in general. Further, I have shown specifically in this chapter that there is strong psychological justification for the view that *akrasia* and *enkrateia* have wide ranges of expression. Moreover, the thesis or purpose of Aristotle's ethical inquiry, the reason why he sets out to study virtue, is not even primarily to provide a definition of the most praiseworthy character type; rather, the goal is facilitating the cultivation of virtue in his audience. It should not be surprising that he does not provide complete definitions for or analyses of the inferior character types. That work is up to the textual archaeologists, to synthesize the most complete definitions we can from what little Aristotle does write positively about these inferior character types.

Taking proper account of Aristotle's ethical thesis also helps to dissolve objections that arise when noting that Aristotle does not explicitly declare that *akrasia* and *enkrateia* have expressions in practical domains aside from temperance's practical domain. David Charles (Aristotle's Philosophy of Action) notes, for instance, that Aristotle does not even gesture at agents expressing self-control or un-self-control in courage's practical domain, and further, that Aristotle actually seems to preclude or proscribe *enkrateia*'s expression from courage's practical domain at *NE* II.3 in a passage which I examine soon. Crucially, if Charles's reading of this passage is correct,

it serves as evidence against the view that there can be genuine expressions of *akrasia* and *enkrateia* in practical domains other than temperance's. Charles writes that Aristotle's account

> contains a paradoxical description of courage, as it classifies the agent who resists the enemy with pain overall as cowardly—even though he may on occasion stay and fight in just the same way as the courageous man. On some views of courage, such a man is the more courageous because he overcomes the most fear in acting as he does; but for Aristotle he is not even self-controlled…but cowardly and, as such, not different in fundamental classification from the man who actually flees (and judges it best to do so). And this seems to be mistaken.[92]

The agent who consistently "resists the enemy with pain overall" should be expressing loose *enkrateia* in courage's practical domain on my view. Such a person obeys reason's correct prescription, she enacts the choice to withstand what is frightening, even though she experiences a struggle to enact reason's prescription because fear—a painful affect—pulls her to choose and act otherwise and to flee. But Charles points out that Aristotle calls this person cowardly, and so classifies her as vicious, rather than self-controlled or enkratic.

Recall that the strict enkratic agent in temperance's practical domain abstains from indulging in an object of tactile appetite even though her tactile appetite pulls her toward it; she eventually chooses and performs the correct action, even though she is vexed at having to abstain. If we can conceive of a similar figure in courage's domain, one who eventually chooses and performs the correct action but first must resist an impulse to choose and act otherwise, then she would seem to fit the enkratic model. Since Aristotle does not call such an agent self-controlled, but rather calls her a coward, Charles's considerations apparently lend justification to the suspicion that Aristotle does restrict genuine expressions of *akrasia* and *enkrateia* to temperance's practical domain. For why else would Aristotle neglect to set out a clear account of *enkrateia*'s expression

[92] Charles, David. (1984) Aristotle's Philosophy of Action. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 176

in courage's practical domain and instead declare that the most likely loose enkratic candidate is in fact vicious and a coward?

This is a case in which Aristotle is imprecise in his discussion of a less than virtuous character type because the formal purpose of ethical inquiry is facilitating the development of virtue and not precisely defining character types.[93] If I am right, and the agent who painfully resists the enemy is loosely enkratic, then it should be possible to account for her expression of self-control with more specificity; in providing the locution of qualification (i.e., enkratic with respect to *x*), one would have to locate the appropriate affect of the character type's expression. Courage's practical domain has as its proper affects fear (φόβος) and confidence (θάρσος). The agent who is excessively fearful and deficient in confidence is vicious and called a coward (ὁ δειλός); the agent who is excessively confident about what is fearful is vicious and called an over-bold person (ὁ θρασύς) [*NE* III.7 1115b28-34].

Insofar as practical domains have two vices within them, for instance cowardliness and over-boldness in courage's practical domain, then there should in theory be loose expressions of both self-control and un-self-control that correspond with both extremes. For the un-self-controlled agent generally chooses and performs actions that externally resemble the vicious agent's; but which vicious person in courage's domain is it correct to say that un-self-controlled agent's actions resemble: the actions of the excessively vicious over-bold agent or the actions of the deficiently

[93] Pearson (Aristotle on Desire) maintains something similar, namely that Charles derives too much from a passage that contains "perhaps a careless overstatement on Aristotle's part," (Ch 5, f.25, 123). I am not prepared to ascribe carelessness to Aristotle, but I do think that because the passage arises early on in the *NE* at II.3, Aristotle is not yet prepared to treat with great precision the real distinctions among the character types. It is not until II.5 that Aristotle even defines what a ἕξις or character type is, and it is not until III.2 that he tells us that choices and distinct relations to choice-making are what best distinguish the character types from one another, rather than the externally observable actions which differently disposed agents perform.
Pearson, Gills. (2012) Aristotle on Desire. Cambridge University Press.

vicious cowardly agent? Similarly, the self-controlled agent generally chooses and performs actions that externally resemble the virtuous agent's, even though affect pulls her to choose and perform incorrect actions; but with which affect does the loose enkratic agent struggle in courage's practical domain, fear or confidence? And whose incorrect action is the enkratic agent tempted to choose and perform, the coward's or the over-bold agent's?

I have noted that in temperance's practical domain, the strict akratic agent performs actions externally resembling the actions that the self-indulgent performs. This is because the deficient vice in temperance's domain, insensibility, is so exceedingly rare that Aristotle chooses not to say much about it.[94] The insensible agent's rarity is one reason why I did not pursue an analysis of the akratic agent in temperance's domain whose actions externally resemble the actions of the insensible agent; another reason is that Aristotle does not spend any time considering such an akratic agent. Turning back to courage's practical domain, the situation is somewhat similar. Even though Aristotle countenances both cowardice and over-boldness as vices that lie at the opposite extremes of courage's practical domain, he goes on to provide a sort of deflationary account of over-boldness, holding that most over-bold people are really just cowards who are able to signal falsely that they are confident [*NE* III.7 1115b28-33].[95]

In theory, there are two distinct loose un-self-controlled agents in courage's practical domain: the one whose actions externally resemble the coward's and who is pulled by the affect of fear (this agent is loosely akratic with respect to fear), and another whose actions externally

[94] One might conjecture that Aristotle decides not to discuss insensibility with much detail because lecturing about an uncommon vicious disposition would be unhelpful for the student eager to learn how to become virtuous. That is, just as the character types of *akrasia* and *enkrateia* receive little attention in contrast to virtue, to too do the rare vices receive little attention in contrast to virtue. Here, I can add that this is likely because Aristotle's ethical inquiry is not primarily concerned with providing a population record of all of the possible character types that agents can acquire or develop, but rather a guidebook for how to cultivate virtue in oneself, in one's family, and in one's community.
[95] I return to this point in Chapter 5 when providing an overview of courage's practical domain for the purposes of constructing and analyzing loose akratic and enkratic practical syllogisms.

resemble the over-bold person's and who is pulled by the affect of confidence (this agent is loosely akratic with respect to confidence). Similarly, in theory there are two distinct loose self-controlled agents in courage's practical domain: one whom the affect of fear pulls in cowardice's direction (this agent is loosely enkratic with respect to fear) and another whom the affect of confidence pulls in over-boldness's direction (this agent is loosely enkratic with respect to confidence).[96] It should not be astonishing that Aristotle does not fill in these theoretical details about the various ways agents can express *akrasia* or *enkrateia* throughout the practical domains; such minutiae would distract from the primary purpose of ethical inquiry, which is not to catalogue and explain all of the different character types, let alone the defective ones, but rather to provide a framework regarding how to become virtuous and flourish.

Nevertheless, the theoretical assertion that there ought to be two expressions of *akrasia* and *enkrateia* in courage's practical domain does not match well with Aristotle's anthropological findings. For since most over-bold people are actually cowards on his account, it seems that true or pure over-boldness is a rare or underrepresented character type in courage's practical domain, just as insensibility is a rare or underrepresented character type in temperance's practical domain. To be clear, Aristotle makes stronger remarks about insensibility's inhumanity and rarity than he ever does about over-boldness's. Nevertheless, the cases are similar since Aristotle characterizes over-bold agents as cowards in affective disguises—agents who puff up and falsely display the affect of confidence in the face of horrifying circumstances before eventually fleeing. Since Aristotle offers this deflationary account of the vice of over-boldness, we can infer that the star vice of courage's practical domain is cowardice, and that most self-controlled and un-self-

[96] For earlier references to the notion that there should in principle be two akratic and enkratic character types in a single practical domain, see esp. Ch. 1, Section 1.4, pp. 63-65.

controlled agents struggle against what the affect of fear pulls them to choose and to do in resistance to their own correct rational prescriptions. In short, while in principle there should be two loose akratic and enkratic agents in courage's practical domain, just as in principle there should be two of each in temperance's practical domain, Aristotle proposes that human conduct is more likely to tend toward one extreme rather than the other. On Aristotle's account, real people must express loose *akrasia* and *enkrateia* with respect to fear more often than they express loose *akrasia* and *enkrateia* with respect to confidence because, according to his experience, there are more cowards than over-bold agents.

Let us return to Charles's contention, namely that Aristotle does not attribute an enkratic character type to the agent who, in courage's domain, "resists the enemy with pain overall." The passage that Charles has in mind to justify the view that *enkrateia* has no expression in courage's domain opens *NE* II.3.

> Σημεῖον δὲ δεῖ ποιεῖσθαι τῶν ἕξεων τὴν ἐπιγινομένην ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην τοῖς ἔργοις. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀπεχόμενος τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ αὐτῷ τούτῳ χαίρων σώφρων, ὁ δ᾽ἀχθόμενος ἀκόλαστος. καὶ ὁ μὲν ὑπομένειν τὰ δεινὰ καὶ χαίρων ἢ μὴ λυπούμενός γε ἀνδρεῖος, ὁ δὲ λυπούμενος δειλός.
>
> It is necessary that the pleasure and pain following actions be adopted as a sign of agents' dispositions of character. For one who abstains from bodily pleasures and brings joy to herself through this is temperate, whereas one who is vexed by such abstinence is self-indulgent. And one who takes joy in standing firm against frightening things, or at least is not pained, is indeed courageous, whereas one who is pained is a coward. [*NE* II.3 1104b3-8]

Aristotle begins this passage with the general claim that we can infer something about a person's character by paying attention to the pleasure and pain she takes in performing actions of different ethical value. Aristotle presents as an example that a temperate person takes joy in performing temperate actions; that is, she takes joy in being the kind of person who consistently acts temperately, without excessively indulging in the objects of tactile appetite. The delight she takes in her temperate actions is a kind of signal or symptom of her temperate character. Likewise, the

self-indulgent agent is vexed or annoyed at the absence of the objects of tactile desire and at having to forego them. So the pain she feels in cases when she has to act abstinently, when she cannot satisfy her excessive tactile appetite, is a signal that she has a self-indulgent character. The pleasure and pain that the temperate and the self-indulgent agents experience are opposed to one another, so Aristotle here implicitly suggests a further contrast between the two characters, namely that the temperate agent finds performing self-indulgent actions painful, and that the self-indulgent agent is pleased at performing self-indulgent actions.

Aristotle proceeds by applying the same kind of analysis to the character types of courage and cowardice.[97] He holds that a courageous person takes pleasure in withstanding frightening things, or at least she does not find it painful to do so; her delight or lack of distress signals that she has a courageous character. Aristotle further holds that the coward experiences pain when standing up to frightening things, and that her pain is a symptom of her cowardly character. The coward is pleased to flee from what is frightening, and the courageous agent finds it painful to flee from what is frightening. So Aristotle suggests at *NE* II.3 that we can use the pain and pleasure an agent takes in performing actions having to do with frightening things as evidence for discerning the character type she expresses in courage's practical domain. Charles's worry is that Aristotle classifies the agent who finds it painful to withstand what is frightening, yet nevertheless withstands it, as a coward. If Aristotle meant to ascribe something like an enkratic character to anyone in courage's domain, this sort of person would seem the best candidate. For, as I showed a little earlier, her description runs parallel with the description of the strict enkratic agent. Since Aristotle apparently classifies this person as a coward, Charles concludes that Aristotle precludes

[97] It is worth noting that Aristotle does not consider the vice of over-boldness here, just as he does not consider the vice of insensibility. This further corroborates the view I just expressed, namely that Aristotle conceives of over-boldness as a rare vice in courage's practical domain just as he conceives of insensibility as a rare vice in temperance's practical domain.

or proscribes self-control's expression from courage's domain; to use my terminology, Charles concludes that there is no loose *enkrateia* with respect to fear.

Although Aristotle clearly writes at the outset of *NE* II.3 that the pleasure and pain agents take in the actions that they perform is somehow emblematic of the character types that they have developed, it is important to keep in mind what he writes later on at the outset of *NE* III.2 [1111b5-6], which I discussed at length in Chapter 1: an agent's relation to choice-making provides the best indication of her character type, as choice is what Aristotle thinks best distinguishes the character types from one another. This crucial point is key to dissolving Charles's and similar objections. For Aristotle holds that the choices an agent makes are better indicators of her character type than even the observable actions she performs, let alone the pleasure or pain that she takes in performing them. It is useful to take stock of the three symptoms or indications of an agent's character type before us, as each is indicative of an agent's character to a different degree of precision or reliability. First, Aristotle thinks that the most precise indication or symptom of an agent's character type is the set of choices she consistently enacts and, in general, her relation to choice-making. The second indication or symptom of character concerns the observable actions an agent performs. The third indication of character concerns the pleasure and pain an agent takes in performing the observable actions. Crucially, the latter two symptoms or indications of an agent's character type are less precise or reliable indications than her relation to choice-making is.

We have already seen why an agent's observable actions are not the most reliable or precise indications of her character type. Agents can perform actions of certain types that do not correspond to the character types that they have developed. Someone who is not yet virtuous can perform actions we might call virtuous at the guidance of a role model who is virtuous; someone who is vicious from time to time might mistakenly perform correct actions that do not correspond

to the damaged and corrupted character she has developed. Since action types and character types can come apart, it is obvious why the observable actions that agents perform do not, by themselves, precisely or reliably indicate the character types that they have developed. Strict akratic and strict enkratic agents perform actions that externally resemble those that self-indulgent and temperate agents perform, respectively. The actions they perform, observed by themselves, do not tell us readily that these agents are un-self-controlled or self-controlled, but they do provide a general indication of whether the agents are well or ill-disposed with respect to the affect of tactile appetite. It is only according to their relations to choice-making that it is possible to discern in truth whether they are actually strictly akratic or enkratic. So while it is not wrong to maintain that the actions agents perform tell us something about their characters, it *is* wrong to say that their observable actions are the most precise symptoms or indications of their character types.[98]

Further, observing the pleasure or pain an agent experiences when performing certain actions is also a less precise symptom or indication of her character than her choices and relation to choice-making are. Perhaps the pleasure and pain that an agent takes in her actions provide more precise evidence of her character than the observable actions she performs when considered by themselves. Suppose that Larry and Waylon are both attending a party with an open bar, and that both Larry and Waylon enact the choice to abstain from drinking after having a couple of beers. Further, suppose that a bystander, Ron, is watching Larry and Waylon from the other side of the

[98] There are some points that I should make regarding the accessibility of these three symptoms or indicators of character that help to show why observers of character might rely on the less precise ones. On Aristotle's rendering, choice is something internal, while actions, and agents' hedonic reactions to their own actions, are external. It is difficult to gain access to someone's internal life, and even when one thinks that she has gained such access, it is always possible that whoever reports her own internal choices should lie. What results from these considerations is the realization that even though choice might be the best indicator of an agent's character type, it is the least accessible to observation of the three before us. For it is easy enough to witness the action that someone performs, and it is also easy enough to witness her hedonic reaction to her own action, whether she enjoys it or it brings her pain. But to gain access to an agent's relation to choice-making requires much honesty on the part of the person under examination and perhaps also a long relationship between the agent and her observer.

room and their observable actions are all he has to go on. Ron might quickly class both Larry and Waylon as temperate agents after witnessing them both abstain from drinking. Yet if Ron watches a little longer and sees that Larry continues to have a pleasant evening abstaining while he frequently hears Waylon complaining that he cannot have another beer, Ron might revisit his evaluation and not class Waylon as temperate after all, but as self-controlled instead. So the observable pleasure and pain that Larry and Waylon take in the actions they perform might provide better indications of their character types than the observable actions they perform, viewed by themselves. Nevertheless, Aristotle still maintains that choice and different relations to choice-making are the best symptoms or indications of character, since he holds that choice is what most of all distinguishes the character types from one another at *NE* III.2. After all, Larry might just have a good poker face; despite his apparent enjoyment of the rest of the evening, he may very well be upset at having to abstain from drinking but good at hiding this—in other words, it is still possible that Larry is in fact enkratic and that Ron is still mistaken, even after revising his initial assessment of Larry's character.

In the passage to which Charles draws attention from *NE* II.3, Aristotle is not committing himself to the view that the pleasure and pain that agents take in their actions provide the most precise indications of the character types that they have developed. Instead, Aristotle is merely claiming that it is possible to infer or derive *some* information about an agent's character from how much she enjoys or disdains actions of different ethical value. Similarly, it seems that Aristotle endorses the view that it is possible to infer *some* information about an agent's character by observing the actions that she performs. However, Aristotle's considered view, made clear at III.2, is that neither of these symptoms or indications of character is as precise or reliable as an agent's relation to choice-making is.

Moreover, Charles does not make note of this, but there are other character types missing from the II.3 passage. Of particular note is that Aristotle does not mention strict *akrasia* and strict *enkrateia* in that passage where he notes that the pleasure and pain agents take in their actions tells us something about their character types. He does note that temperate agents take pleasure in abstaining from bodily pleasures, whereas self-indulgent agents are vexed at ever having to abstain from them, but he does not analyze strict akratic or enkratic agents along these lines in the passage. This could generate a similar worry and someone could pose an objection similar to Charles's about these character types in response to the fact that no mention of them appears either, namely that Aristotle proscribes strict *akrasia* and strict *enkrateia* from temperance's practical domain. Consider specifically that strict *akrasia* is absent from the passage.

According to Aristotle, the strict akratic agent by necessity always experiences the painful affect of regret after choosing and performing blameworthy actions in temperance's practical domain [*NE* VII.8 1150b30-31]. This is one fact that distinguishes her from the self-indulgent agent who never regrets having chosen and performed blameworthy actions. Perhaps it is correct to say that the strict akratic takes pleasure in the moment when choosing and acting against her own correct rational prescription and in indulging her excessive tactile appetite, but it is not correct to say, all things considered, that the strict akratic agent takes pleasure in choosing and performing blameworthy actions: the regret that she consistently experiences in the aftermath is painful. Since the strict akratic suffers pain because she enacted an incorrect and blameworthy choice, then she seems to fit Aristotle's description of the temperate agent from *NE* II.3. For as just noted, Aristotle holds that the temperate agent is pleased at abstaining from objects of tactile appetite, and so finds it painful to indulge in them excessively. In other words, if we reason alongside Charles and treat the II.3 passage as authoritative in a vacuum, then it leads to the preposterous conclusion that strict

akratic agents are actually in fact temperate, for both agents in some sense suffer pain at not abstaining from bodily pleasures. If we treat the passage as Charles does, then we can conclude, on the basis of this passage itself and by itself, that Aristotle precludes or proscribes strict *akrasia* from temperance's practical domain; for he does not differentiate between the pain she experiences as a result of enacting incorrect and blameworthy choices from the pain that the temperate agent would experience as a result of enacting incorrect and blameworthy choices.

This result is clearly worrisome; to describe a temperate agent as un-self-controlled flies in the face of Aristotle's view that strict *akrasia* is a blameworthy character type, whereas temperance is a praiseworthy virtue. But this worrisome issue arises only if we suppose that Aristotle thinks that the pain and pleasure agents experience upon performing actions are the only or the most reliable symptoms of their character types. He clearly does not, but instead holds that their choices, and their relations to choice-making, are the most precise indications or symptoms of which character types they have developed. In short, both the observable actions an agent performs and her hedonic reactions to them can provide only general indications of her character type; they do not provide the most precise or reliable indication. Charles's reading of the passage from *NE* II.3 seems to rely on an incorrect interpretation of Aristotle's view, namely that he considers the pleasure and pain agents take in their actions to be the most precise indications of their character types. Since this interpretation is wrong, I hold that Charles's reading of II.3 is incorrect.

So, the passage Charles takes as evidence that self-control does not have an expression in courage's domain is not really evidence for his worry at all—or at least not good evidence. Moreover, in the *NE* II.3 passage, not only does Aristotle not mention a loose form of *enkrateia* expressed in courage's domain, but he makes no references to strict *akrasia* or strict *enkrateia* either. One might reason along Charles's lines that the passage also precludes strict *akrasia* and

strict *enkrateia* from temperance's practical domain, and not just a loose form of self-control from courage's practical domain. However, since Aristotle devotes *NE* VII.1-10 to the character types of strict *akrasia* and strict *enkrateia*, we clearly cannot accept such a conclusion. The general point arrived at through this analysis is that we cannot treat *NE* II.3 in isolation as the final word on whether there is a loose expression of *enkrateia* in courage's domain. For to do so, and to neglect Aristotle's insistence that choice is what best distinguishes character types from one another, can lead to all kinds of incorrect conclusions. To sum up, I contend that the pleasure or pain an agent takes in performing certain actions is not meaningless as an indication or symptom of an agent's character; it is, nevertheless, raw evidence, capable of leading to false assessments and conclusions about an agent's character. Taking into account an agent's relation to choice-making, on the other hand, provides stronger evidence from which we can derive a more precise evaluation of her character according to Aristotle. So we may do away with Charles's worry that Aristotle seems to proscribe a loose expression of *enkrateia* from courage's domain; the worry depends upon an improper assessment of what Aristotle holds provides the most precise indication of an agent's character.

3.4 Broadie's "Embarrassing Dilemma"

Charles is not the only scholar doubtful that the ranges of self-control and un-self-control are as wide as I maintain. Broadie's (Ethics With Aristotle), too, is an authoritative voice against which I have to contend; she holds that, to use my terms, there are no loose expressions of either *akrasia* or *enkrateia*. Unlike Charles, she does not make a narrow claim about either *akrasia* or *enkrateia*'s exclusion from a particular practical domain such as courage's; rather, she makes the broadest claim possible on this matter, arguing that agents can only express *akrasia* and *enkrateia* in temperance's practical domain.

I quote the following passage at length not only because it provides a clear view of what Broadie thinks on the matter, but also because it serves as a clear point of contrast with the view which I have been arguing that Aristotle holds. Broadie holds that

> …the field of *akrasia*…is the field constituted by normal physical pleasures and pains…(1147b20-1148a14). Thus the corresponding virtue is temperance, the main corresponding vice self-indulgence. (There is also the rare vice of deficiency; i.e., an unwarranted insensibility or exaggerated asceticism with regard to physical comforts and enjoyments. But this hardly figures in the present context, for Aristotle is concerned to distinguish *akrasia* from the vice which it most resembles: namely, excessive devotion to physical comforts and pleasures.) *Akrasia* is giving in to physical appetite against one's better judgment…Giving in to excessive anger, or to excessive desire for honour or wealth, is *akrasia* only in a derivative and qualified sense.[99]

We can glean from the passage that Broadie is a representative of alternative (B) of the puzzling question of alternatives I presented in Chapter 2. That is, she thinks that there is only one way of being genuinely un-self-controlled and only one way of being genuinely self-controlled, and agents express these characters solely in temperance's practical domain. She holds that *akrasia*, and as we will see soon, *enkrateia*, are only possible with respect to the "normal physical pleasures and pains," and the affect of "physical appetite." In other words, she has in mind that what I have called strict *akrasia* and strict *enkrateia* are the only genuine expressions of the character types. Broadie concludes the excerpt above by claiming that to attribute un-self-control to an agent outside of temperance's domain, with respect to affects other than physical or tactile appetite, is only possible "in a derivative and qualified sense." This suggests that Broadie understands Aristotle to be distinguishing genuine from non-genuine expressions of *akrasia* and *enkrateia* when opposing their 'ἁπλῶς' and 'κατὰ μεταφορὰν' forms at *NE* VII.4 rather than, as I have contended, distinguishing genuine strict from genuine loose forms of the character types.

[99] Broadie, Sarah. (1991) Ethics with Aristotle. Oxford University Press. 268-9 [To maintain consistency, I have replaced 'incontinence,' and 'intemperance,' with '*akrasia*,' and 'self-indulgence,' respectively.]

In what sense does Broadie think that expressions of un-self-control and self-control other than strict *akrasia* and strict *enkrateia* are "qualified" or "derivative" expressions? It is important to clarify this point, for I also hold that the loose forms of *akrasia* and *enkrateia* are qualified expressions in contrast to their strict expressions. I have noted that Aristotle provides a consistent locution of qualification for the purposes of specifying in which practical domains agents express the loose forms. Aristotle names the loose forms of the character types metaphorically after the strict forms, and so I have contended that their names are qualified versions of the names of the strict forms. But Broadie presses further, maintaining that what I call the loose forms are not genuine expressions of *akrasia* and *enkrateia*. She and I differ on what it means for an expression of *akrasia* or *enkrateia* to be qualified; she holds that a qualified expression is not a genuine expression of *akrasia* or *enkrateia*, whereas I hold that a qualified expression is a genuine expression of the character type, and the qualification serves the purpose of clarifying with which affect an akratic or enkratic agent struggles and in which practical domain she expresses her character. On my view, and Aristotle's, the strict and loose forms of self-control and un-self-control are all genuine or real forms of *akrasia* and *enkrateia*, even though the loose forms derive or inherit their names from the strict forms; on Broadie's view, only their strict forms are genuine forms of the character types. Another way of highlighting my disagreement with Broadie is to attend once more to the fact that there is a terminological restriction on the use of '*akrasia*' and '*enkrateia*,' a view I attributed to Lorenz in the last chapter.[100] I have consistently held that this terminological restriction does not run parallel to any ontological restriction regarding the practical domains in which agents can express genuine self-control or un-self-control. Yet Broadie seems

[100] See Ch. 2, Section 2.2 pp. 94-97

to endorse the view that there is indeed an ontological restriction that maps onto the terminological one.

Broadie points to Aristotle's insistence that strict *akrasia* is more blameworthy than the other loose or qualified forms of un-self-control he considers in *NE* VII to justify the view that loose forms of *akrasia* and *enkrateia* must be 'forms other than' *akrasia* and *enkrateia* rather than 'other forms of' *akrasia* and *enkrateia*. The only qualified form of *akrasia* Aristotle explicitly considers and contrasts with strict *akrasia* is *akrasia* with respect to spirit or temper (θυμὸς) at *NE* VII.6. Aristotle provides an account of why *akrasia* with respect to temper or spirit is "less shameful" (ἥττον αἰσχρὰ) than strict *akrasia* [1149a24]. The main reason he presents is that θυμός is receptive to reason in a way that ἐπιθυμία is not [ὁ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ θυμοῦ ἀκρατὴς τοῦ λόγου πως ἡττᾶται, ὃ δὲ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ οὐ τοῦ λόγου, 1149b2-3].

Aristotle likens the loose akratic with respect to temper to a dog who, upon hearing a noise, begins to bark ferociously until she recognizes that it is a friend knocking at the door [1149a28-29].[101] Presumably the dog recognizes that she is supposed to intimidate intruders and so initially barks at the noise at the door, but upon noticing that she is attempting to intimidate the wrong kind of person, since it is not an aggressor but a friend at the door, the dog's behavior changes and she stops barking ferociously and perhaps instead begins barking excitedly. The general description that Aristotle gives of the loose akratic with respect to temper or spirit borrows a distinction between complete and incomplete reasoning from this canine example. If someone is akratic with respect to temper or spirit, her θυμός is said to hear some part of what reason prescribes, but to mis-hear or hear only part of (παρακούειν) the whole of reason's prescription [ἔοικε γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς

[101] Burnyeat ("Aristotle on Learning to Be Good") points out that Aristotle "borrows" this canine analogy with spirit or temper "from the middle part of Plato's tripartite soul: the *Republic* (375a) likened the guardians to noble dogs, with special reference to their warm and spirited nature…" (274, fn. 19)

ἀκούειν τι τοῦ λογοῦ, παρακούειν δέ…, 1149a25-26]. Further, temper or spirit is, according to Aristotle, a kind of affect or desire for retribution or vengeance; as Broadie correctly puts it, θυμὸς "is our emotional response to what we take to be unwarranted assault."[102] So the θυμός of the spirited akratic "urges her to vengeance, hearing reason through her quick and heated nature, but not hearing reason's commands," [ὅυτως ὁ θυμὸς διὰ θερμότητα καὶ ταχυτῆτα τῆς φύσεως ἀκούσας μέν, οὐκ ἐπίταγμα δ᾽ἀκούσας, ὁρμᾷ πρὸς τὴν τιμωρίαν, 1149a29-32]. It is as though the agent's θυμός hears *that* reason commands something or other, but it does not hear *what* it is that reason is saying.[103]

One must take care to determine whether it is proper to gloss θυμός, or spirit, as ὀργή, or anger, for Aristotle often associates the affect of anger with whatever he understands θυμός to be. Natali ("*Nicomachean Ethics* 1148b15-1150a8: Beastliness, Irascibility and *akrasia*") carefully treads the distinction between them. He writes that θυμός "indicates the faculty from which impulsive and passionate behaviour in the modern sense results," and about its place at *NE* VII.6, he remarks that, "in the chapter…Aristotle presents examples which are connected mainly with anger (*orge*), revenge (*apolausis*), irascibility (*chalepotes*): this is not surprising, since he is discussing excesses."[104] Natali also notes that Aristotle's audience would have been familiar with θυμός's meaning, situated, as it were, at the end of the historical progression stretching from Homer and Hesiod at one end to Plato at the other. In the earlier poets, θυμός "refers to aggressiveness, belligerent force directed to fight, emulation in work, or contest for victory," whereas "for Plato, it is an autonomous part of the soul, parallel to the military class in the city,

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[102] Broadie (Ethics with Aristotle) 269

[103] This is similar to the common charge against disobedient children that they *hear* what a parent tells them, but are not *listening*, where hearing implies mere reception of the parent's speech, but listening would presumably result in obedience to that speech.

[104] Natali, Carlo. "*Nicomachean Ethics* VII.5-6: Beastliness, Irascibility, *akrasia*." In Aristotle: *Nicomachean Ethics* Book VII, Symposium Aristotelicum. Ed., Natali, Carlo. Oxford University Press. 114

and capable both of opposing reason and of allying with it…"[105] This history informs Aristotle's use of 'θυμός,' and his contemporaries and students would have been familiar with its evolving use over time. So we are to understand that it is possible for 'θυμός' to refer to something like the faculty of spiritedness for Aristotle, and that it does not necessarily pick out or refer to the emotion of anger.

Nevertheless, as Pearson (Aristotle On Desire) points out, Aristotle does appear to use 'ὀργή' and 'θυμὸς' as interchangeable terms. For example, after a close reading and analysis of *De Anima* I.1, where Aristotle defines the affect of anger, Pearson writes that, "one might naturally draw the conclusion that *orge* and *thumos* are being treated as synonyms throughout the chapter."[106] At *DA* 203a5-7, Aristotle lists "becoming angry" (ὀργίζεσθαι) as an affectual process that requires a body for its experience; but at 203a16-19, when he repeats this consideration about affects requiring bodies, 'θυμός' appears instead of 'ὀργίζεσθαι,' or even 'ὀργή.' Similarly at *Rhetoric* II.2, in the chapter where Aristotle analyzes the affect of ὀργή, or anger, Aristotle also uses 'θυμός' in the course of his analysis as though it were synonymous and so interchangeable with 'ὀργή.' So is θυμός just the affect of anger, or is it something more general than the affect of anger? Pearson concludes that θυμός must be narrowly understood to be the same thing as anger on Aristotle's account, at least for the duration of *NE* VII.6, as all his talk of spirit or temper seems intractably caught up with what he holds about the affect of anger.[107]

The tension between considering spirit or θυμός as synonymous with anger or ὀργή on the one hand, and considering it as distinct from anger on the other, clearly arises from the fact that Aristotle often classes θυμός as a species of desire (ὄρεξις) alongside tactile appetite (ἐπιθυμία),

[105] *Ibid*.
[106] Pearson (Aristotle on Desire) 116
[107] *Ibid*. 138

and wish (βούλησις) (e.g., *NE* III.1 1111b11, *EE* 1223a26-7, *DA* 414b2, *De Mot.* 6 700b22). Although at *DA* I.1 and *Rh*. II.2 Aristotle formally defines anger as a sort of *desire* for retribution, he never classes ὀργή as a species of desire as he does θυμός.[108] So one sets out to find in the *corpus* some clear distinction between spirit and anger. Yet, as Nussbaum (Aristotle's *De Motu Animalium*) correctly points out, "we must conclude that Aristotle nowhere gives a sufficiently clear analysis of the objects of θυμός, of its relation to reason and to pleasure, and of its various types and manifestations."[109] So even if Aristotle does have in mind some distinction between spirit and anger, scholars are at a loss for how to defend that view with specificity; Aristotle nowhere sets out such a clear distinction. This is why Natali has to provide a somewhat vague, but nevertheless correct, account of Aristotelian θυμός, namely that it is a soul faculty responsible for impulsive and passionate behavior, before moving on to note that Aristotle clearly has in mind that it is a kind of desire connected with anger and with getting even. This is at least the sense of θυμός that Aristotle has us consider at *NE* VII.6, so this sense should inform our understanding of the loose akratic with respect to θυμός that Aristotle presents in that chapter; we should understand it as synonymous with anger or temper.

It will be helpful to consider an example of an akratic with respect to spirit or temper before turning back to my evaluation of Broadie's view. It looks as though Aristotle has someone in mind who lashes out in circumstances where she knows she is not entitled to such retribution. One must be sure to attribute such knowledge to the loose akratic with respect to temper, since in general, someone is only un-self-controlled if she chooses and acts contrary to her knowledge of what it

[108] Aristotle also presents the material definition of anger, in addition to the formal definition, at *DA* I.1, writing that it is "the boiling of the blood or of the hot around the heart," [402a31-403b1]. I mention this because, importantly for Aristotle, the affects are "enmattered accounts," […τὰ πάθη λόγοι ἔνυλοί εἰσιν, 402a25]. To be angry, both material and formal accounts must coincide at once; one cannot be genuinely angry without her blood boiling any more than she can be genuinely angry without desiring retribution.

[109] Nussbaum (Aristotle's *De Motu Animalium*) 336

would be correct for her to choose and to do. If she lacks this knowledge, then she is not acting akratically, but rather owing to factual ignorance, which Aristotle considers a cause of involuntary action at *NE* III.1, where involuntary actions are neither praiseworthy nor blameworthy. As an example of an akratic with respect to θυμός, suppose that Robin knows that it is correct to get upset and desire retribution if she is a victim of theft. At her neighbor Wilma's house for coffee one afternoon, Robin notices a dish in Wilma's cabinet that looks just like the one which she has been missing for some time; it strikes Robin that Wilma has stolen the dish from her. Robin's θυμός hears from reason that it is right to start boiling and to take back what is hers when she perceives herself to be a victim of theft; so Robin scolds her neighbor while retrieving the dish from the cabinet and abruptly leaves for home. But in the midst of her scolding, Robin realizes that her neighbor never actually stole from her; in fact, Wilma only had the dish in the first place because Robin brought it over on a previous occasion in order to share the results of a recipe that she had been working on. Robin, the loose akratic with respect to temper, realizes her mistake and cringes with regret later, wishing for morning's swift arrival so she can visit and make amends with Wilma.

What is going on in this example is that Robin's θυμός hears from reason that a certain kind of situation calls for retribution, namely that being stolen from calls at least for the return of the stolen goods. What Robin does not hear from reason in this particular case, the one involving Wilma and the missing dish, is that she is not really a victim of theft, but only of her own susceptibility to the reins of her quick temper. Further, it is correct to say that an agent gets revenge only if the case is one that actually calls for retribution, and this case clearly does not. The reason that Robin seeks revenge is because the affect of θυμός in her only partially "hears" reason's command; it is as if the dog to whom Aristotle likens the spirited akratic were to fail to realize that the noise at the door has a friendly source and so continues barking to scare the perceived intruder

away. Aristotle describes the spirited akratic as on par with a person "syllogizing that it is necessary straight away to go to battle with or to become sore at someone," [ὅ δ᾽ὥσπερ συλλογισάμενος ὅτι δεῖ τῷ τοιούτῳ πολεμεῖν χαλεπαίνει δὴ εὐθύς, *NE* VII.6 1149a33-34]. This "just-as" syllogizing is not the same as correct practical reasoning; this distinction is supposed to run parallel with the distinction between complete and incomplete reasoning which Aristotle invokes the canine example to make clear. Further, the akratic with respect to temper engages in incorrect practical reasoning when set against the virtuous agent in the practical domain to which she belongs: mildness's.

Broadie thinks that θυμός's capacity to hear reason's commands, whether it hears them wholly or only in part, makes θυμός so different from ἐπιθυμία, the affect of tactile appetite, that Aristotle refuses to attribute any genuine *akrasia* with respect to θυμός. In other words, Broadie proposes that to claim that *akrasia* with respect to θυμός is a genuine expression of *akrasia* is incompatible with Aristotle's view.

> To the modern theorist, Aristotle's restriction of *akrasia* proper may seem arbitrary or a sign of ascetic prejudice. After all, the modern most interesting problem—'How is it possible at all to act against one's better judgment?'—has the same formal structure whatever the desire to which the agent surrenders. But…Aristotle's restriction is not arbitrary: it depends on the far from formal assumption that it is *base* to care about a physical pleasure foregone in the line of duty.[110]

Here, she opens by endorsing the view that Aristotle restricts genuine *akrasia* to its expression in temperance's domain. She notes that the contemporary weakness of will theorist may find this restriction unsettling, for it neglects to account for cases of agents choosing and acting against their knowledge of what it is correct to choose and to do in a variety of practical domains.[111]

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[110] Broadie (Ethics With Aristotle) 271 [author's emphasis]

[111] This is similar to a concern I raised at the outset of Ch. 2, Section 2.1 (p. 85) when contending that the contemporary weakness of will theorist is barred from adopting Aristotle as a precedent should *akrasia* and *enkrateia* occur only in temperance's practical domain.

Nevertheless, Broadie insists that Aristotle's view requires this restriction of genuine *akrasia* to temperance's domain because the restriction preserves his insight that the temperate agent does not mind sacrificing a physical pleasure in the course of choosing and performing the correct action. On her view, since Aristotle considers the strict akratic agent to be more shameful or blameworthy than the loose akratic with respect to temper, she holds that strict *akrasia* is a unique ethical failure. To consider strict and loose forms of *akrasia* as forms or expressions of the same character is incorrect on her rendering because it detracts from the uniqueness of the strict akratic's ethical failing.

Broadie attributes to Aristotle the view that giving in to tactile appetite is ethically worse than giving in to θυμός against one's knowledge, and, what is more, that strict *akrasia* is worse than any qualified version of the character type, because "proneness to *akrasia* in the strict sense is a direct consequence of our biological nature; the moral problems set by this nature are therefore much the same for everyone…"[112] Failure to rein in one's tactile appetite is an ethical error that spoils the agent at her biological foundations; it is unlikely that she will get much else right over the course of her character development if she cannot even understand what it means to control her tactile appetite. So Broadie claims that, for Aristotle,

> …the paradigm of *akrasia* is the condition in which the agent, actively rational as a rule, sinks back to the original condition. The point is not merely that this person behaves irrationally because he acts against his better judgment, but that in so acting, he pursues objects that he would have pursued had he never been touched by reason.[113]

Since Aristotle holds that the pleasures of temperance's domain are tactile and shared in common with the other animals, Broadie infers that one who lacks control over desire for these sorts of pleasures is like a "young animal," [*NE* III.10 1118a23-25]. To give in to ἐπιθυμία, or tactile

[112] *Ibid*. 270
[113] *Ibid*. 269

appetite, is to act like the cat who will continue to eat so long as there is food in his bowl, unable to restrain himself. In other words, both self-indulgent and strict akratic agents are exemplary of the ethical failure to express oneself as human; they are characters who fall back into their zoological "original condition," as it were, apparently bereft of rationality. Desires for pleasures that are not physical or tactile, for instance, desire for gain, honor, or vengeance, are distinctively human desires on Broadie's analysis.

> Caring about wealth and honour at all, let alone too much, already implies attainment to a truly human level of activity, and this achievement is expressed in the wrong action itself and is not, as in paradigmatic *akrasia*, blotted out altogether.[114]

Giving in to non-tactile desires is less blameworthy than the kind of giving in that strict *akrasia* involves because giving in to the former is already to show the capacity for a complicated sort of desire that is distinctively human.

Broadie's careful reading of Aristotle leads to a correct explanation for why he considers the strict akratic agent more blameworthy than, for instance, the loose akratic with respect to temper or anger. If someone gives in to her desire for vengeance, as the loose akratic does when she incorrectly evaluates that she has been stolen from, she is still doing something distinctively human even as she makes her ethical mistake. She thinks that she has been wronged and seeks retribution for that wrong. But giving in to tactile desire and eating a third helping of cake in opposition to the choice and action that reason correctly prescribes, namely the abstention from eating it, is engaging in activity that is not distinctly human; even *animals* do that.[115] Nevertheless, it does not follow from the fact that strict *akrasia* is more blameworthy than other expressions of

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[114] *Ibid*.

[115] But, one might wonder, what about the dog to whom Aristotle likens the loose akratic with respect to temper or anger? The example suggests that even animals are capable of expressing this form of loose *akrasia*. However, one must admit that Aristotle's analogy between the spirited akratic and the barking dog breaks down for reasons like this one; Aristotle would not attribute anything like "just-as" syllogizing or incorrect reasoning to the animal whose soul lacks a rational nature.

un-self-control that strict *akrasia* is the only genuine expression of the character type. To see that Broadie indeed thinks this, it is useful to return to what she says regarding why she does not think that Aristotle's restriction of both *akrasia* and *enkrateia* to temperance's practical domain is arbitrary. She holds that his restriction "depends on the far from formal assumption that it is *base* to care about a physical pleasure foregone in the line of duty."

Broadie thinks that this assumption is indispensable for Aristotle's explanation of the difference between the temperate and the strict enkratic agent. She correctly holds that Aristotle's "temperate person *finds nothing pleasant* that conflicts with reason, whereas the enkratic one finds conflicting things pleasant but does not give way to them…"[116] Tactile appetite never pulls the temperate agent away from enacting the correct choice; tactile appetite does, however, incorrectly influence the strict enkratic agent's choice and action. Even though the strict enkratic ends up performing an action that externally resembles what the temperate agent performs, the self-controlled agent only follows through on and enacts the correct choice after overcoming her tactile desire to abandon it and act otherwise. So even though the strict enkratic agent performs the correct action and refrains from helping herself to the third serving of cake, for instance, she is not temperate. She really wants the third helping, so she is annoyed at having to give up the pleasure she would have taken in eating it; unlike the temperate agent, the strict enkratic agent does find something pleasant that conflicts with reason. Not only is she *tempted* in the course of enacting the correct choice, abstaining from eating it, but she also afterward *regrets* having to sacrifice the pleasure in order to choose and do what is correct. Such temptation and regret are feelings that accompany the strict enkratic agent, and, as Broadie writes, "Aristotle makes no distinction, even though being tempted is (one would think) worse than merely regretting having to give up what

[116] *Ibid*. 270 [Author's emphasis. I have replaced "continent" with "enkratic" for the sake of consistency.]

reason says we should."[117] For if one is actually tempted to choose and to act otherwise than she knows is correct, then it seems that there is danger that one might choose and perform an incorrect action. But if someone is not tempted to enact a different and incorrect choice, but instead only regrets afterward that she had to forego some tactile pleasure, then this state of affairs seems preferable to the former. For this agent's regret comes after sacrificing or foregoing what reason says she should, and so poses no real threat to her enacting the correct choice. However that may be, Aristotle does not differentiate between regret or "minding" a sacrifice on the one hand, and being tempted on the other.

Broadie's point is that either (a) being tempted by tactile desire or (b) minding having to give up a tactile pleasure in the course of performing the correct action is sufficient by itself to disqualify one from being temperate and to ensure that one is instead strictly enkratic on Aristotle's view. For it is a matter of principle, Broadie holds, that the temperate agent finds anything that conflicts with reason unpleasant; she experiences no temptation to act otherwise, and also does not regret having to pass up indulging in any object of tactile appetite. It is understandable, Broadie thinks, that Aristotle would group temptation and regret together where tactile pleasures are concerned; but because it seems wrong to say that the virtuous agents in other practical domains cannot regret foregoing other sorts of pleasures, Broadie counts this as evidence that there is no genuine expression of *enkrateia* in the other practical domains in addition to there being no genuine expression of *akrasia* outside of temperance's practical domain.

Perhaps in temperance's practical domain, minding or regretting the sacrifice of an object tactile appetite is sufficient evidence that one is not virtuous, even if one chooses and performs the correct action and abstains from eating the third helping of cake. But this does not seem to be the

[117] *Ibid.*

case in other practical domains, whose objects are not objects of tactile appetite, but rather objects of other sorts of desire:

> …a difficulty arises if this principle is extended to cases where the object of *enkrateia* or *akrasia* is respect, honour, or even money. It is not at all clearly the mark of a virtuous person to be wholly indifferent when reason requires him to forego some honour—well-earned, perhaps—even if he is not in the slightest tempted to err against his better judgment and accept it. Nor is it clearly the mark of virtue not to mind at all foregoing revenge in some cases, even though the agent is not actually tempted to take the law into his own hands…Would he be a better human being for not caring? Many would not say so, and I believe that Aristotle would sympathise with them.[118]

The difference between an agent who minds foregoing an object of tactile appetite on the one hand, and an agent who minds sacrificing some other sort of desirable object, such as honor or revenge, is that, according to Broadie, the former is precluded from counting as virtuous, while the latter should not be so precluded. Her view is that in practical domains other than temperance's, it seems permissible for virtuous agents to mind having to sacrifice something pleasant which they desire in order to choose and perform the correct action. Even if all practical domains have in common with temperance's that (a) experiencing temptation to choose and perform an incorrect action bars an agent from counting as virtuous, Broadie notes that other practical domains do not have to share temperance's practical domain's (b) regret or "minding" condition.

Yet Broadie does not probe far into the other practical domains in order to draw her conclusion; she simply asserts that it should be permissible for the virtuous characters in other domains, say, where the object of desire is honor, to mind or care about having to forego an honor she deserves, even if doing the correct thing means sacrificing the honor. In a footnote, she has more to say about this.

> But we should not assume that whenever what is set aside is rightly regretted, the choice was 'agonising.' There may have been no moral dilemma; i.e., it may have been clear what the right course was. In that case, the well-conditioned agent would

[118] *Ibid.*

> not have had to struggle, either intellectually or morally, to reach the right decision.[119]

Broadie attributes a sort of calm regret or "minding" to the virtuous agents who sacrifice objects of non-tactile desire in order to enact correct choices in practical domains other than temperance's. An example is in order to help clarify this point. Suppose that John and Ray compete in a footrace and, neck-and-neck, crowding one another, they come upon the final turn. John suddenly notices he could win the race continuing on his present course, but doing so would also mean stepping on Ray's ankle and causing him great harm, perhaps an injury jeopardizing Ray's future athletic career. John slows down a bit, allowing Ray to inch just a bit further ahead to remove his ankle from harm's way, and thus to cross the finish line first, beating John. This case demonstrates what Broadie proposes about the virtuous person regretting or minding sacrificing some non-tactile pleasure—the honor of winning first prize in the footrace—in the line of duty. Choosing and performing the correct action requires not ruining the other competitor's athletic career with an easily avoidable injury. But this does not entail that John does not mind having to forego the honor. Broadie believes that John can still be virtuous, even if he minds having to give up winning.

Further, Broadie proposes that we need not think of John as having a difficult time enacting the correct choice; supposing that he is virtuous, correct choice and action should easily flow from his character. And, in the case imagined, John has to make the correct choice and act quickly, as he is in a footrace. For John, there is no time to reflect on any ethical dilemma, nor is there any real ethical dilemma; he struggles neither ethically nor intellectually in the course of enacting the correct choice. Yet does it detract from his virtuous character if afterward, when Ray is collecting the honor and the prize, that John should mind at all or regret that he had to forego what would deservedly have been his? Broadie does not think so. But what if Aristotle were to extend the

[119] *Ibid*. 308 (Ch. 5, fn. 6)

"minding" or regret condition to practical domains other than temperance's? Broadie thinks it would result in the following "embarrassing dilemma" for Aristotle:

> If *enkrateia* in general entails *being tempted*, then a person could be considered virtuous and temperate even if, without being tempted, he ignobly regrets some physical pleasure foregone. If, on the other hand, mere *regret* proves *enkrateia* even in the absence of temptation, there will be cases in which the enkratic person is nobler than the person of corresponding virtue! For the latter does not care enough about honour etc. to mind when he has to set it aside.[120]

If Aristotle does impose the regret condition on practical domains other than temperance's, Broadie argues that it would lead to the untenable conclusion that enkratic agents turn out to be "nobler" than virtuous agents in those domains. For if John is virtuous and does not mind having to sacrifice the pleasant honor in the course of enacting the correct choice, then John must not take the honor very seriously or recognize its nobility as worthy of desire. We can avoid this embarrassing conclusion, Broadie thinks, if we just maintain that Aristotle in fact restricts genuine expressions of *akrasia* and *enkrateia* to temperance's practical domain.

The objects of tactile desire are not objects worth valuing on Broadie's view. When they are foregone in order to choose and perform a correct action, they are not appropriate objects of regret or minding.

> It is damaging to desensitise oneself to the pain or frustration of foregoing something good if the good thing can in general be had only by taking trouble or holding it dear in a practical way. Unless we hold it dear we shall not get it, since it is not the kind of thing that comes up automatically.[121]

Tactile desire is something that arises in us automatically, that is, our biological natures are usually good at regularly suggesting to us through hunger that we desire food and through thirst that we desire drink. Broadie considers that human beings do not usually have to remind themselves about the value of the objects of tactile desire. It is not damaging to desensitize oneself to the frustration

[120] *Ibid*. 271
[121] *Ibid*. 273

of foregoing an object of tactile appetite in the line of duty because the experience of tactile desire is a regular occurrence in the daily life of a healthy agent; having to sacrifice eating a meal today does not damage my capacity to experience tactile desire tomorrow—or even later this evening, for that matter. But since being honored for one's athletic abilities is not the sort of thing that comes about with the same regularity, Broadie holds that it is understandable and permissible for John to mind or regret foregoing the prize for winning the race. She thinks it must be Aristotle's view that part of John's being virtuous is that he understands that what he lost in the line of duty is something worth valuing and pursuing, and realizes it is actually a pleasant thing, so that he does not desensitize himself to his desire for such honor in the future. But desensitization to objects of tactile appetite is exactly what Aristotle requires of the temperate agent according to Broadie, and what demarcates her from the strict enkratic agent.

Since the temperate agent finds no objects of tactile desire pleasant that conflict with reason, then she cannot regret foregoing one in the course of being temperate; regret is in fact emblematic of strict *akrasia*. To develop a temperate character, one must either desensitize herself to the frustration of sacrificing an object of tactile appetite when acting temperately or not allow such tactile appetite to arise for it. Thanks to biological regularity, another opportunity to satisfy her tactile appetite will arise automatically, so such desensitization is not damaging to her practical life. Broadie thinks that Aristotle restricts *akrasia* and *enkrateia* to temperance's domain because to require desensitizing oneself to non-tactile pleasures characteristic of other domains *is* damaging to a person's practical life. If John's being virtuous requires that he not care about foregoing a deserved honor in the line of duty, then John may not seek out or recognize the value of such honor the next time he has an opportunity to enact the choice to obtain it.

I propose that Broadie makes too much of Aristotle's point that the temperate can desire no pleasures that conflict with reason. Figuring out what it means for someone to experience tactile appetite that conflicts with reason is crucially relevant for making sense of this claim about temperate people. Broadie points to the concluding passage of *NE* VII.9 as evidence for her view that Aristotle bars the temperate agent from minding or regretting foregoing an object of tactile appetite in the line of duty.

> ὅ τε γὰρ ἐγκρατὴς οἷος μηδὲν παρὰ τὸν λόγον διὰ τὰς σωματικὰς ἡδονὰς ποιεῖν καὶ ὁ σώφρων, ἀλλ᾽ ὃ μὲν ἔχων ὃ δ᾽οὐκ ἔχων φαύλας ἐπιθυμίας, καὶ ὃ μὲν τοιοῦτος οἷος μὴ ἥδεσθαι παρὰ τὸν λόγον, ὃ δ᾽οἷος ἥδεσθαι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄγεσθαι.
>
> For both the enkratic and the temperate are such that they never act contrary to reason through the bodily pleasures, but the enkratic has foul tactile desires while the temperate agent does not. So the temperate agent is the kind of person who is not pleased contrary to reason, while the enkratic is such as to be pleased contrary to reason, yet not to be led by the pleasure. [*NE* VII.9 1151b34-1152a3]

Neither the strict enkratic nor the temperate agent chooses or performs the incorrect action; the agents come apart, in this passage, because of their distinct relations to tactile appetite. The strict enkratic has foul tactile appetites (φαύλας ἐπιθυμίας) while the temperate agent does not. Aristotle provides one clear explanation for why the strict enkratic's tactile desires are foul: in accordance with her desires, the strict enkratic is pleased contrary to reason (παρὰ τὸν λόγον). The strict enkratic does not follow her foul desires contrary to reason's prescription all the way, for she chooses and performs the correct action; but she has a character distinct from and inferior to the temperate agent in part because of her foul desires. Even though she abstains, it is still true that the strict enkratic would have been pleased at eating the third helping of cake. In opposition, the temperate agent abstains from the third helping and would not have taken pleasure in eating the third helping. Yet we cannot infer from the passage that the temperate agent lacks tactile appetite entirely, but rather that her tactile desires are not φαύλας; the temperate agent's bodily appetites are not foul, but rather allied with reason.

So suppose that at one side of a booth at a diner sits a strict enkratic agent who has had a couple of slices of Nadine the baker's cake and knows that she has had enough; she really wants and could easily obtain a third slice, feels tactile temptation to eat it, yet nevertheless overcomes her desire and abstains. Seated at the other side of the booth sits a temperate agent who has also had a couple of slices of Nadine's cake; her tactile appetite is satisfied, and she desires no more. The strict enkratic's desire for more than enough, even though she abstains, is a mark that her character is inferior to the temperate agent's. These considerations serve as evidence that Broadie is correct that (a) being tempted by tactile appetite is sufficient by itself to disqualify one from being temperate.

But what about the sufficiency of (b) minding or regretting having to forego some object of tactile appetite in the line of duty, by itself, to preclude one from being temperate? I do not think that the *NE* VII.9 passage justifies the view that a temperate agent cannot mind at all passing up a tactile pleasure in the line of duty. For suppose that the baker, Nadine, is going away on an extended vacation, or worse, moving far away to settle and open a bakery in another state or province. Further, suppose again that the temperate agent at the diner has just had two slices of Nadine's chocolate cake, satisfied her tactile appetite, and with ease abstains from indulging in a third helping. But this time, also suppose that the temperate agent is privy to the fact that Nadine is moving away for good tomorrow. Does it detract from the temperate agent's virtue if she minds that she is turning down something pleasant she has enjoyed already today because it will not be available to her tomorrow, or in the foreseeable future? There is another way of phrasing the question: Is it indicative that an agent has foul or vile desires that conflict with reason if she minds that, in turning down the third helping of Nadine's cake now, she will not have the opportunity to enjoy any more slices in the future? I propose that it does not.

Broadie conflates two psychic states, *regretting* sacrificing some tactile pleasure on the one hand, and *minding* having to forego some tactile pleasure on the other. Regret, first of all, seems to be an affect more specific than the general notion of minding or caring about something. Second, Broadie correctly holds that the temperate agent cannot regret sacrificing a tactile pleasure in the line of duty. So I am not going to argue that the temperate agent can feel regret after foregoing an object of tactile appetite in the course of enacting the correct choice. Regret is a painful affect agents experience when things turn out otherwise than they intended, which is why Aristotle claims that the pain of regret follows involuntary actions—at least the ones owing to ignorance—at *NE* III.1 [1110b18-22]. This is also why Aristotle holds that regret characteristically follows the strict akratic agent's actions and considers that experiencing regret is one dimension along which the strict akratic differs from the self-indulgent agent. Aristotle opens *NE* VII.8 by noting that the self-indulgent is never regretful (οὐ μεταμελητικός), for she sticks to her choice (ἐμμένει γὰρ τῇ προαιρέσει), whereas the strict akratic is always regretful (ὁ δ᾽ἀκρατὴς μεταμελητικὸς πᾶς), because she does not commit to and enact what she knows is the correct choice [*NE* VII.9 1150b29-31]. So it is safe to conclude with Broadie that Aristotle does indeed bar the temperate agent from feeling regret after foregoing some object of tactile appetite in the course of enacting a temperate choice. Her tactile appetite listens to and obeys her own reason's correct prescription in that she is not bothered to the point of regret when she turns down the unhealthy additional helping of Nadine's cake.

However that is, regretting such a sacrifice is not the same thing as minding or caring about what one has foregone. This is clear from the following considerations about Nadine's cake. It serves as evidence that an agent is not temperate if she minds or cares about *foregoing the third helping*, for in such a case, the agent does seem to regret not indulging beyond what reason

correctly prescribes. But it would not likewise show that an agent lacks temperance if she minds or cares *at all* about the object of her tactile appetite. The temperate agent, like all virtuous agents, is not required to suppress her affects completely. If someone accomplishes a task such as this, then she is likely to become akin to the deficiently vicious agent in temperance's domain, one who is insensible and has little to no tactile appetite. The temperate agent certainly has tactile appetite, but she holds well with respect to it, or manages it well; it does not pull her to choose and act contrary to what her reason correctly prescribes.

Consider the following lengthy passage concerning temperance's objects as evidence that Aristotle attributes tactile desire to the temperate agent:

> ὁ δὲ σόφρων μέσως μὲν περὶ ταῦτ᾽ἔχει. οὔτε γὰρ ἥδεται οἷς μάλιστα ὁ ἀκόλαστος, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον δυσχεραίνει, οὐδ᾽ ὅλως οἷς μὴ δεῖ οὐδὲ σφόδρα τοιούτῳ οὐδενί, οὔτ᾽ ἀπόντων λυπεῖται οὐδ᾽ ἐπιθυμεῖ, ἢ μετρίως, οὐδὲ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, οὐδ᾽ ὅτε μὴ δεῖ, οὐδ᾽ ὅλως τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν. ὅσα δὲ πρὸς ὑγίειάν ἐστιν ἢ πρὸς εὐεξίαν ἡδέα ὄντα, τούτων ὀρέξεται μετρίως καὶ ὡς δεῖ, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἡδέων μὴ ἐμποδίων τούτοις ὄντων ἢ παρὰ τὸ καλὸν ἢ ὑπὲρ τὴν οὐσίαν. ὁ γὰρ οὕτως ἔχων μᾶλλον ἀγαπᾷ τὰς τοιαύτας ἡδονὰς τῆς ἀξίας. ὁ δὲ σώφρων οὐ τοιοῦτος, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος.
>
> The temperate agent holds to the mean concerning [tactile appetite]. For she is not pleased by the pleasures with which the self-indulgent is most of all pleased, but rather does not like them. She generally does not take pleasure in the things she should not, nor does she take pleasure in any such thing excessively. She is neither pained at the absence of tactile pleasures nor desires them when absent, or, rather, she is pained or desires them only moderately, neither more than she should, nor when she should not, nor in general anything of the sort. As many things as are conducive to health or are pleasant for the sake of being well, the temperate person will desire these moderately and as she should. She will also be desirous of other pleasant things that are not impediments to the former, neither contrary to the noble, nor beyond her means. For someone disposed in this way loves such pleasures more than they are worth. The temperate person is not like this, but loves such pleasures as correct reason prescribes. [*NE* III.11 1119a11-20]

Aristotle presents several dimensions along which the temperate agent's tactile desires are subject to restriction; his goal in this passage is to distinguish the temperate from the self-indulgent agent according to their distinct relations to tactile appetite. Self-indulgent agents rank the objects of tactile appetite in a way contrary to the temperate. The things that the self-indulgent desire and

find the most pleasant are objects of the temperate agent's disdain—for instance, third helpings of cake. Aristotle makes the further helpful point that, since the temperate person does not take pleasure in third helpings or things of that sort, then she does not excessively take pleasure in them, either. He follows these considerations up with the claim that, when tactile pleasures are absent, one of the following is true about the temperate agent: either she suffers no pain and experiences no desire for the missing bodily pleasures, or she *moderately* (μετρίως) suffers pain and desires them. A proper understanding of Aristotle's point here renders suspect Broadie's view that the temperate agent cannot mind or care at all about foregoing objects of tactile appetite in the line of duty. For Aristotle permits that either one of these two descriptions can fit the temperate agent should she be denied access to objects of tactile appetite. He makes some clarifying remarks about what it means for the temperate agent to desire such pleasures moderately or to take moderate pain in their absence: she cannot feel more desire or pain for them in their absence than she should (οὐδὲ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ), nor can she desire them or be annoyed at their absence at a time when she should not (οὐδ᾽ ὅτε μὴ δεῖ). However vague these qualifications on moderately longing for absent desires are, they without doubt indicate that Aristotle thinks that the temperate agent can *moderately* long for bodily pleasures when they are absent, whether that means actively desiring them or feeling frustrated when they are not at hand.

The temperate agent shares a basic desire for absent bodily pleasures in common with the self-indulgent, yet what differentiates the two is that the self-indulgent agent longs for absent pleasures painfully and in excess while the temperate agent fulfills neither of these descriptions. Aristotle proceeds in the passage above to hold that the temperate agent ranks the bodily pleasures highest and most pleasant which are conducive to her overall health as a human being, but he also declares that she can take pleasure in other things, too. She enjoys other bodily pleasures so long

as they (1) do not interfere with the ones she enjoys most that are conducive to staying healthy, (2) do not conflict with the noble (παρὰ τὸ καλὸν), and (3) are not beyond her means (ὑπὲρ τὴν οὐσίαν).

So things are more complicated than Broadie's account of temperance's minding condition suggests. For rather than bar the temperate agent from caring at all about or minding absent tactile pleasures, Aristotle instead imposes qualifications on the kind of care that the temperate agent can have for them. Reconsider the strict enkratic and temperate agents to whom Nadine offers a third helping of her soon-to-be permanently off-the-menu chocolate cake. The strict enkratic knows that it is correct to abstain, experiences a desire to indulge in the third helping, nevertheless abstains from it, and perhaps regrets that she has sacrificed eating it. The enkratic agent's tactile appetite is for the third helping itself. The temperate agent, on the other hand, both knows that it is correct to abstain from the third helping and does so, experiences no conflicting tactile desire, yet still *minds* that this sweet thing, this cake, will no longer be available. And tomorrow, after Nadine has moved away, so too might the temperate agent still care that she cannot enjoy the cake again. Such care about an absent object of tactile appetite need not violate any of the conditions that Aristotle places on a temperate agent's relation to tactile appetite. Such minding or caring need not: (1) interfere with the pleasures she most enjoys in staying healthy. In fact, the temperate agent in the example does not indulge in the third helping, so clearly if she cares that Nadine's cake will no longer be available, it does not impede her from enacting her choice to abstain from eating a third helping. In other words, longing for Nadine's cake does not get in the way of her taking pleasure in what is conducive to her health and character.

Further, the temperate agent's care for the absence of Nadine's cake need not (2) conflict with the noble. As shown earlier, Broadie thinks that all of the objects of tactile desire lack nobility or fineness. This is the reason why she thinks that it is not damaging to the temperate agent's

practical life to desensitize herself to tactile pleasures. She writes that, "…minding the sacrifice, but without being tempted, is good, not base, when what is sacrificed is something that has its own nobility."[122] But this is not what Aristotle holds about the temperate agent in the passage under analysis at present. Instead, he holds that the temperate agent can take pleasure in objects of tactile appetite that are not directly conducive to her health or well-being so long as they satisfy the necessary condition that they do not *conflict* with the fine or the noble. It does not follow that these secondary pleasant objects must be noble themselves from the requirement that they not conflict with the noble. So perhaps there is nothing noble about the temperate agent's longing for Nadine's cake in the example; but there is not anything clearly ignoble about it, either. Again, even though she does not long after the third helping, the temperate agent can still mind or care that Nadine's cake, what she turns down now, will not be around to satisfy her tactile desire for it any longer.

And finally, the temperate agent's care for the absent cake need not (3) exceed her means. This final condition is perhaps the most difficult to grasp of the three. The major translators render 'ὑπὲρ τὴν οὐσίαν' as 'beyond her means,' and I have followed suit.[123] It is likely that Aristotle means by this phrase that the temperate agent does not desire go beyond her coin purse's capacity for the sake of an object of tactile appetite. Nevertheless, it is worth wondering whether a more appropriate rendering, taking Aristotle's technical use of 'οὐσία' into account, might read: 'beyond her being,' or 'beyond her substance.' I am not sure that translating the phrase in one of these alternative ways necessarily makes it easier to grasp. Does Aristotle mean by this condition that the temperate agent can enjoy the secondary pleasures so long as they do not become objects of excessive obsession? Or does he mean that the temperate agent can enjoy such pleasures so long as they do not push beyond the bounds of her virtuous character? I do not intend to argue that

[122] *Ibid*. 270
[123] e.g., Irwin: "exceed his means," Ross: "beyond his means," & Rowe: "beyond his means."

Aristotle means either of these options with any certainty; nevertheless, I do contend that the temperate agent who minds foregoing Nadine's cake today because it will not be available tomorrow does not violate the condition under either of the two interpretations. In the example, the temperate agent neither excessively obsesses over Nadine's cake, nor does her enjoyment of the cake and care that it is absent exceed the limits of her virtuous character or coin purse, for she abstains from the third helping despite the fact that she minds that she will have no further opportunities to enjoy Nadine's cake.

In short, Aristotle permits the temperate agent to care or mind that some pleasure is absent, so long as she desires it or is pained at its absence only moderately. Minding or caring about the absence of the pleasure is not the same thing as regretting that one has foregone the pleasure in the course of enacting the correct, temperate choice. For the temperate agent certainly feels no regret as a result of passing up the third helping of cake. If she did feel regret for passing up the object of tactile appetite, then she would surely not be virtuous. She merely minds that Nadine's recipe is leaving town with her; she is not like the strict enkratic who, after abstaining from eating a third helping, feels frustrated that she turned it down. The temperate agent's minding or care is not damaging to her practical life; she still abstains from the third helping at the same time that she recognizes the value of Nadine's cake, of which she foregoes eating too much for the last time.

If I am correct, and it does not detract from the temperate agent's character that she moderately cares about Nadine's cake's absence, then Broadie is wrong to consider that agents who mind sacrificing objects of tactile appetite at all when choosing and performing the correct actions must lack virtue. I have taken care to note that if one minds sacrificing a pleasure to the extent that she regrets it, then her regret serves as a sufficient indication that she lacks virtue. If she enacts the correct choice and regrets her sacrifice, then the best her character can be is self-

controlled. This insight, in turn, shows that temperate agents are not so different from the virtuous agents of other domains on the issue of caring about having to sacrifice a pleasure in order to enact the correct choice. For if the temperate agent can desire some absent, foregone object of tactile appetite, however moderately, then she is like the virtuous runner, John, from the earlier example, who foregoes the honor and winning the race for the sake of choosing and performing the correct action or foregoing the wrong action (nevertheless, to care too much would be ignoble). I conclude that temperance is not alone among the virtues subject to the minding or caring restriction as Broadie suggests. On the contrary, temperate agents can mind, moderately, having to forego some objects of tactile appetite, even in the course of enacting temperate choices. Minding in the sense that I have set out does not interfere with the temperate person's enjoyment of her favorite objects of tactile appetite, i.e., those that conduce to her health; such minding is not contrary to the noble or the fine, and it does not exceed her means.

The "embarrassing dilemma" Broadie attributes to Aristotle does not arise if we realize that Aristotle maintains that both being tempted to perform and regretting performing the incorrect action are both sufficient, by themselves, to disqualify one from being virtuous, but merely minding or caring that one has to forego something pleasant in the line of duty is not sufficient by itself to disqualify one from being virtuous, either in temperance's domain or in any other. What is more, since the "embarrassing dilemma" does not arise, and since paying heed to this dilemma serves as the justification for her view that Aristotle restricts *akrasia* and *enkrateia* to temperance's domain, the result is that Broadie does not appear entitled to the view that the only genuine forms of self-control and un-self-control are the strict ones that agents express in temperance's practical domain.

3.5 Conclusion

At the outset of this chapter, I provided two lines of psychological justification for the view that self-control and un-self-control have wide ranges of expression. Rather than bring in the entirety of Aristotle's work on the soul to bear on my view, I focused on the features of psychology that Aristotle deems relevant to ethical inquiry. The first line of justification results from turning attention to Aristotle's overview of the human soul, its distinct rational and non-rational natures and their respective sub-aspects, and the possible relations and orientations those natures and sub-aspects can have with respect to one another; Aristotle considers these relations to be descriptive and explanatory of the distinct character types. Since it is exclusively true about self-controlled and un-self-controlled agents that they have souls whose natures are not in tune, with their non-rational natures resisting the correct prescriptions of their own rational natures, then we should expect their souls' disharmonious arrangements to result in the expressions of inferior character types in more practical domains than only temperance's. In other words, since Aristotle presents self-controlled and un-self-controlled agents as people with souls whose natures are misaligned in general, the strict forms of *akrasia* and *enkrateia* are not their only genuine forms. The loose forms of *akrasia* and *enkrateia* are just as genuine as the strict forms, for they result from the general misalignment of an agent's soul's natures and their desiderative sub-aspects' struggle against the correct prescriptions that issue from their deliberative sub-aspects. This line of justification shows that agents can express genuine forms of *akrasia* and *enkrateia* in practical domains other than temperance's.

The second line of psychological justification for my view regarding the ranges of *akrasia* and *enkrateia* arises from considering the unity constraint that Aristotle applies to genuine character virtue. I contended that self-control and un-self-control are subject to a modified version of this constraint, which I termed the *duality* constraint. It requires that an agent who genuinely

expresses a form of *akrasia* in any one practical domain can only genuinely express a form of *akrasia* or *enkrateia* in any other practical domain. Similarly, the duality constraint requires than an agent who genuinely expresses a form of *enkrateia* in any one practical domain can only genuinely express a form of *akrasia* or *enkrateia* in any other practical domain. Since self-controlled an un-self-controlled agents have souls with disharmonious rational and non-rational natures, I hold that they cannot genuinely express either virtue or vice in any practical domain; for both virtuous and vicious agents have souls whose natures are aligned. This line of justification shows that not only *can* agents express genuine forms of self-control and un-self-control in practical domains other than temperance's, but it shows that genuine self-controlled and un-self-controlled agents *must* express genuine forms in practical domains other than temperance's.

In the latter half of this chapter, I responded to some objections to the view that self-control and un-self-control have wide ranges of expression. First, I dealt with the general objection that Aristotle does not explicitly endorse a view about *akrasia* and *enkrateia* like the one I am advancing anywhere in the ethical works. In response, I argued that the ethical works provide an account of how to become virtuous; they are not definitional treatises, but rather protreptic guides or manuals for what it takes to become virtuous. I also responded to two particular objections. First, I explained and replied to Charles's worry that Aristotle apparently precludes a loose form of *enkrateia* from courage's practical domain. I met this objection by presenting Aristotle's considered view that choice, rather than the pleasure and pain agents take in their actions, is what best sets the character types apart. Second, I explained and replied to Broadie's view that strict *akrasia* and strict *enkrateia* are their only genuine forms.

In the next two chapters, I turn attention to Aristotle's model of the practical syllogism as his explanatory model for how agents come to choose and perform their actions. The practical

syllogism intersects with ethics at *NE* VII.3, where Aristotle provides *ethical* practical syllogisms to account for how and why strict akratic agents enact the choices that they do. First, in Chapter 4, I distinguish non-ethical from ethical practical syllogisms and explain what sets them apart, paying close attention to the examples that Aristotle provides of non-ethical practical syllogisms at *De Motu Animalium* 7 and ethical practical syllogisms at *NE* VII.3. This work sets the stage for Chapter 5, in which I construct and analyze loose akratic and enkratic practical syllogisms to demonstrate the choice-making that attends them in practical domains other than temperance's.

CHAPTER 4. ETHICAL PRACTICAL SYLLOGISMS

Aristotle understands character types as dispositions which agents develop that account for consistency regarding their choice-making and behavior; on his view, people settle into lives conceivable as patterns of choice-making and behavior susceptible to ethical evaluation. The goal of the next two chapters is to show that *akrasia* and *enkrateia* are dispositions assignable to agents who live consistent lives expressing akratic and enkratic patterns of choice-making and behavior. I want to show that there are practical syllogisms that track self-controlled and un-self-controlled choice-making and action—in both their strict and loose forms—just as Aristotle holds that there are practical syllogisms that track virtuous choice-making and action.[124] But it is necessary first to provide an overview of the practical syllogism in general and to address the debates regarding it before constructing and analyzing strict and loose akratic and enkratic practical syllogisms in the next chapter.

So in this chapter, I discuss practical syllogisms and distinguish between non-ethical practical syllogisms and ethical practical syllogisms. In what follows, I focus on *De Motu Animalium* 7 as the text where Aristotle provides the clearest examples of bare or non-ethical practical syllogisms, and I focus on *NE* VII.3 as the source of Aristotle's clearest examples of ethical practical syllogisms. Even though these two kinds of practical syllogism have many features in common (for instance, they are structurally similar in that Aristotle describes both of them in terms of agents combining universal and particular propositions for the sake of choosing and acting), there are also important reasons to treat them as distinct ways that agents reason

[124] As in the preceding chapters, this chapter will focus on and treat *akrasia* more directly than *enkrateia*. This is partially due to the fact that Aristotle has more to say about *akrasia* than *enkrateia* in the relevant texts, but also because there are some conclusions about both character types that can be drawn from the examination of one because they are counterpart character types.

toward choice and action. One important difference between non-ethical and ethical practical syllogisms is that the former are neither indicative of nor issue forth from the character types of the agents who are syllogizing. Ethical practical syllogisms, on the other hand, do indicate and issue forth from the character types of the syllogizing agents. The enacted choices that conclude ethical practical syllogisms generally inherit their ethical descriptions or values—as virtuous, enkratic, akratic, or vicious—from the character types of the syllogizing agents, whereas the conclusions of non-ethical practical syllogisms *prima facie* have no ethical value, or are ethically irrelevant. Not only do ethical and non-ethical practical syllogisms differ with respect to their conclusions, but the two kinds of practical syllogism also differ with respect to the propositions involved in them.

The propositions that agents combine in non-ethical practical syllogisms do not have any *prima facie* ethical value, whereas the propositions that agents combine in ethical practical syllogisms do, and they inherit their ethical value from the character types of the reasoning agents, just as the enacted choices that conclude them. Since the propositions of an ethical practical syllogism inherit ethical value from an agent's character, then the enacted choice that concludes an ethical practical syllogism might be said to inherit its ethical value in a proximate way from the ethical value that the syllogism's propositions inherit. Nevertheless, even if this is true, the propositions themselves inherit their ethical descriptions from the character types of syllogizing agents. In short, both the propositions and conclusions of ethical practical syllogisms inherit their ethical value from an agent's character and so they all ultimately have their ethical value in an *agent-dependent* way. The propositions that comprise and the actions that conclude non-ethical practical syllogisms, on the other hand, do not fall into the same classificatory scheme as those that comprise and conclude ethical practical syllogisms; there is nothing clearly *ethical* about them.

C.C.W Taylor (Aristotle: *Nicomachean Ethics* Books II-IV) correctly notes that a fundamental feature of Aristotle's virtue ethics is the notion of "the primacy of character," according to which,

> The ultimate object of ethical evaluation is the agent, not particular actions or action-types; particular actions and action-types are evaluated as evincing traits of character which are themselves good (virtues) or bad (vices), and traits of character are in turn evaluated as those which a good (virtuous) or bad (vicious) agent would manifest.[125]

My point here is to extend Taylor's line of reasoning: an agent's character is not only responsible for the ethical value of an ethical practical syllogism's concluding action, but her character is also responsible for the ethical value of the propositions which she commits to and combines in her ethical practical syllogism.

Since the examples of ethical practical syllogisms I consider in this chapter come from *NE* VII.3, and since Aristotle's treatment of un-self-control and self-control in *NE* VII focuses on the strict expressions of *akrasia* and *enkrateia*, the VII.3 ethical practical syllogisms describe and explain actions that agents choose and perform in temperance's practical domain. In that chapter, Aristotle presents a virtuous practical syllogism concluding with a temperate choice and action, and an inferior, un-self-controlled practical syllogism concluding with a strict akratic choice and action. For this reason, all references to *akrasia* and *enkrateia* in this chapter are references to their strict forms unless otherwise noted. Aristotle's examples of ethical practical syllogisms at *NE* VII.3 do provide a blueprint which is useful for constructing and analyzing loose akratic and loose enkratic practical syllogisms, but I do not make that argument in this chapter. First we must understand Aristotle's accounts of temperate and strict akratic practical syllogisms before extrapolating from those accounts to construct and analyze a strict enkratic practical syllogism, let alone loose akratic and enkratic practical syllogisms in practical domains other than temperance's.

[125] Aristotle. *Nicomachean Ethics* Books II-IV. (2006) Ed., Taylor, C.C.W. Oxford University Press. xvi

I devote two sections of this chapter to examining the ethical propositions that agents exercise and combine in ethical practical syllogisms. When analyzing ethical universal propositions, I pay special attention to Aristotle's complicated view about what it means for agents to know them. According to the complex theory of knowledge that he presents at *NE* VII.3, to say that an agent *knows* a universal proposition could mean at least three different things. First, it could mean that she uses or exercises the proposition in her practical syllogism: this is knowing the universal proposition in the *active* sense. Second, it could mean that she knows but does not exercise the proposition in her practical syllogism: this is knowing the universal proposition in the *potential* sense. Third, it could mean that an agent knows the universal proposition in the potential sense because she is in a condition such as drunkenness that keeps her from exercising it; this third way of knowing the proposition is similar to knowing it in the potential sense, but the agent's failure to exercise the proposition in this kind of case owes to something like a lack of sobriety or disease. This catalogue of the senses of 'know' and its application to the knowledge that agents have of ethical universal propositions is important for explaining self-controlled and un-self-controlled practical syllogisms. For such agents know the correct universal to exercise, but affect induces them to exercise an alternative, incorrect universal with mixed success; the self-controlled agent overcomes the impulse of affect and uses the correct universal, while the un-self-controlled agents succumbs to the impulse and uses the incorrect universal. The theory of knowledge that Aristotle presents at VII.3 permits agents to know two apparently exclusive universal propositions at the same time without violating the law of non-contradiction. So long as an agent knows one of the alternative propositions in a potential sense, while she knows the other in an active sense—by employing it in her practical syllogism—then there is no contradiction.

In the final section of this chapter, I examine ethical particular propositions and discuss strict akratic and enkratic ignorance of them at some length. For Aristotle holds at *NE* VII.3 that the strict akratic agent (and, by extension, the enkratic agent, too) is ignorant of the particular proposition of the temperate agent's practical syllogism. I do not develop a full account of akratic and enkratic ignorance of the temperate syllogism's particular proposition in this chapter, but rather make the case that their ignorance of it is not *factual ignorance*, i.e., the kind of ignorance responsible for actions that fall outside of the voluntary. I delay presenting a full account of strict akratic and enkratic ignorance, which I call *evaluative ignorance*, until the next chapter where I construct and analyze examples of strict and loose akratic and enkratic practical syllogisms. For evaluative ignorance also explains what goes wrong in loose akratic and enkratic practical syllogizing relative to virtuous practical syllogizing throughout the practical domains.

The overarching point of this chapter is that one must take care to form a proper understanding of Aristotle's model of the practical syllogism, which for the present purposes means being attentive to the differences between the non-ethical and ethical kinds of practical syllogisms. Practical syllogisms in general do not determine, predict, or order actions. Instead, they explain how agents come to choose and perform actions in terms of normative, action-guiding universal propositions and evaluative particular propositions. As we will see, all successful or complete practical syllogisms have normative force and conclude with enacted choices. However, in some cases, the normative force of a practical syllogism is also ethically relevant, and so bears an important relation to the syllogizing agent's character type. It will be important to keep this general distinction in mind as I explore the differences between the two similar, albeit crucially different, kinds of practical syllogism. To begin this chapter, I turn to distinguishing practical syllogisms in general from theoretical syllogisms.

4.1 Non-Ethical Practical Syllogisms – *De Mot.* 7

> πῶς δὲ νοῶν ὁτὲ μὲν πράττει ὁτὲ δ᾽οὐ πράττει, καὶ κινεῖται, ὁτὲ δ᾽οὐ κινεῖται; ἔοικε παραπλησίως συμβαίνειν καί περὶ τῶν ἀκινήτων διανοουμένοις καὶ συλλογιζομένοις. ἀλλ᾽ ἐκεῖ μὲν θεώρημα τὸ τέλος—ὅταν γὰρ τὰς δύο προτάσεις νοήσῃ, τὸ συμπέρασμα ἐνόησε καὶ συνέθηκεν. ἐνταῦθα δ᾽ ἐκ τῶν δύο προτάσεων τὸ συμπέρασμα γίνεται ἡ πρᾶξις, οἷον ὅταν νοήσῃ ὅτι παντὶ βαδιστέον ἀνθρώπῳ, αὐτὸς δ᾽ ἄνθροπος, βαδίζει εὐθέως, ἂν δ᾽ ὅτι οὐδενι βαδιστέον νῦν ἀνθρωπῳ, αὐτὸς δ᾽ ἄνθρωπος, εὐθὺς ἠρεμεῖ. καὶ ταῦτα ἄμφω πράττει, ἂν μή τι κωλύῃ ἢ ἀναγκάζῃ.
>
> But how is it that by thinking sometimes an agent acts but at other times she does not act; that by thinking sometimes she moves herself, but at other times she does not move herself? It seems that what happens is the same as that which happens both when thinking about and inferring about the unchanging things. But in those cases, the end is an object of contemplation—for whenever an agent thinks the two propositions, then she thinks and synthesizes the conclusion. Here [in the practical case], action is the conclusion that comes about from the two propositions, for example, whenever one thinks that every person must walk, and that she herself is a person, straightaway she walks; or now whenever one thinks that no person must walk, and that she herself is a person, then straightaway she remains fixed. And in both of these cases she acts, so long as nothing hinders or forces her respectively. [*De Mot*. 7 701a6-15**]**

The sense of bewilderment Aristotle aims to address here revolves around the relation between thinking and acting. There is a kind of thinking, he informs us, that does not lead to choosing and acting, but instead leads to further thought; this kind of thinking involves agents combining propositions that necessitate further propositional conclusions that themselves serve as objects of further contemplation—more things to think about. For instance, from synthesizing the propositional thoughts, “all dogs are mammals,” and “this creature is a dog,” an agent draws the conclusion, “this creature is a mammal.” This is an example of a *theoretical* syllogism whose conclusion is a proposition entailed by an agent’s synthesis of the two preceding propositions, the first proposition universal, and the second particular.

Aristotle proceeds to draw attention to another kind of thinking that results in action instead of further thinking, and he accounts for this kind of thinking with his model of the *practical* syllogism. Aristotle chooses the actions of walking and not walking to exemplify what a practical

syllogism is and how it works in the passage above. It is important to note that Aristotle construes not walking as a possible conclusion of a practical syllogism, and so also as an action; but this is because not walking has to be understood in the context of the syllogism as a decided upon or chosen course of action. Not walking is not just the absence of the enacted choice to walk in Aristotle's example, but it is an agent's positively chosen course of action. Since Aristotle treats both walking and not walking as conclusions of distinct practical syllogisms, this also means that he treats both as distinct actions agents choose and perform due to their commitments to and combinations of certain kinds of propositions.

The propositions that precede the conclusions of practical syllogisms fall into the same bifurcated classification as the propositions of theoretical syllogisms: universal and particular propositions. Where walking is the conclusion, the propositions which the agent combines in her practical syllogism are the universal, "every person must walk," and the particular, "I am a person,"; where not walking is the conclusion, the agent combines the universal, "no person must walk," with the particular, "I am a person." The practical syllogism is clearly analogous to the theoretical syllogism; in both, agents put together universal and particular propositions to produce conclusions. However, the nature of their conclusions most of all sets the syllogism types apart. In the case of a theoretical syllogism, an agent puts together universal and particular propositions to produce an object of contemplation, i.e., another thought. Yet in the case of a practical syllogism, an agent synthesizes universal and particular propositions which result in choice and action, not merely a further object of thought.

David Charles (Aristotle's Philosophy of Action) objects to this sort of analysis of the difference between theoretical and practical syllogisms. Instead, he holds that the conclusion of a practical syllogism is not an action or enacted choice, but is in fact a proposition: "When the agent

does reason practically, action will only result if he accepts the conclusion appropriately in the desire-based mode."[126] On his view, both theoretical and practical syllogisms have propositional conclusions, but the manner in which agents accept their respective conclusions is what sets the syllogism types apart. Charles holds that agents rationally assent to the conclusions of theoretical syllogisms, but with respect to practical syllogisms, agents non-rationally assent to the conclusions, which means they desire to perform the actions to which the propositional conclusions of practical syllogisms refer. The conclusion of a practical syllogism for Charles "is a statement about an action which is to be done," and not itself an action.[127] After the agent combines the propositions and arrives at a propositional conclusion, she must further desire to perform the action that the proposition sets forth. In short, Charles does not think that a practical syllogism's conclusion is an enacted choice, but rather a proposition that the agent must take the further step of accepting/desiring to enact. So on his view, the natures of their conclusions do not set theoretical and practical syllogisms apart, for in both cases, the conclusions are propositions.

I agree with Charles's point that agents must desire to perform the actions that conclude their practical syllogisms, yet I find it difficult to agree that an agent, when syllogizing toward enacting a choice, holds back her feelings of desire (or aversion) until she reaches a propositional conclusion. Desire must begin to play a role much earlier in an agent's practical reasoning; it is what motivates her to start practically syllogizing and combining propositions in the first place. But Charles explicitly holds that "it is not the *conclusion* that by itself explains the action by being identical with it; rather *accepting* the conclusion explains the action."[128] On his understanding, desire figures into the practical syllogism at the stage when the agent accepts the conclusion, i.e.,

[126] Charles (Aristotle's Philosophy of Action.) 96
[127] *Ibid*. 94
[128] *Ibid*. 93 [author's emphasis]

after the conclusion has been reached, and not at an earlier stage of her practical reasoning. For Charles, theoretical and practical syllogisms really differ according to how agents accept their conclusions; otherwise they are structurally the same.

> Thus what is distinctive of practical as opposed to theoretical reasoning is (at least) the distinct mode of acceptance in each of the premises and conclusion. Desire, unlike belief, is characterized as that mode of accepting the conclusion of a syllogism which explains action under the given circumstances.[129]

He holds that both theoretical and practical syllogisms conclude with propositions, and that what sets them apart is that agents believe in theoretical conclusions while they desire practical conclusions.

Anthony Kenny (Aristotle's Theory of the Will) holds a view similar to Charles's, writing, "It is incorrect to say that the conclusion of a practical inference *must* be an action."[130] He thinks that practical syllogisms can conclude with either propositions or actions. What really demarcates a practical from a theoretical syllogism on Kenny's view is not that the former necessarily concludes with an action while the latter concludes with a proposition. Rather, "in the same sense in which theoretical reasoning seeks to pass from the true to the true, practical reasoning seeks to pass from the good to the good."[131] He holds that the difference between the kinds of syllogism has to do with what each kind transfers or preserves from its propositions to its conclusions. Theoretical syllogisms transfer and preserve truth, while practical syllogisms transfer and preserve goodness, either real or apparent. Importantly, Kenny does not completely preclude the conclusions of practical syllogisms from being enacted choices as Charles does; Kenny instead holds that the conclusions of practical syllogisms need not be actions or enacted choices, allowing that in some cases they can be propositions. According to Kenny's view, sometimes agents have

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[129] *Ibid*. 94
[130] Kenny, Anthony. (1979) Aristotle's Theory of the Will. London: Duckworth. 123 [author's emphasis]
[131] *Ibid*. 128

to desire to choose and act on propositional conclusions of practical syllogisms, while at other times agents enact their choices immediately. In the first case, the conclusion is a proposition representing a choice and action which the agent must further desire to enact, while in the second case the conclusion just is an enacted choice. I return to this point shortly. Nevertheless, Kenny maintains that, just as theoretical syllogisms preserve and transfer truth from the starting gates of their propositions all the way to the finish lines of their propositional conclusions, so too do practical syllogisms preserve and transfer something from their propositions to their conclusions. In the case of practical syllogisms, the object of preservation is goodness, either real or apparent. That the two kinds of syllogism preserve and transfer different qualities from their propositions to their conclusions—truth and goodness, respectively—is supposed to mark the genuine difference between practical and theoretical syllogisms on Kenny's view.

I take issue with Kenny's point that a practical syllogism's conclusion *can* be a proposition for the same reasons I provided in response to Charles's view that its conclusion *must* be a proposition. That is, I deny that agents hold back their feelings of desire (or aversion) in the course of practical syllogizing until they have arrived at practical conclusions. Desire must figure in at an earlier stage, motivating the agent to reason practically in the first place toward choosing and acting. Nevertheless, I do not take issue with Kenny's insight that one way of distinguishing practical from theoretical syllogisms is to recognize the different qualities that each transfers or preserves from its premises to its conclusion. One can hold that when an agent successfully completes a practical syllogism, she transfers goodness, either real or apparent, from the syllogism's propositions to its conclusion, without also maintaining that a practical syllogism's conclusion can (or must) be a proposition. In other words, the view that a practical syllogism's conclusion is an enacted choice and Kenny's preservative view are compatible. I retain the preservative aspect of

Kenny's view in the context of analyzing ethical practical syllogisms later in this chapter without retaining the part of his view allowing the conclusions of practical syllogisms to be propositions. Kenny picks out a primary analogous feature linking theoretical and practical syllogisms when he writes that both sorts of syllogisms aim to preserve and transfer something, truth and goodness respectively. However, Kenny goes wrong in allowing that practical syllogisms can conclude with propositions. For Aristotle holds that such syllogisms are supposed to describe and account for agents' enactment of their choices, not their propositions or further thoughts.

Nussbaum (Aristotle's *De Mot. Anim.*) contends that "the practical syllogism is essentially an explanatory model and…the explanatory scheme proposed involves the ascription to the agent of a desire and of a belief about what must be done if the desire is to be realized."[132] Her sentiment captures what is true about Aristotle's practical syllogism in a way that Charles's and Kenny's views do not; an agent has a desire, and then proceeds to reason about how to attain the object of her desire. There need not be, as Charles and Kenny respectively suggest there must be or could be, a further step at which an agent desires to do whatever it takes to attain the desire she reasons about attaining in the first place. On its face, such a suggestion seems needlessly recursive, and in fact, Aristotle's examples of practical syllogisms at *De Mot*. 7 do not support such a suggestion. Consider the examples that Aristotle invokes at *De Mot*. 7 just after the passage cited at the beginning of this section.

> ποιητέον μοι ἀγαθόν, οἰκία δ᾽ἀγαθόν. ποιεῖ οἰκίαν εὐθύς. σκεπάσματος δέομαι, ἱμάτιον δὲ σκέπασμα. ἱμάτιου δέομαι. οὗ δέομαι, ποιητέον. ἱμάτιου δέομαι. καὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα, τὸ ἱμάτιον ποιητέον, πρᾶξίς ἐστιν. πράττει δ᾽ ἀπ᾽ ἀρχῆς. εἰ ἱμάτιον ἔσται, ἀνάγκη εἶναι τόδε πρῶτον, εἰ δὲ τόδε, τόδε. καὶ τοῦτο πράττει εὐθύς. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἡ πρᾶξις τὸ συμπέρασμα, φανερόν. αἱ δὲ προτάσεις αἱ ποιητικαὶ διὰ δύο εἰδῶν γίνονται, διά τε τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ διὰ τοῦ δυνατοῦ.
>
> It is necessary for me to make something good, and a house is something good. Straight away one builds a house. I am in need of a covering, and a garment is a

[132] Nussbaum (Aristotle's *De Motu Animalium*) 201

> covering, so I am in need of a garment. What I need is to be made, and I need a garment. And the conclusion, that the garment is to be made, is action. One acts from first principles. If there will be a garment, it is necessary for me to do *this* first, and if that, then *this*. And one does this straight away. It is clear that the action is the conclusion. Practical propositions come about through two forms, through the good and through the possible. [*De Mot*. 7 701a16-25]

In both of the examples of practical syllogisms that Aristotle presents, reasoning toward the choices and actions of house building and coat weaving, he depicts each agent as combining a universal and a particular proposition and concluding with choice and action. He does not insert an extra stage in the agents' reasoning prior to enacting their choices, for instance, a stage at which agents arrive at propositional conclusions and then express their desire to enact those propositions, as Kenny and Charles suggest. From this passage alone, it is easy to make the case that Aristotle conceives of a practical syllogism's conclusion as itself an action, for Aristotle makes the claim twice that the conclusion (συμπέρασμα) is action (πρᾶξίς).

However that may be, one can object that, of the two instances above where Aristotle claims that the conclusion of a practical syllogism is an action, the first does in fact seem to allow that the conclusion is a proposition and not an action. The sentence I have in mind from the passage is, "And the conclusion, that the garment is to be made, is action," [καὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα, τὸ ἱμάτιον ποιητέον[133], πρᾶξίς ἐστιν]. If the conclusion of a practical syllogism is in fact an action, then one expects Aristotle to write that actually making the garment is the conclusion, not the statement that it is to be made. This observation apparently justifies views like Charles's and Kenny's, namely that practical syllogisms either must or can conclude with propositions respectively, and not

[133] I render 'ποιητέον' here as, "is to be made," but it is also possible to translate this form of speech with the force of a Latin gerundive as, "must be made." What is important is that it is translated as a verbal adjective expressing necessity. What is up for debate at this point of the analysis is whether Aristotle means that (a) the action itself necessarily concludes the agent's practical syllogism or that (b) a proposition representing the action concludes the agent's practical syllogism. I argue in favor of (a) in what follows, understanding 'ποιητέον' to refer to the actual necessity that the action of making a garment concludes the successful practical syllogism Aristotle is describing in the passage.

enacted choices. On this interpretation of the passage, Aristotle uses 'πρᾶξίς' to refer to more than the performance or enactment of a choice; for he includes what seems to be a proposition representing the agent's choice, "a garment is to be made," under the heading of action. Yet Aristotle does write a few lines later, "it is clear that the action is the conclusion," (ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἡ πρᾶξις τὸ συμπέρασμα, φανερόν). So one has to figure out what Aristotle means by 'πρᾶξίς': does it exclusively refer to the enactment of a choice, or does what it picks out also include something propositional?

Aristotle does tell us that an agent concludes her practical syllogism, enacts her choice, so long as nothing either prevents her from acting or forces her to act otherwise [ἂν μή τι κωλύῃ ἢ ἀναγκάζῃ]. For instance, an agent who thinks that all people should walk and that she is a person might be prevented from walking because of leg trauma. Further, an agent who thinks that nobody should walk and that she is a person may be forced to walk anyhow, or even run, after discovering that she is seated too near a colony of fire ants. Kenny does not think that these agents' failures to perform their respective actions means that they fail to conclude their practical syllogisms. He writes, "…if prevention or compulsion took place, that would not mean the reasoning was inconclusive."[134] This helps to clarify his view that practical syllogisms do not have to conclude with enacted choices, but can conclude with propositions that represent what agents intend to do—even though they can suffer interruption that keeps them from enacting their choices. Kenny would say that these agents' propositional intentions to walk and remain fixed constitute the conclusions of their practical syllogisms. For what else would have been necessary for these agents to act had they not been interrupted? Kenny has at his disposal the same point I made earlier in support of the view that the practical syllogism's conclusion must be an enacted choice, namely that Aristotle

[134] Kenny (Aristotle's Theory of the Will) 143

does not mention a stage of practical reasoning between arriving at the conclusion of a practical syllogism and enacting it. If an agent has combined the universal and particular propositions and intends to perform an action yet is interrupted when the time for enacting her choice arises, is it correct to say that she concludes her practical syllogism? Or does the fact that she fails to enact her choice mean that she fails to conclude her practical syllogism and complete her practical reasoning? The answer to this question bears on the way in which we understand the question concerning Aristotle's use of 'πρᾶξίς,' namely whether it can refer to something propositional, or whether it refers solely to the enactment of a choice.

Dahl (Practical Reason, Aristotle, and Weakness of the Will) opposes Kenny's view regarding agents who suffer interruption in the course of enacting their choices: "Rather, one should say that in a case like this the person has been prevented from drawing the conclusion, even if he has combined all of the premises."[135] For example, the agent who intends to stay put but is forced to run by fire ants, according to Dahl, has not as a matter of fact concluded her practical syllogism since she has not enacted her choice and performed the action; the same is true of the agent who chooses to walk yet is prevented because of her injured leg. Since both agents fail to enact their choices, Dahl holds that their practical syllogisms are incomplete; the agents do not draw practical conclusions even though they have successfully combined the relevant premises. Such agents are either forced to do something other than they intend or are prevented from following through on their intentions. Importantly, Dahl's view aligns with Aristotle's explanation of what distinguishes choice from voluntary action early in *NE* III.2.

> ἡ προαίρεσις δὴ ἑκούσιον μὲν φαίνεται, οὐ ταὐτὸν δέ, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ πλέον τὸ ἑκούσιον. τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἑκουσίου καὶ παῖδες καὶ τἆλλα ζῷα κοινωνεῖ, προαιρέσεως δ᾽ οὔ, καὶ τὰ ἐξαίφνης ἑκούσια μὲν λέγομεν, κατὰ προαίρεσιν δ᾽ οὔ.

[135] Dahl, Norman O. (1984) Practical Reason, Aristotle, and Weakness of the Will. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. 161

> Choice indeed appears to be voluntary, but it is not the same thing, because the voluntary contains a larger share of actions than choice. Even children and the other animals share in voluntary action, but not choice, and we call their spontaneous actions voluntary, but we do not say that they are in accordance with choice. [*NE* III.2 1111b6-10]

When the encroaching fire ants force the agent who intends to remain seated to run instead, it is not correct to say that she enacts a choice to run. Rather, she performs a spontaneous and voluntary action that departs from what she intends to choose and to do. Likewise, when leg trauma prevents the agent from following through on her intention to walk, it is not correct to say that she enacts a choice to remain fixed. Instead, she performs a spontaneous and voluntary action that departs from what she intends to choose and to do. These agents fail to complete their practical syllogisms—they do not enact their choices—and then proceed to perform actions that do not accord with choice, i.e., unchosen actions. Their spontaneous actions are not explainable according to the model of the practical syllogism because they are not enacted choices.[136]

While Kenny's view encounters the obstacle that Aristotle apparently insists that the conclusions of practical syllogisms are enacted choices and not propositions, Dahl's view runs into the apparent obstacle that it seems incoherent to claim about someone both that she has in principle completed all of the stages of her practical reasoning, combined the relevant premises, and also that she fails to draw the conclusion of her practical syllogism. Nevertheless, the obstacle that Dahl's view faces is apparent, for he would not agree that either the person running from fire ants or the person suffering leg trauma has actually drawn the conclusion of her practical syllogism. I propose that that Dahl correctly distinguishes an agent's successful combination of propositions

[136] It is also possible that these agents do not in fact perform spontaneous actions, but rather quickly come up with new practical syllogisms, enacting different choices than the ones that they initially set out and intended to enact. Yet even if this is true, it is still the case that they fail to follow through on their initial intentions and their first practical syllogisms are unsuccessful or incomplete. This is in fact how I conceive of what happens in cases of *akrasia* and *enkrateia* and address this later when examining Aristotle's treatment of the strict akratic practical syllogism at *NE* VII.3.

from her arrival at the conclusion of a practical syllogism, and clearly considers the latter as necessary for a practical syllogism to be successful. An agent who successfully concludes a practical syllogism actually enacts a choice, whereas someone who is interrupted from enacting a choice merely forms a propositional intention to which she does not commit and on which she fails to follow through. Dahl maintains that practical syllogisms conclude with enacted choices, and so that an agent's practical syllogism is incomplete or unsuccessful if she fails to enact her choice.

To Kenny's credit, he does in some sense preserve Aristotle's insistence that the conclusions of practical syllogisms are enacted choices, even though he allows that some practical syllogisms conclude with propositional intentions. Dahl's view, on the other hand, is closer to Aristotle's insistence that the conclusions of practical syllogisms must be actions, denying complete practical reasoning to agents who fail to perform the actions they have chosen to enact. So we seem to arrive at an impasse. (1) If one allows that agents interrupted from enacting choices have concluded their practical syllogisms, then the conclusion of a practical syllogism does not have to be the enactment of a choice. (2) Yet if one denies that agents in such circumstances have concluded their practical syllogisms, then it appears that one must posit some extra stage between combining propositions and acting, which does not appear in Aristotle's account, to explain how an agent concludes her practical syllogism. Charles and Kenny represent the first of these alternatives, which seems to run counter to Aristotle's claims about the conclusion being an action; Dahl and Nussbaum represent the second alternative, which seems to require adding to Aristotle's theory.

However, one can side with Nussbaum and Dahl's shared view that the conclusions of practical syllogisms must be enacted choices, and cannot be propositions, without adding to Aristotle's theory by recognizing that, even though Aristotle likens practical syllogisms to

theoretical syllogisms, it is not necessary that the syllogism types mirror one another in every way. Nussbaum (Aristotle's *De. Mot. Anim.*) correctly writes on this point: "If the analogy to the syllogism shows signs of strain, it, rather than the complexities of the *phainomena* of action, should be sacrificed."[137] In other words, if differences between theoretical and practical syllogisms arise in the course of examining and analyzing them, then we should endeavor to account for and explain these differences positively rather than explain them away or diminish them in service of preserving a stronger analogy between the kinds of syllogism than that which actually obtains. We have so far been looking at an example of the kind of "strain" to which the analogy between practical and theoretical syllogisms is subject. I suggest that errant views about the conclusions of practical syllogisms such as Kenny's and Charles's arise because they wish to preserve a stronger analogy between theoretical and practical syllogisms than is necessary. In contrast, views like Nussbaum's and Dahl's appear to require adding to Aristotle's theory only if one is convinced that the structures of theoretical and practical syllogisms must mirror one another in every way. Yet it is Aristotle himself who calls attention to important differences between theoretical and practical syllogisms.

For my purposes, the most important sense in which the strict analogy between the syllogism types breaks down pertains to differences between their respective conclusions. The combination of propositions is sufficient to produce the conclusions of theoretical syllogisms, and those conclusions are propositions, or further objects of thought. But the combination of propositions is not sufficient to produce the conclusions of practical syllogisms, for their conclusions are not propositions, but as Aristotle emphasizes, their conclusions are enacted choices. What is practical about practical syllogisms is that they are choice-making, and an agent does not

[137] Nussbaum (Aristotle's *De Motu Animalium*) 187

conclude her practical syllogism if she is unable to enact her choice. If an agent does not enact a choice, yet has combined propositions and intends to do something, what is there to be said about her practical syllogism? First, we can say that it is incomplete and unsuccessful, for she does not draw the conclusion and choose and perform an action. We might call the result of such incomplete practical reasoning an *intention* to make clear that it is not fully or actually a choice. An intention in this sense is a sort of theoretical or propositional conclusion, but not a practical conclusion. The agent who intends to walk but cannot because of leg trauma reaches a semi-practical conclusion, but not a genuinely practical one, since she fails to choose and to act. So Charles is wrong to maintain that the conclusions of practical syllogisms must be propositions, even though the intentions he thinks are conclusions do figure into an agent's practical reasoning. In other words, he misidentifies the un-enacted choice or intention with what Aristotle describes as the concluding enacted choice of a practical syllogism. Similarly, when Kenny allows that some practical syllogisms conclude with propositions, he mislabels those propositions as practical conclusions, for they are actually mere intentions.

Nussbaum calls attention a further related difference between theoretical and practical syllogisms, writing that the conclusions of the former are linguistic, whereas those of the latter are not:

> Action (or refraining from action) is the explanandum; speech is no substitute. Of course a human agent might verbalize his conclusion; he might express his desire and his belief in words as well. But this will not in any important respect alter our account of his behavior…The theoretical syllogism is essentially linguistic; to the theory of the practical syllogism language is of minor importance.[138]

It seems strange to describe the thoughts at work in theoretical reasoning as linguistic, but Nussbaum has in mind the notion that an agent can report on her practical reasoning, i.e., she can

[138] *Ibid*. 186

tell others how she came to choose and perform an action, and she can even specify with words the choice that she enacts in the performance of her action. But practical syllogisms describe and explain how agents actually enact choices; should an agent say that she would have enacted some choice if she were not interrupted, prevented, or forced, such narration would be no substitute for the enactment of a choice. What I have called an intention or an un-enacted choice, in other words, is no proxy for an enacted choice.

We can derive indirect assistance for understanding that mere intentions do not count as actions from *De Anima* I.1, specifically from what Aristotle holds constitutes the proper definition of an affect or emotion such as anger. He writes that the affects are en-mattered forms or definitions [τὰ πάθη λόγοι ἔνυλοι εἰσιν, *DA* I.1 403a25], which means that complete definitions of affects require taking into account both their material and formal aspects. Aristotle applies this general claim to the affect of anger.

> ὥστε οἱ ὅροι τοιοῦτοι οἷον: 'τὸ ὀργίζεσθαι κίνησίς τις τοῦ τοιουδὶ σώματος ἢ μέρους ἢ δυνάμεως ὑπὸ τοῦδε ἕνεκα τοῦδε.'
>
> So definitions [of the affects] are such as this: 'to become angry is some change of a body in this way, either of a part or of a capacity, due to *this* reason and for the sake of *this* reason. [*DA* 402a25-27]

Note that Aristotle has sketched a definitional framework for the affect and has not yet filled in its contents; this is not a statement of what kind of bodily change anger is defined as, and it is not a claim about what anger's efficient and final causes are (to which I take 'ὑπὸ τοῦδε' and 'ἕνεκα τοῦδε' to refer, respectively). What this passage reflects is the twofold requirement that Aristotle imposes on complete definitions of affects like anger: such definitions must take into account both their bodily and formal aspects. He does go on to fill in the particulars with respect to anger's definition, holding that practitioners of two different arts or disciplines make use of partial definitions of the affect rather than anger's complete definition.

Aristotle writes that the physician or natural philosopher (ὁ φυσικός) focuses on the bodily aspect of anger's definition. This practitioner understands anger to be the boiling of the blood or of the heat around the heart [403a31-403b1]. The dialectician (ὁ διαλεκτικὸς), on the other hand, understands anger to be desire for retribution [ὄρεξιν ἀντιλυπήσεως, 403a30-31]; the dialectician's concern is with what spurs the agent's desire for vengeance and what the goal or end of the anger is. These partial definitions of anger are sufficient for the physician and the dialectician respectively because the proper work of each profession only requires so much familiarity with the affect's full account. The fact that anger is a kind of retributive desire is less relevant to the physician's work than its bodily manifestation and its symptoms; likewise, that anger is heart-boiling is less relevant to the dialectician's work than that it is a certain desire for vengeance with identifiable efficient and final causes. Nevertheless, anger's complete definition includes both accounts with which each of these practitioners works. To be angry, one must satisfy both requirements, that is, both the blood or the heat around the heart must be boiling and there must also be desire for retribution. If such desire is not accompanied by the bodily symptoms, or should the blood or heat boil around the heart without the desire for revenge, it is not correct to call someone angry.

Now what does this have to do with why an intention is not equivalent to an enacted choice? I propose that for Aristotle, an intention, or un-enacted choice, is no more a complete action than an un-enmattered account or description of an affect is a complete definition of the affect. In other words, an intention is not an Aristotelian action and does not count as πρᾶξις. Just as it is possible to describe an affect like anger in an un-enmattered way, by calling it "desire for revenge" as dialecticians do, it is also possible to describe an action by referring to the intention of which it is the enactment. An agent can narrate her practical reasoning and talk about an action she has

performed by referring to her choice to act in a certain way; when asked why she made the garment, she can report, "I chose to make a garment," or "a garment was to be made." But just as an un-enmattered description of an affect like anger does not count as a complete definition, neither does a declaration of the intention constitute an enacted choice. This is consistent with Nussbaum's point that there is no linguistic substitute for the chosen action that concludes a practical syllogism. What completes the agent's practical syllogism, according to Aristotle, is not that surprising; it is the choosing/acting, which happens immediately (εὐθύς) unless something interrupts her.

Further evidence that intentions are not actions can be found at *NE* III.3, in the midst of Aristotle's discussion of the difference between deliberation and choice. He makes the point that agents engage in deliberation (τὸ βουλεύεσθαι) when they have an end or goal in mind to achieve through action, but the means by which they will attain the goal is indeterminate or indefinite (ἀδιόριστον); what results from their deliberation is that they make a choice (προαίρεσις), which makes the means of attaining the goal definite or determinate. Aristotle notes that the choices agents set out to make do not always translate fluidly into action.

> κἂν μὲν ἀδυνάτῳ ἐντύχωσιν, ἀφίστανται, οἷον εἰ χρημάτων δεῖ, ταῦτα δὲ μὴ οἷόν τε πορισθῆναι. ἐὰν δὲ δυνατὸν φαίνηται, ἐγχειροῦσι πράττειν. δυνατὰ δὲ ἃ δι᾽ ἡμῶν γένοιτ᾽ ἄν.
>
> And if they happen upon something impossible, they let it go, for instance if there is need for money, but there is no such way for the money to be furnished. Yet if something appears possible, they attempt to act. And possible things are those which can come about through us. [*NE* III.3, 1112b24-26]

Agents make choices and act based on what appears possible for them to do. In some cases, agents are wrong about what it is possible for them to do, for instance when someone thinks she can secure an advance payment from her employer in order to satisfy her need for money, yet later learns that her employer is either unwilling or unable to provide it. In cases such as this, agents "attempt to act," that is, they try to enact choices (by discussing it with their employers, etc.), but

fail. Nevertheless, it is still true about them that they intended to do something. It is possible to think of the agents who are interrupted from enacting choices, for instance the agent compelled to run by fire ants and the agent prevented from walking by leg trauma, as examples of agents attempting to act but failing to do so. Their practical syllogisms are incomplete since they do not perform the actions that follow from the propositions they have successfully combined, even if they can formulate or state their intentions in language as propositions. They do not draw the conclusions of their practical syllogisms since they do not follow through and act.

Cooper (Reason and Human Good in Aristotle) commits to a view that sharply distinguishes the process of deliberation from practical syllogizing.[139] He summarizes his view about their relation in two statements: "(1) Aristotle requires that deliberation, to be complete, must issue in a [choice] to perform an act of some suitable specific type…(2) A 'practical syllogism' is not in general any part of the deliberation that leads to the performance of an action."[140] On his view, deliberation results in a choice that is not itself an action, but rather a choice to act in a specific way that serves later as the universal proposition of an agent's practical syllogism. Far from proposing that the practical syllogism concludes with an enacted choice, Cooper instead holds that the practical syllogism begins with a choice in the form of a universal proposition. When deliberation is complete, Cooper holds that "the practical syllogism is tacked on," and so lies outside of the process of deliberation and is subsequent to it.[141] He commits to the view that

> effective deliberation must yield a [choice] to do something belonging to a relevant specific type, but…deliberation ceases when this point is reached. The practical syllogism, which has an action referred to as 'doing *this* (to *this*)' as its conclusion, is not a required last stage in deliberation.[142]

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[139] Cooper, John M. (1986) Reason and Human Good in Aristotle. Indianapolis: Hackett.
[140] *Ibid*. 23-24 [I replaced "decision" with "choice" for consistency.]
[141] *Ibid*. 27
[142] *Ibid*. 33

According to his view, choice and action are distinct, but not in the same way that Charles and Kenny contend. For Cooper, choice concludes deliberation, not the practical syllogism. Through the practical syllogism, "the final link to action is effected," and the agent's choice to do something specific just is the universal proposition she exercises in her practical syllogism. Charles and Kenny, on the other hand, respectively hold that propositional choices must or can conclude practical syllogisms. Despite this difference, Cooper, Charles, and Kenny all share the view that a choice can be un-enacted on Aristotle's account, whereas I contend that for Aristotle there is no such thing as an un-enacted choice—just as there is no such thing as affect that is un-enmattered.

In order to see some of the limitations of Cooper's view about the distinction between deliberation and the practical syllogism, it is important to examine in what sense he holds that an agent's choice is actually a commitment to exercise a universal proposition at some later time and not a commitment to do something here and now. He calls attention to the fact that a choice is supposed to be specific and determinate and that, in principle, deliberation is the process of winnowing down a set of potential choices and finally settling on something specific and determinate, i.e., an actual choice. However, Cooper does not think that the choice that results from deliberation is so specific that it produces a particular action, but rather that a choice is an action-guiding universal proposition for use in the final stage of practical reasoning: the tacked on practical syllogism. Regarding how specific a chosen universal proposition must be, Cooper says that it is

> specific enough if it is one which the agent knows how to apply to things directly, as it were on sight, without having to investigate them carefully first, and if such further specific differences as there may be within the class denoted are not relevant to his purposes.[143]

[143] *Ibid*. 32

To be sure, Cooper holds that there is further specification that needs to be done by the agent after she has made her choice, namely to connect that chosen, "specific enough" universal proposition to a particular action through a particular proposition. He presents an example whereby an agent deliberates and chooses the universal proposition: "to turn on the electric bulb I need to turn the switch to 'on.'" He then presents the practical syllogism as representing what happens when an agent who has chosen this universal perceives that the light switch is located on the wall in front of her. Her perception on his view is the particular proposition that links her choice, her universal proposition, to the performance of her action.

Two things strike me as troublesome about this view. First, Cooper's example of a universal proposition does not really match well with Aristotle's examples of universal propositions at *De Mot*. 7: "every person must walk," and "no person must walk." Cooper's universal proposition, "to turn on the electric bulb I need to turn the switch to 'on,'" does not seem sufficiently universal in comparison. For his is not a generalization about all electric bulbs or all people in similar situations, but a rather specific action-guiding proposition sensitive to the agent's present context. Cooper's example loses some persuasive power in the light of this contrast. Second, Cooper affirms that the conclusions of practical syllogisms are enacted choices, just as I do, but his justification for this point importantly differs from mine. For he contends that the practical syllogism links an agent's choice, i.e. her universal proposition, to the performance of a determinate action, and that is why such actions are enacted choices. I contend that a practical syllogism concludes with a determinate enacted choice because of an agent's combination of and commitment to certain universal and particular propositions. Another way of making this point is to acknowledge that on Cooper's view, agents make somewhat-determinate choices prior to practically syllogizing, whereas on my view, successful practical syllogisms conclude with

determinate choices that agents at the same time enact. To commit to Cooper's view, as tidily as it distinguishes deliberation from practical syllogizing, also means to accept that choices do not have to be so determinate as to relate to an agent doing something at this moment. For one must accept this view of choice as only somewhat-determinate in order to grant that universal propositions can be choices.

I do not propose that there is any problem admitting that a universal proposition might be the result of an earlier stage of the process of deliberation, arising at some point prior to when an agent finally completes her deliberation, makes a choice and acts; but a universal proposition is not specific or determinate enough to count as an Aristotelian choice. At most, a universal proposition by itself counts as an intention that an agent may, through practically syllogizing, choose and perform. For instance, both self-controlled and un-self-controlled agents know the correct universal proposition, as we will see in the next section when examining ethical practical syllogisms. Nevertheless, Aristotle maintains at *NE* III.2 that choice, most of all, distinguishes the character types from one another. If universal propositions are choices as Cooper maintains, then it is difficult to tell how we might distinguish self-controlled, un-self-controlled, and virtuous character types according to their choices, granted that they all in some sense know the same universal proposition. On my view, choosing/acting concludes a practical syllogism, and this is why I refer to the conclusion of a practical syllogism as an enacted choice. Deliberation does not occur outside of the practical syllogism, but rather happens in the course of practically syllogizing. Complete or successful practical syllogisms are choice-making: an agent connects her intention to do something to her actual choice to do it.

Returning to Aristotle's examples of non-ethical practical syllogisms, walking and not walking are enacted choices that have locomotive import, but it is difficult to attribute to them any

additional sense to classify them as other than non-ethical choices and actions. Perhaps Aristotle presents these examples of practical syllogisms at *De Mot*. 7 because they are so clear and easy to grasp.[144] Imagination could supply additional contexts to build specific scenarios: suppose the walker is interested in fitness and under the instruction of a personal trainer who repeats the mantra, "every person must walk." Then it would be reasonable to consider her action as gymnastic, too, or as aiming at health, rather than as just locomotive. It is also noteworthy that it is hard to discern desire's place in the locomotive syllogisms as Aristotle presents them, even though they must involve desire; one would also have to supply appropriate context here, answering why it is that the agent is reasoning about walking in the first place. Perhaps there is some object of desire on the other side of the road, and this is why the walker's syllogism arises. That Aristotle presents these as basic examples of practical syllogisms does not mean they tell us the full story about practical syllogisms as explanatory models of how agents comes to choose and perform actions. For instance, it is not clear at all from these examples how the practical syllogism applies in cases of ethical practical reasoning.

Kenny, dissatisfied with the general label, "practical syllogism," distinguishes between *technical* and *ethical* practical syllogisms, with the first being expressive of certain technical skills (such as pastry-making) that conclude with products (pastries), and the second being expressive of the character types of the syllogizing agents.[145] I take issue with the way he frames this distinction, for he incorrectly counts the *De. Mot*. 7 syllogisms as ethical syllogisms because they are not productive or expressive of any technical skills. I do not accept his classification of the *De Mot*.

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[144] Just as Aristotle uses artifacts like sculptures and brazen spheres as imperfect examples in the course of explaining the relation between matter and form in living things, I conjecture that Aristotle presents the *De Mot*. 7 non-ethical practical syllogisms as models of practical syllogisms that have their own shortcomings. Just as artifacts serve as useful models yet are insufficient for demonstrating the real complexity of the relation of matter and form, so too these basic practical syllogisms are useful models yet insufficient for demonstrating the complexity of, for instance, ethical practical syllogisms.

[145] Kenny (Aristotle's Theory of the Will) 111-166

syllogisms as ethical because it is not clear why the agents in Aristotle's examples are reasoning about walking or abstaining from walking; for we know that the agents have universal propositions in mind regarding what all people must do, but we do not know what the agents aim to accomplish by walking or staying put, and it is unclear what role desire plays in their practical reasoning. I contend that Kenny's characterization is mistaken and does not correctly take into account the fact that the *De Mot*. 7 practical syllogisms are actually non-ethical examples. I agree with Kenny that ethical practical syllogisms are uniquely indicative of and expressive of the character types of reasoning agents, but I disagree with his view that all non-productive practical syllogizing is ethical. So I propose that Aristotle presents the *De Mot*. 7 practical syllogisms as basic, non-ethical examples with which his audience, indeed most audiences, would be familiar. And, after all, *De Mot*. is a treatise concerning animal motion in general.

Yet it is also true that Aristotle believes the practical syllogism has application outside of the realm of purely natural science because he uses the model of the practical syllogism to explain strict akratic choice and action and to distinguish it from his explanation of temperate choice and action at *NE* VII.3. Turning attention to Aristotle's presentation of the practical syllogism as it produces ethical action clarifies how ethical practical syllogisms differ from non-ethical ones. A practical syllogism explaining an agent's locomotive choice and action is significantly different from one explaining her virtuous choice and action, or her akratic choice and action, and so on. For the sake of clarity, in what follows, when I refer to ethical practical syllogisms, I do not mean merely syllogisms that are non-productive as Kenny does. For it is clear from *De Mot*. 7 that Aristotle thinks that there are non-productive, locomotive practical syllogisms whose propositions and conclusions evade ethical description. So when I refer to ethical practical syllogisms in what follows, unlike Kenny, I mean practical syllogisms that conclude with enacted choices that have

ethical import—i.e., enacted choices that are virtuous, enkratic, akratic, and vicious—and whose propositions and conclusions also have ethical value that proceeds from the character types of syllogizing agents.

4.2 Ethical Practical Syllogisms – *NE* VII.3 [1147a24-1147b3]

De Mot. 7 and *NE* VII.3 have something in common. At *De Mot*. 7, Aristotle presents a puzzle regarding the relation between thinking and acting, wondering why thinking sometimes results in acting, while at other times it does not. At *NE* VII.3, Aristotle presents a similar puzzle about *akrasia* and *enkrateia* regarding the relation between reason and correct choice and action, wondering why agents who know what the correct action is sometimes choose and perform it but in other cases do not. In the last section, I showed that Aristotle introduces the non-ethical practical syllogism to address the first puzzle about thought's relation to action; in this section, I argue that Aristotle uses the model of the ethical practical syllogism to address the second puzzle about the relation between correct knowledge and correct choice and action.

As I noted in the last chapter, at *NE* I.13 Aristotle praises the rational nature of akratic and enkratic agents' souls because they know what it is correct to choose and to do. Yet he also implies that there is something blameworthy about them because the impulses within their souls' non-rational natures struggle against their own reason's correct prescriptions.

> τοῦ γὰρ ἐγκρατοῦς καὶ ἀκρατοῦς τὸν λόγον καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ λόγον ἔχον ἐπαινοῦμεν. ὀρθῶς γὰρ καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ βέλτιστα παρακαλεῖ. φαίνεται δ᾽ ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἄλλο τι παρὰ τὸν λόγον πεφυκός, ὃ μάχεται καὶ ἀντιτείνει τῷ λόγῳ.
>
> With respect to enkratic and akratic agents, we praise their reason and the nature of the soul that has reason. For it summons them correctly and to the best things. But there seems to be something else in these agents by nature in addition to reason, something which battles with and resists reason. [*NE* I.13 1102b14-18]

The akratic agent chooses and performs the incorrect action, while the enkratic chooses and performs the correct action, but both struggle with affect, which interferes with their practical reasoning with mixed success. The akratic is clearly blameworthy since she abandons what she knows it would be correct to choose and to do in favor of enacting an inferior choice, but the enkratic is in some sense blameworthy too. For the self-controlled agent desires to depart from what her reason correctly summons her to choose and to do even though she in fact overcomes this impulse and enacts the correct choice. As Gottlieb ("The Practical Syllogism") correctly writes, "'Doing the right thing although I would rather be doing something else' means that one is not doing the right thing *tout court*, but one is doing something that only looks as if it is the right thing."[146] So, Aristotle presents both enkratic and akratic agents as intending to perform correct actions, and for this reason he praises the rational natures of their souls. What is puzzling about this is that, even though the rational natures of the souls of both enkratic and akratic agents are praiseworthy and both know what it is correct to do, only the enkratic agent ends up following through and enacting the correct choice. The rational nature of a temperate agent's soul clearly also merits praise, and she also enacts the correct choice, but unlike the strict enkratic agent, the temperate agent does not struggle or meet internal resistance on the way to enacting it; her soul's non-rational nature merits praise as well. In short, akratic, enkratic, and temperate agents all have souls whose rational natures merit praise, but it would clearly be wrong to group them all together under the same ethical classification on account of this shared feature.[147] These agents have different character types, bear different relations to choice-making, and so they choose and perform

[146] Gottlieb, Paula. (2006) "The Practical Syllogism." in The Blackwell Guide to Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*. Ed., Kraut, Richard. Hoboken, NJ: Blackwell. 229

[147] In fact, as I noted in the last chapter, a virtuous agent has developed the deliberative excellence of practical wisdom while self-controlled and un-self-controlled agents have merely developed the rational disposition of cleverness. See Ch.3, Section 3.2 pp. 158-163

different kinds of actions. Attending only to the rational natures of these agents' souls is not sufficient for explaining either the differences among the agents' character types or the ethical differences among the actions they choose and perform. So Aristotle makes use of ethical practical syllogisms to demonstrate how agents whose soul's rational natures all merit praise to different extents can choose and perform actions that have distinct ethical value due to the fact that their non-rational natures are not all as receptively obedient to their rational natures' prescriptions.

The relevant discussion appears in the midst of Aristotle's extended treatment of a puzzle about the possibility of strict *akrasia* at *NE* VII.3. Aristotle's explanation relies on the model of the practical syllogism. His application of the practical syllogism to ethical choice and action opens with a general explanation of why theoretical and practical syllogisms are distinct, an explanation similar to the one he presents at *De Mot*. 7.

> ἔτι καὶ ὧδε φυσικῶς ἄν τις ἐπιβλέψειε τὴν αἰτίαν. ἢ μὲν γὰρ καθόλου δόξα, ἡ δ᾽ ἑτέρα περὶ τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστά ἐστιν, ὧν αἴσθησις ἤδη κυρία. ὅταν δὲ μία γένηται ἐξ αὐτῶν, ἀνάγκη τὸ συμπεραν θὲν ἔνθα μὲν φάναι τὴν ψυχήν, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ποιητικαῖς πράττειν εὐθύς.
>
> Moreover also in this way, in the way that a natural philosopher looks at things[148], one might look at the cause [of *akrasia*]. For there is a universal opinion and another opinion concerning particulars, of which perception is even now the authority. Whenever one opinion is generated from them, it is necessary that the soul affirm what has been concluded, whereas in the case of making something happen it is necessary immediately for one to act. [1147a24-28]

[148] When Aristotle announces his move into investigating *akrasia* as a natural philosopher would (φυσικῶς), what he means is that he is going to demonstrate an episode of akratic practical reasoning by means of the model of the practical syllogism. He does not mean, as it might seem at first glance, that he is abandoning the ethical lens for the lens of natural philosophy in his endeavor to explain *akrasia*'s possibility. While it is true that Aristotle understands the practical syllogism to be an important tool for the natural philosopher (after all, *De Mot*. is a work of natural philosophy, inquiring into and explaining animal self-motion, and it is in that work that Aristotle most clearly sets forth the model of the practical syllogism on its own terms), natural philosophy does not exhaust the practical syllogism's value as an explanatory mechanism. One does not have to be doing natural philosophy *qua* natural philosophy in order to find the practical syllogism instrumental for her line of inquiry. Aristotle here demonstrates that one can, for instance, find the practical syllogism model helpful for the purposes of ethical inquiry. In other words, the practical syllogism's use does not extend just to the explanation of basic animal motion, but it is also capable of explaining ethical practical reasoning which proceeds from human character types. I propose that this is what Irwin (Aristotle: *Nicomachean Ethics*) has in mind in his commentary on this passage, noting that Aristotle indicates that he is going on to discuss the explanation of *akrasia* by "referring to the structure of practical inference," (259).

Aristotle distinguishes between theoretical and practical syllogisms again here according to the natures of their conclusions. He depicts both theoretical and practical syllogisms as structurally dependent on agents' commitments to and combinations of universal and particular propositions. Regarding the theoretical syllogism, Aristotle describes an agent putting these propositions together to produce a propositional conclusion that she can assent to and judge as true by means of her soul's rational nature. As Broadie says of the theoretical syllogism: "This is the type of case where the premises have no practical import."[149] In considering the practical syllogism, Aristotle describes the agent's combination of and commitment to propositions as resulting in an action immediately (εὐθύς), so long as nothing interrupts her from enacting her choice. So, conversely, this is the type of case where the premises do in fact have practical import. Aristotle's distinction between theoretical and practical syllogisms here gives further reason for rejecting Charles's and Kenny's views about the conclusions of practical syllogisms outlined in the last section; for the *NE* passage is consistent with Aristotle's distinction at *De Mot*. 7 where he sets apart theoretical syllogisms whose conclusions are propositions from practical syllogisms whose conclusions are enacted choices. Aristotle consistently distinguishes the syllogism types according to the natures of their respective conclusions. If the practical syllogism must or can conclude with a propositional intention that an agent must then desire to enact before actually performing, then it looks like the agent's desire to act on that proposition, or lack thereof, is what hinders or forces her action. But if the practical syllogism does indeed conclude with an enacted choice (i.e., an action and not a proposition), then what prevents action or forces another action must be present prior to an agent drawing the conclusion. What hinders or forces the agent to act otherwise may still involve or even

[149] Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics: Translation, Introduction, and Commentary. (2002) Broadie, Sarah & Rowe, Christopher, eds. and trans. Oxford University Press. 392

be desire, but desire that figures into the agent's practical reasoning prior to acting, and so prior to drawing the conclusion of the practical syllogism.

So far in *NE* VII.3, Aristotle's general account of the practical syllogism runs parallel with his general account at *De Mot*. 7. But it becomes clear from the examples of ethical practical syllogisms that he presents in the *NE* that these are very different from the non-ethical practical syllogisms from *De Mot*. 7; the ethical ones not only conclude with enacted choices that inherit ethical value from the character types of syllogizing agents, but the propositions that agents combine in ethical practical syllogisms also inherit their ethical value from the character types of syllogizing agents. This is a significant point of contrast between non-ethical and ethical practical syllogisms and it is consistent with Kenny's view that practical syllogisms transfer or preserve goodness from their propositions to their conclusions just as theoretical syllogisms transfer or preserve truth.[150] Importantly, the propositions and actions of an ethical practical syllogism are not ethically valuable in themselves, but they inherit their ethical value from the character type of the syllogizing agent; Aristotle is not primarily a proposition theorist or an action theorist, but rather a character theorist when it comes to his evaluation of ethical practical reasoning. I clarify this point in later sections devoted to examining ethical universal and particular propositions respectively, but it is important to keep in mind throughout that for Aristotle, the propositions and conclusions of ethical practical syllogisms all ultimately inherit their ethical values in an agent-dependent manner—that is, from the character types of syllogizing agents.

[150] One might object that non-ethical practical syllogisms could not preserve and transfer goodness from their propositions to their conclusions since they are not ethical practical syllogisms. This worry can be met by pointing out that goodness for Aristotle is said in many ways, and also in ways that are not necessarily ethically relevant. If I think it is good for me to keep warm, and I know that putting on a coat is one way to keep warm, and see that there is a coat before me, I eventually put the coat on. Goodness has been preserved and transferred in this practical syllogism even though it is not an example of an ethical practical syllogism.

Aristotle's only explicit examples of ethical practical syllogisms arise from the following important yet complicated passage at *NE* VII.3:

> …εἰ παντὸς γλυκέος γεύεσθαι δεῖ, τουτὶ δὲ γλυκὺ ὡς ἕν τι τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστον, ἀνάγκη τὸν δυνάμενον καὶ μὴ κωλυόμενον ἅμα τοῦτο καὶ πράττειν. ὅταν οὖν ἡ μὲν καθόλου ἐνῇ κωλύουσα γεύεσθαι, ἢ δέ, ὅτι πᾶν γλυκὺ ἡδύ, τουτὶ δὲ γλυκύ—αὕτη δὲ ἐνεργεῖ—τύχῃ δ᾽ ἐπιθυμία ἐνοῦσα, ἢ μὲν οὖν λέγει φεύγειν τοῦτο, ἡ δ᾽ ἐπιθυμία ἄγει, κινεῖν γὰρ ἕκαστον δύναται τῶν μορίων. ὥστε συμβαίνει ὑπὸ λόγου πως καὶ δόξης ἀκρατεύεσθαι, οὐκ ἐναντίας δὲ καθ᾽ αὑτήν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός—ἡ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία ἐναντία, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ἡ δόξα—τῷ ὀρθῷ λόγῳ

> …if every sweet thing must be tasted, and this is a sweet thing insofar as it is one of the particulars, it is necessary for one who is able and not prevented at the same time to act on this. But whenever the universal opinion is in an individual preventing tasting, and also the opinion that every sweet thing is pleasant, and that this is a sweet thing—this is the opinion that is active—and tactile appetite happens to be in the individual, then the one opinion reasons that the individual avoid the sweet thing, but tactile appetite[151] leads the person to the sweet thing, for tactile appetite is able to move each of the parts. What follows is that to be akratic is in a way due to reason and opinion contrary to correct reason, not in itself, but accidentally—for the tactile appetite is contrary, but not the opinion. [*NE* VII.3 1147a29-1147b4]

There are two practical syllogisms nestled in this passage. Aristotle begins with the presentation of an uninterrupted practical syllogism that results in the action one would expect given the two propositions he introduces. Combining the universal proposition, "every sweet thing must be tasted," with the particular proposition introduced by her perception of an object of tactile appetite, "this is a sweet thing," the agent proceeds to choose and perform the action of tasting the sweet thing before her. At least this is the case unless something either hinders the agent's performance

[151] I have chosen to render 'ἐπιθυμία' as 'tactile appetite' rather than desire-in-general, which is consistent with how I rendered it in earlier chapters when considering temperance's practical domain. Broadie (Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics*: Trans., Intro., and Comm.) considers ἐπιθυμία to be more general, calling it "the impulse toward something attractive," (26). However, it is clear to me that Aristotle is using ἐπιθυμία specifically in the *NE* VII context to refer to the agent's desire for tactile pleasures, i.e., tactile appetite, the affect peculiar to the domain of temperance. Corroboration for this conjecture comes from *NE* III.11, where Aristotle distinguishes the ἐπιθυμίαι of agents differently disposed in temperance's domain (the different characters, for instance the temperate and the self-indulgent, desire the objects of tactile appetite in different ways; the self-indulgent desires both the things one should not and also the things one should, though she desires the latter objects excessively). Also, at *NE* II.5, Aristotle classifies ἐπιθυμία as one of the affects toward which agents can be well or poorly disposed. Since Aristotle often couples his discussion of temperance with an investigation into the objects of ἐπιθυμία, it follows that the objects of temperance's domain would thereby be the objects of ἐπιθυμία in the specific sense of tactile appetite.

of the action or forces her to perform another action. It is important to note here that tasting the sweet thing is an ethical enacted choice, as opposed to, for instance, the enacted choice to walk that concludes one of the *De Mot*. 7 practical syllogisms. The agent's enacted choice here concerns her conduct in relation to an object of tactile appetite, in this case, something sweet. The practical domain of the virtue of temperance has to do with how agents comport themselves with respect to objects of tactile appetite, such as food, drink, and sex. What the agent does with the sweet thing in the circumstances in the passage is something for which she can be held accountable, that is, for which she can be either praised or blamed, in temperance's practical domain.

After discussing the practical syllogism concluding with the enacted choice of tasting the sweet thing, Aristotle introduces an alternative possible universal proposition preventing tasting, which I have elected to represent as: "not every sweet thing must be tasted."[152] In doing this, he also introduces the second ethical practical syllogism of the passage. An agent who combines this second universal with the particular proposition, "this is a sweet thing," concludes her practical syllogism by enacting the alternative choice of abstaining from tasting the sweet thing. At least this is the case unless something prevents her from abstaining from it or forces her to act otherwise. Not tasting the sweet thing is also an ethical enacted choice; it is choice and action with respect to an object of tactile appetite in temperance's practical domain. The first of these ethical practical syllogisms results in choice and action that is blameworthy, whereas the second practical syllogism

[152] Aristotle does not introduce the alternative proposition so cleanly as, "not everything sweet must be tasted," however this is the rendering of "universal opinion…preventing tasting," I have elected to use for brevity's sake in this section. Dahl (Practical Reason, Aristotle, and Weakness of the Will) correctly notes that: "Aristotle is not clear at all about what is contained" in this practical syllogism, and that he "only says that there is a universal opinion forbidding tasting." (152) Cooper (Reason and Human Good in Aristotle) makes a similar point, noting that this alternative universal "is not stated," though, "it forbids one to taste," and that, "conceivably, Aristotle has in mind the premiss: 'Avoid all sweet things.'" (49). So, one has to be inventive in this case. Admittedly, my rendering of the alternative universal as, "not everything sweet must be tasted," it itself an ambiguous proposition; it can mean either, "not every sweet thing must be tasted," permitting the tasting of some sweets, or it can mean, "nothing sweet must be tasted," forbidding the tasting of all sweets. All of this just to say that things will get more complicated as we proceed.

results in choice and action that is praiseworthy in temperance's practical domain. In fact, this second syllogism represents the practical reasoning of the temperate agent, so it is the correct practical syllogism and concludes with a temperate choice and action. The rest of the passage represents a strict akratic practical syllogism, in which an agent's tactile appetite pulls her to abandon her correct propositional intention of abstaining from the sweet thing in favor of enacting the incorrect choice to indulge in it instead.

It is worth pointing out that scholars often distinguish these syllogisms, calling the temperate one "the syllogism of reason," and calling the strict akratic one, "the syllogism of appetite."[153] I propose that this distinction is correct only if we understand it to be differentiating between what influences the agent's employment of a universal proposition; in the temperate agent's case, she employs the universal that her reason correctly commands, while in the strict akratic agent's case, she employs the incorrect universal because of the influence of tactile appetite or desire. There is a different way of understanding this distinction that I want to ward off, according to which the strict akratic practical syllogism is not rational and so does not involve making a choice. As we will see, the strict akratic agent employs an incorrect universal proposition and combines it with a particular one given by her perceptual evaluation of the sweet thing, and so ends up enacting a blameworthy choice against her reason's correct prescription. There is a danger of presuming that the strict akratic agent does not actually make a choice in rendering her practical syllogism as a "syllogism of appetite," because of this description's implication that reason has nothing to do with her blameworthy action. Crucially, the strict akratic agent is not like the agents who are interrupted from enacting their choices in the locomotive syllogisms I considered in the last section; the agent who intends to sit but is prevented by encroaching fire ants and instead runs

[153] See especially Cooper (Reason and the Human Good) 46-58, & Dahl (Practical Reason, Aristotle, and Weakness of the Will) 150-155.

away does not make a new choice, but rather spontaneously acts because of this external prevention. The strict akratic agent, on the other hand, is prevented from enacting a temperate choice because of her own relation to tactile appetite, and as I proceed to show that the strict akratic agent has knowledge of both the correct and incorrect universal propositions, it should become clear that what prevents her from enacting the correct choice is something internal rather than external. The strict akratic goes on to reason toward the enactment of a new, blameworthy choice after abandoning what she knows to be the correct intention because of her improper relation to the affect; her action is not spontaneous or unchosen.

Aristotle depicts the strict akratic agent in the passage above as one who knows both of the alternative universal propositions and he explains her inferior behavior in terms of which universal proposition she activates or exercises in her practical syllogism. He re-phrases, "every sweet thing must be tasted," as, "every sweet thing is pleasant," but his point in the passage is that when the akratic agent encounters the sweet thing, tactile appetite functions so as to "move each of the parts," leading her to activate this universal proposition which leads to blameworthy action. On my view, he means that tactile appetite causes a psychological change or movement that results in an agent exercising or activating one universal proposition rather than the other. There is an obstacle in the way of reading Aristotle as claiming that tactile appetite can move the parts of an agent's soul: it is not clear whether Aristotle thinks that souls have 'parts' in the usual sense of the term. In Chapter 3, I worked to avoid talking about souls as having parts to sidestep having to make sense out of immaterial mereology, deferring instead to the language of 'natures,' and 'sub-aspects' of the soul.[154] Aristotle himself is sometimes not keen on talking about souls as if they have parts [*NE* I.13 1102a26-32]. However that may be, at other times, he does use part-language in reference to

[154] See esp. Ch. 3, p. 128, fn. 77

human souls, for instance when describing their rational and non-rational bifurcation at the outset of *NE* VI [1139a3-5].

I am not interested here in whether Aristotle holds that souls have parts in the same way that the bodies which they inform do. It is possible that Aristotle errs on the side of psychic part-language sometimes in the ethics because the practical science of ethics is less concerned with providing precise descriptions of soul than the theoretical science of psychology. When Aristotle claims that tactile appetite is capable of moving or changing "each of the parts," I propose that he is using psychic part-language to make the point that tactile appetite can influence the ways that the functional "parts" or divisions of an agent's soul relate when she encounters the sweet thing. Aristotle is saying that the strict akratic agent's tactile appetite induces her to activate or exercise the universal proposition that leads her to enact the choice to taste the sweet thing. Evidence that Aristotle thinks that tactile appetite is capable of moving or changing the "parts of the soul" comes from considering Aristotle's analysis of desire as the cause of animal motion at *De Anima* III.10.

> ὥστε εὐλόγως δύο ταῦτα φαίνεται τὰ κινοῦντα, ὄρεξις καὶ διάνοια πρακτική. τὸ ὀρεκτὸν γὰρ κινεῖ, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἡ διάνοια κινεῖ, ὅτι ἀρχὴ αὐτῆς ἐστι τὸ ὀρεκτόν. καὶ ἡ φαντασία δὲ ὅταν κινῇ, οὐ κινεῖ ἄνευ ὀρέξεως. ἓν δή τι τὸ ὀρεκτικόν. ἐι γὰρ δύο, νοῦς καὶ ὄρεξις, ἐκίνουν, κατὰ κοινὸν ἄν τι ἐκίνουν εἶδος. νῦν δὲ ὁ μὲν νοῦς οὐ φαίνεται κινῶν ἄνευ ὀρέξεως (ἡ γὰρ βούλησις ὄρεξις, ὅταν δὲ κατὰ τὸν λογισμὸν κινῆται, καὶ κατὰ βούλησιν κινεῖται), ἡ δ᾽ὄρεξις κινεῖ καὶ παρὰ τὸν λογισμόν. ἡ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία ὄρεξίς τίς ἐστιν. νοῦς μὲν οὖν πᾶς ὀρθός ἐστιν. ὄρεξις δὲ καὶ φαντασία καὶ ὀρθὴ καὶ οὐκ ὀρθή. διὸ ἀεὶ κινεῖ μὲν τὸ ὀρεκτόν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ᾽ἐστὶν ἢ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν. οὐ πᾶν δέ, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν. πρακτὸν δ᾽ἐστὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν.
>
> So it is well said that it seems that there are two movers, desire and practical intellect. For the object of desire moves, and on account of this, intellect moves, so that the origin of the movement is the object of desire. This also holds for imagination, as whenever it moves, it does not move without desire. Indeed the mover is the desiderative aspect of the soul. For if there were two movers, mind and desire, then they would be moving, but moving according to some common form. But now mind does not seem to move without desire (for wish is a kind of desire, and whenever something moves according to reasoning, it also moves according to wish), but desire moves even beyond reasoning. For tactile appetite is a type of desire. Mind is always correct, but desire and imagination are both correct

> and incorrect. This is why the object of desire always initiates motion, and this object is either the genuine good or the apparent good. However that may be, it is not every good or apparent good that initiates motion, but rather the good that can be done. That which can be done is that which is also capable of being otherwise. [*DA* III.10 433a17-30]

I have chosen to cite this lengthy passage in full partly because of the consistency with which Aristotle discusses psychological motion or change. For in the course of arguing that desire is the initiator of animal movement, he describes a sequence of κινήσεις, movements or changes, which take place in the soul. Desire initiates the first movement or change, which gives rise to intellect's change, which presumably goes to work structuring a practical syllogism for the sake of attaining the good that an agent desires, either a real or apparent good, which the agent can achieve and has been the object of her desire from the start of the process. Even if Aristotle does not think that the soul has 'parts' in any material sense of the term, he does conceive of the soul as divisible along functional lines, and in this passage he holds that, whatever these divisions represent (parts, sub-aspects, natures, etc.), they are able to affect and be affected. Another reason why I cite this passage in full is that Aristotle here specifically refers to tactile appetite (ἐπιθυμία) as a species of desire and holds that it is capable of initiating such a process of sequential psychological changes. This supports my view that in the *NE* passage under consideration, Aristotle does mean that the affect of tactile appetite is capable of moving the "parts" of the soul, not merely the parts of the body. If this is correct, then Aristotle's depiction of strict akratic practical reasoning is one according to which an agent has knowledge of two competing universal propositions ("every sweet thing must be tasted," and "not every sweet thing must be tasted"), but tactile appetite for an apparent good leads her to activate the universal proposition that results in her enacting the choice to taste the sweet thing, i.e., performing a blameworthy, incorrect action.[155]

[155] It may sound strange to hold that the strict akratic agent *knows* both of the universal propositions, for they appear mutually exclusive, but as I consider more fully in the next section, this is Aristotle's view. He explains and endorses

Aristotle concludes the passage from *NE* VII.3 above by stating that the strict akratic agent's tactile appetite is what in principle is contrary or opposed to her reason's correct prescription. The other possible contrary, which Aristotle holds is not actually opposed to what her reason correctly prescribes, is the universal proposition that the strict akratic agent employs in her complete practical syllogism. Her own reason prescribes the correct universal proposition, namely, "not every sweet thing must be tasted," but tactile appetite influences the strict akratic agent to employ the alternative universal proposition in defiance of her own reason, namely "every sweet thing must be tasted," (or, as Aristotle re-phrases it, "every sweet thing is pleasant"). However, Aristotle insists that these alternative universal propositions or opinions are not in fact contrary to one another, even though they appear to be exclusionary. Where the real contrariety lies is in the contest between the strict akratic agent's tactile appetite and her reason's correct prescription, i.e., the correct universal proposition ("What follows is that to be akratic is in a way due to reason and opinion contrary, not in itself, but accidentally—for the tactile appetite is contrary, but not the opinion—to correct reason.") This accords with a point I made in Chapter 3, namely that akratic—and enkratic—agents have souls whose rational and non-rational natures are out of tune.[156] Specifically, in terms of the relevant sub-aspects of these natures, akratic and enkratic agents each have a non-rational ἐπιθυμητικόν/ὀρεκτικόν that issues desires that resist and struggle against the correct prescriptions that issue from her rational λογιστικόν with mixed success.

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a theory of knowledge that permits the strict akratic to know both propositions as long as she does not know both of them in the same way. He distinguishes active knowledge of a universal proposition, which refers to knowing and using the proposition in a practical syllogism, from mere potential knowledge of a universal proposition, which refers to knowing the proposition but not using it in a practical syllogism. Aristotle's notion of potential knowledge seems similar to our contemporary notion that people can have knowledge "in the back" of their minds; a strict akratic does know both universal propositions, but knows, "every sweet thing must be tasted," in the active sense and knows, "not every sweet thing must be tasted," in the potential "back of the mind" sense.

[156] See esp. Ch. 3, Section 3.1 pp. 138-140 & Section 3.2 154-157

It is worth emphasizing that the text from *NE* VII.3 under consideration aims to explain strict akratic behavior by using the practical syllogism as a model, not to explain the model of the ethical practical syllogism itself. Aristotle focuses exclusively on temperate and strict akratic practical syllogisms. He does not present a strict enkratic practical syllogism, and he does not provide examples of loose akratic or enkratic practical syllogisms, either. However, it is my view that this passage provides a blueprint for constructing strict enkratic, loose akratic, and loose enkratic practical syllogisms; developing that blueprint and applying it to strict and loose forms of both *akrasia* and *enkrateia* depends on a proper interpretation of this passage along the lines I have provided here and is largely the work of the next chapter. What I have shown in this section is that Aristotle presents two ethical practical syllogisms at *NE* VII.3, one temperate and the other strict akratic, just as he presents two non-ethical locomotive practical syllogisms at *De Mot*. 7. In both cases, he introduces the practical syllogism in order to address a puzzle about the relation between thinking and acting.

This is not the only similarity—each of the two non-ethical practical syllogisms concludes with an enacted choice precluding the other's (walking and not walking) and this is also true about the enacted choices that conclude each of the two ethical practical syllogisms (tasting and not tasting the sweet thing). The two kinds of practical syllogisms importantly differ with respect to the kinds of enacted choices that conclude them. Non-ethical practical syllogisms conclude with enacted choices that have no *prima facie* ethical value, whereas ethical practical syllogisms conclude with enacted choices that do have ethical value; at *NE* VII.3, the ethical practical conclusions are temperate and strict akratic enacted choices, and they inherit their ethical value from the character types of the syllogizing agents.

There is a further difference between the syllogism types, apparent from Aristotle's examples of ethical practical syllogisms. Not only do ethical practical syllogisms conclude with enacted choices that have ethical value, but the propositions of ethical practical syllogisms also have ethical value which they inherit from the character types of syllogizing agents. In the following sections, I examine the sense in which the universal and particular propositions of ethical practical syllogisms have ethical value. In general, I contend that the propositions and conclusions of ethical practical syllogisms inherit their ethical values from the character types of the syllogizing agents; the whole of a practical syllogism is an expression of an agent's character.

4.2.1 Ethical Universal Propositions

The pair of alternative universal propositions from *De Mot*. 7, "every person must walk," and "no person must walk," concern the locomotive nature of human beings and an agent's understanding of her species' ambulatory powers and their proper exercise; these universals, as they stand, have no clear ethical import. The pair of universal propositions from *NE* VII.3, "every sweet thing must be tasted," and "not every sweet thing must be tasted," on the other hand, are universal propositions that connect directly to the sphere of ethics. The unbridled consumption of food that is not wholesome or nutritious is behavior detrimental to an agent's character because it is activity uncharacteristic of the temperate agent; it is behavior that is less than virtuous. So the universal propositions of the ethical practical syllogisms that Aristotle presents certainly have ethical import; we can describe them as ethical universal propositions.

Aristotle clearly thinks that the correct ethical practical syllogism of the two he presents at *NE* VII.3 is the temperate one that concludes with an agent enacting the choice to abstain from tasting the sweet thing; she performs this action as a result of combining the universal, "not every sweet thing must be tasted," with the particular proposition, "this is a sweet thing." The other

practical syllogism is a strict akratic one, which concludes with an agent enacting the choice to taste the sweet thing; she performs this action as a result of combining the universal, "every sweet thing must be tasted," with the particular, "this is a sweet thing." Crucially, the strict akratic agent intends to perform the correct action until tactile appetite interferes and pulls her to abandon her intention in favor of choosing and performing a blameworthy action. The temperate and strict akratic practical syllogisms not only conclude with distinct ethical enacted choices, but they also involve agents' commitments to distinct ethical universal propositions.

The ethical value of the conclusion of an ethical practical syllogism is in part a function of the ethical value of the universal proposition that an agent employs in her practical syllogism. Another way of putting this is in terms of Kenny's view that ethical practical syllogisms transfer or preserve goodness, either real or apparent; the temperate practical syllogism accomplishes the preservation of actual goodness from its propositions to its conclusion, whereas the strict akratic practical syllogism merely preserves apparent goodness. The conclusion of a successfully completed ethical practical syllogism inherits its ethical value, for instance as a temperate or strict akratic enacted choice, in a proximate way from the ethical universal proposition an agent exercises in her practical syllogism. Ultimately, however, the universal propositions and the conclusions of ethical practical syllogisms inherit their ethical values from the character types of the agents who are practically syllogizing; they have their ethical value in an agent-dependent way. Yet insofar as we are looking only at the propositions and conclusions of practical syllogisms for the moment, it is correct to say that the conclusions of ethical practical syllogisms get their ethical values in part from the ethical universals that agents use in their syllogisms. The temperate action proximately inherits its ethical value from the universal, "not every sweet thing must be tasted,"

while the strict akratic action proximately inherits its ethical value from the universal, "every sweet thing must be tasted."

Certainly real life experience complicates this tidy presentation of ethical universal propositions. Even when we encounter ordinary objects of tactile appetite, things get much messier than Aristotle's binary presentation of ethical universals suggests. For instance, is it really the case that the temperate agent must always adopt and exercise the universal proposition forbidding her from tasting sweet things? Would it be ethically incorrect for her to eat a slice of pie her mother baked upon visiting home? It is hard to see how indulging in the occasional sweet could bar one from counting as genuinely temperate, and indeed not tasting something sweet might be the incorrect thing to do in some cases: refusing to eat what her mother has baked might not be the most hospitable thing to choose to do. It is hard to imagine that any universal proposition we or Aristotle could formulate would be the correct one to employ in every relevant circumstance. So much of ethical evaluation depends upon the context surrounding choice and action and the people who do the choosing and acting that it is difficult to come to true judgment of the correct universal by means of a set of rules for behavior. This insight influences Aristotle's overall view that goodness, or ethical correctness, is not *in* the universal proposition or the conclusion of even a virtuous agent's practical syllogism. Instead, the goodness is in the agent who has developed a virtuous character type, who reliably exercises the correct universal propositions in her ethical practical syllogisms and enacts virtuous choices.

Part of the reason why Aristotle simply presents only two exclusive universal propositions at *NE* VII.3 is because he understands ethics as a practical science whose variables and combinations are so numerous that no simple presentation of rules will ever be able to account for and provide direction regarding the whole range of possible actions. The range of universal

propositions available to agents, even in the realm shared with temperance, has to be much wider so as to include more than just the two that Aristotle presents; it seems also to include conditionals (e.g., "not every sweet thing must be tasted unless it happens to be sweet and healthy"), disjunctions (e.g., "either these sweet things must not be tasted or those sweet things must not be tasted"), and conjunctions (e.g., "these sweet things must not be tasted but those sweet things must be tasted"). The two universal propositions that Aristotle presents for temperance's practical domain do not exhaust the possible universals available for agents to know and exercise, but they are merely examples he provides for the sake of distinguishing his examples of strict akratic and temperate practical syllogisms.

It is worth wondering in general whether it is appropriate to think of ethical universal propositions as *rules* at all. Cooper certainly does not think we are entitled to think of a universal proposition as a rule, holding that even though it

> may sometimes be a rule ('Don't lie') it often will instead be a particular [choice] made under given particular circumstances (e.g., not to water one's lawn under a current water shortage); and Aristotle's examples…are hardly intelligible if taken as rules…[157]

Setting aside my denial that universal propositions are choices, which Cooper endorses again in this passage, his main point is that sometimes universal propositions take the form of fairly inflexible mandates that hold in almost every relevant case. The prohibition on lying is a generally inflexible principle for one who accepts it, granting certain exceptions in clear cases of lying's necessity; this is why Cooper classes the prohibition on lying as a rule.[158] But his other example of a universal proposition, the prohibition on water use, is conditional and only temporarily binding; because it is comparatively flexible, Cooper does not class this prohibition as a rule. Curzer ("Rules

[157] Cooper (Reason and Human Good in Aristotle) 56
[158] I have in mind the famous sorts of counterexamples to arguments that lying is always morally impermissible; for instance, that it seems permissible to lie if that is what one needs to do so in order to save another person's life.

Lurking at the Heart of Aristotle's Virtue Ethics") makes a similar point a bit more technically in terms of Aristotle's relation to particularism, the idea that each situation and context requires its own unique action-guiding universal proposition.

> Aristotle's embrace of rules does not prevent him from being a moderate particularist. He accepts the core intuitions and attractive features of particularism, namely that moral rules are (a) used in combination with the perception of particular facts of the situation, (b) context-sensitive, (c) exception-laden, and (d) vague.[159]

I am in general agreement with what both Curzer and Cooper say about universal propositions, namely that they vary in terms of flexibility and that Aristotle is not at risk of being a deontologist just because he permits some rules into his virtue ethics.

I propose that the primary reason why Aristotle simply presents only two exclusive universals for temperance's practical domain is because he is preparing to use them to showcase a complicated theory of knowledge that demonstrates that un-self-control is possible. Having a small set of universals to work with makes it easier to present his complex epistemological theory. This theory of knowledge distinguishes between types of knowledge, permitting the apparently impossible: the strict akratic can know both the correct and incorrect universal proposition at the same time, even though she only uses one of them in her practical syllogism. Aristotle in fact distinguishes between three types of knowledge that agents can have of universal propositions at *NE* VII.3 just prior to presenting the examples of ethical practical syllogisms we have been looking at. The first distinction Aristotle draws is between someone who merely has or possesses knowledge and someone else who both possesses and exercises her knowledge.

> ἀλλ᾽ ἐπεὶ διχῶς λέγομεν τὸ ἐπίστασθαι, καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἔχων μὲν οὐ χρώμενος δὲ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ ὁ χρώμενος λέγεται ἐπίστασθαι, διοίσει τὸ ἔχοντα μὲν μὴ θεωροῦντα δὲ καὶ τὸ θεωροῦντα ἃ μὴ δεῖ πράττειν τοῦ ἔχοντα καὶ θεωροῦντα. τοῦτο γὰρ δοκεῖ δεινόν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ εἰ μὴ θεωρῶν.

[159] Curzer, Howard J. (2016) "Rules Lurking at the Heart of Aristotle's Virtue Ethics." in *Apeiron*. Vol. 49, No. 1. 72-73

> But by "to know" we mean two different things, for both the person who has knowledge but is not using it and the person who has and uses that knowledge are said to know. Because of this, there will be a difference between a person who performs incorrect actions who has knowledge that they are wrong but does not attend to that knowledge, and a person who performs incorrect actions who has knowledge that they are wrong and does attend to that knowledge. For this is what seems astonishing, but not the case where the person who does wrong fails to attend to her knowledge. [*NE* VII.3 1146b31-35]

Aristotle thinks that, for instance, John knows how to hammer nails in planks, and that this is true both while John is hammering and also when he is not, for example, when he is out grocery shopping or, in fact, when he is doing anything else and not attending to his knowledge of hammering nails in planks. There is in fact a difference between someone who merely possesses knowledge and someone who puts the knowledge she possesses to use, yet Aristotle claims that both of these people are knowers. We might characterize this first distinction as being between (1) knowing *potentially* and (2) knowing *actively*. It captures the difference between someone who attends to her knowledge and someone who ignores or does not attend to her knowledge, but nevertheless still has it.

This first distinction between ways of knowing something opens up two corresponding ways of not knowing, or of being ignorant of, something. Saying that someone does not know something could mean either (a) she does not possess knowledge of it at all, or (b) she possesses but is not activating, exercising, or using her potential knowledge (all three of which come to the same thing for the present purpose). One can appeal to Aristotle's orders of potentialities and actualities from *De Anima* II.5 to clarify the distinction between the ways of knowing he is drawing here; to exercise one's knowledge, one must have the knowledge prior to its exercise. To know potentially is to know latently; to know actively is to put that latent knowledge to use. According to this view of the two senses in which someone can know something, and the two corresponding senses in which someone can be ignorant of something, it is possible for an agent to know

something in one sense but to not know it in the other. That is, an agent can know something in the potential sense without also knowing it in the active sense. We can account for this distinction, as Aristotle does, by noting that there is a difference between someone who pays attention to her knowledge and someone who does not attend to her knowledge.[160] An agent can then know both of the exclusive ethical universal propositions at the same time: the correct one, "not every sweet thing must be tasted," and the incorrect one, "every sweet thing must be tasted," so long as she knows one of them in the potential way and knows the other in the active way. In other words, she can know both of them at the same time even though she cannot use both of them in her ethical practical syllogism at the same time. This is in a sense how Aristotle describes the strict akratic agent's knowledge of the relevant universal propositions at *NE* VII.3: the strict akratic knows the correct universal proposition in the potential way, but she knows the incorrect universal in the active way, for tactile appetite pulls her to exercise it in her complete strict akratic practical syllogism.

Nevertheless, Aristotle does not think that calling the strict akratic's knowledge of the correct universal *potential* is precise enough. He describes the strict akratic agent's knowledge of the correct universal proposition in more detail when he adds a third kind of knowledge to his catalogue.

> ἔτι τὸ ἔχειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἄλλον τρόπον τῶν νῦν ῥηθέντων ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. ἐν τῷ γὰρ ἔχειν μὲν μὴ χρῆσθαι δὲ διαφέρουσαν ὁρῶμεν τὴν ἕξιν. ὥστε καὶ ἔχειν πως καὶ μὴ ἔχειν, οἷον τὸν καθεύδοντα καὶ μαινόμενον καὶ οἰνωμένον. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὕτω διατίθενται οἵ γε ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ὄντες. θυμοὶ γὰρ καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι ἀφροδισίων καὶ ἔνια τῶν τοιούτων ἐπιδήλως καὶ τὸ σῶμα μεθιστᾶσιν, ἐνίοις δὲ καὶ μανίας ποιοῦσιν. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι ὁμοίως ἔχειν λεκτέον τοὺς ἀκρατεῖς τούτοις.
>
> Knowledge can belong to people in still another way than the two ways just spoken about. With respect to the state of knowledge according to which someone has

[160] Note that it is not possible for someone to know something in the active sense without also knowing it in the potential sense, for one must have potential knowledge of something prior to putting it to use. The reverse, on the other hand, is possible: an agent can know something in the potential sense without also knowing it in the active sense.

> knowledge but does not use it, we can observe a distinction. What results is that someone can in a sense have and not have knowledge at the same time, as is the case for the sleeping, the crazed, and the wine-drunk. Yet people under the influence of the affects are in a condition just like theirs. Experiences of anger and lustful desires and some of the other affects clearly cause changes in bodies, and for some people they even produce madness. So it is clear that akratic agents must be said to have knowledge like those who are asleep, crazed, or wine-drunk. [*NE* VII.3 1147a11-15]

Knowers in this third way possess knowledge that they do not use because they are in a condition that keeps them from being able to use it or exercise it. Not every case of potential knowledge comes with this additional qualification, so Aristotle considers this kind of knowledge to be distinct from the potential kind of knowledge he has recently considered, despite their similarities. Some examples are in order to help clarify the difference between potential knowledge and this third sort of knowledge.

John, who knows how to hammer nails in planks, does not exercise his knowledge of hammering until he arrives at work; during his commute to work, his knowledge of hammering remains potential. When he gets to work, he puts that knowledge to use and becomes a knower in the active sense. People who are asleep, insane, or drunk, on the other hand, are potential knowers who cannot readily put their knowledge to use because of the conditions which they are in. The sleeping must wake up, the crazy must become sane, and the drunk must sober up before they can activate their potential knowledge.[161] Aristotle regards the strict akratic agent's knowledge of the correct ethical universal proposition to be an instance of this third kind of knowledge: for not only does the strict akratic not use her potential knowledge of this universal in her successful practical

[161] Broadie expresses a similar view in her commentary on this passage: "The point of comparison with sleep, intoxication, and madness is that, in these, one has knowledge in that one has acquired it, but not in such a way as to be ready to act on it if the occasion arises," (Aristotle: *Nic. Eth*., Trans., Intro., and Comm. 391)

syllogism, but she is also not readily able to put her knowledge of it to use because of her relation to tactile appetite.[162]

If John goes home after a long day of hammering nails and gets drunk, his knowledge becomes potential, for he does not use it, but his knowledge is not potential in the same way that it was potential during his commute to work earlier that morning. For when he arrived at work, he was readily able to put his knowledge of hammering to use. But now that he is drunk, his intoxication is an impediment in the way of putting his knowledge to use; even if he should try to hammer nails in a plank, he is liable to miss and strike his own thumb, or position the nail the wrong way around. Aristotle thinks that the strict akratic, just as inebriated John, meets an impediment in the way of exercising her potential knowledge. Her relation to tactile desire, rather than drunkenness, influences the strict akratic agent's practical reasoning, influencing her to use the incorrect ethical universal proposition, even though she knows, in the potential way, that it is wrong to exercise it. This is why Aristotle emphasizes that the two ethical universal propositions are not contrary to one another; instead, the strict akratic agent's relation to tactile appetite is what opposes reason's correct prescription and influences the strict akratic to exercise the incorrect universal.

I have so far clarified what ethical universal propositions are and the sense in which we might think of them as proximately responsible for the ethical values of the enacted choices that conclude ethical practical syllogisms. However, it is worth taking a step back and emphasizing once more that ultimately, the propositions that agents commit to and combine and also the

[162] Sarah Francis ("'Under the Influence' – The Physiology and Therapeutics of Akrasia in Aristotle's Ethics") unpacks this kind of ignorance and persuasively argues that akratic agents "turn out to be people whose condition is typified by an internal physical disability," and that "there is a physiological basis to *akrasia*," (171). While investigating the physiology of *akrasia* and *enkrateia* exceeds the scope of the present work, it is interesting to consider that the sort of ignorance that accompanies these character types has a physiological cause analogous to drunkenness or slumber.

conclusions of ethical practical syllogisms all inherit their ethical value in an *agent-dependent* way: they inherit their descriptions as correct or incorrect, or, more specifically as temperate or strict akratic in the case of the conclusions, from the character types of the agents who are practically syllogizing. We must not think of the ethical practical syllogism as a wholly external representation of the structure of an agent's choice-making, as something entirely detached from her. Each of its elements, its propositions and its conclusion, tracks a part of what it means for her to enact a choice; in other words, the agent is present throughout the entire ethical practical syllogism. When we talk about the universal proposition of an ethical practical syllogism, we are referring to an action-guiding thought to which an agent explicitly commits. When we talk about the particular proposition of an ethical practical syllogism—as we will examine closely in the next section—we are referring to what an agent perceives or grasps and her evaluation of it. When we talk about the conclusion of an ethical practical syllogism, we are referring to what an agent chooses and does—her follow-through, as it were—after combining her universal proposition and her particular proposition. All of the elements of an ethical practical syllogism have the agent as their source or origin, which fits with Aristotle's overarching view that an agent is the origin of her voluntary actions, let alone her choices [*NE* III.3 1112b31-32]. So although we might understand universal propositions as proximately responsible for the ethical value of the enacted choices that conclude practical syllogisms, ultimately a syllogizing agent's character is responsible for the ethical value of all of the elements of her ethical practical syllogism.

However, someone can raise the issue that not all agents have developed character types, so in their cases, character types cannot be the ultimate source of the ethical value of the universals which they exercise in their practical syllogisms. Take, for instance, someone who is training to become virtuous: what determines the ethical value of the universals she exercises in her ethical

practical syllogisms? Aristotle's view is that the trainee's universal propositions still inherit their ethical values or descriptions in an *agent-dependent* way, with the qualification that they do not inherit their values from the character of the trainee herself—since she does not have one yet—but rather from the character of her trusted ethical role model or advisor. One way to see this is by considering the primary audience for Aristotle's ethical treatises, the students populating his academy. He presents his lectures on the good life to students who have been brought up well, who wish to flourish, and who are aware that there are lives they could lead that would result in their languishing. His students must assume that Aristotle has the expertise and the capacity to provide direction and explanatory insight concerning how to lead flourishing lives. To them, then, Aristotle might appear as a φρόνιμος, one who is practically wise, a character excellent at choice-making, deliberating, intending to act according his reason's correct prescriptions, and following through by enacting correct, virtuous choices. It is a significant element of Aristotle's work that proper character formation in great part depends on the φρόνιμος' guidance. His definition of character virtue as a mean or intermediate disposition in fact identifies the φρόνιμος as the standard for determining what is intermediate in any given practical domain.

> ἔστιν ἄρα ἡ ἀρετὴ ἕξις προαιρετική, ἐν μεσότητι οὖσα τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ὡρισμένῃ λόγῳ καὶ ᾧ ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὁρίσειεν.
>
> Virtue is a choice-making disposition of character, being intermediate with respect to us, determined by reason and as the practically wise person would determine it. [*NE* II.6 1106b35-1107a2]

If someone lacks practical wisdom, she is not thereby condemned to exercise incorrect ethical universals or enact blameworthy choices; rather, she can rely on the powers of discernment that the practically wise and virtuous have developed to guide her conduct. Of course this does not mean that this person without practical wisdom is virtuous, but it does mean that she can choose

and perform actions which fall under the virtuous action type classification; she just cannot choose and perform such actions *as* the virtuous, practically wise person chooses and performs them.

By doing what the virtuous person does, but not for the same reasons, one discovers what to think, how to evaluate perceptions, and which kinds of actions to choose and perform repeatedly in order to develop a virtuous character. Ethical progress depends on taking seriously the advice of one's virtuous role models, especially in the early stages of character development. So for Aristotle's students, it is plausible that the ethical universal propositions in his own examples of ethical practical syllogisms at *NE* VII.3 inherit their ethical value in an *agent-dependent* way because Aristotle, his audience's ethical role model, has presented them as such. It is likely that, in general, advice regarding which of various universal propositions to exercise in practical syllogisms forms part of the training the practically wise pass on to those training to become virtuous. So even if someone has not developed a character type, the universal proposition she uses in her practical syllogism can still be said to inherit its ethical value from an agent's character type, i.e., inherit its value in an agent-dependent way.

However, one might pose a further objection that Aristotle's status as practically wise does not exactly answer the question regarding from which source universal propositions inherit their ethical values or descriptions. One might expect, for instance, that in the absence of a φρόνιμος or role model, universal propositions should still have ethical values or descriptions. For since they are universal, one might suppose that such propositions are ethically valuable regardless of whether anyone is aware of them or exercising them in practical syllogisms. But this supposition hangs on a view that ethical universals have their values in an *agent-independent* way, and this view is incompatible with Aristotle's view on the matter. He insists, for instance, that there are no practically wise or virtuous children, though there are, for instance, mathematically brilliant

children [*NE* VI.8 1142a12-18]. His explanation is that the development of character requires a vast amount of experience, and that one must practice at choosing and acting in the ethically relevant practical domains. What is more, one must practice at choosing and acting *as* the virtuous choose and act in order to develop anything close to a character meriting the same appellation.

One can practice the same math equations many times over a single day on the way to becoming mathematically proficient, but how many chances does an agent get to make choices regarding the same appropriate ethical course of action to take in a single day? She may be able to run through countless hypothetical scenarios considering what she thinks it would be correct to choose and to do in various sets of circumstances, but in order to choose and to act, she must be in an appropriate position to do so. Moreover, a person can practice the same math equation in various locations, from the bedroom to the bus station, but choosing and acting's practice is locked into specific contexts and situations. When one syllogizes for the sake of choosing and acting courageously, for instance, she must be in a situation having to do with the proper objects and affects of courage's expression. If she is not in such a context, then she syllogizes into the wind, so to speak, for she is not in a situation in which such practical syllogizing is pertinent.[163] Part of the reason why the rational and deliberative excellence of practical wisdom is so difficult to achieve has to do with the wide array of situations in which an agent might encounter even a specific object of tactile appetite, for example, a pastry. If we amplify the stakes and consider that expressing temperance is but a single way of expressing character virtue, it becomes clear that practical wisdom is more methodological than content-based; agents who are truly practically wise

[163] One could make a similar point regarding temperance and suggest that when someone deliberates for the sake of choosing and acting temperately, then she must be in a situation having to do with the proper objects and affect of temperance's expression. However, since all normally constituted people have biological impulses that will necessitate future eating and drinking, there does not seem to be a time at which someone deliberating about her eating or drinking behavior would count as "deliberating into the wind." Further, should an agent live at a time or under a government which ensures constant warfare, then perhaps a similar point could be made about there being no time at which an agent's deliberation about courageous action would count as "deliberating into the wind."

know how to handle situations as they arise, no matter how surprising and unpredictable the variables that accompany them may be. Knowing which ethical universal proposition leads to correct action—and actually committing to it and using it in an ethical practical syllogism—is a mark of being practically wise and ethically virtuous. A universal proposition is correct if it is both the one which the practically wise, virtuous agent would employ in the circumstances and also employed *as* the practically wise, virtuous agent would employ it. It is in this sense that I contend that universal propositions inherit their ethical values from the character types of syllogizing agents, that is, in an *agent-dependent* way.

This is why, for instance, both the temperate and strict self-controlled agents can exercise the same universal proposition in their practical syllogisms without them both concluding with temperate enacted choices. Strict enkratic action, although difficult to distinguish from temperate action from an external observer's perspective, is importantly distinct from and inferior to temperate action according to Aristotle. Strict enkratic action is inferior to temperate action since it results from practical reasoning that is incorrectly influenced by tactile appetite. Unlike the strict akratic agent, however, the strict enkratic does not abandon enacting the correct choice to abstain from tasting the sweet thing; her reason, though in conflict with her tactile desire, wins the contest. Since her reason prescribes the correct universal proposition, and since tactile appetite does not successfully pull her away from exercising it in her practical syllogism, the strict enkratic agent exercises the correct universal proposition and enacts the correct choice. Both the strict enkratic and temperate agents exercise the same universal proposition, but their practical syllogisms conclude with enacted choices of different ethical value. This provides sufficient reason for understanding that universal propositions inherit their ethical value from the character types of the

agents exercising them in their ethical practical syllogisms; a universal proposition does not have any *agent-independent* ethical value.

If ethical universals were ethically valuable in an agent-independent way, then it would be difficult to explain what distinguishes temperate and strict enkratic action; that is, why one agent who uses the same universal in her practical syllogism enacts a virtuous choice, and why the other enacts a strict enkratic choice. Even though the strict enkratic agent exercises the correct universal proposition and like the temperate agent abstains from tasting the sweet thing, she is not temperate and does not choose and perform a temperate action. If the universal proposition has its ethical value, its correctness or incorrectness, independently of the character of the agent who employs it, then it would be difficult to explain why the strict enkratic agent does not actually enact a temperate choice. For both agents have adopted the correct universal proposition, employed it, and performed actions that are externally indistinguishable. If ethical universal propositions have their ethical values in an agent-independent way, then it seems that the strict enkratic agent should actually enact a temperate choice, and not a strict enkratic one, since she exercises the correct ethical universal proposition in her practical syllogism and enacts the choice to abstain from tasting the sweet thing.

Gould ("A Puzzle…") expresses the worry that "Aristotle does not specify what subverts [the enkratic's] development," that he fails to show why *enkrateia* is a character type rather than a transitional stage on the way to becoming virtuous (echoing part of Anton's view concerning whether *akrasia* and *enkrateia* are genuine character types considered in Chapter 1).[164] This worry is similar to the concern I have just raised that follows from recognizing that both strict enkratic and temperate agents use the same ethical universal proposition in their practical syllogisms and

[164] Gould ("A Puzzle about the Possibility of Aristotelian *enkrateia*") 186

perform what observers might assess as actions of the same ethical kind. For how, then, can we mark their difference?[165] Kenny's point considered earlier in this chapter is immensely helpful here, namely that practical syllogisms transfer and preserve goodness—either real or apparent—just as theoretical syllogisms transfer and preserve truth. He notes that in ethical practical syllogisms, agents aim to employ good propositions toward conclusions that are good actions, "but an agent is only acting on those premises if he accepts them as in some way expressing *his good*."[166] With this additional qualification, Kenny notes that to claim that an agent has full active knowledge of an ethical universal proposition signifies more than merely the fact that she exercises it in her practical syllogism. When an agent fully exercises an ethical universal proposition, she does not just use it in her practical syllogism, but she uses it with the further requirement that she understands exercising it as expressive of what is good for her. I would add a further requirement, namely that for an agent to employ an ethical universal in a way that is expressive of her good, she must be successful in enacting her choice and concluding her practical syllogism.[167] Aristotle is clear that practical syllogisms conclude with enacted choices, or the successful performance of chosen actions, so exercising an ethical proposition as expressive of one's good requires the successful performance of the action that concludes the practical syllogism.

Kenny's view about full, active knowledge of universal propositions arises in the light of Aristotle's contention at *De Mot*. 7 that: "Practical propositions come about through two forms, through the good and through the possible," [701a25]. Aristotle insists on distinguishing the

[165] I want to be clear that the full answer to this question undoubtedly involves the agent's relevant perceptual evaluation when it comes time to act, and this requires an investigation of the particular proposition's role in ethical practical syllogisms. For now it is worth emphasizing and examining the reasons why the strict enkratic and temperate agents, agents with distinct character types, both employ the same universal propositions yet perform different kinds of actions.
[166] Kenny (Aristotle's Theory of the Will) 127 [author's emphasis]
[167] Recall that Kenny thinks that practical syllogisms can sometimes conclude with propositional intentions, for instance, if something interrupts and prevents an agent from enacting her choice or forces her to do something else.

propositions here in terms of goodness and possibility not because he conceives of two sorts of practical syllogisms, with one sort comprised of possible propositions and the other sort comprised of good propositions; rather he is noting that the good and the possible can come apart. There are actions it would be good to perform that fall outside of the bounds of an individual agent's capacity to perform; for instance, I think that teaching all of the children in Indiana about healthy dietary habits would certainly be a good thing to do, but due to various impediments, it is also a practical impossibility for me to teach them all. Aristotle separates the good from the possible when describing the propositions of practical syllogisms to show that practical syllogisms are comprised of propositions that are potentially both good *and* possible. This accords with Aristotle's claims at *NE* III.3 and *DA* III.10 considered earlier in this chapter, first that an agent gives up on trying to enact a choice if she realizes it is impossible, and second that objects of desire only initiate physical or psychic motion or change when the desiring agent conceives that it is possible for her to attain what she desires. So perhaps an emendation of Kenny's claim about full, active knowledge of universal propositions is in order here: an agent fully actively employs a universal proposition if she recognizes it both as expressive of her good *and also* as a proposition of practical possibility in a successful practical syllogism.[168]

Kenny's notion of full, active knowledge appears to be what the temperate agent has of the universal proposition preventing tasting and also what the strict enkratic agent lacks of the same universal. For both the strict enkratic and the temperate agent exercise this universal, but only the temperate agent understands it as expressive of her good; the strict enkratic, on the other hand,

[168] Kenny's view about full, active knowledge is similar to a view that Dahl (Practical Reason, Aristotle, and Weakness of the Will) presents regarding how well agents "integrate" the "correct idea of the good…into their character," (147). Dahl ranks the character types on a "continuum" based on the degree to which an agent has practical knowledge. A virtuous agent has practical wisdom, which he identifies as "full and complete" practical knowledge; akratic and enkratic agents have less than full and complete practical knowledge on his view because they know what they should do, but, unlike the virtuous agent, they are not "sufficiently motivated" to enact a choice based on that correct practical knowledge (148).

experiences the pull of tactile desire to exercise the other universal proposition that leads to tasting the sweet thing. The difference between a temperate person's understanding and a strict enkratic person's knowledge of the universal also helps to explain why each agent chooses and performs an action that we classify differently; in some sense, both perform the correct action, but the choice that the strict enkratic enacts is still inferior to the choice that the temperate agent enacts. This further strengthens the point that correctness or goodness is not in universal propositions themselves, but that their correctness or goodness is agent-dependent; universal propositions inherit their ethical value, their correctness or incorrectness, from the character types of syllogizing agents. This means that when we call universal propositions correct or good, incorrect or inferior, and, in short, whenever we ascribe an ethical value or classification to a universal proposition, we are really referring back to the character type of the syllogizing agent.

It is important to note that if an agent in temperance's practical domain exercises the universal proposition preventing tasting without understanding it as expressive of her good—and so does not know it in the full, active sense, then she falls short of temperance, but she is not in every such case a strict enkratic agent; she could be a strict akratic agent instead, or someone who has yet to develop a character type.[169] What Kenny's contribution demonstrates is that one can know this universal proposition in an active way, even if she does not have full active knowledge of it, that is, even if she does not understand it as expressive of her good. The upshot is that, in

[169] It might strike one as wrong, at first glance, to think that a strict akratic agent could use the same universal in one of her practical syllogisms that the temperate and the strict enkratic agents use in their practical syllogisms, and so perform an action that at least appears to an observer to be a correct action. This is possible because of the distinction Aristotle presents between action types and character types. Agents who have acquired character types characteristically perform actions that correspond to their character types, but from time to time they can perform actions that usually correspond to other character types. So a strict akratic agent might from time to time perform actions that one expects a strict enkratic agent to perform, especially if she is taking advice from an ethically superior role model in service of bettering her own character. Just as a young person training to become virtuous can perform actions of the virtuous type without already being virtuous, so too can agents who have acquired character types from time to time perform actions that seem like departures from her character type.

fact, temperate, strict enkratic, and strict akratic agents can all, in principle, exercise the same universal proposition preventing tasting in practical syllogisms; nevertheless the effectiveness of the proposition varies among the character types since in each case it inherits its ethical value from the character type of the syllogizing agent. Unless an agent exercises the correct universal proposition while at the same time recognizing that it is possible and expressive of her good, then she is not exercising the universal proposition *as* the virtuous agent is exercising it.

The ethical universal preventing tasting is the most effective in the temperate agent's practical syllogism, for she knows it in the fully active sense, that is, she both uses it and understands it as expressive of her good, and she successfully chooses and performs the correct action of abstaining from tasting the sweet thing. The same universal is less effective in the strict enkratic agent's practical syllogism, for she uses it without understanding it as expressive of her good (or, if she does understand it as such, it is not immediately, but only after struggling with tactile appetite's pull to understand it otherwise). The same universal is least effective in the strict akratic agent's practical syllogism, for she most likely does not use the same universal as the others at all (instead having full, active knowledge of the alternative universal, with her knowledge of the correct one remaining potential), or she does exercise it begrudgingly without at the same time understanding it as expressive of her good. The self-indulgent agent stands as an exception in this lineup; since she is vicious, she does not know the same universal proposition as the others even in the potential, "back of the mind" sense. When contrasting the strict akratic with the self-indulgent agent at *NE* VII.8, Aristotle holds that, "vice escapes one's notice, whereas *akrasia* does not," [1150b36] because in the strict akratic's soul, "the best thing is preserved, the foundational principle (ἡ ἀρχή)," [1151a25-26]. For this reason, the self-indulgent person never so much as wonders whether chasing after every object of tactile appetite is the correct thing to choose and to

do; she lacks knowledge of the universal proposition preventing tasting even in the most potential sense.

This general construal of the different kinds of knowledge that the character types in temperance's practical domain have of the same universal proposition permits a reply to the objection that ethical universals should have their ethical values in an agent-independent way, that is, regardless of whether there are any practically wise and virtuous people using them in their practical syllogisms. On Aristotle's view, to be genuinely ethically correct, a universal proposition must be one that a virtuous, practically wise agent would exercise and an agent must exercise it *as* the virtuous agent would exercise it, that is, while at the same time understanding it as expressive of her good and possible. The temperate, strict enkratic, and strict akratic agents all know the same ethical universal, but each knows it in a different way as a result of the character type she has developed. It is worth emphasizing that even though Aristotle maintains that an agent's character type is the ultimate source of the ethical values we attribute to her ethical practical syllogisms' propositions and conclusions, he also holds that agents develop character types through consistently exercising universal propositions and choosing and performing actions that correspond to those character types. If this were not the case, then it would not be clear how agents without character types, for instance the young, end up acquiring them; it would also be unclear how agents who have already developed character types could change them and acquire new ones. At *NE* II.4, Aristotle points out that developing or acquiring a character type such as virtue depends on habitually choosing and performing particular kinds of actions as a response to the objection that his account of character development is circular. It is absurd, Aristotle's objector thinks, to hold on the one hand that in order to become temperate an agent must perform temperate actions,

while holding on the other hand that an agent must already be temperate in order to perform temperate actions. How does one break into this closed loop?

Aristotle dissolves this circularity objection and ancillary worries with a distinction an important passage from *NE* II.4 [1105b5-9]—as demonstrated in Chapter 1[170]—where Aristotle introduces the distinction between character types and action types. Agents who are not yet virtuous can perform actions belonging to the virtuous action type, for example, by following the guidance of a practically wise, virtuous role model. Of course Aristotle does not allow a non-virtuous agent to choose and perform virtuous actions *as* a virtuous agent does. He only maintains that the mere performance of an action classifiable as virtuous is not sufficient evidence for concluding that the agent is actually virtuous any more than a child writing the alphabet at the guidance of her teacher is sufficient evidence for concluding that the child is fully literate. What we can conclude about both the not yet virtuous agent and the not yet literate child in the example, however, is that they are performing virtuous actions and creating literate products respectively, but not *as* virtuous or *as* literate agents would perform or produce them.

The ones capable of performing and producing *as* virtuous and literate agents are the φρόνιμος and the grammar teacher. Someone who is not yet temperate, for example, can become so by habitually practicing at choosing and performing temperate actions. Such an agent develops her character type by means of habitually employing and committing to correct universal propositions, and through choosing and performing temperate actions. She does not yet choose and perform them *as* the temperate agent would, for she seeks help in identifying the correct universal propositions to exercise and does not yet on her own understand them as expressive of her good. If her training goes well, she forms a temperate character: she acquires the disposition

[170] For the earlier treatment of the distinction between character types and action types, see Ch. 1, Section 1.1 pp. 32-37

to think, perceive, choose, and act temperately. In the trainee's case, she does not express a temperate character through her ethical practical syllogisms, but rather she develops one. Something similar holds for agents who already have developed character types inferior to virtue, for instance strict *akrasia*. If the strict akratic agent has a temperate role model in her life, then her chances of developing a character type closer to temperance might hang on asking for and heeding a role model's advice about which universal propositions are the correct ones to exercise. If she succeeds in compelling herself to commit to and exercise the appropriate universal and follows through by not tasting the sweet thing, then she is a strict akratic agent who has performed an action that falls under the temperate action type; albeit she has not performed the action *as* the temperate agent would perform it, for she, in common with the trainee, has to follow a role model's advice regarding the appropriate universal proposition to exercise. Aristotle's response to the circularity objection demonstrates his commitment to following general view: One develops a character type by habitually employing universal propositions and performing actions consistent with those that an agent with the corresponding character type would employ and perform; once one has developed a character type, the universal propositions one employs and the actions one performs inherit their ethical values or descriptions from one's own character type.

I have shown in this section that ethical practical syllogisms involve agents' commitments to and exercise of ethical universal propositions, and this is one way that ethical practical syllogisms are different from the non-ethical practical syllogisms which Aristotle presents at *De Mot*. 7. I have also described Aristotle's complicated view regarding the knowledge that agents can have or lack of ethical universal propositions, the three different kinds of knowledge that agents with different character types can have of the same universal proposition, and the implications of this epistemological framework. Next I turn to analyzing the particular propositions

of practical syllogisms and examining in what sense they inherit their ethical value from the character types of syllogizing agents.

4.2.2 Ethical Particular Propositions

It may seem strange to attribute ethical value to the particular proposition of an ethical practical syllogism, for in the *NE* VII.3 examples of such syllogisms, Aristotle seems to link the particular proposition with an agent's perception or sensation of something. In the examples, the shared particular proposition is, "this is sweet," which seems to be a factual report of what agents perceive. If the particular proposition of an agent's ethical practical syllogism is just her perception of an object, then its correctness or incorrectness would seem to hinge on the condition of her perceptual organs rather than on her character type. Yet Aristotle nowhere suggests that an agent is praiseworthy or blameworthy in reference to what condition her perceptual organs are in. The particular proposition must be something more than an agent's mere perception or grasping of some object; rather than being merely perceptual, the particular proposition must also somehow be an evaluative proposition.

Aristotle confirms that the particular proposition is evaluative in the course of depicting strict akratic agents as ignorant of the particular proposition of the temperate agent's practical syllogism:

> ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἡ τελευταία πρότασις δόξα τε αἰσθητοῦ καὶ κυρία τῶν πράξεων, ταύτην ἢ οὐκ ἔχει ἐν τῷ πάθει ὤν, ἢ οὕτως ἔχει ὡς οὐκ ἦν τὸ ἔχειν ἐπίστασθαι ἀλλὰ λέγειν ὥσπερ ὁ οἰνωμένος τὰ Ἐμπεδοκλέους. καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ καθόλου μηδ᾽ ἐπιστημονικὸν ὁμοίως εἶναι δοκεῖν τῷ καθόλου τὸν ἔσχατον ὅρον καὶ ἔοικεν ὃ ἐζήτει Σωκράτης συμβαίνειν. οὐ γὰρ τῆς κυρίως ἐπιστήμης εἶναι δοκούσης παρούσης γίνεται τὸ πάθος, οὐδ᾽ αὕτη περιέλκεται διὰ τὸ πάθος, ἀλλὰ τῆς αἰσθητικῆς.
>
> Since the last proposition is both an opinion about something perceptible and also the spurrer of actions, either [the akratic agent] does not have this proposition since she is impassioned, or she does in fact have it, though not as one who knows it, but rather as one who speaks it just as the drunk person rehearses the views of

> Empedocles. And since the final proposition is neither universal nor scientific, as the universal is expected to be, Socrates's position seems to follow. For it is not knowledge in the highest sense that is present when affect arises, nor is it this kind of knowledge that gets dragged around by affect, but rather perceptual knowledge. [*NE* VII.3 1147b9-17]

This important passage identifies the "τελευταία πρότασις," the final or ultimate proposition of the good practical syllogism, with opinion or belief (δόξα) whose source is sense perception.

So, Aristotle indeed describes the particular proposition as an opinion or a belief which has the agent's perception as its source or origin, confirming that Aristotle thinks that the particular proposition is evaluative and not merely perceptual; it is evaluative of what an agent perceives. Aristotle further explains in the passage that the strict akratic practical syllogism is inferior to the temperate agent's practical syllogism due to the akratic agent's ignorance of the temperate syllogism's final proposition (τελευταία πρότασις). So Aristotle concedes in a way to Socrates's view in the *Protagoras* that knowledge in a person is unconquerable, let alone that it is unconquerable by affect—so long as by 'knowledge' one means knowledge in the strictest sense and not perceptual knowledge in the form of an evaluative proposition.[171]

Commentators have not agreed about what "τελευταία πρότασις" means, and so have disagreed about what the object of strict akratic ignorance is. It is my view that Aristotle means that the strict akratic agent is ignorant of the particular proposition of the temperate agent's practical syllogism. However, Charles (Aristotle's Philosophy of Action) points to the passage above as the source of a dispute regarding what Aristotle holds that the strict akratic does not know. Some have noted an ambiguity in the course of translating "τελευταία πρότασις," arguing that "πρότασις" does not have to refer to a practical syllogism's proposition, but that it can also pick

[171] I say that Aristotle concedes to Socrates's view in the *Protagoras* "in a way," for it is unlikely that Socrates as Plato portrays him in that dialogue would accept Aristotle's distinction between knowledge in the strictest sense and perceptual knowledge; rather, Socrates, or at least Plato, would likely reject that the latter is a kind of knowledge at all.

out a practical syllogism's conclusion; in this passage, Charles asserts that Aristotle must mean that the strict akratic is ignorant of the temperate practical syllogism's conclusion, and not its particular proposition.[172] This distinction makes a difference for how we understand both strict *akrasia* and strict *enkrateia*. For if the strict akratic is ignorant of one of these rather than the other, then the strict enkratic will be ignorant of the same thing. Strict akratic and enkratic ignorance may differ according to degree, or with respect to the ease with which agents can surmount their ignorance, but both should turn out to be subject to the same kind of ignorance and ignorance of the same thing. So if the strict akratic is ignorant of the temperate syllogism's particular proposition, then the strict enkratic will also be ignorant of that, but if the strict akratic is instead ignorant of the temperate syllogism's conclusion, then the strict enkratic will also be ignorant of that.

Charles frames the debate about what "τελευταία πρότασις" refers to as a terminological dispute regarding the difference between a 'premise' and a 'proposition.' For both of these are suitable translations of 'πρότασις.' 'Premise' is a term whose use is restricted to referring to the elements of a syllogism that precede the conclusion; for example, what I have been calling universal and particular propositions of practical syllogisms could also bear the titles of universal and particular premises. 'Proposition,' on the other hand, is a term capable of broader application, able to refer either to the universal and particular propositions of a syllogism, or to a syllogism's conclusion. I hold an account that classifies strict akratic and enkratic ignorance as ignorance of the particular proposition of the temperate practical syllogism, and so ignorance of its conclusion only derivatively. For one thing, it is difficult to understand what ignorance of the practical syllogism's conclusion amounts to given that the conclusion of a practical syllogism is an enacted choice. Provided that there is an order of priority regarding an agent's practical syllogizing, the

[172] Charles (Aristotle's Philosophy of Action) 120-122.

universal and particular propositions should come before the conclusion; they are the elements that, when an agent successfully combines them and follows through on the intention she forms, result in an enacted choice.

Given this order of priority, any ignorance of the enacted choice that concludes a practical syllogism would have to cash out in terms of ignorance of either the universal or the particular proposition. Ignorance of the universal proposition is not a viable contender for explaining ignorance of the conclusion, since Aristotle does not think that the strict akratic agent is fully ignorant of the temperate practical syllogism's universal proposition. Rather, as I showed in the last section, he thinks that the strict akratic has at least potential knowledge of the ethical universal that the temperate agent actively knows and exercises in her practical syllogism, and that the strict akratic agent just fails to exercise it in her practical syllogism. Moreover, Aristotle says that the strict akratic is ignorant of something *final* in the temperate agent's practical syllogism, and regardless of how one translates τελευταία πρότασις, it cannot refer to a universal proposition. So even if Aristotle does in some sense attribute ignorance of the temperate practical syllogism's conclusion to the strict akratic agent, he would have to do so indirectly, since it would ultimately be due to the strict akratic's ignorance of the temperate practical syllogism's particular proposition.

Nevertheless, I do not propose that Aristotle is claiming that the strict akratic is ignorant of the conclusion of the temperate practical syllogism at all in the passage. The strict akratic agent certainly does not enact the same choice that the temperate agent does, and so she is ignorant, or does not know what it is like, perhaps, to avoid tasting the sweet thing in this instance. But it is unlikely that this is the object of strict akratic and enkratic ignorance that Aristotle has in mind, for it is hard to see how being ignorant of the temperate action could be the cause or explanation of strict *akrasia* or strict *enkrateia*. Further, the strict akratic must know what it is correct to choose

and to do, because that is part of what it means to be un-self-controlled; and it is also why Aristotle maintains that she is consistently pained by regret after enacting blameworthy choices. Moreover, if the strict akratic agent is ignorant of the temperate practical syllogism's conclusion, then she is merely factually ignorant, which renders her action immune from ethical evaluation, which would mean that she cannot be blamed for her un-self-controlled action. For reasons of implausibility, the ignorance responsible for strict akratic and enkratic choice and action cannot be ignorance of the temperate practical syllogism's conclusion; Aristotle must instead mean that the strict akratic is ignorant of the temperate syllogism's particular proposition, "this is a sweet thing," when he says that she is ignorant of its "τελευταία πρότασις" in the passage.

Turning back now to what it means for the particular propositions of ethical practical syllogisms to have ethical value, it is beneficial to contrast the ethical particular propositions that Aristotle introduces at *NE* VII.3 with the non-ethical ones from *De Mot*. 7. The non-ethical, locomotive syllogisms concluding with either walking or not walking share the same particular proposition: "I am a person." Moreover, this particular proposition fits into both locomotive syllogisms because each of their universal propositions is a generalization regarding all persons ("every person…," or "no person must walk"). The evaluation of oneself as counting as a person is responsible for linking an agent's knowledge of the universal proposition which she exercises to her choice and performance of one of the practical conclusions. Outside of this instrumental value, the particular proposition shared by both *De Mot*. 7 practical syllogisms serves no further purpose. In fact, Aristotle points out a bit later in the same chapter that the particular proposition shared by these locomotive syllogisms often escapes an agent's consideration; one need not explicitly bring to mind as a separate thought that one is a person when practically syllogizing about walking [701a26-30]. It is worth emphasizing that the *De Mot*. practical syllogisms have

particular propositions which are in fact perceptual evaluations, not merely perceptions or sensations; they do not just see or feel that they are human agents, but also recognize that their being human is locomotively relevant, or capable of expressing certain locomotive capacities. Further, the particular proposition that these syllogisms share is ethically irrelevant. We might say that their particular propositions are normative, since they figure into the agent's reasoning about what she ought to do, namely either walk or not walk. Yet for reasons I gave earlier in this chapter when introducing the non-ethical practical syllogisms, there is nothing obviously ethical about them. One can imagine further circumstances in which the locomotive practical syllogisms might be ethically relevant, but that is not the sense in which Aristotle presents them at *De Mot.* 7.

The *NE* VII.3 pair of ethical practical syllogisms under consideration also apparently share a particular proposition, even though their concluding enacted choices also exclude one another's performance. In both of the ethical practical syllogisms, the one that concludes with tasting and the other that concludes with not tasting the sweet thing, Aristotle apparently presents the same particular proposition: "this is sweet," or "this is a sweet thing." Further, this particular proposition fits into both ethical practical syllogisms because each one has a universal proposition which is a generalization regarding all sweet things; this particular proposition, like the one the non-ethical practical syllogisms share, is responsible for linking the universal propositions to the enacted choices that conclude them. Yet despite appearances to the contrary, the ethical practical syllogisms do not in fact share the same particular proposition; instead, the temperate and the strict akratic practical syllogisms have particular propositions that share the same source. For recall that, rather than identify particular propositions with an agent's perception, Aristotle instead describes particular propositions as evaluative opinions or beliefs which have an object of perception as their source. The strict akratic and the temperate agent perceive or grasp the same sweet thing, but each

evaluates it differently. This insight is valuable for the sake of describing un-self-controlled and self-controlled ignorance in general, and not just strict akratic and strict enkratic ignorance: the kind of ignorance which Aristotle thinks that such agents are subject to is *evaluative* ignorance of the virtuous agent's practical syllogism's particular proposition. Evaluative ignorance is distinct from another kind of ignorance that Aristotle devotes a lot of attention to in the ethics: factual ignorance. I develop a positive account of evaluative ignorance in the next chapter, but first it is necessary to sketch an account of factual ignorance to show why strict akratic and enkratic ignorance of the temperate syllogism's particular proposition cannot be factual ignorance.

Upon examining the particular propositions from both the non-ethical and ethical examples of practical syllogisms, there is an important difference between them with respect to what it means for agents to be factually ignorant of them. "I am a person," and "this is sweet," are not propositions of the same type. To see why, just imagine the reaction an observer might have to someone not knowing that she counts as a person, and compare it to the reaction an observer might have to someone not recognizing that a dish resembling a pizza is actually made of dessert toppings. The former person's ignorance is the stuff of astonishment, while the latter person finds a simple remedy for her ignorance through tactile experience. [173]

The contrast Aristotle draws between voluntary and involuntary action at *NE* III.1 is useful here for making the difference between ignorance of the two types of particular proposition clearer.

[173] It is worth pointing out that some scholars have claimed that, regarding for instance a virtuous practical syllogism, something such as "I am a virtuous person" should enter into her practical syllogism as a particular proposition (in the same way that "I am a person" figures into non-ethical practical syllogisms as a particular proposition). Yet, as Gottlieb ("The Practical Syllogism") correctly points out, a statement such as this one might "play an important explanatory role from a third-person point of view," in the course of an agent telling others why she chose and acted as she did, without also playing a significant role from a first-person point of view (227). Just as in the non-ethical syllogisms, an agent does not need to stop and consider that she is a person before walking or not walking, so too in the ethical practical syllogisms, an agent does not need to stop and consider her character type before choosing and acting. The character type that an agent has does the determining work itself: the virtuous agent, for instance, chooses and acts virtuously, without having to stop to check that she is indeed virtuous.

Aristotle writes that ignorance can be a kind of principle or origin of involuntary action.[174] An agent can be factually ignorant of various elements that comprise and surround an action she performs, from the instrument she is using to perform the action (is she using a standard pen or one filled with disappearing ink?) to the end at which the action aims (is she writing for her own development as an author or for the reputation of the journal?). However, Aristotle holds that there is one aspect of her action about which an agent cannot usually be factually ignorant, namely that she herself is the agent choosing and performing it.

> ἅπαντα μὲν οὖν ταῦτα οὐδεὶς ἂν ἀγνοήσειε μὴ μαινόμενος, δῆλον δ᾽ ὡς οὐδὲ τὸν πράττοντα. πῶς γὰρ ἑαυτόν γε;
>
> Nobody could be ignorant of all these (elements of her action) unless frenzied, and it is clear that she cannot be ignorant that she is the one acting. For how could one be ignorant of herself? [*NE* III.1 1111a7-9]

So we find corroboration from Aristotle that the particular proposition common to the non-ethical practical syllogisms—"I am a person"—is itself such a fundamental, inseparable part of an agent's perceptual experience and evaluation that the only significant role it serves in those syllogisms is instrumental. This non-ethical particular proposition does the instrumental work of linking the universal propositions to their respective enacted choices in the non-ethical practical syllogisms from *De Mot*. 7. Only the non-rational could be factually ignorant of this particular proposition.[175] The ethical practical syllogisms from *NE* VII.3, on the other hand, share a particular proposition

[174] In addition to actions that owe to factual ignorance, Aristotle also considers actions that owe to force as involuntary at *NE* III.1. Involuntary actions that owe to force are those in which an agent does not move herself at all, but is rather totally moved by what is external to her. The wind sweeping an agent off a cliff-face, for instance, is an example of involuntary action owing to force; she does not voluntarily jump, but is carried away by the gust. Nevertheless, when I refer to involuntary action from here on, I do not mean to refer to the kind owing to force, but only to the kind owing to ignorance.

[175] Perhaps the agent who enacts the choice to walk does form a different evaluation of the same particular proposition than the one who enacts the choice to remain at rest. The walker might evaluate her personhood in a way that highlights a person's capacity to move from one place to another, while the rester forms a distinct evaluation that highlights a person's capacity to remain fixed in one place. Nevertheless, this interpretation only arises if we try to read what Aristotle holds about ethical practical syllogisms into what he holds about non-ethical practical syllogisms. I do not think we are entitled to such a reading, especially in the absence of any statement in *De Mot*. about different evaluations of the same particular proposition.

about which it *is* possible for an agent to be factually ignorant without thereby incurring the appellation, "frenzied." For an agent can be unfamiliar with a certain dessert dish before her and not know that "this is a sweet thing." Sense experience or the counsel of a trusted culinarily-inclined friend can remedy ignorance of this kind. Moreover, this kind of ignorance is a cause or principle of involuntary action, a subclass of actions for which Aristotle holds that agents merit neither praise nor blame for performing. This gives us reason to doubt that strict akratic and enkratic ignorance of the temperate syllogism's particular proposition is factual ignorance; for akratic and enkratic action is susceptible to blame and praise.

Agents develop character types by voluntarily choosing and performing actions on a habitual basis so that they become the kinds of people who consistently choose and perform such actions; they develop character types and later express their character types by choosing and performing voluntary actions. Aristotle holds that when an agent is factually mistaken about some aspect of her action, then it is not a voluntary action, and she does not merit praise or blame for performing it. Agents do not express or develop character types by performing involuntary actions. An agent who knows and consistently exercises the ethical universal, "not every sweet thing must be tasted," understanding it as expressive of her good, but is unfamiliar with dessert pizza, does not perform a blameworthy action when she tastes it; rather, she performs an involuntary action because of her factual ignorance.

It is possible for a temperate agent to find herself as the guest of some hospitable folks in a far-off land who offer her an unfamiliar dish, urging that she should take a bite. Having tasted it and upon realizing that it is a sweet thing, she feels regret, which according to Aristotle is an affect consequent on involuntary action. Specifically, she regrets that she has, on account of her ignorance, not performed a virtuous action; rather than abstaining from tasting the sweet thing, she

has tasted it. Motivated by the painful regret arising from her action owing to ignorance, she may update her perceptual knowledge and become able to identify the previously unfamiliar dish as belonging to the class of sweet things, an update required for the success of her future practical syllogisms to conclude with temperate enacted choices in similar contexts. It is worth stressing that, because she has performed an involuntary action owing to ignorance, the agent does not merit blame for her non-virtuous action; to blame her would be as absurd as praising another agent for performing a virtuous action by accident. Suppose that a coin flipper intends to land a quarter in a fountain but misses his mark; the quarter bounces its way instead into a homeless person's change cup. Just as it would be incorrect to praise this coin flipper for having a generous character, it would also be a mistake to blame the temperate agent for tasting a sweet thing about which she is factually ignorant. It is also possible for the temperate agent from the example above to face a kind of conflict of ends wherein she is factually ignorant that the dish before her is sweet, and so is rationally unsettled about whether to abstain from it, and yet she also wants to be kind to her hosts who have gone to the trouble of preparing the dish for her. In this case the agent is likely to forego worrying about to which class of tactile objects the dish belongs, even though she is still factually ignorant that it *is* a sweet thing, in favor of being a good guest. It is also possible that, because she faces a conflict of ends, she even adopts and exercises a distinct universal proposition regarding the customs of hospitality, such as, "it is rude to refuse a dish your host prepares for you." Nothing from these considerations makes the temperate agent out to be blameworthy, and in fact her temperate character endures through these sorts of instances unscathed. The fact that her action is involuntary renders it irrelevant as either a determinant or expression of her character type; for agents both acquire character types and express them through choosing and performing voluntary actions.

Since Aristotle holds that strict akratic agents perform their actions due to ignorance of the particular proposition of the temperate practical syllogism, it might be tempting to consider strict akratic and enkratic ignorance as being of the same kind as the ignorance responsible for involuntary actions: factual ignorance. What is more, Aristotle ascribes regret to both strict akratic agents and to agents who perform involuntary actions, further suggesting that the strict akratic agent and the person who performs an involuntary action are alike, and so that the strict akratic is also factually ignorant. Despite the fact that Aristotle notes these similarities between strict akratic and involuntary action, they do not license the view that strict akratic and enkratic ignorance is factual ignorance. For action owing to factual ignorance is involuntary, which means it merits neither praise nor blame, whereas strict akratic and enkratic agents are blameworthy and praiseworthy despite their ignorance. Nevertheless, it is worth taking the time to unpack what Aristotle means when he says that both involuntary and strict akratic actions necessarily lead to regret, exploring why this does not entitle us to the conclusion that strict akratic agents perform involuntary actions owing to factual ignorance.

First, regarding involuntary action and regret, Aristotle writes at *NE* III.1:

> τὸ δὲ δι᾽ ἄγνοιαν οὐχ ἑκούσιον μὲν ἅπαν ἐστίν, ἀκούσιον δὲ τὸ ἐπίλυπον καὶ ἐν μεταμελείᾳ. ὁ γὰρ δι᾽ ἄγνοιαν πράξας ὁτιοῦν, μηδέν τι δυσχεραίνων ἐπὶ τῇ πράξει, ἑκὼν μὲν οὐ πέπραχεν, ὅ γε μὴ ᾔδει, οὐδ᾽ αὖ ἄκων, μὴ λυπούμενός γε. τοῦ δὴ δι᾽ ἄγνοιαν ὁ μὲν ἐν μεταμελείᾳ ἄκων δοκεῖ, ὁ δὲ μὴ μεταμελόμενος, ἐπεὶ ἕτερος, ἔστω οὐχ ἑκών. ἐπεὶ γὰρ διαφέρει, βέλτιον ὄνομα ἔχειν ἴδιον.
>
> Action due to ignorance is entirely not voluntary, but involuntary action leads to pain and into regret. For whenever someone acts due to ignorance, but does not feel vexed at her action, she does not perform a voluntary action, for she did not in fact know, but still she does not perform an involuntary action, for she is not in fact pained. Regarding actions that owe to ignorance, an agent seems to perform an involuntary action if she falls into regret, but she does not seem to perform an involuntary action if she does not fall into regret. Since these are different, let us call the second of these actions ‘not-voluntary.’ For because it is different, it is better that it has its own name. [*NE* III.1 1110b18-24]

Not only does Aristotle distinguish between the voluntary and the involuntary, but he marks off a third category in the passage: the not-voluntary. If an action is due to factual ignorance, then it is not voluntary on Aristotle's view, but if the action does not bring pain in the form of the agent regretting her action afterward, then it is not right to count it as an involuntary action. Instead, Aristotle advises that it is more appropriate to classify this kind of action as *not-voluntary* (οὐχ ἑκούσιος). In the course of contrasting the not-voluntary with the involuntary (ἀκούσιος), he writes that "it is better that [the not-voluntary] has its own name." Aristotle's view is that factual ignorance is responsible for both involuntary and not-voluntary actions, but that regret always attends involuntary actions while it does not attend not-voluntary actions. Some examples are in order to help clarify this distinction.

If Jess's colleague asks to borrow a pencil from her and she hands him a pen, then she is factually mistaken about the instrument she hands him, but it is unlikely that she is pained by regret afterward. Aristotle would class this action as a not-voluntary action, but not as involuntary, for Jess performs an action owing to factual ignorance, but she does feel regret afterward. On the other hand, if Ralph writes a scathing email about his student, John Smith, and intends to share it with his colleague, Jack Smith, but Ralph is factually mistaken about which email address belongs to whom, and so he sends the email to his student, then it is likely that Ralph is pained by regret afterward. Aristotle would class this action as an involuntary action, and not merely as not-voluntary, for Ralph performs an action owing to factual ignorance and he feels regret afterward. To be clear, both involuntary and not-voluntary actions owe to factual ignorance, but only the former lead to regret.

Aristotle imposes a similar regret condition on the strict akratic agent at *NE* VII.8 when distinguishing her from the self-indulgent agent.

> ἔστι δ᾽ ὁ μὲν ἀκόλαστος, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη, οὐ μεταμελητικός. ἐμμένει γὰρ τῇ προαιρέσει. ὁ δ᾽ ἀκρατὴς μεταμελητικὸς πᾶς.
>
> The self-indulgent agent, as has been maintained, is not regretful. For she remains fixed to her choice. Alternatively, every akratic agent is full of regret. [*NE* VII.8 1150b29-31]

Since his view is that both genuine involuntary action and genuine strict akratic action are worthy of regret, and since he holds that both actions are due to ignorance of some sort, it is not difficult to see how one could conclude that both the involuntary and the strict akratic agent are subject to the same kind of ignorance, namely factual ignorance. But this conclusion must be wrong if Aristotle regards involuntary action as unworthy of blame and at the same time regards strict akratic action as blameworthy. Broadie ("*Nicomachean Ethics* VII.8 – 9 (1151b22): *Akrasia, enkrateia*, Look-Alikes") weighs in on this issue with skepticism about the role of regret in separating involuntary from not-voluntary action at *NE* III.1; she considers it "hard to see how the different retrospective attitudes can justify a distinction between different types of non-voluntary agency as such."[176] Her main worry is similar to the one that I outlined above, namely that since both strict akratic action and involuntary action are due to ignorance, and since Aristotle notes that regret follows both, then it looks as though Aristotle should class strict akratic action as owing to the same kind of factual ignorance as involuntary action. Further, on these grounds, if strict akratic ignorance is factual ignorance, then it looks as though Aristotle should class strict akratic action as involuntary action.

Like Broadie, I want to avoid this conclusion because it conflicts with Aristotle's view that strict *akrasia* is a blameworthy character type. Broadie's strategy, with which I disagree, is to cast doubt on Aristotle's separation of involuntary action from not-voluntary action on the basis that regret attends the former but not the latter. She wonders: How could a feeling that arises after the

[176] Broadie, Sarah. ("*Nicomachean Ethics* VII.8 – 9 (1151b22): *Akrasia, enkrateia*, Look-Alikes") 165

agent has performed her action change the kind of action it counts as? Her response is that it could not. Broadie holds that what really makes an action involuntary is the agent's "factual mistakenness at the time," which does not change afterward just because an agent is plunged into feeling regret.[177] Proposing a possible world in which Aristotle takes her side on the matter, she has him clarify in revisions to his thought that regret does not actually function as a necessary condition for involuntary action, being what distinguishes it from not-voluntary action, so that the worry that the akratic's regret makes her action involuntary does not arise. The following passage recounts how Broadie thinks Aristotle ought to have revised his thoughts on the issue and should be read in Aristotle's voice.

> The case where the regretted action was genuinely non-voluntary is one where it was done because the agent was factually mistaken about what he was doing. It is this mistakenness alone that makes for the non-voluntariness, and the regret afterwards in no way makes it the case that the agent was more factually mistaken at the time of acting than if he had been regretless later. Since regret later does not add to the factual mistakenness at the time, it does not add to or heighten the non-voluntariness of the non-voluntary action.[178]

On Broadie's view, involuntary and not-voluntary actions are not actually distinct, and Aristotle should not maintain that they are. She holds that the genuine distinguishing factor setting actions that are voluntary apart from actions that are not is the agent's factual knowledge or ignorance at the time she performs the action. Broadie thinks in harmony with Aristotle that there is a distinction between actions that are voluntary and actions that are not; she departs from Aristotle by denying that there is a distinction between involuntary and not-voluntary actions, at least insofar as the distinction depends on whether the agent experiences regret after performing her action. She thinks that if the strict akratic is not factually ignorant at the time of action, then even though she regrets her action, her action does not count as involuntary and so does merit blame. So Broadie resolves

[177] *Ibid.*
[178] *Ibid.*

the puzzle regarding why strict akratic action is not involuntary by (1) casting doubt on Aristotle's view that experiencing regret distinguishes not-voluntary from involuntary action, and (2) denying that strict akratic action owes to factual ignorance.

However, one does not have to dispense with Aristotle's regret condition distinguishing not-voluntary from involuntary action in order to show that strict akratic action is voluntary and not due to factual ignorance. I agree with Broadie's point that an action does not become involuntary just because an agent regrets her action; clearly even some voluntary actions are worthy of regret. Someone can know what she is choosing and doing and still afterward feel pain at her chosen course of action, desiring that she had done otherwise. A student who knowingly chooses to cheat on an exam by copying a classmate (and is not ignorant of the fact that she is expected to do her own work) may regret afterward that she cheated. Why should the fact that this student feels regret retroactively turn her cheating from a voluntary into an involuntary action? Aristotle does not in fact think that experiencing regret changes a voluntary action into an involuntary action. For he considers strict akratic action to be voluntary, and we have already seen that he describes the akratic agent as full of regret [1150b29-31]. Broadie extends the spirit of this question in an effort to collapse Aristotle's distinction between not-voluntary and involuntary action, asking: why should the presence or absence of regret change a merely not-voluntary action into an involuntary action? If the presence of the affect of regret in the one case makes no difference, then why should we accept that it does make a difference in a second case?

I propose that the reason why experiencing regret does in fact distinguish the not-voluntary from the involuntary is that the painful feeling serves as a measurement tool for both the severity of what happens as a result of an agent's factual mistakenness at the time of action as well as the agent's own awareness of that severity. The reason why subsequent regret does not turn a voluntary

action into an involuntary one is because the agent performing a voluntary action is, by Aristotle's definition of voluntary action, not factually mistaken. But in cases where the agent *is* factually mistaken, she can be mistaken in a variety of ways. Aristotle presents regret as a tool for determining the severity of an agent's mistake. Returning to the above examples of both involuntary and not-voluntary action helps to demonstrate this. Jess, the employee who hands her colleague a pen rather than the pencil he requested and does not afterward regret doing so, performs an action that is merely not-voluntary on Aristotle's account. Ralph, the professor who sends a scathing email to the wrong recipient and afterward regrets doing so, performs an action that is involuntary. Both agents are factually mistaken about some aspect of the respective actions that they perform; Jess is ignorant about which writing instrument she hands over, and Ralph is ignorant about the person to whom he sends his email. Yet the severity of the actions resulting from these agents' ignorance differs greatly. It is not simply the issue of whether or not the agent does feel regret afterward that makes the difference between these examples of involuntary and not-voluntary actions, but additionally whether the agent makes the kind of factual mistake that is worthy of regret that distinguishes the involuntary from the not-voluntary action. Jess makes the un-painful mistake of handing over a pen instead of a pencil and feels no regret afterward, perhaps because it is simple to correct, while Ralph makes the cringe-worthy mistake of sending a scathing email to the wrong recipient and is pained by regret afterward. In cases like these, Aristotle's distinction between not-voluntary and involuntary action tracks the difference of the extent to which the action is worthy of regret. We do not expect agents to regret factual mistakes that are not worthy of regret, whereas we do expect agents to regret factual mistakes that are worthy of regret.

Determining whether a factual mistake is the kind that makes an action regrettable hangs on a lot of contextual factors; as usual, such evaluation depends on the circumstances. In the above cases, I have supposed that mistaking the pen for the pencil is a less severe factual error than mistaking one email address for another, but that is because of the contexts in which I have proposed that the agents make these mistakes. If Jess mistakenly hands a colleague a pen rather than the pencil he requested, and that colleague happens to be reviewing her performance as an employee that day, then the same mistake from before would likely seem to be a more severe factual error in this newly introduced context and so to lead to action that is in fact regrettable. Nevertheless, the agent's experience of regret after performing an action owing to factual ignorance is not the only aspect that matters to Aristotle when distinguishing the involuntary from the not-voluntary; it also matters whether the factual ignorance is such as to lead to action that is worthy of regret, or, in other words, whether the action is regrettable. The regret condition that Aristotle places on involuntary action does not only pertain to an agent's own experience of regret after she makes a mistake and performs an action, but it also pertains to evaluating the severity of the mistake itself as worthy of regret, all things considered.

So unlike Broadie, I am not prepared to do away with the regret condition Aristotle places on involuntary action to distinguish it from not-voluntary action. Rather, I maintain that regret functions as a tool for measuring the severity of the factual mistake that makes an agent's action fall outside of the voluntary. Aristotle is not only interested in whether agents experience regret for their factual mistakenness, but also in whether an action owing to factual ignorance is itself worthy of regret. Further, it is possible both for agents to regret voluntary actions they have chosen and performed and also to describe voluntary actions, such as strict akratic actions, as regrettable or worthy of regret. Regret only serves as a tool to distinguish not-voluntary from involuntary

actions because the regret under consideration is the painful feeling an agent does or does not experience for her factual mistakenness responsible for the action. Aristotle does not and should not class akratic action as involuntary just because regret follows afterward; for voluntary actions can lead to regret, too, even though their agents are not factually mistaken about any of the relevant circumstances surrounding the actions they perform.

Nevertheless, Aristotle does ascribe ignorance to the strict akratic agent, and by extension to the strict enkratic agent, and I have shown that strict akratic and enkratic ignorance both have the particular proposition (τελευταία πρότασις) of the temperate practical syllogism as their object. Their ignorance cannot be factual ignorance, since for Aristotle, factual ignorance is exculpatory, and strict akratic and enkratic agents choose and perform actions for which they merit blame or praise. I have not argued positively for what kind of ignorance it is here, but I develop a positive account of the kind of ignorance it is in the next chapter, holding that akratic and enkratic ignorance in general, the kind of ignorance involved in all of the loose and strict ways that agents express these character types, is *evaluative ignorance*. Evaluative ignorance is crucially distinct from factual ignorance: it is not ignorance that, for instance, some object is sweet, or that this instrument is a pencil, or that this email address in fact belongs to someone else. Rather it is a kind of ignorance that can be described as evaluative mistakenness, such as, for example, what happens in the strict akratic case, where an agent incorrectly evaluates the sweet thing before her as unqualifiedly good when it is actually only qualifiedly pleasant.

4.3 Conclusion

This chapter has served to clarify the model of the practical syllogism and to demonstrate the differences between non-ethical and ethical practical syllogisms. The main purpose of this distinguishing has been to set the stage for the next chapter, in which I positively describe and

examine akratic and enkratic ignorance as evaluative ignorance and construct and analyze a variety of loose akratic and enkratic practical syllogisms. Yet this chapter has also served to demonstrate some facts about ethical practical syllogisms in addition to this stage-setting. I have been able to shed some light on what it means for an agent to express her character type throughout the whole of an ethical practical syllogism and also to explain what it means for Aristotle to be a character theorist about ethics.

In previous chapters, I have made much out of Aristotle's claim at *NE* III.2 that an agent's relation to choice-making is the best indicator of her character, a better indicator than even the observable actions she performs. My examination of ethical practical syllogisms clarifies why this is the case: the conclusions of these sorts of syllogisms—the enacted choices—have their ethical value in an agent-dependent way, and we can trace this value back through the propositions that agents commit to and combine, ultimately back to the character types that they have developed. An ethical practical syllogism is a description and account of the process by which an agent makes an ethical choice and performs an ethical action, and the agent is present throughout all of its stages. The universal proposition that an agent knows and employs tracks her rational presence in the syllogizing process; the particular proposition she combines with the universal tracks her non-rational, evaluative presence in the process; the enacted choice that concludes the syllogism tracks her whole soul's follow-through as result of her commitment to and combination of the aforementioned propositions.

The virtuous, temperate agent, for instance, has a soul whose rational nature issues a correct prescription regarding which universal she should employ, whose non-rational nature is receptively obedient to that prescription and evaluates in agreement with it; she follows through and enacts a temperate choice. The strict akratic agent has a soul whose rational nature issues a

correct prescription, yet whose non-rational nature is not as receptively obedient due to her improper relation to tactile appetite; this misalignment leads her to re-think her commitment to her own reason's correct prescription and to commit instead to an alternative, incorrect rational prescription better aligned with her non-rational desire. She abandons her correct intention and follows through and enacts a blameworthy, strict akratic choice. The strict enkratic agent also has a soul whose rational nature issues a correct prescription, and its non-rational nature is also not as receptively obedient as the temperate agent's non-rational nature; this misalignment leads her to re-think her commitment to her own rational prescription due to an improper relation to tactile appetite, but she overcomes this non-rational resistance and follows through to enact the correct choice. The full story regarding how strict akratic and strict enkratic non-rational resistance plays out in their practical syllogisms requires an in-depth examination of their evaluative ignorance of the temperate syllogism's particular proposition, which constitutes the beginning of the next chapter. Once this has been accomplished, it will then be possible to construct and analyze loose akratic and enkratic practical syllogisms in service of providing further evidence that self-control and its lack have genuine expressions in practical domains beyond that of temperance.

CHAPTER 5. LOOSE AKRATIC & ENKRATIC PRACTICAL SYLLOGISMS

I argued in the last chapter that the particular propositions of practical syllogisms are necessarily connected to perception, i.e., in some sense gotten *via* perception. Yet I also argued that, from what Aristotle tells us about akratic ignorance, it is a mistake to identify the particular proposition with an agent's mere perception or sensing of something. For at *NE* VII.3, he describes the "τελευταία πρότασις" of the temperate agent's practical syllogism as an opinion or evaluation whose source is perception or sensation. This permits a way forward for understanding strict akratic and strict enkratic[179] ignorance of this particular proposition not as factual ignorance, but rather as evaluative ignorance. Strict akratic and strict enkratic agents perceive the same sweet thing that the temperate agent perceives, but the first two evaluate it incorrectly. This is the way that having developed inferior character types influences the particular propositions of their ethical practical syllogisms. The particular propositions of ethical practical syllogisms, like their universal propositions, can be either correct or incorrect, even though both correct and incorrect particular propositions are evaluations of the same object of perception. But what is a perceptual evaluation, and how is it distinct from perception *per se* for Aristotle? Moreover, how is it that temperate, strict akratic, and strict enkratic agents perceive the same sweet thing yet end up with distinct perceptual evaluations? (That is, why do distinct particular propositions arise in their ethical practical syllogisms?) I answer this question in the first stage of this chapter, and then proceed by constructing and analyzing loose akratic and enkratic practical syllogisms to confirm that *akrasia* and *enkrateia* have wide ranges of expression.

[179] Even though Aristotle never explicitly examines strict enkratic ignorance, I show later in this chapter that the strict enkratic agent must also be evaluatively ignorant of the temperate practical syllogism's particular proposition insofar as her character type is inferior to the virtue of temperance.

5.1 Evaluative Ignorance

Jessica Moss's work on akratic ignorance as akin to perceptual illusion is helpful for unpacking what it means for agents to form different perceptual evaluations of the same object. She considers an analogy between perceptual illusion and "evaluative illusion," drawing from Aristotle's work, *On Dreams* (*De Insomniis*), to explain the former phenomenon. Moss holds that perceptual illusion occurs in cases where, "the perceiver is affected by a *y* as she would be in normal circumstances by an *x*: the perception of the *y* somehow triggers a *phantasma* of an *x*."[180] A variety of sensory misperceptions exemplify this description; Moss appeals to cases which Aristotle presents in *De Insomn*., for example, that someone far away appears to be an enemy.[181] In this case, the perceiver sees some actually non-hostile agent out on the horizon, but she is affected by this perception in the manner she would be in normal circumstances by the perception of a hostile agent. Perceiving the far off non-hostile agent somehow gives rise to a *phantasma*, or the appearance, of a hostile agent.

In her account of evaluative illusion, to which she holds akratic agents fall victim, Moss explains that:

> …[T]he agent is perceptually affected by a *y* as she would be in normal circumstances by an *x*: the cognition (sight, thought, etc.) of the *y* somehow triggers a *phantasma* of an *x*. Specifically, the cognition of something that is pleasant only in a qualified way triggers a *phantasma* of something good and pleasant without qualification—and thus induces desire.[182]

Moss's accounts of perceptual and evaluative illusion have some elements in common; in both kinds of illusion, an agent perceives an object which affects her in the manner that some other object usually would. But perceptual and evaluative illusion are importantly distinct. The

[180] Moss, Jessica. (2012) *Akrasia* and the Apparent Good: Perception, *Phantasia*, Thought, and Desire. Oxford University Press. 108
[181] *Ibid*.
[182] *Ibid*.

difference between the two lies in the difference between perceiving something incorrectly on the one hand, and forming an incorrect assessment or evaluation of an object of perception on the other. Perceptual illusion may occur in a variety of life's arenas, whereas evaluative illusion is exclusive to the domain of ethical conduct. Moss ties it specifically to cases where agents mistakenly evaluate the merely pleasant as unqualifiedly good.[183] Just as practical syllogisms can be either non-ethical or ethically relevant, so too can perceptual illusions be non-ethical or ethically relevant. But evaluative illusions are necessarily ethically relevant; on Moss's account, evaluative illusions occur when agents misattribute unqualified goodness and unqualified pleasure to objects that are not unqualifiedly good and are merely pleasant in a qualified way—or even unpleasant. Evaluative illusion concerns judgments agents form regarding whether perceptual objects are the correct objects of desire. For Aristotle, the correct objects of desire are pleasant without qualification, and so they are good. As Moss writes, "The without qualification pleasant is genuinely good. What is merely apparently good…is what is pleasant with some qualification…"[184] The temperate agent both desires correctly and desires the correct objects of tactile appetite; the objects of her desire are genuinely pleasant, good things. Importantly, Aristotle does not distinguish the good from the pleasant as if the former precludes the latter.

At *NE* II.3, he makes the claim that the whole of ethical inquiry, the investigation into how to become good, concerns pleasure and pain and whether agents experience them appropriately

[183] I contend later that evaluative ignorance does not take only this form, namely mistakenly evaluating a merely pleasant thing as unqualifiedly good. A non-virtuous agent can also mistakenly evaluate painful and bad things. Nevertheless, for now, I focus on evaluative ignorance of the sort that Moss introduces, where non-virtuous agents mistakenly evaluate pleasant and good things, because this is the way that strict akratic and strict enkratic agents are evaluatively ignorant of the temperate practical syllogism's particular proposition. Later in this chapter, for instance when dealing with loose akratic and enkratic agents' practical syllogisms in courage's domain, they are evaluatively ignorant of the particular proposition of the courageous practical syllogism, but their evaluative ignorance does not involve mistaking the qualifiedly pleasant for the unqualifiedly good; rather they mistakenly evaluate what is qualifiedly painful as unqualifiedly bad.
[184] *Ibid*. 109

[1105a10-13]. He also classifies the highest good, the activity of flourishing, as a pleasure at *NE* VII.13 in response to the objection that, because there are bad pleasures, the highest good could not be pleasure.

> … εἴπερ ἑκάστης ἕξεώς εἰσιν ἐνέργειαι ἀνεμπόδιστοι, εἴθ᾽ ἡ πασῶν ἐνέργειά ἐστιν εὐδαιμονία εἴτε ἡ τινὸς αὐτῶν, ἂν ᾖ ἀνεμπόδιστος, αἱρετωτάτην εἶναι. τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἡδονή. ὥστε εἴη ἄν τις ἡδονὴ τὸ ἄριστον, τῶν πολλῶν ἡδονῶν φαύλων οὐσῶν, εἰ ἔτυχεν, ἁπλῶς.
>
> … if indeed there are unhindered activities of each of the soul's dispositions, then, whether it is the activity of them all or of some one of them that is human flourishing, if this activity is unhindered, then it is the most choice-worthy activity. But this is pleasure. The result being that if all of this is so, then the highest good would be a certain pleasure, even should many pleasures happen to be entirely foul. [*NE* VII.13 1153b10-15]

Because the activity of flourishing is the activity that is worthiest of choice and desire, there is no escaping that pleasure should at least attend or accompany it; here Aristotle makes the stronger claim that the best human activity is itself a certain pleasure. Not only are the good and the pleasant compatible, but they converge in his description of the activity of flourishing. In order to understand what Aristotle means when he identifies pleasure as an activity in general, it is helpful to attend to Aristotle's distinction between activity (ἐνέργεια) and motion or process (κίνησις), a clear exposition of which occurs at *NE* X.4. Aristotle presents (a) seeing and (b) experiencing pleasure as examples of activities, not motions or processes, and provides the following criteria according to which they count as activities.

> δοκεῖ γὰρ ἡ μὲν ὅρασις καθ᾽ ὁντινοῦν χρόνον τελεία εἶναι. οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἐνδεὴς οὐδενὸς ὃ εἰς ὕστερον γινόμενον τελειώσει αὐτῆς τὸ εἶδος. τοιούτῳ δ᾽ ἔοικε καὶ ἡ ἡδονή
>
> For seeing seems complete at any given time. Indeed, seeing lacks nothing which coming to be later on would complete its own form. Pleasure also seems like this. [*NE* X.4 1174a14-18]

In contrast to this account of what an activity is, Aristotle writes later in the same chapter that the completion of a process, such as building a house, takes place over time, and unlike an activity is

not “complete at any given time.” One must first lay the foundation, and then build the frame, and then structure the interior walls, and so on, until finally the house’s construction is complete. Unlike the activity of seeing, which is complete at every moment one is seeing, the motion or process of house-building takes time, has stages, and a clear end-point after which it is correct to say that it is complete. Since Aristotle classifies pleasure as an activity and not as a motion or process, he holds that pleasure is complete at every moment that one is pleased. Pleasure is not dependent on the next stage or any temporal duration for its being whole or complete.

Aristotle later complicates this straightforward classification of pleasure as activity when he seems to retract it in favor of the view that pleasure is instead what completes or perfects activities. Aristotle writes that perfect or complete activities arise at the confluence of two factors: first, a perceptual capacity or organ in the finest condition (e.g., a pair of eyes with 20/20 vision), and second, a perceptual object corresponding to the capacity or organ that is itself also of the finest quality (κάλλιστον). When these two criteria are satisfied—when one clearly sees the most beautiful sunset, tastes the most delicious dish, or contemplates the most unchanging truth, etc.—the activity is perfect or complete and most pleasant. Further, Aristotle claims that pleasure is not a mere byproduct of the activity, but rather that “pleasure perfects the activity,” [τελειοῖ δὲ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἡ ἡδονὴ *NE* X.4 1174b23-24]. It is important to note that Aristotle sets these demanding criteria only for the most complete and most pleasant activities, suggesting that there are less perfect, yet nevertheless pleasant, activities. Someone with impaired eyesight can still take pleasure in the activity of seeing the most beautiful sunset, but contrasted with someone with better eyesight, she gains less pleasure and her activity is less perfect. This is also true about an agent whose perceptual capacities are in the finest condition while the corresponding perceptual object is not of the finest quality, for instance when cloud-cover partially obscures one’s view of the

sunset. Such an agent's activity is less complete or perfect and less pleasant, but complete and pleasant nonetheless.[185]

So Aristotle provides apparently competing characterizations of pleasure, first as itself an activity, and second as distinct from activity but a cause of the perfection of activities. To save both descriptions, one can hold that nothing precludes pleasure from being both an activity and what completes or perfects other activities. On this view, one must maintain that being pleased is an activity that completes or perfects itself, while all other activities are dependent on the activity of pleasure for their perfection; being pleased is a kind of activity that underlies all of the others, a primitive activity without which there would be no other perfect activities.[186] Unfortunately, Aristotle does not settle the matter here. The *NE*'s investigation into pleasure's classification as either an activity itself or as what completes or perfects other activities ends with the claim that they are entangled inseparably.

> συνεζεῦχθαι μὲν γὰρ ταῦτα φαίνεται καὶ χωρισμὸν οὐ δέχεσθαι. ἄνευ τε γάρ ἐνεργείας οὐ γίνεται ἡδονή πᾶσαν τε ἐνέργειαν τελειοῖ ἡ ἡδονή
>
> They seem to be joined and not to admit of separation. For it is both the case that without activity pleasure does not arise, and also that pleasure completes every activity [*NE* X.5 1175a20-21]

Pleasure depends on activity and, likewise, activity, insofar as it is perfect at every moment unlike a motion or a process, depends on pleasure for its perfection. Activity and pleasure are linked to the extent that it is difficult to tell them apart; for the sake of ethical inquiry, we can treat them as either one in the same or as strongly mutually dependent. Moreover, by extension, the best activity for humans, namely flourishing, must also be treated as either itself pleasure or as nearly

[185] I am not suggesting here that an activity that is less *than* complete or perfect is at the same time complete or perfect, but rather that because some activities are better than others, so too are their completions or perfections more complete or perfect than others on Aristotle's account.

[186] This does not seem too far-fetched, given Aristotle's insistence at *NE* II.3 that ethical development depends on how agents relate to pleasure and pain. Nevertheless, providing an argument for this view exceeds the scope of the present work.

indistinguishable from it. In other words, Aristotle does not think that the good and the pleasant mutually exclude one another. What is in fact unqualifiedly good must also be unqualifiedly pleasant and worthy of desire.

Aristotle thinks that it is possible for agents to go wrong with respect to feelings of pleasure and pain. While all activities are perfected by their attendant pleasures, not all activities are good, and neither are their pleasures. This is clear because when Aristotle casts human flourishing as pleasant at the outset of *NE* X.4, he does so as a response to the charge that the highest good cannot itself be pleasant since there are vile pleasures. To defend against this objection, Aristotle maintains that what is genuinely good is also genuinely pleasant; what substantiates this claim is his view that virtuous agents exclusively take pleasure in what is genuinely good.

> δοκεῖ δ᾽ ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς τοιούτοις εἶναι τὸ φαινόμενον τῷ σπουδαίῳ. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο καλῶς λέγεται, καθάπερ δοκεῖ, καὶ ἔστιν ἑκάστου μέτρον ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἀγαθός, ᾗ τοιοῦτος, καὶ ἡδοναὶ εἶεν ἂν αἱ τούτῳ φαινόμεναι καὶ ἡδέα οἷς οὗτος χαίρει.
>
> In all such matters it seems that what appears to the good person is what is real. If this is correct, just as it seems to be, and virtue and the good person, *qua* virtue and goodness, are the measure of each thing, then it is also the case that pleasures are those things that appear to the good person as pleasures and pleasant things are those in which the good person takes delight. [*NE* X.5 1176a18-20]

He contends that the world appears to virtuous agents exclusively as it really is, that what virtuous agents perceive is the way that things really are, and he applies this view specifically to virtuous agents' perception of pleasure. Aristotle holds that virtuous agents are not subject to what Moss calls evaluative illusion; rather, virtuous agents serve as the evaluative standards or exemplars who form the correct evaluations of everything that they perceive and grasp, including evaluations of objects or circumstances as good or pleasant. This is, as we will see, why the temperate agent without fail evaluates the sweet thing before her as it really is, as only qualifiedly pleasant, while the strict akratic and strict enkratic agents incorrectly evaluate the same sweet thing as unqualifiedly pleasant at different stages of their practical reasoning.

It might seem strange to claim that non-virtuous agents take pleasure in things that are not actually pleasant. Yet, in a way, this is exactly what Aristotle claims in the continuation of the passage above from X.5:

> τὰ δὲ τούτῳ δυσχερῆ εἴ τῳ φαίνεται ἡδέα, οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν. πολλαὶ γὰρ φθοραὶ καὶ λῦμαι ἀνθρώπων γίνονται. ἡδέα δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ τούτοις καὶ οὕτω διακειμένοις.
>
> Should the things that appear vexing to the good person appear pleasant to another, this would not at all be surprising. For many corruptions and damages befall people. But these things are not pleasant things, though they are pleasant to these people and agents situated in this way. [*NE* X.5 1176a20-23]

What the non-virtuous desire, the things which they find pleasant, are not actually pleasant things, no matter how much they enjoy or find them pleasant. The less-than-virtuous are mistaken about what is genuinely pleasant and worthy of desire because they have corrupted, damaged character types. Aristotle writes that one should not marvel at the fact that non-virtuous people take pleasure in and desire objects that bring pain to the virtuous agent who avoids them; having inferior character types is responsible for their evaluative ignorance of such objects. In this passage, Aristotle also makes it clear that virtuous agents are not only the exemplars for evaluating whether something is genuinely good or pleasant, but also for whether something is genuinely bad or painful. This means that agents with damaged character types are liable not only to make mistakes when it comes to evaluating whether something is unqualifiedly good or merely qualifiedly pleasant, but they are also liable to mistakenly evaluate whether something is unqualifiedly bad or merely qualifiedly painful. Such agents take pleasure in what the virtuous agent finds repugnant and are pained by what the virtuous agent enjoys. Analogously, something that is in fact bitter can seem sweet to an agent who has a damaged tongue. Nobody denies that the bitter tastes sweet *to her*, but this does not make the bitter genuinely, or without qualification, sweet. For the truth, one turns to an agent with an undamaged, uncorrupted tongue who is experienced in tasting and

distinguishing sweet and bitter objects and discovers that the previous agent's defective taste buds are the cause of her mistaken evaluation. Similarly, one turns to the virtuous agent whose character is uncorrupted and undamaged for the truth concerning whether something is unqualifiedly good or merely qualifiedly pleasant, or whether something is unqualifiedly bad or merely qualifiedly painful. In Chapter 3, I addressed a passage from *NE* II.3 where Aristotle similarly holds that agents with character types inferior to virtue take pleasure and pain in different actions than virtuous agents do.[187]

> Σημεῖον δὲ δεῖ ποιεῖσθαι τῶν ἕξεων τὴν ἐπιγινομένην ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην τοῖς ἔργοις. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀπεχόμενος τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ αὐτῷ τούτῳ χαίρων σώφρων, ὁ δ᾽ἀχθόμενος ἀκόλαστος. καὶ ὁ μὲν ὑπομένειν τὰ δεινὰ καὶ χαίρων ἢ μὴ λυπούμενός γε ἀνδρεῖος, ὁ δὲ λυπούμενος δειλός.
>
> It is necessary that the pleasure and pain following actions be adopted as a sign of agents' dispositions of character. For one who abstains from bodily pleasures and brings joy to herself through this is temperate, whereas one who is vexed by such abstinence is self-indulgent. And one who takes joy in standing firm against frightening things, or at least is not pained, is indeed courageous, whereas one who is pained is a coward. [*NE* II.3 1104b3-8]

Here, Aristotle makes the same fundamental claim that he does in the X.5 passage above while making specific reference to the virtuous and vicious agents from temperance's and courage's practical domains. We can now understand this passage more clearly as describing that temperate and courageous agents delight in choosing and doing what is truly pleasant, since their characters are not corrupted, whereas self-indulgent and cowardly agents find performing these truly pleasant actions to be painful since their characters are damaged.

Moss's account of strict akratic ignorance as evaluative illusion should be clearer now given this overview of Aristotle's views on pleasure and the virtuous agent's unwavering evaluative clarity. All non-virtuous characters are subject to evaluative illusion insofar as the

[187] For my earlier discussion of this passage, see Ch. 3, Section 3.3, pp. 170-177

virtuous character exclusively knows which objects of perception are genuinely good, merely pleasant, genuinely bad, or merely painful. Recall that evaluative illusion is similar to perceptual illusion, which occurs when some perceptual object *x* affects an agent as some other perceptual object *y* usually would. But evaluative illusion differs from perceptual illusion because it pertains to the ethically relevant evaluation of what an agent perceives, and not to whether the object that appears to the agent corresponds to the real object perceptually affecting her. All that is required for a case of evaluative illusion in temperance's practical domain is that a non-temperate agent mistakes a perceptual object that is not genuinely good and pleasant for one that is. The contrast, of course, is the temperate agent. As Moss puts it, "part of what virtue entails is an immunity to a certain sort of false appearance: the appearance of qualified pleasures as good. The virtuous person has correct non-rational cognition of a kind that all others lack…"[188]

The kind of ignorance, then, which strict akratic and strict enkratic agents have of the temperate practical syllogism's particular proposition, "this is a sweet thing," is evaluative ignorance. Perhaps surprisingly, both strict akratic and strict enkratic agents are subject to evaluative ignorance of the temperate practical syllogism's particular proposition. The difference is that the strict akratic does not overcome or correct her evaluative illusion prior to enacting a blameworthy choice; her evaluation of the sweet thing as unqualifiedly good is the particular proposition of her complete practical syllogism. The strict akratic agent realizes her evaluative ignorance too late and so is subject to regret in the aftermath of her enacted choice. The strict enkratic agent, on the other hand, does overcome her evaluative ignorance before choosing and acting; she is in danger of acting on her evaluative ignorance of the sweet thing, but is able to overcome it and form the proper evaluation before it is too late. Their evaluative ignorance of the

[188] *Ibid*. 111

sweet thing also explains why strict akratic and strict enkratic agents exercise the universal propositions that they do in their ethical practical syllogisms. Since strict akratic and strict enkratic agents know both of the competing universal propositions relevant to temperance's practical domain, these agents' different perceptual evaluations of the sweet thing influence which of the two universals they commit to and exercise. In the next few examples, I show what it means for an agent's particular proposition to be responsible for which universal proposition she exercises.

Upon encountering something sweet, a strict akratic agent evaluates it as something good without qualification, so her tactile appetite pulls her to exercise the universal proposition most likely to result in her attainment of it. Her tactile appetite influences her to exercise, "every sweet thing must be tasted," over its alternative, competing universal proposition which would lead her to abstain from tasting the sweet thing. The strict akratic still knows the universal proposition preventing tasting, but she does not use it, so she knows it only in the potential way. It is as though her evaluative illusion is responsible for flipping a toggle switch, activating her knowledge of the incorrect universal and rendering her knowledge of the correct universal potential. She abandons her correctly reasoned intention to refrain from tasting sweet things and instead enacts the choice to taste the sweet thing in front of her. She never completes the good or temperate practical syllogism, for because of her improper relation to tactile appetite, she fails to exercise the correct universal. The strict akratic is evaluatively ignorant of the temperate practical syllogism's particular proposition; because of her improper evaluation, she chooses and performs a blameworthy action. Afterward, she painfully regrets what she has chosen and done, realizing too late that she evaluated the sweet thing incorrectly.

Similarly, upon encountering something sweet, a strict enkratic agent also straightaway evaluates it as good without qualification, and so at first is ready to exercise the incorrect universal

proposition. Yet due either to reflection or to recollection of similar mis-evaluations in the past, the strict enkratic agent recognizes prior to completing this practical syllogism that the sweet thing is actually only qualifiedly pleasant; as her evaluative ignorance dissolves, her reason leads her to exercise the correct universal instead. Frustrated at having to abstain, and of half a mind that the sweet thing is still worth pursuing, the strict enkratic nevertheless enacts the choice to refrain from tasting it. Importantly, because of her evaluative ignorance, the strict enkratic struggles to choose and perform the correct action, for tactile appetite pulls her to exercise the incorrect universal and enact a blameworthy choice. However, tactile appetite is not as successful in the strict enkratic's case as it is in the strict akratic's case. Even though the strict enkratic at first incorrectly evaluates the sweet thing as unqualifiedly good, it dawns on her before she enacts a choice to taste it that she has evaluated it incorrectly. I do not propose that it must dawn on a strict enkratic agent in a dramatic way that her immediate evaluation of the sweet thing is incorrect. Suppose that strict enkratic Jon sees a chocolate bar on the table and straightaway evaluates it as something unqualifiedly good when it is in fact only qualifiedly pleasant. He starts to form the intention to taste the chocolate bar, but on second thought, recognizes that it will spoil his appetite for what promises to be a wholesome and healthy dinner. So, Jon abandons his intention to eat the chocolate bar, having revised his perceptual evaluation, exercises a new particular proposition, and enacts the choice to refrain from tasting it. But this need not disturb him very much; after refraining from eating it, perhaps he sits on the couch to read until dinner is ready.

Importantly, even though she ends up forming a correct evaluation of the sweet thing, the strict enkratic does not form the most correct or true evaluation of the sweet thing, as her character is corrupted or damaged insofar as she is not temperate. Aristotle holds that agents with characters inferior to virtue do not evaluate the world as it really is. So we might say that the strict enkratic

is less evaluatively ignorant when compared to the strict akratic agent, since she is able to overcome her ignorance, but she is still evaluatively ignorant in comparison to the temperate agent. When the temperate agent encounters the sweet thing, she straightaway correctly evaluates it as it actually is: qualifiedly pleasant. She never mistakes it for being unqualifiedly good and so does not desire to taste it at any point during her practical reasoning. After forming the correct perceptual evaluation, she activates the correct universal proposition preventing tasting sweet things, and finally chooses and performs the correct action; she refrains from tasting the sweet thing. At no point does the temperate agent suffer from evaluative ignorance of the particular proposition of her own practical syllogism. This helps to demonstrate the crucial difference between strict enkratic and temperate agents more clearly when it comes to their perceptual evaluations of the same object: the temperate agent correctly evaluates the sweet thing consistently and without fail, whereas the strict enkratic arrives at the correct evaluation of the sweet thing only after rejecting and replacing her incorrect evaluation with the true one. The strict enkratic agent must overcome, or dissolve, her evaluative ignorance before choosing and performing the correct action; she must resist tactile appetite's pull to act contrary to what her reason correctly prescribes, which is a struggle to which the temperate agent is immune. The temperate agent suffers from no practical stutter. It is also worth pointing out that the strict enkratic agent does not overcome her evaluative ignorance for good; it returns upon future encounters with sweet things, and in each case, she must overcome it again, rejecting her evaluation of each sweet thing as unqualifiedly good and recognizing that it is in fact only qualifiedly pleasant.

In each of the preceding examples of ethical practical syllogisms in temperance's practical domain, an agent's perceptual evaluation of the sweet thing influences which universal proposition she activates or exercises. The strict akratic evaluates the sweet thing as unqualifiedly good and

pleasant, which influences her to activate the universal proposition she knows that leads to tasting it; she abandons her correctly reasoned intention to avoid tasting sweet things and her knowledge of the correct universal is rendered potential. The strict enkratic, on the other hand, first evaluates the sweet thing in the same way as the strict akratic, as unqualifiedly good and pleasant, but is able to recognize prior to enacting a choice that it is actually merely qualifiedly pleasant, which leads her to exercise the universal proposition preventing tasting and enact a correct choice. Finally, the temperate agent forms the correct evaluation of the sweet thing straightaway as qualifiedly pleasant and so exercises the correct universal preventing tasting with no impediment. This is in a sense how deliberation figures in to their practical syllogisms: the un-self-controlled and self-controlled agents have two courses of action available to them, and due to their distinct relations to tactile appetite, each enacts a distinct choice. The temperate agent, on the other hand, does not have to deliberate in this case: correct choice and action flows from her character unfailingly.

From these considerations, it should be clear that the kind of ignorance that strict akratic and strict enkratic agents have of the temperate syllogism's particular proposition is ignorance owing to evaluative illusion. They are not factually ignorant of the particular proposition, for if an agent performs an action owing to factual ignorance, then it is not voluntary, and an agent who acts from factual ignorance merits neither praise nor blame. Evaluative ignorance, however, *is* blameworthy, and strict akratic and strict enkratic agents are subject to this kind of ignorance because their character types are damaged and corrupted in comparison to temperance. If they were temperate agents instead, then the world of tactile appetite would appear to them as it actually is rather than in the mixed up, illusory way that makes possible their mistaken evaluations of the wrong tactile objects as unqualifiedly pleasant and good.

So far, my accounts of akratic, enkratic, and virtuous practical syllogisms have focused on the character types as agents express them in temperance's practical domain; yet as I argued in Chapters 2 and 3, agents do not express *akrasia* and *enkrateia* only in temperance's practical domain. In addition to these strict forms of the character types, I contend that there are also loose forms of them which agents express in practical domains that are not temperance's. My next task is to construct and analyze loose enkratic and akratic practical syllogisms, using the temperate and strict akratic practical syllogisms Aristotle provides at *NE* VII.3 as models and guides.

5.2 Loose Akratic & Enkratic Practical Syllogisms

In the following sections, I show that loose akratic and enkratic practical syllogisms are structurally similar to strict akratic and enkratic practical syllogisms. The only significant differences that arise among these various practical syllogisms result from the fact that each practical domain involves its own distinct affects; for instance, temperance's domain involves the affect of tactile appetite, while courage's primarily involves the affect of fear. This also means that the evaluative ignorance characteristic of loose akratic and enkratic agents will differ across the practical domains as well; sometimes it involves mistaking qualified pleasure and unqualified goodness for one another, and other times it involves mistaking qualified pain and unqualified badness for one another. Nevertheless, despite these particular differences, loose akratic and enkratic practical syllogisms are structurally similar to strict akratic and enkratic practical syllogisms and result from psychological struggles between the rational and non-rational natures of agents' souls; all this serves to justify my view that the character types have wide ranges of expression.

In the next sections, I construct and analyze loose akratic and enkratic practical syllogisms in the practical domains of: (1) courage, (2) generosity, (3) the unnamed virtue that has to do with honor/recognition, and (4) mildness. I have chosen courage's practical domain in order to confirm

and follow through on my response to Charles's Worry, a major objection I considered in Chapter 3.[189] Recall that David Charles alleges that there is no loose form of *enkrateia* in courage's practical domain because of a claim that Aristotle makes at the beginning of *NE* II.3, namely that a person who withstands frightening things yet still finds them vexing or painful is a coward; on my view, this person is actually a loose enkratic agent. I do not rehearse my reply to that objection here, but I construct and analyze loose akratic and enkratic practical syllogisms in courage's domain connected to the affect of fear, not only to demonstrate that there is indeed a loose form of *enkrateia* in courage's practical domain and to strengthen my response to Charles's objection, but also, independently, to provide a plausible account of how agents can express both *akrasia* and *enkrateia* in courage's domain.

Next, I have chosen the practical domains of generosity, the unnamed virtue that has to do with honor/recognition, and mildness since Aristotle explicitly states that there are loose forms of *akrasia* regarding the affects connected to these practical domains at the end of *NE* VII.4.[190] He calls the loose akratic agent in generosity's practical domain, "akratic with respect to desire for gain"; he calls the loose akratic agent in the unnamed virtue's practical domain, "akratic with respect to desire for honor/recognition"; he calls the loose akratic agent in mildness's practical domain, "akratic with respect to spirit/anger," [1148b11-14]. I argued in Chapter 2 that Aristotle employs a consistent locution of qualification in order to clarify which loose expression of *akrasia* or *enkrateia* he means to invoke: "akratic/enkratic with respect to x," where x stands in for

[189] See Ch. 3, Section 3.3 pp. 163-177

[190] Since Aristotle never explicitly notes that there are loose forms of *enkrateia*, there is no similar catalogue of examples to draw from. Nevertheless, this is because Aristotle's primary goal in the ethics is to explain how to become virtuous, not to provide a precise account of inferior character types. In other words, the absence of an explicit catalogue of loose expressions of *enkrateia* does not indicate that Aristotle maintains that there are none. Rather, I propose that for any expression of *akrasia*, there is a corresponding expression of *enkrateia*. Just as strict *akrasia* corresponds to strict *enkrateia* in temperance's practical domain, so too does loose *akrasia* with respect to fear correspond to loose *enkrateia* with respect to fear in courage's practical domain, and so on for the other loose forms of the character types.

whichever affect pulls the loose akratic or enkratic agent to abandon her intention to behave as her reason correctly prescribes. Since desire for gain is the affect that unites the character types in generosity's practical domain, that domain is the practical home of the loose akratic/enkratic with respect to desire for gain. Likewise, since desire for honor/recognition is the affect that unites the character types in the unnamed virtue that has to do with honor's practical domain, that domain is the practical home of the loose akratic/enkratic with respect to desire for honor/recognition. Finally, since spirit/anger is the affect that unites the character types in mildness's practical domain, that domain is the practical home of the loose akratic/enkratic with respect to spirit/anger. In the next few sections, I provide overviews of the respective practical domains and then construct and analyze virtuous, loose akratic, and loose enkratic practical syllogisms to explain the choice-making and behavior of the corresponding character types within them.

5.2.1 Loose Akratic & Enkratic Practical Syllogisms in Courage's Practical Domain[191]



Figure 2. - Courage's Practical Domain

Before constructing courageous, loose akratic, and enkratic practical syllogisms in courage's practical domain, it will be useful to provide an overview of the virtue of courage and its practical domain, paying special attention to the affects that unite the character types within it. Aristotle's

[191] Throughout this section, sometimes I will use 'loose akratic' and 'loose enkratic' in the place of their longer formulations that include the relevant affect, i.e., 'loose akratic with respect to fear,' and 'loose enkratic with respect to fear.' Likewise, I will use 'loose akratic' and 'loose enkratic' in the place of their longer formulations in the next three sections concerning the practical domains of generosity, the unnamed virtue that has to do with honor, and mildness, where the affects involved are desire for gain, desire for honor/recognition, and spirit/anger respectively.

specific examination of courage arises at *NE* III.6 and starts with an affirmation of the affects which the virtue involves.

> καὶ πρῶτον περὶ ἀνδρείας. ὅτι μὲν οὖν μεσότης ἐστὶ περὶ φόβους καὶ θάρρη, ἤδη φανερὸν γεγένηται…
>
> And so first, let us discuss courage. That it is an intermediate disposition regarding fear and confidence has already become clear… [*NE* III.6 1115a6-7]

Aristotle clarifies later at III.9 that, of these two affects, fear is more relevant to courage's definition than the affect of confidence.

> περὶ θάρρη δὲ καὶ φόβους ἡ ἀνδρεία οὖσα οὐχ ὁμοίως περὶ ἄμφω ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον περὶ τὰ φοβερά. ὁ γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ἀτάραχος καὶ περὶ ταῦθ᾽ ὡς δεῖ ἔχων ἀνδρεῖος μᾶλλον ἢ ὁ περὶ τὰ θαρραλέα.
>
> Courage involves being confident and being afraid, yet it does not involve both affects equally, but is more concerned with what is fearful. For one who is steady in such things and holds as one should concerning fearful things is brave more so than one who is like this regarding confident ventures. [*NE* III.9 1117a29-32]

Following Aristotle, I focus on courage as primarily involving the affect of fear, leaving aside its relation to the affect of confidence for the most part and where possible. Moreover, Aristotle does not think that agents express courage regarding just any kind of fearful objects, but rather that agents express real courage regarding what is most fearful, namely circumstances that could result in their own deaths. It is not just any kind of death that passes muster, either, as Aristotle narrows the parameters even further.

> κυρίως δὴ λέγοιτ᾽ ἂν ἀνδρεῖος ὁ περὶ τὸν καλὸν θάνατον ἀδεής, καὶ ὅσα θάνατον ἐπιφέρει ὑπόγυια ὄντα. τοιαῦτα δὲ μάλιστα τὰ κατὰ πόλεμον… ἅμα δὲ καὶ ἀνδρίζονται ἐν οἷς ἐστὶν ἀλκὴ ἢ καλὸν τὸ ἀποθανεῖν…
>
> Most of all the person should be called courageous who is fearless about a noble death, and fearless about as many imminent occurrences as bring death with them. Most of these occurrences happen in war…All together, people express courage in dangerous situations in which they can either resist or die a noble death…[*NE* III.6 1115a32-35, 1115b4-5]

Agents express real courage in circumstances where standing up to what is fearful could result in their own noble deaths. A courageous agent is one who, for instance, engages in a skirmish on the battlefield to protect her loved ones from an invasion, risking a noble death should her defense efforts fail. This also means, of course, that courageous agents are able to withstand other sorts of frightening things that fall short of the severity of death, as Aristotle affirms in the next chapter. Nevertheless, Aristotle presents the courageous agent, in the primary sense, as one who withstands fearful circumstances that threaten to result in her own noble death.

It follows that to express courage is not pleasant in itself; Aristotle compares the courageous agent to the pugilist in the following passage in order to explain why being courageous is in fact painful.

> διὸ καὶ ἐπίλυπον ἡ ἀνδρεία, καὶ δικαίως ἐπαινεῖται. χαλεπώτερον γὰρ τὰ λυπηρὰ ὑπομένειν ἢ τῶν ἡδέων ἀπέχεσθαι. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν τέλος ἡδύ, ὑπὸ τῶν κύκλῳ δ᾽ ἀφανίζεσθαι. οἷον κἀν τοῖς γυμνικοῖς ἀγῶσι γίνεται. τοῖς γὰρ πύκταις τὸ μὲν τέλος ἡδύ, οὗ ἕνεκα, ὁ στέφανος καὶ αἱ τιμαί, τὸ δὲ τύπτεσθαι ἀλγεινόν, εἴπερ σάρκινοι, καὶ λυπηρόν καὶ πᾶς ὁ πόνος. διὰ δὲ τὸ πολλὰ ταῦτ᾽ εἶναι, μικρὸν ὂν τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα οὐδὲν ἡδὺ φαίνεται ἔχειν.
>
> This is why courage is painful, and it is rightly praised. For it is more difficult to withstand what is painful than to abstain from what is pleasant. But the goal of courage does not seem to be pleasant, but to be obscured by what surrounds. This also happens, for instance, in gymnastic competitions. The end is pleasant for boxers, namely the crown and the honors and that for the sake of which they compete, but to be knocked around is grievous, insofar as boxers are made of flesh, and the labor of training is also painful. Because these many aspects are painful, the end for which boxers compete seems small and not at all pleasant. [*NE* III.9 1117a33-b6]

Even though their ends are pleasant, the activities of boxing and being courageous are themselves painful; taking jabs to the stomach hurts, and so do the wounds one receives on the battlefield. Aristotle does not mean to imply with this analogy that the courageous agent loses sight of the noble and pleasant end of being courageous, even though he explains that the end of the boxer's activity does not seem pleasant to her given the pain she must endure on the way to winning. I

return to this point shortly, when discussing the sense in which the courageous agent is not, while the loose akratic and enkratic agents in courage's domain are, evaluatively ignorant. Nevertheless, I propose that Aristotle's goal with this analogy is to show that being courageous is painful, just like boxing or wrestling, even though the end of courageous activity is not itself painful.

This account of courage is Aristotle's, and he takes care to note that there are other senses in which his contemporaries describe courage, most of which he deems incorrect. At the beginning of *NE* III.8, Aristotle sums up his primary account of courage and begins to survey some different descriptions or accounts of the virtue which others have offered and with which he is familiar.

> ἔστι μὲν οὖν ἡ ἀνδρεία τοιοῦτόν τι, λέγονται δὲ καὶ ἕτεραι κατὰ πέντε τρόπους.
>
> Courage, then, is such as this, but there are other things that are called courage, and they come in five types. [*NE* III.8 1116a15-17]

The first of these, political or civic courage (πολιτική), Aristotle says seems most like the virtue he has just been describing,

> …ὅτι δι᾽ ἀρετὴν γίνεται, δι᾽ αἰδῶ γὰρ καὶ διὰ καλοῦ ὄρεξιν (τιμῆς γάρ), καὶ φυγὴν ὀνείδους, αἰσχροῦ ὄντος.
>
> …because it comes to be through virtue, for it arises on account of shame and a desire for what is noble (for it is desire for honor), and as a flight from reproach, which is something shameful. [*NE* III.8 1116a27-29]

Aristotle goes on to describe the other types of courage as less akin to the virtue he understands as the primary type of courage.[192] For instance, someone who is ignorant that the circumstances before her are worthy of fear seems courageous, for she faces up to them steadily and undisturbed;

[192] Broadie (Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics*: Trans., Intro., & Comm.) correctly comments on Aristotle's catalogue of five kinds of courage: "Ar. is emphasizing that an action is correctly said to be done from courage only if it is, and is done as, an instance of the [noble], rather than, say, because it is useful, or because one will be punished otherwise. This will be the main criterion that distinguishes actions of real courage from ones belonging to the five false types…In four of these the [noble] is absent, and in one (the first) it is present imperfectly," (323-324). Further, I considered the first of these simulacra of true courage in Chapter 2, Section 2.3 (p. 105) when surveying Aristotle's use of the opposition between 'ἁπλῶς' and 'κατὰ μεταφοράν' in the ethics.

yet she is not really courageous, because when her ignorance dissolves and she recognizes that the circumstance are indeed fearful, her steadiness diminishes. The main point Aristotle makes with his catalogue of the five types of courage is that most of them, with the possible exception of civic or political courage, are not expressions of the particular virtue that he has in mind when he discusses courage in the primary sense. This is why he ends the chapter focused on the catalogue by differentiating real courageous agents from the merely apparently courageous:

> οἵ τε δὴ ἀνδρεῖοι εἴρηνται ποῖοί τινες, καὶ οἱ δοκοῦντες ἀνδρεῖοι.
>
> It has now been stated what sort of people the courageous are, and what sort of people those who seem courageous are. [*NE* III.8 1117a27-28]

It is important to emphasize that the properly courageous person is not fearless on Aristotle's view; rather, she fears the right objects, in the right ways, as reason correctly prescribes.

> ὁ δὲ ἀνδρεῖος ἀνέκπληκτος ὡς ἄνθρωπος. φοβήσεται μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὡς δεῖ δὲ καὶ ὡς ὁ λόγος ὑπομενεῖ, τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα. τοῦτο γὰρ τέλος τῆς ἀρετῆς.
>
> The courageous person is as undaunted as a person can be. Yet she will also fear such things as she should and as reason submits, for the sake of the noble. For [the noble] is the end of virtue. [*NE* III.7 1115b10-13]

She has not extinguished her capacity for fear any more than the temperate agent rids herself of tactile appetite. Instead, the courageous agent holds or manages well with respect to fear, expressing her virtue for the sake of what is noble. With this in mind, we can infer that the affect of fear most of all (alongside confidence to a lesser extent) unites the character types in courage's practical domain.

Aristotle focuses on two vicious agents in courage's practical domain, the cowardly agent and the over-bold agent. Agents who have developed each of these character types hold differently with respect to the affects of fear and confidence.

> περὶ ταὐτὰ μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ὅ τε δειλὸς καὶ ὁ θρασὺς καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος, διαφόρως δ᾽ ἔχουσι πρὸς αὐτά. οἳ μὲν γὰρ ὑπερβάλλουσι καὶ ἐλλείπουσιν, ὃ δὲ μέσως ἔχει καὶ ὡς δεῖ.

> The coward, the over-bold person, and the courageous person are all related to the same things, but they hold toward them differently. For the first two are excessive and deficient with respect to them, but the last one holds in an intermediate way and as she should. [*NE* III.7 1116a4-7]

Just as the affect of tactile appetite unites the character types in temperance's practical domain, so too do the affects of fear and confidence unite the character types in courage's practical domain—even though agents with each character type in each practical domain manage or relate to the relevant affects differently. Aristotle describes the coward in terms of her relation to both affects, fear and confidence, but clearly privileges her description in terms of her relation to fear.

> ὁ δὲ τῷ φοβεῖσθαι ὑπερβάλλων δειλός. καὶ γὰρ ἃ μὴ δεῖ καὶ ὡς οὐ δεῖ, καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀκολουθεῖ αὐτῷ. ἐλλείπει δὲ καὶ τῷ θαρρεῖν. ἀλλ᾽ ἐν ταῖς λύπαις ὑπερβάλλων μᾶλλον καταφανής ἐστιν. δύσελπις δή τις ὁ δειλός, πάντα γὰρ φοβεῖται.
>
> The one who exceeds in being afraid is a coward. For she fears the objects she should not and she fears as she should not, and all such aspects attend her character type. She is also deficient in confidence, but her excessive pain is a clearer indication of her character. The coward is indeed a kind of despondent person, for she is afraid of everything. [*NE* III.7 1115b33-1116a3]

The coward is characteristically both deficient and excessive; she is deficiently confident, and she is also excessively fearful. However, Aristotle insists that it is more emblematic of the coward to be overly fearful than it is for her to display a lack of confidence. Just as Aristotle begins *NE* III.9 with the remark that courage deals more with fear than with confidence, here he depicts cowardice as related more to fear than to confidence. So far, the impression one gets is that fear is the more relevant affect when accounting for the character types in courage's practical domain.

His account of the over-bold agent, on the other hand, does not outright privilege her description in terms of fear; her description in terms of confidence also seems important.

> ὁ δὲ τῷ θαρρεῖν ὑπερβάλλων περὶ τὰ φοβερὰ θρασύς. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ἀλαζὼν εἶναι ὁ θρασὺς καὶ προσποιητικὸς ἀνδρείας. ὡς γοῦν ἐκεῖνος περὶ τὰ φοβερὰ ἔχει, οὗτος βούλεται φαίνεσθαι. ἐν οἷς οὖν δύναται μιμεῖται. διὸ καὶ εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοὶ αὐτῶν θρασύδειλοι. ἐν τούτοις γὰρ θρασυνόμενοι τὰ φοβερὰ οὐχ ὑπομένουσιν.

> The one who exceeds in being confident about fearful things is over-bold. The over-bold person seems to be boastful and to pretend to be courageous. Nonetheless, the over-bold wishes to appear as the courageous person regarding what is fearful. So, she mimics the courageous person in circumstances where she is able. This is why most of the over-bold are actually over-bold-cowards. For they project confidence in some cases but do not actually withstand what is fearful. [*NE* III.7 1115b28-33]

Aristotle describes the over-bold person as excessive with respect to both fear and confidence. Her excessive confidence does not enable or motivate her actually to risk her life by withstanding what is frightening. He presents her as one who feigns courage by puffing up and excessively demonstrating her confidence to those around her in frightening circumstances; her display, nevertheless, does not match her resolve. For Aristotle describes her as similar to the coward since she fails to withstand what is fearful. In fact, when Aristotle holds that most over-bold people are actually over-bold-cowards (θρασύδειλοι), he imparts that most over-bold agents are in reality cowards who additionally signal falsely that they are courageous by means of their overt displays of confidence.[193] Since Aristotle describes the over-bold agent as excessively confident, one might get the impression that she is so confident that she is fearless, that she is one who rushes into battle at every chance she gets, even at the most inopportune times, and one who generally never knows when to back down from something frightening. Yet it is clear that this is not the kind of person Aristotle thinks that the over-bold agent is. For not only does his account of over-boldness hold that most over-bold people are in fact "over-bold-cowards," but he also attributes fearlessness to a distinct, nameless disposition in courage's practical domain.

> τῶν δ᾽ ὑπερβαλλόντων ὁ μὲν τῇ ἀφοβίᾳ ἀνώνυμος (εἴρηται δ᾽ ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς πρότερον ὅτι πολλά ἐστιν ἀνώνυμα) εἴη δ᾽ ἄν τις μαινόμενος ἢ ἀνάλγητος, εἰ μηδὲν φοβοῖτο, μήτε σεισμὸν μήτε κύματα, καθάπερ φασὶ τοὺς Κελτούς.
>
> Of those who are excessive, the person who exceeds in fearlessness is nameless (it was said by us in earlier remarks that many character types are nameless), but she

[193] I treated Aristotle's deflationary account of over-boldness earlier in Ch 3, Section 3.3, pp. 168-170

> would be frenzied or insensible to pain, if she were to fear nothing, neither an earthquake nor a flood, just as they say about the Celts. [*NE* III.7 1115b24-28]

Aristotle does not return to this nameless disposition, but by including it here he demonstrates that fearlessness belongs to agents who have developed this Celtic habit, and not to those who have developed over-boldness.

As a result of these considerations, we can better understand the two vices and the virtue in courage's practical domain in terms of their relation to the affect of fear for the most part. While the cowardly agent is deficient with respect to confidence, more importantly, Aristotle insists that she is excessively fearful. Further, while the over-bold agent is excessively confident (insofar as she falsely signals that she is courageous), more importantly, Aristotle informs us that most over-bold agents are actually excessively fearful and he explicitly classifies them as cowards of a sort. Finally, the courageous agent is both confident and fearful according to reason's correct prescriptions, but Aristotle emphasizes that being courageous involves withstanding what is fearful more than it involves being confident. Clearly, fear is the star affect of courage's practical domain, since Aristotle holds that these three character types have more to do with fear than with confidence. So, as I begin to construct and analyze practical syllogisms in courage's practical domain, I focus on fear as the primarily relevant affect. What is more, since Aristotle thinks that agents most of all express courage when withstanding the most frightening things that threaten to result in their noble deaths, these are the sorts of circumstances I consider in the examples that follow.

Aristotle nowhere sets forth a practical syllogism involving courage, let alone either a loose akratic or enkratic practical syllogism having to do with fear. Unsurprisingly, neither does he provide any explicit examples of universal propositions that agents in courage's practical domain might adopt and exercise in their practical syllogisms. Nevertheless, we can come up with some likely universal propositions for courage's domain based on the overview I have provided, and by

modeling them after the universal propositions Aristotle sets forth at *NE* VII.3 for temperance's practical domain. I propose that the following two universal propositions both fit with what Aristotle reports about courage's practical domain and are similar in form to the universal propositions from temperance's practical domain. First, "every frightening thing must be withstood," is the ethical universal that I propose both the courageous and loose enkratic agents exercise in their complete practical syllogisms; I treat this as the correct ethical universal in courage's domain, just as Aristotle treats, "not everything sweet must be tasted," as the correct ethical universal in temperance's domain. Second, "every frightening thing must be fled from," is the alternative universal proposition that I propose the loose akratic agent exercises in her successful practical syllogism; I treat this as the incorrect ethical universal in courage's domain, just as Aristotle treats, "everything sweet must be tasted," as the incorrect ethical universal in temperance's domain. Further, by "frightening thing," in both cases, we must understand it to refer to what is most frightening, i.e., circumstances that could lead to an agent's noble death. These two ethical universal propositions do not exhaust all of the possible universal propositions available to agents in courage's practical domain, but they are two alternative universal propositions that agents with different character types in courage's practical domain are liable to exercise in their practical syllogisms; they do not seem out of place with respect to Aristotle's overview of courage's practical domain, and I have modeled them after the ethical universals he provides for temperance's domain at *NE* VII.3.

Simply presenting these ethical universals as available for agents to exercise in courage's practical domain is not by itself helpful for constructing courageous, loose akratic, and loose enkratic practical syllogisms. For there must be a reason why agents with the different character types exercise the universal propositions that they do. In temperance's practical domain, Aristotle

holds that the different agents' relations to the affect of tactile appetite explains why each character exercises a certain universal proposition in her practical syllogism. He blames the inferior practical syllogisms of strict akratic and enkratic agents on their evaluative ignorance of the temperate syllogism's particular proposition. Both agents at some point during their practical reasoning incorrectly evaluate the sweet thing before them as unqualifiedly good when it is actually only qualifiedly pleasant. A similar explanation holds for the inferior practical reasoning of loose akratic and loose enkratic agents in courage's practical domain. At some point during these self-controlled and un-self-controlled agents' practical reasoning, the fearful agents evaluate their perceptions of the frightening circumstances before them incorrectly as painful without qualification, or as unqualifiedly bad, when they are actually only qualifiedly painful; loose akratic and enkratic agents are evaluatively ignorant of the courageous practical syllogism's particular proposition in this way.

Suppose that a courageous agent, Andrea, finds herself in horrifying circumstances. A sizeable group of soldiers is attempting to invade her city, endangering the welfare of her loved ones. She aligns with her own sizeable group of defensive soldiers, but nevertheless, Andrea is afraid. She knows that the chances of incurring wounds are high, that her own noble death is on the table, and, since she is virtuous, she stands to lose the most of all.

> …ὁ μὲν θάνατος καὶ τὰ τραύματα λυπηρὰ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ καὶ ἄκοντι ἔσται, ὑπομενεῖ δὲ αὐτὰ ὅτι καλὸν ἢ ὅτι αἰσχρὸν τὸ μή. καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν μᾶλλον τὴν ἀρετὴν ἔχῃ πᾶσαν καὶ εὐδαιμονέστερος ᾖ, μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τῷ θανάτῳ λυπήσετα. τῷ τοιούτῳ γὰρ μάλιστα ζῆν ἄξιον, καὶ οὗτος μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν ἀποστερεῖται εἰδώς, λυπηρὸν δὲ τοῦτο. ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲν ἧττον ἀνδρεῖος, ἴσως δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον, ὅτι τὸ ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ καλὸν ἀντ᾽ ἐκείνων αἱρεῖται.
>
> Death and the wounds will be painful and involuntary for the courageous person, but she withstands them because it is noble or because it is not shameful to do so. Moreover, as much as she has excellence in its entirety and the happier that she is, the more she will be pained by her death. For to such a person, life is most worth living, and this person knows that she is detaching herself from goods of the greatest kind, and this is painful. But this in no way means that she is less courageous, and

> perhaps it means that she is even more courageous, because she chooses what is noble in war instead of those things. [*NE* III.9 1117b7-15]

The courageous person correctly evaluates the frightening circumstances that she perceives; in the example case, Andrea correctly assesses that meeting oncoming troops is painful and that it is in fact how soldiers die, and this makes her afraid. Nevertheless, she evaluates what she perceives as merely qualifiedly painful, for while what the courageous person endures when expressing her virtue brings her pain, the goal of her activity, the noble, is not painful. Aristotle affirms that courage's end is pleasant after detailing how painful expressing courage truly is:

> οὐ δὴ ἐν ἁπάσαις ταῖς ἀρεταῖς τὸ ἡδέως ἐνεργεῖν ὑπάρχει, πλὴν ἐφ᾽ ὅσον τοῦ τέλους ἐφάπτεται.
>
> Pleasant activity does not in fact belong to every excellence, except insofar as the activity lays hold of its end. [*NE* III.9 1117b15-16]

This recognition sets the courageous agent further apart from the pugilist considered earlier, for the courageous agent never loses proper sight of her activity's end, which we cannot say about the boxer whose painful activity makes her athletic end, the prize of winning, seem small. Because the courageous agent's character is undamaged and uncorrupted, she forms the proper evaluation of what is most frightening as merely qualifiedly painful, because she knows the ultimate goal of expressing courage is the noble, which itself is neither unpleasant nor painful.

Andrea's correct evaluation of the horror before her as only qualifiedly painful is the particular proposition of her practical syllogism. Her proper assessment of the fearful circumstances leads her to exercise the correct universal, "every frightening thing must be withstood," in her ethical practical syllogism. She appropriately fears meeting the oncoming troops in battle and evaluates it as only qualifiedly painful, exercises the correct universal proposition, and enacts the courageous choice to withstand and meet the frightening soldiers on the battlefield. The usual constraints on practical syllogisms also apply here, namely that Andrea successfully

enacts her choice so long as nothing interrupts her by either preventing her from acting or forcing her to do something else. If a steed on the defensive front line were to get cold hooves and turn around to trample her, then this would prevent the agent from enacting her courageous choice; supposing that being trampled also leads to immediate and serious injury, then it would also force her to do something else aside from enacting her courageous choice, for instance, tend to her wounds. These external sources are all that could interrupt her from enacting her choice.

Loose akratic and enkratic agents with respect to fear, on the other hand, are subject to practical stuttering, and the courses of their practical reasoning reflect this. Suppose that the loose akratic with respect to fear, Phoebe, also finds herself in horrifying circumstances just like the courageous agent. Phoebe knows both universal propositions, "every frightening thing must be withstood," and "every frightening thing must be fled from." For if she is genuinely un-self-controlled, then she must know what it would be correct to choose and to do. This crucially distinguishes the loose akratic from the cowardly agent in courage's practical domain who does not know both of the relevant universal propositions. The loose akratic ends up exercising the incorrect universal in her practical syllogism, but she still has potential knowledge of the correct universal that her reason ineffectually urges her to exercise; the coward exercises the incorrect universal in her practical syllogism, but she has no knowledge, not even in the potential sense, of the correct universal. The coward experiences no regret after choosing and performing a blameworthy action—her badness is continuous and she never realizes that she forms the incorrect evaluation of the oncoming troops, mistakenly evaluating meeting them on the battlefield as unqualifiedly painful. Phoebe the loose akratic, on the other hand, painfully reflects on her choice and action afterward, is aware of the blameworthiness of her action, and she is full of regret—her

badness is not continuous, for she realizes (when it is too late) that she incorrectly evaluated meeting the oncoming troops.

Nevertheless, Phoebe exercises the incorrect universal proposition and chooses and performs the blameworthy action of fleeing from the battlefield. In terms of Aristotle's classification of ways of knowing, the loose akratic knows the correct universal proposition in the potential way, since she does not exercise it in her practical syllogism; she knows the second universal proposition in the active way, since she does exercise it in her complete practical syllogism. What induces Phoebe to exercise the incorrect universal proposition is the non-rational, affective pull of fear. Just as tactile appetite pulls the strict akratic to evaluate the sweet thing incorrectly, the affect of fear pulls the loose akratic in courage's domain to evaluate the frightening circumstances she perceives, meeting the oncoming troops, incorrectly. Phoebe evaluates meeting the oncoming troops in battle as unqualifiedly painful and bad, when it is actually only qualifiedly painful, as courageous Andrea correctly assesses. Her incorrect evaluation of meeting the oncoming troops serves as the particular proposition of her practical syllogism. It pulls her to activate the incorrect universal, against her own reason's correct prescription, and to enact the choice to flee from the battlefield. It dawns on the loose akratic after she has chosen and performed the incorrect action that she formed an incorrect evaluation of the oncoming troops, but it is too late for this recognition to influence her choice and action.

To see how this translates into Aristotelian language, we can take the passage from *NE* VII.3 [1147a29-1147b4] where Aristotle sketches temperate and strict akratic practical syllogisms and substitute in the universal propositions and affect connected to courage's practical domain for those connected to temperance's.

> …if every frightening thing must be fled from, and this is a frightening thing insofar as it is one of the particulars, it is necessary for one who is able and not prevented

> at the same time to act on this. But whenever the universal opinion is in an individual preventing fleeing, and also the opinion that every frightening thing is painful, and that this is a frightening thing—this is the opinion that is active—and fear happens to be in the individual, then the one opinion reasons that the individual withstand the frightening thing, but fear leads the person away from the frightening thing, for fear is able to move each of the parts. What follows is that to be loosely akratic with respect to fear is in a way due to reason and opinion that is contrary to correct reason, not in itself, but accidentally—for the fear is contrary, but not the opinion.

Again, Phoebe knows both competing universal propositions, the one that encourages fleeing from, and the other that encourages withstanding what is frightening, albeit she knows the former in the active sense and the latter in the potential sense. If someone were to ask the loose akratic what it would be correct to do in frightening circumstances like those she perceives now, she could respond with the correct answer, and narrate something like a correct intention, but one that she does not ultimately follow through on. Prior to encountering the frightening circumstances, she seems to have active knowledge of the correct universal because she knows and can report what it is correct to do. Yet upon encountering the frightening circumstances, rather than correctly evaluate withstanding the oncoming troops as only qualifiedly painful—which is the true, courageous agent's evaluation—her relation to fear is responsible for her evaluation of it as unqualifiedly painful. Her evaluative ignorance is responsible for her activation of the universal proposition that leads to fleeing, which in combination with her incorrect evaluation of the oncoming troops, results in her enacted choice to flee. To be clear, Phoebe forms an incorrect evaluation, and the courageous agent forms a correct evaluation, of the same perceptual circumstance, namely meeting the oncoming troops. These different evaluations are equivalent to the particular propositions of the practical syllogisms these agents complete. The loose akratic is ignorant of the particular proposition of the courageous agent's practical syllogism in this precise sense: she does not evaluate the frightening circumstances before her as only qualifiedly painful, at least while she is choosing and acting. She is not factually ignorant that there are hostile troops

on the horizon, and she does not suffer from perceptual illusion, mistaking an actually peaceful group of people in the distance for hostile invaders.

The final practical syllogism left to consider in courage's practical domain is the one belonging to the loose enkratic with respect to fear. The loose enkratic agent is similar to the loose akratic agent in some important respects. First, each of these agents knows both alternative universal propositions about frightening things, even though each exercises a different universal in her complete practical syllogism. Second, both the loose akratic and enkratic agents suffer from evaluative ignorance of the courageous practical syllogism's particular proposition. And third, the practical syllogism that each of these agents completes does not exhaust her practical reasoning; both loose akratic and loose enkratic agents fail to follow through on their initial intentions. This similarity sets both loose akratic and loose enkratic agents apart from the courageous agent whose practical reasoning is continuously correct; Andrea's relation to fear causes no practical stutter.

Suppose that the loose enkratic agent, Tracy, finds herself in horrifying circumstances just like those that the courageous and loose akratic agents face. At first, Tracy incorrectly evaluates meeting the oncoming troops on the battlefield as unqualifiedly painful. Her inferior character renders her evaluatively ignorant and her inferior relation to fear pulls her to exercise the incorrect universal proposition, "every frightening thing must be fled from." However, she is not as evaluatively ignorant as the loose akratic agent, for she recognizes prior to following through on her intention to flee that she has evaluated the circumstances incorrectly. Before completing a practical syllogism that concludes with fleeing, it dawns on her that meeting the oncoming soldiers in battle is not unqualifiedly bad, but rather qualifiedly painful. So at first, Tracy suffers from evaluative ignorance of the courageous practical syllogism's particular proposition and begins structuring a practical syllogism that would conclude with the blameworthy choice and action of

fleeing. However, she is able to overcome her evaluative ignorance and she does not flee. Instead, since she no longer assesses the frightening circumstances incorrectly, Tracy exercises the correct universal proposition and enacts the choice to withstand the oncoming troops. She is nevertheless inferior to the courageous agent, for the courageous agent, being virtuous, never suffers from evaluative ignorance, and so does not have to overcome an incorrect evaluation of the frightening circumstances before her. The loose enkratic must overcome her evaluative ignorance of the courageous practical syllogism's particular proposition in order to perform the correct action of withstanding the frightening circumstances and to abandon her intention to flee from them. Importantly, Tracy does not overcome her evaluative ignorance for good; in future cases when similar frightening circumstances arise, her relation to fear will again result in evaluative ignorance that she has to overcome; she has a propensity for assessing such circumstances incorrectly at first, but recognizing before it is too late that her evaluation is incorrect.

Both loose akratic Phoebe and loose enkratic Tracy have practical reasoning that involves abandoning an intention, or foregoing one course of action, prior to concluding their own practical syllogisms and enacting their respective choices. Phoebe abandons an intention to withstand the oncoming troops when her knowledge of the correct universal becomes merely potential because of her relation to fear and she does not exercise it; after perceiving the oncoming troops and mistakenly evaluating meeting them as unqualifiedly painful, she lets go of that intention and instead enacts the choice to flee. Tracy, on the other hand, abandons her intention to flee from the oncoming troops when she overcomes her evaluative ignorance; after letting go of the incorrect evaluation and forming the correct one, she abandons her prior intention and enacts the choice to withstand meeting the troops on the battlefield.

5.2.2 Loose Akratic/Enkratic Practical Syllogisms in Generosity's Practical Domain



Figure 3. - Generosity's Practical Domain

Before constructing and analyzing generous, loose akratic, and loose enkratic practical syllogisms, I begin with an overview of the virtue of generosity's practical domain. This is one of three practical domains in which Aristotle explicitly claims that there is a loose form of *akrasia* at the end of *NE* VII.4, calling an agent with this character type "akratic with respect to desire for gain," [ἀκρατῆ κέρδους, 1148b13-14]. I pay special attention to desire for gain as the affect that unites the character types in generosity's practical domain for reasons that become clear from the overview in what follows. It is worth noting first that generosity is not the only Aristotelian virtue that has to do with an agent's relation to her finances; μεγαλοπρέπεια—magnificence—is another financial virtue to which Aristotle devotes attention in the ethics.

He carefully distinguishes magnificence from generosity in the opening lines of *NE* IV.2, the chapter about magnificence that comes just after Aristotle's chapter on generosity. Generosity, as we will see shortly, involves both financial giving and taking, whereas magnificence

> …οὐχ ὥσπερ δ᾽ ἡ ἐλευθεριότης διατείνει περὶ πάσας τὰς ἐν χρήμασι πράξεις, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὰς δαπανηρὰς μόνον. ἐν τούτοις δ᾽ ὑπερέχει τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος μεγέθει.
>
> …is not like generosity which relates to all actions that involve money/property[194], but rather it concerns only lavish spending. What is more, magnificence exceeds generosity in these expenditures in scale. [*NE* IV.2 1122a20-22]

[194] Sometimes I translate 'χρῆμα' as simply 'money' for the sake of convenience in this section, but importantly, this does not exhaust the sense of the term. It can refer generally to one's finances, which include but are not limited to one's liquid currency; 'χρῆμα' may also refer to one's goods or property.

Magnificence is a virtue suited only to those who are wealthy enough to engage in large-scale public spending. Further, magnificence especially involves financial giving, contrasted with generosity, which involves both giving and taking. Despite the differences between these two financial virtues, Aristotle maintains that magnificence is a higher order version of generosity, where the difference depends on the weight of an agent's coin purse. He writes, "For the magnificent person is generous, but the generous person is not for this reason magnificent," [ὁ μὲν γὰρ μεγαλοπρεπὴς ἐλευθέριος, ὁ δ᾽ ἐλευθέριος οὐδὲν μᾶλλον μεγαλοπρεπής, 1122a28-29]. Aristotle indicates that there is a one-way relation between these two virtues; the magnificent person's virtue must coincide or overlap with the virtue of generosity, since the magnificent person is also generous. If the magnificent person were by a turn of fortune to become less wealthy and as a result unable to spend lavishly on large-scale goods or projects any longer, then she would not all of a sudden lose her financial virtuousness. She would still retain her praiseworthy financial habits and spend appropriately, but now only on a "small or mid-sized" scale [1122a26].

Generosity, on the other hand, does not entirely coincide or overlap with magnificence, and this is for at least two reasons. First, generosity characteristically involves both financial giving and taking, while magnificence involves only expense; Aristotle does maintain that generosity is more concerned with financial giving than it is with taking, but taking in money or property still figures in to his account of generosity more than it figures in to his account of magnificence. Second, one must be wealthy in order to be magnificent, whereas someone of meager means can still be generous. In the light of the first of these reasons, it is not clear how desire for gain could unite the character types in magnificence's practical domain, for one who is wealthy and can spend on a large-scale is not characteristically concerned about running out of money or property and needing to take in more. Further, in the light of the second reason, it seems that magnificence is a

rarer virtue than generosity; people from all financial classes can be generous, whereas only the wealthy can be magnificent. Since generosity is the more common of the two financial virtues and the affect of desire for gain more clearly figures in to generosity's practical domain than it does magnificence's, I have chosen to set aside magnificence's practical domain and to focus instead on generosity's practical domain for the remainder of this section.

Aristotle opens *NE* IV with a lengthy treatment of generosity (ἐλευθεριότης), which he defines straightaway as an "intermediate disposition regarding money/property," [δοκεῖ δὴ εἶναι ἡ περὶ χρήματα μεσότης, 1119b22-23]. He holds that generous agents "are praised…regarding giving and taking money, but more so for their giving," [ἐπαινεῖται γὰρ ὁ ἐλευθέριος…περὶ δόσιν χρημάτων καὶ λῆψιν, μᾶλλον δ᾽ ἐν τῇ δόσει, 1119b23, 25-26]. Later, Aristotle again emphasizes that financial giving is more characteristic of the generous person than taking is.

> ἐλευθερίου δ᾽ ἐστὶ σφόδρα καὶ τὸ ὑπερβάλλειν ἐν τῇ δόσει, ὥστε καταλείπειν ἑαυτῷ ἐλάττω. τὸ γὰρ μὴ βλέπειν ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτὸν ἐλευθερίου.
>
> Being exceedingly enthusiastic about giving is very characteristic of a generous person, with the result that she keeps little money for herself. For it is emblematic of a generous person not to look at her own finances. [*NE* IV.1 1120b4-6]

It is not difficult to see how the affect of desire for gain might accompany inferior character types in generosity's domain, but it does not seem easy to attribute the same affect to the generous person whom Aristotle primarily describes as a giver. The issue here is similar to the one faced above when noting that desire for gain does not clearly figure in to the practical domain of magnificence. How could we describe a generous person as desirous of gain if she does not rank her own wealth over giving it to others, even to the point of leaving little for herself? The matter becomes more difficult when recognizing that Aristotle holds that generous people are not usually wealthy.

> πλουτεῖν δ᾽ οὐ ῥᾴδιον τὸν ἐλευθέριον, μήτε ληπτικὸν ὄντα μήτε φυλακτικόν, προετικὸν δὲ καὶ μὴ τιμῶντα δι᾽ αὐτὰ τὰ χρήματα ἀλλ᾽ ἕνεκα τῆς δόσεως.

> It is not easy for the generous person to be wealthy, not being someone who takes or keeps money, but someone who lets go of her money and does not value money for its own sake, but rather for the sake of giving. [*NE* IV.1 1120b14-17]

Since the generous person is someone who easily lets go of her money and is liable neither to take it from others nor to keep much for herself, it might appear that desire for gain is entirely foreign to her character. Yet the fact that she has need of money for the sake of giving is what makes gain worthwhile, even for a generous character such as her. So, the generous agent can be said to have a moderate desire for gain, only for as much as she needs for the purposes of giving.

Just as the temperate agent does not extinguish her tactile appetite, and just as the courageous agent does not rid herself of fear, the generous agent does not purge herself of desire for gain. Instead, as is the case with agents who express other virtues of character, she holds or manages well with respect to the relevant affect. Even though the generous person is not primarily a taker or a keeper of money, she nevertheless must have money or property to let go of and give, and for this reason she must in some sense desire gain and be a taker. Aristotle affirms that the generous person does in fact take, even though he emphasizes that expressing generosity has more to do with giving money.

> ὅθεν δὲ δεῖ, λήψεται, οἷον ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων κτημάτων, οὐχ ὡς καλὸν ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἀναγκαῖον, ὅπως ἔχῃ διδόναι.
>
> The generous person will take from the sources which she should, for example from her own belongings, where she recognizes taking as not noble but as necessary so that she might be able to give. [*NE* IV.1 1120a35-b2]

Aristotle presents the generous agent's own belongings as an example of an appropriate source from which she can take, but this is only an example; nothing in the text requires that this is the only appropriate source from which she can draw for financial gain. Indeed, Aristotle goes on to state that most generous people are those who have inherited their money, their property, and so on, and not those who acquired it through their own efforts [1120b11-12], suggesting that deceased

family members are also an appropriate source from which to take money. Moreover, it is worth pointing out that Aristotle does not preclude those who earn their money from being generous; he merely suggests that they are less likely to be generous in comparison with inheritors. Supposing that one of the few generous money-makers is a tradesperson, for instance a house builder, and that she exchanges her services for money, then she appropriately takes from those who employ her.

Admittedly, in both the inheritance and money-making examples just presented, the money the generous agents take becomes their own so that they can ultimately give from their own stores, but they do nevertheless take in order to fill their own stores. We can infer that generous agents are in fact desirers of gain, just as they are takers, but that they neither desire nor take money for its own sake, but rather so that they might have money to give in order to express their virtue. So, despite Aristotle's early insistence that generosity has more to do with giving than taking money, it is an inescapable feature of the generous agent's practical life that she must take money from somewhere in order to have some to give; after all, she is not wealthy enough to express magnificence and her finances are limited in comparison. In what is his fullest account of generosity, Aristotle describes the generous person as both a giver and a taker, but as one who gives and takes money in the appropriate, correct ways.

> τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος δὴ μεσότητος οὔσης περὶ χρημάτων δόσιν καὶ λῆψιν, ὁ ἐλευθέριος καὶ δώσει καὶ δαπανήσει εἰς ἃ δεῖ καὶ ὅσα δεῖ, ὁμοίως ἐν μικροῖς καὶ μεγάλοις, καὶ ταῦτα ἡδέως. καὶ λήψεται δ᾽ ὅθεν δεῖ καὶ ὅσα δεῖ. τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ περὶ ἄμφω οὔσης μεσότητος, ποιήσει ἀμφότερα ὡς δεῖ.
>
> Since generosity is an intermediate regarding both giving and taking money, the generous person will give and spend on the things that she should and as much as she should, on small and great projects alike, and she will do these things pleasantly. She will also take from the sources that she should and as much as she should. Because the virtue is an intermediate regarding both [giving and taking], she will do both as she should. [*NE* IV.1 1120b27-32]

The generous person gives money both in the correct quantity and to the correct people and causes, and she takes money both in the correct quantity and from the correct sources. In order to understand what it means to give or take incorrectly on Aristotle's account, we must turn attention to the two vicious character types he identifies in generosity's practical domain: wastefulness and stinginess.

Aristotle describes both of these vicious character types according to their relations to giving and taking.

> ἡ μὲν οὖν ἀσωτία τῷ διδόναι καὶ μὴ λαμβάνειν ὑπερβάλλει, τῷ δὲ λαμβάνειν ἐλλείπει, ἡ δ᾽ ἀνελευθερία τῷ διδόναι μὲν ἐλλείπει, τῷ λαμβάνειν δ᾽ ὑπερβάλλει…
>
> Wastefulness is excessive with respect to giving but not taking, for it is deficient with respect to taking, while stinginess is deficient with respect to giving, but excessive with respect to taking… [*NE* IV.1 1121a12-15]

The genuinely wasteful person spends or gives away too much money without taking any, and Aristotle thinks that this combination of giving and taking is rare, since an agent with this character would quickly run out of money or property to give away [1121a16-19]. This is reminiscent of Aristotle's remarks about the rarity of the deficient vice of insensibility in temperance's practical domain. What is more, Aristotle thinks that the vice of wastefulness is "easily cured by coming of age and by poverty," [1121a20-21] and that it is likely to resolve into the virtue of generosity. For both the wasteful agent and the generous person characteristically give more than they take, which makes them alike when contrasted with the stingy agent who characteristically takes more than she gives. The fact that both wasteful and generous agents are characteristically not takers explains why wastefulness is easily cured and why the generous agent must in fact desire gain. When the wasteful agent runs out of her own funds and cannot give any more, she in turn desires gain to restore her finances, and, as Aristotle assumes, she learns from this lesson to restrain her giving to appropriate amounts and to appropriate recipients. Recognizing that the generous and wasteful

agents are similar with respect to taking, Aristotle declares that wastefulness is not really the worst character type in generosity's domain.

> διὸ καὶ δοκεῖ οὐκ εἶναι φαῦλος τὸ ἦθος. οὐ γὰρ μοχθηροῦ οὐδ᾽ ἀγεννοῦς τὸ ὑπερβάλλειν διδόντα καὶ μὴ λαμβάνοντα, ἠλιθίου δέ
>
> This is why [wastefulness] does not seem to be a bad character type. For it is not emblematic of the wretched or of the inferior person to be an excessive giver and not a taker, but rather it is characteristic of a fool. [*NE* IV.1 1121a25-27]

Because it is rare and easy to cure, Aristotle sets genuine wastefulness aside and focuses on stinginess as the more common vice in generosity's domain. Interestingly, when turning to his discussion of stinginess, Aristotle seems to blend the two vicious character types he has just explicitly distinguished.

> ἀλλ᾽ οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀσώτων…καὶ λαμβάνουσιν ὅθεν μὴ δεῖ, καὶ εἰσὶ κατὰ τοῦτο ἀνελεύθεροι.
>
> But many of those who are wasteful also take from sources they should not, and so according to this, they are also stingy. [*NE* IV.1 1121a30-33]

Rather than dissolve the distinction between the two vices, Aristotle is merely trying to show that most people who give and spend money inappropriately are also in fact people who take money in inappropriate ways and from inappropriate sources. So, he retains the description of 'wasteful' to refer to the excessive giving that accompanies stinginess.[195] The case here is similar to what Aristotle holds about the vice of over-boldness in courage's practical domain: most over-bold agents are actually cowards because they retreat from what is frightening in spite of their puffed up displays, and most wasteful people are actually stingy because they take inappropriately in addition to their excessive giving.

[195] Broadie (Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics*: Trans., Intro., and Comm.) comments about this practical domain that "Aristotle is writing about abstract types, not concrete persons, since of course the word is 'proper to' all concrete persons who are wasteful, whether or not other characteristics also obtrude," (328). This view does not seem required by the text, but rather, as I have noted, the genuinely wasteful person might still be a concrete person, even if easily cured and rare, while Aristotle retains the adjective 'wasteful' to refer generally to people who give and spend money excessively.

While wastefulness is a rare vice in generosity's practical domain, Aristotle maintains that the vice of stinginess is relatively common.

> ἡ δ᾽ ἀνελευθερία ἀνίατός τ᾽ ἐστίν (δοκεῖ γὰρ τὸ γῆρας καὶ πᾶσα ἀδυναμία ἀνελευθέρους ποιεῖν), καὶ συμφυέστερον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τῆς ἀσωτίας. οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ φιλοχρήματοι μᾶλλον ἢ δοτικοί. καὶ διατείνει δ᾽ ἐπὶ πολύ, καὶ πολυειδές ἐστιν. πολλοὶ γὰρ τρόποι δοκοῦσι τῆς ἀνελευθερίας εἶναι.
>
> Stinginess is both incurable (for it seems that old age and all kinds of powerlessness make people stingy), and more in line with human nature than wastefulness.[196] For there are many more money-lovers than there are people liable to give. And stinginess stretches over much, and it has many forms. For there seem to be many ways of being stingy. [*NE* IV.1 1121b12-17]

Even though Aristotle characterizes stinginess as a vice that is excessive with respect to taking and deficient with respect to giving, he notes that stingy people sometimes only exemplify half of the description.

> …οὐ πᾶσιν ὁλόκληρος παραγίνεται, ἀλλ᾽ ἐνίοτε χωρίζεται, καὶ οἳ μὲν τῇ λήψει ὑπερβάλλουσιν, οἳ δὲ τῇ δόσει ἐλλείπουσιν.
>
> Complete stinginess does not arise in all cases, but sometimes it is divided, and some stingy people are excessive with respect to taking, while others are deficient with respect to giving. [*NE* IV.1 1121b19-21]

Aristotle goes on to describe the stingy people who are deficient givers as people who do not want to take from others in order to be able to give, either because they do not want to incur shame as a result of begging or because they are afraid of retributive consequences. These stingy people certainly have a desire for gain, yet it leads them to hoard their own money rather than to take money from others. In contrast are the stingy people who are excessive regarding taking. Aristotle describes them in the following passage, while also informing us about some of the professions these kinds of stingy agents take on.

[196] Here, Aristotle must be referring to the genuine vice of wastefulness, i.e., the combination of excessive spending and deficient taking, and not only to the characteristic of excessive spending he also uses the adjective 'wasteful' to describe.

> οἳ δ᾽ αὖ κατὰ τὴν λῆψιν ὑπερβάλλουσι τῷ πάντοθεν λαμβάνειν καὶ πᾶν, οἷον οἱ τὰς ἀνελευθέρους ἐργασίας ἐργαζόμενοι, πορνοβοσκοὶ καὶ πάντες οἱ τοιοῦτοι, καὶ τοκισταὶ κατὰ μικρὰ καὶ ἐπὶ πολλῷ. πάντες γὰρ οὗτοι ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ λαμβάνουσι, καὶ ὁπόσον οὐ δεῖ. κοινὸν δ᾽ ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῖς ἡ αἰσχροκέρδεια φαίνεται. πάντες γὰρ ἕνεκα κέρδους, καὶ τούτου μικροῦ, ὀνείδη ὑπομένουσιν.
>
> On the other hand, those who are excessive with respect to taking by taking everything they can get and taking from every source, for example those who work at stingy trades—the brothel-keeper and all such professions, and bankers who lend small amounts for great gain. For all these people take from sources that one should not, and in quantities that one should not. It appears that a shameful desire for gain is common to all of these. For they all withstand reproach for the sake of their desire for gain, and such a small gain. [*NE* IV.1 1121b31-1122a3]

Here Aristotle explicitly states that desire for gain accompanies these sorts of stingy people, and in fact claims that their love of gain is of the shameful or sordid sort (αἰσχροκέρδεια). They desire gain so much that they are willing to take money in excessive amounts and from inappropriate sources (such as their own friends, to whom they should instead be giving, 1122a10-11). In contrast, of course, is the generous person who only takes as much money as is necessary to have something to give and also only takes from appropriate sources (such as her own belongings).

Since the loose akratic agent Aristotle locates in generosity's practical domain at *NE* VII.4 is called "akratic with respect to desire for gain," and since Aristotle focuses on desire for gain so intently in this passage about stingy agents who go to excess regarding taking, in what follows I construct and analyze practical syllogisms related to this part of generosity's practical domain. What I mean is that the loose akratic and enkratic people I consider in this domain are agents whose desire for gain pulls them to take money from inappropriate sources and in excessive amounts, while the generous person I consider in this domain is immune to the former characters' improper relations to desire for gain. Aristotle nowhere sets forth an example of a generous practical syllogism, let alone examples of loose akratic or enkratic practical syllogisms in generosity's practical domain; neither does he provide any explicit examples of ethical universal propositions relevant to generosity's practical domain. Nevertheless, this is no impediment, just as

it was no impediment for courage's practical domain in the last section. We can come up with ethical universals relevant to generosity's practical domain that are consistent with Aristotle's overall remarks about the domain and by using the ethical universals he provides for temperance's domain at *NE* VII.3 as models.

First, I propose that, "not every opportunity to profit from friends must be taken," is the ethical universal that both the generous and loose enkratic agents exercise in their complete practical syllogisms. In other words, I treat this as the correct ethical universal in generosity's practical domain. Second, I propose, "every opportunity to profit from friends must be taken,"[197] as an alternative ethical universal that the loose akratic agent exercises in her complete practical syllogism; I treat this as the incorrect ethical universal in generosity's domain. These universals do not exhaust all of those available for agents to exercise in generosity's practical domain, but they are exclusive universals that fit with Aristotle's overall presentation of generosity's practical domain. For one thing, Aristotle clearly states that generous agents do not take money from friends, but rather that they give money to friends, countenancing the finances of friends as inappropriate sources from which to take; so it is fitting that one universal forbids and the other encourages taking money from this inappropriate source. Further, someone who makes a profit from her friends also takes excessively with respect to quantity; for if the finances of one's friends constitute an inappropriate source, then making any profit from her friends is additionally taking too much money from the inappropriate source. Finally, it is not difficult to see how an agent's relation to desire for gain might affect which of the two universals she exercises in her practical syllogism, for each has to do with making a profit and so financial gain. An agent's relation to desire for gain

[197] Alternatively, "every opportunity to make a profit must be taken," would work as the incorrect ethical universal, however I have presented it more specifically in order to contrast it directly with the correct ethical universal. Further, presenting the universals as exclusive of one another in this way fits the model Aristotle sets for universals in temperance's practical domain that I followed in presenting ethical universals for courage's practical domain.

determines which of the universal propositions she exercises in generosity's domain, playing the same role that an agent's relation to tactile appetite plays in temperance's domain, and the same role that an agent's relation to fear plays in courage's domain. The generous agent manages her desire for gain best of all the character types in generosity's domain, while the others to varying extents manage their desire for gain poorly and have inferior characters. First, I construct and analyze a generous practical syllogism that has to do with desire for gain and making a profit from one's friend, and then proceed to do the same for loose akratic and enkratic practical syllogisms in generosity's domain.

Suppose that generous Jerry has a friend, Maria, who has taken a liking to a painting that Jerry owns. Unbeknownst to Maria, Jerry does not much care for the painting—although it is worth a substantial amount of money and he inherited it from his uncle, Jerry usually keeps it in storage. Further, suppose that one night, when Jerry's family has invited Maria's over for dinner, Maria offers to purchase the painting. What does generous Jerry do? He has a desire for gain, but since he is generous, he does not desire gain or value money for its own sake, but only for the sake of having something to give to the appropriate sources, for instance, to his friends. Jerry perceives both that Maria is his friend and also that parting with the painting at the same cost it is worth, or even at a lower cost, will cause him no financial damage. As long as he receives the same amount of money that the artwork is worth, or even less, and retains enough money to continue giving and expressing his generosity, Jerry's desire for gain will be satisfied. Depending on the circumstances, Jerry might even give the painting to Maria at no cost, supposing that his capacity to continue expressing his virtue does not depend on retaining this one asset. Since Jerry perceives that money and gain are not good for their own sakes, but only for the sake of giving to friends such as Maria, he exercises the universal proposition, "not every opportunity to profit from friends must be taken,"

and enacts the choice to refrain from profiting from Maria. The generous choice that Jerry enacts could take a variety of concrete forms. Imagining that the painting is worth $1,000, Jerry could either enact the choice (1) to sell the painting to Maria for the amount that it is worth, (2) to sell it to Maria for less than that amount, or (3) to give the painting to his friend for free; all three of these are particular ways for Jerry to enact the generous choice to refrain from making a profit from his friend.

According to this analysis, Jerry perceives that financial gain in general is only qualifiedly good; it is instrumentally necessary for the sake of having the means to express his generosity. However, since Maria is his friend, he perceives that making a profit from her is not even qualifiedly good, since generous people characteristically give rather than take, especially when it comes to their financial dealings with friends. It strikes him as painful to profit from his friends, even if by doing so he might secure funding for future giving. Jerry's perceptual evaluation that it is in no way good or pleasant, but rather unqualifiedly bad, to take excess money from Maria serves as the particular proposition of his generous practical syllogism; his correct perceptual evaluation is what leads the generous agent to exercise the universal that discourages making a profit from his friends. The usual constraints on successful practical syllogizing apply here, namely that Jerry enacts his generous choice to refrain from profiting from his friend, Maria, as long as nothing external prevents him or forces him to do something else. If Jerry intends to sell or give the painting to Maria, goes to remove it from storage, but cannot find it, then this prevents him from following through and enacting the choice to sell or give it to her; supposing further that Jerry still wants to express generosity toward Maria, the fact that he cannot find the painting might compel him to do something else, such as offer to give or sell another similar painting to Maria.

External interruptions like these are all that could get in Jerry's way, as it were, to impede him from enacting his generous choice.

Just as strict akratic and enkratic agents are evaluatively ignorant of the particular proposition of the temperate agent's practical syllogism, so too are loose akratic and enkratic agents in generosity's practical domain evaluatively ignorant of the particular proposition of the generous agent's practical syllogism. Since their characters are damaged and corrupted when compared to the generous agent, loose akratic and enkratic agents experience a struggle between their desire for gain and what their reason correctly prescribes, leading them to misevaluate the same situation that the generous agent correct evaluates. As a result, their improper relation to desire for gain pulls them to depart from what their reason correctly prescribes and to exercise the incorrect, alternative universal proposition encouraging profiting from one's friends. Loose akratic and enkratic agents in generosity's domain misattribute unqualified goodness to money, when it is actually merely qualifiedly pleasant; putting them into Jerry's shoes, they perceive a friend's offer to purchase the painting as a chance to gain an unqualified good, irrespective of the fact that it involves profiting from a friend.

Suppose that a loose akratic agent from generosity's domain, Luke, faces a situation just like Jerry's: a friend offers to purchase a painting from Luke, and Luke does not care for the painting very much—although he has inherited it from his uncle and it is worth a substantial amount of money, he usually keeps it in storage. Since the loose akratic perceives his friend's offer as an opportunity to gain money, and since he desires money for its own sake, his desire for gain pulls him to exercise the universal proposition encouraging profiting from one's friends. Crucially, Luke knows both universal propositions: he knows the incorrect one he exercises in his practical syllogism in the active sense, while he knows the alternative universal discouraging profiting from

one's friends in the potential sense. He must know both universals if Luke is truly un-self-controlled, for otherwise one cannot say that he acts against what his own reason correctly prescribes. Because of his inferior relation to desire for gain, the loose akratic incorrectly evaluates the same perceptual circumstances that the generous agent correctly evaluates; he perceives making a profit from his friend as unqualifiedly good, he exercises the universal that leads to profiting from one's friends, and enacts the choice to profit from his friend.

To see how Aristotle might describe this loose akratic practical syllogism himself, we can take the passage from *NE* VII.3 [1147a29-1147b4] describing a strict akratic practical syllogism and this time substitute in the universal propositions and affect connected to generosity's practical domain for the universals and affect relevant to temperance's domain.

> …if every opportunity to profit from friends must be taken, and this is an opportunity to make a profit from a friend insofar as it is one of the particulars, it is necessary for one who is able and not prevented at the same time to act on this. But whenever the universal opinion is in an individual preventing profiting from one's friends, and also the opinion that every profit is pleasant, and there is money to be made—this is the opinion that is active—and desire for gain happens to be in the individual, then the one opinion reasons that the individual refrain from making a profit from his friends, but desire for gain leads the person to make a profit from his friends, for desire for gain is able to move each of the parts. What follows is that to be loosely akratic with respect to desire for gain is in a way due to reason and opinion contrary to correct reason, not in itself, but accidentally—for the desire for gain is contrary, but not the opinion.

Importantly, just as the ethical universals in temperance's practical domain are not contrary to one another, the real opposition in Luke's case is between his desire for gain and what his reason correctly prescribes. His relation to desire for gain leads him to abandon any intention to refrain from profiting from his friends, ignoring and rendering potential his knowledge of the universal proposition preventing it on the way to enacting the choice to profit from his friend. It is as though Luke's inferior relation to desire for gain and his perceptual misevaluation flips a toggle switch in his soul's rational nature and he activates his knowledge of the incorrect universal, leaving the

knowledge of the correct universal un-activated and in the back of his mind. There are many concrete ways in which the loose akratic can enact his choice to profit from his friend: he could charge her more money than the painting is worth or even negotiate that she rent it from him at an exorbitant monthly rate.

The loose akratic also regrets what he has chosen and done afterward. He realizes too late that taking his friend's money is not unqualifiedly good, but that financial gain is good for the sake of having something to give to his friends. His evaluative ignorance dissolves, but not in time to prevent him from enacting his blameworthy choice. He may have the opportunity to attempt to make things right with his friend by reaching out to her later and correcting his ethical mistake. However, this depends on how resistant to reason's correct prescription his desire for gain is. If Aristotle's remarks about the strict akratic always experiencing regret are extendable to the loose akratic in generosity's practical domain, then it is likely that Luke's desire for gain is a consistent victor in its contest with his reason's correct prescriptions. So, as much as the loose akratic might wish to correct his ethical mistake, when the opportunity arises to do so, he is likely to succumb again to desire for gain's influence and exercise an inferior universal condoning profiting from friends.

The last practical syllogism left to consider in generosity's practical domain belongs to the loose enkratic with respect to desire for gain. He, like the loose akratic, is also evaluatively ignorant of the particular proposition of the generous agent's practical syllogism. For the loose enkratic agent's character type is damaged and corrupted, or inferior, when compared to the character of the generous agent. Nevertheless, his character type is better than the loose akratic's, and this is reflected in the fact that the loose enkratic is able to overcome his evaluative ignorance prior to enacting a blameworthy choice. He abandons his incorrect intention in favor of enacting a

praiseworthy choice. Suppose that Gary the loose enkratic faces a situation similar to the one that generous Jerry and loose akratic Luke face in the preceding examples. One of Gary's friends offers to purchase a painting from him and Gary does not care much for it—although the painting is worth a substantial amount of money and he inherited it from his uncle, he usually keeps it in storage. At first, Gary mistakenly evaluates this as an opportunity to gain the unqualified good of money because of his improper relation to the affect of desire for gain. His mistaken evaluation and improper relation to the affect pull him to exercise the incorrect universal proposition that leads to profiting from friends and sets him up to follow through and enact a blameworthy choice.

However, prior to choosing and acting, it dawns on him that money is only qualifiedly pleasant in the sense that it is necessary for the sake of giving to appropriate recipients, for instance to friends such as the one now interested in purchasing the painting. Gary realizes through reflection or recollection of past instances of evaluative ignorance that money is not unqualifiedly good and lets go of the intention to profit from his friend. Having overcome his evaluative ignorance, he subsequently correctly evaluates the circumstances, exercises the correct universal preventing profiting from friends, and enacts the praiseworthy choice to refrain from doing so. There are just as many concrete ways available for Gary the loose enkratic to enact his choice as there are for the generous agent to enact his: Gary could (1) offer to sell the painting to his friend at the same cost that it is worth, or (2) at a lower cost, or (3) he could give the painting to his friend for free. How the loose enkratic agent concretely enacts his choice depends on his financial circumstances and, for instance, at what cost he can depart with the painting without disrupting his capacity to enact similarly correct choices in the future. This inconsistency with respect to his choice-making is what primarily sets his practical reasoning apart from the generous agent's. The generous agent experiences no practical stutter because of his desire for gain; Jerry fluidly enacts

the choice to refrain from profiting from his friend because he straightaway correctly evaluates money and gain as only qualifiedly good for the sake of having something to give. He is never evaluatively ignorant. The loose enkratic, on the other hand, must overcome his evaluative ignorance prior to enacting the correct choice; overcoming evaluative ignorance is characteristic of the self-controlled agent's practical reasoning as long as he remains self-controlled.

Both the loose akratic and loose enkratic agent abandon or let go of intentions prior to successfully concluding their own practical syllogisms. The loose akratic, Luke, lets go of his intention to commit to the universal proposition preventing profiting from friends; his knowledge of the correct universal is rendered potential since his desire for gain successfully pulls him to activate and exercise the incorrect alternative. The loose enkratic, Gary, on the other hand, abandons or lets go of the incorrect intention to profit from his friend once he overcomes his evaluative ignorance. Gary's desire for gain is not as successful as Luke's in leading him to exercise the incorrect universal, since Gary ends up exercising the correct universal in his successful practical syllogism and enacting a correct choice. This in fact sets both the loose akratic and enkratic agents apart from the generous agent whose choice-making is consistent and uninterrupted; Jerry's relation to desire for gain is pristine, and he without fail correctly evaluates opportunities for profit and gaining money or property as only qualifiedly good and pleasant. For the generous person takes pleasure in giving money [1120a24-27], while taking is merely a necessary means for having money to give [1120a34-b2].

5.2.3 Loose Akratic/Enkratic Practical Syllogisms in the Unnamed Virtue's Domain



Figure 4. - Love of Honor's/Unnamed Virtue's Practical Domain

Perhaps the most cryptic virtue in Aristotle's catalogue is the unnamed one that has to do with honor or recognition (τιμή). Aristotle devotes all of *NE* IV.4 to it—a small chapter that ranges only from 1125b1-25. He does not include a chapter about the unnamed virtue in the *Eudemian Ethics*, and it does not show up in his chart of the ethical virtues and their related vices at *EE* II.3. If it arises anywhere in the *EE*, it appears that Aristotle briefly mentions the unnamed virtue that has to do with honor or recognition in his concluding remarks about the higher order virtue that has to do with honor/recognition: μεγαλοψυχία.[198] Similarly, the chapter devoted to the unnamed virtue, *NE* IV.4, occurs just after a substantially longer chapter about μεγαλοψυχία. What is clear about both of these virtues is that each involves (1) an agent's self-evaluation of his own worthiness of honor or recognition, and (2) an agent's evaluation of the honor or recognition available for him to receive. Aristotle provides the following general definition and description of honor or recognition early in his chapter on μεγαλοψυχία.

> ἡ δ᾽ ἀξία λέγεται πρὸς τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθά, μέγιστον δὲ τοῦτ᾽ ἂν θείημεν ὃ τοῖς θεοῖς ἀπονέμομεν, καὶ οὗ μάλιστ᾽ ἐφίενται οἱ ἐν ἀξιώματι, καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τοῖς καλλίστοις ἆθλον. τοιοῦτον δ᾽ ἡ τιμή, μέγιστον γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν.

[198] There is no clear way to render this virtue into English: some scholars opt for a literal translation and refer to this virtue as "greatness of soul," yet this, to say the least, is not very informative and also fairly vague. Others have opted for "pride," and some for "dignity," which seem to be less vague ways of rendering 'μεγαλοψυχία,' since these labels bear clearer and more specific relations to honor. Nevertheless, "pride," for better or worse, is accompanied by a negative connotation in the history of ethics; rendering the virtue as "dignity" runs the risk of giving the impression that Aristotle is some kind of proto-deontologist. For these reasons, I have elected to leave this virtue untranslated.

> Worth is defined according to external goods, the greatest of which we might posit that we assign to the gods, and that which those in worthy positions most of all seek out, and the prize for the noblest deeds. Such a thing is honor/recognition, for it is indeed the greatest of the external goods. [*NE* IV.3 1123b17-20]

Not only does Aristotle classify honor/recognition as the greatest of external goods, but he also notes that some honors or recognitions are greater than others. This difference in scale is in some sense what separates μεγαλοψυχία from the unnamed virtue.

The relation between the two virtues involving honor/recognition is similar to the relation between the two financial virtues considered at the beginning of the last section: generosity and magnificence. Aristotle introduces the unnamed virtue at *NE* IV.4 by noting that it differs from μεγαλοψυχία in terms of scale, just as the difference between generosity and magnificence is one of scale.

> ἔοικε δὲ καὶ περὶ ταύτην εἶναι ἀρετή τις, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις ἐλέχθη, ἣ δόξειεν ἂν παραπλησίως ἔχειν πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ ἐλευθεριότης πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοπρέπειαν. ἄμφω γὰρ αὗται τοῦ μὲν μεγάλου ἀφεστᾶσι, περὶ δὲ τὰ μέτρια καὶ μικρὰ διατιθέασιν ἡμᾶς ὡς δεῖ.
>
> Regarding honor, just as in what was said before, there seems to be a certain additional virtue which appears to approximate μεγαλοψυχία in the same way that generosity appears to approximate magnificence. For neither of these involves greatness, but they condition us as is correct with respect to small and mid-sized things. [*NE* IV.4 1125b1-5]

Recall that one does not need to be wealthy in order to express the virtue of generosity, whereas the magnificent person must be wealthy in order to have the means necessary to spend lavishly on large-scale public projects. Since every magnificent person is also generous, while the reverse is not true, I made the point that magnificence is a higher order version of generosity. If a generous agent who was not wealthy before happens to become so, and she is able to make great expenditures on public goods as reason correctly orders, then we can also call this generous agent magnificent. Magnificence does not *replace* generosity, but rather it extends from generosity's practical domain and its expression greatly depends on an agent's external circumstances, for

instance, the weight of her coin purse. As Broadie (Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics*: Trans., Intro., Comm.) correctly notes about the pair of financial virtues, "…there is no reason why the [magnificent] person should not be [generous], since these two excellences operate in different contexts…"[199] For instance, expressing magnificence involves large-scale spending of money, whereas expressing generosity involves giving *and* taking money for the sake of spending on a small or mid-sized scale.

Aristotle clearly also thinks that the difference between the two virtues involving honor depends on a difference of scale, but I propose that he does not mean to imply that the μεγαλόψυχος also has the unnamed virtue regarding honor. Unlike the pair of financial virtues, each of which operates in a different context, the two virtues involving honor operate in the same context.[200] The virtue of μεγαλοψυχία, in other words, is not a higher order version of the unnamed virtue in the same way that magnificence is a higher order version of generosity. Μεγαλοψυχία is still be a higher order version of the unnamed virtue, but μεγαλοψυχία replaces the unnamed virtue, whereas magnificence does not replace generosity. To see this, recall that the magnificent person is not barred from expressing generosity, as Aristotle informs us that she makes use of her generosity in the course of expressing her magnificence [*NE* IV.2 1122b10-14]. However, the μεγαλόψυχος is barred from expressing the unnamed virtue. This becomes clear from following passage in which Aristotle holds that the μεγαλόψυχος will disregard or ignore (ὀλιγωρήσει) honors that are not great in scale because he[201] is above or beyond them.

> μάλιστα μὲν οὖν περὶ τιμὰς καὶ ἀτιμίας ὁ μεγαλόψυχός ἐστι. καὶ ἐπὶ μὲν ταῖς μεγάλαις καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν σπουδαίων μετρίως ἡσθήσεται, ὡς τῶν οἰκείων τυγχάνων ἢ

[199] *Ibid*. 32 [I replaced "munificent" with "magnificent," and "open-handed" with "generous" for consistency.]
[200] *Ibid*.
[201] I have elected to construe the μεγαλόψυχος and the person with the unnamed virtue as well as the other dispositions in these practical domains in the masculine, with the exception of the examples of agents who have developed these character types later in this section. The primary reason for this is to avoid confusion as I present an overview of these practical domains, for Aristotle clearly conceives of the agents in these practical domains as men (see especially 'ἀνδρώδη' at *NE* IV.4 1125b12).

> καὶ ἐλαττόνων. ἀρετῆς γὰρ παντελοῦς οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀξία τιμή, οὐ μὴν ἀλλ᾽ ἀποδέξεταί γε τῷ μὴ ἔχειν αὐτοὺς μείζω αὐτῷ ἀπονέμειν. τῆς δὲ παρὰ τῶν τυχόντων καὶ ἐπὶ μικροῖς πάμπαν ὀλιγωρήσει. οὐ γὰρ τούτων ἄξιος. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀτιμίας. οὐ γὰρ ἔσται δικαίως περὶ αὐτόν.
>
> The μεγαλόψυχός is most of all concerned with honor and dishonor. This person will be moderately pleased by great honors from good people since such a person is laying hold of what is proper to him, or even less than what is proper to him. For there could be no honor worthy of perfect virtue, but he will nevertheless accept the honor because they have nothing greater to assign to him. He will entirely disregard honor that he chances upon and also honor that he receives for small things. For he is not worthy of these sorts of honor. Further, he will similarly disregard and be unworthy of these sorts of dishonor. For such honors and dishonors will not rightly concern him. [*NE* IV.3 1124a4-12]

The μεγαλόψυχος is not concerned with small or mid-sized honors at all, while the person with the unnamed virtue is only concerned with small or mid-sized honors; μεγαλοψυχία concerns great honors exclusively [1125a34-35].

Aristotle further claims that the greatest honors or recognitions available for good people to bestow upon the μεγαλόψυχος may not be symmetrical to what he in fact merits. This is because of the connection that Aristotle thinks that the virtue of μεγαλοψυχία has with perfect or complete virtue. There is no honor or recognition worthy of complete virtue, and Aristotle holds that only agents with perfect virtue can develop and express μεγαλοψυχία.

> ἔοικε μὲν οὖν ἡ μεγαλοψυχία οἷον κόσμος τις εἶναι τῶν ἀρετῶν. μείζους γὰρ αὐτὰς ποιεῖ καὶ οὐ γίνεται ἄνευ ἐκείνων. διὰ τοῦτο χαλεπὸν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μεγαλόψυχον εἶναι. οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ἄνευ καλοκαγαθίας.
>
> It seems that μεγαλοψυχία is a certain crown of the virtues. For it makes them greater and does not arise without them. This is why it is in truth difficult to be a μεγαλόψυχος. For it is not possible without goodness and nobility. [*NE* IV.3 1124a1-4]

The virtue of μεγαλοψυχία depends on the other virtues for its expression and also intensifies an agent's expression of the other virtues. This relation between μεγαλοψυχία and the other ethical virtues appears to be what bars the μεγαλόψυχος from expressing the unnamed virtue. For someone with complete virtue is not worthy of chance or small honors, but only of the greatest ones, while

the person with the unnamed virtue is concerned with properly managing his desire for small and mid-sized honors. As Lear (Happy Lives and the Highest Good) correctly notes:

> But whereas the unnamed virtue with respect to honor discussed by Aristotle in the following chapter seems to be concerned with the regulation of the natural desire for honor per se, [μεγαλοψυχία] is focused more on one's understanding of oneself as already worthy of honor.[202]

The μεγαλόψυχος is already worthy of the greatest of the external goods because of his thoroughly virtuous character. He already manages the natural desire for honor well, otherwise, for instance, it would interfere with his proper exercise of courage.

When Aristotle refers to μεγαλοψυχία as the crown (κόσμος) of the virtues, noting both that it is not possible for an agent to express it without having all of the other virtues and also that it intensifies all of the others, he is in fact setting it apart from all of the other ethical virtues, including the unnamed one that also has to do with honor.[203] Μεγαλοψυχία is an ethical disposition that most concerns honor, since that is the highest prize available for his complete virtue, but Aristotle does not think that proscribes other affects and objects from μεγαλοψυχία's practical domain.

> μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ἐστίν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ὁ μεγαλόψυχος περὶ τιμάς, οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ πλοῦτον καὶ δυναστείαν καὶ πᾶσαν εὐτυχίαν καὶ ἀτυχίαν μετρίως ἕξει, ὅπως

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[202] Lear, Gabriel Richardson. (2006) Happiness and the Highest Good. Princeton University Press. 169

[203] An interesting question arises as a result of Aristotle's view that the μεγαλόψυχος has all of the other ethical virtues, namely: What is the relation between μεγαλοψυχία and εὐδαιμονία? In other words, is it necessarily the case that a genuine μεγαλόψυχος is also happy, blessed, or flourishing? The answer depends on whether achieving εὐδαιμονία depends on an agent being completely ethically virtuous alone, or whether one also needs to have developed all of the theoretical virtues in order to flourish. Lear (Happiness and the Highest Good) correctly points out that Aristotle only seems to hold that the μεγαλόψυχος has all of the ethical virtues, and not the theoretical virtues: "Aristotle says…that the great-souled person is great in all of the other virtues, but the context suggests that he has in mind the practical, and not the theoretical, virtues. Or at least there is no reason at this time to think he includes the theoretical virtues," (169, fn. 48). The debate between whether εὐδαιμονία or the best life is the social life of complete ethical virtue or the contemplative life of theoretical virtue is not one that I intend to settle in this work. Cooper, for example, has changed his mind on this point, holding at one time that the social life of ethical virtue is subordinate to the flourishing contemplative life of theoretical virtue (Reason and Human Good in Aristotle), and holding at a later time that the two lives comingle and that flourishing depends on the development and exercise of both ethical and theoretical virtue ("Contemplation and Happiness: A Reconsideration"). Nevertheless, I propose that the safest answer at present to the question of whether μεγαλοψυχία necessarily entails flourishing is that it does not, for it seems likely that Aristotle would have made this point in the text given how significant this point would be to his overall ethical theory.

> ἂν γίνηται, καὶ οὔτ᾽ εὐτυχῶν περιχαρὴς ἔσται οὔτ᾽ ἀτυχῶν περίλυπος. οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ τιμὴν οὕτως ἔχει ὡς μέγιστον ὄν.
>
> The μεγαλόψυχος is most of all concerned with honor, as it has been said, but he is also disposed moderately toward wealth and power and all good and bad fortune, whatever happens to arise, and he is neither exceedingly glad at good fortune nor deeply pained by bad fortune. For he does not even hold about honor that it is the greatest thing. [*NE* IV.3 1124a13-17]

Since μεγαλοψυχία casts such a wide net, it appears to be an extra layer of ethical virtue, so to speak, or an ethical virtue that supervenes on all of the others in a general way. Broadie (Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics*: Trans., Intro., Comm.) crafts a distinction between μεγαλοψυχία and what she terms, "simple excellence" or "ordinary excellence" in order to make a similar point.

> Aristotle might have defined [μεγαλοψυχία] as the excellence called into play when ordinary excellence is challenged by major turns of fortune. Or he might straightforwardly have identified it as the disposition to prize excellence above all else. But while these are effects of Aristotelian [μεγαλοψυχία], its essence remains linked to respect from others.[204]

Separating μεγαλοψυχία from "ordinary excellence" helps to make sense out of what it means for μεγαλοψυχία to be the crown of the virtues. The μεγαλόψυχος recognizes his character virtue and his continuous virtuous activity as worth more than anything else; he grasps that there is no prize that matches up to what he merits according to his correct self-evaluation as virtuous, that even the greatest of the external goods, honor, falls short, let alone wealth, power, and fortune. In some sense, the μεγαλόψυχος sees virtue as its own reward and this must be the reason that Aristotle invokes the symbolism of a crown or adornment when describing μεγαλοψυχία's relation to the other virtues.

Nevertheless, as Broadie notes, μεγαλοψυχία is connected most of all to respect, honor, or recognition from other good people, even though what these good people have to bestow on him

[204] Broadie. (Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics*: Trans., Intro., and Comm.) 31 [I replaced "greatness of soul," with "μεγαλοψυχία" for consistency.] Broadie makes clear in Fn. 149 to her "Philosophical Introduction" that: "This 'simple excellence' is set forth for the purpose of analysis. It may be that no such actuality is possible for human beings…" (85).

can never be symmetrical to what he merits. In the continuation of the passage I have cited above, Broadie writes that Aristotle wants to emphasize that, even though there is no honor or recognition that matches up to complete virtue,

> …in principle, there can be external respect that it would be right to care about within reason. We should therefore expect the [μεγαλόψυχος] to go to some trouble, rather than none at all, to explain himself where necessary to those whose respect he deserves, i.e. those who respect excellence.[205]

The μεγαλόψυχος concerns himself with ensuring that his complete virtue is understood correctly by good people whose honor and recognition of his excellence matters. As Taylor (Aristotle: *Nicomachean Ethics* Books II-IV) correctly notes, Aristotle's μεγαλόψυχος

> …is the agent of complete Aristotelian excellence, whose sense of superiority is grounded in his or her awareness of that excellence, an awareness which expresses itself in detachment from any values other than those of excellence itself.[206]

The effects of μεγαλοψυχία which Broadie points out are important to consider. First, we might think that μεγαλοψυχία contributes to an agent's endurance as virtuous over time, for instance, as he becomes wealthier or more famous and discovers novel challenges to exercising virtue around people who are and circumstances that are "larger-than-life." Second, we might think that attending properly to μεγαλοψυχία as a virtue contributes to ensuring that social respect and recognition of the incommensurable worth of perfect virtue does not diminish; an agent's proper exercise of μεγαλοψυχία serves as a communal reminder of what really matters most in practical life. We can think of the honors and recognitions that an agent deserves for being completely and actively virtuous as the greatest honors; in other words, we can think of these as the greatest of the greatest external goods.

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[205] *Ibid*. [I replaced "great-souled person" with "μεγαλόψυχος" for consistency.]
[206] Taylor, C.C.W (Aristotle: *Nicomachean Ethics* Books II-IV) xxi.

Since μεγαλοψυχία involves the greatest honors, while the unnamed virtue involves small and mid-sized honors, the μεγαλόψυχος cannot have the unnamed virtue. Broadie aptly points out that the μεγαλόψυχος "cannot have the nameless excellence if it necessarily involves minor worth, and in any case is likely to lack it by being too unambitious for the honours in question."[207] It is nevertheless still possible to think of μεγαλοψυχία as a higher order version of this unnamed virtue, even though μεγαλοψυχία replaces the unnamed virtue in the soul of one who has achieved both complete virtue and a high social stature. This is the sense in which the analogy between the pair of virtues involving honor and the pair of financial virtues in terms of differences in scale breaks down. In both pairs, there is one virtue that is of a higher order than the other, but in the case of the financial virtues, an agent can have both simultaneously, whereas in the case of the two involving honor, an agent can only have one at a time. So, on my estimation, it is appropriate to set aside μεγαλοψυχία as I construct and examine practical syllogisms that have to do with desire for honor/recognition. Instead, in what follows, I focus on practical syllogisms in the unnamed virtue's domain. For this is the practical domain concerned with the proper management of an agent's desire for ordinary honor/recognition.

As I noted at the beginning of this section, there is no *EE* chapter on the unnamed virtue. Nevertheless, Aristotle does appear to mention it in the concluding remarks of *EE* III.5, that ethical treatise's chapter on μεγαλοψυχία.

> καίτοι δόξειεν ἂν ἐναντίον εἶναι τῷ μεγάλων ἀξίῳ ὄντι μεγάλων τὸ μικρῶν ὄντα ἄξιον μικρῶν ἀξιοῦν ἑαυτόν. οὐκ ἔστι δ᾽ ἐναντίος οὔτε τῷ μὴ μεμπτὸς εἶναι ὡς γὰρ ὁ λόγος κελεύει ἔχει. καὶ ὁ αὐτός ἐστι τῇ φύσει τῷ μεγαλοψύχῳ ὧν γὰρ ἄξιοι, τούτων ἀξιοῦσιν αὑτοὺς ἄμφω. καὶ ὃ μὲν γένοιτ᾽ ἂν μεγαλόψυχος, ἀξιώσει γὰρ ὧν ἐστιν ἄξιος…
>
> But still it might seem that someone who is worthy and thinks himself worthy of small things is contrary to someone who is great and worthy of great things. But he is not contrary to that one and he is not blameworthy, since he holds himself as

[207] Broadie (Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics*: Trans., Intro., and Comm.) 31

> reason prescribes. Further, this person has the same nature as the μεγαλόψυχος, since both think themselves worthy of the things of which they are worthy. This person can also become a μεγαλόψυχος, for he will think himself worthy of that which he is worthy… [*EE* III.5 1233a18-25]

Aristotle proscribes greatness from the character who both is worthy and estimates himself worthy of small things, but he emphasizes that such a person is not blameworthy; he obeys his own correct rational prescription when it comes to evaluating both his own worthiness and also the sorts of honor or recognition which correspond to his worthiness. Although Aristotle does not label this person or his character type as virtuous here, Aristotle does maintain that this person and the μεγαλόψυχος *share the same nature* insofar as they both correctly estimate their own worth and seek out honor or recognition that corresponds with their correct self-evaluations. If Aristotle does indeed have the unnamed virtue in mind at the end of *EE* III.5, then the passage above serves as justification for the view that μεγαλοψυχία replaces the unnamed virtue in the soul of a person who undergoes a social transformation, for instance, from the middle class into the upper echelons of the rich and powerful. People with the unnamed virtue cannot stretch their virtue as widely as the μεγαλόψυχος or provide the grandest displays of their virtue, but this is not a fault on their part; they are still praiseworthy since they manage their natural desire for honor and recognition in the correct way, as reason orders; they desire honor or recognition that is symmetrical to what they in fact merit.

I propose that there can be no loose forms of *akrasia* or *enkrateia* in μεγαλοψυχία's practical domain, since Aristotle maintains that this crown of the virtues is only achievable for those who are already thoroughly virtuous and have reached a high social status. The rational and non-rational natures of a thoroughly virtuous agent's soul are perfectly aligned; such an agent's non-rational nature receives and obeys his rational nature's correct prescriptions unfailingly in all practical domains. So, if developing and expressing μεγαλοψυχία depends on whether an agent is

thoroughly virtuous, then his soul's natures cannot be misaligned in the way that Aristotle describes akratic and enkratic souls at *NE* I.13. Considering the so-called vicious character types in μεγαλοψυχία's practical domain—the deficiently vicious μικρόψυχος and the excessively vicious χαῦνος—bears this out more clearly. The μικρόψυχος is also worthy of the greatest of external goods, but his incorrect self-evaluation results in a miserable self-image. He thinks of himself as less than worthy of the greatest honor or recognition, even though he is worthy of it. Aristotle notes that the μικρόψυχος occurs more often and is more harmful than the excessively vicious character in μεγαλοψυχία's practical domain, the χαῦνος, or the conceited person who thinks of himself as worthy of the greatest honor even though he is not [*NE* IV.3 1125a32-34].

It is worth pointing out that it is not clear whether Aristotle really counts these two inferior character types in μεγαλοψυχία's practical domain as *vices*, for he notes:

> οὐ κακοὶ μὲν οὖν δοκοῦσιν εἶναι οὐδ᾽ οὗτοι, οὐ γὰρ κακοποιοί εἰσιν, ἡμαρτημένοι δέ.
>
> These [characters] do not seem to be bad, for they are not injurious to anyone else, but they miss their own marks [of self-evaluation]. [*NE* IV.3 1125a18-19]

These mark-missers only harm themselves on Aristotle's view because they do not understand their real worth, and this affects the choices they make and the actions they set out to perform. The μικρόψυχος's poor self-evaluation leads him to withdraw from pursuing grand actions with which he could display his other virtues; his lowly self-estimate also leads him to turn down the honors that good people wish to bestow on those who choose and perform such actions [1125a24-27]. For these reasons, his other virtues are not intensified; he is unable to stretch them out, as it were, in order to continue his upward trajectory toward μεγαλοψυχία. He must acknowledge that he is worthy of the greatest honors if he is to propel himself toward choice and action that result in the greatest honor or recognition of the good people in his community, but he does not. This does not mean that he inappropriately manages the desire for ordinary honor and recognition, but he

undercuts himself when it comes to the greatest honor that he could win for himself; he does not give himself enough credit. The conceited person, on the other hand, thinks too highly of himself. He likewise incorrectly evaluates his own worth, but instead of undercutting himself, this character misses the mark in the other direction. This incorrect self-evaluation as worth more than one really is turns out to be not as harmful as the μικρόψυχος's because it is both easier for the agent himself to notice and also for those in his community to see through.

> οὐ γὰρ ἄξιοι ὄντες τοῖς ἐντίμοις ἐπιχειροῦσιν, εἶτα ἐξελέγχονται…
>
> For being unworthy, [the conceited] attempt to put themselves in honorable positions[208], and then are fully refuted…[*NE* IV.3 1125a28-29]

The conceited do not hold back from trying to perform grand actions and striving to win the greatest honor and recognition for themselves. However, they fail to follow through on the grand actions because they lack the ability and the good people in their communities, recognizing this, correctly refuse to bestow the greatest honors on them. So, conceitedness appears to be a self-correcting vice on Aristotle's account. When a conceited person fails to accomplish what is most honorable, it is likely that he afterward acknowledges that he is unworthy of the greatest honors which he set out to win, for the members of his community have seen through the charade.[209] This is why Aristotle thinks that conceitedness is more opposed to μεγαλοψυχία than μικροψυχίᾳ and

[208] Rowe (Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics* Trans., Intro., and Comm.) translates, "τοῖς ἐντίμοις," as "public competition," which, although not a literal translation, helps to make clear the spirit of what Aristotle means. The conceited throw themselves into difficult situations that they are unable to navigate, like an untrained runner who enters into an Olympic sprinting event, in which case there is no way of obscuring the fact that she is unworthy of the honor or recognition for winning the event.

[209] Admittedly, it seems unlikely that conceitedness is self-correcting in every case. Consider someone who attempts an activity for the sake of obtaining honor or recognition and fails in front of a large audience, perhaps making a fool of himself. He can either realize that he was mistaken in making his attempt and as a result be put in his place, or he can develop a kind of resentment for the people who he thinks fail to recognize his worthiness. It is curious that Aristotle poses the first of these options in the text, but not the second. He might have in mind that the audience who witnesses this person's failure at achieving honor will not easily permit him to try his hand at the activity again, forever remembering the mismatch between what he is actually worth and what he tried to accomplish. Alternatively, if conceitedness is not a vice in the usual sense, then perhaps it is because the conceited person is otherwise fully virtuous (lacking only the higher order virtue of μεγαλοψυχία) that he does not develop the kind of resentment that I have just described.

occurs less frequently than μικροψυχίᾳ. For all that, nevertheless, this does not seem to entitle anyone to the view that these two character types are *vices* in the ordinary sense of the term for Aristotle; for both might very well have the unnamed virtue involving small and mid-sized honor or recognition, even though they miss the mark when it comes to large-scale honor or recognition. If these characters who fall short of μεγαλοψυχία still have the unnamed virtue, then they cannot be akratic or enkratic with respect to desire for honor or recognition.[210]

In Chapter 3, I unpacked Aristotle's unity constraint on ethical virtue, noting that on his view, an agent cannot be properly or genuinely virtuous without having acquired or developed all of the ethical virtues and the intellectual virtue of practical wisdom.[211] It might *prima facie* appear that the relation between μεγαλοψυχία and the unnamed virtue calls the unity constraint into question. For if the virtue of μεγαλοψυχία is able to replace the unnamed virtue, then the μεγαλόψυχος will have all of the ethical virtues *except for* the unnamed virtue. However, this problem only arises if one ignores Aristotle's claim above from *EE* III.5 that an agent with the unnamed virtue can become or transform into a μεγαλόψυχος should his external circumstances change. For once an agent becomes worthy of the greatest honors because of his grand displays of excellence, he no longer has any use for the unnamed virtue; small and mid-sized honors become meaningless to him. Should the μεγαλόψυχος as a result of bad fortune lose his high status and become unworthy of the greatest honors and recognitions, then the unnamed virtue might, in turn, replace μεγαλοψυχία as he becomes worthy of small and mid-sized honors. There is nothing that bars such an agent from being completely virtuous if we understand, as Broadie correctly points out, that the unnamed virtue and μεγαλοψυχία are virtues that operate in the same context. When

[210] It is worth pointing out that agents with the unnamed virtue cannot be akratic or enkratic at all, given Aristotle's unity constraint on character virtue. If they truly have developed the unnamed virtue, then on Aristotle's account, they have developed all of the other virtues, too (with the exception of μεγαλοψυχία).
[211] See Ch. 3, Section 3.2, pp. 142-150

someone becomes worthy of the greatest honors and acknowledges this about himself, then he no longer has to manage his desire for lower honors; when someone is only worthy of small or mid-sized honors and acknowledges this, then he is barred from expressing μεγαλοψυχία and instead expresses the unnamed virtue.

Finally, it is appropriate to turn direct attention to the unnamed virtue and the small chapter that Aristotle devotes to it: *NE* IV.4. I have chosen to reproduce most[212] of this chapter below to demonstrate just how little attention Aristotle devotes to the lower order virtue and why I have had to focus on μεγαλοψυχία to such a great extent in preparation for discussing it.

> ὥσπερ δ᾽ ἐν λήψει καὶ δόσει χρημάτων μεσότης ἔστι καὶ ὑπερβολή τε καὶ ἔλλειψις, οὕτω καὶ ἐν τιμῆς ὀρέξει τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ ἧττον, καὶ τὸ ὅθεν δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ. τόν τε γὰρ φιλότιμον ψέγομεν ὡς μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ τῆς τιμῆς ἐφιέμενον, τόν τε ἀφιλότιμον ὡς οὐδ᾽ ἐπὶ τοῖς καλοῖς προαιρούμενον τιμᾶσθαι. ἔστι δ᾽ ὅτε τὸν φιλότιμον ἐπαινοῦμεν ὡς ἀνδρώδη καὶ φιλόκαλον, τὸν δ᾽ ἀφιλότιμον ὡς μέτριον καὶ σώφρονα, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις εἴπομεν. δῆλον δ᾽ ὅτι πλεοναχῶς τοῦ φιλοτοιούτου λεγομένου οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ φέρομεν ἀεὶ τὸ φιλότιμον, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπαινοῦντες μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ πολλοί, ψέγοντες δ᾽ ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ. ἀνωνύμου δ᾽ οὔσης τῆς μεσότητος, ὡς ἐρήμης ἔοικεν ἀμφισβητεῖν τὰ ἄκρα. ἐν οἷς δ᾽ ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις, καὶ τὸ μέσον. ὀρέγονται δὲ τῆς τιμῆς καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ ἧττον. ἔστι δὴ καὶ ὡς δεῖ. ἐπαινεῖται δ᾽ οὖν ἡ ἕξις αὕτη, μεσότης οὖσα περὶ τιμὴν ἀνώνυμος.
>
> Just as there is an intermediate, an excess, and a deficiency regarding the giving and taking of money, so too regarding desire for honor: there is desiring honor more or less than one should, there are sources from which one should desire it, and a manner in which one should desire it. For we blame the honor-lover both for longing for honor more than one should and also for seeking it from sources one should not, while we censor the one who is not honor-loving for not choosing to be honored for his noble deeds. Yet sometimes we praise the honor-lover as virile and a nobility-lover, and sometimes we praise the one who is not honor-loving as measured and temperate, just as we said in our earlier accounts. Since honor-lover is said in many ways, it is clear that we do not always use the term 'honor-lover' to refer to the same character, but we praise someone for being an honor-lover when he desires honor more than most people, and we blame someone for being an honor-

[212] I leave out the initial lines of the chapter because I have already addressed them. In those opening lines, Aristotle announces the analogy between the pair of virtues involving honor and the pair of financial virtues. I have also left off the last few lines of the chapter [1125a21-25] because they re-iterate the point that 'honor-lover' is said in more than one way, with the additional notice that this causes confusion for labeling the character types in the virtue's practical domain.

> lover when he loves it more than one should. Since the intermediate is nameless, the extremes seem to wrangle for that position as though it were empty. But in this practical domain, there is an excessive vice and a deficient vice, as well as an intermediate virtue. There are people who desire honor both more than one should and less. Indeed it is also possible to love honor in the way that one should. So, this disposition is praised, being a nameless intermediate regarding honor. [*NE* IV.4 1125b6-21]

One thing that becomes clear when contrasting this unnamed virtue with μεγαλοψυχία is that developing and expressing the unnamed virtue, as well as the other character types in its practical domain, is about an agent's management of the *desire* for honor, rather than making sure that his self-evaluation is symmetrical with the honor or recognition that he pursues and accepts from good people in his community. Aristotle devotes much of his attention in this chapter to the fact that calling someone an honor-lover can cash out as both an epithet of praise and as a condemnation of character. When we call someone honor-loving, we can either mean that he is incorrectly and overly obsessed with gaining honor or recognition, or that he correctly appreciates honor or recognition in the correct manner. Conversely, when we say that someone is *not* honor-loving, we could be making the claim either that he does not appreciate honor or recognition at all, or that, compared to the overly obsessed, he appreciates honor or recognition as reason correctly orders. So, in addition to noting that this virtue lacks a name, Aristotle also indicates that it is difficult to name the vices that serves as the practical domain's deficient and excessive extremes. For example, 'honor-lover' could serve as the name for the practical domain's excessive vice, but it could also serve as the name of the unnamed virtue; what the term means in any particular case is context-dependent. Similarly, claiming that someone is not an honor-lover could mean that she is a deficiently vicious character in this practical domain, or that she is virtuous in comparison to the excessive honor-lover. Nevertheless, even though the names for these character types are difficult to pin down, Aristotle provides somewhat clear accounts of them. I have elected to give them names, for the sake of clarity, and I have descriptively labeled the character types in the sketch of

the unnamed virtue's practical domain at the beginning of this section (Figure 3): I have labeled the two vices as 'deficient love of honor,' and 'excessive love of honor,' and I have simply labeled the unnamed virtue as 'love of honor.'[213] I propose that these labels correspond with Aristotle's claim that it is possible to love honor too much, to love honor too little, and finally to love honor in the appropriate way, that is, both to the extent and from the sources which reason correctly prescribes.

Since Aristotle devotes little attention to describing the character types in love of honor's practical domain, it is useful to provide a survey of them based on what he does write about them and construct some examples. A deficient lover of honor goes wrong in at least two manners. First, she does not love or desire honor as much as reason correctly prescribes, and second, as a result of her lack of desire, she does not desire honor from any sources at all, let alone from the correct ones. She is akin to the insensible agent in temperance's practical domain who has little to no tactile appetite. Both of these deficiently vicious characters not only have low or no desire for their corresponding objects—honor and the objects of tactile appetite, respectively—but, by extension, they are also deficient with respect to their desire to attain them from the correct sources. Consider, for example, that Miranda is a deficient lover of honor and that she learns that there is a competition in town to see who can log the most hours serving at nearby charities over the next month. Further, she learns that the winner will be honored by the town council at a festival scheduled for the end of the month. Since she has little to no desire for such honor, she lacks the motivation to compete in the charity competition. If anything is to count as a correct source of small or mid-sized honor, then winning this charity competition should certainly suffice. However, because she lacks desire for honor all together, let alone from this correct source, Miranda does not enter the competition.

[213] It is important to keep in mind that the honor or recognition involved in these character types is small or mid-sized, as the greatest honors and recognition are the objects of μεγαλοψυχία's practical domain.

She is subject to the evaluative illusion that such honor is not worth pursuing, no matter its actual worth. She does not grasp that the recognition of good people in her community for such honorable work is something worth trying for.

An excessive lover of honor also goes wrong in at least two respects. First, she clearly obsesses over honor or recognition to an extent that exceeds what reason correctly prescribes, and second, as a result of her excessive love of honor, she desires to attain it from whichever sources she can, even those sources from which "one should not" obtain honor or recognition. Suppose that Linda is an excessive lover of honor and that she learns that a local group of ne'er-do-wells is hosting a competition to see who can drink the most alcohol without succumbing to intoxication and passing out. Further, she learns that whoever wins this competition will be recognized some evening at the local dive bar in front of crowd of self-indulgent alcoholics; the owners will recognize the winner of the competition by posting a photograph of her face on their "wall of honor." If anything counts as an incorrect source of small or mid-sized honor, then winning this drinking competition should certainly count. Since Linda is an excessive lover of honor who obsesses over the chance to attain recognition from any sources that she can, let alone from incorrect ones, she enters the competition. It is also likely that Linda obsesses over honor so much that she would enter the charity competition that Miranda, the deficient lover of honor above, refrains from entering. Linda is subject to the evaluative illusion that all honor or recognition, regardless of its source, is good without qualification and worth pursuing. She does not grasp that being recognized for winning such a drinking competition is actually a bad or unpleasant thing; she incorrectly perceives that being recognized by good people for worthwhile works *and* being recognized by vicious people for unworthwhile works are both goals that she should try for.

Someone who has the unnamed virtue and is what I have termed a 'lover of honor' obeys her own reason's correct prescriptions when it comes to desiring and pursuing small and mid-sized honor or recognition. That is, she desires such honor and recognition both to the correct extent and also from the correct sources. Consider, for example, that Vickie has developed this virtue. Unlike Miranda, the deficient lover of virtue, she correctly desires the small or mid-sized honor that results from winning the charity competition, and so she enters it. Not only does Vickie desire the honor that comes from logging the most hours serving at her local charitable organizations to the correct extent, but she recognizes that such a competition is a correct, worthy source of honor or recognition. Further, unlike Linda, the excessive lover of honor, Vickie does not desire to enter the ne'er-do-wells' drinking competition at all, but rather detests even the prospect of doing so, since she knows that the recognition awarded to the winner of such a competition is not really honor at all; the prize that results from the drinking competition *is* a sort of recognition, but it is neither good nor noble, since it would come from a group of vicious, self-indulgent people as a result of choosing and performing her own self-indulgent actions.

With this overview of love of honor and its attendant vices in mind, it is now possible to begin considering virtuous, loose akratic and loose enkratic practical syllogisms in love of honor's practical domain. Recall that at VII.4, Aristotle lists the akratic with respect to desire for honor as an example of an agent who expresses a loose form of *akrasia* [1147b13-14]. Following the pattern of the previous sections, for the rest of this section I construct and analyze loose akratic and enkratic practical syllogisms that characterize the choice-making and actions of agents who struggle against an excessive desire for honor. One reason why I focus on this part of love of honor's practical domain is because it seems likely that excessive desire for honor occurs more frequently than deficient desire for honor, just as Aristotle holds that excessive tactile appetite

occurs more frequently than deficient tactile appetite and excessive desire for gain occurs more frequently than deficient desire for gain. Further, the major reason I hone in on this part of the practical domain is because Aristotle has so little to say about honor in the rest of the *NE* with one interesting exception, at *NE* IX.8, in the midst of analyzing a puzzle about whether it is good or bad to be a self-lover. This evaluative puzzle about self-love is strikingly similar to the problem Aristotle addresses at *NE* IV.4 when he reports that calling someone an honor-lover can be either laudatory or condemnatory.

Aristotle thinks that there are two sorts of self-love, just as there are at least two sorts of love of honor. In a similar fashion, there is a sense in which being a lover of oneself is good and praiseworthy and another sense in which being a lover of oneself is vile and blameworthy. In the course of explaining the difference between these two sorts of self-love, Aristotle mentions honor and its assignment to agents. Regarding the blameworthy sort of self-lover, Aristotle says the following.

> οἱ μὲν οὖν εἰς ὄνειδος ἄγοντες αὐτὸ φιλαύτους καλοῦσι τοὺς ἑαυτοῖς ἀπονέμοντας τὸ πλεῖον ἐν χρήμασι καὶ τιμαῖς καὶ ἡδοναῖς ταῖς σωματικαῖς. τούτων γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ ὀρέγονται, καὶ ἐσπουδάκασι περὶ αὐτὰ ὡς ἄριστα ὄντα, διὸ καὶ περιμάχητά ἐστιν. οἱ δὴ περὶ ταῦτα πλεονέκται χαρίζονται ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ ὅλως τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ τῷ ἀλόγῳ τῆς ψυχῆς.
>
> Those who make self-love into something blameworthy say that lovers of self are those who assign to themselves the greater share in money and honor and bodily pleasures. For most people are desirous of these things and they eagerly pursue them as being the highest things, which is why they are fought over. Indeed those who are greedy for these things indulge in their appetites and, in general, they indulge in their affects and in the non-rational nature of the soul. [*NE* IX.8 1168b15-21]

Included in the list of objects that the blameworthy self-lovers assign to themselves in larger shares is honor. Clearly Aristotle does not only have honor in mind in the passage above, but he does recognize it as an object of most people's desire and something which many consider to be among the highest goods. This is consonant with his own description of honor in the chapter on

μεγαλοψυχία, *NE* IV.3, where he calls honor or recognition the greatest of the external goods. These blameworthy self-lovers do what they can to ensure that, among other things, they receive the greatest shares of honor or recognition, indulging their excessive desire for it.

In contrast are praiseworthy self-lovers, whom Aristotle describes as follows.

> εἰ γάρ τις ἀεὶ σπουδάζοι τὰ δίκαια πράττειν αὐτὸς μάλιστα πάντων ἢ τὰ σώφρονα ἢ ὁποιαοῦν ἄλλα τῶν κατὰ τὰς ἀρετάς, καὶ ὅλως ἀεὶ τὸ καλὸν ἑαυτῷ περιποιοῖτο, οὐδεὶς ἐρεῖ τοῦτον φίλαυτον οὐδὲ ψέξει. δόξειε δ᾽ ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος μᾶλλον εἶναι φίλαυτος. ἀπονέμει γοῦν ἑαυτῷ τὰ κάλλιστα καὶ μάλιστ᾽ ἀγαθά, καὶ χαρίζεται ἑαυτοῦ τῷ κυριωτάτῳ, καὶ πάντα τούτῳ πείθεται.

> For if someone were always zealous that she most of all should perform just actions or temperate actions or whichever others of those that are in accord with the virtues, and generally should always procure the noble for herself, no one would call this person a self-lover or blame her. But this one seems to be more of a self-lover. For she assigns to herself the noblest and best things, and indulges the highest in herself, and obeys it with respect to all things. [*NE* IX.8 1168b25-31]

Praiseworthy self-lovers do not busy themselves about pursuing the objects of desire as the blameworthy self-lovers do. Instead, they assign "the noblest and the best things" to themselves, leaving those who have inferior characters to squabble over other honors and recognition, money, and pleasure. It is important to note that this account does not entail that a praiseworthy self-lover is not desirous of these things at all, but rather that she is desirous of these things to the extent and in the way that her reason correctly commands: this is what Aristotle means when he says that the praiseworthy self-lover "indulges the highest in herself," i.e., her soul's rational nature. Further confirmation for this arises in the following passage in which Aristotle says more about the distinction between the praiseworthy and blameworthy sorts of self-love.

> διὸ φίλαυτος μάλιστ᾽ ἂν εἴη, καθ᾽ ἕτερον εἶδος τοῦ ὀνειδιζομένου, καὶ διαφέρων τοσοῦτον ὅσον τὸ κατὰ λόγον ζῆν τοῦ κατὰ πάθος, καὶ ὀρέγεσθαι ἢ τοῦ καλοῦ ἢ τοῦ δοκοῦντος συμφέρειν.

> So the one who is most of all a self-lover, distinct from the kind that is blameworthy, differs from such a person as much as living according to reason differs from living according to affect, and as much as desiring the noble differs from desiring what seems to be useful. [*NE* IX.8 1169a3-6]

It is also useful to note that Aristotle invokes *akrasia* and *enkrateia* in this same chapter, differentiating the character types from one another in a way similar to how he distinguishes the two sorts of self-lovers. The difference between the two involves whether the rational or the non-rational nature of an agent's soul is in command.[214]

> καὶ φίλαυτος δὴ μάλιστα ὁ τοῦτο ἀγαπῶν καὶ τούτῳ χαριζόμενος. καὶ ἐγκρατὴς δὲ καὶ ἀκρατὴς λέγεται τῷ κρατεῖν τὸν νοῦν ἢ μή, ὡς τούτου ἑκάστου ὄντος.
>
> And the self-lover is indeed most of all the one who chiefly loves and indulges this [i.e., the rational nature of her soul]. Further, agents are called enkratic or akratic with respect to whether intelligence rules or does not, with this [i.e., intelligence] being what each person is. [*NE* IX.8 1168b33-35]

As we have already seen regarding the practical domains of temperance and generosity, it is not the case that the virtuous person lacks desire for tactile pleasures or financial gain. Instead, the virtuous agents in these domains desire their respective objects as their reason prescribes is correct. Similarly, as I go on to examine and construct practical syllogisms in love of honor's practical domain, the virtuous agent does not lack desire for ordinary honor, but rather desires it to the extent and in the way that her own reason correctly orders. The loose enkratic agent in this domain, who I consider shortly, struggles against an excessive desire for honor or recognition, but nevertheless ends up follows her reason's correct prescription; her reason or intelligence ends up overruling her desire. The loose akratic, on the other hand, struggles against excessive desire for honor or recognition, but does not end up following her reason's correct prescription; her excessive desire overrules her reason's commands.

Given that Aristotle does not spend much time discussing love of honor, it comes as no surprise that he does not provide examples of practical syllogisms for the virtue's practical domain.

[214] Note that by calling one of the two natures of the human soul "in command" here does not mean that the remaining nature is extinguished or eradicated, but is rather a way of describing whether an agent follows her reason's prescription or her affect's pull when she chooses and acts.

Similarly, it is not shocking to note that he does not provide examples of universal or particular propositions for practical syllogisms in love of honor's domain. However, as I demonstrated in previous sections devoted to other practical domains, this does not mean we are at a loss for coming up with such propositions and constructing practical syllogisms. We must first begin by presenting universal propositions that are consistent with Aristotle's remarks about this practical domain and that fit the examples he sets forth at *NE* VII.3 when presenting universal propositions for temperate and strict akratic practical syllogisms.

First, I propose that "not every honor or recognition must be pursued," is the correct universal proposition in love of honor's practical domain. This is the universal proposition that both the lover of honor and the loose enkratic agent exercise in their practical syllogisms. Second, I propose that "every honor or recognition must be pursued," is the incorrect universal proposition for this practical domain; this is the universal that the loose akratic agent exercises in her practical syllogism. These are not the only two universals available for agents to exercise in this practical domain, but they are exclusive alternatives that follow the examples of universals that Aristotle presents for temperance's practical domain. Moreover, since I am focused on the part of love of honor's practical domain that lies between the virtue and the excessive vice, these universals help to showcase the internal struggle an agent faces between desiring ordinary honor as reason correctly prescribes and desiring ordinary honor to an excessive extent and from any source which she can attain it.

First, consider that Georgia is a virtuous lover of honor who is also incredibly athletic. She learns that there is a race coming up organized by her local city council to determine who is the most athletically capable. All of the runners who enter the race also have to pay a small entrance fee to compete, and all proceeds will be donated to a local charity in the winner's name. The

council will publicly recognize the winner at a festival downtown at the end of the month where the check will also be presented to a representative of the charity. This all sounds good to Georgia, until she discovers something suspicious about the charity a couple of days later; she overhears some representatives of the charity laughing to themselves about how they intend to take the contestants' money for themselves, and so Georgia learns that the charity is actually a scam. Nevertheless, if she wins the competition and keeps this information to herself, she will still receive the honor and recognition in front of the festival's attendees at the end of the month, with none of them being the wiser. Since Georgia is a virtuous lover of honor, she both desires honor to the extent and also *from the correct sources* that reason prescribes. Even though she desires honor and recognition and knows that honor is the greatest of external goods, she does not desire it so much that she perceives that any and every honor and recognition is unqualifiedly good or pleasant. In fact, in this case, she perceives that the honor that comes from winning this "charitable" race is indeed fraudulent; she evaluates this honor as unqualifiedly bad, rather than as either qualifiedly pleasant or unqualifiedly good. Georgia's perceptual evaluation of this "honor" serves as the particular proposition of her practical syllogism. Her correct evaluation of the circumstances leads her to exercise the universal proposition, "not every honor or recognition must be pursued," and she concludes her ethical practical syllogism by enacting the choice to refrain from pursuing this particular honor and to refuse to enter the race.[215]

Next, suppose that Carrie is a loose akratic agent in love of honor's practical domain; further, consider that she finds herself in a situation just like the one Georgia faces above. She intends to enter the race and likewise desires the honor and recognition that the city council will bestow on the winner at the festival at the end of the month. Further, Carrie also overhears some

[215] Supposing that Katrina is in fact virtuous, she probably also shares with the local city council information about what she overheard from the snickering representatives of the charity.

representatives of the charity laughing and talking about how they plan to take the donation money for themselves, effectually scamming the race's entrants. Carrie is at a crossroads: she knows both universal propositions—"not every honor or recognition must be pursued," and "every honor or recognition must be pursued," for if she is truly un-self-controlled, she must know what it would be correct to choose and to do (even though she does not end up enacting the correct choice). Nevertheless, she evaluates the honor that comes from winning the race as good or pleasant without qualification. That is, despite what she learns about the intentions of the charity's representatives to mismanage the donation money, she still desires the honor and recognition that the winner will receive at the festival. Carrie misattributes unqualified goodness to this particular honor and her incorrect evaluation of it serves as the particular proposition of her ethical practical syllogism. Her improper desire for honor and misevaluation pulls her to exercise the incorrect universal, "every honor or recognition must be pursued," and she concludes her practical syllogism by enacting the choice to pursue the honor and to enter the race. To be clear, Carrie knows the correct universal proposition, but only in the potential sense, for she does not exercise it in her practical syllogism. She knows the incorrect universal, on the other hand, in the active way, because she employs it in her practical syllogism. It is as if her improper relation to desire for honor flips a toggle switch in her soul's rational nature and she activates her knowledge of the incorrect universal, rendering her knowledge of the correct one potential.

To see how this translates into Aristotelian language, we can again take the passage from *NE* VII.3 [1147a29-1147b4] where Aristotle presents both temperate and strict akratic practical syllogisms and substitute in the universal propositions and affect connected to love of honor's practical domain for those connected to temperance's.

> …if every honor must be pursued, and this is an honor insofar as it is one of the particulars, it is necessary for one who is able and not prevented at the same time

> to act on this. But whenever the universal opinion is in an individual preventing pursuing honor, and also the opinion that every honor is pleasant, and that this is an honor—this is the opinion that is active—and desire for honor happens to be in the individual, then the one opinion reasons that the individual not pursue the honor, but desire for honor leads the person to pursue the honor, for desire for honor is able to move each of the parts. What follows is that to be loosely akratic with respect to desire for honor is in a way due to reason and opinion that is contrary to correct reason, not in itself, but accidentally—for the desire for honor is contrary, but not the opinion.

It is important to emphasize that the loose akratic indeed knows both universal propositions. Should someone ask the loose akratic what it would be correct to do in similar circumstances, Carrie would be able to respond correctly and narrate something like a correct intention, but one that she does not follow through on when it comes time to choose and act. Before encountering her own opportunity to pursue the honor in the example, she seems to have active knowledge of the correct universal because she knows and can narrate what it would be correct to do. But upon encountering the opportunity to pursue such honor or recognition, rather than correctly evaluate it as unqualifiedly bad or unpleasant, she misevaluates the honor as unqualifiedly good or pleasant. This is because of her relation to the affect of desire for honor; as a result of her evaluative ignorance, she activates the universal proposition that leads her incorrectly to pursue the honor, and so she enacts the blameworthy choice to chase after it by entering the race even though the honor comes from an improper source.

Both Georgia and Carrie perceive or grasp the same circumstance, but each grasps it differently. Georgia forms the correct evaluation, while Carrie forms an incorrect evaluation, of the honor and recognition that comes from winning the race. Carrie is ignorant of the particular proposition of the lover of honor's practical syllogism in the evaluative sense. She does not grasp that this honor is actually unqualifiedly unpleasant or bad, at least at the time of action. She is neither factually ignorant that the "charity" race is an opportunity for her to pursue honor, nor is she factually ignorant of the scam being cooked up by the charity's representatives. Instead, she

suffers from evaluative illusion because of her improper relation to desire for honor. After enacting the choice to enter the competition, Carrie regrets that she chose and acted against her own reason's correct prescription to refrain from pursuing honors that come from improper sources.

The last ethical practical syllogism left to consider in love of honor's practical domain is the one belonging to the loose enkratic agent. Suppose that Daniel is such a loose enkratic agent and that he finds himself in circumstances akin to those that Georgia and Carrie face. He intends to enter the race and pay the entry fee that he is told will be donated to a local charity, and further learns that the winner will be honored and recognized by the city council at a festival downtown at the end of the month. Moreover, he overhears some representatives of the charity laughing to themselves about how they plan to take the money for themselves rather than use it for the cause that they apparently represent. Since Daniel is a loose enkratic agent, he knows both the correct and incorrect universal propositions. The loose akratic and enkratic agents are similar in this regard, even though each ends up exercising a different universal proposition in their practical syllogisms. A further feature that loose enkratic Daniel and loose akratic Carrie share is that they are both evaluatively ignorant of the particular proposition of the virtuous lover of honor's practical syllogism, albeit Daniel is able to overcome his evaluative ignorance prior to enacting a blameworthy choice.

At first, Daniel mistakenly evaluates the honor as pleasant or good without qualification because of his improper relation to the affect of desire for honor. The fact that Daniel's character is inferior in comparison to the lover of honor's character renders him evaluatively ignorant, that is, subject to evaluative illusion. His excessive desire for honor pulls him to exercise the incorrect universal proposition that encourages pursuing the honor, but he is not as evaluatively ignorant as Carrie, the loose akratic. For Daniel recognizes prior to entering the "charity" competition that he

has formed an incorrect evaluation of the honor that comes from entering and winning the race. He realizes that it comes from an improper source, as those who will attend the festival at the end of the month and honor the winner will falsely believe that the entrance fees are donated to a charitable cause in the winner's name. Daniel overcomes his evaluative ignorance and it dawns on him that the honor or recognition for winning the race is in fact unqualifiedly bad, rather than pleasant or good, before enacting a choice. Initially intending to enter the race, he revises his evaluation of the honor and is no longer ignorant of the particular proposition of the virtuous practical syllogism. Since he no longer assesses the honor incorrectly, but instead forms a correct evaluation, he exercises the correct universal proposition: "not every honor or recognition must be pursued," and enacts the correct choice to refrain from pursuing this honor; he does not enter the race.[216]

Both the loose akratic and loose enkratic agents abandon their initial intentions prior to concluding their respective practical syllogisms. The loose akratic, Carrie, abandons her initial intention to refrain from pursuing an honor that comes from an incorrect source; her knowledge of the correct universal becomes merely potential, while her knowledge of the incorrect universal is active, since it is the one she exercises in her practical syllogism. She is unable to overcome her evaluative ignorance prior to enacting her blameworthy choice, but afterward, she regrets what she has done. Further, loose enkratic Daniel abandons his initial intention to pursue the honor that comes from an improper source after overcoming his evaluative ignorance; his knowledge of the correct universal is active, while his knowledge of the incorrect universal is potential, since he does not employ it in the practical syllogism that he concludes. Daniel does not overcome his

[216] As I noted earlier when considering virtuous Georgia, loose enkratic Daniel might also inform others that there is a scam afoot in an attempt to blow the whistle on the charity's representatives' plan.

evaluative ignorance for good, however, since as long as he is merely enkratic and not virtuous, he will suffer from evaluative ignorance again upon encountering similar circumstances.

5.2.4 Loose Akratic/Enkratic Practical Syllogisms in Mildness's Practical Domain



Figure 5. - Mildness's Practical Domain

Loose akratic and enkratic practical syllogisms in mildness's (πραότης) practical domain are the final ones that I consider in this chapter. I have chosen to include them partially to contribute further thoroughness to this chapter's goal of justifying my view that agents can express *akrasia* and *enkrateia* in practical domains beyond merely that of temperance. Further, Aristotle explicitly mentions that it is possible for an agent to express loose *akrasia* in mildness's practical domain at the end of *NE* VII.4, a character whom he calls: 'ἀκρατῆ θυμοῦ,' or akratic with respect to the affect of spirit or anger [1148b13-14].[217] Before constructing and analyzing loose akratic and enkratic practical syllogisms in mildness's practical domain, as usual, it is necessary to begin with an overview of mildness's practical domain and the virtue and vices that populate it. The most extensive treatment of mildness's practical domain occurs at *NE* IV.5. Spirit or temper (θυμός) unites the character types in this domain, where the characteristic activity of all of them involves

[217] I first discussed loose *akrasia* with respect to spirit, temper, or anger at length in Chapter 3, Section 3.4, when responding to Sarah Broadie's worry that there could not be loose forms of *akrasia* outside of temperance's practical domain because strict *akrasia* is a uniquely primitive ethical failure. I argued then that when Aristotle holds that *akrasia* with respect to spirit temper is less shameful than strict *akrasia* [*NE* VII.6 1149a24-25], this does not entail that the former falls short of being a genuine expression of un-self-control. See Ch.3, pp. 181-185 for my earlier discussion of what affect Aristotle thinks an agent's reason struggles against when discussing the spirited akratic agent.

how agents who have developed them respond—whether correctly or incorrectly—to a perceived harm or injury. As noted in Chapter 3, we can understand the affect of spirit or temper, indeed anger more specifically, as a desire for retribution.

Aristotle accounts for the virtue of mildness by describing the mild person and his relation to the affect of spirit or anger.

> βούλεται γὰρ ὁ πρᾶος ἀτάραχος εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἄγεσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἂν ὁ λόγος τάξῃ, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις καὶ ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον χρόνον χαλεπαίνειν. ἁμαρτάνειν δὲ δοκεῖ μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν, οὐ γὰρ τιμωρητικὸς ὁ πρᾶος, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον συγγνωμονικός.
>
> For the mild person wishes to be calm and not to be led by the affect, but to be angry in such ways and for the duration that reason prescribes. Further, he seems to miss the mark more so in the direction of deficiency, for the mild person is not revengeful, but rather is inclined to pardon. [*NE* IV.5 1125b33-1126a3]

In common with the other virtues, mildness requires following one's own rational prescription, and expression of the virtue involves several different affectual vectors; in this case, the virtuous agent not only feels anger in the correct way, toward the correct people, and to the correct extent, but also for the correct amount of time. A perhaps unique aspect of expressing the virtue of mildness, then, is knowing when it is appropriate to let go of a grudge and to allow the affect of anger to subside when it has run its due course. This notion accords with Aristotle's point above that the mild person tends to miss the mark in the direction of the deficient vice in mildness's practical domain, want of spirit (ἀναλγησία), rather than in the direction of the excessive vice, irascibility (ὀργιλότης). Someone who is inclined to pardon, or let a grudge go, is liable to appear too forgiving in the face of some harm, whereas someone who continues to chase after vengeance is likely to appear appropriately incensed in certain circumstances. Despite these possible appearances, however, Aristotle insists that the virtuous mild person indeed lets go of his desire for retribution in many cases instead of holding fast to pursuing retaliation. As is the case with all

of the other ethical virtues, the agent who has developed mildness does not extinguish the relevant affect within him, but rather manages it properly, as his own reason correctly prescribes.

Since Aristotle claims that the mild person often seems to miss the mark in deficiency's direction, it is appropriate to turn next to the vice of want of spirit, or as Rowe translates it, "spiritlessness."[218] It is important to emphasize that in the passage above, Aristotle does not claim that the mild person actually sometimes expresses want of spirit, but rather that he *seems* to miss the mark in spiritlessness's direction in the eyes of his observers. Aristotle describes actual spiritless characters as follows.

> οἱ γὰρ μὴ ὀργιζόμενοι ἐφ᾽ οἷς δεῖ ἠλίθιοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, καὶ οἱ μὴ ὡς δεῖ μηδ᾽ ὅτε μηδ᾽ οἷς δεῖ. δοκεῖ γὰρ οὐκ αἰσθάνεσθαι οὐδὲ λυπεῖσθαι, μὴ ὀργιζόμενός τε οὐκ εἶναι ἀμυντικός, τὸ δὲ προπηλακιζόμενον ἀνέχεσθαι καὶ τοὺς οἰκείους περιορᾶν ἀνδραποδῶδες.
>
> People who do not become angry in the circumstances in which one should seem to be foolish, as are those who do not become angry as they should, when they should, or toward the people whom one should. For it seems that such people, since they do not become angry, are neither feeling nor experience pain; they are not liable to defend themselves from attack, where not holding up one's fists and going toe-to-toe with an assailant and not looking out for one's close friends is the mark of being slavish. [*NE* IV.5 1126a3-8]

Those who are wanting in spirit are not the sort to ever stand up for themselves and fight back when they have been grievously wronged; neither are they the sort to stand up and fight back for others, even their intimates, when they are the victims of serious harm. It is not merely that these vicious agents do not retaliate in such cases, but further, they do not feel any anger at all welling up inside of them; they bear witness to injury and shrug it off as if nothing happened at all. The spiritless are sedated, and Aristotle claims that it is as if such people do not sense or perceive things (οὐκ αἰσθάνεσθαι), reminiscent of his description of the deficiently vicious agent in temperance's practical domain, whom he also describes as insensate when he labels the vice, 'insensibility

[218] Rowe (Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics*: Trans., Intro., and Comm.) 152

[ἀναισθησία, *NE* III.11 1119a7]. For those who are wanting in spirit, experiencing serious unprovoked harm for themselves or witnessing others fall victim to similar attacks evokes no reaction from them. In this sense, we must take Aristotle's labeling of such agents as 'spiritless' literally. Unlike the virtuous mild agent, the vicious spiritless person seems to have extinguished the affect of spirit or temper within him.

The remaining vice to consider in mildness's practical domain is the excessive one called irascibility. It sits at the other end of the practical domain; it is the greatest distance away from want of spirit, so we should expect that an irascible agent is full of spirit rather than devoid of it. Aristotle notes that this vice is more opposed to the virtue of mildness than spiritlessness is.

> τῇ πραότητι δὲ μᾶλλον τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ἀντιτίθεμεν, καὶ γὰρ μᾶλλον γίνεται. ἀνθρωπικώτερον γὰρ τὸ τιμωρεῖσθαι, καὶ πρὸς τὸ συμβιοῦν οἱ χαλεποὶ χείρους.
>
> We set the excessive vice against mildness more (than the deficient vice) because it also arises more often. For it is more human to be vengeful, and it is worse to live with people who are difficult. [*NE* IV.5 1126a29-31]

This point is similar to one encountered in other practical domains, for instance, μεγαλοψυχία's [*NE* IV.3 1125a32-4] and generosity's [*NE* IV.1 1122a13-16]; in each of these domains, Aristotle notes that the excessive vice is more opposed to the virtue than the deficient vice is, and further, that the excessive vice arises with greater frequency. There is a further similarity between the excessive vice of irascibility in mildness's domain and the excessive vice of stinginess in generosity's domain in particular, namely that all of the features that Aristotle notes when describing these vices do not usually arise together at once in the same individual. That is, while the general descriptions of these vices run counter to the general descriptions of their respective virtues, agents with these vicious character types do not express all of the features that Aristotle ascribes to the vices. To see what I mean in further detail, it is useful to examine the following

lengthy passage where Aristotle first gives a general description of irascibility and then outlines two particular ways in which an agent might express it.

> ἡ δ᾽ ὑπερβολὴ κατὰ πάντα μὲν γίνεται, καὶ γὰρ οἷς οὐ δεῖ, καὶ ἐφ᾽ οἷς οὐ δεῖ, καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, καὶ θᾶττον, καὶ πλείω χρόνον, οὐ μὴν ἅπαντά γε τῷ αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει. οὐ γὰρ ἂν δύναιτ᾽ εἶναι, τὸ γὰρ κακὸν καὶ ἑαυτὸ ἀπόλλυσι, κἂν ὁλόκληρον ᾖ, ἀφόρητον γίνεται. οἱ μὲν οὖν ὀργίλοι ταχέως μὲν ὀργίζονται καὶ οἷς οὐ δεῖ καὶ ἐφ᾽ οἷς οὐ δεῖ καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, παύονται δὲ ταχέως, ὃ καὶ βέλτιστον ἔχουσιν. συμβαίνει δ᾽ αὐτοῖς τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐ κατέχουσι τὴν ὀργὴν ἀλλ᾽ ἀνταποδιδόασιν ᾗ φανεροί εἰσι διὰ τὴν ὀξύτητα, εἶτ᾽ ἀποπαύονται. ὑπερβολῇ δ᾽ εἰσὶν οἱ ἀκρόχολοι ὀξεῖς καὶ πρὸς πᾶν ὀργίλοι καὶ ἐπὶ παντί, ὅθεν καὶ τοὔνομα. οἱ δὲ πικροὶ δυσδιάλυτοι, καὶ πολὺν χρόνον ὀργίζονται. κατέχουσι γὰρ τὸν θυμόν. παῦλα δὲ γίνεται ὅταν ἀνταποδιδῷ. ἡ γὰρ τιμωρία παύει τῆς ὀργῆς, ἡδονὴν ἀντὶ τῆς λύπης ἐμποιοῦσα. τούτου δὲ μὴ γινομένου τὸ βάρος ἔχουσιν, διὰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ ἐπιφανὲς εἶναι οὐδὲ συμπείθει αὐτοὺς οὐδείς, ἐν αὑτῷ δὲ πέψαι τὴν ὀργὴν χρόνου δεῖ. εἰσὶ δ᾽ οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἑαυτοῖς ὀχληρότατοι καὶ τοῖς μάλιστα φίλοις. χαλεποὺς δὲ λέγομεν τοὺς ἐφ᾽ οἷς τε μὴ δεῖ χαλεπαίνοντας καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ πλείω χρόνον, καὶ μὴ διαλλαττομένους ἄνευ τιμωρίας ἢ κολάσεως.
>
> The excessive vice arises in all of the following ways, that is, toward the people whom one should not, in the circumstances one should not, more than one should, more quickly than one should, and for a longer time than one should; but not all of these aspects of the excessive vice belong to the same person. For it is not possible to be that way, since what is bad destroys itself, and when it is complete in itself, it becomes unendurable. The 'irascible'[219] become angry quickly with the people one should not, in the circumstances which one should not, and more than one should, but they cease their anger quickly, which is the best thing that they have going for them. This follows for these people because they do not hold their anger back, but they take vengeance, in which they are obvious in their quickness, and then they stop. The irascible, who are quick-angered, are quick and angry toward everything and in all circumstances, whence they get their name. The irascible who are bitter, on the other hand, are difficult to reconcile and are angry for a long time. For they hold back the affect of temper. The end of their anger arises whenever they take vengeance. For getting back at an assailant stops their anger, putting pleasure in the place of pain. Should this not happen, they hold on to a burden, for because their anger does not come forth, neither can anyone persuade them, and it is fitting that it takes a while to digest anger by oneself. Such people are irksome to themselves and most of all to their friends. We call 'difficult' those who are angry in the circumstances that one should not be, more than one should, and for a longer duration; they do not reconcile with others without getting vengeance or chastisement. [*NE* IV.5 1126a8-28]

[219] I follow Rowe (Arist. *Nic. Eth.*: Trans., Intro., Comm. 153) in putting single quotation marks around 'irascible' in the translation, since it is clear that Aristotle means to include all of the following agents in his general categorization of the excessive vice, even though he uses 'ὀργίλοι' to describe this agent in particular.

Aristotle describes two sorts of irascible agents in the preceding passage: (1) those who are quick to become angry and also quick to retaliate and thus get over what makes them angry, and (2) those who are slow to act on their anger and take a long time to retaliate and thus to get over their anger. Both specific kinds of irascible agents share the majority of the features that Aristotle ascribes to irascible people in general: they become angry at the wrong people, in the wrong circumstances, and more than one should. Yet the former sort of irascible agents fulfill one further feature of irascibility that the latter sort do not—they become angry more quickly than one should—while the latter fulfill a feature that the former do not—they remain angry for longer than one should. Aristotle does not think that both of these features can reside in the same irascible person, and this is why he divides irascible agents into two sorts, calling the first plainly 'irascible,' and the second 'difficult.'

It is now appropriate to turn to the task of constructing and analyzing virtuous, loose akratic, and loose enkratic practical syllogisms in mildness's practical domain. Since Aristotle thinks that irascibility is more common than want of spirit, I focus on self-controlled and un-self-controlled characters that fall between mildness and irascibility, and, in particular, the 'irascible' sort of the vice rather than the 'difficult' one. I propose the following two universal propositions for consideration as I construct these syllogisms. First, I treat "not every harm must be retaliated against," as the correct universal, i.e., the one that both the mild and loose enkratic agents exercise in their practical syllogisms; second, I treat "every harm must be retaliated against," as the incorrect universal, i.e., the one that the loose akratic agent exercises in her practical syllogism. Without a doubt, there are other universal propositions relevant to mildness's practical domain, but these follow the model of ethical universal propositions which Aristotle provides for temperance's practical domain which at *NE* VII.3. Further, the fact that they are simple

propositions makes them easier to deal with in the examples that follow. As with the other practical domains and syllogisms that I have considered in this chapter, these universal propositions do not operate in a vacuum, but rather agents employ them due to certain evaluations that they form of particular perceptual circumstances. Let us begin with a virtuous practical syllogism in mildness's practical domain.

Suppose that Kristina is a mild agent who is driving to work one morning. She is just about to merge onto the interstate when another driver in the nearest lane speeds up and blocks her from crossing over, nearly running her off the road. Kristina is sure to become frustrated at this driver's action, and she evaluates what the driver has done as something that it is correct to become angry at. Yet she does not evaluate the other driver's action as so bad that it is worth pursuing him down the interstate to get revenge, following his car beyond the exit she needs to take to make it to her place of work. Kristina evaluates the driver's obnoxious action as bad in a qualified manner, experiences anger to the extent that her reason correctly prescribes, and exercises the universal proposition that states, "not every harm must be retaliated against," finally letting it go as she resumes her commute. The correct evaluation she forms of the obnoxious driver's action serves as the particular proposition of her practical syllogism, influencing her to exercise the correct universal on the way to enacting the praiseworthy choice of abstaining from retaliating against him. Kristina becomes angry at the correct person, in the correct circumstances, and so on, but she does not become angry at him for longer than she should. In Aristotle's terms, she *seems* to miss the mark, perhaps in the eyes of observers, in the direction of deficiency: for she does not go on to exact clear revenge. In truth, anger does well up inside her, but she is not bloodthirsty, as it were, and is able to move past what has happened.

Next, consider someone who is a loose akratic with respect to spirit or anger. Imagine that James finds himself in a situation akin to Kristina's while merging onto the interstate during his commute to work. Nearly blocked from making it safely into the nearest lane by a similarly obnoxious driver, James evaluates what he has just perceived as bad in an unqualified manner. He mistakenly evaluates the same circumstance which Kristina correctly evaluates because of his inferior character, which leads him to exercise the alternative universal proposition, "every harm must be retaliated against." He improperly manages the relevant affect and his anger gets the better of him. James knows both of the universal propositions, the one encouraging getting revenge in every case of harm, and the other, correct universal discouraging seeking revenge in every case that one suffers harm. However, his incorrect evaluation of the circumstances before him as unqualifiedly bad, when they are in fact only qualifiedly painful, leads him to activate the incorrect universal and to render potential the correct one. In other words, his evaluative ignorance of the mild practical syllogism's particular proposition is responsible both for his exercising the incorrect universal and his enacting a blameworthy choice. He might blare his horn, or speed up to the obnoxious driver and proceed uncomfortably close to his tailgate, or even worse, attempt to run the other driver off of the road. James might pursue the other driver beyond the exit he needs to take to get to his place of work, not ceasing the chase until he is satisfied that his revenge has been exacted. There are many concrete ways in which the loose akratic could enact his blameworthy choice to retaliate against the harm. Afterward, James regrets that he enacted a blameworthy choice, even though it is too late for him to take it back. His regret stems from the fact that he is truly un-self-controlled; even though his improper relation to the affect of anger renders his knowledge of the correct universal potential and un-activated, he nevertheless does know, prior to and after enacting the blameworthy choice, what it would be correct to choose and to do.

To see how Aristotle would describe this loose akratic agent's practical syllogism, we can again take the passage from *NE* VII.3 [1147a29-1147b4] detailing a strict akratic practical syllogism and substitute in the universal propositions and affect relevant to mildness's practical domain.

> …if every harm must be retaliated against, and this is a harm insofar as it is one of the particulars, it is necessary for one who is able and not prevented at the same time to act on this. But whenever the universal opinion is in an individual preventing retaliating against every harm, and also the opinion that every harm is painful, and that this is a harm—this is the opinion that is active—and spirit or temper happens to be in the individual, then the one opinion reasons that the individual not retaliate against the harm, but spirit or temper leads the person to retaliate, for spirit or temper is able to move each of the parts. What follows is that to be loosely akratic with respect to spirit or temper is in a way due to reason and opinion that is contrary to correct reason, not in itself, but accidentally—for the spirit or anger is contrary, but not the opinion.

It is useful to emphasize here once more that Aristotle does not think that the two universal propositions are opposed as contraries in the sense that it is impossible for the akratic to know both at the same time. Rather, it is as though the akratic agent's relation to the affect of anger is capable of flipping a toggle switch which can either activate the correct or the incorrect universal, both of which James the loose akratic knows. It *would* entail a contradiction should someone assert that James could activate both universal propositions at the same time, that is, exercise them both in the same practical syllogism. When it comes time to act, just as the loose akratic agent cannot enact two competing and distinct choices at once—say, both to retaliate and not to retaliate against the other driver at the same time—neither can James exercise both alternative universal propositions at the same time. James's perceptual misevaluation of the circumstances serves as the particular proposition of his practical syllogism, and his improper relation to the affect of spirit or temper pulls him to activate the incorrect universal proposition and use it in his practical syllogism.

The final practical syllogism to consider in mildness's practical domain is the one that belongs to the loose enkratic agent who, like loose akratic James, struggles against the influence

of spirit or anger, but unlike James, ends up enacting the correct choice in accord with her own rational nature's prescription. Suppose that loose enkratic Irene finds herself in circumstances akin to those that mild Kristina and loose akratic James face: on her commute to work, as she is about to merge onto the interstate, an obnoxious driver blocks her from getting into the nearest lane, almost running her off of the road. Since Irene is truly self-controlled and falls short of the virtue of mildness, she knows both of the alternative universal propositions regarding whether to retaliate against harm. At first, Irene suffers from evaluative ignorance just as James the loose akratic does; she grasps that she has been harmed and initially evaluates the circumstances as unqualifiedly bad. This mistaken evaluation pulls her to exercise the universal proposition: "every harm must be retaliated against." Yet prior to enacting the blameworthy choice of retaliating, she recognizes that this is the incorrect evaluation and that what has happened to her does not constitute the end of the world. Perhaps her hand is raised just above her steering wheel, inches away from depressing the horn, or she might be just about to stomp down on the gas pedal intending to accelerate uncomfortably close to the obnoxious driver's tailgate, but then it dawns on her that she has evaluated the circumstances improperly. As a result, she abandons the intention to retaliate against the other driver, after recognizing that the harm he has caused her is bad only in a qualified manner. This newfound evaluation resets her, and her relation to the affect of spirit or anger becomes more measured, influencing her to activate the alternative universal, "not every harm must be retaliated against," instead. The correct evaluation of the circumstances serves as the particular proposition of her practical syllogism. Her commitment to and combination of this universal proposition with the correct evaluation results in the enactment of the choice to refrain from retaliating against the other driver. She lets the harm go and continues on her way to her place of work. Importantly, Irene differs from Kristina because Kristina never forms an incorrect evaluation of what the driver

has done; Kristina suffers no practical stutter, whereas Irene does, and she must overcome her evaluative ignorance prior to enacting the correct choice to refrain from retaliating. Moreover, Irene does not overcome her evaluative ignorance for good, but so long as she remains enkratic, she will suffer from evaluative ignorance when encountering circumstances similar to this one.

5.3 Conclusion

With this chapter, I have demonstrated that it is possible to describe and explain the choice-making and behavior of various loose akratic and enkratic agents by means of ethical practical syllogisms. Common to all expressions of un-self-control and self-control is that they involve internal psychological struggles between an agent's rational and non-rational natures. Further, I have shown with more precision what it means for an akratic or enkratic agent's soul's non-rational nature to be disobedient to its own rational nature's prescription. When Aristotle claims that akratic and enkratic agents are ignorant of the particular proposition of the virtuous agent's practical syllogism, he means that they are *evaluatively* ignorant of it because of their improper relations to the affects connected to their respective practical domains. Their mistaken evaluations constitute non-rational failures. Evaluative ignorance can take a variety of forms. Sometimes, as in temperance's and generosity's practical domains, akratic and enkratic agents mistakenly evaluate something that is merely unqualifiedly pleasant as unqualifiedly good. In other cases, as in courage's and mildness's practical domains, loose akratic and enkratic evaluative ignorance involves mistakenly evaluating something that is merely qualifiedly bad or painful as unqualifiedly bad. Further, in love of honor's practical domain, akratic and enkratic evaluative ignorance can mean mistakenly evaluating something that is unqualifiedly bad as unqualifiedly pleasant or good. All of these cases of evaluative ignorance arise because an agent's character is inferior to virtue. I have not taken it upon myself here to provide an exhaustive list of examples of akratic and enkratic

practical syllogisms for every practical domain that Aristotle considers in the ethics. Such work befits an entire volume of examples and analyses and exceeds the limits of this present undertaking. What I have undertaken to show is that it is possible to account for the choices and behavior of self-controlled and un-self-controlled agents in practical domains other than temperance's in a consistent manner. Strict and loose akratic practical syllogisms are structurally similar, and so are strict and loose enkratic practical syllogisms. The only significant differences that arise among them result from the fact that in each case, reason contends with a different affect or desiderative impulse.

Un-self-controlled practical syllogisms share the same basic structure. A strict or loose akratic agent expresses her character type through the whole of her practical syllogism. She is evaluatively ignorant of some circumstance or object before her and so does not properly grasp its actual goodness or badness because of her improper relation to the relevant affect; this incorrect evaluation serves as the particular proposition of her practical syllogism. As a result, she has active knowledge of an incorrect universal proposition, exercises it, and enacts a blameworthy choice. Genuinely un-self-controlled agents also have knowledge of the correct universal proposition, but their evaluative ignorance renders their knowledge of it merely potential or "in the back of the mind." It is as though their improper relation to affect flips a toggle switch and so they activate their knowledge of the incorrect universal; they abandon their intentions to choose and act correctly. After enacting a blameworthy choice, akratic agents are full of regret, wishing that they had chosen and acted correctly, but it is too late.

Self-controlled practical syllogisms also share the same basic structure. A strict or loose enkratic agent expresses her character type through the whole of her practical syllogism. She is at first evaluatively ignorant of a circumstance or object of perception before her and does not

straightaway recognize its actual goodness or badness. Akin to an akratic agent, she has a character inferior to virtue. Unlike an akratic agent, an agent who expresses *enkrateia* is able to overcome her evaluative ignorance prior to enacting a blameworthy choice. Her evaluative ignorance primes her to employ an incorrect universal proposition, but before she commits to it and follows through, she overcomes her ignorance and forms the correct evaluation of the circumstance or object before her. This revised evaluation serves as the particular proposition of her practical syllogism. As a result, the enkratic agent instead employs the correct universal proposition and ends up enacting the correct choice. Her choice and action is praiseworthy when compared to what the akratic agent chooses and does, but blameworthy in comparison to what the virtuous agent chooses and does. For the virtuous agent experiences no practical stutter as a result of an improper relation to affect, while this sort of practical stutter is emblematic of the self-controlled agent's relation to choice-making. Enkratic agents abandon the intention to choose and act incorrectly because they are able to overcome their evaluative ignorance before following through on what it prompts them to do and enacting an incorrect choice.

Un-self-controlled and self-controlled agents are subject to evaluative ignorance so long as they remain akratic and enkratic. Even though an enkratic agent characteristically overcomes her ignorance prior to choosing and acting, she does not get over her evaluative ignorance for good, with it never to return to influence her practical reasoning again. The struggle between the enkratic agent's soul's rational and non-rational natures is recurrent, given that her self-control is a developed disposition or character type. She is able to overcome her evaluative ignorance prior to choosing and acting; for instance, a strict enkratic agent is able to recognize that the sweet thing before her is actually qualifiedly pleasant even though her affectual side initially pulls her to evaluate it as unqualifiedly good. Yet tomorrow, when the strict enkratic perceives another sweet

thing, the struggle returns and begins afresh. As long as she remains self-controlled, her rational nature wins out and her non-rational nature receives and obeys its correct prescriptions, but only after another struggle with what her tactile appetite pulls her to do instead. Similarly, the un-self-controlled agent's internal battle recurs in each case as long as it is correct to call her un-self-controlled. The akratic agent consistently regrets her blameworthy choice and action. It is possible for both of these agents to become better; the self-controlled agent can over time shape her soul's non-rational to become more obedient to her rational nature and become virtuous; the un-self-controlled agent can likewise shape her soul's non-rational nature to be more receptively obedient to its rational nature and become self-controlled and perhaps eventually virtuous. Further, it is possible for both agents to become worse: both are also capable of slipping into viciousness should their non-rational natures become even less receptive and obedient to the prescriptions of their rational natures. Yet insofar as they remain enkratic or akratic, they are agents subject to internal struggle between the choice and action that their own reason ordains as correct and the incorrect choice and action that affect pulls them toward.

CHAPTER 6. REVIEW & A SUGGESTION ABOUT ARISTOTLE'S AUDIENCE

The purpose of this work has been to develop robust accounts of inferior character types that populate Aristotle's ethical taxonomy but receive little attention in comparison with virtue, the star character type of his ethical treatises. I have noted throughout that *akrasia* and *enkrateia* receive little attention from Aristotle because the point of his ethics is to provide a framework for how to become virtuous. His ethical inquiry is primarily protreptic—its function is to show agents how to turn toward goodness, to develop psychological dispositions to choose and to perform virtuous actions on an unflinchingly consistent basis. Aristotle's goal in the ethics is narrower in this sense than, say, the wider *De Anima*, where he endeavors to provide a complete account of soul, which explains why all living things live and, further, live in the way that they do. Aristotle does not take it upon himself in either the *Nicomachean Ethics* or the *Eudemian Ethics* to explain in great detail all of the ways in which a human being can lead an ethical life or to analyze with precision all of the possible psychological dispositions that agents can develop. To be sure, he is not silent when it comes to character types other than virtue—he has much to say about vice in many chapters, especially particular vices that form the extremes of all of the ethical virtues' practical domains.

Further, Aristotle devotes *NE* VII.1-10 to investigating and explaining strict *akrasia* and *enkrateia* in general terms. He primarily focuses on self-control and un-self-control for the sake of pushing back against the views of his predecessor, Socrates, who rejected the very possibility of *akrasia* (and, by extension, *enkrateia*) [*NE* 1145b22-27]. Anyone who reads Aristotle's ethical works closely and entirely cannot help but to get the sense that these works are primarily about virtue, in both its ethical and intellectual varieties, while the inferior character types in his taxonomy sit farther back in the frame. This does not mean that the other character types are

insignificant or less likely to occur than virtue. We might even speculate that, had Aristotle more time and fewer interests, then he could have written an entire treatise on *akrasia* and *enkrateia*. In the ethical treatises we have before us, however, Aristotle only scratches the surface of these inferior character types, for he argues for their reality in the face of high-profile detractors and even uses them to justify his view that the soul is subject to a rational and non-rational division.

Since Aristotle does not take it upon himself to provide a full analysis and explanation of self-control and its lack or fill in his views about the range of their expressions, I have taken it upon myself in this work to do so. Each of the preceding chapters focuses on a particular gap that Aristotle leaves unfilled in his examination of *akrasia* and *enkrateia*. These gaps are not indicative of any intellectual failure on Aristotle's part; again, his primary interest in the ethical works is to show his audience what virtue is so that they might themselves aim at becoming good. Since this is his ethical thesis, it would not be fitting, as I propose he understands well, to devote much attention to the inferior character types of *akrasia* and *enkrateia*. The situation is similar, albeit not identical, to one in which a chef records an intricate recipe for a dish like *paella*. She hopes to guide and inform her audience to a degree that is sufficient for them to re-create her version of the dish. Of course there are many ways in which someone who heeds her directions might go wrong. A chef in training might overcook the rice, or mix the wrong proportions of herbs, or stir the ingredients together too infrequently. Making each of these mistakes by itself leads to an incorrectly prepared dish, and each failure is distinct and its own. Yet a quick survey of *paella* recipes reveals that few, if any, go to great lengths to record and analyze such possible mistakes in much detail. Likewise, Aristotle's ethical works provide something akin to a recipe for becoming virtuous. Certain members of his audience might make their own distinct mistakes along the way; some of them develop enkratic dispositions generally to choose and perform the correct actions

even though they struggle against improper desires to enact incorrect choices; others develop akratic dispositions generally to choose and perform incorrect actions because they struggle unsuccessfully against improper desires. Clearly Aristotle makes note of these kinds of failed ethical and psychological developments, more so than the *paella* recipe's author records the manners in which one following her instructions can fail. This is a sense in which the present analogy breaks down. Nevertheless, the similarity between the cases survives in that Aristotle brings to light the names of dispositions that fall short of virtue, and he investigates and provides brief explanations of them, even though these explanations fall short of the depth of attention that characterizes his investigation and explanation of virtue.

Even though this analogy is imperfect, it is helpful. For because Aristotle is not silent on the character types of *akrasia* and *enkrateia*, while the imagined *paella* recipe's author is silent on the myriad ways an apprentice could go wrong in preparing the dish, this means that we are in a better position to fill in the gaps related to completely understanding *akrasia* and *enkrateia* than the chef's apprentice is to completely understanding how failed attempts at *paella* look, smell, or taste. To put the matter differently, if Aristotle had in fact left *akrasia* and *enkrateia* untouched in his ethics, then we would have to speculate when it comes to filling in the gaps in understanding them. Despite the fact that Aristotle's treatment of these two character types is sketchy and brief in comparison to his treatment of virtue, we are not at a total loss for filling them in.[220] For throughout the ethical treatises, he uses self-control and its lack as touchstones, as it were, for highlighting what it is that the virtuous agent gets right in the course of ethical choice-making and behavior.

[220] Contrast Aristotle's treatment of *akrasia* and *enkrateia* with his analysis of "superhuman virtue," and "beastliness," which is another pair of opposed character types that Aristotle introduces at the start of *NE* VII.1. If Aristotle said as little about *akrasia* and *enkrateia* as he does about this other pair of character types, would be at a much greater disadvantage for filling in our understanding of them.

I began in Chapter 1 by settling the issue of whether *akrasia* and *enkrateia* are character types in the sense that virtue and vice are character types. I concluded that they are indeed character types, settled psychological dispositions to choose and act in habitual ways, due in part to Aristotle's inclusion of them in a catalogue of psychological dispositions at the start of *NE* VII.1 [1145a16-20]. I contended that *akrasia* is a settled psychological disposition to choose and act against what an agent knows is correct due to improperly controlling her affectual side. I further argued that *enkrateia* is a settled disposition to choose and act as an agent knows is correct, albeit after having to overcome an affectual impulse to choose and act against what she knows is correct. These are character types, not mere conditions of character into and out of which agents easily or quickly slip. I demonstrated that akratic and enkratic agents are *kinds of people* who lead respective *kinds of ethical lives*. In Chapter 1, I focused exclusively on *akrasia* and *enkrateia* as agents express them in temperance's practical domain, for most of Aristotle's analysis of these character types deals with how agents express them with respect to the affect of tactile appetite and its attendant objects.

In Chapters 2 and 3, I turned to considering whether Aristotle in fact limits these character types exclusively to temperance's practical domain or whether agents can express *akrasia* and *enkrateia* in other practical domains, for instance in courage's practical domain. In Chapter 2, I focused on the notion that '*akrasia*' and '*enkrateia*' are subject to terminological restrictions due to the conventions of language at Aristotle's time; in Chapter 3, I focused on the psychological justification for the wide range of the character types that derives from Aristotle's remarks about *akrasia*, *enkrateia*, and the human soul. I demonstrated that Aristotle cannot hold that these character types are tethered only to temperance's domain, given that he uses *akrasia* and *enkrateia* as evidence early in *NE* to justify his view that the human soul is subject to a division between its

rational and non-rational natures [*NE* I.13 1102b13-21]. An enkratic agent has a soul whose non-rational, affectual nature resists its own rational nature's correct prescriptions, albeit unsuccessfully, for she ultimately chooses and performs the correct action. An akratic agent, on the other hand, also has a soul whose non-rational, affectual nature struggles against its own rational nature's correct prescriptions, but succeeds in pulling the agent to choose and perform an action which she knows is incorrect. Since Aristotle describes self-controlled and un-self-controlled agents as caught up in psychological civil war between their souls' two natures, it is improbable that this conflict only influences the choices they make and the actions they perform in temperance's practical domain. Moreover, he concludes both *NE* VII.4 [1148b11-14] and VII.5 [1149a21-24] by noting that there are indeed affects other than tactile appetite with respect to which agents express *akrasia* (and, by extension, *enkrateia*).

The two passages I just mentioned might appear to cause trouble for my contention that *akrasia* and *enkrateia* have expressions outside of temperance's practical domain, for Aristotle insists in both locations that the character types, in their unqualified senses, refer to their expressions only in temperance's domain. Nevertheless, as I argued in Chapter 2, Aristotle is making a terminological point and not an ontological point when he distinguishes qualified forms of the character types from unqualified forms. The terms '*akrasia*,' '*enkrateia*,' and their cognates have traditionally been used to refer to expressions of un-self-control and self-control in temperance's practical domain by the time Aristotle begins to use them. All that this entitles us to conclude is that the ethical vocabulary available to Aristotle is rich with meaning by the time he begins to employ and modify it for his own purposes. In other words, Aristotle does not restrict agents' expressions of these character types to only temperance's practical domain, but rather introduces a distinction between what I have termed *strict* and *loose* forms of the character types

of *akrasia* and *enkrateia*. He makes use of the underappreciated ontological relation of metaphor in order to modify the names of the strict forms of the character types—those that already have names and arise in temperance's practical domain and are called '*akrasia*' and '*enkrateia*' without qualification—in order to furnish names for the previously uncatalogued loose expressions of *akrasia* and *enkrateia* that arise in other practical domains. These loose forms are called '*akrasia*' or '*enkrateia*' with respect to x, where x stands in for the affect peculiar to whichever practical domain is under consideration. For instance, '*akrasia* with respect to fear' refers to un-self-control in courage's practical domain; '*enkrateia* with respect to desire for gain' refers to self-control in generosity's practical domain.

Moving forward, in Chapters 4 and 5, I set out to confirm my view that *akrasia* and *enkrateia* have wide ranges of expression through the construction and analysis of strict and loose akratic and enkratic practical syllogisms. First, in Chapter 4, it was necessary to provide a thorough account of the model of the practical syllogism, given that Aristotle only covers this structured sort of practical reasoning in a few places in the *corpus*. Moreover, due to his brief treatment of the practical syllogism, debates have arisen in the scholarly literature regarding various aspects of these syllogisms. I navigated some of this scholarship, eventually arriving at the conclusion that there are many ways in which practical syllogisms are similar to theoretical syllogisms, but also fundamental ways in which the syllogism types diverge from one another. The most important similarity between the syllogism types pertains to their structure: both sorts of syllogism are comprised of universal and particular propositions that, when combined, let loose a conclusion. The significant difference between the syllogism types is that the conclusion of a theoretical syllogism is a proposition or further thought, whereas the conclusion of a practical syllogism is an enacted choice, i.e., an action that an agent chooses to perform.

After distinguishing theoretical from practical syllogisms, I moved on to considering the differences between non-ethical and ethical practical syllogisms. The simplest way to phrase this difference is to note that a non-ethical practical syllogism *prima facie* has nothing to do with the ethical character type that the reasoning agent has developed. This is not to suggest that there is nothing psychological about non-ethical practical syllogisms; in both non-ethical and ethical practical syllogisms, an agent combines and commits to a universal proposition with the rational nature of her soul, grasps or perceives some particular proposition governed by the non-rational nature of her soul, and finally commits to, chooses, and performs an action of which she is the origin. The difference between non-ethical and ethical practical syllogisms lies in the fact that there is nothing necessarily ethical about the former; the ethical character of an agent plays no *prima facie* role in the choosing and acting that constitutes a non-ethical practical syllogism. For examples of non-ethical practical syllogisms, I turned to the locomotive practical syllogisms which Aristotle presents at *De Mot*. 7, one that concludes with an agent's choosing and performing the action of walking, and another that concludes with an agent's choosing and performing the action of not walking. These are both positively chosen course of action, but there is no sense in which anything about whether agents are virtuous, akratic, enkratic, or vicious seems to matter in the course of their practical reasoning.

Ethical practical syllogisms, on the other hand, are ethical all the way through. Agents express their character types throughout their ethical practical syllogisms. The universal and particular propositions that an agent employs in an ethical practical syllogism, and the enacted choice that concludes it, are all ethically valuable insofar as they are expressions of an agent's character type. A virtuous agent, for example, expresses her virtue by exercising the correct universal proposition, forming the correct evaluation of what she perceives, and enacting a

praiseworthy choice; her character is expressed throughout the whole of the syllogism. After making this distinction between the two kinds of practical syllogism and determining that the ethical ones depend on an agent's character type for their value all the way through, I next sought to extend this line of reasoning to the character types and practical syllogisms of akratic and enkratic agents. In other words, I aimed to demonstrate that there are also akratic and enkratic practical syllogisms, both loose and strict ones, which have ethically valuable propositions and result in enacted choices that depend on the psychological dispositions that un-self-controlled and self-controlled agents have developed. Akratic and enkratic agents express their character types through their ethical practical syllogisms just as the virtuous agent expresses her character through hers. I turned to *NE* VII.3 as the only location in the *corpus* where Aristotle presents examples of ethical practical syllogisms. There, he presents two ethical practical syllogisms: one that belongs to and issues from the character of a temperate agent, and another that belongs to and issues from the character of a strict akratic agent.

Aristotle describes two exclusive universal propositions for temperance's practical domain and notes that the temperate agent exercises the correct one for the circumstances and that the strict akratic uses the incorrect one. He also describes the temperate agent as choosing and performing a correct action, abstaining from choosing to taste something sweet, while he reports that the strict akratic agent chooses and performs an incorrect action, indulging in something sweet. At first glance, this might appear to suggest that the strict akratic is ignorant of the universal proposition that the temperate agent employs, and further, that this is the lynchpin explaining where the strict akratic goes wrong in her practical syllogism. However, as I argued, this is not the case, for Aristotle explicitly notes that the strict akratic agent is ignorant of the temperate syllogism's particular proposition, and not its universal proposition. In fact, he proposes a theory of knowledge

earlier in the same chapter and he presents the examples of ethical practical syllogisms in part to demonstrate that an agent can "know" two exclusive universal propositions at the same time without contradiction, so long as she knows one actively and the other potentially. An agent has active knowledge of a universal proposition when she both knows and employs it in a practical syllogism; an agent has potential knowledge of universal proposition when she knows it but does not employ it in a practical syllogism. The strict akratic agent knows the correct universal in the potential sense, whereas she knows the incorrect universal in the active sense, for she actually exercises it in her practical syllogism. What explains why the strict akratic agent exercises the incorrect universal is ignorance—driven by appetite or desire—of the temperate practical syllogism's particular proposition.

The sort of ignorance that the strict akratic agent has of the temperate syllogism's practical syllogism was the subject of the first half of Chapter 5. At the end of Chapter 4, I outlined *factual ignorance* and explained why the strict akratic could not be factually ignorant of the temperate syllogism's particular proposition. Rather, I contended that she is *evaluatively ignorant* of it, thanks in large part to Jessica Moss's work on akratic ignorance as akin to perceptual illusion. The notion of evaluative ignorance derives from Aristotle's contention that the virtuous agent not only sets the standard for correct choice and action, but also for correct perception and evaluation. The way that the world appears to the virtuous agent, Aristotle notes, is the way that the world *actually is*. Agents who have damaged or corrupted characters (i.e., those who fall short of virtue), perceive and evaluate the world in an illusory way. I went on to argue that this influences the particular propositions that agents with different character types employ in their practical syllogisms. Self-controlled and un-self-controlled agents both suffer from evaluative ignorance; they both form incorrect evaluations of perceptual objects and circumstances, and this influences their practical

reasoning. Akratic agents enact blameworthy choices because of their improper relation to affect and mistaken evaluations of the world around them; they suffer from evaluative ignorance until after they have chosen and acted and then are full of regret for what they have done. Enkratic agents enact correct choices, but only after struggling against what affect pulls them to do; they, too, suffer from evaluative ignorance, but are able to overcome it prior to choosing and acting.

In the second part of Chapter 5, I constructed and analyzed loose akratic and enkratic practical syllogisms in a variety of practical domains to serve as data confirming my view that *akrasia* and *enkrateia* have wide ranges of expression. I extended the examples of strict akratic and temperate practical syllogisms that Aristotle provides at *NE* VII.3 to the practical domains of courage, generosity, love of honor, and mildness. I provided general overviews of each practical domain, as much as was possible given what little Aristotle has to say about some of them, and then proceeded to demonstrate how evaluative ignorance plays the same role in loose akratic and enkratic practical syllogisms as it does in the strict ones. Importantly, evaluative ignorance does not have to take the same form in each practical domain as it does in temperance's. In temperance's practical domain, evaluative ignorance involves mistakenly attributing unqualified goodness to objects that are only qualifiedly pleasant, whereas, for instance in courage's practical domain, such ignorance involves misattributing unqualified badness to circumstances that are only qualifiedly painful. What matters most when identifying evaluative ignorance is not how something gets mistakenly evaluated, but rather that agents with inferior character types are subject to mistaken evaluation. By the end of Chapter 5, I showed that, consistent with the work of my earlier chapters, *akrasia* and *enkrateia* have wide ranges of expression; agents who express these character types in practical domains other than temperance's make the same structural mistakes in their practical

reasoning even though the affects and universal propositions are distinct from those that are connected to temperance's domain.

What results from my investigation of two inferior character types is that we can provide some much needed nuance to overlooked and underappreciated aspects of Aristotle's ethics. In addition to demonstrating that *akrasia* and *enkrateia* have wide ranges of expression, for example, I have been able to address the puzzling idea that follows from Aristotle's claim at *NE* I.13 that there is something *praiseworthy* about the rational natures of the souls of un-self-controlled and self-controlled agents. Aristotle makes it clear that such agents do not have practical wisdom; so one wonders in what sense the rational nature of an akratic or enkratic agent's soul is worthy of praise. Such agents cannot be practically wise because of Aristotle's commitment to the view that an agent who is practically wise is also completely ethically virtuous. Any agent who expresses *akrasia* or *enkrateia* in any practical domain is surely not completely ethically virtuous. As a result of these considerations, in Chapter 3, I was able to conclude that what is praiseworthy about the rational natures of the souls of akratic and enkratic agents is that they have developed the intellectual disposition of cleverness. Cleverness, Aristotle notes in *NE* VI.12, is a sort of dispositional pre-condition for the intellectual virtue of practical wisdom; when agents use their cleverness for the sake of achieving vile ends, it is blameworthy, but when they use it for the sake of achieving noble ends, their cleverness is praiseworthy. Cleverness appears as a kind of practical knowledge or awareness that nevertheless falls short of the intellectual virtue of practical wisdom.

For self-controlled agents, it is immediately clear why their cleverness is praiseworthy; even though agents who express a form of *enkrateia* struggle against affect in the course of choosing and performing a correct action, they nevertheless do end up enacting a correct choice. Enkratic agents use their cleverness for the sake of attaining praiseworthy goals after overcoming

a struggle with affect. Yet for un-self-controlled agents, there seems to be a difficulty in ascribing praise to their souls' rational natures given that they ultimately choose and perform blameworthy actions; that is, akratic agents uses their cleverness for the sake of attaining blameworthy goals. There are two ways to respond to this point while preserving Aristotle's view that even akratic agents have souls with praiseworthy rational natures. First, in the light of the theory of knowledge that Aristotle presents and endorses at *NE* VII.3, an akratic agent in fact has knowledge of the correct universal proposition; it is just the case that she fails to exercise it in her practical syllogism due to the influence of affect and her evaluative ignorance. In contrast, consider the vicious agent whom Aristotle informs us does not even have potential knowledge of correct universal propositions; he tells us that a vicious agent's first principles are unhealthy and unpreserved [*NE* VII.8 1151a25-26]. In this sense, there is still something to praise about the akratic agent's soul's rational nature, despite the fact that she does not exercise her knowledge of the correct universal proposition. Second, Aristotle also informs us that an important difference between an akratic and a vicious agent lies in that an akratic agent always experiences regret after choosing and performing a blameworthy action, while a vicious agent does not [*NE* VII.8 1150b29-31]. Regret is a painful affect that follows an akratic agent's choice and action *because she knows better*, that is, because she fails to exercise the correct universal. Regret does not follow a vicious agent's choice and action because, as just mentioned, her first principles are corrupted and *she does not know better*. So, secondly, in this comparative sense, the rational nature of an akratic agent's soul merits praise when set against the rational nature of a vicious agent's soul.

My investigation into the character types of *akrasia* and *enkrateia* also permitted an exploration of ethical virtue's unity constraint, which Aristotle endorses at *NE* VI.13 (1144b30-1145a2). I argued that *akrasia* and *enkrateia* are subject to a modification of virtue's unity

constraint, and I termed it the *duality constraint*. In short, an agent who genuinely expresses *akrasia* or *enkrateia* in one practical domain must express either *akrasia* or *enkrateia* in all of the others. I did not argue, as I propose would be mistaken, that an agent who expresses *akrasia* in one practical domain must also express *akrasia* in all of the others. I issued a similar warning about an agent who expresses *enkrateia* in one practical domain: it is not the case that she must express *enkrateia* in all of the others. Rather, if an agent expresses *akrasia* in one practical domain, then the only character types available for her to express in any other are either *akrasia* or *enkrateia*; the same restriction applies to an agent who genuinely expresses *enkrateia* in one practical domain. I showed through eliminative reasoning why an agent who expresses *akrasia* or *enkrateia* in any one practical domain must express either of the two character in all of the others; she cannot genuinely express virtue because she lacks practical wisdom, and she cannot genuinely express vice because Aristotle insists that there is something praiseworthy about her soul's rational nature. Moreover, this duality constraint aligns well with the notion that akratic and enkratic agents are clever, and that cleverness is the disposition that characterizes their souls' rational natures in the place of the practical wisdom that characterizes the rational nature of a virtuous agent's soul.

One result of arguing in favor of the duality constraint is that it accords with common experience. When we think of the people who inhabit our lives, we recognize that they are better at making correct ethical choices and performing correct actions in some practical domains, and worse at doing the same in others. For example, my father was a police officer for over 20 years in Indianapolis, and I would not consider him virtuous according to Aristotle's standards. Nevertheless, he was better at enacting the correct choices in courage's practical domain when on duty than he was at enacting the correct choices in temperance's practical domain when off duty, for he was an alcoholic. He was better at overcoming the affect of fear and following through on

his commitments to put his life on the line for the safety of others than he was at overcoming his tactile appetite for alcohol, which would eventually lead to his demise. Take as another example the elderly neighbor I had when I was younger, Wilma, who was better at managing her desire for gain—she helped finance many neighborhood cookouts and gatherings—than she was at managing her own pursuit of honor for doing so—she would not have it if you tried to thank her for what she had chosen to do. She seemed to express *enkrateia* in generosity's practical domain, while her overt humility indicated that she expressed a form of *akrasia* in love of honor's practical domain. Upon reflection on the people in our lives, it is obvious that various combinations of genuine expressions of *akrasia* and *enkrateia* are not only possible, but that they also occur quite frequently.

These last considerations help to support the final point that I want to make in this concluding chapter. Although Aristotle's ethical treatises are protreptic and focused on guiding his audience toward becoming good and virtuous, it is striking that he does not name a single contemporary or even historically recent individual in these works to exemplify a completely virtuous agent. This because it is rare for agents to develop a virtuous character. Aristotle does not explicitly state that virtue is rare, but we can clearly infer it from the following point he makes about the best species of friendship at *NE* VIII.4. The highest sort of friendship that Aristotle countenances is the one that arises between virtuous agents, that is, agents who see the virtuous characters they have developed mirrored in the souls of their intimates.

> καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν δὴ καὶ ἡ φιλία ἐν τούτοις μάλιστα καὶ ἀρίστη. σπανίας δ᾽ εἰκὸς τὰς τοιαύτας εἶναι. ὀλίγοι γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι.
>
> Both loving and friendship are all together the best among these sorts of people. But it is reasonable that such friendships should be rare. For these sorts of people are few. [*NE* VIII.3 1156b23-25]

Because virtuous people are hard to find, it makes sense that Aristotle would compose his ethical works in response to the shortage. In the light of this recognition of the rarity of virtuous agents, a

simple question arises: Which ethical dispositions characterize the majority of agents? I propose that it would be wrong to suggest that Aristotle surmised that most people in his community were vicious. If that were the case, then Aristotle's ethical treatises would have been written in vain—after all, the vicious have corrupted foundational principles; not only do they perceive the world as it is *not*, but their grasp of things is so inverted that what is most of all incorrect appears most of all correct to them. As my reader can likely already guess, I propose that Aristotle believes that most of the people in his community are akratic and enkratic, expressing self-control in some arenas of conduct and un-self-control in others.[221]

Aristotle aims his virtue ethics at agents who are in danger of becoming mark-missers, but not agents who are likely to become vicious. Vice appears as an apotropaic feature of his ethical account: it figures in as a terrifying prospect, but not one that his students are likely to develop and exercise. Just as Aristotle does not provide a catalogue of contemporary virtuous agents, his work is also bereft of any contemporary vicious agents (with the exception of those dastardly non-Athenians who have habits of nail-biting and yanking out their hair [*NE* VII.5 1148b27-28], or opening up the stomachs of pregnant women to feast on their unborn children [1148b20-21]). So it is possible that the real danger that Aristotle believes his students face is developing dispositions to express un-self-control in more domains of conduct than they express self-control. The task before him is to provide a guide with the purpose of shaping his students' souls such that, in the civil war that obtains between their souls' rational and non-rational natures, their rational natures often win battles. An exemplary Priam or a Hector might once again walk the earth, and it is Aristotle's hope that his ethics might hurry such an agent along. However, one cannot suppose that

[221] On this point, I am in agreement with Burnyeat ("Aristotle on Learning to Be Good") who writes, placing himself in the shoes of one of Aristotle's students, that "the seeds of *akrasia* are going to be with us as we enter Aristotle's lecture room," (277).

Aristotle imagines that his ethical account will result in any consistent output of practical golden standards. Given virtue's rarity, this is just unlikely. In most cases, approximating virtue will have to do, and agents who exercise self-control in more domains than they express its lack are people who approach—without quite touching—consistent lives of active virtue.

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