

ESSAYS ON SOCIAL NORMS AND THE MANY SIDES OF RACISM

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
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To my parents

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ABSTRACT

My dissertation is divided into five relatively freestanding yet thematically linked essays, investigating a number of ways in which social norms and the question of racism are related. In these chapters, I aim to show the vital influence of social norms on our interpersonal relationships, going beyond the futile binary between individual (moral philosophy) and state (political philosophy), thereby affirming the primacy of the social over the political. Considering social norms can help us to see how individual agents are socially and culturally mediated, shaped, and distorted. In the dissertation, I discuss the racial contract (John Rawls and Charles Mills), racism as volitional states (Jorge Garcia), racism as ideology (Tommie Shelby and Sally Haslanger), and anti-racism through social movements (Elizabeth Anderson). By engaging them, I argue that racism as a socially harmful norm should be understood in the context of broader social environments. My thesis is that racism as a socially harmful norm should be understood as a manifestation in broad social environments where the mechanisms of social norms function structurally. In conclusion, I argue for the relevance of social critique instead of a narrow moral critique of racism. In this regard, my solution is not intended as a complete solution for the termination of all forms of racism, rather as certainly a needed viable approach both morally warranted and pragmatically efficacious.

INTRODUCTION

Justification and Context

My dissertation is divided into five relatively freestanding yet thematically linked essays, investigating a number of ways in which social norms and the question of racism are related. In these chapters, I aim to show the vital influence of social norms on our interpersonal relationships, going beyond the futile binary between individual (moral philosophy) and state (political philosophy), thereby affirming the primacy of the social over the political. Considering social norms can help us to see how individual agents are socially and culturally mediated, shaped, and distorted. In the dissertation, I discuss the racial contract (John Rawls and Charles Mills), racism as volitional states (Jorge Garcia), racism as ideology (Tommie Shelby and Sally Haslanger), and anti-racism through social movements (Elizabeth Anderson). By engaging them, I argue that racism as a socially harmful norm should be understood in the context of broader social environments. In doing so, I also utilize undertheorized notions such as self-respect, civility, ideology, and social movement to ponder the question of racism. My thesis is that racism as a socially harmful norm should be understood as a manifestation in broad social environments where the mechanisms of social norms function structurally. In conclusion, I argue for the relevance of social critique instead of a narrow moral critique of racism. In this regard, my solution is not intended as a complete solution for the termination of all forms of racism, rather as certainly a needed viable approach both morally warranted and pragmatically efficacious.

Through these essays, I emphasize that the various relationship between social norms and the many sides of racism. In this introduction, I would like to offer some justification for and contextualization of this guiding thread. Racism is usually associated with the view that members of a certain race are inferior because of their racial membership. Social norms are typically norms

that are sanctioned as authoritative and followed by members in certain groups. Why consider racism and social norms? The connection between them may not be so obvious at a first glance. According to Fredrickson, “Racism exists only when one ethnic group or historical collectivity dominates, excludes or seeks to eliminate another on the basis of differences that it believes are hereditary and unalterable” (Fredrickson 2002, 170). In turn, such racist behaviors of domination are actualized by racist minds. If so, then isn’t racism a matter of individual mind? Racist stereotypes and demeaning attitudes seem to derive from various elements in human minds: beliefs, volitions, and, emotions. Racism seems also harmful given its impacts on human psychology: guilt, shame, humiliation, and degradation. It is fairly common to attribute racism to individual human beings. Yet, we can similarly attribute it to some official institutions such as governments and legal regulations. They are largely public, formal, and explicit. Additionally, there are other implicit, opaque, and informal kinds of social practices and norms. If racism can be applied to both individuals and socially constructed objects, which have relevant norms, coupling racism and social norms may not be so odd. Rather, as I will show below, it points to a fruitful intersection between social ontology and social and political philosophy.

Officially speaking, there is no longer South African apartheid, slavery, and European colonialism, or Jim Crow segregation at least for now. Yet, even though we are living in the post-civil rights epoch, racism persists as informal regimes. Further, the forms of racism have been evolving. Contra overt racism, we see avert, unconscious, cultural, or symbolic forms of racism. Drug laws, mass incarceration, educational segregation, and housing practices are now banal examples that affect racial minorities disproportionately and discriminatorily. At the time of writing this introduction, the national news coverage concerning police killing of innocent Blacks seems endless. The massive social movements in the wake of the death of George Floyd in the US

are also combined with racially disproportionate effects of COVID-19 in 2020. Given this, as Leonard Harris suggests, it makes sense to consider “death, mortality, morbidity, and irredeemable misery as primary indicators of racism across an array of types of racism globally” (Harris 2020, 274).¹

The Persistence of Racism

These facts lead us to our main question: why does racism persist? To effectively deal with the normative question of critiquing racism, it is important to know how racism descriptively works. While everyone officially denounces that racism is immoral, unjust, and inhumane, how can many simultaneously believe that racism persists in many places on earth? If one is not misanthropic and thinks that most people are basically morally benign, it is hard to understand how the majority of people and their institutions can be racist and thereby immoral. Some may say that they are implicitly harboring racism while officially denying it (Brownstein and Saul 2016a, 2016b). Alternatively, some argue that conceptual clarification can explain the inconsistency since people are not so clear about what racism is in the first place (Blum 2002a). Nonetheless, however the notion of racism is essentially contested, the obvious wrongfulness of racism makes its persistence as a phenomenon of racism deeply puzzling. There has to be a convincing account of the existence of racism without racists (Bonilla-Silva 2013). Moreover, even those who deny that racism exists may be simply ignorant of relevant racist facts around them. Charles Mills (2007) famously calls it white ignorance. Because of white ignorance as a structural phenomenon, many whites do not perceive racist wrongs (“where is racism today? I don’t see it”).

¹ On this view, racism ultimately makes necro-being: “The boundary, in virtue of what makes a condition at the very least a feature of racism, is undue ill-health and death as a function of raciation” (Harris 2018, 280).

The question of racism's persistence relates to the definition of racism. And if we know what racism means, where can we find racism? Is it in one's head or heart? Or is it in various social objects such as states, parliaments, courts, and the like? Why is it hard to identify racism for some people while the racialized people suffer from it every day? This can be called the location problem of racism (Glasgow 2009b, 69). Identifying the location and scope of racism will aid the task of eliminating racism from where it persists. If racism is a matter of false belief, we can educate ignorant people with scientific information. Moreover, if racial groups are not permanent, it may be better to give up the notion of race. On this view, racists are cognitively misguided because they are misinformed concerning the idea of race and cured by "the acquisition and distribution of the required information about human biology" (Zack 2002, 113). If racism lies in vicious heart, we should cultivate one's morally virtuous attitudes. When people are antagonistic to racialized people, this hostility as a vicious attitude should be corrected and deeper changes in one's person should be made. If governmental institutions are racist, we can revise those institutions to non-racist ones accordingly. If certain institutions are led by racist individuals, for instance, then simply eliminating them and rendering the institutions in question fair and just can pose an easy solution. Consider the ghetto. If de facto segregation between different races is the main source of racial problems, then racial integration is a way to go. On this view, racial integration is beneficial in both undermining pernicious group stereotypes and promoting dignity, equality of socioeconomic opportunity, and democracy (Anderson 2010). All of these solutions make sense on their own. The diagnose of racism and its cure are closely connected.

Varieties of Racism: Agent-based, Institutional, and Structural

Let me briefly describe the current scholarship around the research question. Racism has been differently analyzed by competing accounts. First of all, racism can be a matter of individual

agents' beliefs, attitudes, or behavior. For Kwame Appiah, racism is a matter of belief. This is doxastic account. For him, racist propositions should be understood with respect to racialism: "there are heritable characteristics, possessed by members of our species, that allows us to divide them into a small set of races, in such a way that all the members of these races share certain traits and tendencies with each other that they do not share with members of any other race" (Appiah 1990, 5). Racialism is false because there is no such thing as racial kinds, namely, racial groups unified by a racial essence. This fact shows that racialism's supposed correlation between visible features ("skin color") and psychological characteristics ("laziness") in certain races is unwarranted. For Appiah, insofar as racialism does not make moral or evaluative claims, it is a cognitive problem. As a result, racial prejudice is a sort of cognitive flaw or what Appiah calls "the deformation of rationality in judgment" (Appiah 1990, 8).

Appiah's distinction between racialism and racism is also reflected in another distinction: extrinsic racism and intrinsic racism. While extrinsic racism holds that "members of different races differ in respects that warrant the differential treatment," intrinsic racists believe that "each race has a different moral status, quite independent of the moral characteristics entailed by its racial essence" (Appiah 1990, 5). Yet, intrinsic racism is not just harmful because racially oppressed groups can permissibly employ intrinsic racism to fight harmful racism. Solidarity among the oppressed races, like family in a broad sense, can be an example of intrinsic racism. But even in this case of beneficial intrinsic racists, their view can be seen as misleading when considering public morality where race cannot be a legitimate criterion for treating people. Taken together, for Appiah, racism is not only cognitive but also moral problem.

Instead, what defines racism can be motivational and volitional (Schmid 1996). Garcia's volitional approach analyzes racism in terms of ill-will. For him, the fundamental form of racism

is in an individual agent's volitional and affective states: "racism ... is something that essentially involves not our beliefs and their rationality or irrationality, but our wants, intentions, likes and dislikes and their distance from the moral virtues" (Garcia 1996, 400). While racist beliefs are usually problematic, they should count as racist as far as they are connected to specific negative emotions such as racial disregard or antipathy. Therefore, Garcia views cognitive racism as secondary because epistemic state and its moral significance are distinct. Unlike doxastic views, Garcia's view emphasizes affective aspects.

While Appiah and Garcia represent monistic accounts, Lawrence Blum's account is pluralistic. Blum attends to the ways in which many different sources of racism manifest: actions, practices, institutions, symbols, jokes, and the like. Blum's main worry is about overusing the term 'racism.' This conceptual inflation is problematic since "That overuse ... feeds a diminishing of 'racism's moral force, and thus contributes to weakened concern about racism and other racial ills" (Blum 2002b, 206). While Garcia's view sees racial antipathy morally objectionable, there may be subtle cases like racial anxiety or discomfort, which are not as abhorrent as racial antipathy. Therefore, Blum argues that there can be diverse forms of race-related ills such as racial injustice, racial insensitivity, racial ignorance, and racial discomfort. On this view, there is good reason to worry about the conceptual inflation of racism as far as it prevents productive conversation regarding races and weakens the power of moral criticism. Blum's work can be seen as an attempt to clarify conceptual confusion. All things considered, despite its diversity, he concludes that racism is related to either inferiorization or antipathy.

So far, we have seen that racism is defined by reference to individual agents, whether it be belief, attitude, or behavior. Also, racism is primarily seen as a moral ill. Now let me turn to institutional aspects of racism. Charles Mills rightly calls attention to racism's social dimension,

analyzing it in terms of racial injustice and oppression. According to him, a polity like the US is fundamentally racist. Mills critiques the social contract theory tradition in Western philosophy, most notably John Rawls's theory of justice, according to which society is consensual as "a cooperative venture for mutual advantage" (TJ 4). Mills argues that Rawls's liberal theory does not capture the oppressive aspect of the domination contract. On Mills's view, in fact, it is not accidental that so-called just liberal societies are a race-based hierarchical system of domination and subordination. This is because alleged equality and freedom in liberal societies do not extend to people of color: "the general purpose of the Contract is always the differential privileging of the whites as a group with respect to the nonwhites as a group, the exploitation of their bodies, land, and resources, and the denial of equal socioeconomic opportunities to them" (Mills 1997, 11). As a result, the non-white is identified with moral sub-person in such liberal societies. White supremacy as a social structure systematically disadvantages nonwhites and privileges whites as groups. As Rawlsian theory mystifies and idealizes domination contract, white supremacy is manifest as white ignorance in cognitive domains. Here Mills follows a Marxist tradition of critiquing bourgeois liberalism.

Indeed, racism can be seen as an ideology. In the wake of Karl Marx's critique of false consciousness, the notion of ideology has been influential (Ng 2015; Jaeggi 2008). This is particularly relevant to the question of racism given the material deprivation, cognitive distortions, and relevant institutional supports. Tommie Shelby extends the doxastic view of racism held by Appiah on a social scale. For Shelby, "ideologies are widely accepted illusory systems of beliefs that function to establish or reinforce structures of social oppressions (Shelby 2002, 415). Racism is also ideological in cognitive senses since racists fail to respond to countervailing evidence to their belief that certain racial groups are inferior (Stanley 2015, 185). On this view, racism is

mostly a matter of cognitive incapacity or irrationality caused by self-interest, self-deception, and the like.

Sally Haslanger concurs with Shelby that “it is reasonable to count as ‘racist’ not only the attitudes and actions of individuals but also the full range of practices, institutions, policies, and such like that ... count as racially oppressive” (Haslanger 2012, 335). Human agency is always already embedded in various social practices. While Shelby’s account is an institutionalized version of Appiah’s cognitive view, Haslanger builds on and revise Shelby’s account to consider affective, implicit, and perceptual aspects of racism. As far as ideologies shape people’s cognition, what matters is the social and cultural practices as a structural constraint. Though institutional and structural accounts largely overlap, to distinguish them from Mills’s view of institutional racism, I call Shelby and Haslanger’s approaches structural. The basic idea is that social structures constrain individuals in various ways.² Anderson’s view in favor of racial integration (2010) can also count as the structural approach in contrast to the agent-based approach of racism.

In short, racism can be agent-based, institutional, and structural. I take these to be the main positions within the contemporary debates in the philosophy of race. My own view is closer to the structural and institutional approaches than agent-based views, though I try to deepen the former’s insights. My dissertation extends the current scholarship on racism by analyzing racism in terms of varying social norms and applying norms to the understanding of racism. While many scholars agree that racism is immoral, little has been said about how immoral racism does not vanish despite the critique of its immorality. It is my claim that this insufficient analysis can be cured by paying attention to the close examinations of broader racist social mechanisms. The upshot is that racist social norms are embedded and transmitted in various social practices, which require a different

² As I will argue, while Mills’s institutional approach is more pessimistic about racist aspects of political institutions, Shelby and Haslanger seem more ambivalent toward institutional kinds of racism.

sort of critique than a critique based on pure moral appeal. If this is the case, then we must construct anti-racist social norms rather than merely positing moral norms against racism. Even though the topics of racism and social norms have growing literature respectively, the connection between them has been wanting. This dissertation aims to fill some of this lacuna by extensively engaging with the recent works of philosophy of race and social and political philosophy.

Social Norms

To that end, in investigating the issues of racism, my methodological tools draw on recent literature on social norms. Regarding the persistence of harmful social patterns of thoughts and behaviors, I start from a simple intuition: “We are social animals embedded in thick networks of relations, and what we do has consequences, for us and for others. Interdependence, not independence, rules social life” (Bicchieri 2017, 10). Social norms connect and cement interdependent individuals with relevant social groups by demarcating the deontic scope of permissible, required, or forbidden acts.

Since there are many competing kinds of collective patterns of behavior, one can ask how social norms are different from moral norms. Moreover, racism seems like a clear violation of the moral norms of equality and liberty. While aspects of social and moral norms overlap, we can distinguish them in principle.³ While social norms are group-based, conditional and contextual, moral norms are largely individual-based, unconditional and universal in the sense that people tend to believe that they should follow them regardless of what others do. Also, whereas moral norms are clusters of practice-independent normative judgements, social norms are essentially practice-

³ For the sake of the argument, I set aside the skepticism concerning the distinction between moral and social norms (Foot 1972). Even if it turns out that there is no genuine difference between them, making a distinction between the moral and the social is useful for our purposes or so I will argue.

dependent (Brennan et al. 2013, 72). For instance, moral norms may include the Kantian categorical imperative such as “don’t lie” or “don’t steal.” Unlike fairness or justice, purity, honor, and loyalty can be part of social norms depending on a given culture’s specific social practices. Social norms are also distinct from customs as unconditional preferences. A similar unconditionality can be said about legal injunction, which is distinct from social sanction.

The key is to understand social norms’ expectation-dependency. Christina Bicchieri notes that conditional preferences and social expectations matter in our social life influencing others’ preferences in a strategic interaction. On her view, there are two kinds of expectations: empirical expectation and normative expectation. Whereas empirical expectations concern factual beliefs about how others will act in certain situations (first-order beliefs), normative expectations are social beliefs about personal normative beliefs held by other people (second-order beliefs) (Bicchieri 2017, 11-12). Hence, Bicchieri defines a social norm as “a rule of behavior such that individuals prefer to conform to it on condition that they believe that (a) most people in their reference network conform to it (empirical expectation), and (b) that most people in their reference network believe they ought to conform to it (normative expectation)” (Bicchieri 2017, 35). Note that social norms are socially enforced to motivate and guide actions. Those expectations usually are accompanied by negative sanctions like punishment as well as positive sanctions such as liking, trust, and respect. People are responsive to social norms by variously conforming, evaluating, or defying them. Relatedly, individuals continually occupy and move between different social roles. I will show how this relatively simple idea of social norms as conditional preferences and social expectations can be applied to deal with various issues raised by philosophy of race and social philosophy in the subsequent chapters. As Michael Dummett says, “People adopt racist attitudes when they find themselves in a social milieu in which it is acceptable or encouraged to display

such attitudes, and in which maintaining them is advantageous” (Dummett 2004, 33). If this is the case, what is at stake is changing the social milieu to discourage racist attitudes.

Critical Social Theory: Nonideal, Pragmatic, and Realist

Let me briefly describe my theoretical orientations in this dissertation. As a broad theoretical approach, my dissertation stands in the tradition of the critical social theory. On Horkheimer’s seminal definition, critical theory aims “to liberate human beings from the circumstances that enslave them” (Horkheimer 1982, 244). As I emphasize the primacy of the social over the political above, it is worth noticing that critical theory is social rather than political. Whereas the political deals with a narrow aspect of our social life such as voting and legislation, the social encompasses broader collective practices and associations including nonpolitical arrangements and informal institutions. We also need a distinctively comprehensive social theory is also needed insofar as the political good is not the overriding and primary good in the contemporary pluralistic world. On this view, political philosophy is part of social philosophy, not vice versa. Since Rousseau’s *Second Discourse* (1997a), critical social theory centrally diagnoses social pathologies such as domination, alienation, injustice, and oppression with the prospect of human flourishing. In this regard, contra representational and ahistorical views of traditional theory, critical theory has transformative and emancipatory interests (Horkheimer 1982; Geuss 1981; Habermas 1984, 1987; Honneth 1995). To this end, in addition to these critical theorists, I try to draw on pluralist and interdisciplinary works in human and social sciences such as sociology, psychology, anthropology, and history. This is because critical theory is inseparable from empirical social analysis in addition to purely conceptual and definitional analysis. Its interdisciplinarity is also one of the factors that distinguishes critical theory from traditional theory.

Here the epistemological task of critical theory is inseparable from normative inquiry. In Marx's dictum, critical theory is "the self-clarification of the struggles and wishes of the age."

The critical theory I endorse has several distinct features: it is nonideal, pragmatic, and realist. First of all, I engage with nonideal theories such as Mills, Haslanger, Anderson. On Mills's view, ideal theory involves some or all of the following problematic assumptions: an idealized social ontology, idealized capacities, silence on oppression, ideal social institutions, an idealized cognitive sphere, and strict compliance (Mills 2005, 168-69). Contrary to these, nonideal theory does not look for ideals for a perfectly just society as Rawls does his version of ideal theory. Rather than having a complete moral theory and justifying its associated ideals, nonideal theory starts from diagnosing and critiquing moral and social ills in our current unjust and nonideal societies. Nonideal theory aims to use the nonideal as "ideal-as-descriptive-model" (Mills 2005), instead of the ideal as "ideal-as-idealized-model," which ends up obscuring and normalizing crucial realities of oppression. Contrary to these idealized assumptions, what is required is ideal-as-descriptive-model that maps the power relations in which a system of domination harmfully affects the ideational (Mills 2005, 174).

Second, insofar as critical social theory is driven by problematic situations, my approach is broadly pragmatic (Frega 2014). Roughly, the pragmatism I have in mind has the following features. First, it starts with concrete problems and real-world oppression. In prioritizing empirical analyses it also embraces fallibilism and experimentalism against a priori and conceptual approaches. While ideals are still valuable, they are to be tested in practice and experience. In this sense, collective learning processes are central to pragmatic inquiries as problem-solving activities. Also, pragmatism endorses a pluralism concerning the methods for ameliorating problematic

situations. In this regard, I reject absolutist and monist approaches in social theory in favor of contextual and pluralist approaches.

Finally, my view is also consistent with recent realist approaches in political theory, against “ethics first” or “political moralism” approaches represented by Kantians like Rawls. Insofar as politics and morality are discrete, the task is to understand the distinctively political dimension of our social and political life rather than conflating politics with applied ethics (Geuss 2008; Williams 2005). Similar to critical theorists, realists are interested in topics such as power, privilege, group interest, conflict, coercion, material conditions (Prinz and Rossi 2017). Just as critical theory distinguishes itself from traditional theory, realists do not overlook historicity and particularity of our moral and political values. Even though moral values are valuable, far from setting an unachievable ideal of morality, realists also care about moral value’s feasibility and try to avoid moralist positions given the constraints of circumstances. Regarding this point, realists are also committed to the primacy of social practices.

Chapter Summaries

The following is a brief overview of each chapter. In chapter 1, I introduce the social constructionist notion of race as a human social kind. To this end, I discuss Ian Hacking and Sally Haslanger’s views. To make sense of my account of race and racism, I distinguish two different kinds of social groups: voluntary and non-voluntary. Building on this, I argue that collective intentionality is not an adequate way to consider racism. Instead, I propose preliminary ways of explaining racism by referring to implicit bias and social norms.

In chapter 2, I consider the problem of racism through the lens of the social contract theory. To this end, I examine relevant works by John Rawls and Charles Mills. Whereas Rawls’s ideal theory can deal with racial injustice as racial discrimination, I argue that Mills’s nonideal theory

is mostly concerned with racist oppression. Between racial injustice and racist oppression, however, there are varying degrees of race-related wrongs, which social norms can help elucidate. I extend Mills's critique of Rawls by showing the narrowness of the concept of the basic structure with the help of social norms. I then emphasize the relevance of social norms by looking at the case of self-respect.

In chapter 3, I critique Jorge Garcia's volitional account of racism. As a corrective to his misguided view, I propose the norm of civility as a cure for racism in Garcia's sense. I show this by referring to the influences of social norms over individual moral agents. The point is to construct anti-racist social environments in which people think, feel, and act. On this view, our social roles as citizens would constrain our civil obligations toward others. To this end, drawing on Cheshire Calhoun, I suggest we cultivate civility as a beneficial social norm to overcome racism in mind.

In chapter 4, I argue that we should understand racist ideology in terms of racist social norms. First, I reconstruct Tommie Shelby's account of racism as ideology, arguing that his view is too cognitivist. Rather, what is essential in ideology is its functional dimension. Then I turn to Sally Haslanger's account of ideology as cultural techne. While Haslanger is right about her critique of Shelby's cognitivist view of ideology, I argue that what she calls nonideal moral epistemology weakens her overall insight. Taken together, both Shelby and Haslanger narrowly understand ideology in terms of epistemic or moral deficiency. In contrast, I argue that ideology is better understood as a harmful social norm. This account is explanatorily superior to Shelby and Haslanger's views in its stress on the nonepistemic, nonmoral, and functional aspects of ideology.

In chapter 5, I argue that the insights of Elizabeth Anderson's pragmatic view of social movements should be further pushed and revised to propose pluralistic strategies of social movements against racist social norms. I first show that her view of bias correction in morality

does not take into account the power of social norms. In addition to this, I argue that Anderson's idea is not pragmatic enough in that she does not take the moment of testing moral principles in practice seriously. To remedy this, I argue that unlearning racism is possible by contentions and social sanctions. Building on this, I conclude that pragmatists should consider civil and uncivil social movements in terms of their efficacy. This would further pragmatists' desideratum that social movements mobilize various methods in learning beyond rational persuasion.

Finally, I would like to conclude this introductory chapter by adding some remarks on the relationship between chapters. While diagnosing race-based social ills in nonideal ways is mostly manifest in chapter 1 and 2, the prescriptive parts of my discussion are most evident in chapter 3, 4, and 5. My view of civility in chapter 3 and uncivility in chapter 5 concern a beneficial social norm against racism through the lens of pragmatism. The idea is that social norms are related to a kind of intersubjective problem-solving process, which is itself embedded in the process of learning. In this pragmatic sense, social norms are ordinary, conventional, and changeable. In chapter 4, I advance a realist and pragmatic kind of ideology critique. Also, although my chapters are basically independent of each other, there are some thematic affinities and continuities. Chapter 1 and chapter 4 are overlapping concerning the stability of racial oppression. A social ontological view of chapter 1 is applied to a normative political philosophy of Rawls in chapter 2. Volitional aspects of racism are covered in chapter 2 (collective volition) and chapter 3 (individual volition). Insofar as social epistemology is about "the construction of knowers through social and cultural practices" (Haslanger 2020, 22), social epistemological considerations concerning racism are dealt in chapter 4 (ideology) and chapter 5 (social movements as learning experiences).

CHAPTER 1. RACE, SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONISM, AND EXPLANATION

1.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I introduce the notion of race as a human social kind. As a group, the category of race is constituted by individual people. But it does not mean that the concept of race is meaningless because individuals are not identical to groups or that it should be eliminated for the sake of ontological parsimony. In what follows, I will begin by briefly sketching racial eliminativism (race is not real) and biological racial realism (race is biologically real), which play a role in preparing for the discussion of the position of social constructionism (race is socially real). On this view, racial terms refer to social kinds, rather than natural kinds. To this end, I will discuss Ian Hacking and Sally Haslanger's views. My point is that these social constructivist accounts are relevant to normative issues surrounding racism as well as the metaphysics of race. To make sense of my account of race and racism, in the second half of the chapter, I will make a distinction between two different kinds of social groups. Building on this, I will argue that collective intentionality may not be a good way to consider racism in favor of more structural approaches. Finally, I will propose preliminary ways of explaining racism at two levels (sub-personal and supra-personal) by referring to implicit bias and social norms. While my concern is mostly limited to explanatory accounts, not immediately normative, issues, this would be needed to analyze and engage social critique of race-based injustice as I hope to show in the rest of the dissertation.

1.2 Between Objectivism and Constructivism

Let me start from the following definition of racism: "Racism attributes a single set of real or imaginary physical and/or mental features to the precise ethnic groups, and believes these

features to be transmitted from one generation to generation” (Bethencourt 2013, 7-8). This definition of racism seems to imply some preconception of race. We can think of two different conceptions of race: objectivist and constructivist. According to Leonard Harris’s distinction, while the objectivist argues that “races may be considered natural, caused by human biologies” and believes that “the uses of racial categories are justified because they refer to objective realities,” the constructivist holds that “races are constructed causal agents” since it is impossible that “groups exist independent of cultural or social ideas” (Harris 1999a, 18-19).⁴

Starting from this basic distinction, let me begin by examining racial naturalism and racial eliminativism before a detailed discussion of social constructivism, to avoid confusing racial eliminativism with racial constructivism. Since J.S. Mill’s tradition on natural kinds, the term ‘kind’ itself seems to suggest the essence or type of things in scientific studies.⁵ One might ask if there is any essential property like genetic traits shared by races just as having an atomic number 79 guarantees a membership in the kind ‘gold’. Some scholars such as Philip Kitcher claim that even though there is no fixed racial essence, it is still possible to consider race as natural kind characterized by a certain extent of reproductive isolation. Race can be analyzed in terms of evolutionary variations in lineages of biological populations over time. According to the racial naturalist or objectivist, race is considered to be a relevant biological group with reproductively distinctive populations. Although he has changed his view, Kitcher argues that “divisions into races might have biological significance” (Kitcher 1999, 90) as objective kinds regardless of any ethical motivation of racial eliminativism. While it is true, for example, that we ordinarily do not

⁴ Given pragmatic reasons, Harris ultimately favors objectivist account over constructivist account: “It is objective criteria of what exists, across contexts, that I suggest we use to decide what situations count as racist. ... Stable definitions offer, for example, criteria we can use to evaluate changes, such as whether the conditions creating racial misery are increasing or decreasing” (Harris 1999b, 447). I will return to the issue of stability later.

⁵ To be sure, this Millian view of essence or kind is not the only option. Recently, Charlotte Witt (2011) reintroduced an Aristotelian version of essence to make sense of socially constructed categories such as gender.

know about the exact essence of water as H₂O, relevant scientists, in this case biologists, can determine the essence of race, if such a thing exists.

It might be argued that what is at stake, however, is our folk conception of race, rather than the scientific understanding of race, which involves a kind of linguistic division of labor between relevant experts and laymen.⁶ For even though we, as laymen, do not exactly know what we are scientifically talking about, this ignorance still does not hinder a successful reference for race. In this regard, the normative meaning of race is at least partly to be determined by our commonsensical and ordinary usage. Moreover, it is far from clear whether facts about race can be entirely neutral given the value-ladenness of human kinds. It seems now a widely shared view that race is not simply a natural kind, such as gold or water, which has a certain racial essence. This is because several studies reveal that genetic variation between two individuals within a racial group has greater diversity than between different racial groups, and it is now taken for granted that there is no such thing as a biological essence (clusters of genes, heritable genetic traits) concerning race.⁷

This seems to suggest that race as a group may not exist in the first place. Consider what Kwame Appiah calls racialism according to which members in the same race must share “certain fundamental, heritable, physical, moral, intellectual, and cultural characteristics with one another that they [do] not share with members of any other race” (Appiah 2002, 80). The mismatch between our ordinary conception of race and its referent leads us to Appiah’s defense of racial eliminativism, according to which racial groups do not exist. On this view, although races are

⁶ This point was made by Glasgow 2008. Being agnostic about the race debate on whether racial discourse refers to social or natural kinds, he argues against the dominant theory of conceptual analysis that racial concepts should be analyzed by historical experts in favor of the need to investigate contemporary, folk discourse on race.

⁷ The biological notion of race is deeply problematic because “there is considerably more genetic variation within populations as between them” and “there is no argument that there are correlations between phenotypical outcomes and genetic variation” (Manicas 2006, 46-47). Even though genes are causal and figure in explanation, various phenotypical outcomes should be viewed as causally complex products.

supposed to refer to certain biological groups of people with visible phenotypical traits, there seem to be no objects satisfying that description. From this, it follows that there are no races. As far as there are no racial essences, regardless of adopting descriptive theory (what Appiah calls an “ideational” account) or casual-historical theory of reference (what Appiah calls a “referential” account), they hold that the term ‘race’ does not refer to the real thing in the world and thereby should be eliminated from our vocabulary. If the idea of ‘race’ is meaningful and conservable, the term race is supposed to give a valid causal explanation of certain racial phenomena. But this term race seems to not pick out some underlying essence of race because a sentence like “someone is black” seems to have no substantial extension.⁸

Moreover, at least, today there seems to be no reproductive isolation given the widespread occurrence of mixed-race and interracial marriage. Rather, it is argued that human populations have not been reproductively and geographically isolated for a long enough period of time while the term race is always concerned with purity. Even if an infamous ‘one-drop rule’ holds, the contemporary biological division into pure races does not make sense due to mixed-races. Even though biologically relevant racial groups might have existed, given the global existence of mixed-race and the complexities of racial identity, it is not at all clear that these kinds of racial groups are still significantly prevalent in the contemporary United States.⁹ As Naomi Zack notes, the concept of race “requires that the majority of humans be and always have been racially pure” (Zack 1994,

⁸ Naomi Zack also employs her theory of natural kind terms to conclude that the folk usage of race is misguided. As far as racial terms are like natural kind terms, it is scientifically evidenced that racial terms do not refer to any underlying structures shared by racial groupings (Zack 1999, 2002). If so, people’s far-reaching ignorance should be corrected. Zack argues that we need “the acquisition and distribution of the required information about human biology” (Zack 2002, 113).

⁹ Zack writes: “The visibility of a growing population of self-identified mixed-race Americans undermines traditional racial categories in the false biological sense. ... over sixty combinations are now possible as sites for racial identity. ... If a fraction of those combinations become broadly acknowledged as legitimate racial identities, it will no longer be assumed that a person’s race is a visible trait” (2003, 268). Here she seems to believe that an increasing number of mixed-race individuals can count as recalcitrant anomalies, which can bring about something like a scientific revolution for the existing paradigm of race (Kelly et al. 2010).

17). Moreover, today many individuals can have their own conception of race, independent of the official standard in a census when they are asked about their races. Especially in the case of multiracial people, it seems that self-reports of the assignment of race are much more fluid and context-dependent. Given that the way race is classified and assigned is largely varied, it is not clear there is any single best way of racial categorization. Hence Appiah concludes that “no large social group in America is a race” (Appiah 1998, 73).

However, on Appiah’s view, it is hard to explain why races as social groups can have an effectivity in our social spheres if they did not exist in the first place. Even if ‘biological’ races do not exist, there may be other social, if not biological, ways for races to be efficacious. While racial eliminativism is largely committed to the anti-realist position on race, one may have a strong intuition that race is something real and causally effective like other social practices which are real. Even though social scientists or philosophers might acknowledge that race is a myth or illusion like phlogiston, race is still an important concept insofar as members of a given population treat and classify each other by race.¹⁰ That is, the fact that races as a social group have no biological basis does not entail that the concept of race is useless as an explanatory tool. Here we should be careful about the assertion that race is social rather than biological. As Michael Root explains, for example, single men tend to have a better chance of dying of heart disease than married men in the U. S (Root 2007, 737).¹¹ While genes do not make us single or married, we can infer that other

¹⁰ To be sure, there may be a worry that we cannot move straight from ‘race don’t exist’ to ‘race must be socially constructed.’ For instance, Santa Claus does not exist and seems not socially constructed. But since many people have the false belief that he does not exist, it seems possible to have a lot of explanatory purchase by appeal to that widespread but false belief. Yet if we stress the causal efficacy of race, this analogy between race and Santa Claus seems rather weak. My point is that races are socially constructed and exist actually.

¹¹ In a similar vein, race can be taken as similar to marital status. While race is social kind like marriage, Root notes that it is different from marriage because race is biologically, not culturally, transmitted and assigned through the social traits such as skin color. Against racial eliminativism, he concludes “social scientists have a reason not to be race-blind as long as their subjects are race-conscious.” (Root 2007, 752).

social categories not determined by genes—like race—can play a role in causal explanation regarding biological conditions like heart disease.

1.3 Social Constructionism

If biological racial realism and racial eliminativism represent two extreme views, I take social constructionism to be a more plausible middle-ground for explaining the term race and using it as an explanatory variable insofar as race needs to be considered real but non-essential. According to this line of thought, race is not a biological or natural kind since the very notion of race is not essential, innate, nor ahistorical. Rather, insofar as mind-independence itself need not be a proper criterion for realism (Thomasson 2003a), race can be still considered real while the racial categories themselves are socially and historically constructed. For even if race is socially constructed and thus mind-dependent, it does not follow that race is not really real insofar as we do not take mind-independence as the criterion for realism. As far as race picks out something both objective and socially constructed, in contrast to racial eliminativism, the term ‘race’ seems to have a certain explanatory value in the social sciences. By understanding race as structured by various cultural norms, conventions, and formal or informal institutions, we can have a ground for considering the causal role of race in our social life. While there are many different strands in social constructionist view on race, the bottom line of the view is that race is a historically and culturally local and socially caused or constituted by a variety of cultural or institutional factors. The use of racial categories can be justified on the condition that they are produced by culture and social conventions.

Lawrence Blum argues that racialization is “the treating of groups as if there were inherent and immutable differences between them; *as if* certain somatic characteristics marked the presence of significant characteristics of mind, emotion, and character; and as if some were of greater worth

than others” (Blum 2002a, 147). Through this process, race-based boundaries acquire their moral and social significance. According to him, “racialized groups are characterized by forms of experience they have undergone and a sociohistorical identity that they possess because of the false attributions to them ... of innate biobehavioral tendencies” (Blum 2010, 300). While acknowledging racialism is false and pernicious in maintaining a problematic status quo, we can consider the effect of racialization by considering social construction. Here I think that racialization is a key to make sense of racism.

Let me start with Hacking’s view. He asks why race still matters from the social constructionist point of view. One of pervasive tendency concerning race is the fact that we classify things into several kinds according to our own conception. As authors like Cornel West or Foucault point out in their own versions of genealogy of modern racism (West 1982; Foucault 2003), the categories of determining races have been historically varied. By reference to the institutionalized practices such as census, Hacking shows that racial classification of certain individuals can have causal effects on those individuals. The stereotyping labeling and conception towards certain racial groups would cause harmful and oppressive effects on individuals who are members of underrepresented racial groups, not to mention the historical facts about colonialism and imperialism for Europeans and Americans. Hacking correctly writes that racist tendencies are “produced by the imperial imperative, the instinct of empires to classify people in order to control, exploit, dominate, and enslave,” (Hacking 2005, 114).

Hacking investigates the distinctiveness of human kinds by appealing to the notion of interactive kind. Unlike quark or gold as indifferent kinds, human kinds like race seem to interact with specific categorization. For “what was known about people of a kind may become false because people of that kind have changed in virtue of what they believe about themselves”

(Hacking 1999, 34). What Hacking calls the looping effect covers a wide variety of cases such as homosexuality, child abuse, and multiple personality disorder. One of Hacking's main points is that classifying or describing human kinds brings about feedback that changes the very kinds in question. If our classification affects human kinds, the treatment of human kinds should be different from natural kinds: "The target of the natural sciences are stationary. Because of looping effects, the targets of the social sciences are on the move" (Hacking 1999, 108). Even though there may be feedback mechanisms in natural kinds like between bacteria and antibiotics (Cooper 2004), what makes human kinds distinctive is the fact that human kinds seem to be aware of the particular way in which they are described. As an intentional being, our nominal practice, which tends to be widely shared by members of certain communities, seems to make race a social kind which affects our self-conception: "Constructionist tend to maintain that classifications are not determined by how the world is, but are convenient ways in which to represent it" (Hacking 1999, 33). In this way, without drawing on any biological or anatomical differences, race as social kind can be understood as both real and historically contingent kind. The fact that we are self-consciously adopting or rejecting certain descriptions available shows why the social kinds should be differently treated from natural kinds: "Quarks are not aware that they are quarks and are not altered simply by being classified as quarks" (Hacking 1999, 32). The looping effect of human kinds is a sort of feedback mechanisms, as Robert Merton nicely shows regarding reflexivity in the social realm. For instance, consider the looping effect in which "the members of a minority group ... have a reputation for being opportunistic strikebreakers. As a consequence, they are excluded from trade unions. But because they are excluded from the unions, they have fewer opportunities to find a job.... The self-fulfilling prophecy is an equilibrium" (Guala 2016, 123-24).

Hacking's view can assume a critical role in social researches since there may be many other equilibria which are better than the example above. For, as Haslanger nicely puts it, social construction can contribute to a "debunking project" as long as it shows that something which is uncritically taken for granted is not actually inevitable and need not have existed as it is. By a debunking project, she means: "A debunking project typically attempts to show that a category or classification scheme that appears to track a group of individuals defined by a set of physical or metaphysical conditions is better understood as capturing a group that occupies a certain (usually "thick") social position" (Haslanger 2003, 318). If we trace the historical origins of various social positions, the notion of race can turn out to be alterable or contingent. As long as our labeling is dynamic and not determined by the natural world, human kinds appear as socially constructed. If certain categorizations cause certain injustices concerning race or gender, social constructionist projects can be emancipatory in the sense of unmasking pernicious ideology on stereotyping and essentializing human kinds. Although races are socially constructed, they can be reified and ossified such that they appear as out of human control. According to this line of thought, given a socially constructed category's inherent contingency and variability, we can transform or abolish our oppressive categorizations so as to overcome degrading and unjust disempowerment of social agencies.

While Haslanger largely agrees with Hacking's basic approach, she says that the point is "a complex, usually unwieldy, and somewhat haphazard collection of institutions and practices together with their material manifestations" (Haslanger 2003, 314). Ideas do not need to be consciously and willingly known for social construction to work. It would be simply implausible to think that we need a constant rational evaluation concerning socially constructed objects. Although idea or conception may play an important role in social constructions, it is possible that

we are shaping our own identities without self-awareness or explicit acceptance.¹² By drawing on what she terms ideology¹³, in addition to material practice or even violence, Haslanger argues that “we need a way of thinking about... the formation of social kinds, that acknowledges the causal impact of classification, but also gives weight to the unintended and unconceptualized impact of practices” (Haslanger 2003, 315). While Hacking focuses on the intentional character of self-conception of interactive kinds, Haslanger is more acutely aware of the ascriptive effect of various unintended and unconceptualized social practices. The point is that explanation here can function as a debunking project that is closely connected to a kind of ideology critique. Social constructionism can serve as a critique of false naturalization of human kinds by destabilizing them.

1.4 Stability

The previous considerations seem to raise a question about how certain social constructions can be stabilized and sustained over time insofar as races as social groups should be distinct from random or ephemeral assemblages and aggregates. Moreover, as a group, the concept of race as an explanatory category should survive mere changes of membership.

From Hacking’s viewpoint, social constructionism needs to take a form of causal explanation insofar as it involves interactions between objects and ideas. However, one may argue that it is not clear how his argument for social constructionism can warrant a valid causal explanation in the social sciences. While in many cases stability in science may be seen due entirely to natural facts independent of human convention, here the question should not necessarily

¹² Cooper already points out this possibility in her paper. For example, non-verbal agents like birds can do intentional acts without referring to explicit descriptions. From this and other observations, Cooper argues that Hacking fails to show that human kinds are radically different from natural kinds (Cooper 2004, 82-83).

¹³ Tommie Shelby’s definition of ideology is useful: “*An ideology is a widely held set of loosely associated beliefs and implicit judgments that misrepresent significant social realities and that function, through this distortion, to bring about or perpetuate unjust social relations*” (Shelby 2014, 66). I will return to the problem of his view in chapter 4.

be committed to a certain kind of reductive analysis. Can the categories of social construction make successful generalizations in the social sciences? Here Ron Mallon's explanation of how social kinds can appear more or less stable kinds is suggestive. In contrast to hermeneutical traditions that emphasize meaning, understanding (*Verstehen*), or intentionality in the social sciences¹⁴, according to Mallon, we can still find some degree of law-like regularities and thereby the possibility of induction and prediction. Those who are under the same racial category may be under the same types of causal influences in a society. For example, race can be used as a descriptive, if not prescriptive, category in the social sciences with regard to income, health care, employment, ownership, and death risk. For one can readily see the differences among racial groups are more or less persistent. Like natural kinds that can enter into causal generalizations, there is no reason to think that social kinds cannot have any causal power and allow robust induction and explanation.

On Hacking's account, human kinds look like fleeting and malleable. As Mallon claims, however, "if all human kinds are as unstable as Hacking says child abuse is, then his position amounts to a general skepticism about the possibility of successful... social science, and basic social knowledge" (Mallon 2003, 340). Even if absolutely stable categories are not necessary for a successful account, there should be something that guarantees stabilization to some degree. In this regard, to my mind, Mallon correctly writes: "Hacking gives us a picture of how instability might work, but no illumination to why it should always work, or in what cases it does work. To recognize that social roles may be unstable is not even to show that they usually are" (Mallon 2003, 346).

¹⁴ For the survey of this tradition, see Little 1991, ch. 4; Risjord 2014, ch. 4.

But a way to explain the stability of social phenomena may be an open question. The non-essentialist claim that race is a social kind and unstable does not entail that there are always anomalies which would hinder explanation and prediction. It should be noted that it is not clear if social construction can be easily fixed. While our intuition may be that unstable socially constructed kinds are easy to change, evidence regarding specific social kinds, such as mental illness, shows the contrary is true: socially constructed kinds are often more difficult to change than natural kinds because the mechanisms of change are far more opaque and complicated than those of natural kinds.

Consider the case of mental illness with regard to social constructionism. It is worth noting that interactive kinds may not be just unstable or easily variable. As Jeniffer Church points out, “social conditions can be changed, of course, but social change is not necessarily easier than biological change. Delusions caused by brain tumors are more easily eliminated than delusions caused by childhood neglect... it is certainly easier to take Prozac than to change the conditions that make one depressed” (Church 2004, 401). Church goes on to say that “there is no reason to suppose that a socially constructed mental disorder is easier to change than a naturally constituted mental disorder; and until one considers the situation-specific alternatives, there is no reason to suppose that change is even desirable” (Church 2004, 403). Even if something is socially acquired and not natural, it does not mean that it would be easy to change. The basic point is that the stability of social kinds is largely sustained by equilibria among diverse and interconnected social mechanisms insofar as social kinds are seen as homeostatic property clusters.

Therefore, the looping effect should be adjusted in order to take into account of stability of social norms. If harmful social norms are in place over a long time, racist ideology can be stabilized and persist. The point is that social construction and stability are not incompatible. Rather, at some

level, social construction can contribute to stabilizing certain socially relevant cognition, disposition, and behavior. Moreover, the social reality can be recalcitrant, resisting, and intractable. As the contrast between Mallon and Hacking suggests, we can have a viable account of the stability of race and racism by appeal to the effect of the racial categorization even if there are no such categories in the first place. Now let us turn to the case of race.

1.5 Two Different Kinds of Social Groups

In the previous section, we have seen that the issue of stability is crucial in considering an explanation in the social sciences. As a human social kind, one intuitive starting point to consider social constructionism is to acknowledge that the concept of race depends on human intentional attitudes as significant causal variables in a similar way in which we treat or believe certain piece of paper as money following specific rules or convention. On this view, social objects are “constituted by the collective imposition of status functions on brute *x* terms” (Searle 1995, 394). In other words, our social practice of allocating status functions constitutes differential functions of human social kinds. According to such view, it may be argued that racism eventually comes down to a matter of individual or collective belief and action. For instance, on Searle’s view, what racists do can be seen as assigning inferior “deontic status” to certain racial group.¹⁵ What he calls deontic status is to regulate various relations between people, involving “rights, responsibilities, obligations, duties, privileges, entitlements, penalties, authorizations, permissions, and other such deontic phenomena” (Searle 1995, 100). Searle goes on to say that once recognized, deontic powers provide us desire-independent and normative reasons for action (Searle 2010, 9).¹⁶

¹⁵ For this type of critique of Searlean racial kind, see Jenkins 2016. While I agree with the general point of Jenkins, my point is that it is not clear if Searle’s view is a good way to see the notion of race.

¹⁶ It may be suggested that “institutions should not just be understood in deontic terms, but need to be understood in *telic* terms as well, that is, in terms of there being a point or purpose to an institution, it serving some function, establishing certain ideals, securing or producing some good(s), and so on” (Brännmark 2019, 152). On this view,

Searle's starting point is that we can collectively share intentional states such as beliefs, desires, and intentions. In this regard, his kind of account of race may be attractive to the extent that it reveals that the notion of race is positively correlated to individual or collective intentionality, which in turn explains the goals, meanings of agents.¹⁷ Thanks to collective intentionality, we can consciously and voluntarily join intentions with others, resulting in shared intentions. This is because we can consider making social groups as creating a kind of plural subjects, which are constituted by joint commitment with regard to a shared goal such as walking together or painting a house: "Members of some population P share an intention to do A if and only if they are jointly committed to intend as a body to do A" (Gilbert 2009, 179). On this view, like a theory of social contract, a social group as a unified body should be seen as "we" who are jointly committed to a common goal, belief, and action. If so, overall social outcomes should be explained as the cumulative or aggregative effects of individuals' intentions, attitudes, and actions.

However, explaining race is not the same as analyzing racism as individually held beliefs or intentions. While it may be the case that "Any fact involving collective intentionality is a social fact" (Searle 1995, 38), it does not show that every social kind needs collective intentionality. As Amie Thomasson correctly puts it, contrary to Searle's view, "not all forms of social power are created through explicitly endowing someone or something with power; powers, too, may arise as unnoticed by-products of existing social institutions" (Thomasson 2003a, 276). As a social phenomenon, the effects of racism seem to go far beyond a mere aggregate of any individual malicious beliefs and intentional actions. As Francesco Guala rightly argues, "We tend to deal

ideology can be understood as "some kind of large-scale teleology providing support to the basic societal distribution of rights and duties" (Brännmark 2019, 153).

¹⁷ For instance, see the works of Bratman (1992), Gilbert (2009), Searle (1995; 2010), and Tuomela (2013). Tomasello (2009) shows the capacity for collective intentionality is unique for human beings. For these thinkers, collective intentionality is designed to solve "conflicts between collective and individual rationality – and give cooperative, collectively beneficial solutions to these problems in the face of the chaos and conflict that unfettered individual action tends to lead to" (Tuomela 2013, 229).

with social kinds thoughtlessly, and we appreciate the conventional nature of social reality only occasionally, upon reflection. To account for this fact most collective acceptance theorists give up the requirement that collective acceptance must be constantly operative” (Guala 2016, 159).

Moreover, it is entirely possible to consider that racist outcomes occur even when all of the individuals are well intentioned. Since oppressive racist cultures do not necessarily involve individual intentionality or subjective preference on race, a viable explanation on it should be different from phenomenological accounts of racism. It is because, race and racism can remain both real and social through a stable social reproduction beyond explicit, intentional, and phenomenological consciousness. If we limit our attention to individuals’ intentional and explicit consciousness as correlated to racism, we cannot understand how ‘racism without racists’ can be systemically created and sustained (Bonilla-Silva 2013). Rather, under certain structural circumstances such as racially discriminatory mortgage loans or housing policies, ordinary individuals’ reasonable ways of action can end up reproducing the racialized social structures: “something or someone can be racist without anyone regarding anything as racist” (Thomasson 2003b, 276).¹⁸ That there is no explicit intentional aspect is consistent with a realist and functional view of institutions. For instance, think of the case of party: “From an institutional point of view what really matters is not what we intend to do, how the gathering is called, or whether we believe that it is a party. What matters is what the gathering *does* for us (its real, rather than its intended function)” (Guala 2016, 171).¹⁹

Furthermore, there can be coercive powers, conflicts, and status asymmetries that may distort the egalitarian formation of collective intentionality in the first place. For instance, Searle

¹⁸ One example is the case that a schoolboard decides to add dairy products in breakfasts when many Black children are actually lactose-intolerant (Blum 2002b, 207). This decision can unintentionally harm certain racial groups.

¹⁹ In a similar vein, Guala also says: “It seems entirely possible that something (a rule for example) has a function without there being any normative reason to conform with it” (Guala 2016, 74).

writes that “the notion of a we-intention, of collective intentionality, implies the notion of cooperation” (Searle 1990, 406). It is not accidental that the typical examples of we-intention are walking together or painting a house together. Whereas collective intentionality implies the idea of cooperation, not every social structure is something like social contract as a cooperative venture. In this egalitarian formation of ‘we’ from discreet individuals, racism and sexism may appear as anomalous, rather than ordinary. But this is not the case.²⁰ If the cases where there is no conflict or coercion around collective intentions are more exceptional than ordinary, the degrees of individual liberty to join in collective intentionality should not be overstated. Moreover, there are scale-ups from norms to institutions: “An institution is the solidification of a norm that can be back up its cause with relevant referents. Once molded into an institution and hence endowed with identifiable authoritative power, norms are particularly difficult to resist” (Krause 2012, 350). This is why “the focus on individuals (and their attitudes) occlude the injustices that pervade the structural and cultural context and the ways that the context both constrains and enables our action” (Haslanger 2015, 10).

What is at stake is the explanation of the reality and persistence of racial kinds. My aim in this section is to show that explanation in the social sciences should aim at both sub-personal (micro) and supra-personal (macro) level of social phenomena. What we need is a type of explanation without wholly committing to the idea of intentionality.²¹ By this way, we will also

²⁰ “it seems clear, especially if we look historically, that strongly hierarchical social relations and repressive institutions are hardly anomalies. For instance, bonded labor has been common practice across the world; in many places, we have even had chattel slavery, and serfdom was a mainstay of feudal Europe. There have been (and still are) systems of forced marriages, even marriages by abduction, honor killings, and female genital mutilation. These are all institutions” (Brännmark 2019, 143)

²¹ I think these two approaches of sub-personal and supra-personal level in the social sciences can correspond to the two different types of sociology: Gabriel Tarde’s microsociology on belief and desire and Emile Durkheim’s sociology of social facts as collective representations.

When considering the reproduction of institutions, a sociologist Charles Tilly shows that the hoarding behaviors, recursive benefits, and cumulative effects of asset accumulation can be irrelevant to any intentional or moral character of individuals (Tilly 1999; Harris 2018, 288-89).

see how social constructions can be located within the causal domain of our action and belief while they are not reducible to individual intentionality.

For this reason, I should emphasize that some social groups like races should be distinguished from other ones like teams, committees, and courts. Even though most social groups are largely unstable, contingent, and changing, a generic term like ‘social group’ does not help us to understand the issue at hand. While the teams and committees can be functionally organized through the act of shared or collective intentionality, such intentional structures are not required for racial groups. When it comes to teams or committees, one can voluntarily join or leave groups. On the contrary, it is almost impossible or much more difficult to voluntarily decide to be a member of a certain racial group.²² Rather, membership in racial groups is a matter of ascription by others, not usually an intention to actively join a group. What matters in racial group membership is that individuals are treated or regarded as certain races by others as a result of relevant social norms. In other words, races as social groups are established and reinforced by norms of treatment by others. To be sure, there can exist self-identification as to racial identity or even the formation of collective solidarity. Like individual actors, there may be a collective agency to whom collective intentionality can be ascribed.²³ But such intentional acts are not required for one to count as certain races in the first place. In other words, concerning categorizing or classifying races, it might be said that social recognition precedes any voluntary self-identification. Contrary to the case of creating a new committee, we cannot just nominate random people and performatively declare the existence of racial groups. Here the role of perceived bodily marks such as skin color is crucial as far as the shared features serve as the demarcating role in racialization. As Haslanger says,

²² I leave aside the difficult cases of transracial people such as Rachel Dolezal for another occasion. While I do not want to be exclusionary to such cases, I would just note that the existence of transracial people does not eliminate the obvious difference between social groups such as teams and racial groups.

²³ For the possibility of group agent, see Pettit 2003.

members of racialized groups are “socially positioned as subordinate or privileged along some dimension (economic, political, legal, social, etc.) and the group is ‘marked’ as a target for this treatment by observed or imagined bodily features presumed to be evidence of ancestral links to a certain geographical region” (Haslanger 2012, 236).

Given such distinction, I favor that Katherine Ritchie’s distinction between two types of groups: type 1 (teams, committees, and courts) and type 2 (racial, gender, and ethnic groups) (Ritchie 2015, 314).²⁴ In the case of organized group (type 1), groups must have certain structural-functional organization and members must have shared or collective intentionality out of member volition. In the case of feature groups (type 2), such conditions are not required.²⁵ For we cannot find any functional and organized hierarchy among the same racial members and there is very little room for member volition, not to mention shared or collective intentionality. Rather, feature groups must have some sort of apparently shared features which organized groups may lack. Here apparently shared features need not be something like natural essences insofar as racial groups are social kinds. The notion of social construction is still relevant to see how such shared features can be socially constructed through social practices as both contingent and historical.

1.6 The Sub-personal and Supra-personal Mechanisms

As I argued in the previous section, race as a social group is not properly explained by individual or collective intentionality. Voluntary intentional acts can ultimately come down to the

²⁴ Ann Cudd already made a similar distinction: voluntary and non-voluntary social groups. Synthesizing what she calls intentionalist and structuralist approaches of social groups, she recommended “a compatibilist position, holding that while all action is intentionally guided, many of the constraints within which we act are socially determined and beyond the control of the currently acting individuals; to put a slogan on it, intentions dynamically interact within social structures” (Cudd 2006, 36). I think while voluntary social groups can be explained by intentionalist approach, structuralist approach is suitable for non-voluntary social groups.

²⁵ Similarly, Mallon makes a distinction between overt and covert social roles. If community believes something is a social kind and it really is a social kind, then it would be overt (and institutional) social roles such as mayor of Indianapolis. In contrast, if community believes something is a natural kind but it really is a social kind, it would be covert social roles such as race and gender (Mallon 2016, 182).

notion of person, which should be a bearer of such intentionality. As a moral and legal concept, it is argued that person is responsible for her intentional act or voluntary commitment. However, race as social group cannot be properly elucidated by reference to such a notion. Rather, race as a social category should be understood as constituting a social position, which is distinct from a person (Witt 2011). Social positions are regulated and evaluated by relevant social norms. Yet, due to over-voluntarization and over-intellectualization, collective intentionality based-views may obscure the ways in which social norms are not derived from collective acceptance or joint commitment. Given that the egalitarian and democratic ideals and racial biases can actually coexist, the explanation of racism by appealing to sincere persons' self-report and good intentions is not promising. Rather, we need to explain the intractability of racial injustices or oppressions by looking at certain structural social mechanisms. I believe that there can be two different levels mechanisms beyond and below person as to race categories. In short, while I have critically argued against the social constructionism that appeals to collective intentionality, I will now present the positive accounts in which sub-personal and supra-personal sources of influence stabilize racial categories and the racial social roles that they help constitute. These two tasks (critical and positive) are interconnected insofar as collective intentionality assumes individual personal intentional attitudes as its constituents.

First, let me start with a sub-personal level. Here I would like to argue that one way to warrant law-like generalization concerning human kinds may be appealing to human psychology in a cross-cultural context. To be sure, Hacking is also aware of the evolutionary psychological explanation of the innate cognitive and developmental predisposition of sorting people into different races and the survival value of pollution rules ("we who are not polluted") (Hacking 2005,

111, 114).²⁶ In the conclusion of his paper, he interestingly alludes to the two strands of thought regarding race, namely, the one universalist position like cognitive science and the other one emphasizing contingencies like West or Foucault's genealogical account. While Hacking was not so explicit about the former, naturalist explanations including evolutionary psychology aim to explain the anthropological difference.

The explanation for existence and persistence of races can be achieved by an evolutionary and cognitive psychological explanation. This allows what Dan Kelly and Mallon call a "hybrid constructionism" which pairs "social constructionism about racial difference with a partially nonconstructionist account of racial representations" (Mallon and Kelly 2012, 512). While social constructionist accounts show racial representations remarkably vary across space and time, it does not have to mean that everything is dependent upon human culture and institution. Rather, recent evolutionary psychological accounts suggest that our racial representations are at least partially "constrained by psychological mechanisms that are innate, domain-specific, and species-typical – in effect that racial representations are stabilized by features of human nature" (Mallon and Kelly 2012, 513). It is important to note that this hybrid constructionism need not commit to a sort of biological reductionism. To be sure, as Root says, "race does not travel. Some men who are black in New Orleans now would have been octoroons there some years ago or would be white in Brazil today" (Root 2000, 631-32). But even though the particular content of American racial categorizations may be historically local and culturally unstable, the categorization of human groups itself can be universally found across various cultures. A number of psychological studies seem to suggest that essentialist thoughts about various human groups, irrespective of its moral and political effects, appear widespread and emerge early in children. For Mallon, our conception

²⁶ Foucault (2003, 81) makes a similar point that racism is related to the idea of purity. This particular aspect may explain the connection between some of racist emotion such as disgust and the idea of racial purity.

of race is essentialist, although it is socially constructed. That is, folk psychologically we think of races as essential categories. For example, participants in studies almost always maintain the race of origin for children adopted by parents of a different race. If we can make a subtle distinction between what is socially constructed and what is psychologically constrained, it would be possible to consider some stability in our racial representations and classifications while paying attention to the historical variability in them. Whereas our folk conception of race presupposes an essentialist assumption on human differences which is largely due to inheritable cognitive structures and less variable, according to Mallon and Kelly, the category of mixed-race is more conventional and less universal.

We may find another way to see a link between the capacity for categorization and the inability to see all unconscious and automatic associations in the notion of implicit biases (Brownstein and Saul 2016a; Brownstein and Saul 2016b). Investigating implicit biases on race can be considered a good example of explanation in the social sciences. For example, numerous tests including the implicit attitude test (IAT) can successfully measure individual's implicit attitudes and biases (Mallon and Kelly 2012, 518-19; Kelly and Roedder 2008). What the IAT reveals is that “a great many people, including those who genuinely profess themselves to be racially impartial and explicitly disavow any form of racial prejudice, display subtle signs of racial bias” (Kelly and Roedder 2008, 524). Given that implicit biases against certain racial groups can coexist with an explicit commitment to anti-racist doctrine even within a single individual, this test shows that unconscious biases can be causally effective without the explicit and reflective endorsement. It is also argued that performance on the IAT's is actually predictive of many behavior and judgment (Kelly and Roedder 2008, 526). While social constructionist account requires an institutional and structural change beyond individual efforts to overcome racial

inequality, this may not directly address our implicit psychological tendencies regarding racial cognition which is hard to consciously manageable. Rather, institutional approaches and psychological approaches can be complementing each other.

Given that implicit biases are beyond one's introspection or self-report, one might argue that this psychological investigation would reify the current racial categorization and discrimination.²⁷ This is because, as Haslanger writes, "If the best explanation of social stratification is structural, then implicit bias seems at best tangential to what is needed to achieve justice" (Haslanger 2015, 2). Moreover, she believes that "we are each complicit in the perpetuation of unjust structures, practices, and institutions. Moral responsibility concerns not only what I can and should do, but also what we can and should do together" (Haslanger 2015, 12). As long as social constructionism focuses on the variability of social practice, it could be argued that our inherent psychological tendencies toward other racial groups cannot be amended.

However, in Searle's term, we do not have to take our psychological settings to be brute facts in contrast to institutional facts (Searle 1995, 27). By this, I mean that psychological dispositions do not have to be seen as fixed and unchangeable. That is, even though I grant that racial oppression is irreducible to individual psychologies, appealing to psychological factors of racism does not imply that it is utterly inevitable and merely individual. As Joshua Greene says, even though "in the modern world we discriminate on race (among other things), but race is not a deep, innate, psychology category. Rather it is just one among many possible markers for group membership.... we readily sort people into Them and Us based on the most arbitrary of criteria" (Greene 2013, 54-55). While it may be true that our brains are evolutionarily wired for tribalism (us/them distinction), it is unclear if the social categorization is something permanent.

²⁷ For a critique of this sort of sociology-based worry, see Machery et al. 2010.

Categorization as such and racial categorization should be separated (Marchery et al. 2010, 239). Rather, implicit biases as a sort of aversive racism and their particular valuations are closely related to one's social environments. If so, we do not have to conclude that psychological explanations through implicit biases are necessarily detrimental to any explanation referring to social issues (Marchery et al. 2010). Even though brute facts are prior to institutional facts, which are ontologically objective and epistemologically subjective, they can be in interaction each other at some levels. It seems obvious that various biases are related to and learned in social environments. As far as implicit biases are a kind of socially relevant cognitive schemas²⁸, one may go so far as to suggest that they are “a particular type of social structure” (Zheng 2018a, 19) at micro-level. As I will argue later, implicit biases are largely subject to the vital influence of social norms including culturally induced stereotypes and prejudices. As Jason Stanley argues, there is what may be called cognitive penetration of social norms on perceptual judgment since “The perceptual mechanisms of Americans are affected by their flawed ideological belief that Blacks are violent” (Stanley 2015, 212). Rather, what is at stake here is first to understand how our moral psychology works in categorizing racial groups in order to overcome racism. We do not have to suppose the social actors are self-consciously racists even though their behavior in social level would result in racist effects.

Let us turn to more macro-level or supra-personal level of racism. In this regard, while I do not think that we must prioritize structural interventions such as integration over individual ones such as prejudice reduction or debiasing²⁹, I agree with Haslanger that “an adequate account

²⁸ Following William Sewell, Haslanger defines schemas as “intersubjective patterns of perception, thought, and behavior” (Haslanger 2012, 415). If implicit biases are part of certain social schemas and individual psychologies, we do not have to see implicit biases and social structures are incompatible. By drawing on Bourdieu's notion of habitus as a bridge between bias and structure, Zheng (2018a) convincingly argues that implicit biases should be seen as a species of social structures.

²⁹ For the critique of structural prioritizers such as Elizabeth Anderson and Haslanger and their oversimplified models of the mind, see Madva (2016). According to him, given that psychological biases are not mirror-like reflections of social reality, “We cannot simply count on structural interventions to be two-bird stones,

of how implicit bias functions must situate it within a broader theory of social structures and structural injustice” (Haslanger 2015, 1). This is where the notion of social norms comes in at macro-level or rather meso-level. Elizabeth Anderson defines a social norm as “a standard of behavior shared by a social group, commonly understood by its members as authoritative or obligatory for them.” (Anderson 2000, 401). The existence of institutional racism, including publicly acknowledged criteria for assigning race to an individual, shows that racism involves a lot of socially generative mechanisms, along with our psychological tendencies. When some social scientists simply explain the difference in the overall level of income of the whites and the black in the U.S. by reference to race, it seems that racial explanation has little explanatory value. In order to avoid a tautology, it should come down to a detailed analysis of racially discriminatory institutions. Here we should be cautious to avoid confusing causation with correlation. If race as such is not a cause of this socioeconomic difference, we still wonder what specific aspects regarding race make this specific difference. As we have argued that race is a social kind, we should see how racial discrimination, as a generative mechanism, can cause the difference in wages according to races. Surely, this does not mean that race as such would make blacks poorer than whites. The very racial identities in themselves do not directly cause any race-based harms. Rather, discriminatory, asymmetrical, or oppressive social mechanisms do so. Even if these discriminatory mechanisms may not be so explicit, they can be efficacious.³⁰ The point here is that racial explanations should be causal explanations which would involve a variety of practices, institutions, and norms where various inequalities and injustices are maintained and perpetuated in society. By

simultaneously redressing basic conditions of injustice and transforming individual hearts and minds” (Madva 2016, 715).

³⁰ For example, the reason for calling for affirmative action is that, even after the decrease of the overt racial discrimination since the 1960s, eliminating overt discrimination in employment does not guarantee a just and fair race conscious employment. For selecting an employee simply based on an achievement does not necessarily reflect the result of past discrimination across the previous generations.

referring to various manifestations of social norms on race, we can understand its explanatory as well as practical value in interacting with others and expressing ourselves in daily lives.

Let's consider the case of the educational achievement gap, more specifically, African-American students' poor performance on standardized tests. One of the ways to explain racial discrimination is referring to social norms among black students. As Root shows, black and white students seem to have different norms regarding academic achievement in school (Root 2007, 741-42). Let us suppose that this explanation is plausible for the sake of argument. Because of racial discrimination and vast differences in life opportunities, minority racial groups adopt norms requiring members to behave poorly, as opposed to school success like getting a good grade on tests. An explanation of racial inequality in education should aim at explaining why a peer norm, which requires performing poorly in school in this case, is influential to black students. While deviation or transgression from the norm can occur, norms seem to have a sort of permanency to some degree. To be sure, in different racial groups what is to be taken normal can vary from group to group. In our case, performing poorly in school rather than conforming to the rule can be explained by a peer norm that involves criticizing achieving black students for not being black enough. This can be called a case of ingroup-related social norms as to how to behave, internally binding in the students in question. In a similar vein, think of the Pygmalion effect, according to which labeling students affects their academic performance.

How do we interpret this finding? One way to see this is that the norm among black students is simply wrong and to be criticized. For the fact that most black students do not follow the standard social norm does not imply that the norm in question is normatively desirable. To speak differently, the mere existence of norm should be distinguished the question of the normativity of certain norm at issue. With the Humean distinction between 'ought' and 'is' in mind, some theorists in the

interpretivist tradition may think that this mere regularity cannot explain the normativity of social norms. If rational choice theory reduces normativity to non-normativity such as regularity and stability of behavior pattern, on this account, we cannot understand what makes norm truly normative. It may be argued that the relation between reason and action should be normative since our intentional actions must be done for appropriate reasons. On this broadly Kantian line of thought, norms should be created and transformed by individuals' normative attitudes by reflecting and responding other's action as being correct or mistaken. Hence, if it is the case, some good students can convince other deviant students with the power of good reason and reasoned engagement with regard to the norm in school.

However, we observe that this is not frequently happening in reality. Even though properly recognizing and reacting to social norms is needed, it is only partly the case. Moreover, race as a social group concept can be normatively significant in organizing our shared lives together (Thomasson 2016, 10). As far as one's social identity is normatively structured by relevant social norms, the question of conforming to one's group norms is not a mere matter of individual deliberation from the detached view. If so, an explanation from intentionality does not entirely succeed. Rather, the implication of the above example is that we can explain social phenomena without relying on shared or collective intentionality. Surely, as Christine Korsgaard (1996) argues, a person's practical identity is voluntarily formed by one's reflective endorsement. This may work as to moral norms. When it comes to social norms, however, it is not a mere matter of consciously choose not to endorse them as such given their own social normativity. For instance, social norms such as peer pressure can lead individual agents to adopt sub-optimal strategies. That is, with respect to one's social position which is ascribed by others' recognition, being responsive to certain

social norms are inescapable. As Charlotte Witt nicely puts it, even “rebellion is one way of being responsive to a norm; so is compliance” (Witt 2011, 43).

While we can assume that moral norms can be accepted by rational deliberation or mutual recognition, it is possible to introduce the distinction between moral norm and social norm. Whereas moral norms about rights and obligations seem to be universal, unconditional, and fixed, social norms appear to be more local, conditional, and variable. Social norms typically work around the demarcating boundaries of social groups into ingroups and outgroups. Social norms, as social constructs, can be also unspoken, implicit, and informal in contrast to formal norms. One may go so far as to argue that even different societies define what is moral.³¹

Social norms are shared ways of thinking and acting which are regularly reproduced and repeated in the specific community. Social norms can appear as external to social actors and have a sort of coercive power of sanction and reward with regard to cooperation and coordination. That is, while actions that conform to the norm are praised or rewarded, the deviations are punished or disapproved. The violations of the relevant norms may be largely accompanied by feelings of guilt, fear, or shame. While it is possible that we are blind to relevant social norms, it is so only when we take the risk of various official or informal sanctions such as ostracism. This shows that without rational endorsement there can be group norms of conformity operated by mere imitation or punishment of non-conformity. In this respect, we may think of social roles or institutions as mainly functional, rather than normative, from an evolutionary perspective.

Norms may be seen as a result of stable patterns of behaviors as equilibria in strategic interactions among individuals. For example, game theorists conceive conventions as patterns of

³¹ Here I will only point out that what counts as moral norm is a vexed issue, noting that I remain neutral on any specific view on the distinction between moral norms and social norms in general. For a survey, see Brennan et al. 2013, ch. 4.

regularities in behaviors. In the context of coordination problem, David Lewis, among others, defines convention as follows: “There is some possible regularity R' in the behavior of members of P in S, such that no one in any instance of S among members of P could conform both to R' and to R, and such that in any instance of S among members of P, everyone would prefer that everyone conform to R', on condition that at least all but one conform to R” (Lewis 1969, 72). While Lewis’s game-theoretic account of convention presupposes the instrumental rationality and self-interest based on shared knowledge and mutual expectations, it does not engage with the question of normativity from which we can tell which action is correct or mistaken. That is, Lewis’s account of convention does not capture our phenomenology of social norms in ordinary life.³² Moreover, it seems that social norms can have no immediate benefit or be harmful or inefficient in some cases.

Against Lewis’s explanation, Christina Bicchieri invokes the example of norms of honor killing to show that following norms may not be in one’s best interest (Bicchieri 2014, 217). On her view, whereas honor killing is not officially and explicitly institutionalized nor morally justified, such harmful norms as prescriptions can emerge as informal social norms from the unplanned and decentralized interaction of various agents. Social norms are tacitly expected to follow in many cases. Since norm compliance is not a matter of cost/benefit analysis, social norms need not be socially beneficial or functionally efficient (Bicchieri 2006, x, xii).

Here social norms are fundamentally related to relevant social expectations. Distinguishing norms from convention, contra Lewis, Bicchieri argues that in order for conventions as a sort of regularity to be norms, there should be also other conditions such as the relevant empirical and normative expectation of compliance held by a sufficient number of people within a certain population. While convention only concerns empirical expectation that “a sufficiently large part

³² As Bicchieri writes: “the *ought* is not prudential, because disregarding a prudential *ought* would not normally elicit a negative sanction” (Bicchieri 2017, 35).

of the relevant group/population conforms to the norm” and conditional preference, Bicchieri argues that norms should be related to normative expectation that “a sufficiently large part of the relevant group/population believes they ought to conform to the norm and may sanction behavior” (Bicchieri 2014, 225).³³ Even though following the internal norm among black students may be harmful or even wrong in the long run, regardless of its being true or correct and despite all different motivations for compliance, social norms can persist once they are widely held and expected by most people in the community. We may also try to explain the white supremacy by appeal to the persistence of social norms. For instance, despite the official moral norms of equal human right regardless of one’s race, racist social norms may allow certain races to be treated and evaluated as less morally worthy and permissible to abuse, disrespect, degradation, and insult in reality, largely due to group privilege and interest. However, as noted above, norm stability may not be a direct function of overall social benefits. While norm stability is not reducible to a matter of intentionality, in order for certain social norms to be genuinely beneficial for many and thus stable in the long run, “there must be a shared belief that the norm is valuable for the group that embraces it” (Bicchieri 2014, 228). As a member of the common group, we can always evaluate whether a certain social norm is just and valuable for all of us, regardless of our own racial identities.³⁴ I will discuss how norm shifts are possible in later chapters, especially chapter 3-5.

³³ In understanding social norms in terms of institutions, Brännmark comments on Bicchieri: “while it might perhaps be worried that the *sufficiently many relevant others*-clause leaves too much open, this is just how it has to be. The reason is precisely that this is an account of institutions that is supposed to capture both strongly hierarchical institutions as well as egalitarian ones.... *All the slave-owners* will typically be a very small minority, but they will play a vastly disproportionate role in shaping and maintaining an institution of slavery” (Brännmark 2019, 151)

³⁴ Some might still argue that it is unclear whether acknowledging that we think it is a bad rule actually makes a difference about whether we feel compelled to follow it. Given what Witt calls ascriptivism, an individual is only responsive to a set of norms by virtue of occupying a social position. Even if it is the case, we know from history and expect that a social system is dynamic as well as stable.

1.7 Conclusion

In sum, I think that even if race is not biologically real, it can be real by appeal to social constructions. Our racial classifications are not entirely arbitrary and unstable. Rather, focusing on the question of stability, I suggested that there are the two levels of explanation of race in the social sciences. First, at a sub-personal level, there would be some stable and nonconstructionist elements in our socially constructed racial representations regulated by our evolutionary and cognitive mechanisms. Drawing on recent psychological and statistical studies on implicit biases on race, for example, we can try to make successful explanations in the social sciences. Second, at a supra-personal level, I showed how stable social norms can be explanatorily relevant to explain racial phenomena. Even though social norms are not natural kinds, they can be considered real and causally operative in the regularities and stabilities of our actions.³⁵ Even if there is no single invariable account of racism, explanatory schemes referring to various social norms should be extensive enough to accommodate many anomalies and variations.

Even if the notion of race as social construction can be beneficial for the purpose of critiquing oppressive social practice, the task of explaining *per se* can be distinguished from the social critique of racism. But if we can accept that in order to resist racism we need to first understand and explain how racism is reproduced, we should be able to expect social scientific explanation can be potentially of political importance. As Shelby puts it, “Social scientific research

³⁵ I suppose this position may be close to what Harris calls “a moderate form of objectivism” which believes that “there are facts about the human world independent of contingent cultural or social ideas” (Harris 1999, 442). As he argues, “racism is explained by objectivist criteria in a more convincing fashion than constructivist criteria, and it can offer long-term suggestions for creating community. Yet, without constructivist insights into how visceral race is, objectivist explanations can mistake anabsolutes for more substantive social objects, discount the influence of social constructions, and mistake contingent communities for natural communities” (Harris 1999, 446).

This view is in line with his recent actuarial account of racism (Harris 2018), which considers health and death desiderata. On this view. “The boundary, in virtue of what makes a condition at the very least a feature of racism, is undue ill-health and death as a function of raciation” (Harris 2018, 280). This view is not contextual since “Death is the shadow that no interpretation escapes; no property of ill-will, disrespect, disdain, loathing, or irrational judgment survives the termination of life” (Harris 2018, 298).

will therefore be essential to ensuring that our moral assessments are suitably informed by the relevant facts” (Shelby 2014, 63). In this way, I believe that the realist explanation of race in the social sciences can be connected to emancipatory projects in the long run even though it is not directly and immediately engaged with social movements.

CHAPTER 2. RAWLS, INSTITUTIONAL RACISM, AND SELF-RESPECT

2.1. Introduction

In this chapter, I would like to consider the problem of racism through the lens of the social contract theory. In the previous chapter, I critically examined some strands in social ontology such as collective intentionality by reference to different kinds of social groups. This theory is “oriented toward showing how people without institutions or people not already forming a social group can *ex nihilo* establish an institution or form a social group, the underlying logic of institutions that is primarily sought to be explicated is a *logic of creation*” (Brännmark 2019, 141). In thinking of society as something that starts from scratch, the approach of collective intentionality is similar to contract theorists. Likewise, the upshot of social contract theory is that the legitimacy of political community consists in each member’s voluntary agreement to establish the common political order. For this reason, against feudal hierarchies, the social contract theory is deemed as an influential account of how justified political norms emerge from each person’s volition. Given its radical and universal assertion of equality and liberty among contract parties, this may raise a question: how does a community based on social contract allow for racial injustice as an actual practice and as a theory allowing the justification of racism?

This chapter is divided into two parts. In the first part, relevant works by John Rawls and Charles Mills are mainly examined. To this end, I first begin by examining Rawls's ideal theory of justice and its relevance to the issue of racism. I then consider Mills’s non-ideal critique of Rawls and supplement it with the help of the notion of social norms. Whereas Rawls’s view can deal with racial injustice, I argue that Mills’s theory is mostly concerned with racist oppression. Between racial injustice and racist oppression, however, there are varying degrees of race-related wrongs, which can be elucidated by harmful social norms. In the second part, I show the relevance of social

norms by looking at the case of self-respect. I end the chapter by comparing the case of self-respect with Joshua Glasgow's view of racism as racial disrespect.

2.2 Rawls on Race

It is well-known that Rawls's principles of justice are above all to protect the equal liberties, including basic political liberties such as the right to vote, freedom of speech and conscience, and protection from arbitrary arrest. On what he calls the doctrine of the priority of liberty (Rawls 2001, 46), Rawls says that "liberty can only be limited for the sake of liberty itself" (Rawls 1999b, 214). In addition to that, according to the difference principle, socioeconomic inequalities should be arranged such that the least advantaged are allowed to have the greatest benefit, with fair equality of opportunity.

In this way, society as a scheme of cooperation is to fairly distribute various tasks, burdens, rights, and benefits. *Prima facie*, such overriding principles of justice should also counteract any racial inequalities. To be sure, Rawls's primary interests lie in the principles of a well-ordered society under the condition of strict compliance under favorable circumstances (Rawls 1999b, 7-8, 215-17). For this reason, he does not deal with the question of partial compliance in which people do not behave justly nor the theory of rectifying injustice. Since his actual remarks about race and racism are scarce as well as marginal, some reconstruction of his view is needed. As far as he admits that "Among our most basic problems are those of race, ethnicity, and gender" (Rawls 1993, xxviii), it would be reasonable to expect that Rawls would have something to say about the issue of race and racism.

Let me start from the original position. From the point of view of justice as fairness, racial identity should not be a basis of distributing rights and liberties. From the impartial viewpoint of justice, racial traits as particular and contingent facts are not morally relevant. Here race is regarded

as a fixed natural feature which is ascribed by birth. Not to be biased by such arbitrary contingencies, social or natural contingencies should be ruled out by the device of the original position. Behind the veil of ignorance as an initial condition, every party is similarly situated for formal constraints of justice such as generality, universality, and publicity. From the original position, it is impossible to know one's racial identity. As far as racist doctrines are not only unjust but also irrational, they are impermissible and unacceptable as a conception of justice (Rawls 1999b, 129-30). This consideration is also based on the view that all persons should be treated as equal and free in virtue of their moral personality. Insofar as "there is no race or recognized group of human beings that lack" (Rawls 1999b, 443) the capacity for moral personality, that is, two moral powers, namely, a conception of good and a sense of justice (Rawls 1999b, 442), racist principles cannot be allowed in a just polity.³⁶ By having "a conception that is suited for the basis of democratic citizenship" (Rawls 1993, 18), citizens are to be regarded as free and equal persons in virtue of having the two moral powers. This is why, as Rawls puts it, we have a pre-theoretic conviction that "religious intolerance and racial discrimination are unjust" (Rawls 1999b, 19). Here we are not concerned with something like a caste society where "each person is believed to have his allotted station in the natural order of things" (Rawls 1999b, 479). In this sense, it may be fair to say that Rawls did not endorse any sort of racial inequality given that he later explicitly states that "we view a democratic society as a political society that excludes ... a caste, slave, or a racist one" (Rawls 2001, 21).

Moreover, while focusing on socioeconomic inequalities and religious conflicts, it may be argued that Rawls has some normative resources to articulate race-based injustice and secure the

³⁶ Rawls defines these two moral powers as follows: "A sense of justice is the capacity to understand, to apply, and to act from the public conception of justice which characterizes the fair terms of social cooperation"; "The capacity for a conception of the good is the capacity to form, to revise, and rationally to pursue a conception of one's rational advantage or good" (Rawls 1993, 19).

fair value of justice. That is, even if Rawls's theory cannot prevent racial injustice, it can be useful for rectifying past racial injustices (Matthew 2017a). Although the least advantaged is defined not by racial identity but by class position, Rawlsians may argue that racial inequalities as a product of racial injustice should be ruled out by the difference principle and mitigated by securing the principle of fair equality of opportunity. Relatedly, defending Rawls, Tommie Shelby stresses that applying justice as fairness proceeds through a four-stage (the original position, a constitutional convention, a legislative stage, and a final stage) (Shelby 2004, 1706-09). In later stages after lifting the veil of ignorance in the original position, relevant historical knowledge can be utilized to remedy the harmful effects of past racist cultures through race-conscious policies such as affirmative action. Ultimately, institutionalizing fair equality of opportunity would require "considerable redistribution of wealth, the expansion of educational and employment opportunities, and aggressive measures to address discrimination in employment, housing and lending" (Shelby 2004, 1711). As Rawls argues, such institutionalization is justified since "In all sectors of society there should be roughly equal prospects of culture and achievement for everyone similarly motivated and endowed. The expectations of those with the same abilities and aspirations should not be affected by their social class" (Rawls 1999b, 63; Rawls 2001, 44). Following Shelby's claim that in the United States some individuals are denied fair equality of opportunity only in virtue of their races (2004), we may legitimately add the category of racial identity in the place of "social class" in the above passage.

It may seem odd that Rawls only talks about limited kinds of contingencies such as social class, native endowments, and fortune, not mentioning some fixed as well as contingent statuses such as race and gender. In this regard, it would be helpful to recall Rawls's own remark on his omission of race. Although he believes that racial injustice is a serious problem to be resolved, he

thinks that “an omission [of race] is not as such a fault, either in that work’s agenda or in its conception of justice” (Rawls 2001, 66). He is aware of this critique and answers that his focus is exclusively concerned with ideal theory, not non-ideal theory concerning historical circumstances like racial injustice: “in a well-ordered society under favorable conditions, with the equal basic liberties and fair equality secured, gender and race would not specify relevant points of view” (Rawls 2001, 66). Rawls’s concern is limited to ideal theory since non-ideal theory “presupposes that ideal theory is already on hand. For until the ideal is identified... nonideal theory lacks an objective, an aim, by reference to which its queries can be answered” (Rawls 1999a, 89-90). That is, ideal normative theory is supposed to provide “the only basis for the systemic grasp” (Rawls 1999b, 8) of the pressing matters like racial injustices. In this way, Rawls seems to believe that particular racial injustice will be identified and evaluated to the extent that an institution deviates from an ideal conception of justice conceived in ideal theory.

In sum, it is noteworthy that racial injustice need not be the same as racist oppression or domination. Rather, for Rawls, racial justice is a very limited ideal since it only means the absence of racial injustice such as race-related differential treatment in laws or policies, which is racially discriminatory. On this minimal definition of racial discrimination, “S practices racial discrimination with regard to A and B when S treats A and B differently because A belongs to one race and B belongs to another” (Matthew 2017b, 897). Rawls justifies his position against racial discrimination by appealing to the liberal value of fairness and justice. For him, the point is to have fair principles of distributive justice without discrimination. As I will argue below, this is an extremely narrow view of institutional racism.

2.3 Mills's Critique of Rawls

Let me turn to some of Mills's critique of Rawls's silence on the issue of racism and engage with the conception of the racial contract. For Mills, it is truly regrettable that Rawls's "huge body of work on questions of social justice... has nothing to say about racial injustice" (Mills 2009, 162). First of all, Mills believes that Rawls is naïve enough to think of race as merely fixed and natural, not viewing race as a social construction. Rather, race should be seen as an institutionalized status, that is, "a pervasive social construction, a set of positions in a global structure... that influences the socialization one receives, the life-world in which one moves, the experiences one has, the worldview one develops" (Mills 1998, xv).

What is more, on Mills's view, Rawls's ascription of equal moral status seems to be only extended to white people. On Mills's view, society should not be seen as a scheme of mutual cooperation from which everyone should benefit but as a group-based hierarchical system of subordination and domination. Mills asserts that "the general purpose of the Contract is always the differential privileging of the whites as a group with respect to the nonwhites as a group, the exploitation of their bodies, land, and resources, and the denial of equal socioeconomic opportunities to them" (Mills 1997, 11). Mills thinks that Rawls's systematic omission of the concept of race suggests that he wrongly dismisses the actual history that non-white people have been excluded and degraded. Given that the modern racial order is thoroughly structured as a social system of global white supremacy, Mills believes that Rawls wrongly remains silent about the issue of racial subordination and inequality. If so, what Rawlsian ideal theory shows is nothing more than a mystified and idealized version of domination contract: "the ignoring of race in Rawls's work is structural and symptomatic of white political philosophy in general" (Mills 2009, 169). Mills argues that Rawls's social contract theory is also Eurocentric in ignoring the fact that

“Domination and coercion of the nonwhite population are the founding moments for the American (and not just the American) polity, not democratic inclusion and consent” (Mills 2009, 173).

Finally, unlike Rawls’s *de jure* idea of universal moral personhood, which is to be recognized by a just society, Mills argues that one’s personhood can *de facto* come in hierarchical degrees through the racial contract. Although Rawls follows Kant’s formula of humanity that every person should be treated as an end in itself with equal respect, Rawls’s theory does not clarify how racialized people’s full personhoods are systemically denied.³⁷ As far as a Rawlsian social contract is a racial contract among white persons, in a nonideal situation, racial identities, as an indispensable mark of physical, cultural, or genealogical characteristics, play a justificatory role of domination, dehumanization, and oppression by identifying the non-white with moral subperson (Mills 1997, 53-81). This is readily evidenced by the actual history of racist oppression such as slavery, colonization, and genocide. Here the notion of subpersonhood is essential to Mills’s notion of racial contract: “Subpersons are humanoid entities who, because of racial phenotype/genealogy/culture, are not fully human and therefore have a different and inferior schedule of rights and liberties applying to them” (Mills 1997, 56). The denial of the moral personhood distinguishes racism from other moral or social ills, such as class exploitation. While Rawls is mostly concerned with political and economic inequalities, Mills is right in pointing out the limitation of merely focusing on unfair distributions of rights, liberties, and material goods. While it is argued that part of Rawls’s theory may provide some measures to address the distributive problem related to racism, it is unclear whether his difference principle and the

³⁷ In *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant says: “So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means” (Kant 1996, 80). But this is not the end of the story. As Thomas McCarthy writes, “*from a historical-developmental perspective*, Kant understood slavery to be one of those evils that contributed to the advance of the human race through the diffusion of European culture, a part of its ‘civilizing mission’” (McCarthy 2009, 64).

principle of fair equality of opportunity can address corrective justice, accounting for the specifically racial aspect of oppression such as marginalization and dehumanization.³⁸

But knowing the ideal principle of perfect justice may not be required to make comparative judgments of injustice.³⁹ Instead, Mills makes a distinction between the ideal as “ideal-as-idealized-model” and the nonideal as “ideal-as-descriptive-model” (Mills 2005). Whereas the former presents an ideal or an exemplar of something, the latter provides a descriptive account of the actual working of it. He argues that ideal theory involves some or all of the following problematic assumptions: an idealized social ontology, idealized capacities, silence on oppression, ideal social institutions, an idealized cognitive sphere, and strict compliance (Mills 2005, 168-69). On Mills’s view, they end up obscuring and normalizing crucial realities of oppression. Contrary to these idealized assumptions, what is required is ideal-as-descriptive-model that maps the power relations in which a system of domination harmfully affects the ideational (Mills 2005, 174).

Furthermore, Mills argues that Rawls’s ideal theory is inapt to deal with rectificatory ideals for remedying past racial injustice through various measures including compensation for harms. Since what Mills calls Rawls’s “ideal ideal” may be only about the principles of justice in the ideal circumstance as ground zero where there is no history of past injustice, Mills calls for a rectificatory ideal: “What is required is the nonideal (rectificatory) ideal that starts from the reality

³⁸ Young (1990, ch. 5) classifies five types of oppression as follows: violence, exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, and cultural imperialism. One of Young’s main points is that Rawlsian theories of distributive justice cannot account for such diverse aspects of oppression.

Similarly, we have to distinguish racial injustice as a localized and limited ideal from other group-based injustice such as class and gender injustice. As Matthew argues, “the attainment of racial justice will not *necessarily* make the society in question less unjust in terms of class” (Matthew 2017b, p. 889). By critiquing Avishai Margalit’s inflated view of racism as the denial of dignity to any human group, Lawrence Blum raises a similar point (Blum 2002b, 207).

³⁹ Naomi Zack’s view of applicative justice is helpful in this regard: “Applicative justice is not only an abstract theory. Applicative justice requires comparisons of group treatment. If minorities are treated unjustly, a description of that injustice does not require an ideal or nonideal theory or model of justice, but simply a comparison with how the majority is treated” (Zack 2017, 551). See also the actuarial account of racism as comparative judgements of mortality and ill-health (Harris 2018).

of these injustices and then seeks some fair means of correcting for them, recognizing that in most cases the original prediscrimination situation ... cannot be restored” (Mills 2009, 180).

However, it should be noted that Mills does not reject the idea of contractarianism. As he says, “Though it may appear to be such, the ‘racial contract’ is not a ‘deconstruction’ of the social contract.... It criticizes the social contract from a normative base that does not see the ideals of contractarianism themselves as necessarily problematic but shows how they have been betrayed by white contractarians” (Mills 1997, 129). Insofar as the idea of social contract is historically and descriptively explanatory, it is Mills’s claim that we should hold on to the notion. Following the spirit of demystificatory domination contract, his project can be still characterized as retrieving contractarianism in a non-ideal way. If racial contract is a group domination contract, then the normative notion of contract can be still used as a viable heuristic tool to detect oppressive racist practices, showing “how society was created or crucially transformed” (Mills 1998, 4). In a similar vein, rather than dismissing the idea of liberalism as such, Mills still seems to be committed to the emancipatory potentials of liberalism such as egalitarianism and universalism. On his view, if there is no such thing as “an immanent conceptual/normative logic to liberalism,” (Mills 2017b, 13) which makes it intrinsically racist, it is better to redeem liberalism and deracialize it for a radical program.

Yet, it is not clear whether only white contractarians are problematic while contractarianism itself is fine. Before dealing with this issue in the next section, let me first note that the Rawls-Mills debate concerning race comes down to the debate between ideal theory and non-ideal theory. If the debate between Rawls and Mills can be reformulated as a debate between ideal (normative) and non-ideal (descriptive) theory, drawing on Rousseau's original formulation of two different modes of contract, the two positions can be seen as corresponding to *Social*

Contract and *Discourse on Inequality* respectively.⁴⁰ Mills's critique is a contemporary version of Rousseau's demystificatory domination contract as the actual genesis of political communities, critiquing a key contractarian assumption of "a founding moment that is consensual and inclusive" (Mills 2009, 181).

Even if nonideal theory is not included in ideal theory as such, the incompatibility between the two need not follow if this distinction is no more than "a theoretical division of labor" (Boettcher 2009, 255). So if Rawlsian ideal theory of justice are suitable for distributive justice for a well-ordered society, Mills's nonideal theory can be used for corrective justice for what he calls an ill-ordered society. To see this point differently, let me make a distinction between racial injustice and racist oppression. By distinguishing racial injustice and racist oppression, one way to see this division of labor is to think that while Rawls is only concerned with racial injustice caused by racial discrimination, Mills is dealing with racist oppression from the actual political institutions. If this view is plausible, Mills's critique of Rawls's racism and Shelby's use of Rawls to critique racial injustice may be compatible.

While Rawls's theory is thoroughly concerned with abstraction and idealization, recall that Mills is deeply suspicious about ideal theory's validity to deal with existing racial injustice. Rather, he focuses on "the *actual* historical record and the *actual* norms and ideals" (Mills 1997, 92). Following a Marxist tradition of critiquing bourgeois liberalism, Mills goes so far as to suggest that ideal theory must be essentially ideological in the pejorative sense that contributes to illegitimate group privilege. Furthermore, ideal theory is objectionable since it is false, distorted,

⁴⁰ In a way, Mills seems to think of something like this when he invokes Rousseau's two contracts: ideal and non-ideal. As a non-ideal contract theory, "Rousseau's *Discourse on the Origins of Inequality* (1755) ... rethinks the 'contract' to make it a contract entered into *after* the formation of society, and thus the creation of socialized human beings" (Mills 2017b, 15)

and illusory: “Ideal theory ... is really an ideology, a distortional complex of ideas, values, norms, and beliefs that reflects the nonrepresentative interests and experiences of a small minority of the national population” (Mills 2005, 172). On Mills’s view, such an ideal theory is not only counterproductive and ineffectual due to its color-blindness but also explanatorily limited with regard to racial injustice (Boettcher 2009, 243). As far as rejecting abstraction and generalism *per se* amounts to a danger of relativism, Mills calls for nonidealizing abstractions that “reflect the specificities of group experience” (Mills 2005, 173).⁴¹ Without empirical analyses of historical circumstances and realities, Mills argues that “we are abstracting away from realities crucial to our comprehension of the actual workings of injustice in human interactions and social institutions ... thereby guaranteeing that the ideal-as-idealized model will never be achieved” (Mills 2005, 170).

In responding the non-ideal charge of Mills, Rawlsians may argue that insofar as there are proper usages of ideal theory, it need not necessarily be abused for justifying the unjust status quo. The idea is that Rawls’s view need not be hopelessly utopian. Consider what Mills calls “nonidealized descriptive mapping concepts” such as capitalism, patriarchy, and white supremacy as ideal-as-descriptive-model.⁴² There may be no decisive reason to think that Rawlsians cannot accommodate these kinds of concepts and employ Rawlsian concepts to tackle racial injustice (Shelby 2016). The problem is not abstraction itself but an idealizing abstraction. As Mills himself admits it, even Nozick’s theory of entitlement can be utilized for rectificatory ideals when properly applied to “Native American expropriation and African slavery” (Mills 2005, 180). While sympathetic to Mill’s challenge to Rawlsian views, I argue that Mills’s criticism of Rawls that his

⁴¹ Mills develops this idea from Onora O’Neill (1988) who distinguishes idealization, which involves false assumptions, from abstraction, which unavoidably involves some omission.

⁴² Mills writes: “These are all global, high-level concepts, undeniable abstractions. But they map accurately (at least arguably) crucial realities that differentiate the statuses of the human beings within the systems they describe; so while they *abstract*, they do not *idealize*” (Mills 2005, 175).

ideal theory of social contract is necessarily ideological can be seen in a different light. For even though some instances of racist society may involve allocating a dehumanizing status to certain racial groups, the function of racism is not merely a matter of all-or-nothing (either recognizing moral personhood or ascribing subpersonhood). Rather, dehumanization as animalization or demonization may be better conceived as a justificatory tool for war, atrocity, or genocides.⁴³ While dehumanization can be an important part of racism, racism is not exactly coextensive with dehumanization. Given that racial injustice and oppression can come in degrees, there may be ways in which the official principles of justice as fairness, the principle of fair equality of opportunity, and democratic citizenship are systematically distorted and undermined without presupposing the strong notion of dehumanization.

If so, the alternative options are not to be simply made between oppression and liberation. For instance, as I will argue later, the idea of black inferiority is internalized in people by the racist culture, which does not simply deny the moral personhood of black people but effectively undermines a robust sense of self-respect. In this way, people of colors are to be treated as having inferior second-order citizenship, if not non-citizens who do not have equal political liberties. Arguably, this sort of racial injustice as discrimination seems to be less serious racial ills than slavery. As Lawrence Blum claims, there may be many diverse race-related moral wrongs that are not necessarily racist and dehumanizing in Mills's sense. Following Blum's worry of the conceptual inflation of the term 'racism,' we need to distinguish Mills's version of racist oppression from the Rawlsian critique of racial injustice as discrimination.⁴⁴ Between the two

⁴³ For the detailed study of the concept of dehumanization, see Smith 2011. He writes: "To recognize someone as a person – a fellow human being – you need to have the concept of a human being.... From time immemorial men have banded together to kill and enslave their neighbours, rape their women.... How do we manage to perform these acts of atrocity? ... It's by recruiting the power of our conceptual imagination to picture ethnic groups as nonhuman animals" (Smith 2011, 127).

⁴⁴ Blum's main worry is about overusing the term 'racism.' This conceptual inflation is problematic since "That overuse in turn feeds a diminishing of 'racism's' moral force, and thus contributes to weakened concern about

extremes of racial injustice and racist oppression, there are diverse social mechanisms which result in race-related ills. If so, it is debatable if Mills's theory is not nonideal enough as far as these mechanisms are not accurately captured by his own abstracting, if not idealizing, model of racial contract. Racism does not have to appear only as violence and conflict as far as it can be manifested in ordinary social actions.⁴⁵ I argue that the account of racial contract may overlook the ways in which racism subtly, informally, and implicitly pervades social practices, circulating the negative racial stereotypes.⁴⁶ In addition, I argue that making reference to social norms can be a more nuanced and productive way to address the problems of the ideal theory. I would like to focus on the social mechanisms of racism by referring to the notion of self-respect.

2.4 The Relevance of Social Norms

In the second part of the chapter, I elaborate my critical point concerning the Rawls-Mills debate by reference to the idea of self-respect. Before getting into this concept, I should show why social norms can be relevant to consider those issues. Relatedly, it is noticeable that Mills says that “Racism and racially structured discrimination have not been deviations from the norm; they have been the norm, not merely in the sense of de facto statistical distribution patterns but, as I emphasized at the start, in the sense of being formally codified, written down and proclaimed *as*

racism and other racial ills. Not all racial incidents are racist incidents. Not every instance of racial conflict, insensitivity, discomfort, miscommunication, exclusion, injustice, or ignorance should be called ‘racist’” (Blum 2002b, 206). Elsewhere, Blum urges to recall that the history of the term ‘racism’ is too short (Blum 2004, 57). A similar point was made by Garcia for different reasons: “*Racial* discrimination is not always *racist* discrimination. The latter is always immoral The former – racial discrimination – is not inherently immoral. Its moral status will depend on the usual factors – intent, knowledge, motive, and so on – to which we turn to determine what is vicious” (Garcia 1996, 408).

⁴⁵ In this regard, Young's definition of oppression is helpful. As she writes, “oppression refers to the vast and deep injustices some groups suffer as a consequence of often unconscious assumptions and reactions of well-meaning people in ordinary interactions... in short, the normal processes of everyday life” (Young 1990, 41).

⁴⁶ This aims to include what Boettcher calls “racial resentment, inegalitarian civic myths, an orientation to social dominance, or a failure to appreciate the historical background, complex causes, or continuing significance of persistent racial inequalities” (Boettcher 2009, 256). They can distort the public reasoning of both citizens and officials.

such” (Mills 1997, 93). While racist norms can be explicit, official, and public as a dominant contract, they can be also implicit, unofficial, and opaque. First, racist social norms are pervasive in the social structures in which even the racially oppressed conform to them. But the heuristic of the racial contract between the white and the non-white fails to capture why the oppressed are willing to participate in the racial contract, which generates and reproduces their own oppression in the first place.⁴⁷ On the contractarian view, there is no reason for the oppressed to regard oneself as a party of the racial contract and commit to living together as a collective body. Second, as far as such social norms can be opaque, rather than publicly transparent, to the parties of the alleged racial contract, the emergence of the norms is not best described by the idea of the racial contract. Rather, such opacity would need a more sophisticated epistemology of ignorance (Mills 2007). Racist social norms cannot be legitimate as a product of voluntary agreement if relevant social cognition in the first place was distorted in the ground zero of the contract. Regarding our topic, it should be stressed that social norms are neither solely a matter of cooperation nor that of domination. Rather, they can cut both ways. Coordination can be cooperation in certain conditions. Even though Mills is right that the actual modern social contract has been historically characterized by domination, coercion, and subordination, there may be no absolute necessity for the fact, as he may argue.

The point is that the framework of social contract may not be suitable for considering racism. The social norms in question seem to be different from coordination equilibrium, which can be stable when everyone conforms to it because of each’s interest. This is because such a view would not be able to account for some cases of motivation such as group identification, which are

⁴⁷ “After all, even though we need to recognize that institutions can often be repressive or oppressive, it would also seem to be the case that people are often quite wholeheartedly on board with institutional arrangements” (Brännmark 2019, 152). I will return to this point when dealing with the ideology critique as to racism later in chapter 4.

not simply derived from self-interest. If so, contrary to contractarian assumptions of rationally self-interested agents who are to maximize expected utilities, a different starting point may be needed to explain why people are adopting and complying with social norms. Moreover, social norms in a broad sense may differ from moral norms or norms of prudential rationality. Even when there are no economic or other incentives, social norms can be experienced as obligatory, binding, and meaningful for one's social identities and shared sense of values. Thus, "under a wide range of conditions, people act cooperatively, and obey and enforce norms of fairness even against their self-interest" (Anderson 2000, 176). Furthermore, our willingness to cooperate would be sensitive to our normative expectations of others' intentions to reciprocate. In addition to norm-conforming motivations, people will follow social norms in place when they do not want to be exposed to the resentment of others.⁴⁸ Sometimes even when the norms concerned are pernicious, people can still endorse the normative force of them, which can be reinforced and supplemented by various sanctions and rewards.

Let me turn to Rawls again. Rawls defines an institution as "a public system of rules which defines offices and positions with their rights and duties, powers and immunities, and the like. These rules specify certain forms of action as permissible, others as forbidden; and they provide for certain penalties and defenses, and so on, when violations occur" (Rawls 1999b, 48). The basic structure is defined as "the way in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages from social cooperation" (Rawls 1999b, 6). He also defines the basic structure as "the background social framework within which the activities of associations and individuals take place" (Rawls 2001, 10). In this broader characterization, the

⁴⁸ In a similar vein of Hume's suggestion of moral sentiments, one may say that "normative expectations exist when people resent others for frustrating both their empirical expectations of conformity to a rule and their interests" (Anderson 2000, 183).

basic structure is deemed as crucial to our social life since individual actions are constrained and mediated by such a structure. A pressing question is how to determine the scope of the basic structure.⁴⁹

My point in this section is that we need to broadly consider the scope of what Rawls calls the basic structure of society by referring to social norms, which should be distinguished from moral or legal norms. As far as our beliefs, desires, and actions are largely dependent upon others' expectations in society, social norms governing normative expectations should be regarded as a viable category of social ontology. That is, social norms shape people's range of choices, motives, and characters.⁵⁰ While a narrow approach on explicit governmental institutions and laws has been the mainstream political philosophical perspective, other nonpolitical everyday practices and social norms can be a proper site of justice and injustice. As Miriam Ronzoni argues, it seems plausible to think that a just basic structure is "not blind to problematic social norms" (Ronzoni 2008, 205).

Mills writes: "white-supremacist societies (such as, but not limited to, the United States) have been founded on a "basic structure" (Rawls) predicated on the racial denial of equal personhood to people of color" (Mills 2017b, 210). However, I argue that there may be other ways to see Rawlsian politics as racially wrongful even if the basic structures are seemingly non-racist. To see this point, in addition to explicit laws and government institutions, I would like to adopt the perspective of what Tim Syme calls "pervasive structure" as "the interdependent set of rules, norms and practices in place across an entire society" (Syme 2018, 890). If this perspective is right,

⁴⁹ From a structural perspective of individual actions, Iris Young's nuanced notion of social structure is helpful here: "Social structures are not a part of the society; instead they involve, or become visible in, a certain *way of looking* at the whole society, one that see patterns in relations among people and the positions they occupy relative to one another" (Young 2011, 70); "Structures describe a set of socially caused *conditions* that *position* a large number of people" (Young 2011, 18).

⁵⁰ I will turn to this issue of motives and characters in detail in chapter 3 by critically examining Jorge Garcia's view.

the basic structure should not be seen as a fixed and isolated set of static institutions but as dynamic and complex patterns of social structures in interaction with various levels of social norms. According to this view, even if the basic structure does not include social norms and informal mechanisms of pressures, they are “*not* conceived of as fully *independent* of the general background created by the basic structure” (Ronzoni 2007, 75).

This view may be consistent with what some Rawlsians would say about the relationships between the basic structure and the background culture. That is, they may argue that the basic structure and the problematic social norms in the background culture should be compatible. In my view, this requirement is still unsatisfactory since it does not take seriously the vulnerability of the basic structure with regard to the problematic social norms. Moreover, for securing the stability of the well-ordered society, citizens should have a sense of justice, which may not be cultivated by official institutions of the basic structure. The same thing can be said about several civic virtues or ethos of justice such as tolerance and open-mindedness.⁵¹ In other words, culture involves “the world in which agents exist, the normative expectations that shape how they learn, mold, express, and understand their life, self, and sense of character” (Ikuenobe 2004, 39).⁵²

Let me elaborate why this point is important to our context. According to Rawls, the principles of justice should “manifest in the basic structure of society men's desire to treat one another not as means only, but as ends in themselves” (Rawls 1999b, 156), in an ideal community of equals. At the same time, however naïve, Rawls is aware of “prejudice and bias, self- and group interest, blindness and willfulness” (Rawls 1993, 58) in the political realm. A distinctively social

⁵¹ These virtues need not necessarily be moral virtues. I will deal with the issue of civic virtue and civility in chapter 3.

⁵² In some sense, culture is necessary for our survival and flourishing (Outlaw 1996, 15-16). As far as cultural groups are built upon racial distinctions, on Outlaw's view, race as a social construction is anthropologically necessary while being biologically contingent.

character of social norms can be instructive to make sense of this seeming inconsistency. Consider the case of symbolic racism that blacks have an inferior work ethic and impulse control in the post-racial era: Given Rawlsian liberalism's commitment to non-intervention of freedom of expression and conscience, it is hard to see how the state can engage in discouraging an individual's racist attitudes. For instance, it is conceivable that someone is not racist in a public context whereas they may be racist in informal social practices. At any rate, individual behavior is not up to the task of the liberal political, if not moral, philosophy of justice whose main task is to deal with the basic structure of society. A political conception is supposed to only govern the basic structure, not individual actions in specific situations. If institutions are defined as the realization of "a public system of rules" (Rawls 1999b, 47), a formal conception of justice should only be concerned with the "impartial and consistent administration of laws and institutions, whatever their substantive principles" (Rawls 1999b, 51).

Following this view, it is notable that Rawls makes a distinction between the public political culture (non-comprehensive) and its background culture, which involves all kinds of comprehensive doctrines (Rawls 1993, 13-14, 220-22; Shelby 2004, 1703). This rigid distinction can be related to Rawls's liberal defense of neutrality. According to this, it is not permissible for the state to impose a particular conception of the good. Defending Rawls against Mills, Shelby's claim is that a political conception of justice should be something that is publicly justifiable and reasonably acceptable, even for non-white citizens. Thus, Shelby argues that we "should interpret the fundamental ideas and principles latent in our public political cultures from *our own* standpoint, i.e., 'here and now'" (Shelby 2004, 1704). To be sure, one may say that our officially public political culture has been at least partly shaped by the history of struggles against racial oppression and domination. Now racist doctrines are not publicly and officially declared even though

individuals in private associations can still harm people of color. Rawls's point is strictly limited to the basic structure because of its "profound and pervasive influence on the persons who live under its institutions" (Rawls 2001, 55). But given this functional definition, he seems to too narrowly conceive of the basic structure. He is explicit that his liberal theory of justice is only about the basic structure of society, not regulating individuals and their particular conducts. This is why Shelby writes that "the establishment of a just and well-ordered society does not require that individual racism be altogether extinct... The complete eradication of all forms of racism, overt and covert, is probably more than a 'realistic utopia'" (Shelby 2004, 1713). What he means by this is that the antidiscrimination legislation does not have to deal with private racial discrimination by individuals in informal contexts (see also Matthew 2017a, 238).

Thus, Rawls claims that the "primary subject of justice is the basic structure of society" (Rawls 1999b, 6-7). In this respect, "Acquaintance with and participation in ... public culture is one way citizens learn to conceive of themselves as free and equal" (Rawls 2001, 56). Yet, the problem is that the relation between the public political culture and the background culture is not fixed in the milieu of social interaction. In this respect, I concur with G. A. Cohen that it is "seriously unclear which institutions are supposed to qualify as part of the basic structure" (Cohen 2008, 132).⁵³ On his view, in addition to coercive rules, what matters is social ethos and culture, which are not reducible to individual or political institutions. Even if personal discrimination occasionally happens, the fact that legal or cultural systems tolerate such attitudes may allow the possibility of its perpetuation. Due to a stark distinction between individual (personal morality) and the basic structure (political morality), Rawls seems to underestimate the alternative possibility of both informal and unofficial racism, which can communicate and transmit habitual racial bias

⁵³ By extending the principles of justice in the public sphere to so-called personal choices in the private sphere, contra Rawls, Cohen argues for a broad view concerning the site of justice.

and prejudice even within a just form of the basic structure.⁵⁴ That is, to the extent that the ordinary functioning of the basic structure does not necessarily preclude racism, he seems to overlook the pervasive influence from the background culture, which can be racist contrary to the so-called color-blind public political culture.⁵⁵

I believe that this can show Mills's critical point without assuming that Rawlsian basic structure is inherently racist. If it is the case that Rawls understands the notion of society too narrowly, ignoring the social norms flowing from the background culture to the basic structure, we cannot readily say that citizens' sense of their own worth "is confirmed in the constitution of the *whole* society" (Rawls 1999b, 205, my emphasis). This is why, contrary to Shelby's overly optimistic commitment to Rawlsian view, "the joint commitment to equal citizenship and formal justice, including the rule of law" is not at all enough to exclude "both *de jure* and *de facto* discriminatory treatment of citizens" (Shelby 2004, 1708). Institutional racism is a sort of crystallization of racist attitudes embodied in various social practices, which in turn contribute to the reproduction of certain institutional patterns of racial oppression. My point is that a complex interplay between the public political culture and the background culture is not sufficiently explored in Rawls's theory due to his narrow view of social ontology.

⁵⁴ This is evident when Shelby goes on to say: "if the basic structure of a society is well-ordered and just, then even if racist beliefs and attitudes continue to circulate in this society, these beliefs and attitudes should not inhibit any person, regardless of race, from fully participating in the society as an equal citizen, with all the accompanying liberties and opportunities. Nor would the existence of individual racism be an obstacle to any persons' effective choice and active pursuit of a rational plan of life under conditions of fair equality of opportunity. So, while the fact that some individuals harbor racist attitudes would still be a moral problem of some concern, were the overall system of social cooperation a just one or nearly so, this disturbing problem would not be such an urgent practical matter from the standpoint of disfavored racial groups" (Shelby 2004, 1713).

⁵⁵ For instance, even though there are no personal racists, there can be negative racist impacts, which result "from neutral policies that further the effects of past overt discrimination and that encourage the general perception of blacks as inferior to whites by contributing to the exclusion of blacks from skilled jobs or to their segregation in menial jobs" (Headley 2000, 236).

2.5 Self-respect

Following Mills's critical diagnosis, I would like to revise and extend his critique of Rawls in a different direction, by looking at Rawls's concept of self-respect as a case study. In doing so, I will show how the notion of self-respect is relevant to the Rawls-Mills debate on racial injustice. Rawls calls self-respect "perhaps the most important primary good" (Rawls 1999b, 348). Here self-respect involves both "a person's . . . secure conviction that his conception of the good, his plan of life, is worth carrying out," and "a confidence in one's ability, so far as it is within one's power, to fulfill one's intentions" (Rawls 1999b, 386).

Here by self-respect I do not merely mean a Kantian virtue as "a moral strength of the will" (Kant 1996, 533) against various inclinations in favor of freely chosen moral principles.⁵⁶ Given the relevance of social norms, I start from Rawls's assertion of the social bases of self-respect, "not self-respect as an attitude toward oneself" (Rawls 2001, 60). What is unclear is that how the social bases of self-respect for Rawls are genuinely *social* enough to consider the pervasiveness of social norms. I argue that the Rawlsian argument for the value of self-respect should be modified in order to appropriately accommodate the social bases of self-respect, including respect from others. Self-respect is not a mere imperfect duty toward oneself as far as it is not independent upon being respected by others. Here the social bases of self-respect require relevant social norms, which are not reducible to moral nor legal ones. In my view, one of the unsatisfactory things in Rawls's liberal theory on justice is his insufficient focus on the formative role of background culture as the social basis of self-respect.

While Rawls and Mills are concerned with ideal theory and non-ideal theory respectively, it is notable that self-respect as a moral psychological concept seems to stand between the two

⁵⁶ A stoic view of self-respect also implies that our self-respect is self-sufficient and does not depend on respect of others. I set aside those stoic or Kantian views.

extremes. On the one hand, it is the case that in ideal theory the parties in the original position would rationally avoid social conditions that erode self-respect. But at the same time, on the other hand, social conditions of self-respect would require a good deal of sociohistorical and moral psychological knowledge. Rawls is aware of this duality when saying “a *moral psychology* drawn from the political conception of justice as fairness ... not a psychology originating in the sciences of human nature but rather a scheme of concepts and principles for expressing a certain political conception of the person and an ideal of citizenship” (Rawls 1993, 86-87). Furthermore, a weakened sense of self-respect would undermine a sense of justice, threatening the stability of a well-ordered society. As Rousseau shows in his analysis of self-love (*amour propre*), this may be better located in the domain of background culture behind the official device of social contract. To be sure, Mills correctly argues that social disrespect cannot be limited to the regulatory principles for politics and economy since this project is distinct from ending both racially unequal citizenship and racial exploitation as two principles of corrective justice (Mills 2017b, 224). But one may not be sure if “social ‘disrespect’ for blacks and other subordinated races is an explicit part of the original ‘contract’ and, correspondingly, of the basic structure” (Mills 2017b, 214). In my view, because there are diverse sources of self-respect outside of the basic structure, self-respect should matter within a whole pervasive social structure.

Citizens’ self-respect is indispensable to developing and exercising the two moral powers (a conception of good and a sense of justice). If self-respect is in order, one’s survival is seen as valuable and worth affirming the use of abilities and talents.⁵⁷ Moreover, people are willing to develop such abilities and talents. The notion of self-respect normatively and motivationally matters due to its centrality to what it is to be an efficacious practical agent. On the basis of self-

⁵⁷ Along with its moral *psychological* implication, “Self-respect, as Rawls conceives of it, is a moralized or normative concept” (Krishnamurthy 2013, 188).

respect, an individual agent can independently or collectively deliberate and rationally endorse one's own aims, attachments, and values. Without it, there is only apathy and cynicism since nothing would appear worth doing since "When we feel that our plans are of little value, we cannot pursue them with pleasure or take delight in their execution" (Rawls 1999b, 386).

In addition to its importance to moral agency, self-respect is also closely linked to a normative standing in social hierarchies, securing equal citizenship in political status. As Rawls notes, "our self-respect normally depends upon the respect of others" (Rawls 1999b, 155). When we are appropriately respected by others, we can "confirm the sense of our own worth" (Rawls 1999b, 389). In this sense, a positive self-relation depends on one's interpersonal or social environment (Honneth 1995; Margalit 1998). Even if a just state cannot directly provide one's self-respect, in a well-ordered society, "self-respect is secured by the public affirmation of the status of equal citizenship for all" (Rawls 1999b, 478) as a proper social condition.⁵⁸ Rawls goes on to say that "The basis for self-respect in a just society is not . . . one's income share but the publicly affirmed distribution of fundamental rights and liberties" (Rawls 1999b, 477). Given this statement, Rawls seems to narrowly understand securing self-respect as a matter of distributive justice. Surely, a sense of self-respect may be said to be distributed or transferred across generations or classes.⁵⁹ But the public recognition of citizenship is a more complicated social process than Rawls believes since self-respect is not merely some possessable and compensable good. Despite the official acknowledgment of equal rights and liberties, when there is pervasive social hostility towards certain racial identities and as a result one's aspiration to develop abilities and talents is consistently frustrated, racialized groups' self-respect is severely diminished. Here a

⁵⁸ Similarly, Rawls writes that "self-respect depends upon and is encouraged by certain public features of basic social institutions" (Rawls 1993, 319).

⁵⁹ For instance, a decent sense of self-respect would be impossible without a minimal possession of material goods such as clothes and houses, which can function as a symbolic value of status.

sense of self-efficacy and practical agency is undermined. As Michele Moody-Adams says, “when a scheme of discrimination is rooted in a complex network of degrading and dehumanizing fictions about its victims it can become truly dangerous to self-respect” (Moody-Adams 1993, 255).

These dual connotations are inscribed in the notion of self-respect, which is not only self-regarding but also other-regarding. Let me briefly mention the difference between self-respect and self-esteem. Rawls does not cautiously distinguish these concepts but treats them as largely equivalent notions. This is understandable and can even be fruitful since they happen to overlap and interact in many occasions. Here it is instructive to see Stephen Darwall’s distinction between appraisal respect, which is a feeling of esteem that responds to merit or achievement and recognition respect, owed to every person (Darwall 1977). Likewise, we need to make a distinction between universal basic respect and particular esteem. In this regard, whereas basic respect is to consider every agent to be equal, differential esteem works by comparison and evaluation of certain abilities, achievements, and merits.⁶⁰ In a footnote, Rawls is explicit about the connection between self-esteem and what he calls the Aristotelian principle (Rawls 1999b, 389). As far as it is compatible with the principles of justice, the Aristotelian principle is allowed for admiration or esteem of accomplishing a rational life plan for “other things equal, human beings enjoy the exercise of their realized capacities (their innate or trained abilities)” (Rawls 1999b, 364). In a similar vein, whereas disrespect based on irrelevant traits like skin color is to be strictly prohibited, positive disesteem as to one’s societal contribution may be only permissible or optional, not required, insofar as meritocratic perfectionism should be avoided.⁶¹ In sum, while there may be no

⁶⁰ In this regard, the distinction between respect and esteem seems to correspond to the distinction between morality and ethics, which has been established in the context of the Kant/Hegel debate.

⁶¹ Another notable point is that while self-esteem is more closely connected to relative class positions, self-respect is typically related to racial membership. But the distinction between class and race can be overlapped and intersecting each other.

clear-cut distinction between self-respect and self-esteem in some cases, the distinction is important to consider the difference between merit (esteem) and status (respect). While individual pursuits of self-realization only matter in private or associational spheres, the state as the basic structure should inhibit disrespect such as violating basic rights against discrimination.⁶² We cannot voluntarily enter into or leave the state as we can as to various social unions. This is what Rawls means by the state as “a social union of social unions” (Rawls 1999b, 462). But as I will argue, even though self-respect is more basic than self-esteem, the reduction of the latter can lead to that of the former.

Rawls is explicitly committed to the democratic value of equal political liberties. Meena Krishnamurthy also talks about the ways in which racial minorities’ self-respect is undermined by having less equal political liberties such as the right to vote: “Excluding racial minorities from the process of political decision-making, by denying them voting rights, suggests that their two moral powers are less important, less valuable than others” (Krishnamurthy 2013, 183). While Krishnamurthy only discusses the value of equal political liberty for securing a sense of self-respect, what is overlooked in both Rawls and Krishnamurthy is the value of the sociocultural aspect of our self-respect. Notice that today nobody in the U.S is formally denied from political decision-making processes such as the right to vote on the ground of one’s racial membership. While the value of equal political liberty is certainly essential to one’s sense of self-respect, I argue that securing equal political liberty and its fair value is not sufficient to secure a robust sense of self-respect.

⁶² In an extreme case, we may suppose that racist people can have self-esteem but it seems not plausible to see they can have self-respect on the morally sharable reasons. This is also related to the reason Rawls disagrees with perfectionism inherent in the notion of self-esteem: “Individuals respect themselves on the basis of reasons, and self-respect’s moral nature means that those reasons are ones which third parties can in principle share. Suppose that A, a racist white person, claims to respect his own racism. Other things being equal, reasonable people have no reason to respect A for his racism. Though A might esteem his own racism, he cannot, on this definition, respect A for his racism” (Seglow 2016, 1109).

Thus, I turn to other ways in which racism can work by endangering a sense of self-respect, without a direct denial of human dignity, which is believed to be inherent in human persons. Here disrespect and undermining self-respect are analytically distinct. Unlike the denial of dignity by others, undermining self-respect can be seen as a sort of indirect harm as far as self-respect is foremost a matter of self-relation, which is also deeply shaped by interpersonal relationships.⁶³ Consider the social practice of racial stigmatization.⁶⁴ When our sense of self-respect is dependent upon respect from others, such stigmatization would generate normative expectations of inferiority and unworthiness, which may in turn lower one's self-respect. Without proper opportunities to develop one's self-respect, a racist culture would lead racial minorities to alienation and a negative self-conception. Although each citizen should not suffer from undue feelings of self-loathing or self-mistrust, social expectations, including racial prejudices transmitted from one's social environment, deeply influence one's self-respect. In turn, as Rawls notes, "self-contempt leads to contempt of others and threatens their good as much as envy does" (Rawls 1999b, 156). In this way, racial oppression can work through the culture of racism, without explicitly denying the moral personhood in members of subordinate racial groups. Undermining self-respect can be comparable what Bernard Boxill calls dignitary harm, meaning "the sense of wounded dignity, inferiority, and stigma experienced by the victims" (Boxill 1992, 82) of oppression.

⁶³ Darwall also raises a similar point: "not even universal disrespect can destroy the dignity of free and rational persons, at least, not directly.... Humiliations that aim to degrade, depersonalize, and dehumanize must work differently. They must seek not simply lower someone's standing in others' eyes, but to demean someone in his own eyes so that he loses self-respect.... it is possible for domination by violence and threats of violence, and even by relatively nonviolent, disrespecting relations or institutions that are, in Goffman's term, sufficiently 'total,' to beat down, dispirit, and undermine self-confidence and self-respect" (Darwall 2006, 144-45).

⁶⁴ Elizabeth Anderson defines racial stigmatization as follows: "The *condition* of racial stigmatization consists of public, dishonorable, practically engaged representations of a racial group with the following contents: (1) *racial stereotypes*, (2) *racial attributions* or explanations of why members of the racial group tend to fit their stereotypes, that rationalized and motivate (3) *derogatory evaluations* of and (4) *demeaning or antipathetic attitudes* (such as hatred contempt, pity, condescension, disgust, aversion, envy, distrust, and willful indifference) towards the target group and its members" (Anderson 2010, 48).

What I am arguing against is any moralizing and individualizing account of self-respect. Surely, there may be to some extent personal differences since some are severely affected by racist cultures while others are not so. Racist cultures are not a mere one-sided brainwashing or indoctrination. Even if there are socially imposed hostile environments that undermine one's self-respect, one may argue that a subjective attitude toward one's moral regard is still important. For instance, in a Kantian line of argument, it is said that one should be held responsible for a vicious character like servility (Kant 1996, 557-58). In addition, one might argue that willing racists should not be excused for their attitudes or behaviors by appealing to pervasive racist culture. Blaming racist cultures as such may not be helpful if such cultures are actually accepted and perpetuated by the people who are willingly and intentionally exploiting material and symbolic advantages.

But there still seems to be some asymmetry between the oppressed and the oppressor. For instance, when there are pervasive racist cultures, having self-loathing should not be simply taken as something personally blameworthy (Ikuenobe 2004). Rather, it should be noted that racist social norms as a normative guide for action, which is largely beyond one's control, significantly constrain options, opportunities, and facilities people can choose in advance. In this regard, informal social norms concerning social stigmatization can be as much coercive as official governmental institutions (Syme 2018, 901). Given that there are not alternative norms available to develop a robust sense of self-respect, it would be wrong to think that blacks are solely responsible for their own negative self-conceptions on the grounds that they voluntarily internalize racist social norms. Neglecting this point may be used to endorse the logic of 'blaming the victim. Even if "for each person there is some association (one or more) to which he belongs and within which the activities that are rational for him are publicly affirmed by others" (Rawls 1999b, 387)

from which each acquires one's sense of self-respect, such associations may be extremely restrictive and onerous to racialized populations.

The central point is that a sense of self-respect is deeply shaped by various social circumstances. To the extent that one's self-respect is largely owed to institutional and interpersonal relations, it should not be seen as a subjective self-determination of an individual rational agent. It should be noted that one's self-identification concerning social positions builds on self-conception that is available for agents in certain societies. In addition to possible options of self-conception, social norms shape a particular community's normative and empirical expectations, which consist of a complex set of belief, attitudes, schemes, and habits (Bicchieri 2017). If people do not conform to racist social norms, they would be forced to do so by ostracization, humiliation, and punishment. Such patterns of expectations would correspond to what Moody-Adams calls "the social construction of self-respect" (Moody-Adams 1993). Various normative expectations may be found in what Robert Merton calls "self-fulfilling prophecy" in which expecting certain behaviors tend to evoke those very behaviors. Or consider stereotype threat.⁶⁵ For instance, if being black is identified with failure, successful black students are not taken as "really black" (Moody-Adams 1993, 262).

It is important to note that such aspects of the socially constructed bases of self-respect are not captured by mere legal perspectives as well.⁶⁶ For instance, even though the Jim Crow laws have been officially abolished by public officials and legislators, the discriminatory and exclusive

⁶⁵ Claude Steele and Joshua Aronson defines stereotype threat as "the immediate situational threat that derives from the broad dissemination of negative stereotypes about one's group – the threat of possibly being judged and treated stereotypically, or of possibly self-fulfilling such as stereotype" (Steele and Aronson 1995, 798).

⁶⁶ "In spite of anti-discriminatory laws, many people still have and get away with racist and discriminatory attitudes, and still discriminate in many subtle ways. Anti-discriminatory laws cannot change attitudes which shape or govern human actions. ... Talk about equal opportunity and protection under the law cannot have substantive effects when pervasive racist attitudes and principles are embedded in social institutions in which people apply the law" (Ikuenobe 2004, 26).

social mechanisms linger, effectively hindering equal opportunities to affirm the black's self-respect.⁶⁷ This is because even if governmental legislations may indirectly influence informal social norms, they do not directly control such norms. To be sure, social norms may track some relevant normative content of laws. But when prevailing social norms are racist, they informally permit niches of racism, thereby encouraging a widespread racist ethos despite official legislative efforts. Changing relevant laws do not immediately resolve the pervasive structure of racial oppression as far as social norms governing racial classification do not simply supervene on the laws and have a relatively autonomous normative power.⁶⁸ Rather, such norms are socially transmitted, partly and indirectly influencing the reproduction of discriminatory attitudes. There is no macro group agency responsible for racism because social norms are fundamentally decentralized among individual agents, local organizations, and social practices. Just as group agency is not required for feature group such as racial group, having group agent is not necessarily required for having highly structured social structures: "Non-agential joint actions ... can be highly structured despite not being group agents. Some joint activities really are ephemeral and chaotic, but others, like informal social practices, can be long-lasting and highly organized, despite being non-agential" (Syme 2018, 906). So the logic of social contract and sovereignty do not correctly capture emergence and change of social norms. Also, changing social norms may be uncertain and open-ended.

⁶⁷ A similar thing can be said about gender equality. Consider the principle of equal treatment: "The principle of equal treatment is probably now one of the most firmly entrenched democratic ideals.... Nevertheless, there is no country in which true gender equality has been reached, even where extensive legislation may have been passed with this objective in mind" (Coffee 2015, 53). Coffee continues to rightly argue that "The distorting effect of cultural influences, combined with the complex manner in which these pervade social structures, means that notional agreement to considerations, such as the equal treatment of citizens, cannot reliably protect everyone's common, avowable interests" (Coffee 2015, 55).

⁶⁸ "Unlike the law, the social background is not a defined and identifiable body of codified principles or rules, but is, rather, amorphous, intangible and fluid. Culture cannot be controlled or regulated in the same way as the law" (Coffee 2015, 57).

To sum up, it is questionable if the Rawlsian normative political philosophy is truly freestanding, separated from a background culture and social norms. While Rawls considers the background culture to be a secondary domain of non-public reasons and comprehensive views from diverse associations, the boundary between public reason and social reason is not as stable and impenetrable as he supposes. Rather, we are constantly open to nonpolitical social pressures represented by social norms. This also implies that racism may be compatible with just institutions in a narrow sense. It is notable that Rawls holds on to the idea of the moral point of view to consider the value of personhood, whether it be a person or citizen. For this reason, my claim is that the theory of social contract is too narrow a concept to deal with the issue of critiquing the structural, sociocultural, and nonmoral aspects of racism.

2.6 Racial Disrespect

To conclude, it is worth contrasting the social norms approach with a moral account of racism. Here the object of moral evaluation is personal morality such as individual motives or acts, not institutional or structural wrongs. Whereas for Kantians, such disrespect means the violation of the absolute value of humanity, it would mean an undesirable and even contemptible vice for virtue ethicists. To be sure, it seems plausible that a proper account of racism should involve a kind of moral condemnation. Especially, the Kantian claim that we should treat every person as an end in itself is also reflected in Glasgow's view that racism is always morally condemnable as far as it is a sort of disrespect (Glasgow 2009b). As Kant writes, "every human being has a legitimate claim to respect from his fellow human beings and is *in turn* bound to respect every other" (Kant 1996, 579). Asking where racism is fundamentally located, Glasgow argues that racism should be seen as a kind of racial disrespect as to either agent-based racism (beliefs, attitudes, or behaviors) or institutional racism. On his view, given our ordinary usage, racism is univocally defined as

being “disrespectful toward members of racialized group R as Rs” (Glasgow 2009b, 81). In addition to typically agential attitudes of disrespect, Glasgow believes that his approach can accommodate the case of beliefs, behaviors, and even institutions. This is because, however diverse its particular manifestation, what is common in disrespect seems to be “a failure to adequately recognize autonomous, independent, sensitive, morally significant creatures” (Glasgow 2009b, 85). Additionally, Glasgow argues that racism should be something racially disrespectful, not disrespect in general. The upshot of Glasgow’s theory is that we need to capture what makes racism always morally wrong by considering the notion of disrespect.

However, the relation between self-respect and racial social norms may complicate the claim that racial disrespect is merely a moral wrong. As far as Glasgow holds on to his definition of racism as moral wrong, which seems to be attributable to particular agents, it is also hard to understand how institutions can be disrespectful. When it is granted that social institutions may have nonmoral functions and purposes, the notion of disrespect may oftentimes be subject to conflicting judgments. Consider Darwall’s appraisal respect, which is a feeling of esteem that responds to merit. For instance, when meritocratic principles work well in various social institutions and policies, which can be seen as fair to some, the reproduction of the status quo would still be disrespectful for certain racialized groups due to the cumulative effect of past injustice.⁶⁹ Rather, given its potential ideological function, the idea that society is meritocratic may be what Chris Lebron calls a “legitimizing myth” (Lebron 2013, 57) held by elites to justify various injustices. Even if people are equally and formally respected, meritocratic principles can allow

⁶⁹ This is why, as Haslanger writes, “in order for a system or a structure to be nonracist it must not remain ‘neutral’ with respect to the impact of past racial harms. Institutions conveniently becoming ‘race’ or ‘gender’ blind after great harm has been done are not just” (Haslanger 2012, 332-33).

differential esteems, which may undermine one's sense of self-respect under the racist circumstances.

As Rawls rightly argues, “it is conceivable that a social system may be unjust even though none of its institutions are unjust taken separately” (Rawls 1999b, 50). Using his own words, one implication of my argument is that a Rawlsian social system as a whole may be unjust even if its basic structure is just. Concerning the nuanced and multifaceted ways of oppression, I follow Marilyn Frye's analogy of the bird cage: “It is perfectly *obvious* that the bird is surrounded by a network of systematically related barriers, no one of which would be the least hindrance to its flight, but which, by their relations to each other, are as confining as the solid walls of a dungeon” (Frye 1983, 5). Moreover, it should be noted that the moral norms such as reciprocity and fairness may be subject to the influences of differing social norms. By social norms, I would like to call attention to various nonmoral aspects of racism. In light of this, a narrow focus on the moral wrongness of racism may be misleading when it comes to nonmoral sides of it. In addition to the universal respect for dignity, there are other culturally specific codes such as honor, authority, and purity, which may often override moral norms.⁷⁰ The point is that social expectations do not have to be good in a moral sense. This suggests that there may be racist norms without violating the formal norm of racial equality. Likewise, racism as a socially harmful norm is not merely unconditional but conditional on others' expectation because of its social aspect. Despite the advantage of talking about dehumanization as a violation of human dignity, Kantian appeals to the unconditional value of human dignity as a critique of racism may not be adequate in this context. These considerations suggest that if social norms are inherently conditional and contextual in

⁷⁰ According to the moral foundations theory, there are at least five foundations for morality: harm/care, fairness/reciprocity, ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity. The only first two have been considered the main foundations for morality by many. In many cases, the categories such as group loyalty and purity can be as effective as those of fairness in social norms. For this, see Haidt and Graham (2007); Haidt (2012).

contrast to both unconditional and universal moral norms, we may need a different or more nuanced kind of social approach than Kantianism's moral approach.

2.7 Conclusion

So far, I have argued that consideration of social norms can be relevant to the Rawls-Mills debate on race. I showed this by considering the notion of self-respect in Rawls. Although Rawls largely follows the spirit of the Kantian respect of humanity when saying that “in the basic structure of society men's desire to treat one another not as means only, but as ends in themselves” (Rawls 1999b, 156), one may argue that his view is more nuanced than Kant given his awareness of huge institutional impacts on self-respect given that racial or other forms of justice are a matter of institutional rather than personal virtue. But since Rawls mainly focuses on the basic structure, different from the pervasive structure of society, with the assumption that the state is distinctively coercive and public, he fails to acknowledge the social enforcement of morality (Edmundson 2002, 228). Unlike Rawls's assumption, norms of “the social, not of the political,” namely, “background culture” (Rawls 1993, 14) may not be something we can freely and voluntarily choose or leave. While social group membership is not regulated by formal laws, social norms may deeply influence our behaviors toward social groups. Social norms can be causally effective in securing a stable pattern of people, contrary to moral or civic virtues (McTernan 2014). By contrast, what I call moral critique does not take into account the relevance of social norms in structural injustices such as racism.⁷¹

⁷¹ I showed in this chapter that undermining self-respect is essential to the logic of racist background culture. At the same time, it is important to see that self-respect can be essential to defeating racist oppression as well (Boxill 1976). As Tommie Shelby (2007) proposes, along with the other-regarding duty of justice, the self-regarding duty of self-respect can be a duty of resistance. One's duty of self-respect is to defend one's dignity by standing up for oneself to assert one's equal moral worth. On Shelby's view, this could be expressed as a crime as a legitimate or permissible response to the ghetto plight. That is, given the significant impact of the unjust basic structure of society on the ghetto poor, it is understandable why those who are frustrated and shamed in the ghetto engage in criminal

activities such as shoplifting. Although these cathartic acts of defiance may be politically ineffective, Shelby notes that they can be necessary for maintaining self-respect. While this is a crucial point, I will not pursue this point further here.

CHAPTER 3. RACISM AS INDIVIDUAL VICE AND CIVILITY AS SOCIAL NORM

3.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I turn to the question of racism as individual volition.⁷² Here I argue that racism consists in racially differential wrongful conduct, rather than volition or intention. To show my point, I will use Jorge Garcia's account of racism and provide a norm of civility as a cure for racism in Garcia's sense. The basic thesis is that Garcia's view is misguided and racism in his sense can be overcome by the norm of civility I introduce. Once we have a better understanding of what Garcia's view of racism is, that will allow us to see that my proposal based on the norm of civility will help make progress on overcoming it.

In the first half of this chapter, I will reconstruct Jorge Garcia's volitional account of racism and argue that it suffers from shortcomings. I will show this by referring to the influences of social norms over individual moral agents. After elucidating Garcia's model's affinities to a virtue-theoretic model of ethics, I will argue that Garcia's theory is susceptible to something analogous

⁷² In the previous chapter, I argued that the Rawlsian framework of the basic structure is too narrow to accommodate various types of racism, which flow from racist social norms. One notable case is undermining self-respect as a primary good in Rawls's theory. This subtle way of racism is also to be distinguished from racist oppression as dehumanization in Mills's sense. In addition, considerations about the social bases of self-respect lead us to see that one's self-respect is significantly dependent upon respect from others. Here respect as a kind of intention can roughly refer to two things. First, it may mean Kantian respect toward others in the sense of treating someone as an invaluable and unconditional subject of dignity. Failing to respect others may count as disrespect. In the previous chapter, I argued that the individualist theory of Kantian respect should be expanded to consider the social aspect of respect by reference to Glasgow's theory of racism as disrespect. Second, there is another virtue-based reading of respect according to which disrespect is disregard and malevolence such as hatred and ill-will toward others. On this view, racism is morally wrong since it is malicious. This may suggest that we need to look at theories of racism as vicious volition.

While Rawlsian social contract theory deals with collective volition as a source of political legitimacy as to warrant the basic structure of society, however, what is at stake here is individual volition as a source of racism in the moral domain. While Rawls is concerned with the collective aspect of institutional racism as social practice, it seems intuitive that the moral evaluation of racism can be more easily achieved by attending to individual moral agent's attitude. For this reason, it would be instructive to consider more individual levels of racism if we take the following claim seriously: "the individual level is more important, and that institutional racism occurs when institutions and their behavior are corrupted by the racism of individuals" (Garcia 1997, 42).

to the situationist critiques of virtue ethics. When it is the case that there are no such things as global personality traits, the point is to construct anti-racist social environments in which people think and act.⁷³ On this view, our social roles as citizens would constrain our civil obligations toward others. In this regard, it is vital to consider the efficacy of social enforcement of morality through proper social practices. In the second half of the chapter, I will examine the concept of civility, which was also discussed by Rawls as a virtue of mutual respect and tolerance in a pluralistic world. In so doing, I will suggest that civility as a beneficial social norm, rather than a civic virtue, should be cultivated to overcome racism in mind.

3.2 Garcia's Volitional Account of Racism

To see why racism is always and essentially immoral, Garcia argues that racism is to be found “in the heart.” That is, the fundamental form of racism consists in an individual agent’s volitional states. Arguing against doxastic views of racism such as Appiah’s view, Garcia says that “Racism ... is something that essentially involves not our beliefs and their rationality or irrationality, but our wants, intentions, likes and dislikes and their distance from the moral virtues” (Garcia 1996, 400). Garcia argues that racism derives from a “vicious kind of racially based disregard for the welfare of certain people” (Garcia 1996, 399). In short, he stipulates that racism consists in “racial disregard, including disrespect, or most gravely, in ill will. Racially based or racially informed disregard (or ill will) is an indifference (or opposition) to another’s welfare on account of the racial group to which she is assigned” (Garcia 2004, 43).⁷⁴

⁷³ As Angela Davis famously says, “In a racist society, it’s not enough to be non-racist, we must be anti-racist.”

⁷⁴ Similarly, Schmid argues that racism should be defined as the desire or intention to harm or dominate on the basis of race. See Schmid 1996. On his motivational racism, mere unfair treatment does not count as what Schmid calls ‘true racism.’

While prioritizing individual over institution, Garcia wants to permit his definition of racism to accommodate both individuals and institutions. Since the volitional aspect is a primary form of racism, on this view, other derivative forms of racism should be understood in terms of racism in the heart. Consider institutional racism: For instance, internal racism within an individual agent can externally spread to institutions or policies - "Institutional racism exists, as we said, when the racism in individuals becomes institutionalized" (Garcia 1996, 423). As far as racist intention is conceived as the essential origin of racist structures, those structures are condemnable only if they are derived from individual intention. On his view, a good account of institutional racism should provide the resources for the moral evaluation of an individual's wrong. For this reason, Garcia calls his model of racism a kind of "'infection' (or 'input-centered' or backwards-looking) models of wrongdoing" (Garcia 1996, 403). Because "mere causation is without moral import" (Garcia 2004, 49), on this view, racist social structures should be morally evaluated by reference to their intentional and attitudinal sources. For instance, universities' admission policies can be said to be racist if they were intended to malevolently harm certain racial groups. In a similar vein, the claim that contingent, unexpected, or unintended social effects cannot be morally blamed is supported by his assertion that "nothing is racist simply by chance" (Garcia 2004, 53). Even though it can have racially bad effects that are unevenly distributed among members of different races, it does not count as racism proper. Another notable thought experiment by him is this: "Suppose, for example, the government of a hostile planet, free of any bigotry toward any earthling racial group, but unenamored of all earthlings, launches a missile to destroy the earth. Suppose it lands in Africa. This institutional (governmental) action has a disproportionately adverse impact on black people, but it is silly to describe it as racist" (Garcia 1996, 417). For him, accidental and unintended domination is not *ipso facto* racist. Even if accidental or unintended

domination by one racial group over another is possible, Garcia believes that it is insufficient for it to count as genuine racism since being accidental implies being careless, lack of intent or foresight (Garcia 2004, 36, 39). In this regard, Garcia is against a consequentialist conception of racism since “Actions and beliefs are racist in virtue of their coming from racism in the desires, wishes, and intentions of individuals, not in virtue of their leading to these or other undesirable effects” (Garcia 1996, 404).

Likewise, privileging affective and volitional elements over cognitive ones, Garcia wants to allow various things that can be racist such as “practices, procedures, actions, beliefs, hopes, fears, goals, desires, etc.” (Garcia 1997, 6) so that he need not necessarily exclude doxastic views of racism advocated by Appiah. Garcia insists on the distinction between primary racism and secondary racism: While racism should be primarily seen as inhering in noncognitive and nonepistemic attitudes, Garcia thinks that prejudicial beliefs can be characteristically racist due to their rootedness in racial disregard or their possible advancement and rationalization of such disregard. For instance, on Garcia’s view, a belief that “blacks are subhuman” or “Arabs are all terrorists” (Blum 2004, 72), which seems racist as such and morally repulsive, is usually and typically (but not always) racist because they tend to be connected to racial disregard or antipathy.⁷⁵ But it is possible to conceive that someone simply hates some racial members without bothering to rationalize such an attitude. Insofar as “mere belief that one racial group is better than another need not entail the sort of disaffection that characterizes those we ordinarily think of as racists” (Garcia 1997, 16), racial disaffection, rather than a belief of racial superiority, should count as a proper source of racism. In this regard, Garcia seems to believe that this kind of belief by itself does not constitute morally impermissible racism when there is no vicious volitional element in

⁷⁵ Similarly, in critiquing cognitive racism, Schmid argues that “belief in the essential factual inequality of the races is not necessarily racist, nor is action based upon that belief” (Schmid 1996, 36).

that belief, maybe out of innocent ignorance. Here “volitional” (including affective, motivational, and conative) means something that contrasts to merely representational or coldly cognitive. But given the distinction between epistemic state and its moral significance, being foolish is not the same as being racist. When racialism is seen as a faulty belief of race, it is even possible for someone to be both anti-racist and racist (Garcia 2004, 43).⁷⁶ What morally matters is what Garcia calls “noncognitive embracing” of certain racist beliefs insofar as “cognitive failings, cases of ‘imperceptiveness,’ take on moral significance only when they reflect an affective or desiderative or volitional fault” (Garcia 1997, 37; 2004, 53). This is why, against a discursive conception of racism of David Goldberg (1993), he resists to identify racism with a racist discourse.

I would like to note that his volitional account significantly adopts virtue theoretic vocabularies such as being vicious, malicious, or even evil.⁷⁷ Garcia is explicit that one of his main purposes is “to attend ... to the seat of morality in the human heart and to the theory of moral virtues” (Garcia 1997, 31). In a later paper, he continues to argue for “looking for racism’s heart in moral vice, that is, in deformations of character, in our dispositions to want, desire, choose, ignore, or neglect what we ought not” (Garcia 2004, 41). Of course, there seem to be *prima facie* cases of race-related virtuous, or at least innocuous, things such as racial solidarity, racial pride in Black nationalism, or racial preference in affirmative action. As it were, it seems plausible to ascribe moral virtues such as benevolence and justice to Martin Luther King.⁷⁸ Just as an agent can be morally evaluated as virtuous or vicious, so racists seem to be criticized in that they manifest

⁷⁶ This point is not so clear for Appiah, who would argue that to be racist having racialism as a belief that races exist is required.

⁷⁷ Garcia writes: “My argument brings to bear on this topic in social philosophy points made in recent criticisms of modernist moral theory, especially criticisms offered by those who call for increased attention to the *virtues*” (Garcia 1997, 10, my emphasis). Interestingly, recalling feminist critiques of deontological ethics, one of the points why Garcia is against doxastic view of racism is that Appiah’s view tends to “privilege impartiality, rights, principles, and detachment over special ties, virtues, affective inclinations, and relationships” (Garcia 1997, 20). Here it is easy to see that there are many structural similarities between care ethics and virtue ethics.

⁷⁸ For Martin Luther King as a case of moral trendsetter, see chapter 5.

“the vice of malevolence” due to racial antipathy or “the vice of moral disregard” (Garcia 1997, 29) due to a racially differential lack of goodwill. Moreover, just as the traditional picture of virtues comprises appropriate feeling and understanding, Garcia argues that we should accommodate various elements of individual character traits such as desires, motives, emotions, and intentions. If we are to condemn a racist prejudice, against Appiah, Garcia argues that it would be “better to attribute the *moral* status of a racist’s prejudice ... to its role in shielding moral vice” (Garcia 1997, 17).

Garcia’s virtue-based account of racism seems to assume a conception of stable agency. For instance, Garcia argues that a view that sees racism as mere systems of social domination is misguided since it is impossible for such a view to account for unsuccessful or apolitical racism (Garcia 1997, 11).⁷⁹ For him, it is assumed that the primary form of racism comes from an individual person’s more or less stable states of mind including racist will, desire, and wish. When respect is considered a virtue, it should involve “a characteristic disposition of the will, a willingness to defer to the other” (Garcia 2004, 47). As far as one’s potentially vicious character persists, on this anti-consequentialist view, whether it is actualized as a racist act or speech is irrelevant. This is why there should be an explanation for why a powerless, solitary person, even who cannot exercise any substantial power in isolated settings, can be racist. Otherwise, “we will be unable to distinguish the person who *is* a racist from the actor who is merely portraying one” (Garcia 1997, 22). To consider the difference between the actually racist person and the apparent portrayal of certain racist personality, Garcia’s way of moral evaluation of racism should assume a stable and reliable state of the personality of agents, which should be distinguished from mere

⁷⁹ Later, Garcia adds the case of internalizing self-hatred of one’s own racial group to show that racism does not have to be directed against others (Garcia 2004, 41). In addition to that one can be racist against one’s own racial groups, this may allow that the weak or the oppressed can be racist too.

acts. Without relying on the notion of human personhood or agency, on Garcia's view, it is impossible to morally evaluate and criticize racism. For him, structural or social approach of oppression is mistaken since "oppression is not something that merely exists or happens, but is done and therefore done by some agents" (Garcia 2004, 39). Surely, changing relevant social practices is required but it may be comparably easy to achieve. Given "the primacy of the internal over the external," what is more demanding, according to Garcia, is to change vicious attitudes in people's character through "deeper changes within persons" (Garcia 2004, 55). Here Garcia's view can be seen as an individualist against structuralists.⁸⁰

3.3 A Kind of Situationist Critique

There have been many challenges to Garcia's volitional model of racism. Above all, his monistic model was critiqued by Lawrence Blum who argues for the pluralistic model of racism. According to Blum (2004), Garcia is wrong to argue that racism is always wrong as a function of the same reason. Rather, there seem to be many different sources of racism, such as racial injustice, racial insensitivity, racial discomfort and the like. For instance, racist jokes need not be necessarily racist in Garcia's sense of racial animosity since one "may tell the joke without sharing the racist sentiments the joke expresses" (Blum 2002b, 208).⁸¹ Moreover, there may be different degrees of

⁸⁰ One legitimate objection would be that while Garcia only talks about racist attitudes, he does not hold a view of stable agency as virtue ethicists do. But I do not think that his adoption of virtue-theoretic vocabularies is accidental. Given his critique of structural accounts of racism as social domination, what matters for him seems to be individual's more or less stable states of mind, not mere unrelated tokens of vicious attitudes.

⁸¹ For another example, when fraternity members dress up in Native American warrior clothing in a fraternity party, what they are doing is demeaning to Native Americans, regardless of their intention. Contrary to Garcia's contention, "It is not even clear that ignorance of the affront would be morally more acceptable than an intention to affront" (Blum 2002b, 209). Similarly, Headley invokes the case of "a progressive white motorist who jokingly shouts 'you damn digger' at a black motorist without the intention to cause harm" (Headley 2000, 225). As James Rachels famously denies the distinction between active and passive euthanasia on the grounds that both result in the same consequence, one may argue that intention is not relevant to the case of unintentional racist joke.

vices, which is not well captured by Garcia's unitary view of vice.⁸² Given the "diversity of racial phenomena that constitute moral ills," (Blum 2004, 77) it is not clear why there must be a fundamental unity like malevolence underlying numerous phenomena of racial ills.⁸³

But I am not interested in the debate between monism and pluralism in the racist's psychology. This is because it is open for Garcia to accommodate various racist affective states such as fear, disgust, and jealousy in addition to his initial monist focus on hate and malevolence as the source of racism. He may even try to accommodate the case of implicit biases as an affective element of racism within his initial account.⁸⁴ On a more charitable reading, Garcia's view may include something like implicit biases since he grants that "as racist discrimination need not always be conscious, so it need not always be intended to harm" (Garcia 1996, 408). All Garcia needs to do is to make his virtue-based theory of agency more complicated and nuanced, insisting on his point that "intentional discrimination based on racist attitudes will be more objectionable morally, and harder to justify, than is unintentional, unconscious racist discrimination" (Garcia 1996, 408). But even if Garcia's strong requirement of psychological and moral monism can be weakened, it is still unclear how he can answer to the charge of virtue-based individualism. Let me consider the situation-sensitiveness of racism by looking at the situationist critique of virtue ethics.

⁸² Blum argues that while laziness and cruelty are both vices, the latter is much worse than the former. Likewise, hating someone is worse than failing to give adequate regard for other's welfare (Blum 2004, 67).

⁸³ Against Garcia's psychological monism, Faucher and Machery also argue that there are multiple sorts of racists' psychology. For instance, while Blacks are despised and Jews are envied by racists, gays may be deemed disgusting (Faucher and Machery 2009, 49). If so, unlike Garcia's claim of the commonality of different forms of intergroup animosity (1996, 401), it is not entirely correct to say that there are structural similarities between anti-black racism and anti-Semitism.

⁸⁴ At the end of their paper, Faucher and Machery actually consider the possibility that Garcia could respond that the implicit biases are a form of malevolence. As they argue, this strategy does not work because there may be the cases in which implicit biases are not malevolent (Faucher and Machery 2009, 59). But if Garcia can revise his volitional theory of racism to be a more pluralist account, it is not entirely impossible to take implicit biases are part of one's more or less stable disposition. For a similar position of mine, see Vall 2009.

The situationist critique attacks the idea that there are robust and reliable virtues. The situationist critique is motivated by a bias that is called “the fundamental attribution error,” according to which we tend to focus on the internal causes of person’s action (personality, character traits, and the like) rather than external and situational causes.⁸⁵ Consider the famous Milgram experiment or the Good Samaritan experiment. A series of such experiments show that our behavior tends to vary in accordance with situational variations, including even very trivial factors such as a dime or noise. This consideration leads us to be skeptical about the virtues in general. As John Doris writes: “virtues are supposed to be *robust* traits; if a person has a robust trait, they can be confidently expected to display trait-relevant behavior across a wide variety of trait-relevant situations, even where some or all of these situations are not optimally conducive to such behavior” (Doris 2002, 18).⁸⁶ If Garcia’s virtue-based theory is based on the assumption that there are cross-situational character traits and the situationist critique is convincing, then to cultivate virtues, or to eradicate vices may not be feasible as a matter of changing a particular norm.⁸⁷

But it might be argued that it is too strong of a requirement that virtues should be necessarily reliable across all situations. Not only may there be different types of personality

⁸⁵ Note that the “we” here might not include all of humankind, but only members of certain human cultures. For cultural diversity of situationism, see Sarkissian (2010).

⁸⁶ Here I am not assuming that Doris’s view is unimpeachable. For one may worry that Doris’s argument depends on social psychology experiments that didn’t replicate well. But my argument does not need to rely on the factual correctness of the experiments. Rather, my view is that ‘a kind of’ situationist point is suggestive as to the case of Garcia’s view of racism as vicious volitional states. So even if Doris is wrong, the thesis developed here can be right.

⁸⁷ One possible criticism of my view is that my discussion of Garcia and the situationist critique is largely irrelevant. That is, one may say that the actual criticism being leveled against Garcia has very little to do with the situationist critique of virtue ethics. While this may be a fair critique, as I name this section “a kind of situationist critique,” I think we can find a structural similarity between the situationist critique of virtue ethics and my claim that racial antipathy (as I will call it) is constructed and perpetuated by social-situational factors. The fundamental issue is that Garcia prioritizes racial antipathy as a sole source of racism, thereby trivializing social factors around racist personal traits.

traits,⁸⁸ it also seems undeniable that there is a bit of reliable behavioral tendencies, which is not necessarily incompatible with the situationist critique. Instead, it seems that virtues come in degrees. Against this charge, it should be stressed that Doris does not reject the idea of personality traits as such (Doris 2002, 39). Rather, we can still keep the idea of local traits even though we grant the nonexistence of global character traits. He writes: “I allow for the possibility of temporally stable, situation-particular, ‘local’ traits that are associated with important individual differences in behavior. As I understand things, these local traits are likely to be extremely fine-grained” (Doris 2002, 25). If so, a more plausible claim would be that both personality and situation play a role in shaping one’s action. That is, individual character factors and situational factors interact. But I want to stress that the situationist point still holds because local traits are highly context-dependent. As far as we can subjectively reduce cognitive dissonances, objective consistencies of such traits are also debatable. Such local character traits are not so self-sufficient but are dependent upon their situations. When local traits are extremely fine-grained as Doris argues, their explanatory scope should be also very (maybe extremely) narrow.⁸⁹ People’s internal psychological dispositions and habits are in part shaped, sustained, and altered by their surrounding situational factors and social environments.⁹⁰

⁸⁸ For instance, consider the ‘Big Five’ model of personality (also known as OCEAN) in personality psychology: openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism.

⁸⁹ For this reason, we do not need to go so far as to suggest that we get rid of character from our vocabulary. Although there may be no such things as global character traits, holding on the notion of character can be justified on instrumental reasons.

Surely, one might argue that it could be the case that we do have robust, stable character traits, but that these traits are sensitive to social influence. One of the moves situationists make is to concede the behavioral stability of most people. Then they can claim that this stability is a function of the fact that most people are fairly consistent in the stable situations they move through. On this view, a significant part of the explanation of an individual exhibiting stable behavior is stable environment. If so, we need not attribute it all to stable inner character.

⁹⁰ Consider various techniques for nudging people in favor of environmental conservation or reducing heavy drinking.

When Garcia locates the source of racism in volition or emotion, he does not ask further where racist volition or emotion comes from. When it comes to our original topic of racism, this situationist point can be more readily accommodated by looking at a sociofunctional approach to emotions in social psychology. On this approach, each emotion is a specific response to specific social and environmental problems such as contamination and physical or economic danger (Faucher and Machery 2009, 51-52). The upshot is that racist emotions such as antipathy have some social origins. For instance, while African Americans tend to be perceived as evoking mostly fear and posing problems for security, Asians are seen as evoking envy, posing problems for the economy. This kind of emotional diversity cannot be understood without considering specific background knowledge of racism's history in the U.S. If this socio-psychological point is the case, a proper account of specific social norms in a given society can be useful for studies in sociohistorical origins of racism. When it comes to implicit racial biases, along with implicit negative evaluations, implicit stereotypes are not merely the psychological given but also culturally shared beliefs among certain populations (Faucher and Machery 2009, 54). When there can be a sincerely and genuinely benevolent person who harbors implicit racist biases, the point is that those psychological states are significantly affected by certain sociocultural norms and their accompanying schemata. This can be an example of the intertwinement between implicit biases and racist social norms.

3.4 Racist Social Norms

There are several different ways in which racist volition or its effectivity is influenced by its social circumstances. Charles Mills's discussion of white paternalists can be seen as a good example that shows the inadequacy of the moral account of racism, as argued by Garcia. According to Mills, it is possible for well-intentioned individuals to paternalistically and benevolently treat

blacks in a racist manner without any racial antipathy (Mills 2003a).⁹¹ It is instructive to consider the history of slavery in the U. S. When there were social norms that are functional to slavery, it would be plausible to think that the ultimate motives for individual efforts to “keep blacks in their place” (Urquidez 2017, 231) are not relevant, whether it be vicious concerns for protecting one’s property or benevolent assistance. Under the pervasive influence of racist norms in slavery, blacks are assigned to certain social roles as slaves. The social structures of slavery are constituted by a collection of nodes (slaves/masters) and relations (subordination).⁹² In this situation, masters’ states of mind are deeply constrained by their social roles as masters and associated normative expectations. According to a master-schema, perhaps without certain antipathy, a master may think: “I am benevolently treating my slaves. But keeping their assigned place is just what they have to do. So they should stay in their place.” Even if Garcia may argue that benevolent paternalists are oxymoronic, Mills would reply that the problematic inferiorization of blacks based on racist belief can be entirely separated from any racist motives, characters, or intentions. While Garcia’s volitional view may elucidate the subjective aspect of individual racist agents, Mills’s point is that what makes racism racist is its objectively harming circumstances in accordance with one’s racial membership. In a similar vein, Blum also talks about racial inferiorization as “treating racial other as inferior or of lesser value and, secondarily, viewing the racial other as inferior” (Blum 2002b,

⁹¹ Blum also rightly argues: “Some superiority racists do not hate the target of their beliefs. They may have a paternalistic concern and feelings of kindness for persons they regard as their human inferiors.... The concern and kindness are misdirected, and demeaning, because the other is not seen as an equal, or even as a full human being; it is a racist form of concern. Nevertheless such attitudes are distinct from antipathy and hatred” (Blum 2002b, 210). He also writes: “During the slavery and segregation eras in the United States, for example, most whites believed blacks to be inferior, even barely human, but many did not harbor ill will toward them” (Blum 2004, 69). A similar point was raised by David Goldberg’s example of the benevolent utilitarian: “despite equal rights to liberty and justice abstractly considered, the ‘less civilized’ level of development of some races renders them incapable of the best administration of their resources from the perspective of maximizing their own utility” (Goldberg 1990, 386).

⁹² Sally Haslanger (2016) provides an account of social structure as a set of nodes and relations following Stewart Shapiro. Her structural approach is also useful in that it allows that “a structure motivated by good intentions may be unjust in its distribution of goods and power and in the social meaning of the relationships it creates” (Haslanger 2012, 324).

210), which is distinct from Garcia's racial antipathy, such as dislike or hostility toward racial groups.

Even if Garcia insists on the inseparability between racist volition and racist belief, his view does not take into account the deep influence of social roles on individual agents that shape their relationships. In this respect, Garcia's view can be also critiqued on empirical grounds. Let us recall that the Milgram experiment divided roles into those who torture and those who are tortured.⁹³ Even if someone tends to have benevolence toward blacks, after the recurrent experience of racist social norms and their situational cues, her affective attitudes may be developed into vicious ones through certain racial roles and their behavior schemata. In this way, making people vicious ends up being part of a feedback loop by internalizing racist social norms.⁹⁴

A similar concern can be said about relatively newly emerged forms of racism, such as so-called color-blind racism as racism without racists (Bonilla-Silva 2013). Here a new kind of racism is not based on biological ideologies of racial hierarchies. Rather, it is cultural differences, which happen to be coextensive to racial groups, that explain racial ills (McCarthy 2009). However benignly and complementarily conceived, for instance, the stereotypical belief that "blacks are naturally strong" can be used to justify some sort of racially oppressive policing where it is also believed that blacks are inherently predisposed to violence and criminality.⁹⁵ Contrary to Garcia's view, this point shows that racial stereotypes can be harmful even without any racial antipathy. Here members of different racial groups are ascribed different social roles and associated norms. Their behaviors are evaluated as acceptable or desirable by relevant norms.

⁹³ Similarly, Philip Zimbardo's the Stanford prison experiment divided people into the two roles: guards and prisoners.

⁹⁴ Unlike moral norms, it is important to keep in mind that the expectations that others in the relevant group would follow the norms are indispensable in shaping social norms.

⁹⁵ I borrow this example from Urquidez 2017, 236. Blum argues that a stereotype like 'blacks as good dancers' is not necessarily racist stereotype due to its attribution of a positive quality, but an objectionable overgeneralization (Blum 2002b, 211). But such a stereotype can be also objectionable in certain historical context like the slave era.

To be sure, Garcia could counter that “The institutions cannot be racist ... if there never were any racist people or attitudes To think otherwise runs the risk of both de-personalizing racism and reifying it” (Garcia 1997, 26). But it is unclear why de-personalizing racism is problematic in the first place when individual agents are embedded within a specific society’s norms and institutions, which are fundamentally de-personalized. Moreover, in my view, considering institutional backgrounds of racism and their pervasiveness is intended to change them, not reify racism. My aim here is pragmatic and ameliorative.⁹⁶ Because social functions of individual intentions are at least partly determined by their nonindividualistic and nonintentional social circumstances, Garcia’s problematic assumption of “isolated individuals” (Headley 2000, 238) cannot explain important aspects of social practices that may result in negative racial impact. Without relevant background knowledge of social norms, it is hard to morally evaluate one’s volition’s social effects.

3.5 Civility

In the previous section, I critically examined Garcia’s virtue-based account of racism by referring to the situationist critique of virtue ethics and relevant aspects of social norms. Against the moralistic and individualist account of racism suggested by Garcia, in what follows, I argue for the social norm of civility as a feasible way to overcome racism. I believe that promulgating a norm of civility will help overcome racism while developing an account of racism and its wrongness that avoids the kinds of objections I have been developing against Garcia. Although civility as a norm can be applied to more general cases such as gender or religious conflicts, I hope to show that the notion of civility is especially helpful to consider Garcia’s type of racism as

⁹⁶ Haslanger argues that her ameliorative approach is to “elucidate “our” legitimate purposes and what concept of F - ness (if any) would serve them best (the target concept). Normative input is needed” (Haslanger 2012, 376).

vicious attitudes. Insofar as Garcia's virtue-based theory is vulnerable to the kind of the situationist critique I raised in the previous section, to appeal to inculcating virtues may not be a stable and reliable way to critique racism.⁹⁷ On top of that, it is plausible to think that a good theory of racism should aim at influencing the majority of citizens, not a few exceptionally virtuous or vicious agents. In contrast, this norm of civility is desirable because it is effective and pragmatic. And in light of the situationist critique, appealing to social norms as a sort of situational factor is to utilize our central psychological tendency of norms-conformity. While being changeable, stable social norms tend to be followed by many people and taken to be obligatory since they are supported by relevant social practices. When our usual ways of behavior are linked to our specific social roles, civility as a social norm suggests that we should follow it as equal and free citizens.

Before proceeding, some prior clarification of the concept is needed.⁹⁸ As Cheshire Calhoun (2000) argues, civility has not been considered as a distinct moral virtue by many philosophers for several reasons. She especially emphasizes three reasons: First, civility is often confused with etiquette or good manners. Second, civility is not seen as a moral virtue since it is closely associated with following socially established rules, not involving a socially critical moral perspective. Third, it seems that civility can be reduced to other familiar virtues such as Kantian respect or tolerance (Calhoun 2000, 251-54). Against this traditional understanding, Calhoun argues for its own practical value.

Let me note that what I want to address is not about civility as politeness, decency, or good manners.⁹⁹ Rather, it is closer to the political conception of civility in a modern pluralistic

⁹⁷ Concerning the situationist critique in social psychology researches, a similar point of the insufficiency of cultivating virtues, not norms, is raised by McTernan 2014.

⁹⁸ The concept of civility is very ambiguous. As Zurn points out, "Sometimes 'civility' is equated with mere manners or etiquette; sometimes with sacrifice of individuality in the service of common goods; sometimes with compromise and conciliation; sometimes with mutual respect, tolerance, and trust; sometimes simply with positive affect toward others" (Zurn 2013, 343).

⁹⁹ For civility as good manners, see Stohr 2012; Buss 1999.

society.¹⁰⁰ Insofar as “all moral requirements entail some permissible means of social enforcement” (Edmundson 2002, 217) such as censure and education, civility as a social norm is expected to function as an effective constraint concerning people’s everyday conduct. On this view, civility should be understood as a political constraint for the stable and well-ordered polity. For instance, Rawls invokes civility as “a moral, not a legal, duty – the duty of civility – to be able to explain to one another on... fundamental questions how the principles and policies they advocate and vote for can be supported by the political values of public reason” (Rawls 1993, 137, 216-17). Insofar as this duty of civility is a sort of open-mindedness for free and open dialogue on political matters, Rawls’s notion of civility is to be distinguished from civility in the ancient sense that refers to politeness and good manners, which were mainly related to class distinctions (for instance, civil versus barbaric). For Rawls, following the spirit of John Locke’s idea of religious tolerance, civility as mutual respect and nondiscrimination is required for our collective life because of the pervasively pluralistic circumstances where deep disagreement of comprehensive views and social identities is entrenched. Along with the duty of civility, achieving overlapping consensus from within a plural and even conflicting comprehensive views is required since “democratic citizens holding different comprehensive doctrines may agree on political conceptions of justice” (Rawls 2001, 9). To avoid unduly sectarian and unstable disagreement, Rawls’s liberal notion of civility as accommodation appeals to the political value of public reason, which is distinct from social reason of various civil associations or domestic reason of family. When for Rawls civility is to obey the rules of public reason, public reason is defined as “the proper idiom that fellow citizens are to limit themselves to when arguing with one another about political matters” (Zurn 2013, 347) as far as it is not controversial and accessible to all. While Rawls’s main target is about moral or

¹⁰⁰ In distinguishing moral and political notion of civility, I do not want to make a stark distinction. In many cases, the line between them can be hazy, overlapping, and tenuous (Edyvane 2017).

religious intolerance, Rawlsian duty of civility does not have to be limited to the case of religious conflicts. When public reason is supposed to reconcile conflicts based on status, gender, and race (Rawls 1993, viii), Rawls mentions the case of the public reason of the abolitionists along with Martin Luther King Jr.'s nonviolent disobedience. In this regard, the virtue of civility can be seen as a kind of toleration and respect from a Rawlsian perspective, appealing to the value of public reason for a more inclusive community. As far as we are open to various social pressures, citizens who violate this moral duty of civility may be socially blamed, if not legally sanctioned (Edmundson 2002).

However, Rawls's view of the political duty of civility is too narrow since it neglects the distinctively social dimension of civility. This is because he limits the moral duty of civility only to the domain of basic justice or the constitutional essentials.¹⁰¹ In Rawlsian ideal theory, civility as a moral duty of mutual respect is only supposed to be shared among equal citizens. But given the social enforcement of morality, what is more coercive, pervasive, and inescapable than the state can be various social pressures, such as public opinion, as acutely seen by John Stuart Mill (1978) concerning the danger of "despotism of custom" in *On Liberty*. Even though free speech is guaranteed by formal laws, for instance, it is subject to people's informal toleration of certain racist opinions. Recall that our public reasoning can be distorted by racially unjust social practices such as racial stereotypes and racial resentment (Boettcher 2009). This is why so-called hate-based or

¹⁰¹ By constitutional essentials, Rawls means "the fair terms of social cooperation.... These principles specify the basic rights and duties to be assigned by the main political and social institutions, and they regulate the division of benefits arising from social cooperation and allot the burdens necessary to sustain it" (Rawls 2001, 7). I deal with this narrowness of Rawls's view of the basic structure in chapter 2. In this regard, as Edmundson shows, the comparison between Rawls and Mill is instructive: "Rawls conceives the state as peculiarly coercive, while Mill saw state and society as equally prone to oppress. Mill was familiar with the constraints of monolithic, Victorian, social opinion, and was concerned only secondarily with their enforcement by the state. Rawls, on the other hand, confronted twentieth century societies that had become, in his view, intrinsically pluralistic and centrifugal" (Edmundson 2002, 222). Since the influence of the social is not less powerful than that of the political, I think Rawls's view suffers from its narrowness. Likewise, Edmundson concludes that portraying civility as a political duty is misguided because it "obscures the relation of the social to the political" (Edmundson 2002, 229).

bias-based crime concerning race, sexual orientation, religion, and the like is not merely a matter of an individual person's hate or bias. Rather, such hate or bias is deeply intractable since it is shaped and cultivated by various long-standing, structural, and hostile social environments.

Beyond a political value, it is important to note that civility is “opposed to personal or identity-based denigration, personal vitriol, and other forms of direct personal demonization, including most (but not all) forms of *ad hominem* attacks” (Zurn 2013, 349). When civility is used as a negative duty of anti-discrimination, a good example of displaying civility is restraining hate speech against stigmatized minorities.¹⁰² Racist hate messages paradigmatically include the three following characteristics: they proclaim “racial inferiority”; they are “directed against a historically oppressed group”; they are “persecutory, hateful, and degrading” (Matsuda 1993, 36). When racist hate speech is harmful, far from restricting freedom of speech, regulating hate speech is not intended to privilege one kind of view, namely, a non-racist view while illegitimately silencing racist views. Although the First Amendment, being content-neutral, may serve to preserve the racist status quo by protecting such speech, it can be argued that racist hate speech should be regulated by civility, if not government, given its profound harms to victims.¹⁰³ Even if it does not directly cause physical violence, racist hate speech tends to undermine self-respect by

¹⁰² For many, civility means a constraint on disruptive or insulting political speech. But I do not limit the value of civility to the domain of democratic deliberation or political speech. Rather, as I will elaborate below, I prefer a broader notion of civility since “it is not just a matter of keeping a civil tongue; the ‘looks’ matter (gestures, accents, ties, modes of dress and comportment), and so does the ‘table’ (different seating positions imply different hierarchies and different power dynamics)” (Edyvane 2017, 346).

¹⁰³ This claim is made by critical race theory in legal studies. As Mari Matsuda writes, racist hate speech can induce “physiological symptoms and emotional distress ranging from fear in the gut to rapid pulse rate and difficulty in breathing, nightmares, posttraumatic stress disorder, hypertension, psychosis, and suicide” (Matsuda 1993, 24). Here civility is basically unenforceable, with respect to racist speech, from a Constitutional point of view. As to this, one may object that many states in the U.S. do have laws against hate speech, and they are sometimes enforced. Moreover, one may ask that why United States Constitutional law should be dispositive concerning the regulation of speech from the standpoint of political theory in the first place. In other words, rules of contemporary U.S. law as quite fundamental rules do not dictate what should or should not be controlled by legislation as such. But I do not commit to any specific legal theory at this point. Rather, while acknowledging complex interactions between social norms and legal norms, my point is that the enforcement of civility is basically independent of the control of the State.

evoking negative emotions such as anxiety, powerlessness, anger, humiliation, and insecurity. Because hate speech is so harmful, counter-speech against harmful speech or merely having more speech may not be effective. Contrary to Mill's optimistic idea of the marketplace of ideas, free competition of ideas and speeches would not work due to pervasive power disparities.

In our context, it is notable that the civility view should be distinguished from Garcia's view of racist hate speech. He argues that racist hate speech should be defined in terms of a speaker's intention: "Unlike racially *offensive* speech, which is defined by its (actual or probable) effects, *racist* hate speech is defined by its origins" (Garcia 1996, 408). However, his distinction between racially offensive speech and racist hate speech is not defensible as far as the former can be more objectively and directly harmful than the latter. Recall that racist hate messages include the idea of racial inferiority and should be directed toward historically oppressed groups, in addition to hatred or animosity. The first two aspects (racial inferiority and the fact of historical oppression) are not captured by a speaker's intention alone. Incivilities such as hate speech are not best understood by one's intention because civility as a social norm, rather than a speaker's intention, specifies appropriate speeches in light of socially established norms on what is contemptible or intolerable.¹⁰⁴ In this case, civility is concerned with a duty concerning the socially accepted appropriateness of our speech insofar as the attitudes of others tend to affect our interpersonal relationships, affecting people's well-being including psychic harms. Here hate is not merely a function of individual psychologies. Rather, as far as hate tends to be oriented to particular groups, it should be stressed that haters choose members of the certain oppressed group simply because they are the members of the disproportionately vulnerable group.¹⁰⁵ In this regard,

¹⁰⁴ But I think there may be more democratically significant forms of incivilities. While I only talk about racist incivilities for now, I will turn to the possibility of anti-racist incivilities in chapter 5.

¹⁰⁵ For instance, the case of a French magazine *Charlie Hebdo* in 2015 may be seen as suggesting that the right to free speech should be balanced against the norm of civility given the power asymmetry.

given the asymmetry of oppression, there seem to be notable differences between a black criminal who offends whites and a white criminal who offends blacks. As Blum notes, hate crime can be a severer moral wrong than hate out of personal envy and warrants strong punishment, not because it is derived from hate but because of its structural and group-based characteristics (Blum 2004, 68).¹⁰⁶

It is important to notice that civility seems primarily concerned with actions including verbal or symbolic offense, rather than motives. Because merely having a feeling of hatred is insufficient, conduct that is motivated by such a feeling should be the object of civility. Note that the notion of civility can be taken to assume or at least consistent with the behavioral model of racism. According to this behavioral model, racism must involve behaving or a disposition to behave to harm the members of racial groups: “P performs a Basic Racist Act by doing A when: (a) P does A in order to harm Q because Q is a member of a certain ethnic group; *or* (b) (regardless of P’s intentions or purposes) P’s doing A can reasonably be expected to mistreat Q as a consequence of Q’s being a member of a certain ethnic group” (Philips 1984, 77, my emphasis). What is notable in this disjunctive formulation is that on this behavioral view a person’s individual beliefs, feelings, motive, or intentions are not decisive. Is not this vulnerable to Garcia’s critique of the behavioral view on the grounds that even the powerless can be racist? Not necessarily.

Rather, the behavioral model can be preferable than the volitional model as a basis for deciding the wrongness of hate speech. Note that behavioral racism with a benign intention can be

¹⁰⁶ Blum continues: “Why might it be worse to hate someone because of her race than to hate her for purely personal reasons, such as envy or jealousy? One reason is purely consequentialist. When someone is targeted for hatred because of her race, other members of the same race may feel anxious or fearful, or suffer some other form of psychic harm ... I ... want to suggest that the full opprobrium attached to race-related manifestations of hatred or ill will derives from the severer forms of discrimination, oppression, degradation, dehumanization, and violence perpetrated historically in the name of race” (Blum 2004, 68).

more damaging than or at least as damaging as the motivational racism with a vicious intention.¹⁰⁷ Recall the situationist point is that evaluating character traits is not reliable and effective. For this reason, civility aims to regulate uncivil conducts rather than directly controlling uncivil motives. By regulating uncivil conducts, it is expected that uncivil motives will be ultimately reduced. Insofar as it is not vital to “distinguish the person who *is* a racist from the actor who is merely portraying one” (Garcia 1997, 22), I would like to reverse Garcia’s “primacy of the internal over the external.” Further, if it is the case that most of our attitudes typically involve a willingness to express those attitudes, we do not need to sharply distinguish racist volition and the expression of it. When someone’s attitude of contempt matters to me due to its harm to my interest in a broad sense, “the attitudes of others can matter to me regardless of whether those attitudes gain expression and quite apart from any further consequences that the existence of those attitudes may have for me or for anyone else” (Owens 2015, 3).¹⁰⁸ Additionally, given that we often act from a mixture of differing motives, it is also highly onerous to maintain the motivational hygiene required by Garcia’s volitional model.¹⁰⁹ A difficulty is that vicious attitudes can be oftentimes indirect, subtle, and unverifiable.¹¹⁰ Civility’s focus on actions can be pragmatically justified on the grounds that it is not feasible to access every individual’s inner motives. Without directly touching on a complex set of a person’s motives, civility aims to determine what is appropriate to

¹⁰⁷ For this consequentialist reason, Headley says that “there is no major moral difference between the behavioral racist and the motivational racist” (Headley 2000, 239).

¹⁰⁸ To be sure, public and explicit expression of disapproval and intolerance is more pressing and damaging: “the public expression of an unfavourable attitude could matter to me whether or not it is addressed to me and whether or not I am even aware of it.... Homophobic abuse is no less intolerant just because the abuse keeps it for the ears of presumed heterosexuals” (Owens 2015, 8).

¹⁰⁹ One similar example is this: “If, for example, I know I am biased against Ivy League graduates, but also have independent doubts about a particular job candidate, I may never know whether my vote against him was tainted by bias” (Edmundson 2000, 226).

¹¹⁰ Also, it is unclear whether racist animosity should be always considered a particularly more vicious or culpable than other diverse motives.

express or suppress regarding our attitudes such as contempt, anger, or disgust toward others in various social relationships.

Again, civility is not merely a variant of moral virtues. The upshot is that morally permissible options are restricted and mediated by social norms. As Calhoun says, “civility involves conformity to socially established rules of respect, tolerance, and considerateness” (Calhoun 2000, 255).¹¹¹ Calhoun’s view of civility is especially helpful to stress its distinctively social character, for she writes:

civility always involves a display of respect, tolerance, or considerateness. Thus civility is an essentially *communicative* form of moral conduct. In addition, because communicating our moral attitudes is central to civility, being genuinely civil ... requires that we follow whatever the socially established norms are for showing people considerateness, tolerance, or respect (Calhoun 2000, 260).

That is, civility tries to *connect* moral virtues to socially particular conventions. For instance, sincerely treating with tolerance may not be accompanied by its display of tolerance or vice versa. Whereas treating others respectfully or tolerantly can be a matter of doing things individually and morally right, the central aim of civility as a social virtue is to communicate one’s respectful or tolerant attitude with others. For instance, even though saying to a new employee that “You know you only got this job because you’re black” (Calhoun 2000, 261) may not actually deprive any equal opportunity, it seems to display inconsiderate and demeaning attitudes.¹¹²

¹¹¹ I think a similar point is well put in Haslanger’s following statement: “Living together in peace and justice does not require that we love each other, or that we even fully respect each other, but rather that we conform our actions to principle of justice” (Haslanger 2012, 335).

¹¹² Another notable example of Calhoun is this: “contributing to charities is a way of treating unknown others considerately and respectfully; but that considerateness is not displayed to the recipients of charity. Charitable donors behave well, but they are not being civil (or uncivil)... when people engage in covert trespassing, theft, forgery, tax evasion, bribing public officials, and drug trafficking, particular persons, or citizens generally, are treated with disrespect. But... there is no opportunity to display any attitudes at all to the targets of disrespect” (Calhoun 2000, 261-62).

In this regard, it is particularly uncivil that the store manager suspects that every black youth is potential shoplifters as far as the manager subtly communicates the implicit message about the flawed moral standing to the black youth (Schmid 2000, 229).

Insofar as genuine respect or tolerance can be different from the display of them in principle, existing social norms as a shared common language serve as specifying our display of moral virtues as socially appropriate or suitable. In addition to explicit, intentional, and public expression of attitudes, it is also notable that communicating can be wide enough to accommodate various forms of implicit, unintentional, and private communication (Owens 2015, 5).¹¹³

To be sure, this does not mean that established social norms should always be genuinely moral. This is another difference between Garcia's moral view and the civility view I propose. As Calhoun rightly worries, in a morally imperfect and non-ideal world like ours, "social norms of civility may fail to condemn the contemptuous treatment of socially disesteemed groups" (Calhoun 2000, 266). Since social norms can be conservative from a socially critical moral perspective, they may sanction what is not genuinely moral. For instance, holding doors for women is a kind of display of civility but such lady-first policies and related assumptions behind them may not be genuinely respectful (Calhoun 2000, 262). In such a case, displaying moral attitudes and treating others with genuinely moral attitudes can be competing. The worry is that when there are diverse and conflicting social norms, it is unclear which norms should be judged as dictating a genuinely moral kind of civility. But the point is that it is not possible to detour this socially relevant dimension of moral evaluation in our social lives. For this reason, I argue that this possibility does not suggest that we should give up the value of civility. As social norms are historically changeable, civility as a social norm can also be fallible and critically evaluable. For instance, sexual harassment, before the coinage of the very concept, was "socially interpreted as innocent flirting, or as a response invited by some women's impropriety" (Calhoun 2000, 266). Now we have a

¹¹³ These forms of communication may also include what is recently called microaggression. Derald Wing Sue defines microaggressions as "the brief and commonplace daily verbal, behavioral, and environmental indignities, whether intentional or unintentional, that communicate hostile, derogatory, or negative racial, gender, sexual orientation, and religious slights and insults to the target person or group" (Sue 2010, 5). See also McTernan 2018.

different norm of civility concerning sexual harassment. A similar point can be made as to racism. A few centuries ago, racial inequality or racial oppression was not as critiqued by any moral framework including Kantianism and utilitarianism as it is now as being obviously objectionable and intolerable.

One might object that civility is a kind of civic virtue rather than a social norm. Of course, there is some ambiguity as to civility since it can be interpreted as either a civic virtue or a social norm. While clarifying the distinctively social characteristic of civility, Calhoun sometimes seems to understand civility as a personal virtue.¹¹⁴ Invoking the notion of character, virtue, and disposition (Rawls 2001, 118; Rawls 1993, 445), Rawls also seems to consider the duty of civility in terms of a sort of political virtue or an ideal of citizenship. Against this view, I argue that civility should not be considered a merely individual or agential virtuous character. Surely, I can take that individual's democratic habits or civil disposition to be a virtue. If so, then so be it. For instance, in principle, I do not need to object the suggestion that civility, perhaps as an antidote to racist vice, can be "a benevolent attitude, consisting of well-wishing and well-doing, of citizens toward each other" (Kekes 1984, 442).¹¹⁵ But my point is that such habits should be something encouraged and cultivated by a proper social norm, not a pre-given global character trait.¹¹⁶ That is to say, civility as a virtue should be seen as an effect of a social norm, not a cause of it. I do not deny the whole

¹¹⁴ Relatedly, Calhoun writes: "civility is the virtue and incivility the vice with respect to communicating moral attitudes in contexts governed by social norms" (Calhoun 2000, 265). Zurn also believes that Calhoun's account of civility is largely concerned with a personal virtue (Zurn 2013, 344-45).

¹¹⁵ But I do not suggest that this is the only possible way of civility either since there can be a variety of the content of civility. For instance, contrary to Kekes's emphasis on friendliness and warm attitude, Jeremy Waldron says that "civility is a cold virtue, not a warm one, not really a matter of affection or benevolence" (Waldron 2014, 49).

¹¹⁶ I think it is possible to see civic virtue as an internalized social norm like civility too. Provided successful socialization, these virtuous dispositional states can be intrinsic, not just extrinsic or external, motivations. What I want to argue is not that we can ignore the importance of individual psychologies, but that we should be attentive to how those psychologies are related to relevant social norms. When it comes to the genesis and the reproduction of civic virtue, the relation between civic virtue and social norm does not have to be a question of which comes first. With this in mind, I think the issue of classifying civility as social norm or civic virtue may be just a matter of verbal dispute.

tradition of virtue theory. Rather, given the relevance of the situationist critique, it should be stressed that the virtues are subject to various situational factors. In the case of racism, we have seen that Garcia's volitional model is largely dependent upon this atomistic, individualistic, and virtue ethical perspective.¹¹⁷ Yet, it is suggested that what matters in behavior may be social normative expectations rather than personal normative volition (Bicchieri 2017). The situationist critique of character traits in the previous section indicates the vital influence of situational variation, which also involves social norms. For this reason, character traits may only weakly correlate with action. In light of the fragility of character traits, it is unclear if individual intention, ill will, or disregard are sufficient bases for racism.

By using this situationist critique against Garcia's volitional account of racism, I argue that civility is better understood as a beneficial social norm that is required to live peacefully and respectfully. Civility may be too unspecified to be a stable civic virtue. In the face of identity conflicts, civility should be understood as a minimal social norm, rather than as a morally desirable and isolated individual virtue. Whereas social norms are trans-individual, civic virtues are agent-based in that they are first and foremost believed to be possessed by individual agents.¹¹⁸ Without positing a thick notion of civic virtue as reactionary communitarianism does, supplementing socially beneficial norms is required in non-coercive and non-paternalistic ways.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁷ For a similar charge of the motivational account of racism of Schmid, see Headley 2000. Haslanger also believes that "an individualistic approach to group domination is inadequate because sometimes structures themselves, not individuals, are the problem" (Haslanger 2012, 320).

¹¹⁸ I argue that a social norm of civility is better than a virtue of civility. For a claim that norms are a particularly good way to frame ameliorative effects because they are both individual and collective, see Davidson and Kelly (2018).

¹¹⁹ According to the tradition of civic republicanism such as Rousseauism, following common social norms should be promoted as a civic virtue (MacIntyre 1985). Against this position, liberalism's typical worry is that this may compromise individual rights and what Rawls calls a fact of reasonable pluralism. While many communitarian or republican political theories are critiqued for assuming the vital importance of thick virtues in a specific conception of the good, appealing to social norms is better because it is normatively rather thin (McTernan 2014, 102).

Surely, it may be argued that the state should legislate for civility.¹²⁰ But since this raises another difficult question on the permissibility of the state to force civility or forbid incivility through coercive measures, here I will limit myself to the case of civility as social norm. Since it may not be imposed by official institutions in a top-down way, civility as a social norm can be seen as a sort of social pressure by public opinions in a bottom-up way. If civility as a social norm is fundamentally decentralized, civility should not be seen as normatively objectionable for the sake of liberty, as some Millian liberals may think. Again, pernicious social norms can be criticized and revised from below. The point is to have a democratic and reflexive environment in which citizens feel constrained by a commonly beneficial norm of civility. For any social norm to stick, it has to be stabilized by enforcement or punishment. If needed, sometimes, it may even be permissible to shame citizens by other citizens: “citizens should be disposed to experience shame if they violate morally appropriate social norms, and to react to violators in punishing, shame-inducing ways” (Arneson 2006, 62). When we fail to conform to a norm of civility, one is expected to feel shame. Shaming violators is one form of punishment, along with blaming, shunning, and ostracism. In this respect, I think forms of affective resistance such as mobilizing a contempt for racists are often permissible (Bell 2013). This point distinguishes civility as a social norm from civility as a politeness to merely get along well or to be agreeable to others. When it comes to pernicious racism, each citizen is motivated to constrain and sanction other citizens to not display uncivil racist attitudes in our daily life.

Civility should be encouraged because it signals our willingness to participate with others in common social practices. That is to say, “Civility requires obedience to social norms not for their own sake but for the sake of one important moral aim: the communication of moral attitudes

¹²⁰ For the problems of legislating The Anti-Social Behaviour Orders (ASBOs) and Prevent Nuisance and Annoyance (IPNAs) in the UK, see Edyvane 2017, 2020.

to fellow inhabitants of our moral world” (Calhoun 2000, 273). Here civility is presented as a meta-norm that governs our moral relationship to a set of social norms. Unlike Garcia’s assumption of isolated individual, this point of communicating moral attitudes shows that morality is also a matter of regulating our commonly shared interpersonal relationship. For instance, unlike the case of keeping a secret diary full of racist hatred, the reason why hate speech is problematic is that it communicates one’s hatred to its victims. When it comes to social relationships, I would like to stress the importance of social roles, which are both constraining and enabling as “the interface between social structure and individual agency” (Zheng 2018b, 874).¹²¹ A social role is associated with certain expectations that apply to an individual who occupies the social role.¹²²

While we occupy multiple social roles, a relevant context of civility is the role of citizens. As citizens, in addition to critically and individually reflecting our current social norms, we should communicate appropriate moral attitudes toward other fellow citizens. Note that this norm of civility does not need to presume controversial ideas of human nature as dignified being or natural human rights, which can backfire as justifying dehumanization, as out-and-out racists would argue that people of colors are not persons in the relevant sense.¹²³ Whereas being human is too broad to accommodate specific motivating powers, being citizen as a determinate social role is narrower

¹²¹ To show that we are accountable for structural injustice in virtue of our occupation of social roles, Zheng (2018b) derives the dual characters of social role by drawing on the two competing sociological traditions: structural-functionalism such as Talcott Parsons (constraining) and symbolic interactionism such as Erving Goffman (enabling). What she calls role-ideal is defined as follows: “For every social role R occupied by an individual P, a role-ideal is P’s interpretation of how she could best satisfy the expectations constituting R (based on P’s own beliefs, values, commitments, abilities, and lived experience)” (Zheng 2018b, 875). I think civility can be an important part of role-ideal of citizen.

¹²² Sunstein writes: “people’s conception of appropriate action and even of their ‘interest’ is very much a function of the particular role in which they find themselves. This is true of judges, lawyers, doctors, parents, children, waiters, wives, husbands, colleagues, friends and law school deans. Attention to the place of social role shows that for many purposes, the contrast between ‘rationality’ and social norms is unhelpful. What is rational for an agent is a function of, and mediated by, social roles and associated norms. And even when social norms appear not to be present, it is only because they are so taken for granted that they seem invisible (Sunstein 1996, 911-912).

¹²³ To be sure, incivilities can be used to justify some sort of dehumanization with other problematic assumptions. But it seems that they need not be mobilized to justify extreme cases such as war or genocide.

than being human. While being citizens are not something like ascribed social roles such as race, provided successful socialization, we are highly motivated to conform to the duty of civility. Civility can be effective since it utilizes our specific social roles as citizens, whose contents are intersubjectively shared. As citizens, we are constrained to speak and act against tribalism and racism.¹²⁴ Insofar as it is not permissible for citizen to do anything, one significance of civility as social norm is to set some socially acceptable limits concerning civilly decent conduct. When individuals are citizens in virtue of occupying a particular social role, citizens as social roles have their associated behavior schemata, such as displaying appropriate interpersonal attitudes. Beyond merely condemning a vicious person, making people conform to the social role of citizen can be achieved by relevant social pressures.

3.6 Replying to Objections

Let me finally consider some possible objections to the notion of civility. Due to its possible biases I previously mentioned, rejecting civility may seem tempting. Or civility as niceness may be seen as at best fleeting, cursory, and hollow. For instance, noticing its inherent ambiguity, Christopher Zurn calls civility an illusionistic ideal and enumerates five objections to it.¹²⁵ Let me examine them in turn. First of all, civility seems to be vacuously indeterminate and too polymorphous since what counts as civil is too context-specific and fluctuating. Against this, while civility has historically changed, as Zurn points out, we can reply that it has a central function

¹²⁴ In this respect, being citizen is also related to the ideas of the civic and the civilian. As far as the persistent practice of incivility can lead to the overall degeneration of civic culture permitting racist and sexist violence, cultivating civility should be emphasized to ease social conflicts and facilitate social interactions (Boyd 2006).

¹²⁵ He distinguishes illusionistic ideals from idealistic or simple illusions: "Illusionistic ideals are ... much harder to simply dismiss from our thinking than idealistic illusions or mere illusions. On the one hand, as ideals, they seem to retain a serious hold on our thinking.... And yet we have persistent evidence that their actual pursuit is often nothing more than illusory.... Illusionistic ideals are then systematically ambiguous; on reflection, they present a Janus-face, simultaneously worthy of endorsement and skeptical dismissal" (Zurn 2013, 342). It is notable that he is not dismissing the idea of civility as an illusionistic ideal but encouraging us to see its ambiguity.

of communicating moral attitudes. Despite its apparent variability, this communicative function can be considered a core meaning of civility. Second, civility may be epiphenomenal to the agonistic reality of politics. If so, calling for civility may be something like putting a band aid on a broken arm. But we can reply that civility is needed because of the very conflictual and confrontational feature of real politics. Moreover, against this danger of extreme violence, civility as anti-violence (Balibar 2015) should play a positive role as a stable social norm anchored in social practices.¹²⁶ Third, civility can be seen as a merely strategic tool for power and position. Contrary to this objection, we can respond that this bare possibility does not show that we should throw away civility altogether. All this shows is that civility should be critically examined, revised, and utilized. Fourth, civility can be critiqued as anti-individualist and homogenizing. But this conclusion is not necessary since civility may not negatively affect the development of individuality (Zurn 2013, 355). Instead of undermining self-respect, for instance, civility can support our robust sense of self-respect. Unlike Mill's time, the fact that we are living in a very heterogeneous and pluralistic society, as Rawls sees, is the very reason why civility is needed in the first place. Fifth, civility may seem marginalizing and anti-egalitarian. To my mind, this criticism is reasonable and worth considering. As Linda Zerrilli convincingly argues, "throughout American history, disenfranchised minorities, such as women and African-Americans, have been regularly accused of incivility just by virtue of daring to show up in public and press their rights claim" (Zerrilli 2014, 108; Harcourt 2012).¹²⁷ While it is true that civility can be used to enforce exclusion and privilege, this is not necessarily so. Rather, the aim of civility can be also egalitarian

¹²⁶ For the function of civility as preventing political disagreements from leading to violence, see Waldron 2014. But we do not need to preclude some sort of incivility as well. As he writes, it is "unlikely that civility is an absolute requirement or an unconditional virtue ... Sometimes hostility and combativeness are what a situation requires" (Waldron 2014, 49).

¹²⁷ It should be also noted that in a similar vein of Zurn's view of civility, Zerrilli adds that her intention is not "to defend incivility or to contest the worry about a lack of civility *tout court*" (Zerrilli 2014, 130).

and emancipatory. Once we realize that civility does not necessarily mean non-violence, various forms of dissent (Shelby 2016) can be seen as part of civility in a broad sense of anti-violence I have argued for. Even if civility is often anti-egalitarian, “those negatively affected by provincial or exclusionary civility norms are not passive victims, but have often been able to effectively mobilize and change such norms” (Zurn 2013, 357). Rather than denying civility and simply turning to incivility, transforming civility into more moral and egalitarian manners can be a better way to fight racism. For this reason, I conclude that these criticisms of civility are mistaken. Far from being anti-individualist and anti-egalitarian, civility is more needed to the oppressed than the privileged in many cases. In this regard, I agree with Calhoun’s following remark: “Members of disesteemed social groups are more likely to experience displays of contempt, intrusions on their privacy, intolerance of their conceptions of the good, and the discounting of their feelings and aims as less important.... What they need is precisely for the privileged to feel constrained to control their hostile, contemptuous, disapproving, and dismissive attitudes” (Calhoun 2000, 274).¹²⁸ What is required is to display our proper moral attitudes toward others in accordance with a norm of civility. While civility as a norm may be contested and revised, it is through civility as a shared common understanding of being civil to critique racism as vicious attitudes.¹²⁹

¹²⁸ See also: “civility, particularly toward members of socially disesteemed groups, protects individuals against the emotional exhaustion of having to cope with others’ displays of hatred, aversion, and disapproval” (Calhoun 2000, 266).

¹²⁹ I am open to the suggestion that even civility can be revised as uncivil types of disobedience in a special moment. As far as the rhetoric of civility can function as a conservative tool for suppressing social movements, I grant that appealing to civility can be oftentimes misleading. This shows the significant variability of the norm of civility, to which I will return later. As Candice Delmas argues, this is because “Incivility may ... be appropriate— and uncivil disobedience may be justified— where agents are oppressed, silenced, and otherwise marginalized” (Delmas 2018, 68). Moreover, there may be something like ‘insurrectionist’ civility. I will deal with this issue in chapter 5.

3.7 Conclusion

So far, I have suggested that civility as a social norm can be used to combat racism when Garcia's sense of 'racism' is meant. If racism is vice in mind as Garcia believes, the actualization of vice as racist volition is subject to various situational factors. My claim is that civility based on our social roles as citizens is an effective way to regulate such a vice. While I believe that civility is efficacious in regulating racist vices, I do not go so far as to claim that civility is the cure for every kind of race-related ills. For instance, civility may be no more than a secondary requirement in the case of racial injustice.¹³⁰ In such a case, what is required above all can be institutional reforms. Furthermore, while I only focused on the volitional account of racism by Garcia in this chapter, there should be considerations for cognitive and doxastic aspects of racism including scripts, schemas, stereotypes, and ideas. I will turn to this issue by reference to the view of racism as ideology in the next chapter.

¹³⁰ This is because "for many of those who suffer injustice, 'private' attitudes are not the worst problem; systematic institutional subordination is" (Haslanger 2012, 335).

CHAPTER 4. CRITIQUING RACIST IDEOLOGY AS HARMFUL SOCIAL NORMS

4.1 Introduction

While the previous chapter deals with the volitional aspect of racism by reading Garcia, this chapter is concerned with non-volitional, doxastic, and cognitive aspects of racism. When civility is presented as a beneficial social norm, racist ideology is a harmful social norm. What, then, do we mean when we say that racism is an ideology? Ideology answers Wilhelm Reich's (and before him, Spinoza's) famous question: Why do the oppressed people not revolt against the oppressors? Ideology aims to explain the pervasive phenomena of voluntary servitude since the very point of it is that oppression is not recognized as such due to ideological effect. Ideology explains the persistence of harmful social arrangements. In this chapter, I will specifically consider ideology regarding racism. As Haslanger puts it, "Ideology ... is intended to function as an answer to the *explanatory* question: what explains persistent racial injustice?" (Haslanger 2017a, 8). In addition to its explanatory function, theorists argue that racist ideology has a negative cognitive impact on people in a pervasively racist society. The functional and the epistemic aspect of ideology are interconnected.

In what follows, I will argue that racist ideology should be understood in terms of racist social norms. While this view may not solve all problems in defining ideology, it better accounts for ideology's changeability. To this end, I will motivate my position by examining two existing accounts of ideology: those of Tommie Shelby and Sally Haslanger. First, I will begin by reconstructing Shelby's account of racism as ideology. After analyzing three dimensions of ideology (epistemic, genetic, and functional), I will argue that his view is too cognitivist. In this regard, like Appiah's, Shelby's view is doxastic in viewing that racist ideologies consist in

misguided beliefs. Rather, what is essential in ideology is its functional dimension. Here ideologies persist because they function to stabilize and reinforce the unjust status quo of subordination and oppression.¹³¹ Then I will turn to Haslanger's account of ideology as cultural technē. Her view is more functional than Shelby's since the former is based on the account of social practice and culture. While Haslanger is right about her critique of Shelby's cognitivist view of ideology, I argue that what she calls nonideal moral epistemology weakens her overall insight. The problem is that without considering how to intervene in concrete social mechanisms, merely knowing certain moral truths may not practically motivate subjects under ideologies. Taken together, both Shelby and Haslanger narrowly understand ideology in terms of epistemic deficiency. Even though Shelby and Haslanger deal with the discursive superstructure of ideology, both underestimate the functional substructure of ideology such as social and psychological motives, desires, and needs. In contrast, I will argue that ideology is better understood in terms of a racist social norm. This account is explanatorily superior to Shelby and Haslanger's views in its stress on the nonepistemic, nonmoral, and functional aspects of ideology. Furthermore, this conception of ideology I develop helps us better see the connection between ideology and social changes.

4.2 Shelby on Ideology: Epistemic, Genetic, and Functional

In what follows, I will show why racist ideology cannot be merely a matter of misrecognition, that is, false and irrational ideas concerning races. To this end, in this section, I will begin by reconstructing Tommie Shelby's account of racism as ideology.¹³² While ideology

¹³¹ "A functional explanation of a social institution or practice P with benefits B within a larger social system S has this structure: A given practice P persists within a society S because of the benefits B that it confers upon the society (social cohesion, stability, economic efficiency, outlet to antisocial behavior, etc)" (Little 1991, 94). On this functional explanation, ideologies persist because they stabilize existing social structures.

¹³² The issue at hand is what we mean when we say that racism is ideological. Surely, it might be argued that racism is at least partly ideology since the former is not entirely reducible to the latter; things other than ideology (such as institutions and public policies) can be racist. It is also possible to distinguish intrinsic and extrinsic institutional

may mean the nonevaluative idea of political doctrines or worldviews, Shelby's main interest lies in the evaluative notion of ideology as a critical concept. That is, what Shelby is interested in is a strong conception of ideology according to which "the fact that a system of thought is ideological is a *sufficient* reason to reject it" (Shelby 2003, 157). On what Shelby calls a form of social consciousness, ideology is seen as a sort of worldview accompanied with a coherent set of beliefs, which is widely accepted as the general outlook within a social group, significantly impacting social action as well as social practice (Shelby 2003, 158). Note that this sort of social consciousness can include things like black nationalism and cosmopolitanism. Insofar as this form of social consciousness does not need to involve any negative characteristics, ideology as a critical concept should be more than social consciousness. What makes social consciousness ideological is three properties: epistemic, genetic, and functional. Following Raymond Geuss (1981), Shelby articulates these three properties (Shelby 2003, 163-64). First, ideologies have epistemic properties insofar as they are false, distorting, and illusory. Second, concerning the etiology or history of ideas, ideologies have genetically negative features in that they are adopted because of some bad psychological origins such as the class interests. Third, ideologies have a certain social function or legitimating role of specific interests or social position. In a later paper, incorporating these three points, Shelby succinctly defines ideology: "*An ideology is a widely held set of loosely associated beliefs and implicit judgments that misrepresent significant social realities and that function, through this distortion, to bring about or perpetuate unjust social relations*" (Shelby 2014, 66).

Let me unpack this statement.

racism. On extrinsic institutional racism, an institution is extrinsically racist when it employs a policy which has a negative racial impact despite there is no racist beliefs for the part of the policymakers. In contrast, intrinsic institutional racism has some racist content as its constitutive features and goals, rather than its external effect (Shelby 2016, 24-26).

On this view, ideology is primarily a matter of beliefs. Despite its profound social impact, here ideology is fundamentally a system of widely accepted beliefs or a form of social consciousness. As noted in the previous chapter on Garcia, racist beliefs as such need not be originated from racist volitions or affections. On top of being beliefs, ideologies are seen as a kind of cognitive defect, distorting the social reality and thereby biasing individual agents' epistemological perspective. That is, ideology represents some sort of imaginary relationship of individuals to their social world (Althusser 2014), concealing real contradictions and taking certain false things to be true. For instance, in appealing to racial essence as an indicator of biological or cultural inferiority, racialism is one case of racist ideology. When it comes to culture, a straightforward version of ideological representations of antiblack racism would be like: "blacks are inherently lazy and therefore responsible for their poverty." But contrary to this ideological appearance, the social scientific research refutes this by revealing that the high rate of poverty of black people is not due to their inner characteristics such as laziness. Rather, it is due to structural and institutional factors which are beyond their control, such as racial segregation and discrimination (Anderson 2010; Shelby 2016). In this respect, ideology as illusion and misrepresentation contrasts with a scientific understanding of the social world.

Further, these cognitive defects need not be explicit all the time. Rather, due to its peculiar opaqueness, ideology can be held without full awareness. The truth of certain beliefs is distinguished from the way in which they are epistemically justified or warranted. This is the genetic or etiological aspect of ideology. In addition to the falsity of ideological representations, the fact that ideology involves false consciousness suggests that ideology is problematic since it is irrationally or unconsciously held because of bad epistemic reasons such as noncognitive interests (Shelby 2003, 170). That is, ideologies are problematic due to their "tainted origin" (Geuss 1981,

21). Even if some beliefs happen to be accidentally true, ideological beliefs are to be critiqued on the grounds that they are held because of some sort of motivated cognition or unconscious bias. In this sense, what matters in ideology critique is tracking the certain historical and causal origin of ideologies. For example, as Marx indicates, our epistemic standpoints are not free from certain class positions and related material conditions since consciousness is determined by life, not vice versa. This genetic aspect is also related to a tendency to resist revision when faced with any reasonable criticisms and objections. Indeed, as Jason Stanley says, ideological beliefs are epistemologically defective since “The distinctive feature of ideological belief is that it is very difficult to rationally revise in light of counter evidence” (Stanley 2015, 185).¹³³

This leads us to the functional aspect of ideology. Ideologies serve to establish and maintain unjust relations of domination. For instance, a classical version of the Marxist view is that ideologies promote dominant class interests (“cui bono?”). In this sense, the genuine foundation of society is the economic structure whereas ideology as a functional part of the superstructure is conditioned by the foundation. While certain politicians and ideologues deliberately utilize ideologies while not accepting them (or sincerely embracing them), this need not be always intentional and conscious.¹³⁴ Even if we do not accept this strong version of ideology as something like propaganda or conspiracy, ideology’s central feature is still how it functions to stabilize and reinforce the unjust status quo of subordination and oppression. Note that the illusory aspect and

¹³³ Regarding extrinsic racism, Appiah also raises a similar point: “An inability to change your mind in the face of appropriate evidence is a cognitive incapacity; but it is one that all of us surely suffer from in some areas of belief; especially in areas where our own interests or self-images are (or seem to be) at stake” (Appiah 1990, 8).

¹³⁴ I think that this is where Jason Stanley’s account of ideology as propaganda falls short. Since his focus is mainly on the ideology of elites, this view makes it difficult to see the structural mechanisms beyond individual’s manipulative intention. On top of that, his view underestimates the functional aspect of ideology in favor of the epistemic one. He is very explicit that his theoretical tools such as formal semantics, analytic epistemology, and social psychology are overtly nonpolitical (Stanley 2015, 219). After pointing out that material or political inequalities tend to bring about flawed ideology, he says that his focus is “not on a political or moral notion of flaw. It is on a purely epistemic notion of flaw” (Stanley 2015, 180).

the functional aspect of ideology are significantly interconnected. This point is worth stressing because Shelby thinks that not all ideas that maintain the unjust status quo are ideological. Moreover, the racist content of certain belief and its morally troubling function may not be the same thing. This is because “racist beliefs and implicit attitudes are not necessarily intrinsically wrong, but we are justified in objecting to them because they tend to create or reinforce unjust social hierarchies” (Shelby 2014, 70). For Shelby, racially false ideology can be racist in virtue of its function. For example, a paternalistic racist ideology, which is both illusory and oppressive, during the period of slavery in the United States constitutes the belief that “blacks are childlike and not fully autonomous.” Ideologies can be a functional part of our social reality by virtue of being illusionary representations of the social world through “legitimation, reification, or metaphysical mystification” (Shelby 2003, 177). In this regard, racist ideology is part of a larger looping effect (Hacking 1995; Mallon 2003) between harmful ideologies and other social mechanisms such as malicious stereotypes, institutional exclusion, exploitative practices, and the like.¹³⁵

Provided this view of racism as ideology, it is obvious to see that not every form of racism represents individual moral failings. I suggested this by critiquing Garcia’s view of racism as racial antipathy. Rather, insofar as there can be various ways in which racism appears, what is at stake is racism as a social system of oppression, which is epistemically supported by racist ideology. In contrast to Garcia, it is notable for Shelby that there can exist purely cognitive racism without any racially affective elements. Moreover, if there can be racist beliefs which need not be analyzed in terms of morality, they may be rather a matter of epistemic failings. In this respect, Shelby tries to

¹³⁵ Due to this functional stability and relative autonomy from the economic bases, it should be also noted that ideologies are not merely epiphenomenal. Haslanger has developed a similar idea with respect to the ideological formation. I will return to this topic later.

relax Lawrence Blum's moralistic definition of racism by broadening the scope of racism and thereby including racist beliefs that are not morally culpable but epistemically unwarranted (Shelby 2014, 65). Contrary to Blum and Garcia, Shelby's point also usefully shows that political philosophy concerning institutional arrangements should have theoretical primacy over personal morality.¹³⁶ While the charge of racism is a kind of moral condemnation, according to Shelby, this should be better understood when racism is located within the broader background of power relations and political dynamics. In short, with this background, he suggests that we consider racism to be ideology: "*Racism is a set of misleading beliefs and implicit attitudes about 'races' or race relations whose wide currency serves a hegemonic social function*" (Shelby 2014, 66).

4.3 Against Racism as Irrationality

What is notable in Shelby's definition of ideology is that for it to serve a hegemonic social function it should be misleading and distorting as well. That is, a belief that has a hegemonic function is racist when the belief is false. This is why Shelby considers "ideological belief to be the primary object of ideology-critique, treating talk of 'ideological practice' as a derivative usage" (Shelby 2003, 157). Contrary to this view, I think that Shelby should have emphasized the functional aspect of ideology, which concerns the stability of ideology over time. Recall the central question about ideology: why do ideologies *persist* despite the modernization of the worldviews? One idealist answer to this question attributes it to individual ignorance, irrationality, and faulty reasoning (Shelby 2003, 184; Appiah 1990). Here it is assumed that real racists would exhibit "a systematically distorted rationality" (Appiah 1990, 8). Indeed, since Marx identifies ideology as irrationality (the illusionary image of camera obscura), it has been commonly argued that racism

¹³⁶ As I discussed in chapter 2, this parallels his positive endorsement of Rawlsian basic structure of society against critics.

is inherently irrational. For instance, Michael Dummett says that “No one can rationally think that the great majority of members of any racial group are intellectually or artistically inferior to the great majority of members of some other group” (Dummett 2004, 29). He thinks that racism is more irrational than other hostilities between groups concerning politics or religion to the extent that one cannot change one’s race unlike political belief or religion. Thus, he concludes: “Racist attitudes are almost always backed by wildly erroneous beliefs about the Others as a group” (Dummett 2004, 31). If so, racism should be rejected because racist beliefs are erroneously sustained by stereotyping, category mistakes, overgeneralization, equivocation, false dichotomy, and inconsistencies (Goldberg 1990; Shelby 2003).¹³⁷

I argue that we need to see the functionality of racist ideologies, rather than making them necessarily dependent upon their irrationality. For instance, Shelby writes: “Regardless of what other troublesome features a set of beliefs may have, if we think the beliefs are nevertheless true or sufficiently warranted, then, surely we must accept them” (Shelby 2003, 165). For a belief to be racist, on his view, it should be false, in addition to wrongful social functions. Before proceeding to Haslanger’s view in the next section, note that it can be misleading to assume that racism is inherently and necessarily irrational, not to mention the polysemy of rationality itself. For rationality as a contested concept is not a necessary component of functionality. In critiquing Shelby’s view, my point is not to rationalize or legitimate racism but to see how racism is cognitively maintained and legitimated via ideology. Though racism usually involves racist beliefs concerning racial differences as unchangeable and inevitable, what practically matters is the

¹³⁷ In a similar vein, Stanley says that “Some flawed ideologies will be democratically problematic, because they lead to widespread theoretical irrationality, which typically results in failure to track one’s own interests” (Stanley 2015, 216). Given that “it is epistemology that ultimately lies at the center of the theory of ideology” (Stanley 2015, 264), he argues that “[ideology’s] moral and political flaws are a consequence of these epistemological defects” (Stanley 2015, 198).

function of racist beliefs, rather than their truth condition. It might be also argued that even ideological beliefs that are true but dysfunctional can exist. Insofar as racism is primarily about domination based on differing racial ascription, it need not involve a very rational and coherent set of racist beliefs. Thus, it does not follow that there need be a close connection between falsity and oppressive function for something to count as ideology. Shelby's point is that being cognitively distortive is a necessary condition of racism. By contrast, my point is that beliefs, whether true or false, can have a hegemonic social function. Racism is not simply limited to a few irrational anomalies; this implies that a mere critique of racist belief would not abolish the racist practices as a whole.

Allow me to elaborate. Categorizing to reduce complexity in the social and natural world and heuristics for processing information both seem to be unavoidable as means of human social cognition. Hence, it is unclear whether stereotyping itself counts as irrational. Surely, stereotyping can be inaccurate and erroneous, if not efficient. Yet, our focus should be against a bad kind of stereotyping, since there can be neutral and innocuous kinds of grouping and classification of social groups. As David Goldberg argues, "Interpreted as statistical generalizations across phenotypes, 'race' may be viably employed as a taxonomic unit, though with limited scope.... determination of racial membership by ancestry is not necessarily racist in conception" (Goldberg 1990, 374). A similar thing can be said about overgeneralization inherent in racism. As Dummett says, racism ignores individual differences within intragroup members and thereby commits factual errors. But if this is no more than "probability estimates of different group trait characteristics" (Goldberg 1990, 376), this kind of social cognition is not necessarily irrational since it allows some degree of exception while holding on to the generalization. For instance, to the extent that racist logic can allow room for inconsistencies, "There need be nothing irrational

in believing that Jews, in general, are stingy while admitting that one's close Jewish friends are generous" (Goldberg 1990, 380).

Likewise, there can be a sort of open-ended generalization, which may be called roughly true, if not fully true. Think of generics such as "Boys don't cry" and "Birds fly." Surely not all birds fly. But since generics do not use quantifiers like 'some' or 'all', they are not simply rejected in a manner of quantified statements.¹³⁸ For instance, while the negation of "all birds fly" would be "some birds don't fly," this is not how generics work because "birds fly" is compatible with "some birds don't fly." Moreover, the generic is understood in light of our assumption that flying is a part of birds' essential nature and birds that cannot fly are defective and anomalous (and perhaps should be avoided). If what is normal can mean both a statistical and normative concept, generics tend to be ideological by implicating a remarkable connection between "statistical regularities, claims about natures, and claims about norms" (Haslanger 2014, 367).¹³⁹ Consider generic statements like "Women are more nurturing than men" or "Blacks are criminals." In invoking and repeating a wrongful association between blacks and criminality, generics cue and strengthen racist ideology. In this way, generics make us implicitly infer that what is natural is also what is normative or how things should be. This shows why generics are problematic and misleading: they replace the question of social and historical positions with that of transhistorical nature. However, given our psychological tendencies of essentialization, calling something natural

¹³⁸ For instance, Donald Trump said in his 2015 presidential announcement speech that "When Mexico sends its people, they're not sending their best. [...] They're bringing crime. They're rapists. And some, I assume, are good people." As to "boys don't cry," "The term 'boys' may have as its semantic value either ideal boys, or the set of ordinary boys. Thus, considering only the set of ideal boys, the generalization is true, even if it is false when considering all boys" (Haslanger 2014, 378).

¹³⁹ Haslanger draws on Sarah-Jane Leslie to classify four types of generics: characteristic generics ("birds lay eggs"), striking property generics ("mosquitoes carry the West Nile virus"), statistical generics ("tigers have stripes"), and normative generics ("a woman puts family before her career") (Haslanger 2014, 371-72). The structure of conversational implicature and the pragmatics are also important to understand the ideological function of racist slurs (Swanson forthcoming). Rebecca Kulka also connects slurs, which are derogating and subordinating, to generics such as "Thug," "Slut," and "Illegals" (Kukla 2018).

or normal does not automatically show its irrationality, not to mention its immorality. That is, even though many generics are indeed harmful, it is debatable whether generics *as such* are to be blamed. Rather, certain stereotypes and heuristics are at least innocuous. Despite their connections to stereotyping, it may be possible to re-appropriate generics about social groups for valuable objectives such as fostering solidarity.

For this reason, it is not the case that we can just resolve or explain away this issue by identifying racism with irrationalism. For Shelby, ideological beliefs are irrational since they are cognitively distortive. But if many people are actually racist, it is hard to see how they are so irrational. As Shelby notes, if “the locus of ideology is common sense, that reservoir of background assumptions that agents draw on spontaneously as they engage in social intercourse” (Shelby 2014, 67), there must be something rational, at least in the prudential sense, and ordinary in ideologies, including even racist ones. A more plausible position is to think that when people seem to act irrationally, this is exceptional rather than normal. In this sense, ideologies are part of forms of life. However, as Haslanger says, “universal norms of rationality will only in rare cases be sufficient to adjudicate between different forms of life” (Haslanger 2017b, 164). The point is that the task of determining the correct notion of rationality is far from clear and this difficulty is aggravated by the existence of diverse forms of life.

As an alternative, Shelby argues that “The social critique of ideology combines epistemic evaluation, moral assessment, and social-scientific analysis, and serves as the foundation for a distinctive type of social criticism, sometimes called ‘critical theory’” (Shelby 2014, 68).¹⁴⁰ In principle, there is no reason to object to this pluralistic approach toward the social critique of ideology. Yet it is unclear how Shelby’s position differs from the idealist answer he hopes to reject.

¹⁴⁰ It is also notable that his main framework for moral assessment is Rawlsian liberal egalitarianism. Since I dealt with the problems of Shelby’s Rawlsian framework in chapter 2, I would focus on his cognitivist aspect of ideology.

For instance, consider his assertion that “were the cognitive failings of an ideology to become widely recognized and acknowledged, the relations of domination and exploitation that it serves to reinforce would, other things being equal, become less stable and perhaps even amenable to reform” (Shelby 2003, 174). If Shelby is right, then one possible corrective to the falsifying aspect of racist ideologies is to enlighten the deceived people, providing them with correct scientific information. Surely, ideology critique must involve tools for debunking falsities or unmasking concealed social truths. However, a sort of consciousness raising is necessary but not sufficient.¹⁴¹ Against this, I will argue that we should emphasize the functional aspect of ideology more.

4.4 Haslanger on Ideology: Cultural Technēs

In this section, I will examine Haslanger’s account of ideology. Sally Haslanger sympathetically builds her theory of ideology on Shelby’s initial account. Whereas on Shelby view ideologies are fundamentally propositional, for Haslanger, the explanatory framework for ideology should be less cognitivist and more expansive. Although I largely concur with Haslanger’s critique of Shelby’s cognitivist account of ideology, in the end, I will argue that it falls short of proper ideology critique. While Haslanger is right that social movements against racism are a viable solution, her appeal to nonideal moral epistemology do not solve the issue.

According to Haslanger, while Shelby is too optimistic about the power of scientific and philosophical inquiry over ideology, “‘successful’ ideology isn’t always false. (This is, in fact, how we often end up forming the ‘ideological’ beliefs in question – we look around us” (Haslanger 2017a, 4). This position not only makes ideology something true-like, but it also implies that what others do and expect from us is significant. For instance, we learn about racist ideology and

¹⁴¹ I will return to this point in chapter 5 regarding contentious activities in social movements.

associated behavioral norms by simply looking around us.¹⁴² As Simon de Beauvoir puts it, “The American White relegates the Black to the rank of shoeshine boy; and he concludes from this that the Black is good for nothing but shining shoes” (Beauvoir 1972, xxx). The point is that social knowledge and the social reality it represents are interdependent such that “ideology (sometimes) makes itself true” (Haslanger 2020, 16). When such racist norms and racist ideology mirror each other to some degree, reasoned dialogue by itself is far from sufficient to critique, or to dislodge racist ideology. If so, then contrary to Shelby’s view, “it is not even clear how teaching people the biology of race and a liberal theory of justice will dislodge implicit bias” (Haslanger 2017a, 5). The cognitivist view of ideology, which focuses on explicit beliefs and shared judgments, is inadequate to consider non-propositional or sub-doxastic elements of ideology such as implicit racial bias.¹⁴³ Such elements in ideology do not represent or misrepresent the world in any truth-conducive way. If so, in addition to reasoned debate, the conception of ideology should be expanded to include various attitudes, dispositions, and habits of our minds. This is what Shelby’s account is lacking.

If ideologies are not limited to shared cognitive failings and ideology critique does not solely consist in showing the irrationality of shared beliefs, then we need a different, less cognitivist perspective. In this respect, what is needed is a broadened account of the components

¹⁴² Susanna Siegel expresses this point by stipulating what she calls culturally normal belief. There are three components to racialized attitudes: “a culturally entrenched presumption that P, an individual who causally absorbs this presumption, and a conflicted sense that while such absorption in general seems epistemically innocuous ..., the end result seems epistemically suspect” (Siegel forthcoming, 2). In this case, she argues that the ill-foundedness of a racial attitude is transmitted from the social-level to individuals via testimony. For instance, the presumption that ‘the black man is only fit for slavery’ is “not prevalent because it is tracking the truth about human beings, or because it is the product of discoveries made (as Newton’s and Euler’s were) using methods that lead to well-founded beliefs. It became socially normal to believe that water from faucets was safe to drink, and it was socially normal under slavery to believe that blacks were only fit to be slaves. Social normality is a poor guide to well-foundedness” (Siegel forthcoming, 21).

¹⁴³ Tamar Gendler’s notion of alief as a new kind of mental state suggests that our schemas are not just narrowly cognitive but also motivational and emotional (Gendler 2008). As it is evident in the case of the glass skywalk over the Grand Canyon, alief is resistant to rational revision. The sociological theory in Haslanger’s view is also indebted to Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of habits and dispositions in the social practices.

of culturally shaped ideologies. As Haslanger says, “ideology is not primarily a psychological phenomenon, but is also a cultural one; therefore, a change of culture, and not just a change of individual attitudes, is required to achieve social justice” (Haslanger 2017a, 7). Rather than beginning from discrete individual minds, the starting point of ideology critique is now located in various social practices which are “collective solutions to coordination or access problems with respect to a *resource*” (Haslanger 2017c, 20).¹⁴⁴ Various cultural schema can be embodied or instantiated in the relevant material resources. For instance: “the schema of two sex categories is manifested in the design and labeling of toilet facilities” (Haslanger 2012, 415).¹⁴⁵ In turn, those resources function to stabilize and reproduce the very schema of binary genders.

According to Haslanger’s practice-first approach, while culture and material resources interact with each other in a sort of looping effect, social practices are dependent upon ideology to practically orient individual agents. That is, ideologies should be understood as cultural schemas which are “clusters of culturally shared mental states and processes, including concepts, attitudes, dispositions, and such, that enable us to interpret and organize information and coordinate action, thought, and affect” (Haslanger 2017c, 21).¹⁴⁶ Even though ideology is something that is learned through socialization, “in learning an ideology, we don’t just form a set of beliefs; there is a sense

¹⁴⁴ Here the concept of resources is very broadly construed: “things of all sorts – human, nonhuman, animate, or not – that are taken to have some (positive or negative) value (practical, moral, aesthetic, religious, etc). Valuable resources are a source of power” (Haslanger 2017c, 21-22). On this view, culture largely shapes our perspectives on what is valuable.

¹⁴⁵ Most of us unreflectively endorse this scheme of binary gender. Haslanger offers another example of the looping effect: “The material world reinforces our tutored dispositions: QWERTY keyboards reinforce our QWERTY dispositions, but our entrenched QWERTY dispositions are responsible for the ongoing production of QWERTY keyboards. Racial classification reinforces racial segregation, which reinforces racial identity, which reinforces racial classification” (Haslanger 2014, 391).

¹⁴⁶ She develops this concept of schemas from social historian William Sewell, who in turn borrows his model from Anthony Giddens. In social psychology, schemas, being mental and social, are broadly about organizing an individual’s thought like heuristics (Haslanger 2012, 414-15).

Rahel Jaeggi similarly stresses schemas’ hermeneutical role: “ideologies constitute our relation to the world and thus determine the horizons of our interpretation of the world, or the framework in which we understand both ourselves and the social conditions, and also the way we operate within those conditions” (Jaeggi 2008, 64).

in which we learn a form of life” (Haslanger 2017c, 38). That is, ideology is about the lived experience of social agents who spontaneously see the surrounding social world as natural and normal.¹⁴⁷ For instance, consider the division of labor in the family. Under sexist ideology, the gendered division of labor appears as inevitable, natural, and normal. For this division to work, sophisticated propositional knowledge of the inferiority of women is not required. Rather, unconscious and habitual conformity to certain cultural schemas as know-how is enough to sustain practices of caring labor and housework.¹⁴⁸ As Haslanger writes, “Living together requires social fluency, skills for interpretation, interaction and coordination that we exercise ‘unthinkingly’” (Haslanger 2017b, 158). Cultural schemas provide social agents with the tools for a degree of regularity and patterns of actions. Thus, “Although schemas are variable and evolve across time and context, their elements are sticky and resist epistemic updating” (Haslanger 2017c, 21). Given the centrality of social practices over individual action, reasoned advice concerning particular actions may miss the point. As Haslanger writes,

Insofar as my action is called for by a practice, the pros and cons of this particular choice to act are set aside.... And because we are typically fluent, ‘unthinking,’ in the social practices of our milieu... what is missing from the cognitivist account is how these attitudes are connected to our unthinking responses, our bodily comportment, the social and material realities that constitute our milieu (Haslanger 2017a, 13).

The point is that while there is some room for rational revision in social practices, much of our social practices are implicit, opaque, informal, and unintended. This is not to deny that there are some rationalizable potentials of social practices, but to call for perceptual, conative, and affective shifts in cognition as well. Given that it is very hard for an individual to change

¹⁴⁷ Again, this topic of reification has been predominant in German critical theory tradition since Marx. Because of reification, “something socially ‘made’ is imagined to be something naturally or irreducibly ‘given’” (Jaeggi 2008, 65).

¹⁴⁸ As Blaise Pascal says and Althusser (2014) famously cites him, “Kneel down, move your lips in prayer, and you will believe.”

entrenched practice, the central task of ideology critique is to collectively change problematic cultural schemas. Here Haslanger argues that: “broad social change requires change on multiple levels: change to agents, change to culture, and change to structures, policies, and laws” (Haslanger 2017a, 15).

When it comes to Shelby’s stipulation of racism as ideology, it is notable that explaining the persistence of racism by reference to racism as ideology is circular. Even if ideologies are oppressive, not all oppressive relations are ideological. Instead of ideological state apparatuses (ISAs), consider what Louis Althusser (2014) calls repressive state apparatuses (RSAs) such as army and prisons, which work through merely coercive measures. While ideological oppression and repressive oppression usually go hand in hand, the point is that there are instances of racism, which are not necessarily explicable in terms of racist ideology. To avoid the danger of merely begging the question of persisting racism, there should be distinctions between explanandum and explanans. In this vein, insofar as ideology is part of the larger web of social practices, Haslanger proposes that we think of racism as ideological formations, rather than an ideology per se. By ideological formations, she means “The unjust practices, institutions, behavior, and other artifacts guided or formed by an ideology are ideological formations” (Haslanger 2017a, 16).¹⁴⁹ In turn, racism as ideological formations is connected to “an interconnected web of unjust social *practices* that unjustly disadvantage certain groups, such as residential segregation, police brutality, biased hiring and wage inequity, and educational disadvantage” (Haslanger 2017a, 16-17). An advantage of this view is that it sees racial inequality as a systematic phenomenon which can be characterized by dynamic homeostasis (Mallon 2003). As dynamic homeostasis, ideological formation is stable

¹⁴⁹ Elsewhere, she defines social structure as “a general category of social phenomena, including, for example, social institutions, social practices and conventions, social roles, social hierarchies, social locations or geographies, and the like” (Haslanger 2012, 413).

enough to reproduce but changeable at the same time. For Haslanger, conceiving ideology in terms of culture is decisive since culture is a site of transformation as well as reproduction. If ideology is one causal factor in the complex of social mechanisms, Haslanger's definition of racism as ideological formation may be useful to consider it to be dependent upon other factors such as material resources. So, her account of ideology is "materialist because the source and structure of a discursive/conceptual frame depends on the complex network of social relations that organizes our relationship to things of (assumed) value" (Haslanger 2017c, 25). This is also consistent with the reason why I favor the functionalist approach of ideology over the epistemic one.

While I agree that social movements are valuable in critiquing ideologies, I think that she steps back from her insight when appealing to epistemology of moral truths. To see this, it is important to note that Haslanger draws on what she calls nonideal moral epistemology to motivate social movements and thereby critiquing ideology. Even though it is inevitable to detour any normative theory of morality to critique ideology, she argues against ideal theories because "it is not necessary to *know what justice is*, or have a complete moral theory, to engage in critique" (Haslanger 2017c, 41). For the sake of the argument, Haslanger introduces two assumptions. One assumption is that we are reliably capable of having basic knowledge of the good and justice.¹⁵⁰ Her presuppositions of non-relative moral truths are, among others, that slavery, genocide, and rape are morally wrong.¹⁵¹ Another assumption is that moral knowledge is gained through interactions with others.¹⁵² For instance, we learn that slavery is wrong from others. Similar to standpoint epistemologies, taken together, Haslanger suggests a kind of epistemic humility: "we

¹⁵⁰ She seems to hold on to this position when she recently writes: "In my own experience, what appears to be moral disagreement is often based on empirical disagreements, and fundamental moral disagreement is rather rare" (Haslanger 2020, 118)

¹⁵¹ As I will show regarding the abolition of slavery in chapter 5, note that even these are not accepted as a moral truth in all cultures, especially historically.

¹⁵² I will deal with this issue of moral learning via social movement in chapter 5 in detail.

should listen to those directly affected by the practices in question because they are likely to have better access to morally relevant facts” (Haslanger 2017b, 166).¹⁵³

In light of this nonideal moral epistemology, Haslanger ultimately defends social movements as a paradigm case of contentious politics, thereby disrupting the very social practices in which we inhabit: “not by offering reasons, nor by rational discussion, but by queering our language, playing with meanings, and monkey-wrenching or otherwise shifting the material conditions that support our tutored dispositions” (Haslanger 2017a, 10). In sum, drawing on Elizabeth Anderson’s pragmatist view of moral progress, which I will discuss in chapter 5, Haslanger favors radical moral changes: “A crucial step in disrupting ideology is to create experiential breaks that allow for (and often depend on) the creation of new and potentially emancipatory concepts and other tools for thinking, feeling, and acting” (Haslanger 2017a, 11).

4.5 Haslanger’s Ambiguity

While I largely agree with her proposal, there are unresolved issues with Haslanger’s view. First, it is unclear whether this introduction of nonideal moral epistemology actually helps her theory of ideology. If the point of ideology is to turn the actuality of voluntary servitude into the appearance of non-servitude and to prevent the oppressed from recognizing the oppression, is it viable to appeal to some obvious moral truths to critique ideology? Granted, we need not have a complete theory of justice for social critique. Nonetheless, the idea of moral truths can be controversial insofar as there may be a reasonable but substantial degree of disagreement concerning what counts as ideological, especially if such moral truths are not about gross injustices like slavery, genocide, and rape. For example, as I argued in chapter 2, the case of undermining

¹⁵³ Mills expresses this idea citing black activist James Weldon Johnson: “colored people of this country know and understand the white people better than the white people know and understand them” (Mills 2017b, 53).

self-respect, which is reducible to neither racist oppression nor racial injustice, is more nuanced than those clear-cut cases. Haslanger's suggestion of epistemic humility may not help either because the very point of ideology is that the oppressed do *not* necessarily perceive the moral wrong better than others do.¹⁵⁴ Trying to resolve the problem of ideology by referencing standpoint epistemology (listening to "those directly affected by the practices in question") only pushes back the initial question if there is no privileged epistemic position for ideology critique in the first place. Even if one has to avoid a moral skepticism and have normative resources for ideology critique (Haslanger 2020, 116), such a privileged epistemic position, if any, should be achieved, rather than presumed.

Even if those who are oppressed are likely to have some epistemic advantages over the oppressor, there is no a priori guarantee of epistemic privilege. Given this danger of circularity, the epistemic position of the oppressed by itself does not secure the epistemic privilege. When Charles Mills formulates the notion of white ignorance as a group-based cognitive handicap, note that he is quick to add that "white ignorance is not infeasible" (Mills 2017b, 58). As he writes:

the 'white' in 'white ignorance' does not mean that it has to be confined to white people. Indeed ... it will often be shared by nonwhites to a greater or lesser extent because of the power relations and patterns of ideological hegemony involved (This is a familiar point from the Marxist and feminist traditions – working-class conservatives, 'male-identified' women, endorsing right-wing and sexist ideologies against their interests.) (Mills 2007, 22).

For Haslanger's moral epistemology to work, the scope of ideology should be very narrow. As a result, in relying on some putative moral truths, it is difficult to see how Haslanger's position ultimately differs from Shelby's cognitivist view. In her earlier paper "But Mom, Crop-Tops are

¹⁵⁴ As she admits, ideology explains why a variety of oppression in Iris Young's definition persists. The list of oppression includes "economic injustice and exploitation ... systematic violence (domestic violence, sexual violence, police brutality), marginalization, powerlessness, cultural imperialism" (Haslanger 2017c, 11). But as Jaeggi points out, "Even if some social actors profit from ideologies in a variety of ways, an ideological structure is still something that affects all sides" (Jaeggi 2008, 68).

Cute! Social Knowledge, Social Structure, and Ideology Critique,” Haslanger deals with this problem of moral epistemology. Consider the following dialogue. While Daughter says “crop-tops are cute; and I don’t want be a dork,” Parents reply that “Crop-tops are too revealing.... Crop-tops *are not* cute” (Haslanger 2012, 408). One may suggest that crop-tops are cute according to the daughter while they are not cute according to parents. But this disagreement over fashion norms is not resolved by saying that it is simply a matter of subjective and aesthetic taste. Rather, for Parents, who are constrained by parental norms, the issue is critiquing the very social framework that constitutes the meaning of cute/dork. Note that Parents and Daughter belong to different social milieus with different social knowledge. One suggestion is to expose Daughter to an alternative social milieu than her own, thereby broadening her perspective and destabilizing it. Yet, this may not be sufficient. Drawing on the common ground between different social positions, Haslanger’s proposes:

To say that a critique is genuine ... is not to say that it is the final word; rather, it is to say that a response is called for.... For Parents to have a critique of Daughter’s choices, they should offer more than a flat denial of her claim relative to their milieu; it is their responsibility to seek common ground from which Daughter can assess their critique. If Parents can find common ground with Daughter and their claim that crop-tops are not cute is true relative to that common ground, then because Daughter shares that ground, she must address Parent’s concern; hopefully, the two sides will continue to engage until they reach a mutually acceptable common ground (Haslanger 2012, 425).

While it is unobjectionable to think that genuine ideology critique rests on some kind of common ground, it is far from clear whether we can achieve ideology critique by forming a common milieu. Especially when common ground is symmetrical between conflicting positions, there should be further criteria for favoring certain normative stances at some point. Even though Haslanger suggests formal criteria for a superior common ground, such as the absence of coercion or violence (Haslanger 2012, 426), this is too narrow to be a substantial guide. Note that the point

of ideology is to make de facto coercion or violence de jure consent. In the case of crop-tops, the cuteness of them, as dictated by relevant social groups, is the very point of discrepancy and incommensurability. Which view is emancipatory, rather than illusory? Daughter might argue that crop-tops can be empowering, rather than oppressive. Even if Parents are right, how can they convince Daughter? It seems that Daughter and Parents have fundamentally irreconcilable interests. In this case, we are back to the issue of nonideal moral epistemology.

This appeal to the nonideal moral epistemology is also reflected in the fact that Haslanger remains ambiguous about the normative features of ideology. When critiquing Shelby's cognitivist account of ideology, recall that Haslanger defines ideology as a subset of cultural *technēs*. Note that in Haslanger's view, ideology is deemed as descriptive, normatively neutral, and less pejorative, since culture as such is mostly inescapable and not necessarily subordinating. Even though she believes that a sociopolitical dimension of ideology critique is indispensable, ideology as cultural *technēs* need not be necessarily morally problematic or just. As she admits, "we cannot live together without ideologies to guide us. Although some ideologies are pernicious and partly constitute unjust social structures, improved ideologies are crucial in order to achieve social justice" (Haslanger 2014, 386).¹⁵⁵ Clearly, she wants to "avoid normative overreach" (Haslanger 2017b, 192) since a moral critique may be too abstract or inefficacious.

At the same time, she is explicit that ideology is "a cultural *technē* gone wrong" (Haslanger 2017b, 159). Haslanger writes: "Some *technēs* ... sustain, good and just forms of coordination. Ideologies, however, are *technēs* that produce or sustain injustice by guiding us to enact unjust

¹⁵⁵ Shelby also considers something like counter-ideology as the ideology of oppressed groups: "sometimes a subordinate group will embrace aspects of an existing ideology, discard many of its illusory elements, and then use it for emancipatory purposes, by, for example, calling for an end to exploitation and domination in all its forms. Such forms of consciousness are *not* appropriately thought of as ideology, despite their ideological origins" (Shelby 2003, 180).

practices. If racism is an ideology, in this sense, then it partly constitutes social practices that give people reason to act in racist ways” (Haslanger 2017a, 16). This is because “human coordination is, in principle, valuable; we also know that not all forms of human coordination are morally acceptable” (Haslanger 2017c, 46). A cultural *technē* becomes ideological by virtue of its unjust outcomes, which are to be evaluated according to some theory of justice and morality (Haslanger 2017c, 39).

At this point, Haslanger moves back and forth between these two positions. It may be that whether a cultural *technē* as a set of social meanings is ideological or not depend on context. To determine whether cultural *technē* is ideological, in any case, Haslanger must appeal to her version of nonideal moral epistemology (“a mutually acceptable common ground”), which is dubious. Though she convincingly argues against Shelby’s cognitivist view of racist ideology, it is unclear how Haslanger’s account better connects the cognitive dimension and the functional dimension of ideology, simply by adopting different terms such as epistemic dimension and normative dimension (or reasoning and valuing) of ideology.

4.6 Ideology as Harmful Social Norms

Though I find the materialist view of ideology as ideological formation unobjectionable, Haslanger’s insight should be pushed more. Especially, her pragmatic conception of ideology as cultural *technēs* should be developed further, rather than simply appealing to alleged moral truths. In a similar vein of pragmatism, I reject absolutist and monist approaches in ideology critique in favor of contextual and pluralist approaches. To the extent that what matters in ideology is our ordinary social interaction, we should be cautious about the supposed privilege and authority of critical theorists who may be too paternalistic and uncharitable toward their subjects. Since it is implausible to suppose that we live under the spell of ideology as an inescapable and total illusion,

we must give due respect for the basic epistemic competence of the oppressed.¹⁵⁶ Moreover, even disengaged philosophers and social critics are not immune from ideology. A relevant point of critical theory would be that despite the gap between the standpoint of third-person observers/critics and first-person participants, these standpoints should be properly mediated in the task of social critique. Whereas critique and its object are kept separate in traditional theory, ideology critique in critical theory should be reflexive, immanent, and self-referential (Ng 2015; Geuss 1981). If we are not merely passive victims of ideology, then there must be some already-existing resources in the social actors' ordinary experiences and self-understanding to critique ideology. But this should not commit to the status quo. Instead, what we need is a critique without authoritarianism. In critiquing ideology, we require "the practice of critique without presupposing a privileged epistemic position and a break with ordinary practices of justification" (Celikates 2006a, 35).¹⁵⁷ When a single ideology cannot be thoroughly hegemonic and may involve differing presuppositions, the point is that ideology critique should be immanent, revealing inconsistencies, disharmonies, and paradoxes within a particular ideology, without appealing to an external standpoint.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁶ Drawing on Stuart Hall, Haslanger also raises this point by saying that we are not 'judgmental dopes' (Haslanger 2017c, 15). In a similar vein, in ideology critique, we should take Donald Davidson's principle of charity seriously: "all interpretations are constrained by a principle of charity. The best interpretation is the one that ascribes the most reasonable set of beliefs to that person, which is to say, the one that maximizes the number of true beliefs the person is thought to hold" (Heath 2000, 364). A good example of this would be anthropologists' effort to interpret so-called "pre-logical" culture as reasonable as much as possible from the native's perspective. For the view of ideology as a cultural system, see Geertz 2000, especially chapter 8.

¹⁵⁷ Although what Celikates has in mind in this passage is about social critics, I think that a similar thing can be said about the standpoint of the oppressed. This is also the point of what is known as "Mannheim's paradox," according to which there seems to be no neutral point of view which is not ideological in critiquing ideology. This is because a sociology of knowledge can lead to a totalizing form of the suspicion of ideology. If so, the interpretive nature of ideology suggests that it is difficult to achieve a neutral and scientific view against ideology. Celikates's pragmatic view is consistent with Haslanger's emphasis on the practice: "the primacy of practice, of the agent's perspective and her self-understanding over the standpoint of science or theory that claims the privilege of detachment" (Celikates 2006a, 21).

The need for a non-authoritarian model of justification as an immanent critique is a common theme in Frankfurt critical theory (Cooke 2006; Ng 2015; Prinz and Rossi 2017).

¹⁵⁸ Jaeggi writes: "the critique of ideology sets out the inner inconsistencies of a given situation from the *internal contradictions* or self-contradictions. Thus, it does not immediately counter something that is wrong with what is

Of course, ideology critique in Shelby or Haslanger's manners is a valuable task. Yet, we should bear in mind that ideology critique is always already embedded in various sociocultural mechanisms. While I think that Haslanger's view of racism as ideological formation vaguely captures this point, she lacks a more detailed account. Whether it be fixing cognitive failings (Shelby) or relying on moral epistemology (Haslanger), knowing epistemic or moral truth does not by itself overcome ideology. Ideologies are not simply negative and constraining but also positive and enabling. In this regard, I stress the ambivalence of ideology as such and its instrumentality.

On my view, Haslanger seems to underestimate a paradox that ideologies are simultaneously normative and functional (Jaeggi 2008; Prinz and Rossi 2017). As Rahel Jaeggi writes, when we say that ideologies suffer from a practical contradiction, it is "characterized by the fact that the obstacles or crises that are part of it are normatively problematic in both senses: something does not work (well), and the way it works is not good" (Jaeggi 2008, 78). While some ideologies can be moral, they may not work well. Conversely, other ideologies may be functional while being immoral.¹⁵⁹ The point is that the normative ("the way it works is not good") and the functional component ("something does not work well") are closely interconnected in the case of successful ideologies. While ideology critique is normatively significant, it should not be normativistic and moralistic such that it appeals to some abstract ought as external normative criteria.¹⁶⁰ A moralistic understanding of ideology is not feasible since it ignores the ways in which

'right' and it does not apply an external standard to a given situation" (Jaeggi 2008, 65). Celikates concurs with her view that "Social arrangements can therefore never totally immunize themselves against critique; they can only afford a certain amount of ideological closure... Ideologies are always heterogeneous and operate locally, even if they present themselves as totalities without an outside" (Celikates 2006a, 35).

¹⁵⁹ "It seems entirely possible that something (a rule for example) has a function without there being any normative reason to conform with it" (Guala 2016, 74).

¹⁶⁰ See Hans Sluga's definition of normativism: "The normativist believes it possible to move from context-bound, personal, local political judgments to unconditional philosophical truths" (Sluga 2014, 17). On Sluga's realist view,

ideologies do not include immoral elements while supporting domination and oppression. Alternatively, certain ideologies can be mobilized to promote morally admirable aims since, as Haslanger herself passingly admits, “improved ideologies are crucial in order to achieve social justice” (Haslanger 2014, 386). Given this ambivalence of ideologies, rather than focusing on ideology critique by reference to external epistemic or moral truths, my point is that we need both analysis *and* critique as an immanent critique of ideology.¹⁶¹ Ever since Aristotle, it may be only trivially true that “inequalities, even material inequalities, give rise to flawed ideological beliefs” (Stanley 2015, 216). To capture the processes of socialization and transmission of ideology, however, what is at stake is understanding the causal mechanisms of ideology, rather than simply drawing on moral intuitions about it.¹⁶²

In the remainder of this chapter, I will illustrate this point in reference to social norms. In my view, the ambivalence of ideology would be better and more simply understood when ideology is considered in terms of harmful social norms. In doing so, I will argue that her nonideal moral epistemology should give a way to strategic and pragmatic considerations of collective action concerning individual and group interests. Before demonstrating my disagreement, let me first note that I take Haslanger’s view of ideology, which I largely agree with, to be consistent with the

it is implausible to suppose an unconditional, invariable, and ultimate validity of general political principles, which are abstracted from actual political life.

¹⁶¹ Jaeggi helpfully elaborates five traits of immanent critique as follows: 1) “immanent critique takes norms that are *inherent to an existing (social) situation* as its starting point.” 2) “immanent critique obviously does not follow the typical argumentation pattern of internal (or hermeneutic-reconstructive) critique, namely, to claim that a community has lost touch with its ideals” 3) “immanent critique, therefore, focuses on the *internal inconsistency* of reality itself and of the norms that constitute it” 4) “immanent critique is also *transformative*” 5) “this necessary transformation ... involves both the deficient reality and the norms themselves” (Jaeggi 2008, 75-76).

Similarly, against an Althusserian thesis that the practice of public recognition is always ideological, Honneth argues that the concept of recognition is not necessarily subordinating but emancipatory as a public display of value in critiquing practices of degradation, disrespect, and humiliation (Honneth 2007).

¹⁶² Sankaran raises a similar complaint: “contemporary adopters of the ‘critical theory’ mantle – including the New Ideology Critics – almost totally ignore relevant literature in economics, political science, psychology, and anthropology... a theory of ‘progressive’ or ‘emancipatory’ social change requires a well-supported causal story about how such change has happened in the past” (Sankaran 2020, 1456).

view of social norms I defend. Indeed, one of her examples of cultural *technēs* concerns traffic laws and norms (Haslanger 2017c, 34), which are also a typical case of social norms. Driving on the right side of the road is one kind of traffic coordination but that is not the only and true answer. What matters here is not its epistemic element but its functional aspect. Social norms are related to a kind of intersubjective problem-solving process, which is itself embedded in the process of learning and social evolution. In this pragmatic sense, social norms are ordinary, conventional, and changeable. Akin to Haslanger's cultural *technēs*, Bicchieri also talks about schemata and scripts (Bicchieri 2006, 93-94). They function to cognitively support social arrangements and related social norms. While there can be beneficial and harmful kinds of social norms, what social norms do in our social life is not different from what cultural *technēs* do. Culture and social norms not only constrain but also enable social agents such that we can interpret and understand what is valuable and salient in the social world. This is possible via determining what kind of options and preferences are available and appropriate to agents.¹⁶³

While ideology is a part of various constituents of social norms, ideology focuses on the cognitive and justificatory elements of social norms. But as noted above, this does not mean that critiquing ideology is a matter of rational revision of distorting representations of the social world. Although it can be argued that the relation between social norms and cultural *technēs* is unclear in this respect, it should be noted that social norms always involve various values, technologies and norms, which are irreducible to beliefs or statements. This is why adopting the framework of ideology as harmful social norms does not necessarily take us back to a cognitive approach.¹⁶⁴ In

¹⁶³ In a sense, as social norms delimit the range of preferences and choices, ideology also involves a formation of adaptive preferences. Surely, ideology cannot be reduced to a kind of adaptive preference. See Rosen 1996. Also, preferences do not need to be merely for one's narrow self-interest since sometimes beliefs are connected to one's identity. Following Dan Kahan, Stanley argues that "One central source of ideological beliefs is our social identities (Stanley 2015, 185) since it is very difficult to give up one's social identity.

¹⁶⁴ In this regard, I agree with Jaeggi: "The critique of ideology, strictly speaking, does not directly criticize an ideology, but rather a practice that is maintained via this ideology or constituted by it" (Jaeggi 2008, 69).

accommodating functional and motivational dimensions, conceiving of ideology as a whole interlocking cluster of dynamic social norms with relevant social expectations is a much more comprehensive and explanatorily superior hypothesis. As I argued against Shelby's postulate of rationality, it seems plausible that ideology is a kind of device that solves collective action problem in which agents rationally participate in the patterns of social action that contradict their actual interests. Since the reproduction of oppressive social structures is not necessarily dependent upon collectively false and irrational beliefs, what is at stake is not rational persuasion; rather, the point is to effectively intervene on the underlying social mechanisms to change the norms of ideology.¹⁶⁵ Insofar as ideologies' function implies their own degree of stability over time, they can function in diverse ways, whether it be legitimating, nonmoral, or unintentional. Importantly, ideologies can be effective only when they are deemed as credible and reliable enough to their addressees. Although this suggests that brute coercion without any moral validity would not be likely to succeed, even people's acceptance of certain harmful social practices may be merely prudential, rather than based on good normative considerations, oftentimes feeling the hopelessness that there cannot be any viable alternative than the status quo. In this regard, the value of social movements is not limited to creating new epistemic possibilities. While Haslanger's proposal of social movements as such is not objectionable, she does not properly address that social movements are usually costly and even risky. Hence, the simplistic dichotomy between ideology and social movement is debatable. Even though we are not perfectly self-interested agents, it should be stressed that we are also both largely instrumentally rational and significantly constrained by others'

¹⁶⁵ Heath writes: "while some social practices are directly 'patterned' by the cultural system, many more are reproduced through very loosely constrained strategic action. These interactions are integrated only indirectly, and so the associated outcomes may not reflect any specific set of values or beliefs. In this case, social criticism alone will not change anything" (Heath 2000, 370). Before Heath, Michael Rosen (1996) also dismisses the theory of ideology for being redundant and favors the theory of the coordination problem.

expectations and actions.¹⁶⁶ After claiming that we should not mistake a collective action problem for ideology, Joseph Heath writes:

The most significant thing about these collective action problems, from the standpoint of critical theory, is that agents often have a hard time getting out of them, even if they realize that they are engaging in collectively self-defeating behavior. The reason is that the mere recognition that the outcome is suboptimal does not change the incentives that each individual has to act in a way that contributes to it.... It is only if *everyone* stops that I will begin to see a difference. But I have no control over what everyone else does... in order to change the interaction, *everyone* has to stop doing what they have been doing (Heath 2000, 366).

Certain social patterns of action can persist because they are stuck in a suboptimal equilibrium. Even when individuals are perfectly rational in a sense, they can be collectively irrational. In the case of labor movements, a revolution is unlikely to arise since it is too risky for workers despite its emancipatory promise. Merely knowing people's real interests does not mean that those interests immediately become incentives to change existing behaviors. Why is having nonideal moral epistemology not enough? Heath makes a case with respect to the feminist claim that women should be free from the dependence on the concept of beauty and the beauty industry. The problem is that endorsing this feminist lesson may not directly motivate women's personal conduct. A collective action problem helps explain this point:

beauty has an inherently competitive structure... When a 50-year old woman gets a face-lift that makes her look 40, the action can be described in one of two ways. In a sense, she has made herself look younger. But in another sense, all she has done is make all the *other* 50-year old women in the population look a little older.

¹⁶⁶ I do not share the first generation of the Frankfurt critical theory's intuition of that instrumental rationality is inherently pervasive, totalizing, and wrong in the modern capitalist world. We are not exclusively concerned with calculating means and ends. Rather, we should take into account of "the reality of human beings as imperfectly rational, imperfectly informed and somewhat confused, often fearful, subject to more or less reasonable forms of hope, prone to a condition sometimes termed learned helplessness" (Finlayson 2015, 138). On this point, I do not disagree with Finlayson's argument against what she calls the coordination problem of rational choice since "Everyday life is riddled with cases of hesitation, uncertainty and more or less tragic (or cosmic, or tragi-comic) misunderstanding" (Finlayson 2015, 138). However, I find her objection indecisive since nobody needs to make a very strong assumption of perfectly rational human beings in the first place.

These women may then be motivated to get a face-lift *just to retain position* (Heath 2000, 369).

This practice is maintained not because a face-lift is advantageous but rather because not doing so is disadvantageous. Surely, beauty as a positional good is not the only example. Rather, it is important to see that conforming and defying harmful norms should be understood in light of interests and needs. Again, one may make a distinction between individual interest and group interest. The point is that individuals can oftentimes benefit from going along with oppressive social norms even though those norms would collectively disadvantage those individuals as a *group* and individuals in question are well aware of this fact.

If this is the case, it is better to consider ideology to be social norm with its own stability. A primary function of ideology as a sort of convention is to coordinate social agents by reference to shared understandings and social expectations. Given this coordinating function, it is understandable why mere epistemic revision is not enough to motivate people: a one-sided deviation from a given equilibrium can be very costly. Here it is notable that the cognitivist assumption of ideology goes hand in hand with the individualist view of social agency. The task of ideology critique should be collective, not individual. When racist practices are in place, a few individual anti-racists can be easily punished and disregarded. Racism can be said prudentially rational from the perspective of economic reason. For instance, consider “the case of a Jewish employer who, while personally not antagonistic toward Arabs, refuses to hire Arab personnel because all businesses in the community have been threatened by boycott should they employ Arabs” (Goldberg 1990, 383). Ideology is embedded in strategic situations where the consequence of one’s actions depends on others’ expectations. Insofar as ideologies are seen as self-maintaining and persistent conventions, they are “solutions to coordination games with multiple equilibria” (Guala 2016, 44). When an ideological equilibrium is not desirable, it is important to convince

people that there can be multiple equilibria other than the current one. But something more is needed as well. The questions of order, safety, and trust are as decisive as legitimacy and morality of certain social norms.¹⁶⁷ This is why we need a realist and contextualist standpoint concerning ideology critique (Prinz and Rossi 2017).¹⁶⁸

Here Bicchieri's example of female genital mutilation (FGM) illustrates why ideology is not merely dissolved by invoking its illegitimacy, immorality, or even outcomes like health risks. The practice of FGM cannot be understood without seeing the contextual value of female purity, chastity, and family honor since social norms are "embedded in a thick web of values, beliefs, and other norms that form shared cognitive schemata" (Bicchieri 2017, 121). In turn, due to a correlation between high levels of poverty and inequality, valuation of virginity as a desirable trait of a young and modest bride is also related to the vital need to find a rich husband. Surely, discussion and deliberation may convince people that justice should be prioritized over honor since "protection of one's child (in the sense of avoiding harming him or her) carries more weight than the need for purity, as attained through female genital cutting" (Bicchieri 2017, 79). Even if the value of honor is maintained, people can be convinced that "honor is not necessarily best protected by female genital cutting" (Bicchieri 2017, 126). But when it is a pervasive practice, despite FGM is a costly way to control fidelity, many are motivated to imitate others and continually engage in such a practice.

The practice of FGM persists as far as there are no known possible alternatives and, as in the collective action problem, being the first mover is very costly. Bicchieri explains the

¹⁶⁷ In *In the Beginning Was the Deed*, Bernard Williams (2005) calls these problems part of the first political question.

¹⁶⁸ In a similar vein, against the Western idea of missionary feminism, Khader writes: "One cannot know whether sexist oppression is present in a given case without knowing the overall effects of certain social practices, which in turn cannot be understood without rich contextual information" (Khader 2019, 41). From a decolonial perspective, this is why "different strategies will be effective in different contexts" (Khader 2019, 134).

persistence of harmful social norms nobody likes by reference to pluralistic ignorance: “individuals may not believe that the particular practice is positive or even desirable, but a lack of transparent communication and the observation that the practice is widespread makes them conclude that it is widely supported. Here, people might have good reasons to change, but they do not actively voice them.” (Bicchieri 2017, 122).¹⁶⁹ According to this, even if we know that the purity norm behind FGM is wrong and unjust, deviation from the practice requires more than knowing its disadvantages. Initiating deviation is costly due to the pluralistic ignorance.

What is striking is that despite its historical persistence, the practice of FGM was rather rapidly abandoned. As Bicchieri writes, “the observation of a few, highly schema-discrepant instances can induce a sudden, dramatic revision of the associated schema” (Bicchieri 2017, 137). Abandoning a social schema is possible because of a trendsetter who is a relevant role model in the reference group; it can also occur due to continuous exposure to an alternative culture with different social norms. To this end, a norm shift requires advertising a new frame that “linked traditional values of honor and purity to the idea that uncut girls are complete and pure” (Bicchieri 2017, 139-40). Yet, we need assurance as well as proper knowledge. In addition to various educational campaigns about the harmful health effects of FGM, there should be some effective measures to carefully coordinate a norm shift, thereby reducing first mover costs.¹⁷⁰

Taking this into consideration, the task of ideology critique should accompany a proper account of the moral and social psychology of ideology. Ideology is a kind of motivated cognition,

¹⁶⁹ She explains a set of conditions for pluralistic ignorance: a) “individuals engage in social comparison with their reference network... we are influenced by the behavior of other network members, but we do not know the true distribution of their beliefs and preferences” b) “others' behavior is observable” c) “No transparent communication is possible” d) “We assume that, unlike us, others' behavior is consistent with their preferences and beliefs” e) “We infer that all but us endorse the observed norm” (Bicchieri 2017, 42-43).

¹⁷⁰ Surely, we cannot expect something like perfect synchronicity. But “the actions of the oppressed need to be coordinated not only in the sense of happening at roughly the same time, but in some further sense of being *organized* in some minimally mutually supportive way” (Finlayson 2015, 139).

according to John Jost and his colleagues, since “ideologies possess both a discursive (socially constructed) superstructure and a functional (or motivational) base or substructure” (Jost et al. 2013, 233). Even though Shelby and Haslanger deal with the discursive superstructure of ideology as a bundle of beliefs, attitudes, and values, both end up underestimating the functional substructure of ideology such as social and psychological motives, desires, and needs. For instance, in the political realm, what Dan Kahan calls “identity protective cognition” may be one example of motivated reasoning.¹⁷¹ Even in the face of compelling evidence that shows the persistence of racism, one line of motivated cognition would be that “I don’t like it. I don’t believe it.” This functional structure is worth emphasizing, since we are inescapably dependent upon relevant others. On this view, ideology is a motivation of system justification:

the tendency to defend, bolster, and justify the status quo is motivationally compelling because it satisfies *epistemic* needs to attain certainty, order, and structure; *existential* needs to maintain safety and security and to minimize danger and threat; and *relational* needs to affiliate with others and to acquire a sense of belongingness and shared reality (Jost et al. 2013, 236).

This does not mean that ideologies inherently justify systems and support the status quo. Rather, ideologies can be also liberal or challenging to the extent that people who endorse them are open to new experiences, cognitive complexity, and tolerance of uncertainty. Haslanger’s nonideal moral epistemology is committed to this as well. As noted above in our discussion of FGM, the point is to adequately motivate people and address their epistemic, existential, and relational needs in specific situations. Returning to the issue of racism as ideology, while I disagree with Dummett that racism is inherently irrational, his following statement can be better understood in light of ideology as social norm: “People adopt racist attitudes when they find themselves in a

¹⁷¹ Kahan argues that “Individuals depend on select groups – from families to university faculties, from religious denominations to political parties – for all manner of material and emotional support. Propositions that impugn the character or competence of such groups, or that contradict the groups’ shared commitments, can thus jeopardize their individual members’ well-being” (Kahan 2011, 20).

social milieu in which it is acceptable or encouraged to display such attitudes, and in which maintaining them is advantageous” (Dummett 2004, 33). If my view is right, “By giving persons incentives to act in ways counter to oppressive social norms, they will choose to do so, and perhaps choose to do so in better ways than could have been devised from those farther removed from the problem (Cudd 2006, 230).”

4.7 Conclusion

So far, I have critically examined Shelby and Haslanger’s respective views of ideology. Despite their merits, while Shelby’s view of ideology is too cognitive, Haslanger’s appeal to nonideal moral epistemology limits her insight that ideology serves as cultural *technēs*. In short, contrary to Shelby and Haslanger’s view, ideology is neither simply irrational nor merely immoral. But both primarily think of ideology as a kind of epistemic flaws in a broad sense. Either way, the functional aspect of ideology is not taken seriously enough. In light of this, I have also argued that thinking of ideology as a social norm is more comprehensive and less cognitivist in accommodating motivational and functional aspects of ideology critique. Ideology critique can be successful when we consider the functional and motivational points in addition to the epistemic ones. This view is more amenable to possible social changes and learning. I now turn to exploring this topic further in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 5. SITUATING ANTI-RACIST SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AS PRAGMATIC LEARNING AND UNLEARNING

5.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I argue for the value of social movements as pragmatic learning experiences by engaging with Elizabeth Anderson's view. What I mean by "pragmatic learning" should be more specified. Learning is important in the pragmatist tradition represented by John Dewey. For Dewey, as for Mill, democracy is not merely about a form of government or official institutions but also about a way of life. From Deweyan perspective, in demonstrating the need for the interracial integration, Anderson writes: "Habits cannot be taught like a creed. They can only be learned by practice" (Anderson 2007, 232). On this view, what we need to unlearn is various racist stereotypes, attitudes, and prejudices. Correspondingly, we need to learn how to engage in interracial interaction in more respectful, civil, and positive ways.

This is where my view of pragmatic social movement diverges from Anderson's view. It may be plausible to say that racism is immoral and irrational. Yet, in order to transform racist social norms, I claim that various pragmatic strategies can be mobilized beyond the narrow scope of moralist and rationalistic criticism. What I want to try to present in this chapter is a morally warranted and pragmatically efficacious critique of racism. By social movements as pragmatic learning processes, I mean something more than learning through rational argumentation and reasoned deliberation. For instance, these learning processes can involve a variety of sanctions, coercion, confrontation, rewards, and artistic forms of learning.

Let me start with the idea of social movement. Usually, in sociology, social movements have been defined as a political process, "rational attempts by excluded groups to mobilize sufficient political leverage to advance collective interests through noninstitutionalized means"

(McAdam 1999, 36). More broadly, social movements can be defined as what Charles Tilly calls “contentious politics”: they are a “sustained campaign of claim making, using repeated performances that advertise the claim, based on organizations, networks, traditions, and solidarities that sustain these activities” (Tilly & Tarrow 2015, 11). They typically target governments. Yet, to the extent that power is not exclusively confined to the public domain of governments, social movements can also aim at changing various social norms. Here various political groups can include formal organizations and informal, non-governmental associations.

One crucial function of social movements consists in changing public opinions and attitudes concerning social issues by making various claims, campaigns, and assertions. As Avery Kolers puts it, “through social movements, individuals ... become capable of things they could not previously conceive of, let alone achieve” (Kolers 2016b, 588). That is, by conceiving social movements as collective learning experiences, what I try to show is that one important advantage of social movements is epistemic. While social movements do not strictly resemble reasoned debate and deliberation, regardless of their eventual success, they can be beneficial from the standpoint of social epistemology. The urgency of epistemic empowerment is especially evident when epistemic oppression (Dotson 2011) is one of the key aspects of racist oppression. My focus in this chapter is limited to consider social movements to be collective learning experiences.

My point in this chapter is as follows: In anti-racist social movements, I argue that we need to conceptualize them as two distinct moments: learning and unlearning. In learning, I argue that what Anderson calls moral inquiry should be mediated by the intervention of social norms. To elaborate, I explicate the role of trendsetters in social norms, which is not simply democratic as such. In unlearning, social enforcement and contentions should be taken into account. To exemplify, I will discuss the role of civil and uncivil disobedience. I will make my own case by

building on Anderson's idea of democratic moral inquiry via social movements. As it will be clear, my claim here is more of a friendly amendment to her view than a wholesale rejection of it. While I agree with the implications of Anderson's pragmatic view of social movements, I would like to carry them further.

5.2 Anderson on Social Movement as Pragmatist Moral Learning

Let me start from Anderson's view of moral learning and moral progress. In her paper "Social Movements, Experiments in Living, and Moral Progress: Case Studies from Britain's Abolition of Slavery," Anderson elaborates her view of moral learning by examining the case of abolishing slave trade as an example of transforming moral obliviousness. Before the 19th century, to our surprise, the idea of slavery was widely considered natural and normal in many parts of the world. Rather than various forms of slave resistance, such as insurrection and escape, which were used to try and destroy the institution of slavery, what Anderson is interested concerning the case of the moral learning of the wrongness of slavery is concerned with broader social movements as learning experiences. To make her case, following Dewey's naturalistic account of morality, Anderson starts from the conception of humans as social beings who need various ways of cooperation and coordination through conventions, norms, and laws. She argues that "Moral norms, like social norms and conventions, are largely sustained through shared expectations of conditional conformity, backed up by expectations of sanction" (Anderson 2014, 3). Against the atomistic view of society, her interest is "not to explain individual moral change, or change in beliefs alone, but rather how groups can improve their moral practices" (Anderson 2014, 3). As she rightly argues, this shows why we need to focus on the collective dimension of large-scale moral change since "few people will comply with moral demands out of pure moral conscience alone, if others

reject those demands” (Anderson 2014, 3).¹⁷² This shows that contrary to many philosophers’ aspiration that pure and *a priori* moral reasoning will bring about moral progress, the actual history reveals that merely enhanced moral reasonings do not sufficiently cause moral progress.

In Anderson’s pragmatist view of morality as problem-solving in our interpersonal relationships, “morality as a social practice becomes reflective – open to reconstruction through people thinking together how they will govern their interpersonal claims” (Anderson 2014, 4). There are several modes in which uncertainty and disagreement concerning moral norms arise: interpersonal conflicts, changed conditions concerning moral principles, and challenges against the legitimacy of existing norms.¹⁷³ That is, under certain perplexing situations, moral norms go through a kind of problem-solving test. Far from having the ultimate moral principles, a variety of uncertainty, conflict, and disagreement in the actual practice prompt deeper justification, reflection, and contestation of existing moral principles which have been unreflectively accepted.

Anderson identifies two pragmatic procedures to improve our moral norms: correcting biases in formulating moral principles (*ex ante*) and testing moral principles in practices (*ex post*). First, consider her view of the social movement as bias correction. According to her, moral thinking is susceptible to various systematic biases. For instance, with asymmetrical social positions, the self-serving bias is problematic since it makes the powerful unaccountable: “A major source of bias is unaccountable power over others ... Power makes people morally blind” (Anderson 2016, 93). When moral contestation arises, the powerful tend to insulate themselves

¹⁷² For instance, Peter Singer says that he became a radical animal liberationist once he was convinced by moral arguments for animals by fellow graduate students at Oxford (Singer 1995, xxvi). I am not sure if this is the case for most people.

¹⁷³ Anderson writes: “First, an interpersonal conflict may give rise to uncertainty as to how an accepted principle applies to it.... Second, conditions may have changed such that the usual and accepted application of a principle gives rise to surprising and unsatisfactory consequences.... Third, people may challenge the legitimacy of a customary norm or principle, by drawing attention to objectionable features of its operation and failures in its purported justification” (Anderson 2014, 4-5).

from the demands of moral justification by confusing power and moral authority. This tendency is manifest when the powerful willingly or otherwise confuse their parochial good with the moral right. From the standpoint of moral epistemology, this kind of biased moral reasoning cannot be reliable. For Anderson, moral biases are not only unjust but also epistemically unsound.¹⁷⁴ Against this kind of authoritarian moral inquiry, some remedial measures like double-blind clinical trials are required to reduce potential moral biases. To correct such biases and construct more just social norms, Anderson suggests some social practices that

Inform the powerful of the needs and interests of the less powerful, in a form vivid enough to spur feeling and action respecting those needs and interests. 2. Express what is required to respect these needs and interests as claims or demands on the powerful to change their conduct in specified ways, by confronting them with the characteristic experiences that arouse moral consciousness... 3. Enable the less powerful to display their worthiness (Anderson 2014, 8).¹⁷⁵

In short, by social movements, the less powerful strongly express their needs and interests as claims and demands, which should be respected in a way to display their dignity. Surely, when the powerful unconditionally have good will, conveying relevant information about the needs and interests of the less powerful may be enough. But given arrogance and selfishness usually paired with ignorance of the powerful as well as unreflective habits of the bystanders, without any immediate practical needs, it is unlikely for pure moral argument to induce broad social changes. Recall that raising public awareness is necessary but not sufficient for overcoming harmful

¹⁷⁴ This corresponds to what Shelby calls noncognitive motives for holding ideological beliefs such as wishful thinking.

¹⁷⁵ Anderson then applies the pragmatic principles (correcting biases and testing moral principles in practice) to the case of the British abolition movement where many contentious activities were invented. She notes that this case shows why pure moral reasoning was not sufficient to induce moral change since the argument that slavery is morally wrong was known before the movement. To sustain the unity of the movement and facilitate further movements in the next stage, the British Abolitionists first focused on abolishing the slave trade before abolishing slavery itself by referring to Biblical morality ("manstealing is wrong"). While immorality of forced labor can be demonstrated by showing its cruelty, violence, and gross injustice, an experiment in living in the case of abolishing slavery is to challenge the common assumption that involuntary servitude and a surplus is necessary for securing civilization.

ideologies as I argued in chapter 4. Hence, litigation, protest, demonstrations, rebellion, and other kinds of democratic contention are needed to force the socially privileged to confront challenges from the oppressed. When it comes to contentious politics, Anderson draws on Tilly's identification of four main features of social movement: unity, commitment, numbers, and worthiness (Anderson 2014, 13). By participating in contentions, the oppressed "must manifest in deed and not only words their own interest, capacity, and worthiness for the rights and privileges they are demanding" (Anderson 2015, 39). If genuine moral deliberation is only motivated by some sort of pressure in this way, "to induce practical reasoning, people must be confronted with situations in which they can no longer carry on with habitual ways of acting" (Anderson 2014, 10).¹⁷⁶ Insofar as a motive to comply with moral norms is sustained by shared expectations, effective contentions should discourage the motivation to conform to unjust norms and impose some moral cost on those who resist the challenge from the oppressed by exposing the powerful and the public to various contentious activities. In what follows, I will engage with Anderson's two stages of democratic moral inquiry via social movements by critiquing her view and supplementing it with proper considerations of social norms.

5.3 Social Norms and Democratic Moral Inquiry

In this section, I will show that Anderson's ideal of democratic moral inquiry does not fully consider the normative force of social norms by overlooking potential conflicts between sociality and morality. In particular, I focus on the first component of her pragmatic conception of moral learning: correcting bias. If the obstacle to moral progress is only self-serving bias and power, I

¹⁷⁶ As she writes, "between pure argument and violence is a wide range of contentious activities that are more or less disruptive of habitual ways of life, from petitioning, publicity campaigns, theatrical performances, candlelight vigils, litigation, and political campaigns to street demonstrations, boycotts, teach-ins, sit-ins, picketing, strikes, and building occupations" (Anderson 2014, 9). I will consider these various contentious activities in the last section of the chapter.

grant Anderson's view may fully make sense. Here a hidden assumption seems to be that if immorality is a kind of biased way of thinking, then genuine morality should be unbiased and impartial. But this picture is too simplified. Instead, I argue that she does not take the fact that unjust social norms must also be taken into consideration. As I argue in chapter 2 regarding Rawls, Anderson similarly overlooks the ways in which social norms can trump moral norms. To recall, while social norms are conditional, group-based, practice-dependent, and contextual, moral norms are largely unconditional, individual-based, practice-independent, and universal. Given the social enforcement of morality, what matters is the two-tier shift, not just from immoral norms to moral norms but also from unjust social norms to more just social norms. These parallel processes will require something more than mere bias correction. While moral biases imply some sort of nonmoral prudential considerations, social normativity is different from biased and self-interested prudence.¹⁷⁷ Even though social sanctions and shared expectations are required in stabilizing social norms, the motivation to comply with such social norms is in principle distinct from self-serving and biased motivation. When enough of the group upholds empirical and normative expectations, social norms work, often contrary to certain universal moral norms.

Surely, it may be argued that Anderson seems to be aware of the question of social norms. She passingly cites Margaret Gilbert to invoke the importance of shared expectations and attitudes generated by social norms (Anderson 2014, 82). Also, in her earlier paper, Anderson seems to acknowledge the importance of social groups: "Most people's identities are largely, although not exclusively, constituted by their membership in social groups or collective agents" (Anderson 2000, 192). This endorsement is important because the issue of social grouping and identity as such does

¹⁷⁷ I showed this point when I talk about the difference between Bicchieri's view of social norms and Lewis's view of convention in chapter 1. While Lewis's game-theoretic account of convention presupposes the instrumental rationality and self-interest based on shared knowledge and mutual expectations, Christina Bicchieri invokes the example of norms of honor killing to show that following norms may not be in one's best interest.

not matter in moral norms in which everyone morally counts regardless of social membership. But it seems that this insight was not fully pushed enough to consider that moral progress cannot be reduced to the process of correcting bias and selectivity. This is because Anderson's view is still dependent upon the equal standing of individual moral agents and their capacity for moral reasoning, who are largely detached from particular social contexts. Moreover, Anderson is misguided when she identifies moral norms with social norms despite the differences between them. One important way in which they differ being that social norms are instantiated from diverse biases that may be nonmoral, yet are pervasive in our social lives.

Being a pragmatist and a non-ideal thinker, Anderson hopes to build her theory of moral learning on the actual case of history. However, as Agnes Tam recently argued, because her view is missing the power of the social ought, Anderson's view of democratic moral inquiry is historically incorrect. For instance, far from being democratic, she argues that the communitarian ideal of national honor was decisive in the development of the British abolitionist movement.¹⁷⁸ According to Tam, "The slave trade was socially accepted as a necessary evil in the service of national prosperity.... It was valued for the greater glory of the British empire. The value of national glory gave the British "We" a reason to support the trade" (Tam 2020, 89). By identifying this kind of We-reason as the unjust social norm, a new national honor could be transformed to British identity as conscientious individuals. Here it is notable that the national honor, rather than moral dignity of everyone, was primarily invoked in the British abolitionist movement. On top of this, mobilizing patriotic rhetoric, "British abolitionists argued that Britons' joint commitment to humanitarianism outweighed their commitment to avarice and class interest" (Tam 2020, 95). With this, Tam continues to argue that the issue of moral progress should be analyzed in terms of a

¹⁷⁸ According to Tam, "the majority of participants in the social movement ... were white British nationals" (Tam 2020, 80) while black abolitionists remained a minority in number.

communitarian We-reasoning of competing social groups where shared expectation and membership are constitutive. In this view, along with moral norms that are usually expectation-independent, social norms have a distinct kind of expectation-dependent normativity which is based on joint commitment within different groups. This also suggests that the unit of moral progress should be located on different levels in accordance with different groups.

In a similar vein, elucidating the role of changing honor code in moral revolution, Appiah showed the overriding importance of chastity and class honor over moral reasons in the case of foot-binding practices in China (Appiah 2010, 53-100).¹⁷⁹ While Appiah does not exactly analyze the issues such as dueling and British chattel slavery in terms of shifting social norms, what is notable is that socially and historically differentiated honor codes are distinct from moral principles such as the categorical imperative. Recall the case of FGM in chapter 4. As it is evident in the case of pluralistic ignorance, many ordinary and not-so-vicious individuals may continue to participate in some wrongful practice while privately dissenting because of collectively sustained moral beliefs: “social norms can make people act and talk publicly in ways that are different from how they actually think, or from how they act and talk privately” (Sunstein 1996, 929). Complying with FGM is not a matter of sheer immorality but that of unjust social norms, which are open to differing interpretations and contestations.

One immediate objection may be that since social norms can include some immoral content, moralizing social norms or subordinating them to genuine moral norms should be an alternative. In this argument, as far as social norms are distinct from moral norms, the latter should prevail because one cannot lose a moral status despite given wrongful social norms. For instance, if FGM is an immoral practice as a communitarian social norm, it may be argued that this should be

¹⁷⁹ According to Mackie (1996), bound feet signaled gentility and chastity, thereby showing the marriageability.

replaced by a cosmopolitan moral norm. This is an important objection because sociality through peer pressures can be morally blind or biased. To be sure, I do not argue that any kind of social norms should be immune from the possibility of moral inquiry. Rather, I claim that merely advancing moral inquiry against unjust practices may not be powerful enough to override the force of social norms. If this is the case, then what is needed is to implant moral components into immoral social norms and thereby immanently transforming them. In short, I think we need to think about why and how *social* movements bring about *moral* progress. Given that the social group is decisive in our ways of We-reasoning, the social enforcement of morality cannot detour the communal aspect of social norms. In this way, as I argue in chapter 4 regarding ideology-critique, moral critiques should not be simply external to existing social norms but be incorporated into them. Embedding moral content in existing social norms is a way of immanent ideology critique.

5.4 Trendsetters in Social Norms

The point is that there are the different mechanisms by which social norms change. The fact that Anderson's view of moral inquiry overlooks social normativity can be also shown by looking at her view of democracy in social movements. In opposing vicious power and virtuous democracy, it is notable that Anderson's view of moral learning limits social movements as horizontal and democratic activities. For correcting biases in her theory is crucial as far as it can contribute to making a community of equals, thereby leveling the playing field. On Anderson's view, against what she calls "bias in favor of groups to which one belongs" (Anderson 2012, 169), democratic moral inquiry is democratic since greater inclusion of the oppressed contributes to equal and direct participation in deliberation. In turn, democratic inquiry is beneficial because being open to many diverse epistemic sources can improve its effectiveness and correctness.

Epistemic exclusion should be avoided since it “undermines the ability of collective decision-making to take advantage of ... the fact that citizens from different walks of life have different experiences of problems and policies of public interest, experiences that have evidential import for devising and evaluating solutions” (Anderson 2006, 14). Note that her approach is similar to deliberative democrats who consider deliberation and reason-giving activity to be indispensable to democracy (Habermas 1984). As she notes, democratic moral inquiry ultimately aims at “epistemic democracy: universal participation on terms of equality of all inquirers” (Anderson 2012, 172). While democratic moral inquiry is valuable in its own terms, I argue that the picture that the oppressed come to equally participate in moral inquiry is incomplete, if not incorrect.

In what follows, I will strengthen my argument that Anderson’s view of learning is too narrow by exploring another mode of learning. Although learning, deliberation, and inquiry may be all differential activities in their own right, Anderson seems to suppose that deliberation and inquiry are essential in moral learning. As far as moral learning and democratic deliberation are distinct, I try to show that her pragmatic view of democratic moral inquiry should be open to the possibility of even seemingly undemocratic modes of moral learning. In learning, I argue that we need to cultivate anti-racist virtues. One main example is emulating trendsetters of new beneficial norms.¹⁸⁰ Those prefigurative forerunners are few.¹⁸¹ This kind of learning is more vertical than on the view of non-ideal moral epistemology that Anderson supposes.

As we saw in chapter 4, Haslanger draws on Anderson in arguing for the need to adopt non-ideal moral epistemology to overcome racist ideology. In claiming that moral knowledge is

¹⁸⁰ Although my view does not depend on particular moral theory, this aspect of trendsetters is comparable with the virtue ethical theory that virtue can be learned by emulating virtuous and admirable exemplars. Also, as particular and indeterminate circumstances require good judgment, trendsetters as political avant-gardes need some kind of practical wisdom, namely, Aristotelian *phronesis*.

¹⁸¹ Except for those trendsetters, “In the marketplace of social group norms, the individual is a norm-taker, not a norm-setter” (Cudd 2006, 46).

gained through interactions with others, the basic point of this non-ideal moral epistemology is to listen to the oppressed in order to correct the moral blindness of the oppressors and the bystanders. This emphasis on the diversity of epistemic sources from unprivileged or marginal social locations is in line with standpoint epistemology. Surely, she is right in that it is not the case that majorities are infallible. But the very oppressive ideology can impose various epistemic barriers on the side of victims. This is why merely turning to the victim is not always a viable solution to harmful ideologies. Unlike the non-ideal moral epistemology, I argue that diverse ways of moral learning can be mobilized in addition to this kind of standpoint epistemology. This view is to be distinguished from Anderson's version of non-ideal moral epistemology insofar as my view does not assume the truth of standpoint epistemology in advance. In my view, Anderson's commitment to democratic moral inquiry unnecessarily narrows the scope of non-ideal moral epistemology. While it is plausible to suppose that democratic moral inquiry is valuable, contrary to Anderson's view of moral progress, processes of moral learning can be asymmetrical and even undemocratic in some aspects. In fact, there seems to be no necessary connection between learning and democracy in the first place. While I agree with her emphasis on the inclusion of the victims in epistemic practices, I would like to stress that the role of the avant-garde in moral learning is often indispensable.

Cass Sunstein once coined the word "norm entrepreneurs" to consider the initiation of changes in social norms.¹⁸² Christina Bicchieri's idea of trendsetters as catalysts for social change inherits Sunstein's idea of norm entrepreneurs. Changes in social norms require changing normative and empirical expectations among people, which in turn is mainly possible by the

¹⁸² "norm entrepreneurs can alert people to the existence of a shared complaint and can suggest a collective solution. Thus political actors, whether public or private, can exploit widespread dissatisfaction with existing norms by (a) signaling their own commitment to change, (b) creating coalitions, (c) making defiance of the norms seem or be less costly, and (d) making compliance with new norms seem or be more beneficial" (Sunstein 1996, 929).

initiating role of trendsetters. While it may be one of many ways of norm change, Bicchieri considers it to be a crucial way. She adds reference networks as relevant local contexts for trendsetters. That is, if trendsetters are central and respected as authoritative in a social network, their action can be more visible. When a new norm spreads in a certain reference network, those trendsetters initially adopt the norm and spread it throughout the local network, so extending it to larger groups. They can be autonomous in their decision making because of their low sensitivity to the pressure from the current norms and a high level of self-efficacy: “trendsetters should be both autonomous and have high perceived self-efficacy before being willing to deviate from an established norm” (Bicchieri 2017, 171).¹⁸³ In chapter 4, I discussed the stickiness of social norms by reference to the risk of being the first mover in the collective action problem where most people are reluctant to change for a better norm because of the fear of the cost. On the contrary, a few trusted and admirable individuals of the reference group are less vulnerable to the burden of dissenting the prevailing unjust social norms than many of those who cannot speak up against the unjust status quo. This is why the danger of deviating from maladaptive norms is less onerous for the trendsetters who are subject to fewer social sanctions than most people.¹⁸⁴ Starting from trendsetters, broad social movements provide most people a motivation to deviate from harmful norms and seek a collective change for the better: “as more and more people abandon a social norm, disobedience is perceived as increasingly less risky” (Bicchieri 2017, 175). After passing a tipping point, the dynamic process of contagion, convergence, acceleration, and mass mobilization then followed.

¹⁸³ Of course, this does not mean that we can talk about generic trendsetter: “A highly autonomous, self-efficacious, risk-insensitive individual might not be a trendsetter with respect to a particular norm” (Bicchieri 2017, 183).

¹⁸⁴ Trendsetters are either risk-insensitive or misperceive the actual risk. Bicchieri distinguishes risk sensitivity as a stable disposition from risk perception which varies across situations (Bicchieri 2017, 173). When social movements are powerful enough, despite that different individuals have different psychological traits and differing kinds of risk sensitivity, the degree of risk perception can be significantly lowered.

This idea of trendsetters can be compared with the idea of the avant-garde in art and politics.¹⁸⁵ In numerous critical historical moments, sociopolitical innovations are possible by a few avant-gardes' leading role in transforming existing social practices. In its etymology, it is not accidental that the term refers to the foremost part of armies in battles. As noted above, social norms have a distinct kind of normativity compared to moral norms. Translating moral discourse into ordinary language and socially communicating it to broader mass movements is possible by active political agency and advocacy.¹⁸⁶ In this sense, political avant-gardes or trendsetters are a mediator linking abstract and general moral principles to concrete and particular social circumstances. Moreover, trendsetters are generally respected since they have proper character traits such as tenacity, audacity, irreverence, and indignation, which can be appealing to the public.¹⁸⁷ For instance, we can find such character traits in various insurrectionists such as David Walker, Maria Stewart, and Lydia Maria Child. Also, consider the fact that Martin Luther King advanced an alternative norm of racial equality in the Civil Rights Movement in the 1960s. Those insurrectionists tried to challenge oppressive or unjust social norms and practices on the basis of moral conceptions of personhood. The existence of trusted, persistent, and committed trendsetters as moral exemplars is important in initiating new social norms and motivating the general public

¹⁸⁵ Harris would call the idea of the avant-garde "representative heuristics," according to which individuals within a population represent the whole oppressed populations (Harris 2002, 197).

Since trendsetters do not have to be individuals, they can be also collective as groups. In large communities, media such as TV shows can be also effective. In this case, presenting alternative lifestyles and new models of acting is the key.

¹⁸⁶ Against idealist politics, Antonio Gramsci expresses a strategic and realist idea of political avant-gardes: "the active politician is a creator, an initiator; but he neither creates from nothing nor does he move in the turbid void of his own desires and dreams. He bases himself on effective reality" (Gramsci 1971, 163).

¹⁸⁷ In this sense, trendsetters or avant-gardes in politics can be compared to insurrectionist character traits (Harris 2002, 196). In my view, insurrectionists can be efficacious when they can be part of broader social movements. Note that this does not preclude so-called uncivil forms of resistance which I will discuss later. Rather, they are "phenomenologically accurate" (Delmas 2018, 23) to activist culture. Delmas also argues that the privileged should cultivate virtues such as vigilance and open-mindedness (Delmas 2018, 222).

to participate in social transformations when many are still reluctant and motivationally weak.¹⁸⁸ The trendsetters or political avant-gardes take the lead and try to expand their alternative ideals of social norms: “Owing to the activity of political avant-gardes what initially appeared unacceptable to consolidated elites or was considered over-demanding by the larger mass of citizens progressively matured into a persistent popular request for modifying the scope and franchise of democratic citizenship” (Ypi 2014).

Note that this role of trendsetters, however indispensable it is to progress or regress in social norms, is not democratic in Anderson’s sense. This also shows the dynamics of social norms is different from the logic of moral norms, which is supposed to inform Andersons’ model of democracy. One might object that the vanguard model I present may be elitist, manipulative, and even authoritarian. Learning from a few trendsetters seems like risking minority, not majority, rule. Worse, it may be argued that the lived experience of the oppressed cannot be captured by the privileged trendsetters. However, the fact that social movements in the beginning are not majoritarian by themselves does not show their illegitimacy. Rather, when a sense of justice is widely distorted, it does not make sense to appeal to existing moral sentiments of the majority for the sake of social transformation. Note that even though the abolitionist movement was not a widely shared conception of justice during the antebellum era, it turned out to be morally progressive. The role of trendsetters is indispensable for new norms to initiate, if not for old norms to disappear. Large-scale and long-term political struggles must begin from local social networks. More importantly, the content of what those trendsetters try to advance is democratic and inclusive in its nature. For instance, in the era of slavery, abolitionists may be minor in their number but can

¹⁸⁸ Here I assume that this is limited to trendsetters as moral exemplars. Of course, trendsetters do not have to be moral. As Rousseau puts it, legislator can turn out to be charlatan. I am open to the possibility of immoral trendsetters, which makes the question of moral progress open-ended.

be said to be morally justified in countering the wrongful behaviors of slaveholders and uncritical bystanders. Note that they draw on the moral principles of personhood and humanity. Even if the mode of learning with the help of trendsetters is seemingly undemocratic and inequalitarian, this does not make learning in social movements initiated by trendsetters worthless. Instead of being manipulative, the essential role of trendsetters is concerned with the motivational and psychological makeup of people with regard to social norms.¹⁸⁹

To be sure, following Marx, I believe that educators should be educated. The privileged should not be out of touch with the oppressed people. But the objection above assumes that the relationship between trendsetters and people is unilateral once and for all. While trendsetters work to organize communities and coalitions of resistance, these particular social groupings and their leading roles should not be like stable categories or natural kinds (Harris 2002, 198). If the problematic situations are dissolved, trendsetters and their coalitions may be disbanded.¹⁹⁰ Considering the general processes of moral and social progress, a proper theory of moral trendsetters is needed to translate moral learning into social dimensions. Even if resisting injustice turns out to be everyone's moral duty, a few are more conscious of their duty than most people. Given the differently situated epistemic and motivational capacities, the initiation can begin by some trendsetters in a core group and spread to the rest of the people.¹⁹¹

¹⁸⁹ In this sense, trendsetters are more similar to a Rousseauian legislator, who is a kind of *vanishing* mediator, than a tyrant. The role of the legislator is to give men laws and answer to the following problem: "men would have to be prior to laws what they ought to become by means of them" (Rousseau 1997b, 71). The legislator should resort to "neither force nor reasoning" and rather, compel "without violence and persuade without convincing" (Rousseau 1997b, 71). Like trendsetters, they try to embody the universal ideals of justice to particular interests and specific local social circumstances.

¹⁹⁰ Insurrectionists "represent social groupings that they ultimately hope their insurrectionist action will render anachronistic. As such, this position runs contrary to nationalisms and rooted identities; it opens possibilities for moderate forms of cosmopolitanism, multiplicitous subjectivities, and intercultural polyglossia" (McBride 2017, 228).

¹⁹¹ As Machiavelli sees it in the relationship between prince and people, what is needed is a dynamic account of the relationship between trendsetter/activist and people/spectator/bystander, including a preference to emulate someone people esteem (Goodin 2018). And as Rousseau puts "persuasion without convincing", we are sometimes to be nudged and even forced to be free by learning beneficial social norms.

5.5 Pragmatic Testing Moral Principles in Practice

In this section, I engage with the second component of Anderson's pragmatic conception of moral learning: testing moral principles in practice. I argue that she does not fully develop this idea despite her emphasis on pragmatic learning. One way to think about the idea of testing is to see it with respect to the background of external social circumstances such as the economy. That is, other things being equal, one moral principle can be seen more successful than another when it is useful for advancing economic interests. As Anderson admits, while the abolitionists rightly rely on moral reasonings, antislavery movements would not have been successful without additional economic grounds: "free labor is more productive than slave labor because the free worker has an incentive to work" (Anderson 2014, 17). Surely, this does not mean that economic reasons such as the productivity of wage labor are not the only justification for the experiment of emancipation. But the point is to see how to convince many Britons with pro-slavery interests who shunned the moral questions and turned to the national economic interests to rationalize their position. When the abolition of slavery turned out to be economically benign, the abolitionist movement was also more broadly supported by the masses. Even though a standard of justice requires other moral considerations such as equality and freedom, the point is that merely moralist arguments do not work in such a situation. In this case, one may say that the abolitionist moral principles were not only morally justifiable but also tested as successful in promoting economic interests.

But this kind of testing does not exhaust what testing moral principles in practice entails. The lesson of the case above is that there can be a plurality of instruments in inducing moral learning and ameliorating wrongful injustices. Before closely examining this, I should first show

Also, the duty of trendsetters can be justified by reference to these differences in resources and powers: "One's ability to help is a function of one's opportunities and position in society, and the greater the ability to help, the weightier the duty to do so" (Delmas 2018, 152-53).

that this second component was not as equally weighed as the first component (bias correction) in Anderson's view. Despite her apparent commitment to Deweyan pragmatism, she says little about the idea of testing moral principles in practice. While I agree with her assertion that "what is required is practical action to dislodge shared expectations, unsettle attitudes, and trigger practical deliberation" (Anderson 2014, 12), I worry that she tends to overintellectualize what practical action amounts to in social movements. Though she recognizes that both contention and deliberation are required, Anderson nonetheless thinks that reasons and arguments remain central in Abolitionists' activity to persuade people. On her view, the "change in view from acceptance to condemnation of slavery was therefore brought about by processes that we have good reason to believe tend to lead to better informed, less partial and narcissistic moral views" (Anderson 2014, 23). On this view, what is learned in this moral learning is the idea that every member of society is worthy of equal moral consideration whereas immorality is derived from partiality, misinformation, and narcissism. To be sure, I concur with her that "we should not dismiss moral argument as inert" (Anderson 2014, 12). But this is not exactly what is central in social movements. To this point, I argued that Anderson overlooks the power of social norms in her considerations of moral progress in the previous section. In this section, by underestimating testing moral principles in practice, I contend that her view seems to reduce a variety of learning styles to a single mode: deliberation.¹⁹²

This seems to contradict her commitment to pragmatism because pragmatist views are fundamentally pluralistic in allowing for various learning methods. I argue that her view of

¹⁹² It may be argued that this is not merely Anderson's fault. Rather, regarding the justification of insurrection, the difficulty consists in Dewey's view of instrumental reasoning strategies in pragmatism in the first place. Consider Harris's insurrectionist challenge to pragmatism: "There is not human progress without the discord of social conflict, insurrections, and revolutions.... The uses of intelligence, dramatic rehearsal, dialogue, and discourse are hardly the sole modes through which institutions fundamentally change" (Harris 2020, 272).

contention should be broadened if she wishes to be faithful to the pluralist aspect of pragmatism. Unlike her somewhat simplified picture of moral learning, there can be a plurality of pragmatic learning methods. Relatedly, despite her assertion that “Ultimately, moral claims, like factual claims, need to be tested in experience” (Anderson 2014, 24), what is notable in her naturalistic approach strikes me as not naturalistic enough. This is because, rather than showing “how groups actually manage to improve their practices” (Anderson 2014, 3), her view does not fully capture what is actually going on in dynamic processes of moral and social progress. In other words, the problem of Anderson’s approach is that it ends up privileging the role of bias correction in democratic moral inquiry at the expense of the vital role of group interests and social struggles in social change. In her theorizing, this method of correcting biases overrides the second method of pragmatic moral improvement: testing moral principles in practices, or “experiments in living” in Mill’s terminology.

These experiments of social movements without the predetermined final end, however, are not frictionless. Against King, we should not assume that “the arc of the moral universe” automatically bends toward justice. For instance, successful bias corrections are not the only probable and tendential consequence in social movements. Rather, some social movements may end up deepening pre-existing biases, resulting in group polarization (Sunstein 2006). Furthermore, it is unclear if Anderson leaves room for moral regress. In the actual social movements, unlike Anderson’s ideal and optimistic version, the possibility of epistemic bubbles and echo chambers is also pervasive (Nguyen 2020). This fact is especially disturbing when we consider the fact that many of the alleged unbiased moral reasonings in the history of philosophy were used to rationalize contemporary oppression and domination.¹⁹³ Consider some regressive social movements led by

¹⁹³. Consider Kant and many others in the history of Western philosophy. To name a few, “Hobbes’s depictions of native Americans as “savages”... Locke’s investments in the slave-trading Royal Africa Company, his role in

White supremacists. In this regard, I think Anderson should have further emphasized the pragmatic idea that social movements are fallible, open-ended, and experiential. Since alternative norms advanced by social movements can be defective in some respects, the eventual test of moral progress should be experiments in living under the new norms to see if they can solve the existing problems. This empirical test is vital partly because it is extremely difficult to determine what counts as moral progress once and for all without continuous experiments in living. In this regard, pragmatists' instrumental reasoning should not presume predictability and controllability of social movements.¹⁹⁴

Testing moral principles in practice is not simply a process of verification and corroboration of unbiased moral principles or falsification of them. In my view, as we can see in the pragmatic processes of trial-and-error, testing here should be construed more broadly than Anderson believes in her Deweyan analogy with scientific inquiries. Further, there are some feedback mechanisms of experimenting with moral principles in living. Therefore, correcting moral biases and testing them in practice should not be understood as two sequential stages, as Anderson calls them *ex ante* and *ex post* respectively. Of course, I do not deny that having good reasons for change by correcting biases is required. But in addition to this, surrounding social expectations in practice need to change as well. For, rather than having fixed criteria of moral

writing the Carolina Constitution, and his representation of Native Americans as incompetent appropriators; Rousseau's limiting of contemporaneous "savagery" to people of color and his noncondemnation of African slavery; and (the easiest case) Kant's racial hierarchies.... Hume's denial of nonwhite civilization, Hegel's Eurocentric characterization of the path of the World-spirit, and Mill's precolonial writings.... The key point is not merely the racism of these philosophers, as people, but the penetration of this racism into their theoretical claims, both descriptive and normative" (Mills 2017a, 69). As Mills writes, "the dynamic role of *white group interests* needs to be recognized and acknowledged as a central causal factor in generating and sustaining white ignorance" (Mills 2017b, 69).

¹⁹⁴ Jacoby Carter writes: "insurrection does not fit the pragmatist problem-solving pattern. Insurrection is an inherently precarious and unstable mode of conduct" (Carter 2013, 58). While I think that insurrection is precarious and unstable, a similar thing can be said about social movements, which can be seen as the pragmatist problem-solving pattern.

rightness, we can revise our moral principles in consideration of the actual consequences of following such principles. In turn, social practices of enforcing certain moral norms inform moral principles. In moral progress regarding racial injustice, broad anti-racist social movements contributed to revise and confirm our moral judgments by disrupting wrongful conventions. Consider the pragmatist notion of moral principles: they are commonly accepted as true in the sense of usefulness and functionality. For instance, far from pursuing fixed and transcendent moral truths out there, the moral principle that racism is morally wrong can be pragmatically established and enforced by the actual process of mutual accountability where racists are sanctioned and blamed by a moral community. This pragmatist view shows the social component of morality. I will elaborate on what this process of mutual accountability would be in terms of contentions and social enforcement in the following section.

5.6 Unlearning through (Un)civil Contentions

Despite her apparent emphasis on contentions, I argued that Anderson's pragmatism falls short since it actually reduces various learning methods to a single one, namely, deliberation at the expense of testing moral principles in practice in the previous section. In this section, to supplement Anderson's view of social movements, I suggest that social enforcement and sanction can be an important experiential mode of learning moral principles. For instance, examples of social movements include "street demonstrations, boycotts, teach-ins, sit-ins, picketing, strikes, and building occupations" (Anderson 2014, 9). I call attention to the fact that those contentious and confrontational activities are beyond pure moral appeals, which is concerned with correcting moral biases. Since Anderson says little about contentions as such, I aim to flesh out what she means by them by drawing on recent works on uncivil social movements. While her view overemphasizes the moment of bias correction in moral inquiry, to broaden her narrow view of

pragmatic learning, I would like to introduce the instance of unlearning as the reverse of learning. Unlearning is a stage of norm abandonment rather than norm change. Specifically, in our context, my claim is that citizen's democratic habits and attitudes are also cultivated by unlearning racist vices through social sanctions. This is worth emphasizing because exercising social sanctions for non-compliance is an important step in changing normative and empirical expectations: "Social norms ... always involve a strong social pressure to conform and, especially at their advent, the threat of punishment" (Bicchieri 2017, 118). The experimental mode of social sanctions can be utilized to revise wrongful moral practices. It may seem that sanctions and punishment are a mode of coercion and violence. While Anderson herself does not make a distinction between civil and uncivil contentions, one objection to the emphasis on contentions and sanctions is a danger of risking uncivility. To dissipate this concern, I will conclude by considering a pragmatist way to assess (un)civility of contentious activities.

To see why the process of testing moral principles in practice is fallible, non-progressive, and open-ended, I suggest that we call attention to the process of enforcement. Insofar as correcting moral biases is not sufficient, changing social expectations through enforcement should be posited as an essential part of social movements. Social enforcements explain at least partly why moral progress depends on changes in contentious, adversarial, and conflictual power relations. Note that this process of unlearning racist vices seems to be more horizontal than the process of learning mentioned above. In contrast, whereas Anderson largely describes contentious activities as vertical in the sense that the oppressed makes claims against the oppressor, I would like to note that this picture is rather incomplete. Contentious activities can be more aptly seen as horizontal in some cases since they are effective as mutual accountability among equal citizens. Contra pacifying and inert political communities, this is to remind us of the moral ideal that citizens are equal and free.

As Hannah Arendt nicely demonstrates it, for instance, civil disobedience can enable a sort of reenacting the horizontal social contract between citizens, reclaiming the political capacities of the citizenry and revitalizing the public sphere (Arendt 1970).

Unlearning is indispensable to undermine racist vices insofar as it exposes people to the experience of moral accountability. In Stephen Darwall's terminology, this can be seen as a matter of second-person authority in the sense of holding one another accountable for complying with beneficial social norms through the mediation of reactive attitudes.¹⁹⁵ The point is that the way we actually treat each other is relevant to moral learning. If old racist social norms learned in a lifetime's experience have permitted racist behaviors, unlearning racism is possible by viable social sanctions necessitated by new anti-racist social norms. Regardless of their personal beliefs, even extremist conservatives are forced to deny that their actions are overtly racist because of such social norms.

While the initiating role of the trendsetter is indispensable, the horizontal process of social enforcement is as important as the vertical process of emulating trendsetters since "if not enough people are changing, their change will be useless and worse, penalized" (Bicchieri 2017, 186). As I argued in chapter 3 in discussing the notion of civility, this unlearning is promoted by citizens' mutual sanctions such as informal punishment, shaming, and ostracization. For instance, on top of the traditional form of consciousness raising, the #metoo movement can be considered a new kind

¹⁹⁵ Once we learn that racism is morally wrong through moral contestation and emulating trendsetters, we can start to blame someone when they are not responsive to these anti-racist social norms. Recently, Anderson interestingly invokes what she calls moral apprehension: "Moral apprehension reflects aversion to guilt and being the target of others' blame, shame, and punishment. It serves the epistemic function of signalling to people that they are doing something wrong" (Anderson 2020, 29).

After repeating similar negative reactions to racist acts, triggering strong emotions such as disgust, resentment, and anger about racists can be fitting. Compare Marilyn Frye's view of anger with Anderson's idea of contention: "anger implies a claim to domain – a claim that one is a being whose purposes and activities require and create a web of objects, spaces, attitudes and interests that is worthy of respect, and that the topic of anger is a matter rightly within that web" (Frye 1983, 87).

of social enforcement against sexual harassment by mobilizing various measures of public naming and shaming.¹⁹⁶ As far as sexist social norms consist of informal rules and procedures concerning sexual harassment, it is important to make bystanders interventions and reports substantially available and readily accessible by lowering costs and increasing expected benefits of such a risky intervention. This will effectively contribute to updating proper empirical and normative expectations of many conditional rule followers who are sensitive to social norms.¹⁹⁷ In turn, changing the empirical and normative expectations is followed by the reconfiguration of the structure of preference. That is, in addition to adopting professionalism as a norm against sexual harassment that can allow women to speak up, the point of the #metoo movement is to introduce a social norm that women ought to publicly oppose sexual harassment and sanction individual wrongdoers (Rasmussen and Yaouzis 2020).

A similar means can be promoted regarding anti-racist social movements. Yet, one may argue that the #metoo movement has gone too far and thereby have become uncivil precisely because of the mechanism of informal punishment, shaming, and ostracization. To use a recent event as an example, some aspects of the massive anti-racist social movements in the wake of the police killing of George Floyd in 2020 have been criticized on the grounds of violence and uncivility. In the remainder of the chapter, I will argue that the pragmatist view should consider the efficacy of activist interventions in varying contexts. In this regard, I find it somewhat futile to strictly distinguish civil and uncivil forms of social movements once and for all. Before delving

¹⁹⁶ Note that the #metoo movement also needed a few trendsetters for it to be actualized. For many, speaking up needs a big leap and is possible by lowering some thresholds by a few prefiguring trendsetters.

¹⁹⁷ This qualification of “many” allows for a few exceptional people who do not care about surrounding social norms such as what Rasmussen and Yaouzis call “jerks” and “saints” respectively. According to them, saints, like trendsetters, always act on moral norms regardless of social expectations whereas jerks act immorally irrespective of social expectations.

into this question, we need to know what uncivil is. To understand the role of contentions, in this regard, it is helpful to consider a recent debate between civil and uncivil social movements.

Candice Delmas has recently argued that much of the traditional theory of civil disobedience overlooks and underestimates the value of uncivil disobedience and “a richer repertoire of political resistance” (Delmas 2018, 23). Her theory reacts to Rawls’s well-known definition of civil disobedience as “a public, nonviolent, conscientious yet political act contrary to law usually done with the aim of bringing about a change in the law or policies of the government” in what he calls a nearly just society (Rawls 1999b, 322).¹⁹⁸ For civil disobedience to be justified, it should also protest a serious violation of justice and be done as a last resort, coordinating an alliance with other minorities (Rawls 1999b, 326-8). This is to be distinguished from other forms of political action such as militant resistance and revolution that do not have fidelity to the law. Here I do not disagree with Rawls that civil disobedience as an integral part of social movements should be public in a broad sense. But one immediate objection would be that our topic questions whether this racist society is nearly just in the first place. While Rawls would admit that “militant action and other kinds of resistance” (Rawls 1999b, 323) can be justified in the face of severely unjust societies, it is contestable how we should consider a society like ours from a Rawlsian perspective.¹⁹⁹ Also, it may be argued that the main point in changing racist social norms is not just a change in law or policy but also a broader cultural configuration.

More importantly, what Rawls takes to be civil seems dubious. Indeed, it is often argued that Rawls’s stipulations of civil disobedience such as nonviolence, publicity, and willingness to

¹⁹⁸ A similar view is held by Habermas: “Civil disobedience is a morally justified protest which may not be founded only on private convictions or individual self-interests; it is a public act ... ; it includes the premeditated transgression of legal norms... ; it demands the readiness to accept the legal consequences of the transgression of those norms; the infraction by which civil disobedience is expressed has an exclusively symbolic character – hence is derived the restriction to nonviolent means of protest” (Habermas 1985, 100).

¹⁹⁹ I dealt with this issue regarding the Rawls-Mills debate in chapter 2. I concur with Mills’s view is that it is far from clear if Rawls sees the polity like the US as severely unjust society.

accept legal punishment (non-evasiveness) count as the conditions for civility. However, I am especially concerned with the idea of nonviolence. While it is the case that civil disobedience aims at communicating morally progressive messages, there is no reason to assume that violence is necessarily coercive and harmful. Some forms of violence, on the contrary, can be used for powerful persuasion, rather than being a brute force. Even though King is deemed as an obvious case of civil disobedience by Rawls, King is explicit that “nonviolent direct action seeks to create such a crisis and foster such a tension that a community which has constantly refused to negotiate is *forced to confront* the issue. It seeks so to dramatize the issue that it can no longer be ignored” (King 1983, 168, my emphasis). However, from the pragmatist position I endorse, King’s qualification does not exclude that forcing people to confront the issue can be done by some qualified forms of violence such as social enforcement. King is explicit that “some form of constructive coercive power” (King 2010, 137) is permissible. The ultimate aim is dramatizing the issue and thereby influencing others through constructively coercive social sanctions. Democracy may be viable through seemingly non-democratic means. As Delmas writes, “Incivility may ... be appropriate— and uncivil disobedience may be justified— where agents are oppressed, silenced, and otherwise marginalized” (Delmas 2018, 68). In this regard, what I call uncivility is equivalent to what Derek Edyvane calls incivility. It is “the deliberately crafted subversion of the prevailing civility code the authority of which the perpetrator acknowledges” (Edyvane 2020, 97). As far as incivility acknowledges the bindingness of shared social norms in society as a common project, it is contrasted with anti-sociality, which stems from ignorance, sociopathy, and being a jerk by not caring about social norms. In recognizing the authority of prevailing social norms, incivility turns to “a shared, social language of disrespect” (Edyvane 2020, 97).

As I argued in chapter 3, civility can be valuable in signaling and communicating moral messages such as tolerance, respect, and considerateness by utilizing contingent social conditions. By contrast, “incivilities draw on a common verbal and behavioral language for displaying disrespect, intolerance, or inconsiderateness” (Calhoun 2000, 260). But does this lead to a problematic sort of quietism? For civility can be seen as suitable to “the white moderate ... who is more devoted to ‘order’ than to justice; who prefers a negative peace which is the absence of tension to a positive peace which is the presence of justice” (King 1983, 171). Similarly, Linda Zerilli argues that “the accusation of incivility ... has been a familiar means for denying the political (and thus common) quality of” (Zerilli 2014, 116) the claims of the oppressed. However, civility is not a mere stabilizing tool for the oppressive elite groups but a very site of social and political struggle. Against the charge that my account of civility is not a proper answer to racist oppression, I argued that civility should not be narrowly construed as good manners or getting along well.²⁰⁰ Rather, displaying and communicating disrespect and intolerance towards unjust racism can be considered morally justified. My view of anti-racist civility is more contentious and confrontational than critics may suppose since civility in my view is to pursue anti-violence, rather than non-violence (Balibar 2015).²⁰¹ My view allows that the process of unlearning can be

²⁰⁰ For a similar view, see Celikates: “civil disobedience thus emerges as an essentially collective and political practice of contestation – as a form of struggle in which the vertical form of state authority is confronted with the horizontal power of the association of citizens or the governed” (Celikates 2016a, 41). In this regard, I am more on the side of inclusive accounts of civility that expands the category of civil disobedience to include so-called uncivil acts. According to this view, civil disobedience should be seen as ambivalent as it oscillates between symbolic politics and real confrontation: “Situated between the poles of symbolic politics and real confrontation, civil disobedience exposes the tension between institutionalized, constituted, and constituting power, between ‘constitutional politics’ and ‘insurrectional politics.’ This tension, however, is at the basis of democracy – and it keeps open the dialectic between these two poles against the claim that it has been successfully resolved and that no further struggles are necessary” (Celikates 2016a, 43).

²⁰¹ This understanding can be compared to Robin Celikates’s definition of civil disobedience as non-violence: “an intentionally unlawful and principled collective act of protest ... with which citizens ... pursue the political aim of changing specific laws, policies, or institutions ... in ways that can be seen as civil (as opposed to military)” (Celikates 2016b, 985). Here it is notable that the term “civil” is contrasted with “*military*.” According to Norbert Elias, the civilizing process is also characterized as a pacifying process of restraining violence (Elias 2000).

compatible with and oftentimes promoted by uncivil kinds of social movement as a radical challenge of the status quo.

In expanding Rawls's narrow definition of civil disobedience, it is notable that Delmas defines uncivil disobedience as "disobedient acts that are principled yet also deliberately offensive, covert, anonymous, more than minimally destructive, not respectful of their targets, or which do not aim to communicate to an audience the need to reform laws, policies, or institutions" (Delmas 2016, 685). Although I think that uncivil disobedience, whether it be covert or anonymous, must communicate certain messages to an audience in the last instance,²⁰² Delmas's definition is still instructive in that it is inclusive enough to permit some limited sort of offensive, destructive, and disrespectful forms of communication beyond Rawls's narrow scope of what civil disobedience counts. Consider the example of the quarterback Colin Kaepernick, who kneeled during the American national anthem to dissent police brutality against Blacks. Regarding the aim of social movements, what Anderson calls contentions correspond to what Delmas calls uncivil disobedience. While learning new social norms can be achieved by emulating a few virtuous and civil trendsetters like King and Ghandi, it is important to see that unlearning can often be promoted by provoking uncivil social movements such as blockades, occupations, whistleblowing, rioting, and the like. The point of uncivility is epistemic in that "uncivil speech and action can enlarge citizens' sense of both what counts as a common matter and who counts as a political speaker" (Zerilli 2014, 131). To the extent that uncivil speech and action are instrumental to enlarge citizens' idea of what counts as morally pertinent, pragmatists should not exclude this uncivil mode of moral learning. Oftentimes, uncivility is needed precisely because it would influence and inspire people in effective ways. It is a way of forcing people to encounter the actuality they want to deny or

²⁰² Consider that media coverages, social media, and press releases can contribute to broader communication of the key message of uncivil disobedience, even including secretive and evasive ones.

ignore. Insofar as learning needs various resources, something beyond rational persuasion can be effective. Disruption, tension, offense, rudeness, demand, and coercion may be mobilized to compel people to unlearn racism to some degree.

But my partial endorsement of uncivil forms of contentious activities does not necessarily mean that civility is totally obsolete. Rather, as I argued in chapter 3, civility can be necessary to protect the marginalized and need not be the same as a mere principle of decorum. Further, the oppressed being civil can be often used to demonstrate that oppressors are by contrast uncivil and barbaric. I am not advocating for militancy and violent forms of social movements either.²⁰³ In many cases, uncivil acts can backfire and are “more likely to *reproduce* authoritarian populism’s disturbing political logic than *counteract* it” (Sheuerman 2019, 3; Mutz 2015).²⁰⁴ While Delmas is right in resisting moralizing tendencies of domesticating uncivility, we should not bend the stick too much, expanding the legitimate scope of uncivility. Following pragmatist and realist views, it is important to note that while uncivil acts can be permissible to some degree, all that matters in the last instance is to find *effective* ways of intervention for unjust social norms. We should accept that there are cases when civility goes right as well as when incivility goes wrong and vice versa in accordance with differing social circumstances. This is where pragmatist and strategic considerations come in. On this view, we do not need to choose between a stark and perhaps false

²⁰³ One may say that violence against property should be much less problematic than violence against persons. Also, violence as a means of self-defense seems not necessarily morally wrongful. Shelby also specifies permissible forms of dissent. According to him, some unlawful actions such as shoplifting, theft, welfare fraud, tax evasion, and the like can be compatible with one's natural duties (Shelby 2016, 220). Under oppressive conditions of material deprivation, racialized stigma, and institutional racism, one response to the Ghetto plight can take the form of spontaneous rebellion ranging from “openly transgressing conventional norms, expressing contempt for authority, desecrating revered symbols, pilfering from employers or state institutions, vandalizing public and private property, or disrupting public events” to “the urban riot, where looting, mass destruction of property, and brutal violence are on public display (Shelby 2016, 223)”

²⁰⁴ For instance, “Today, video recordings of police killings of innocent blacks, spread by social media and Black Lives Matter, aim to activate sympathy for the victims, horror at their unjust treatment, and outrage against the criminal justice system that refuses to hold police accountable or reform police practices. Sympathy for and outrage on behalf of victims is insufficient for justice, however. In the absence of respect for the oppressed, sympathy is compatible with inferiorization and may tire easily” (Anderson 2020, 32).

dichotomy between civility and uncivility. Even uncivility has some kind of civil constraints insofar as uncivil “resistors must act with respect for other people’s interests,” while seeking “the least harmful course of action feasible to achieve their (legitimate) goal” (Delmas 2018, 49).

Indeed, after the BLM movement, it is notable that Delmas herself cites empirical research suggesting that “a majority of Americans (57 percent) ‘feel unfavorable to towards Black Lives Matter protests.’ Only 35 percent of Whites feel favorably toward the movement. The problem is not simply that most people remain unmoved; it is that they don’t hear the rioters’ speech” (Delmas 2018, 66).²⁰⁵ In the same passage, she goes on to say that “Uncivil disobedients may have no hope of bringing about any changes anyway.”²⁰⁶ For she believes that “even if acts of uncivil disobedience are counterproductive to the broader goal of affecting sociopolitical change, they may still constitute intrinsically valuable expressions of dissent, solidarity, and agency” (Delmas 2018, 67). While I agree that uncivil disobedience may have some expressive value like asserting dignity and solidarity of the oppressed, I find Delmas’s assertion problematic because bringing about sociopolitical changes is the very point of social movements. Since civility should be communicative to the broader public, not just an internal audience within an ally, it is my claim that a more nuanced approach for its efficacy is needed. If uncivil acts turn out to be ineffective in educating anti-racism, they should be tactically revised in a more civil way. By contrast, when civil acts are not effective, uncivil forms of social movements can be warranted. This pragmatic process of trial-and-error is a long and difficult project, which requires concrete analyses of

²⁰⁵ Surely, while this poll could be questionable concerning the attitudes of Whites toward this movement as ongoing events, let’s suppose the poll is correct.

²⁰⁶ In a similar vein, Tommie Shelby writes: “When legitimate avenues for political action fail to produce results or are closed off, such public unrest can seem to be the only power the ghetto poor can wield collectively that has a chance of garnering concessions from the state” (Shelby 2016, 223). Like Delmas, Shelby believes that the expression of solidarity is valuable as “a positive expression of association with those most burdened by the injustices one condemns. Such dissent is a way of pledging allegiance to the downtrodden (or perhaps the affirmation of a vow already made), a way of signaling that one is prepared to come to their defense and can be trusted as an ally” (Shelby 2016, 268). For a recent survey of the notion of solidarity, see Kolers 2016a.

specific and particular cases. Using Delmas's own words, I believe that utilizing civility should be strategically evaluated in terms of the political usefulness, with "context-dependent, tactical purposes" (Delmas 2018, 27).²⁰⁷ I am not denying that the need for the political usefulness is mentioned by Delmas: "A sympathetic approach should be phenomenologically accurate - that is, faithful to practitioner's self-understanding - and politically useful, which is to say able to contribute to public debates" (Delmas 2018, 23). Yet, what she overlooks is that these two requirements for uncivil disobedience can be incompatible in some instances. My pragmatic view argues for the superiority of the political usefulness over the phenomenological accuracy.

Let me conclude by noting that my pragmatic view is not necessarily gradual and reformist. Rather, it is consistent with what Chris Lebron calls a new black radicalism. In the article "Time for a New Black Radicalism," he defines radicalism as "the explicit intention to use strong, nonconventional and unsanctioned means to effect systemic change by either disrupting the status quo or reinstating a preferred previous status quo" (Lebron 2012). According to him, the central motivation across various black racial thoughts is "to secure for blacks, against the history of white supremacy and the persistent racial oppression it has spawned, a degree of respect and dignity by means that directly confront and reconfigure both the discourse of and policies around racial injustice" (Lebron 2012). However, in contrast to fundamentalism, I would like to note that this radicalism is inherently pragmatic. What Lebron terms black radicalism need not necessarily involve violence and require insurgency as a way of life. The question is: "*which* flavor of black radicalism should be embraced – Malcolm's or Martin's?" (Lebron 2012). While he does not give

²⁰⁷ While I see some concerns about civility, I disagree with Lee McBride's following assertion for the reason above: "While some (e.g. moral suasionists) endorse more conventional character traits (such as *civility*, restraint, compassion, and humility) in like circumstances, the insurrectionist ethicist holds that the valorization of such character traits in persecuted populations is *counterproductive*. These conventional character traits render an oppressed population self-effacing, submissive, impotent, and pliable. This, in effect, pacifies and binds these populations, squelching even the notion of resistance" (McBride 2017, 228-29, my emphasis).

a definite answer between Martin Luther King (“The Negro must love the white man”) and Malcolm X (“You do too much singing. Today it is time to stop singing, and start swinging”), my view of social movement as pragmatic learning and unlearning permits tactical uses of both kinds of radicalism: civil and uncivil. We need both learning by trendsetters (Martin Luther King) and unlearning through contentious activities (Malcolm X). Given the limit of local and spontaneous protests as seen in the Black Lives Matter movement, Lebron also asserts that “any resurgent black radical politics must also be a unified politics, one that values central leadership coupled with an explicit program of action” (Lebron 2012). This point concerning unity and commitment is resonant with the need for a proper political avant-garde in social movements that I have advocated for.

5.7 Conclusion

I have argued that the insights of Andersons’ pragmatic view of social movements should be further pushed and revised. First, I explained the two distinct moments of social movements for moral progress: correcting moral biases and testing moral principles in practice. I then showed that her view of bias correction in morality does not take into account the power of social norms. To elaborate this point, I claimed that learning through trendsetters and the political avant-garde in social movements is overlooked in her account of democracy. In addition to this, I argued that Anderson’s idea is not pragmatic enough in that she does not take the moment of testing moral principles in practice seriously. For pragmatists, social movements should be able to mobilize various methods in learning beyond rational persuasion. To remedy this, drawing on Delmas’s works on uncivil disobedience, I argued that unlearning racism is possible by contentions and social sanctions. Building on this, my conclusion is that pragmatists should consider civil and uncivil social movements in terms of their efficacy.

CONCLUSION

So far, I have responded to respond to the question: Why does racism persist? I have also engaged the interrelated location problem of racism: Where is racism? Racism can be agent-based, institutional, and structural. When we merely focus on these two extremes (individual and institution), we cannot understand how racism persists despite the official and institutional abolition of slavery and other racist apparatuses. My answer throughout the foregoing chapters has been that racism is embedded in various social norms which are embodied in social practices, institutions, and individuals.

To reiterate, in chapter 1, I lay groundwork for a social ontological understanding of racism. There I draw on Hacking and Haslanger to consider social constructionist view of racism and then provide a two-tier analysis of racism: sub-personal and supra-personal mechanisms, which aim to show the collective intentionality-based view is misguided. I also engage with some existing views on racism in chapter 2-5: Rawls, Mills, Garcia, Shelby, Haslanger, and Anderson. Against Rawls, I argue that racism can exist outside of the basic structure, which is the primary object of his theory of justice. This is a different kind of critique than Mills's claim that the Rawlsian basic structure as such is racist. Rather, I argue that the scope of the basic structure should be more broadly construed given the pervasive structure of society. Even if the basic structure is not racialized, what Rawls calls the background culture can involve racist social norms which also function to undermine the sense of self-respect of racialized citizens. Against Garcia, I argue that racism is not merely correlated with individual volitions. Garcia's volitional account is subject to a kind of situationist critique according to which agential racist vices are cultivated by racist social environments. Rather, given the social and structural constraints of individual racism in mind, we

can counteract racism by constructing a proper social norm of civility. Here civility is a sort of anti-racist social norm which is understood as a tactic of anti-violence rather than non-violence.

I then turn to racism as ideology. Against Shelby, I contend that racist ideologies need not be connected to doxastic and irrational beliefs or doctrines. Against Haslanger, I claim that racist ideologies should be seen as harmful social norms, which are broader than her view of cultural technēs. This implies that racist ideologies should be understood in terms of nonepistemic, nonmoral, and functional aspects. Accordingly, interventions and critiques of racist ideologies should consider various elements such as motivations, interests, and needs of particular groups regarding conditional and contextual social norms, not just appealing to epistemic and moral truths. Finally, against Anderson, I argue for a pragmatist view of anti-racist social movements. We can see the need for considering racist social norms can be demonstrated by referring to moral learning through trendsetters and social sanctions/contentions. Here I argued for pragmatic considerations of employing civil and uncivil types of social movements. In other words, moral suasion should be strategically combined with mobilizing contentious activities. If there is an obligation to resist oppression (Hay 2011; Cudd 2006; Harvey 2010), social movements can socially cultivate this sense of the obligation. Despite its potential ideological functions, social norms themselves are not intrinsically harmful. Rather, we live by them. The pressing task is to transform harmful social norms into beneficial ones.

Obviously, I do not claim that those figures I chose are exhaustive of all the existing accounts of racism. Further, there can be anomalies with any account of racist logic.²⁰⁸ With this in mind, while there are a variety of racisms, I had to be selective in what I take to be a few

²⁰⁸ “General features of racism do not neatly map to particular conditions. That is one reason why explanations of miseries in radically different societies should vary” (Harris 2018, 278).

representative accounts of racism in terms of institution, volition, ideology with regard to social norms.

Further, my dissertation has its own limitations, which can point to future research. First of all, while much of what I have written can be applied to group-based oppression such as sexism, misogyny, xenophobia, colonialism, and the like, I could not specifically consider the intersectional aspects of oppression. In this regard, decolonial, Black feminist or Black male studies can be valuable resources. The intersection between class and race such as racial exploitation is another pressing issue (Balibar 1999; Mills 2003b). Second, since my focus has been on the various aspect of social norms, I do not particularly focus on the lived experience of the oppressed. While I believe that the validity of the first-person experience is not immune from critical scrutiny, I do not claim that this is altogether unimportant. What I am arguing is that, from a point of critical social theory, some degree of abstracting (if not omitting) the lived experience is inevitable. Perhaps phenomenological and existential views of racism can be a helpful supplement (Gordon 1999).

Relatedly, the current project does not specifically engage with recent works on social epistemology (Mills 2007; Fricker 2007; Dotson 2011; Medina 2013) and its relation to racist ideologies. This is another topic worth examining. Moreover, while I am sympathetic to interdisciplinary approaches to racism, I do not incorporate here empirical works on racism and social norms. For instance, I could not deal with many existing works on social norms that involve more technical game-theoretic theorems. Likewise, social psychological mechanisms of implicit biases are worth examining. Theories of cultural evolution may also help to understand transmission and learning of various social norms. Though psychologies of internalizing social norms, categorization, and heuristics can be an interesting subject on their own, my dissertation

does not particularly engage with those empirical works. However, I do develop some normative implications for these by focusing on the social and political dimensions of social norms. I hope to extend my future research to accommodate more empirical and interdisciplinary works.

Finally, it should be stressed that there are a variety of mechanisms through which racism works. While extensive racism is most obviously against African Americans in the contemporary US and my discussion in the dissertation usually assumes racism as anti-black racism, other groups including Asian Americans and Native Americans should be considered. In this regard, group-based particularities of racism should not be overlooked. For instance, racism as the form of anti-Latinx sentiments is widely employed in the case of anti-immigration. Hence, one may say that the so-called Juan Crow segregation continues and extends Jim Crow segregation concerning anti-Latinx/anti-immigration sentiments. For another example, calling COVID-19 Chinese virus leads to a new threat to many Asians in the world. The exploration of these specific manifestations of racism can be possible future research projects.

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