

**REJECTING PHYSICALISM:
A CAUSAL ANALYSIS OF AUGUSTINE'S ARGUMENT
FROM PRESENCE TO INCORPOREALITY**

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First and foremost, this work is dedicated to my wife, Mary Rebecca Krylow, and to my sons, Joseph Paul Krylow and Emil Franklin Krylow. Second, it is dedicated to all the teachers, leaders, friends and family that have believed in me or inspired me to be a better thinker and person: Joseph Emil Krylow III, Donna Marie Smith, Margaret Mabel Krylow, Damion Paul Krylow, Ryan Caudill, Ray Smith, Jeremy Crawford, Nick Staugaitis, Mark Linden, Josh Folk, Samuel Bennett, Paula Lutz, Samuel Anderson, Staff Sergeant Hanks, Gunnery Sergeant Carmody, Captain Mullins, Sergeant Major Theakston, Lukas Mann, Paul Quijano, Nathan Murr, Paul Franklin Bauer, Zena Hitz, Katherin Rogers, Jeffrey Brower, Michael Bergmann, Jan Cover, Laura Hawkins, Socrates, Plato, Augustine, and Jesus Christ. Without each of you (and in more ways than one) this work would not have been realized. Onward!

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ABSTRACT

This work aims to shed new light on Augustine of Hippo's mature dualistic view of the world, the master argument he advanced in support of it, and how it was different from the competing physicalist model that was both prevalent during his time and of which he had earlier been a proponent. Specifically, it aims to understand these topics in light of Augustine's position on the relation of *nonphysical* (or *incorporeal*) objects to space. This topic has yet to be extensively discussed and the secondary claims one finds regarding the matter differ: for some authors claim that Augustine did take nonphysical objects to be located in space and others claim that he did not. I hold that part of the reason for the lack of consensus on this topic is the reliance by each group of authors on limited and distinct sets of direct quotations from Augustine's writings. In contrast to previous treatments, I approach Augustine's position by way of his account of *spatial location* and his account of *incorporeal* objects. On these grounds, in addition to a more comprehensive set of direct textual data, *Chapter 1* argues for *Modal~SLI* or the thesis that *pace* the affirmative position and *beyond* the negative one, Augustine was committed to the view that incorporeal objects generally, and God and human souls in particular, not only *lack* spatial location – they *cannot* be so located. *Chapter 2* argues from *Modal~SLI* in conjunction with further forms of evidence, against *spatial readings* of Augustine's notion of *presence* and for a *causal account* (or *CP*). The causal account holds that Augustine took presence *per se* to be a kind of causal relation which does not require or entail spatially located *relata*. On the basis of *CP* and *Modal~SLI* and additional forms of evidence, *Chapter 3* argues against spatial readings and for a causal analysis of Augustine's argument from presence to the incorporeality of human souls. *Chapter 4* argues on these same bases against the spatial reading and for a causal analysis of Augustine's argument from omnipresence to God's incorporeality. Additionally, *Chapters 3*

and 4 contain extensive discussions of the support that Augustine's provides for the premises in each of the arguments that is their focus. *Chapter 5*, which is the capstone of this project, draws out the implications of earlier chapters to advance new and more complete models of Augustine's mature dualistic view of the world, the rational basis upon which he endorsed the dualistic model and rejected the competing physicalist one, and the comparative relations between his mature model and the physicalist one. Among the conclusions it advances are the following: (i) in including both physical and nonphysical objects Augustine's mature view includes objects that are and must be located in space and objects that are not and cannot be located in space; (ii) in including God and human souls as nonphysical objects it includes them as objects that are not and cannot be located in space; (iii) causal claims (i.e., claims expressing causal relations) were central drivers of Augustine's personal transition from a physicalist to a dualistic view of the world and were central elements of his impersonal or public case against physicalism and for dualism; and (iv) the dualist and physicalist models were similar in that each included physical objects, objects with spatial location, and God and human souls; but they differed in that unlike the physicalist model, the dualist model also included nonphysical objects, objects without spatial location, and numbered God and human souls as nonphysical objects and hence objects without spatial locations.

INTRODUCTION

Assume that God and human souls exist and are nonphysical objects (i.e., objects with no intrinsic spatial extension). Imagine now a map that aims to represent the entirety of space, and to mark the location of every object that has a spatial location. Would (or even could) God and human souls be located on such a map?

According to some commentators, if one were to have posed this question to the early medieval philosopher Augustine of Hippo, he would have answered affirmatively. For on their reading, which is currently gaining prevalence, Augustine took God and souls to be nonphysical *and* to be located in space in the same generic sense in which he took physical objects to be so located. In particular, Augustine took souls to be located in the same portion of space in which the bodies they animate are located and he took God to be located everywhere in space.¹

Other authors, however, have claimed that Augustine denied that nonphysical objects such as God and human souls were spatially located.² Furthermore, there seem to be several passages in Augustine's works which strongly support this negative view, and to which proponents of the affirmative position have either not responded or have not responded adequately.

Contemporary discourse on Augustine's philosophy therefore stands in a state of unaddressed and un-adjudicated tension with respect to this issue: some claim that Augustine attributed spatial location to nonphysical objects, and others deny this; neither party has given a robust or

¹ Proponents of the affirmative position include: Inman (2017), Pasnau (2011), Wierenga (2019) and Goetz and Taliaferro (2011).

² Proponents of the negative position include: Tornau, (2019), Marenbon (2017), and Sundrez-Nani (2017). Marenbon (2017) suggests that Abelard was a proponent of the negative position as well.

comprehensive defense of their view or response to the alternative one. What, therefore, was Augustine's view? Would he have included marks for the location of God and human souls on a complete map of physical space? Or would he have taken such marks to be erroneous?

One might find this topic interesting, or take it to be worthy of scholarly attention, but at the same time suspect that it's an isolated or minor one within Augustine's philosophy. One might therefore also suspect that the task of pinning down Augustine's position regarding it, is one that stands to yield a result of little impact, relevance or significance to Augustinian scholarship. But how one understands Augustine's position on this issue impacts his or her understanding of several further topics of importance within Augustinian Studies, including: (a) his account of the physical-nonphysical divide, (b) his notion of *presence* generally, (c) his account of God's omnipresence, (d) his account of the soul's presence in the body, (e) his arguments from presence to incorporeality, (f) his view of human beings, (g) the content of his mature model or map of reality, and (h) how and why his mature map differed from his earlier one. Understanding Augustine's position on the relation of nonphysical objects to space, therefore, is fundamental to a complete understanding of a host of further important topics.

Given what's at stake regarding our understanding of Augustine's position on the issue, in conjunction with the fact that it has yet to be comprehensively treated and the fact that contemporary secondary discourse stands in a state of un-addressed tension over it, the question of whether or not Augustine took incorporeal objects to be located in space is not only worthy of careful and comprehensive scholarly attention, but urgently calls for it. The task of this work is to answer that call and to work out the consequences which follow for our understanding of the

further elements of Augustine's philosophy such as those listed in (a) – (h) above. This task is realized across the following five chapters.³

Chapter 1. "To Be Nowhere, Yet Be": Augustine on Incorporeal Objects as Spatially Unlocatable. I hold that part of the reason for the lack of consensus regarding Augustine's position on the relation of incorporeal objects to space is previous commentators' reliance on limited and distinct sets of direct quotations from Augustine's writings. In contrast to previous treatments, I approach Augustine's position on the topic by way of his account of spatial location (i.e., his account what it is to stand in a location relation to space) and his account of incorporeal objects. On these grounds, in addition to a more comprehensive set of direct textual data than has previously been considered, Chapter 1 argues for *Modal~SLI* or the thesis that *pace* the affirmative position (which I call *SLI*) and *beyond* the negative one (which I call *~SLI*) Augustine was committed to the view that incorporeal substances generally, and God and human souls in particular, not only *lack* spatial location – they *cannot* be so located. For Augustine takes being located in space to not only require but to consist in being intrinsically spatially extended (i.e., having the property of being extended in the three spatial dimensions of length, width, and height) and he takes incorporeal or nonphysical objects by their very nature to lack such extension. It follows, therefore, that Augustine took being located in space to be part of the physical-nonphysical divide, and not just a contingent part but a necessary part; for while physical objects are and must be located in space, nonphysical objects neither are nor can be spatially located; to be nonphysical is to be nowhere yet be.

³ The accounts of the dissertation chapters that follow aim to highlight the main claims of each chapter and give readers an overview of the logical relations between each chapter and thus an overview of the argument of the dissertation as a whole. Each chapter advances several further important claims beyond these.

Chapter 2. Augustine's Causal Theory of Presence. The notion of *presence* is a prominent one in Augustine's works and central to his philosophical system. One often finds it expressed in his discussions of what he took to be the two most important topics – God and human souls; for he claims God is present everywhere and that human souls are present in the bodies they animate. One therefore cannot understand Augustine's views on God's relation to creation or of souls' relation to bodies without understanding his account of this notion. Chapter 2 argues from *Modal~SLI* in conjunction with further forms of evidence, against spatial readings of Augustine's notion of *presence* (which I call *SP*) and for a causal account (or *CP*). The causal account holds that Augustine took presence *per se* to be a kind of causal relation which does not require spatially located relata. That he does not take it to require spatially located relata follows from *Modal~SLI* in conjunction with the fact that Augustine took God to be nonphysical but stand in a presence relation to all beings, and the fact that he took human souls to be nonphysical but to stand in a presence relation to the bodies they animate. That he understood the relation positively as being a kind of causal relation, follows from a variety of evidence including his own explications of the claim that *God is present everywhere* in terms of God applying causal, creative, sustaining and governing powers to all things and his explications of the claim that *souls are present in the bodies they animate* in terms of souls applying animating, sensitive, sustaining, and governing powers on bodies.

The next two chapters carry forward the main conclusions of the first two (i.e., *Modal~SLI* and *CP*) to advance new accounts of two important arguments in Augustine's works which centrally involve the notion of *presence*.

Chapter 3. Rejecting Psychic Physicalism: A Causal Analysis of Augustine's Argument from Presence to the Incorporeality of Human Souls. The Argument from Presence (or *AP*) is what I

call one of Augustine's main arguments against physicalist conceptions of human souls as it centrally involves or turns on the notion of presence. It may be stated as follows:

- (1) Human souls are simultaneously wholly present in each part of the body they animate. (*The Presence Claim*)
- (2) No physical or spatially extended substance could be simultaneously wholly present in each part of the body. (*The Incompatibility Claim*)
- (3) Thus, the human soul is nonphysical. (*Psychic Nonphysicalism*)

Generically we may say that the argument rests on claims which assert that human souls are present in extended objects in a way that it is impossible for a physical object to be. Previous discussions of AP have either left the argument unanalyzed in terms of its central notion (i.e., presence) or have suggested that it be understood as resting on claims which assert that the manner in which human souls are located in space is impossible for a physical object to realize. On the basis of *Modal~SLI* and other forms of evidence, (including Augustine's claims that souls are incapable of movement in space), *Chapter 3* argues against spatial readings of the argument. On the basis of *CP*, it argues for the causal account which holds that the argument rests on claims which assert that the manner in which human souls are causally related to the bodies they animate, is not possible for a physical object to realize. Additionally, this chapter goes beyond previous discussion of AP in extensively treating Augustine's case for the *presence claim* and *incompatibility claim* of that argument.

Chapter 4. Rejecting Theistic physicalism: A Causal Analysis of Augustine's Argument from Omnipresence to God's Non-Incorporeality. This chapter mirrors the previous one in terms of structure, but in place of AP, it takes an argument which I call the *Argument from*

Omnipresence (or *AO*) as its target of analysis.⁴ *AO* is one of Augustine's main arguments against physicalist conceptions of God. It may be stated as follows:

- (1) God is simultaneously wholly present in each part of extended creation. (*The Omnipresence Claim*)
- (2) No physical or spatially extended substance could be simultaneously wholly present in each part of extended reality. (*The Incompatibility Claim*)
- (3) Thus, God is nonphysical. (*Theistic nonphysicalism*)

Generically we may say that the argument rests on claims which assert that God is present in extended reality in a way that it is impossible for a physical object to be. Previous discussions of *AO* have either left the argument unanalyzed in terms of its central notion (i.e., presence) or have suggested that it be understood as resting on claims which assert that the manner in which God is located in space is impossible for a physical object to realize. On the basis of *Modal~SLI* and other forms of evidence, *Chapter 4* argues against spatial readings of the argument. On the basis of *CP*, it argues for the causal account which holds that the argument rests on claims which assert that the manner in which God is causally related physical creation is impossible for a physical object to realize. Additionally, this chapter goes beyond previous discussion of *AO* in

⁴ Given the similar structure of 3 and 4, readers may wonder why AP and AO were not treated together in one chapter or why a more abstract argument schema of which AP and AO are instantiations was not chosen as the target of analysis. There are several reasons for treating them separately. First, in addition to lacking systematically and textually motivated analyses of the AP and AO in terms of their central notion of *presence*, secondary commentary was also lacking with respect to discussion of the case that Augustine makes for the premises of AP and AO; given the importance of these arguments in Augustine's (personal and public) rejection of psychic and theistic physicalism it was deemed worthwhile to discuss the deeper "evidential roots" of the argument; arguing for the causal analysis of AP and AO and showing his case for the different premises of each argument, however, would have resulted in too long a paper; as would have discussing AP and AO and highlighting more generic Master Argument of which AP and AO were particular instantiations and showing that the case for the premises of each particular version. Furthermore, Chapters 3 and 4 also contain discussions of Augustine's account of the varieties of psychic and theistic physicalism of which he was aware and discussions of the previous versions of each of these views that Augustine himself had earlier held. Lastly, in Chapter 5, and after having shown evidence for and discussed AP and AO in chapters 3 and 4, I will suggest that behind both AP and AO that there is an abstract argument schema of which AP and AO are particular instantiations, which I call Master AP. For it seems that the primary evidence for there being such a schema and for Augustine running or employing it as part of his case against physicalist views of God and souls in particular and the physicalist worldview more generally consists in his running AO and AP in particular.

extensively treating Augustine's case for the *omnipresence claim* and *incompatibility claim* of that argument.

Chapter 5. Rejecting Physicalism: A Causal Analysis of Augustine's Transition from a Physicalist View of the World to a Dualistic One. Chapter 5, the capstone of this project, draws on the main claims of previous chapters (i.e., Modal~SLI, CP, and the causal accounts of AP and AO) to advance and argue for new models of: (i) Augustine's mature dualistic ontology which included both physical and nonphysical objects, (ii) the comparative relations between his dualistic view and competing physicalist view, which took all objects to be physical ones, and of which he had earlier been a proponent, and (iii) the rational basis upon which he rejected the physicalist view and adopted and advocated for the dualistic one. In contrast to the accounts of (i)-(iii) that are implied by the spatial accounts of the topics treated in Chapters 1-4 (i.e., by SLI, SP, and the spatial readings of AP and AO) I argue that Augustine's mature dualistic ontology, in including both physical and nonphysical objects, included both objects that *are and must be* located in space and objects that *are not and cannot be* so located; I argue further that given that the physicalist view took *all objects* to be physical and thus to be objects that *are and must be* spatially located, the dualistic ontology's inclusion of objects that lack spatial location was a point of difference between it and the physicalist ontology. Lastly, I argue that—given that AO and AP figured centrally in Augustine's personal and public rejection of the physicalist view—what figured even more centrally and foundationally in this rejection was an argument *schema* that I call *Master AP*, of which AO and AP are particular instantiations. Like AO and AP, *Master AP*, is better understood as resting on causal rather than spatial claims. Several more claims regarding topics (i)-(iii) will also be advanced in this chapter including Augustine's mature view of human beings; given the amount of material it aims to cover, and the fact that the claims it

advances fall out of those discussed and argued for in earlier chapters, the discussion of this chapter will proceed in more of a summary or outline fashion than did that of the previous chapters.

PART I
AUGUSTINE ON THE RELATIONS BETWEEN INCORPOREAL
OBJECTS AND EXTENDED CREATION

CHAPTER 1

“TO BE NOWHERE YET BE”: AUGUSTINE ON INCORPOREAL OBJECTS AS UNLOCATABLE

Prima facie one might link corporeality (i.e., being extended in the three spatial dimensions) with spatial location, and link incorporeality (i.e., being without spatial extension) with lacking spatial location, and several contemporary philosophers distinguish corporeal from incorporeal objects in these terms.⁵ But Goetz and Taliaferro (2011), Inman (2017), Wierenga (2019) and others suggest that it would be a mistake to understand Augustine on the corporeal-incorporeal divide in this way. They argue that though Augustine took God and souls to be incorporeal, he also took them to be spatially located. This chapter takes up the topic of Augustine’s view on the relation of incorporeal objects to space. In particular it re-visits the question of whether Augustine took incorporeal objects to be spatially located. I begin by presenting the case that has been made for *Spatial Location of the Incorporeal* or *SLI*, which is my name for the view that Augustine did take incorporeal objects to be spatially located, and by identifying further interpretive claims to which proponents of this view are committed. I argue that the evidence advanced does not establish that Augustine held this view. I argue further that there are good reasons to believe that Augustine rejected this position and did so strongly; that is, not only was he committed to the view that incorporeal objects *are not* spatially located, he was committed to the view that they *cannot be* spatially located. It follows that on Augustine’s view *to be incorporeal is to be nowhere yet be*. Further implications will also be discussed.

⁵ See for example: Markosian (2000; 376-7); Carroll and Markosian (2010; 189-91); and Hoffman and Rosenkrantz (2002; 39f).

1.1. SLI

1.1.1 Evidence of SLI in Recent Discussions

Recently several authors have attributed to Augustine a view regarding the relation between incorporeal objects and space which they anticipate may seem puzzling or unexpected, namely, the view that incorporeal objects are *in space* in some real or literal sense (e.g., they are in space in the sense of being: located in space, spatially located, having a spatial location, occupying space or the parts of space).⁶ Goetz and Taliaferro (2011: 43-5) claim that Augustine took souls to occupy space:

Given that the soul is not corporeal in nature, one would expect Augustine to maintain that the soul is not in space. Nevertheless he affirms that the soul is in space, but not in the same way in which something corporeal is in space. How does a body occupy space? It does so by having each of its parts occupy parts of space. With a body that is spread out in space, smaller parts of it occupy smaller spaces and larger parts of it occupy larger space....[I]n contrast to a body that occupies space by means of its parts occupying sub-regions of the space occupied by the whole, so that the whole body is not present in any of the space occupied by its parts, the soul is present in its entirety at one time, not only in the entire space that is occupied by its body, but also in each of the sub-regions of space that are occupied by that body's parts"....

According to Augustine then, the soul exists...and is embodied, though it and its body occupy the same space in different ways.

Wierenga (2019: 1-2) suggests that Augustine took God to be located in space:

According to classical theism, God is omnipresent, that is present everywhere. But classical theism also holds that God is immaterial. How can something that is not, or does not have, a body be *located in space*? Early discussions of divine presence typically began by distinguishing God's *presence in space* from that of material bodies. Augustine (354-430) wrote: "Although in speaking of him we say that God is everywhere present, we must resist carnal ideas and withdraw our mind from our bodily senses, and not imagine that God is distributed through all things by a sort of extension of size, as earth or water or air or light are distributed (Letter 187, Ch. 2)." In contrast to material objects, which, having parts in various

⁶ That these authors anticipate the view may be puzzling or unexpected is suggested by the first few sentences used to introduce the view in each of the quotations that follow in the main text.

parts of the space they occupy, are not wholly present at any of those regions, God is wholly present wherever he is. (*italics mine*)⁷

And Inman (2017: 14-17), who has most explicitly and extensively discussed the topic, argues that Augustine took souls, God, and incorporeal objects generally, to be spatially located:

Augustine remarks “that the soul is immaterial is a fact of which I avow myself to be fully persuaded” (Letter 166, 2.4). He does not, however, infer from the immateriality of the soul that it therefore lacks spatial location....For Augustine, matter is located in space in such a way that “[e]ach mass that occupies space is not in its entirety in each of its single parts, but only in all taken together. Hence, one part is in one place; another part in another” (Immortality of the Soul, 16.25); elsewhere he makes the same point that matter is located in space by “every part of it [being] less than the whole” (Letter 166, 4). The soul, by contrast, is “in any body...whole in the whole and whole also in any part of the body” (On the Trinity 6.2.8)....

Once again, one might think that Augustine’s more developed and mature view of God’s omnipresence was one that removed God from space entirely. As was the case with the soul above, this would be much too quick....[A]s in the case of the soul and the body the point of contrast here is between the distinct ways in which God and material objects are each located in space, not between lacking a spatial location and having a spatial location. Augustine routinely characterizes God’s ubiquitous presence not in terms of his being removed from space altogether but, rather, as a particular way of being located in the totality of space that preserves God’s absolute mereological simplicity and thus in direct contrast to the mode of location exhibited by material beings. While the soul is exclusively located where the body is and is wholly located at each of the parts of the body, God alone is “equally present as a whole not only to the whole of the universe, but also to each part of it.”⁸

⁷ Pasnau (2011a; 19) doesn’t explicitly mention Augustine or use the terms *location*, *occupation*, etc., but what he writes in the quotation that follows suggests that he may be a proponent of *SLI* as well: “Although it is now commonly supposed that God exists outside of space, this was not the standard conception among earlier theologians. Medieval Christian authors, despite being generally misread on this point, are in complete agreement that God is literally present, spatially, throughout the universe. One simply does not find anyone wanting to remove God from space, all the way through to the end of the seventeenth century. Of course, no one wanted to say that God has spatial, integral parts. So the universally accepted view was that God exists holomorphically throughout space, wholly existing at each place in the universe.”

⁸ Note that Inman uses the terms *material* and *immaterial* as if they are coextensive with Augustine’s uses of corporeal (*corporeus*) and incorporeal (*incorporeus*). Wierenga seems to do the same in the passage of his that was quoted in the main text above when he claims that “God is immaterial” but then asks “how can something that is not, or does not have, a body can be located in space”. While using these terms interchangeably, (or rather using *material* as synonymous with *extended* and *immaterial* as synonymous with *nonextended*), is perhaps routine in the contemporary philosophical parlance and in modern translations of Augustine’s works, it obscures the fact that while Augustine took all bodies, (or spatially extended objects), to be material, he also believed that some, (or at least *recognized the possibility* that some), incorporeal objects were material as well, namely, the created and changing ones (e.g., human souls). The only object that Augustine took to be immaterial was God. So while the material-immaterial categories and corporeal-incorporeal ones do have some overlap, it is imperfect: while all corporeal objects are material, some material objects are incorporeal, (e.g., human souls); and while all immaterial

1.1.2. Four further SLI Commitments

In addition to showing that SLI has had several recent proponents, the above passages also serve to introduce four further interpretive theses to which proponents of SLI are committed. For as those passages suggest, what unites these authors (beyond their shared claim that Augustine took incorporeals to be located in space) is an expressed or implied commitment to the following further theses regarding Augustine's philosophical views.⁹

Thesis 1. Augustine takes presence and spatial location to be tightly connected such that passages in which he is found claiming that souls are *present* in the body or that God is *present* everywhere entail or license the claim that he took God and souls to be *located in space*. For in each of the passages above, the evidence used to support the claim that Augustine took these objects to be spatially located (albeit in a different manner from bodies) consists *not* in passages where Augustine is found claiming that God and souls are *located in space, have spatial locations, occupy space*, etc., but passages in which he is seen claiming that souls are *present* in bodies and God is *present* everywhere or in all things. What, however, this tight connection

objects are incorporeal, some incorporeal objects are material, again – human souls. In light of Augustine's views, instead of *material* and *immaterial* I use *corporeal* and *incorporeal*, *bodily* and *nonbodily*, and sometimes *physical* and *nonphysical* when discussing Augustine's views about spatially extended objects and objects that lack spatial extension.

For (limited) secondary discussions of Augustine on spiritual matter see: Gilson (1960: 197-8, 209); Kondoleon (1970: 192); Van Fleteren (1999: 547-9); and (TeSelle (2006: 31), who suggests that the concept of "spiritual matter" is something Augustine "learned from Plotinus, who learned it from Aristotle." Though a reading of Augustine's commentaries on Genesis suggests that another source (if not the source) of the concept is in various claims made in *Genesis* 1.

⁹ I am not claiming that *necessarily* if someone holds the view that Augustine took incorporeal objects to be located in space, that he or she would also be committed to *Theses 1-4* discussed below. I am claiming instead that all of the proponents of SLI discussed above (and that I am aware of) seem to be committed to these claims because of the content of the quotations they use to support the view. Thus, the theses that follow may be better said or thought *not* to fall out of SLI itself, but out of SLI argued for on the basis of the particular primary quotations embedded in the secondary quotations presented above.

consists in for Augustine, or that he takes there to be one, proponents of SLI leave unspecified and undefended.¹⁰

Thesis 2. Augustine does not take being spatially located *per se* to be a part of the corporeal-incorporeal divide. That is, he does not take being spatially located in itself to be a *mark* (i.e., distinguishing feature) of the corporeal, and he does not take being without spatial location be a *mark* of the incorporeal. While it may be commonly thought that corporeal objects are located in space while incorporeal objects are not, Augustine takes both corporeal and incorporeal objects to be located in space.

Thesis 3. Though Augustine does not take spatial location *per se* to be a part of the corporeal-incorporeal divide, he does take the manner, mode, or way in which these objects are or can be located in space to be part of that divide. For given that Augustine takes bodies by nature to be extended in the three spatial dimensions, he takes each body to be spread out through a portion of space and thus to have different extended parts located in the different parts of space. Thus, he takes each body to be wholly located in the totality of space through which it is spread out, but to be partly located in the parts of that space. Given that incorporeal objects essentially lack spatial extension, they cannot have spatially extended parts in different parts of space; thus, their mode or manner of spatial location is to be wholly located in space wherever it is they are located. Thus, souls are wholly located in the totality of space in which the bodies they animate are wholly located and they are wholly located in each of the parts of space in

¹⁰ Candidates for the relation between the presence and location which proponents of SLI have in mind may be identity or sufficiency; that is, they may take the presence relation and the location relation to be one and the same relation under different descriptions or they may take presence and location to be distinct relations but the obtaining of a presence between X and Y to be sufficient for the obtaining of a location relation between X and space; for both the assumption of identity and sufficiency, combined with Augustine's presence claims, would entail *SLI* or the claims of *SLI* proponents.

which that body is partly located.¹¹ And God is wholly located in the whole of space and in every part of space.¹²

Thesis 4. Lastly (where “extension” is understood in the sense in which Augustine uses it, namely, as expressing an intrinsic property) if we consider that Augustine took bodies to be objects extended in the three spatial dimensions of length, width and height¹³, and that he took incorporeal or nonbodily objects such as God and souls to be objects that lack spatial extension, then proponents of SLI are committed to the view that Augustine took it to be possible for an object to be located in space and not be extended. In other words, Augustine took being located

¹¹ “In the parlance of contemporary metaphysics”, Inman (2017; 9-18) uses the term *pertension* to refer to the manner of location in space exhibited by corporeal objects and the term *entension* to refer to the manner of location in space exhibited by incorporeal objects. As to what Augustine called these different ways of *being located in space* nothing is offered. And it is not clear that Augustine did have a name for them.

¹² A further point that is related to *Thesis 3* and which is shared between Inman and Wierenga (but on which the discussion of Goetz and Taliaferro was silent given their focus on the soul) concerns what does and what does not constitute a point of difference between kinds of incorporeals. What differentiates created incorporeals from the incorporeal creator (i.e., souls from God) is *not* spatial location *per se*, and is *not* the mode or manner of spatial location; for on their view Augustine takes both to be located in space and to be capable of being wholly located in different parts of space simultaneously; what differentiates them is the extent or scope of their spatial location: for while souls are wholly located in a limited portion of space and wholly located in the sub-parts of that portion of space, God is wholly located in the whole of space and in each part. Thus, on *SLI* as well Augustine is understood to take the scope of spatial location, but neither spatial location *per se*, nor mode or manner of location *per se*, to be a point of distinction between created and uncreated incorporeals. However, I take this further commitment of *SLI* to state a contingent point of distinction as opposed to a necessary one; for nothing seems to bar the possibility of God creating a soul which is wholly located in the whole of space and wholly located in each part of space; perhaps, if Augustine is committed to the existence of a world soul, this is the actual extent or degree of its spatial location; if so the distinction in extent or scope between created and uncreated incorporeal objects would not hold even contingently.

¹³ The Latin terms that Augustine uses are: *longitudine*, *latitudine*, *altitudine*. *Longitudine* is usually translated as length; *altitudine* is usually translated as height and *latitudine* is translated and translatable as either breadth or width. Some of the translations I have used may have *latitudine* as *breadth* and others as *width*. Augustine had a book on geometry, but it is lost and the most detailed discussion of the dimensions that I have found in his surviving works is in *On the Magnitude of the Soul* 6.10f; there Augustine talks about the distinction between *longitudine* and *latitudine* (and *altitudine* too) in terms of divisibility: something with only length, a line, is divisible not in the direction of its extent but only crosswise; something with *latitudine* (width or depth) can be divided left to right and front to back; and something with *altitudine* can be divided left to right, front to back, and from above and below. (Also everything with *altitudine* has *latitudine* and everything that has *latitudine* has *longitudine*, but not the reverse, e.g., a line has *longitudine*, but neither *latitudine* nor *altitudine*, and a figure such as a square has *longitudine* and *latitudine* but not *altitudine*.) In light of all this perhaps *longitudine* could be understood as front back extension or depth; *latitudine* as left right extension or width; and *altitudine* as up down extension or height; so then we have depth, width and height for *longitudine*, *latitudine*, *altitudine*, instead of length, width and height, or length, depth and height which are literal and standard but not so clear.

in space to be a relation to space instantiable by something that was not spatially extended or that he held a notion of spatial location such that something could be without extension yet still be located in space.

1.1.3. Summary

Given the discussion of the SLI thus far, we may summarize what are at the same time both interesting philosophical theses that proponents of SLI attribute to Augustine and important interpretive theses to which proponents of SLI are committed:

Thesis 1. Augustine believes that presence entails spatial location.

Thesis 2. Augustine believes that spatial location *per se* is not part of the corporeal-incorporeal divide.

Thesis 3. Augustine believes that the manner or mode of spatial location is part of the corporeal-incorporeal divide.

Thesis 4. Augustine believes that it is possible for an object to be located in space but to lack (intrinsic) spatial extension.

Theses 1-4 and SLI are importantly related: If it turns out that Augustine did take incorporeal objects to be located in space then (other things equal) the claims in 1-4 (understood as interpretive theses) would be true; thus, the proponents of SLI would have not only increased our understanding on whether Augustine took incorporeal objects to be located in space, they would also have increased our understanding of Augustine's philosophy (and possibly reality) with respect to the subtle positions expressed in 1-4. If however, it turns out that Augustine did not take incorporeal objects to be spatially located or rather that he denied that they were or even could be, then 1-4 would be false; thus, rather than shedding light into what were previously dark areas of Augustine's philosophy, proponents of SLI would instead be casting interpretive shadows into these areas and increasing their darkness to us both in degree and kind; whereas

before these areas were dark because they were undiscussed, in this case they would be dark because misunderstood - and the darkness of error is greater than that of omission. As I'll argue in the sections that follows, there is good reason not only to doubt SLI, but to reject it and endorse instead \sim SLI, which is my label for the view that Augustine took incorporeal objects to lack spatial location.

1.2. Initial Problems for SLI

There are several facts, which when considered in the context of the topic at hand, cast doubt on SLI as a viable statement of Augustine's position.

The *first* is that none of the passages used in support of SLI (either in the quotations above or elsewhere in the works of SLI proponents) show Augustine claiming (in English or Latin) that *souls, God, or incorporeal objects generally are "in space", "located in space", "spatially located", "have spatial locations", "occupy space", etc.* It is reasonable to suspect that if Augustine held such a view, it would be expressed somewhere in his works and that proponents of SLI would have used it to support SLI instead of using passages where Augustine is found claiming that souls are *present* in bodies and God is *present* everywhere.

Second given that the primary evidence used to show that Augustine was committed to SLI consists in passages where Augustine is making *presence claims*, the basic argument for SLI may be characterized as follows:

The Argument for SLI:

1. Augustine takes souls and God to be incorporeal.
2. Augustine claims that the soul is present in the body and that God is present everywhere.
3. Thus, Augustine takes souls, God and incorporeal objects generally to be spatially located.

The move from 1 and 2 to 3 implicitly assumes Thesis 1, i.e., that for Augustine there is a tight connection between “presence” and “being spatially located”, such that his claims that *souls are present in bodies* and *God is present everywhere*, show that Augustine took such objects to be spatially located. Such a connection, however, does not seem to be a necessary one; consider for example the following contemporary case: imagine some person P is playing a video game and the game character or avatar on the screen moves about given the way that P manipulates the buttons and switches on the controller; in such a case there is a real sense in which we would say that P is present in the avatar; despite the fact that (at least the body of) P is spatially located, this case still provides an example where X is present in Y without being located (in whatever manner) in the very same space in which Y is located. Further, a non-anachronistic and more powerful textual example could come from remarks Augustine makes in *City of God* XII.25-6; for Augustine suggests there and elsewhere that the light that God is said to have first created before everything else symbolically represents the angels.¹⁴ Augustine presumably would also have taken a presence relation to hold between God and the angels even though space itself has not yet been created (i.e., he would presumably have taken the angels to be present to God or God to be present to the angels but neither the angels nor God to be located in space). Regardless of whether these or other cases designed to show that presence and spatial location can come apart are absolutely convincing, it’s still the case that it seems that they could and proponents of spatial location offer no evidence that Augustine held that they could not. Hence, the primary textual evidence offered in support of SLI does not by itself establish that view.¹⁵

¹⁴ See also: *Literal Meaning of Genesis*, II.8.16f; *Unfinished Literal Commentary on Genesis*, 6f and 21 and *Confessions*, 12.11.11f.

¹⁵ A further problem related to the above inference is that it not only assumes a tight connection between the presence and location relations, but it also assumes a tight connection between the presence relation *per se* and the location relation *to space*. For the presence claims that SLI proponents use to support their show Augustine claiming that souls are in/present *in the body* and that God is present *everywhere/in all things*, and not that souls are present or located *in space* or that God is present or located *in space*. But it’s not clear what licenses this assumption; and

Third, the status of Augustine's claims that *souls are present in bodies* and *God is present everywhere/in all things* as exemplary of Augustine's views is questionable. For Augustine's works also include passages where he seems to contradict these claims. Consider the claim that *Augustine held souls to be present in the bodies* they animate. While he does make that claim in *Letter 166* and in other works, elsewhere he expresses commitment to the claim that souls are *not* in the bodies they animate. He does this for example, in the course of a discussion with his friend Evodius, in *On the Magnitude of the Soul 30.61*, as Evodius himself points out:

Evodius: By these reasons can it not be proved that our souls are not in our bodies? And, if that be true, I do not know where I am. For, who takes away from me the truth that I myself am my soul?

Augustine: Do not be disturbed; rather, be of good heart. For, this thought and consideration recalls us to ourselves and as far as may be, takes us away from the body. As for your suggestion that the soul is not in the body of a living person, although it may seem absurd to you, there were some very learned men who entertained that view and I believe there are even some now....¹⁶

Neither Goetz and Taliaferro, nor Inman, reconcile these two seemingly incompatible claims in Augustine's works. In leaving these claims unreconciled, they leave it unclear as to if or in what sense Augustine took the soul to really be in or present in the body. The same situation holds with Augustine's presence claims regarding God given passages where Augustine suggests it is better said that "... all things are in [God] rather than [that] He himself is anywhere..." (*Eighty-Three Questions*, 20).¹⁷ Therefore, even if one were to grant SLI proponents their presumption of a tight connection between *presence* and *spatial location*, whether Augustine took incorporeal

furthermore, the fact that Augustine takes the presence relation to hold between souls and bodies and God and all things seems to show the assumption itself false, combined with the fact that he never claims souls or God stand in a presence or location relation to space suggest the assumption false, (i.e., these facts suggest that Augustine did not take presence per se to be tightly connected to or essentially involve a relation *to space*).

¹⁶ See also *Letter 137*, 2.4-8.

¹⁷ "...in illo sunt potius omnia quam ipse alicubi...". See also *The Literal Meaning of Genesis* VIII.25.46f; *Sermon* 67, 3; and *Letter 187*, 3.9f, and Soliloquies I.2-3, for further examples of Augustine employing what Philip Cary (2000; 102-4) discusses as the "Plotinian reversal of in". (Though this reversal might as well be called the "Pauline reversal"; cf. Rom. 11:36. See also *Acts* 17:28.)

objects to be located in space would not be settled by means of his presence claims alone. The statements comprising the evidentiary starting points for SLI need further discussion and qualification before they can convincingly serve as a clear and firm basis for that interpretation.¹⁸

¹⁸ There would seem to be two basic strategies one might employ towards that end, but as I'll show below neither of them seems promising. First, it might be claimed that Augustine must have "flip flopped" or changed his view over time. At the time of his writing *Letter 166*, he must have held souls to be in the bodies they animate, but at the time of writing *On the Magnitude of the Soul* he must have rejected this view. One problem with taking this route is that Augustine writes of souls being in or present to bodies in *On the Immortality of the Soul* which was written before *On the Magnitude of the Soul* where he rejects it; furthermore, *Letter 166* where he claims the soul is present in the animated body, comes after *On the Magnitude of the Soul*; therefore, employing this strategy doesn't just commit one to the claim that Augustine changed his view on the matter, but that he changed it more than once: he first believed that souls were located in the body, next he rejected this, and lastly he endorsed it again. While it is logically possible to approach the apparent contradiction this way, it seems that if there was another approach that neither committed Augustine to flip flopping, or further - to flip-flop-flipping - it would be preferable *ceteris paribus* to one that did. The second basic strategy that might be employed in the face of these seeming contradictory claims is that Augustine is using different senses of "in" or "presence to" when making each of the claims; on this strategy, Augustine's claims are not taken as actually contradictory but only superficially or grammatically so. For example, it might be said that in claiming in *Letter 166* and elsewhere that souls are present or in the bodies they animate, Augustine is not using "in" in a spatial sense, but rather in some other sense such as "power" or "awareness." Whereas in expressing commitment to the claim that the soul is not in the body in *On the Magnitude of the Soul*, he is not denying that the soul is in the body in a "power" or "awareness" sense but rather in a "spatial" sense. This way of resolving the apparent tension between the claims, does not commit Augustine to a reversal of views at all, let alone multiple ones. Furthermore, this approach to analyzing the *166* claim fits better with the broader context of the claim than its "spatial" reading pushed by Inman et. al. For, Augustine also writes there that:

The soul pervades the whole body which it animates, not by a local distribution of parts, but by a certain vital influence, being at the same moment present in its entirety in all parts of the body, and not less in smaller parts and greater in greater parts, but here with more energy and there with less energy, it is in its entirety present both in the whole body and in every part of it. (Augustine, 2004)

Given this further quotation, it seems clear that in claiming the soul is present in the body, Augustine is not claiming the soul's spatial presence to the body; rather he is claiming a presence to the body in force, power or influence and which does not *prima facie* require or entail its being in the body in a spatial sense. Furthermore, if we examine the context of the claim that the soul is not in the body, in *On the Magnitude of the Soul* (32.68-9), it plainly suggests that he is not denying that the soul is in the body in a power sense, but denying that it is in the body in a spatial sense. For when pressed to explain the very way in which the soul is in the body it animates, Augustine likens it to the way a meaning is in a word namely by animating it but not by being spatially present to it:

For the soul did not occupy a place but held the body which was moved by it. Just as the meaning of a word, without being extended in time, gave life, so to speak, and filled out all the letters that take up slight intervals of time [to pronounce]. With this illustration I ask you for the present to be content. And I see you are delighted with it. But for the present do not look for a learned disquisition on this subject...

Now take my word for it or, if you will, with my help come to realize how great is the soul, not in extent of space or time, but in force and power... (Augustine, 1947e)

Employing this strategy of interpretation avoids committing Augustine to change of view and at the same time is supported by and fits better with the surrounding contexts of the claims in question. Given these features, it is the strategy that should be adopted. Augustine's positive claim therefore that the soul is in or present to the body it animates should not be understood in a spatial sense, but rather a power or influence one. The upshot for Inman and company is that their fundamental claim upon which the base their claim that Augustine took souls to have spatial location, must be interpreted in such a way that the claim does not clearly suffice for establishing something spatial location.

The problems discussed above may not show that SLI is false, but they do show that the primary evidence proponents of SLI advance in its support does not convincingly establish that position and thus that the question of whether Augustine took incorporeal objects to be located in space is not a closed one. Another point that the discussion up to now suggests is that resolving this issue will require a more robust and systematic approach than the ones taken thus far; an approach that takes into consideration a wider range of textual data, but also goes beyond mere presentation of textual data or quotations at the sentential level, and includes as well an account of Augustine's analysis of the relations that figure centrally in the discussion (e.g., especially *his* account of spatial location or being located in space). In the next section, therefore, I shall explicate Augustine's notion of spatial location and his account of incorporeal objects. I will argue by means of these accounts that Augustine was not only committed to \sim SLI (i.e., the claim that incorporeal objects are not located in space) but to *Modal*~SLI (i.e., the claim that incorporeal objects *cannot be* located in space).

1.3. The Case for Modal~SLI

1.3.1. Location or Place

Augustine uses "place" (*locus*) in two main ways: the *first* is what he calls its *proper use* "...being to refer to spaces occupied by bodies" (*The Literal Meaning of Genesis*: IV.18.34).¹⁹ He offers this same account, though in slightly less terse form, in *Eighty Three Different Questions*, 20: "...place is in space which is occupied by length, breadth, and height of a body."²⁰ I'll call places of the kind referred to on the proper use, *proper places* (or *locations*).

¹⁹ "Scio quod non proprie dixerim locum; nam proprie dicitur in spatiis quae corporibus occupantur."

²⁰ "Locus enim in spatio est quod longitudine, latitudine, altitudine corporis occupatur." Notice that the account of place offered in both quotations above is ambiguous between the following two readings regarding the metaphysics of place. On the *first*, place is the space occupied by a body but neither the body nor anything that depends on the body is part of, constitutive of, or identical to the place. The body is necessary for there to be a place and perhaps

The second way that Augustine uses *place* is *improperly* where that is to use the term to refer to something other than a *proper place* (i.e., to something other than space occupied by a body). I'll call the kind of places referred to on the improper use, *improper places*. Augustine sometimes uses *place improperly* to refer to any terminus or goal toward which a thing strives. He takes God to be the place of all creatures in this sense:

While God abides in himself, he swings everything whatever that comes from him back to himself...so that every creature might find in him the final terminus and goal for its nature, not to be what he is, but to find in him the place of rest in which to preserve what by nature it is in itself.²¹

And in *The Literal Meaning of Genesis* XII.30.58f, he uses *place improperly* to refer to *places* that may seem to be in space and occupied by bodies but in actuality are neither in space nor occupied by actual bodies but only by seeming ones (i.e., “bodily-likenesses” or “quasi-bodies”). Augustine calls improper places such as these *non-bodily* or *spiritual places* and takes improper places of this kind to include heaven and hell and also the places seen in visions or dreams.²²

In sum, there are two basic ways that Augustine uses *place* (*locus*), properly and improperly:

Proper Use: The use of “place” to refer to space that is occupied by a body.

Improper Use: The use of “place” to refer to something other than to space that is occupied by the spatial dimensions of a body.

could be said to be cause of or explain why there is a place, but it is not in any way part of the place. On the *second*, place is the space occupied by a body in the sense that both the body and space occupied, together, constitute the place. On this account too, the body is necessary for place (or place depends upon body; or again their being a place depends on their being a body). So here too place could be said to cause or explain why there is a place. But a further difference between the first and second readings (the main difference being that on the *second* the body is part of place but not on the *first*) is that on the first whereas a body could possibly be called an *efficient* and *formal* cause of place (and perhaps a *final* one too given the improper use of place described further down in the main text above), on the *second*, in addition to these the occupying body might also be a *material* cause of place. While *prima facie*, both readings are consistent with the arguments I make in this paper, Augustine's views on place are ripe for further research.

²¹ *The Literal Meaning of Genesis*: IV.18.34.

²² For a further example of Augustine using *place improperly* see his *Unfinished Literal Commentary of Genesis*, 5.24-25.

And corollary to the above distinction *in use*, we may say that there are two basic kinds of place that Augustine includes in his ontology, proper places and improper places (i.e., *non-bodily* or *spiritual places*):

Proper Place: Space that is occupied by the length, width, and height of a body.

Improper Places: Any being that is not space occupied by the length, width, and height of a body (e.g., goals, heaven, hell, and locations seen in dreams and visions)

1.3.2. *Spatial Locations or Spatial Places*

On Augustine's ontology of place, every place is either a proper or an improper place. While there are species of improper place (e.g., goals or aims and spiritual or nonbodily places) there are no species of proper place. Individual proper places may be smaller or larger in size depending on the size of the body occupying them, and in principle one could be the size of the whole of space were some body to occupy all of space. But unlike improper places, Augustine recognizes no division of kinds for proper places: every proper place (i.e., every place in a real or literal sense) is a space that is occupied by the three-dimensional extension of a body. For Augustine, therefore, a spatial location *is* a proper place.

Spatial Place: A spatial place is a proper place (i.e., space occupied by the length, width, and height of a body).

1.3.3. *Implications*

Augustine's view of proper place or spatial location has several interesting implications. The *first*, is that space could exist but no spatial places exist. For in principle God could have created a world that included only space, so given that on Augustine's view a spatial place is space that is occupied by the extension of a body, if there were no bodies there would be no

spatial places or locations.²³ The *second*, is that there are no point sized spatial locations included in Augustine's ontology (nor could there be). This is because Augustine takes every corporeal object or body to be a multiplicity of extended parts, and every extended part of a body to be a body itself. And so on.²⁴ Given that every corporeal object is spatially extended and has spatially extended parts, and every spatial place or location is a space that is occupied by a body, every spatial location is extended and has spatially extended parts. And so on. That is, there are no point sized or atomic spatial locations in Augustine's ontology and nor could there be, given his account of spatial locations and his account of bodies.²⁵ The *third*, and most important implication for this discussion, is that incorporeal objects such as God and human souls, cannot have spatial locations, be spatially located, be located in space, and so on, in any proper, real or literal sense. For given that a spatial location is space occupied by the extension of a body, it stands to reason that to *have* a spatial location, *be* spatially located, etc., in a real or literal sense is to be a body (i.e., it is to be an object that as a whole is literally intrinsically extended through space and is composed of parts that are so extended through space as well). And as Augustine himself claims with respect to what it is to be or have a spatial location: "What indeed is somewhere is contained in place; and what is contained in place is body" (*Eighty Three Different*

²³ Perhaps there could be spatial locations in some other sense in this scenario, but I make the claim that I do with respect to the only account of spatial location that is textually supported by and consistent with Augustine's writings. What I say in discussing the second and third implications in the main text that follows bears on this as well. It is however open to proponents of SLI or others to show that Augustine is committed to spatial locations in some other literal sense.

²⁴ For texts in which Augustine suggests that every body (i.e., spatially extended object) is an infinite multiplicity of smaller bodies (i.e., of smaller spatially extended objects) see: *On the Nature and Origin of the Soul*, IV.35; *On the Trinity*, VI.6.8 and X.7.10; *Letter 118*, 4; *Letter 137*, 2; *Letter 148*, 3; *Letter 166*, 4; *Against the Fundamental Epistle of the Manicheans*, 16; *On the Immortality of the Soul*, XVI.25; *Confessions*, 3.7.12; *The Literal Meaning of Genesis*, VII, 21; *Sermon 277*, 13.13. For discussion and critique of Augustine's view of bodies on this account see Hölscher (1986: Chapter 1).

²⁵ Note that Augustine's view of bodies as spatially extended wholes composed of innumerable spatially extended parts and his commitment to the view that spatial locations are extended wholes composed of innumerable spatially extended parts, in addition to being rooted in his accounts of corporeal objects and of spatial location, seems also to be rooted in his view of extension or extended objects *per se*.

Questions, 20).²⁶ Thus, given that incorporeal objects lack intrinsic spatial extension by their very nature as incorporeal they cannot literally be spatially located, have spatial locations, etc. In other words, on Augustine's view while to be a body is to be spatially located (i.e., to be somewhere or to be extensionally contained by space) given that incorporeal objects by definition are nonbodily objects, to be incorporeal is to be without spatial location (i.e., to be nowhere yet be).²⁷

Corporeal Object: Object that must be located in space.

Incorporeal Object: Object that cannot be located in space.

And while on Augustine's view incorporeal objects may be said to be present in space, present in bodies, present at spatial locations, etc., they cannot be said to be so present in a literal or proper sense (i.e., in sense of their being located in space, having spatial locations, etc.); hence, it cannot be said that Augustine took incorporeal objects to be spatially located. Or some could say this (as recently several authors have) but were Augustine around to hear it, he would deny this characterization of his view. Therefore, SLI is false, (i.e., \sim SLI), and further Modal \sim SLI is true.

\sim SLI: For Augustine incorporeal objects are not spatially located (objects).

Modal \sim SLI: For Augustine, incorporeal objects cannot be spatially located (objects).

And we may state the argument against SLI and for Modal \sim SLI as follows:

²⁶ "Quod enim alicubi est, continetur loco; quod continetur loco, corpus est." Pace Inman (2017; 17) who reads Augustine use of containment here (*continetur*) exclusively in terms of dependence, I take it to involve literal containment, (i.e., containment in an extensional sense as it is said in the sentence "a jar of wine contains the wine"), given that Augustine elsewhere (e.g., Sermon 67, 3) explicates containment or expresses the same proposition in terms of *circumscription* (i.e., in terms of an object having ones extensional boundaries immediately or nonimmediately surrounded by the extensional boundaries of a part or region of space or by space as a whole I leave it open to further research whether containment by space or place *also* involves *ontological dependence* on space.

²⁷ An interesting point between Augustine's account of bodies, and the accounts in Markosian's (2000) and Markosian and Carrol's (2010) exegesis of the options on the table regarding theories of physical objects, is that while these latter recognize a distinction between the three dimensional extension view of bodies and the spatial location view of bodies, Augustine recognizes no such distinction. To be a body = to be three dimensionally extended = to be located in space or spatially located. In other words, the extensional account and spatial location account are different descriptions of one and the same fact or different ways of expressing the same proposition.

The Argument from Spatial Location and Incorporeality to Modal~SLI²⁸

1. If a thing lacks extension, it cannot be located at an extended region.
2. Therefore, if nonextended incorporeal things are located in space, they must be located at point-sized regions of space.
3. Therefore, if there are no point-sized regions of space, incorporeal things cannot be located in space.
4. According to Augustine, there are no point-sized regions of space.
5. Therefore, according to Augustine it is impossible for incorporeal things to be located in space.

1.4. Objections and Replies

Objection 1. The locations of incorporeal objects just are the locations of corporeal objects. So incorporeal objects *have* the locations of corporeal objects but in a different way. They are wholly located in the whole of the space in which the corporeal objects are wholly located, and wholly located in the parts of space in which the body is partly located. For example, the soul is wholly located in the space that the body that it animates is wholly located and wholly located in the parts of that space in which that body is partly located. So the locations of incorporeal objects just are the locations of corporeal ones, and the locations of corporeal objects are included in Augustine's ontology.

Response. The purported locations of incorporeal objects are not identical to the locations of corporeal ones, because the whole of the whole location of the corporeal object is not whole in any of its parts, but the whole of the location of the incorporeal object is purportedly whole in the parts of that location (e.g., as proponents of SLI suggest incorporeal objects such as the soul are wholly located in or occupy the whole of space in which the whole body is wholly located and

²⁸ I owe this explicit statement of the argument to Michael Bergmann.

wholly located in each of the parts). So the purported locations of the incorporeals cannot be the locations of the corporeal objects (i.e., extended locations).

One can say, (as Augustine suggests, but which is less sexy and shocking) that he took incorporeal objects to be wholly present in the whole of the whole location in which corporeal object are wholly located and wholly present in the parts of the location in which the corporeal objects are partly located, but one cannot also state this same sentence and replace “presence” with “location” and create a sentence that is *textually supportable* and *compatible* with Augustine’s philosophy.

Objection 2. Augustine claims that “whatever exists, must be somewhere...” (*Soliloquies* I.29).²⁹ He takes incorporeal objects to exist. Thus, incorporeals must be somewhere, and further, to be incorporeal cannot be to exist but exist nowhere.³⁰

Response. There are several ways one might respond to this objection (or perhaps explanatory challenge). The most important one is that in the same context in which Augustine claims (or commits to the claim) that “whatever is, exists somewhere” he also commits to the view that *only bodies exist in place*:

R: Does this proposition seem to you to be true: anything which exists must be somewhere?

A: There is nothing on which I would be more inclined to agree with you.

R: And do you grant that truth exists?

A: I do.

R: We must, therefore, ask where it is. For it is not in place, unless perhaps you think that anything other than a body has existence in place, or you believe that truth is a body.

A: I don’t believe either of those propositions (Augustine 2008) (*Soliloquies* I.29).³¹

²⁹ In Latin: “Reason. - Verane tibi videtur ista sententia: *Quidquid est, alicubi esse* cogitur? Augustine. - Nihil me sic ducit ad consentiendum” (*italics mine*). For commentary on this principle in ancient and medieval philosophy see Pasnau (2011b:328-33).

³⁰ No proponents of SLI have made an argument for the view on a basis of this text, but it does seem that one could be made on this basis or rather that an objection against Modal~SLI could be raised on this basis.

³¹ The full quotation in Latin (where “R” stands for “Reason” and “A” for “Augustine”):

Hence, “somewhere” in the claim that “whatever is, exists somewhere” should not be understood in terms of spatial location (i.e., the claim should not be understood as asserting that whatever is, is located in space, is somewhere in space in a locational sense, or has a spatial location).

Instead, the claim must be understood in some other way (e.g., as expressing the claim that *everything that is depends on something*, or perhaps as expressing the claim that everything that is has a *proper* or *improper* place).³² Hence, the fact that Augustine is committed to the principle that everything that is, exists somewhere, is consistent with Modal~SLI (and hence, is consistent with ~SLI).³³

R. - Verane tibi videtur ista sententia: Quidquid est, alicubi esse cogitur?

A. - Nihil me sic ducit ad consentiendum.

R. - Fateris autem esse veritatem?

A. - Fateor.

R. - Ergo ubi sit, necesse est quaeramus; non est enim in loco, nisi forte aut esse in loco aliquid aliud praeter corpus, aut veritatem corpus esse arbitraris.

A. - Nihil horum puto.

³² Cary (2000; Chapter 7) suggests just such a reading of the claim. Note this reading poses no problem for or is consistent with Augustine’s commitment to God’s aseity as God’s existence depends upon something, namely, God Himself and nothing else. For an example of Augustine claiming that God is “in Himself” in a dependence sense see *The Literal Meaning of Genesis*, VIII.36.48.

³³ Note that one might not object to the claim on my reading being compatible with the theses I’ve argued for in this paper, but to the claim itself as suffering a kind of regress problem however we analyze it. For example, one might worry that since spatial places exist, the claim implies that they must exist somewhere as well, and wherever that is it would exist somewhere too and so on. One might say the location of a spatial locations is space as a whole, but then again if space exists it must be somewhere too. Is there some super-space in which primary space exists, or further some super-super space in which the super-space exists? Or consider instead as another example what might be taken as the most egregious implication of the principle: given that God exists, God must exist somewhere too – a result that is incompatible with his a-seity. So what is to be said about this? There are a couple of approaches one could take and hence avenues to defend Augustine’s principle against this worry. One would be to restrict it to being a claim about substances (e.g., bodies, souls, God). In this way, for example, we could stop the regress regarding spatial locations because spatial locations are not substantial, so regardless of whether could be said to exist in space, the principle wouldn’t apply to them. This, however, is a kind of piecemeal approach that neither solves the worry about space itself (given that Augustine does seem to take space to be a substance) nor the one about God, nor possible one’s regarding souls. (Notice, however, that the potential regress generated from the existence of bodies, which are substances, would be stopped at their nonsubstantial locations on this substance-restricted reading). What would be preferred, however, is way to wholesale stop or end the regress. Though there may be other ways to do this, the resources provided by the discussion above allow us to cleanly and clearly assuage this worry in this manner. Everything (i.e. every being at all, substance, quality, or whatever) that exists, exists either in a proper or improper place. Bodily properties exist in the improper place of bodies and bodies exist in proper places proper places exist in the proper place of space itself as the master spatial location and the composed of the individual spatial locations as parts. Space itself exists in the improper place of the form of space, and the form of space exists in the improper place that is God Himself. God exists in the improper place that is Himself. So the regress from corporeal creations stops in the “place” of God and so does God Himself. With respect to incorporeal creation,

1.5. Implications of Modal~SLI

Consider again the further theses that came along with SLI, and whose truth or falsity is connected to the truth or falsity of SLI:

Thesis 1. Augustine believes that presence entails spatial location.

Thesis 2. Augustine believes that spatial location is not part of the corporeal-incorporeal divide.

Thesis 3. Augustine believes that the manner or mode of spatial location is part of the corporeal-incorporeal divide.

Thesis 4. Augustine believes that it is possible for an object to be located in space but not (intrinsically) extended in space.

Concerning Thesis 1. Given that Modal~SLI is true and hence SLI false, presence *per se* does not entail spatial location; that is, the mere fact that Augustine takes a presence relation to hold between x and y, does not entail that x or y is located in space or that x is located in the very same space in which y is located. For on Augustine's view, it is possible for presence to hold between x and y, but for neither x nor y to be spatially located and thus for no further relation to hold between the location of the one and the other (e.g., God's presence with respect to souls and His presence with respect to the angels created before space even was created). It is also possible for presence to hold between x and y, and for x to have no spatial location but for y to have one (e.g., God's presence in all bodies and the presence of souls in bodies). Further it's possible for a presence relation to obtain between x and y, for both x and y to be spatially located, and for the location of the one to be in some sense the same as the other (e.g., water in a sponge) or not to be the same but contiguous (e.g., two blocks pushed together) or not contiguous but disparate (e.g.,

mental properties exist in the improper places that are created rational souls or minds, and minds exist in the improper place either that is the form of mind, or the unique form of the individual soul, or (if the first option is distinct from this) in God. And again, God exists in the improper place that is himself. So everything has a place on this reading, and ultimately improper places ground the existence of proper ones. Thus, though proper places are the only real or literal locations, improper places are the most real beings or the truest beings in a literal sense.

as bodies are present to eyes). And so on. These findings raise several important questions. *First*, does Augustine use presence univocally (i.e., in the same sense) across all these predications or not? *Second*, if so, then what does he use it to mean? If not, but instead he uses the notions equivocally, then what is the special meaning of each use and how do we know when he uses which? Does he for example mean spatial location when he claims the relation holds between bodies, but something else when incorporeal objects are involved? How then are we to understand his applications to the latter?³⁴ *Third*, how should we understand his view on the relation between the notions of presence and spatial location (or between the presence relation and the location relation held to space)? In Chapter 2, I will argue for a causal analysis of Augustine's notion of presence, and thus a causal analysis of his presence claims; these analyses in turn will form the basis of causal accounts of Augustine's argument from presence to the incorporeality of souls (the main topic of Chapter 3) and his argument from omnipresence to God's incorporeality (the main topic of Chapter 4). In Chapter 2, I will also suggest that one way to understand Augustine's view on the relation between presence and spatial location is that spatial location is a *species of presence* such that the following claims are not only consistent, but (in conjunction with other facts) are expected: (i) All bodies are and must be located in space. (ii) All bodies are and must be present in space. (iii) No incorporeal object is and no incorporeal object could be located in space. (iv) Incorporeal objects enter into presence relations.

Concerning Thesis 2. Given that Modal~SLI is true, *pace* 2, spatial location *per se* is part of the corporeal-incorporeal divide for Augustine; for while all bodies are and must be located in space, no incorporeal object is and no incorporeal object can be; therefore, spatial location is not

³⁴ These questions may also be rephrased to address not linguistic issues but metaphysical ones. What does Augustine take the presence relation to be? Is it one and the same basic relation across all its instances pure and simple or do all instances share something in virtue of which they are all forms of presence but are distinguished in other respects?

only part of the corporeal-incorporeal divide it is a necessary part. To be a body is to be spatially located, and to be incorporeal is to be without being spatially located (i.e., to be yet be nowhere).

Concerning Thesis 3. Given Modal~SLI, *pace* 3, the manner or mode of spatial location is not part of the corporeal-incorporeal divide; for there is only one mode of spatial location, the manner in which bodies are located in space or the parts of space (i.e., whole in whole and part in part).³⁵ For as, I'll also discuss further in Chapter 2, what Inman and others suggest are modes of spatial location are modes of presence, where again that is understood as a kind of causal relation.

Concerning Thesis 4. Given Modal~SLI, in conjunction with further facts, being intrinsically extended in space is required for being located in space in a real or literal or proper sense.

1.6. Conclusion

In summary, *pace* the narrative that has recently taken root in contemporary philosophy of religion which holds that Augustine took incorporeal objects to be located in space in one and same generic sense in which he took corporeal objects to be located in space (albeit in a different manner or mode) and hence holds that Augustine did not takes spatial location *per se* to be part of the corporeal-incorporeal divide, in this chapter I have argued that Augustine not only did not take incorporeal objects to be located in space, he took them to be incapable of standing in such a relation to space; hence, being spatially located is part of the corporeal-incorporeal divide; specifically, corporeal objects are and must be spatially located and incorporeal objects neither

³⁵ Alternatively, rather than saying there is only one mode of spatial location, it may be better said that there is just spatial location and all spatial location is whole in whole and part and part. For there is no other possible way to be spatially located and there are only said to be modes, manners, or ways of something if there is more than one way in which it could be realized.

are nor could be so located; while to be corporeal is to be located in space to be incorporeal is to be yet lack spatial location (i.e., it is to be nowhere yet to be). In the chapters that follow I will work out the further implications of these conclusions (in conjunction with further forms of evidence) for how to understand: Augustine notions of presence (Chapter 2), his arguments from presence to the incorporeality of human souls and the incorporeality of God (Chapters 3 and 4), and his mature dualistic ontology of reality more broadly and how it was different from the monistic physicalist one which was both prevalent during his time and of which he had earlier been a proponent (Chapter 5).

CHAPTER 2

AUGUSTINE'S CAUSAL THEORY OF PRESENCE

Introduction. The term “presence” (*praesens*) figures prominently Augustine’s writings. It appears in discussions of his two most valued subjects: *God* and *human souls*.³⁶ It’s at the heart of his main arguments for the existence and incorporeality of each, and thus at the heart of his personal and public rejection of a physicalist world view. Given its prominence, a robust account of this relation is vital to Augustinian scholarship. Recently, several authors have understood Augustine’s notion of presence in terms of spatial location. This paper rejects such readings and offers instead a “causal” analysis of Augustine’s notion of presence. It argues that unlike spatial readings, the causal analysis (i) is compatible with systematic and textual evidence, (ii) has positive textual support, (iii) is philosophically robust, and (iv) is explanatorily powerful and elegant as an interpretive hypothesis. The causal analysis of presence therefore not only provides a better understanding of Augustine’s account of this relation, but also a better understanding of the claims that express it, the arguments that contain those claims, and ultimately of Augustine’s personal and public rejection of a physicalist worldview and transition to a dualistic one.

2.1. The Generic Account of Presence

There are several important aspects of Augustine’s account of presence. The discussion which follows aims to introduce Augustine’s account in a helpful but ecumenical manner by characterizing these aspects generically (i.e., in a manner that is neutral between the interpretations which will be later discussed). Let the *generic account of presence* or *GP* be

³⁶ See *Soliloquies* I.7 for Augustine’s claim that what he most seeks to know is God and the soul.

understood as the conjunction of the following five claims which express the central features of Augustine's account with minimal interpretation.

1. *Presence is a relation.* Augustine takes presence to be a *relation* that can hold between different kinds of objects. He most often asserts that it holds between God and creation, souls and the bodies they animate, and bodies and other extended objects. The table below contains paradigm examples of Augustine's central presence-claims:³⁷

Paradigm Relata	Paradigm Presence-claims
God and creation	"He [God] is everywhere present in His majesty, not divided by parts, but everywhere complete" (<i>On the Sermon on the Mount</i> , II.9.32).
Souls and the bodies they animate:	"[The soul] is at the same moment present in its entirety in all parts of the body..." (<i>Letter</i> 166, 2.4).
Bodies and places:	"[Bodies] cannot be present at the same time in distant places" but rather "offer part of [themselves] as present to part of reality and another part...to another part of reality, equal parts to equal parts, but a smaller part to a smaller part and a larger part to larger part" (<i>Letter</i> 187, 4.13).

2. *There are two modes or patterns of presence.* Augustine takes "presence" to express a relation that can be instantiated in different ways. As the quotations in the table above also illustrate, Augustine takes God to be present *as a whole* everywhere, and he takes souls to be present *as a whole* in all parts of the animated body. In contrast to God and souls, he takes bodies to instantiate the presence relation in the most limited way: to whatever it is they are present, they may not be present as a whole to more than one part of that object at the same time, but rather may only be partly present to different parts of a thing at any one time. I refer to the mode of presence exhibited by God and souls (to extended objects) as *holenmeric presence*, and that of bodies (to extended objects) as *circumscriptive presence*.³⁸

³⁷ By *presence-claim* (or *PC*) I mean any claim in which Augustine asserts that a presence relation obtains between some objects.

³⁸ In using *holenmeric* to describe the presence exhibited by God and souls I am following Pasnau (2011b: 55-6) who is following Henry More. Pasnau writes: "a mode of existence more commonly ascribed to spiritual beings:

3. *Mode or pattern of presence (in the extended/corporeal/spatial world) is dependent upon the nature of the subject relatum.* Holenmeric presence (in the extended world) requires an incorporeal or nonextended subject *relatum*. Circumscriptive presence requires an extended subject *relatum*. Neither God nor souls nor any other incorporeal object could be present in the extended world *circumscriptively* because circumscriptive presence is a pattern of presence held exclusively between extended *relata* (e.g., between body and space or body and another body), but incorporeal objects by their nature lack spatial extension, and thus lack spatially extended parts. And no body could be *holenmerically* present in the corporeal world, because by their very nature as extended objects, bodies have spatially extended parts (i.e., parts that have length, width and height and thus which are present in different parts of space), and thus their presence (in the spatial or extended realm) must be circumscriptive.

4. *Scope of presence ranges from restricted to unrestricted.* Along with two modes or patterns of presence, Augustine takes presence regardless of mode to range in scope from *restricted* to *unrestricted*. For example, he takes both God and human souls to be holenmerically present in the extended corporeal world. In this way they share the same mode of presence (i.e., *holenmeric presence*). But the presence of God and the presence of souls differs in scope (i.e., differs in the number of objects over which the presence relation ranges). For God stands in a relation of *holenmeric* presence to the totality of creation, but souls stand in a relation of

existing wholly in each place that it exists. Following Henry More's coinage (16.4), I will refer to this as holenmerism. Although...it was commonplace to discuss holenmeric existence in the context of God, the angels, and the human soul, few were keen to advertise their commitment to this doctrine in the case of prime matter....For if a thing exists wholly in every place it exists, then it need have no spatial parts, and it is in some sense indivisible. Accordingly, given the standard scholastic definition of extension as having *partem extra partem*, prime matter is not extended." See also Pasnau (2011a: 18-19). I use *circumscriptive* to refer to the manner of presence realized by bodies and space, (or more generally – between extended objects), to reflect that it involves a relation between extended objects. It's not clear that Augustine had a name for these distinct patterns of presence (i.e., what I'm *holenmeric* and *circumscriptive*) but instead used the phrases, *whole in whole and whole in part* and *whole in whole and part in part*.

holenmeric presence only to the bodies that they animate.³⁹ Thus, *holenmeric* presence can be either *unrestricted* (as God's presence is) or *restricted* (as is the presence of souls).⁴⁰

In principle the same scope distinction applies to *circumscriptive* presence as well. That is, in principle it is possible that a body be diffused throughout the entirety of the extended world. Augustine in fact had once thought of God as such an object.⁴¹ In this way such an object would be present as a whole to the whole of the corporeal world, but only partly present to the parts of that world and thus would be present everywhere *circumscriptively*. Thus, the presence of such an object would be *unrestricted* because there would be nothing in the corporeal world to which it was not present. Yet in this same world, a smaller corporeal object, say a human body, would be *circumscriptively* present in the corporeal world but its presence would be *restricted* because it would be neither wholly nor partly present to the entirety of that world. Thus, the *restricted-unrestricted* distinction in scope cuts across or is orthogonal to both *circumscriptive* and *holenmeric* patterns of presence.

5. *There is a unified set of conditions under which the presence relation holds.*

Underneath and independent of the nature of the objects that instantiate the presence relation, the mode or pattern of instantiation, and the scope or extent to which it is realized, there is unified

³⁹ If Augustine, like Plotinus and perhaps Plato, was committed to the existence of a world-soul, a further question to ask is how its presence related to that of God's. For like all incorporeal objects its presence would be *holenmeric*, but would it be restricted or unrestricted? It would seem not to be identical to God's but then what exactly would be the scope of its presence? Further research is needed on this topic. Similar questions could be asked regarding both spatial and causal accounts of presence that I will consider later.

⁴⁰ Of course one could also say that the presence of the soul is unrestricted *with respect to the body* (i.e., that it is everywhere in the body) but that it is restricted *with respect to the totality of the extended world* (i.e., the set of all extended objects). But I am drawing the unrestricted-restricted distinction in scope on the basis of the subject *relatum's* presence with respect to the totality of corporeal creation and not to any object in particular that is not identical to the entire corporeal or extended world.

⁴¹ See for example *Confessions*, VII. Augustine's earlier physicalist conceptions of God will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4.

set of conditions under which the presence relation holds.⁴² There is a single condition or set of conditions which must be satisfied for a presence relation to hold between objects X and Y, and which if satisfied entails that such a relation holds.

The *generic account of presence* (or *GP*), therefore, may be understood as consisting in the conjunction of the following five claims:

GP1. Augustine believes that presence is a relation.

GP2. Augustine believes that there are two modes/patterns of presence: *holenmeric* and *circumscriptive*.

GP3. Augustine believes that mode/pattern of presence is determined by the nature of the subject *relatum*.

GP4. Augustine believes that presence (in either mode) can be either *restricted* or *unrestricted*.

GP5. Augustine believes that there is a unified account of the general conditions under which the presence relation holds across all instances of its obtaining.

GP is uncontroversial in the sense that it expresses what seem to be important points of agreement between all parties with an interest in Augustine's view of *presence* and related topics. For as will become apparent in the discussion which follows, disagreements in this area concern not the generic account *per se*, but rather the explication, analysis, or interpretation of the claims that comprise it.

⁴² In other words, the following material-biconditional has an actual and specifiable antecedent: A presence relation holds between object X and object Y iff Z. As we'll see in the discussion that follows, what differentiates the spatial and causal accounts of presence is their respective instantiation of Z with spatial or causal terms or conditions.

Note that an alternative way to characterize claim 5 is in terms of Augustine's use of "presence", (*praesens*). In this way, the point would be stated in terms of univocity; that is, Augustine says or uses presence univocally (i.e., in one and the same basic sense across all his presence-claims); he takes it to refer to one and the same generic relation independently of the objects that instantiate it, independently of the manner, way, or mode in which it is realized, and independently of the scope or extent to which it is realized.

2.2. The Spatial Account of Presence

Let a *spatial account of presence* (or *SP*) be understood for now as any account of presence that takes the presence relation to be identical to or reducible to a location or occupation relation to space. Recently, several authors, (whose are also proponents of SLI and whose views were discussed in Chapter 1, e.g., Goetz and Taliaferro (2014), Inman (2017), Wierenga (2019) and others), have suggested that Augustine held a spatial account of presence.⁴³ There are two main grounds on which these authors may be said to attribute a spatial account of presence to Augustine. *First*, they each offer spatial readings of Augustine's central presence-claims. Goetz and Taliaferro (2014: 43-5) for example read Augustine's presence-claims involving souls and bodies in terms of souls *occupying space* (or more particularly, in terms of souls occupying the very same space that the bodies they animate occupy):

Given that the soul is not corporeal in nature, one would expect Augustine to maintain that the soul is not in space. Nevertheless he affirms that the soul is in space, but not in the same way in which something corporeal is in space. How does a body occupy space? It does so by having each of its parts occupy parts of space. With a body that is spread out in space, smaller parts of it occupy smaller spaces and larger parts of it occupy larger spaces....[I]n contrast to a body that occupies space by means of its parts occupying sub-regions of the space occupied by the whole, so that the whole body is not present in any of the space occupied by its parts, the soul is present in its entirety at one time, not only in the entire space that is occupied by its body, but also in each of the sub-regions of space that are occupied by that body's parts. [...]

According to Augustine then, the soul exists...and is embodied, *though it and its body occupy the same space* in different ways.⁴⁴

⁴³ Note that the quotations below are the same ones used in Chapter 1. In Chapter 1, I used these passages primarily to show evidence of SLI in recent contemporary discussions; in Chapter 2, I use them primarily to show evidence of the presumption of a spatial reading of Augustine's account of presence in recent contemporary discussions.

⁴⁴ In support of their claims in this passage, Goetz and Taliaferro use the following passage from *On Immortality of the Soul*, 16.25: "[Because] it is the entire soul that feels the pain of a part of the body, yet it does not feel it in the entire body. When, for instance, there is an ache in the foot, the eye looks at it, the mouth speaks of it, and the hand reaches for it. This, of course. Would be impossible, if what of the soul is in these parts did not also experience a sensation in the foot; if the soul were not present, it would be unable to feel what has happened there. [...] Hence, the entire soul is present, at one and the same time, in the single parts, and it experiences sensation as a whole, at one and the same time, in the single parts" (43-4).

Wierenga (2019: 1-2) reads Augustine's presence-claims regarding God and the corporeal world in terms of God being *located* everywhere in space:

According to classical theism, God is omnipresent, that is present everywhere. But classical theism also holds that God is immaterial. How can something that is not, or does not have, a body be *located in space*? Early discussions of divine presence typically began by distinguishing God's *presence in space* from that of material bodies. Augustine (354-439) wrote: "Although in speaking of him we say that God is everywhere present, we must resist carnal ideas and withdraw our mind from our bodily senses, and not imagine that God is distributed through all things by a sort of extension of size, as earth or water or air or light are distributed (*Letter* 187, Ch. 2)." In contrast to material objects, which, having parts in various parts of the space they occupy, are not wholly present at any of those regions, God is wholly present wherever he is.

And Inman (2017: 14-17) reads Augustine's presence-claims involving God and the corporeal world and his presence claims regarding souls and bodies in terms of *spatial location*:

Augustine remarks "that the soul is immaterial is a fact of which I avow myself to be fully persuaded" (*Letter* 166, 2.4). He does not, however, infer from the immateriality of the soul that it therefore lacks *spatial location*....For Augustine, matter is located in space in such a way that "[e]ach mass that occupies space is not in its entirety in each of its single parts, but only in all taken together. Hence, one part is in one place; another part in another" (*Immortality of the Soul*, 16.25); elsewhere he makes the same point that matter is *located in space* by "every part of it [being] less than the whole" (*Letter* 166,4). The soul, by contrast, is "in any body...whole in the whole and whole also in any part of the body" (*On the Trinity* 6.2.8)....

Once again, one might think that Augustine's more developed and mature view of God's omnipresence was one that removed God from space entirely. As was the case with the soul above, this would be much to quick....[A]s in the case of the soul and the body the point of contrast here is between the distinct ways in which God and material objects are each *located in space*, not between lacking a spatial location and having a spatial location. Augustine routinely characterizes God's ubiquitous presence not in terms of his being removed from space altogether but, rather, as a particular way of being *located in the totality of space* that preserves God's absolute mereological simplicity and thus in direct contrast to the mode of location exhibited by material beings. While the soul is exclusively located where the body is and is *wholly located* at each of the parts of the body, God alone is "equally present as a whole not only to the whole of the universe, but also to each part of it." (italics mine)

If these authors did not take Augustine to hold a spatial account of presence, then their spatial readings of his presence claims would be puzzling. If, however, they took Augustine to hold a spatial account of presence (i.e., if they understood Augustine to hold that the presence relation – at least as it figures in these passages – is identical to, reducible or stands in some other tight connection to a location relation to space), then spatial readings of Augustine’s presence-claims such as they give would be expected. For spatial readings such as the ones they advance are logically entailed by a spatial account of presence in conjunction with Augustine’s primary or uninterpreted presence-claims quoted by these authors in the passages above.

The *second* main reason these authors may be said to attribute a spatial account of presence to Augustine is their use of identifying disjunctive phrases such as “presence or location” in the lead up to their discussions Augustine’s presence-claims. Wierenga, for example, in the introduction to his article uses the disjunctive phrases “*present at or located at*” and “present at or located in space”. And Inman uses the disjunctive phrases “spatially located or present”, “spatial occupation or location”, “spatially located or present to the physical domain”, “present or located at each and every place”, “located or present at a place”, on the second page of his paper alone. While Goetz and Taliaferro do not use these disjunctive phrases, that they are assuming a spatial account of presence is further suggested by the statement they use to summarize their discussion of Augustine’s claim that souls are *present in* bodies: “According to Augustine then, the soul exists...and is embodied, *though it and its body occupy the same space in different ways*” (2014: 45).

2.2.1. *The Spatial Twist on the Claims of the Generic Account*

Spatial readings of the presence relation, imply the following spatial twists to the five statements comprising GP.

SP1. Presence is a relation that is identical to or reducible to a location relation to space. Specifically, the obtaining of a presence relation between objects x and y consists in x and y occupying or sharing the same location in space.⁴⁵ In light of SP1 we may characterize the standard spatial readings of Augustine’s paradigm presence-claims as follows:

Paradigm Presence-Claims	Spatial Interpretations
“He [God] is everywhere present in His majesty, not divided by parts, but everywhere complete” <i>On the Sermon on the Mount</i> , II.9.32).	God is simultaneously wholly located in the whole of space and wholly located in each part of space.
“[The soul] is at the same moment present in its entirety in all parts of the body...” (<i>Letter</i> 166, 2.4).	The soul is simultaneously wholly located in the whole space in which the body is located and wholly located in the parts of that space.
“[Bodies] cannot be present at the same time in distant places” but rather “offer part of [themselves] as present to part of reality and another part...to another part of reality, equal parts to equal parts, but a smaller part to a smaller part and a larger part to larger part” (<i>Letter</i> 187, 4.13).	Bodies cannot be wholly located in different parts of space simultaneously but only wholly located in one part of space at a time and partly located in different parts of space simultaneously.

SP2. There are two modes or patterns of spatial location: hollenmeric and circumscriptive. Augustine takes God to be *hollenmerically located* everywhere in space, and he takes souls to be *hollenmerically located* in the same space in which the bodies they animated are *circumscriptively located*.

SP3. Mode or pattern of location in space is determined by the nature of the subject relatum. Hollenmeric location in space requires an incorporeal or nonextended subject *relatum*. Circumscriptive location requires an extended subject *relatum*. Thus, given that God and souls

⁴⁵ Note that there are two possible ways to characterize SP1: (a) Presence is a relation that is identical to the relation of *having or sharing the same location in space as, occupying the same space as*, etc. And (b) Presence is a relation that is identical to the location relation to space. With respect to (a) presence is an identity relation between the spatial locations of two or more objects. With respect to (b) presence is a location relation to space. Thus, with respect to the claim *God is present everywhere*, *presence* could simply be replaced with *located* if *where* is taken to denote a *spatial place* as opposed to a corporeal object (i.e., a place or location in an improper sense).

are incorporeal and thus by their very nature lack spatial extension, neither God nor souls (nor any other incorporeal object) could be circumscriptively located in space; and given that bodies by their nature are spatially extended objects, it is not possible for a body to be hollenmerically located in space. Hollenmeric location therefore is exclusive to incorporeal objects and circumscriptive location is exclusive to corporeal objects.

SP4. Spatial location, regardless of mode, ranges in scope from restricted to unrestricted.

Augustine takes God's hollenmeric location in space to be *unrestricted* and the hollenmeric location of souls to be *restricted* to the space in which the bodies they animate are located. In principle it is possible for a body to be circumscriptively located in space *unrestrictedly*; but the *circumscriptive* location in space of ordinary corporeal objects, such as a human body, is *restricted* and so is that of the planet earth for example. Thus, the *unrestricted-restricted* distinction in scope (i.e., the amount of space the location relation ranges over) cuts across both modes or patterns of spatial location.

SP5. The general conditions of the unified account under which the presence relation holds are spatial. That is, the general conditions under which the presence relation holds, across all instances of its obtaining, (i.e., independently of the nature of the *relata*, mode, and scope), consist in conditions regarding the spatial location of x and y or the relation between the locations of x and y. The conditions may be more explicitly stated as follows. A presence relation obtains between objects x and y iff: (i) x is located in space, (ii) y is located in space (or y is space); and (iii) x and y have the same location in space (or where y is space, the space in which x is located is y).

2.2.2. *SP Fully Stated*

We may now characterize the *spatial account of presence* more fully as consisting in the five interpretive claims expressed in SP1-5 which add spatial twists or interpretations to the five uninterpreted claims comprising GP. Let the spatial account of presence of Augustine's view of presence, therefore, now be understood to consist in the conjunction of the following five claims:

- SP1.* Augustine believes that presence is a relation that is identical to the relation of *having or sharing the same location in space as, occupying the same space as*, etc.
- SP2.* Augustine believes that there are two modes of presence/spatial location: *holenmeric* and *circumscriptive*.
- SP3.* Augustine believes that mode/pattern of presence/location in space is determined by the nature of the subject *relatum*.
- SP4.* Augustine believes that presence/spatial location (in either mode) can be either restricted or unrestricted.
- SP5.* Augustine believes that the generic conditions under which a presence/location relation obtains between x and y are spatial conditions.

Notice that spatial readings of Augustine's presence-claims and the spatial account are importantly related. If the spatial readings are correct, then (other things equal) the spatial account (again, now understood as *the set of interpretive theses expressed by SP1-SP5*) would be true. Thus, proponents of these readings would have both increased and refined our understanding of Augustine's presence-claims and our understanding of the 5 generic points of agreement (i.e., our understanding of Augustine's basic or generic account of presence). If however, it turns out that Augustine did not intend spatial readings of his presence-claims but either directly (by explicit denial) or indirectly (by commitment to positions incompatible with such readings) rejected them, then the spatial twists and addenda on the eight points of agreement would be in question as well. As I'll argue in the sections that follow, there is not only

good reason to doubt spatial accounts of Augustine's presence-claims and SP but good reason to reject them both.

2.3. Modal~SLI and the Initial Case against the Spatial Account

While there are textual and philosophical reasons to reject SP, in this section my case against SP is systematic. Recall that in Chapter 1, I argued on the basis of Augustine's account of spatial location and his account of incorporeal objects for *Modal~SLI* or the thesis that Augustine took incorporeal objects to be unlocatable in space. Notice that *Modal~SLI* has significant implications both for SP and for spatial readings of Augustine's presence-claims. For given that Augustine takes incorporeal objects such as God and human souls to be incapable of realizing a location relation to space, but also takes incorporeal objects to instantiate a presence relation to space or the objects that are located in it (i.e., bodies) it follows that the spatial account does not capture or hold the key to understanding Augustine's account of presence or his presence claims in their most fundamental sense. Thus, we may state the Argument from *Modal~SLI* against SP more formally, as follows:

The Argument from *Modal~SLI* against SP

1. (*Modal~SLI*) Augustine takes incorporeal objects to be essentially unlocatable.
2. Augustine takes incorporeal objects to instantiate presence relations.
3. The spatial account (including spatial readings of his presence claims) entails that Augustine took incorporeal objects to be located in space.
4. Thus, the spatial account is false.

There are two important sets of negative claims that follow from the falsity of SP. The first set concerns the negation of claims SP1-SP5 which comprise SP; that is, *Modal~SLI* in conjunction

with the five points of agreement or GP1-GP5 (and possibly his uninterpreted presence-claims too) entail *pace* SP1-SP5 that:

~SP1. While Augustine believes that presence is a relation, it is not identical to or reducible to the relation of *having or sharing the same location in space as, occupying the same space as*, etc.

~SP2. While Augustine believes that there are two modes/patterns of presence – holenmeric and circumscriptive – there are *not* two modes or patterns of spatial location (i.e., all location is circumscriptive).

~SP3. While Augustine believes that mode/pattern of presence (in the extended world) is determined by the nature of the subject *relatum*, the mode of location in space is not determined by the nature of the subject *relatum*; for the nature determines whether it is located or not; and if it is located that determines the mode; it's being extended determines its being located and its being located determines its being located circumscriptively.

~SP4. While Augustine believes that presence in either mode can be restricted or unrestricted, location in either mode cannot be; for there is only one mode of spatial location: circumscriptive; for holenmeric presence, is not a mode of spatial location.

~SP5. Augustine believes that the *generic* conditions under which a presence relation obtains between x and y are not expressible in spatial terms, (i.e., are not expressible in terms of (i) x being spatially located (ii) y being spatially located, and (iii) x and y having the same spatial location.

The second set of negative claims concerns the spatial readings of Augustine's paradigm presence-claims. That is, *pace* the spatial readings of Augustine's paradigm presence-claims, when Augustine claims that:

"[God] is everywhere present in His majesty, not divided by parts, but everywhere complete" (*On the Sermon on the Mount*, II.9.32).

"[The soul] is at the same moment present in its entirety in all parts of the body..." (*Letter* 166, 2.4).

"[Bodies] cannot be present at the same time in distant places" but rather "offer part of [themselves] as present to part of reality and another part...to another part of reality" (*Letter* 187, 4.13).

he does not mean, (or in the case of body presence, he does not mean in the most fundamental or basic sense), that:

God is wholly located in the whole of space and wholly located in each part.

The soul is wholly located in whole space in which the body is located and wholly located in the parts of that space.

Bodies cannot be wholly located in different parts of space simultaneously but only partly located in the parts of space.

In light of the Argument from Modal~SLI, and given the importance of a robust understanding of Augustine's account of presence, how are we to understand Augustine's account and thus how are we to understand his presence-claims? One thing is for certain, what is needed in the least is an account of presence that is compatible with *Modal~SLI* and Augustine's writings more broadly and thus that will generate likewise compatible readings of his presence claims. Even better would be an account that is not only (i) compatible with Augustine's works but that also (ii) enjoys positive textual support, (iii) is philosophically robust, and (iv) is interpretively powerful, (or practically applicable). In the next section I advance a causal analysis of Augustine's account of presence and argue that it fits this bill.

2.4. The Causal Account of Presence

Whereas the spatial account of presence started in or was rooted in an understanding of Augustine's account of the presence as being identical to, reducible to or essentially involving a location relation to space, the causal account (or *CP*) starts with the understanding that Augustine takes presence *per se* to be a kind of causal relation the obtaining of which requires neither that the subject nor the object *relatum* (or *term*) be located in space.⁴⁶ This starting point feeds into or colors the five generic points of agreement on GP as follows.

⁴⁶ As will become apparent in the discussion that follows below, I say *causal relation* loosely. That is, while this kind of causal relation *can* consist in efficient causation (i.e., the kind of causation or causal relation most associated with "cause" today) it does not have to, and in some instances it seems that the relation neither fits neatly into any of the other Aristotelian categories of causation either (e.g., material, formal, or final). Nevertheless the relation does seem to be a kind of causal relation; whether therefore, this implies another category of causation besides formal,

CPI. Presence is a relation that is identical to or reducible to a kind of causal relation between the subject and object relatum. Specifically the presence relation is a causal relation that consists in the application of a power by one object upon the other (or both on each other) where the application of this power neither requires (though it admits of) spatially located objects nor the sharing of one and the same location by these objects. In other words, a presence relation between x and y consists in x applying a power on y, or y applying a power on x, or both applying a power on each other where such application of power does not require (though it admits of) spatially located objects. In light of *CPI* therefore, we may represent the causal interpretation of Augustine’s paradigm presence-claims as follows:

Paradigm Presence-Claims	Causal Readings
“He [God] is everywhere present in His majesty, not divided by parts, but everywhere complete” <i>On the Sermon on the Mount</i> , II.9.32).	God is at the same moment wholly causally related to (i.e., applies power on) everything (that is) and to every part of everything.
“[The soul] is at the same moment present in its entirety in all parts of the body...” (<i>Letter</i> 166, 2.4).	The soul is at the same moment wholly causally related to (i.e., applies power to) each part of the body.
“[Bodies] cannot be present at the same time in distant places” but rather “offer part of [themselves] as present to part of reality and another part...to another part of reality, equal parts to equal parts, but a smaller part to a smaller part and a larger part to larger part” (<i>Letter</i> 187, 4.13).	Bodies cannot be wholly causally related to (i.e., cannot wholly apply power on) distant places simultaneously but can only be partly causally related to (i.e., can only partly apply power on) different places simultaneously.

CP2. There are two modes/patterns of presence or causation: hollenmeric and circumscriptive. That is Augustine takes the causal relation, (i.e., the application of power), that constitutes the presence relation to be realizable in two ways or patterns. He takes God to be

efficient, material or final or whether this implies that I should not use the label *causal relation*, however, is another matter, but perhaps more of a terminological one than a substantive one (e.g., if there is another name that perhaps best applies to the relation that I’m getting after, then one could apply that label him or herself. Furthermore, whether or not it is a kind of causal relation does not matter regarding the truth and falsity of the position I have chosen to represent by that name.

causally related to everything holenmerically where that involves God as a whole applying (e.g., creative and sustaining) power to the everything that is and to every part of everything that is. He takes souls to be holenmerically causally related to the bodies they animate where that involves souls in their entirety applying (e.g., animating, sensitive, governing/motive powers, etc) to the whole of the bodies they animate and to each part of those bodies simultaneously. Bodies, he takes to be circumscriptively causally related to extended objects such as space and other bodies where that involves the whole body applying extensional powers (to fill or occupy) space or other bodies (or to otherwise contact other bodies).

CP3. Mode/pattern of presence or causation is determined by the nature of the subject relatum. Holenmeric presence/causation or application of power requires an incorporeal or nonextended subject relatum. Circumscriptive presence/causation or application of power requires a spatially extended subject and a spatially extended term. Thus, given that God and souls are incorporeal by their nature and lack spatial extension, neither God nor souls (or any other incorporeal object) could apply power circumscriptively in the extended realm. And given that bodies by their nature are spatially extended, it is not possible for a body to apply power holenmerically in the extended realm. Thus, holenmeric applications of power are exclusive to incorporeal objects (or subject *relata*) and circumscriptive applications of power are exclusive to corporeal (or spatially extended subject and object *relata*).

CP4. Presence or causation (in either mode) can be either restricted or unrestricted. Augustine takes applications of power, regardless of mode, to range in scope from restricted to unrestricted. He takes God's holenmeric causation to be unrestricted (e.g., He takes God to apply creative and sustaining power to everything that is) and he takes the holenmeric causation of souls to be restricted (directly at least) to the bodies they animate (e.g., he takes souls to apply

sensitive, ruling, governing powers, etc. to the bodies they animate). In principle it is possible for a body to apply extensional powers in spatial reality unrestrictedly (e.g., if as Augustine had once thought and some people at that time still thought, God was a body, and in fact all objects were corporeal objects, and God stood to the totality of the extended world – the only world – as say light stands to air, water to a sponge, or even blood to a body, then God in this sense would be causally related to everything circumscriptively); but the circumscriptive application of extensional power of ordinary corporeal objects to other extended objects, such as human bodies to space or other bodies, is restricted. Thus, the unrestricted-restricted distinction cuts across both modes of causation or applications of power that Augustine recognizes.

*CP5. The unified account of the general conditions under which the presence relation holds across all instances of its obtaining consists in causal conditions (i.e., conditions which require causal relations hold between presence relata where the holding of these relations neither requires that the subject nor term relatum stand in a location relation to space, nor that the relata, in some manner or other, share one and the same location relation to space). The conditions may be stated as follows: A presence relation holds or obtains between x and y iff: (i) x applies a power to y, or (ii) y applies a power to x (inclusive).*⁴⁷

2.4.1. Summary

We may now characterize CP more fully as the set of (interpretive) claims expressed by *CP1-CP5*:

CP1. Augustine believes that presence is a causal relation (or a relation that consists in the application of power by one object on another or both on each other and which does not

⁴⁷ An alternative way to characterize *CP5* is in terms of Augustine's use of the term "presence": *Presence Is Said Univocally*. Augustine uses presence in one and the same basic sense across all his presence-claims. That is, by *presence* he means *causally related to* or *applies power on*, etc.

essentially involve either relatum standing in a location relation to space or sharing in some way or another one and the same location in space).

CP2. Augustine believes that there are two modes/patterns of presence/causation: *holenmeric* and *circumscriptive*.

CP3. Augustine believes that mode/pattern of presence/causation is determined by the nature of the subject relatum.

CP4. Augustine believes that presence/causation (in either mode) can be either restricted or unrestricted.

CP5. Augustine believes that a presence relation holds between *x* and *y* iff: (i) *x* applies a power to *y*, or (ii) *y* applies a power to *x* (inclusive).

2.5. The Case for the Causal Account

There are several reasons why CP provides a robust account of *presence* in its own right (i.e., as a primary thesis) and also several reasons why CP provides a better understanding than SP of Augustine's account of presence and of his presence-claims (i.e., as an interpretive thesis). These reasons may be grouped under the following headings: (i) systematic and textual compatibility, (ii) positive textual support, (iii) explanatory power/applicability, and (iv) philosophical robustness. I discuss instances of each of these types of reasons in turn below.⁴⁸

2.5.1. Systematic and Textual Compatibility

⁴⁸ Note that membership in a given category does not exclude membership in another; that is, one and the same reason may plausibly be a member of more than one category simultaneously. I have placed the reasons or relevant facts in the categories I did for several reasons including flow of discussion but primarily because they seem to be paradigm or at least better representatives of that category than another in which they may also have membership. Furthermore, that different categories can admit of one and the same reason should not be taken to entail that there is not substantive or real difference between them; that there is shown by the fact that while one and the same reason can be a member in more than one category, and some may actually be, it is possible that a reason be a member of one category alone, but this would not be possible if the categories denoted one and the same class under different descriptions.

The causal account avoids systematic incompatibilities faced by the spatial account.⁴⁹ For example, unlike the spatial account the causal account is compatible with *Modal~SLI*, (i.e., with Augustine taking incorporeal objects to be essentially unlocatable in space). For on the causal account, Augustine is understood as taking presence to be a kind of causal relation the obtaining of which in itself requires neither that the subject nor term *relatum* be located in space (nor excludes the *relata* from being so located). Hence, the fact that Augustine takes incorporeal objects to be incapable of spatial location and the fact that Augustine takes incorporeal objects to enter into presence relations stand in no tension on the causal account as they do on the spatial account with its requirement of or assumption of spatially located *relata*.⁵⁰

⁴⁹ By *systematic incompatibility* I mean *indirect* inconsistency between a secondary thesis and the primary claims of an author's texts, (i.e., the author's primary claims). By indirect inconsistency I mean that the primary claims in the authors works do not directly contradict a commentator's secondary claims but entail the falsity of the secondary thesis in conjunction with either (a) self-evident (or uncontroversial) assumptions, (b) other primary claims, or (c) both a and b.. In other words we could say that a given secondary thesis X is systematically incompatible with an author's works iff: the works contain primary claims which in conjunction with either (a) self-evident or uncontroversial assumption, (b) other primary claims, or (c) both, entail the falsity of the secondary thesis, or rather, entail a claim that is inconsistent with the secondary thesis; the final or direct inconsistency between the secondary claim and the primary ones is a function of the primary claims entailing the author's commitment to a claim or proposition which he or she would not be so committed were the secondary thesis true. Thus, the contradiction holds between the claim that author x is committed to proposition p, where p expresses the entailment of the primary claims, which is not explicitly stated in the texts, and the secondary thesis which claims that x was not committed to p. By textual or direct compatibility or incompatibility, I mean consistency with an author's explicit primary claims; so secondary thesis t is textually compatible with primary claim p iff: both t and p (or the secondary claim that the author expresses commitment to p) can both be true at the same time; t and p would be textually incompatible otherwise.

⁵⁰ A further systematic incompatibility for SP but which is avoided on CP concerns Augustine's claim made in several places that souls are incapable of movement in space (i.e., from spatial place to spatial place). If SP was correct, then given that souls are located in the same space in which the bodies they animate are located, and given that Augustine takes bodies to move from place to place, it would seem to follow that he would also be committed to the movement of souls from place to place. But again, he denies that they do. For instances of Augustine denying that souls are incapable of movement in space and related passages, see: *The Literal Meaning of Genesis*, VIII.19.38f; *Unfinished Literal Commentary on Genesis*, 3.8; *On True Religion*, 10.18; *Eighty-Three Questions*, 8. Letter 18; *Letter 147*, 17.43; *Sermon 198*, 28; *On the Trinity*, VIII.6.9; and *On Order*, II.6.18f.

Abelard in fact read Augustine as not taking souls to be located in space on account of his denying souls move in space. See Marenbon (2008) for Abelard's reading of Augustine.

CP, however, on account of its neither taking location in space to be essential to nor required for the obtaining of a presence relation is consistent with Augustine's claims that: (a) souls do not/cannot move in space, (b) bodies can and do so move, and that (c) souls are present in the bodies they animate. The movement problem for SP, and how CP avoids this problem, will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.

Furthermore, unlike the spatial account, the causal account is also compatible with passages such as the following in which Augustine is found directly or expressly claiming that being in a proper place (i.e., being in a spatial place in the sense of occupying, being located in, having a spatial location, etc.) is exclusive to bodies:

R: Does this proposition seem to you to be true: anything which exists must be somewhere?

A: There is nothing on which I would be more inclined to agree with you.

R: And do you grant that truth exists?

A: I do.

R: We must, therefore, ask where it is. *For it is not in place, unless perhaps you think that anything other than a body has existence in place, or you believe that truth is a body.*

A: *I don't believe either of those propositions (Soliloquies I.29).* (italics mine)

Once again, CPs compatibility with passages such as these is grounded in its account of presence *per se* as requiring neither a subject nor a term *relatum* that is located in space, but instead requiring only that a kind of causal relation (i.e., a power application relation) hold between the presence *relata*. Therefore, the causal account unlike the spatial one is compatible with both *systematically derived facts* (i.e., argued for and well supported secondary claims or interpretations such as Modal~SLI and his denial that souls are incapable of change of place) and *direct textual facts* (i.e., the passage from *Soliloquies* I above and also several further texts presented in the course of the discussion which follows; for there is a surplus of such passages with are directly incompatible with SP or the spatial readings of the presence-claims SP entails).⁵¹

⁵¹ Note that the systematic and textual reasons, evidence, or facts that tell against SP, (i.e., negative evidence), positively and directly supports CP, (i.e., constitutes positive systematic or textual evidence for CP). For part of CP, remember, is the negative claim that presence *per se* does not consist in, essentially involve or require spatially located *relata*; so facts such as Augustine claiming that incorporeal objects enter into presence relations and that only bodies are in place tell against or constitute negative evidence for SP, but positively support CP as these facts entail that presence *per se* does not consist in or require location in space and this is part of the causal account, (i.e., presence *per se* for Augustine consists in (i) a causal relation, specifically the application of some power, where (ii) this does not consist in a location relation to space and does not essentially involve or require spatially located *relata* or their sharing one and the same location in some way or other at the same time. CP then (or specifically CP1 or

2.5.2. Positive Textual Support

In addition to systematic and textual compatibility, the causal account also captures and reflects the causal tone of Augustine's own explications of his presence-claims. In this sense CP, unlike SP, enjoys positive textual support. For example, in discussing the soul's presence in the body when arguing for its incorporeality in *Epistle 166*, Augustine writes:

It is, of course, stretched out through the whole body that it animates, not by a local diffusion [*locali diffusione*] but by a certain vital intention [*vitali intentione*]. For it is at the same time present as a whole through all the body's parts, not smaller in smaller parts and larger in larger parts, but more intensely in one place and less intensely in another, both whole in all parts and whole in the individual parts. (*Letter*, 166, 4)⁵²

Proponents of spatial readings are left puzzled by Augustine explicating the soul's presence in the body in terms of souls effecting a "vital influence" (i.e., applying animating power) on the body instead of in terms of the "the soul occupying the same space that the body occupies" or "the soul being located in the same space in which the body was located". Goetz and Taliaferro (2011: 44) for example, explicitly state their puzzlement over this very passage during their discussion of Augustine's presence-claims about the soul:

It is unclear to us what Augustine has in mind in this passage where he states that the soul is stretched out (present) in the entirety of the body "by a certain vital intention." What is clear is that he believes the soul is present in its entirety at each point in the space it occupies...⁵³

CP5) contain two main parts: a positive part expressed in (i) and a negative part expressed in (ii). All evidence against SP is evidence in support of CP by way of supporting its negative component claim; support for the positive part comes elsewhere; and in these passages where Augustine both denies incorporeals or some particular incorporeal is or can be SL and at the same time or context claims that the object enters into a presence relation and further explicates its presence in terms of causation or the application of some power tells both against SP, in favor of the negative claim on CP and in favor of CP's positive claim. Such passages might be called double whammies as they both tell against SP and in favor of CP, or triple whammies in the sense that they (a) tell against SP, (and thus) (b) in favor of the negative part of SP, and (c) in favor of the positive part of CP.

⁵² Per totum quippe corpus quod animat, non locali diffusione, sed quadam vitali intentione porrigitur: nam per omnes eius particulas tota simul adest, nec minor in minoribus, et in maioribus maior; sed alicubi intentius, alicubi remissius, et in omnibus tota, et in singulis tota est.

⁵³ See also Goetz's and Taliaferro's expression of surprise or puzzlement on p. 43: "...Augustine maintains that which is not corporeal (bodily) is not in space (*Immortality of the Soul*, 10.17). Given that the soul is not corporeal in nature, *one would expect* Augustine to maintain that the soul is not in space. *Nevertheless he affirms that the soul is in space*, but not in the same way in which something corporeal is in space" (italics mine). Cf. Inman (2017: 15):

The causal account, however, rather than leaving its proponents in the dark about Augustine's meaning in this passage, sheds light on it: Augustine is claiming that at least one of the relations that holds between the soul and the body and that constitutes its presence in the body is that the soul is a cause or source of its being a living and unified whole (i.e., in the soul applying animating power on the body). In further confirmation of this reading we find Augustine expressing this same idea in *On the Magnitude of the Soul*, in conjunction with an explicit denial that the soul occupies place:

The soul *did not occupy a place* but *held the body* which was moved by it (32.68; italics mine).⁵⁴

And shortly after this he writes:

The soul by its presence gives life to this mortal and earthly body; it brings the body together into a unity and keeps it in unity; it prevents the body from breaking up and wasting away (33.70).

These latter two passages taken together are once again puzzling on the spatial reading, and the first one is especially so given its explicit denial that the soul occupies place.⁵⁵ But on the causal account explications such as these are what one would expect. For as Augustine explicitly suggests, the soul's presence in the body is not to be thought of in terms of a relation to space (which reflects the negative part of CP) but as a causal relation between animating souls and the bodies they animate (a reflection of the positive part).

"When discussing the way in which the soul is located in the body in particular, *Augustine is at pains* to first distinguish the various ways in which the material and immaterial are related to space in general" (italics mine).

⁵⁴ "Non enim locum ipsa, sed corpus quod ab eadem agebatur, tenebat."

⁵⁵ While considered in isolation the second passage may seem compatible with the spatial account if it was understood as suggesting that by being located in or occupying the space in which the body is located the soul animates and holds together the body. But in the context of the first passage, (and other facts previously or soon to be discussed), such a reading is not available.

The causal account, again unlike SP, also predicts or anticipates, and thus is supported by, Augustine's explications of his presence-claims involving God. Consider, for example, the following two passages:

When we stand at prayer, we turn to the east, whence the heaven rises: not as if God also were dwelling there, in the sense that He who is everywhere present, *not as occupying space*, but *by the power of His majesty*, had forsaken the other parts of the world (*Sermon on the Mount*, II.5.18; *italics mine*).⁵⁶

God is spread out through all things. Indeed.... But God is spread out through all things not such that he is a quality of the world [as things which occupy space or have locations in them are] *but such that he is the substance that creates the world, rules it without any toil and contains it without any burden* (*Letter 187*, 4.14; *italics mine*).⁵⁷

Pace the spatial account, the first passage expressly denies that God's presence everywhere should be understood in terms of God occupying space, and the second passage expressly denies that God is dependent upon anything in creation be it space, bodies, souls, etc. But dependence on space is a feature of all objects that are located in space.⁵⁸ Causal readings, on the other hand, are not merely compatible with these passages but seem to capture the causal spirit in which Augustine writes them. For the first suggests that God's presence everywhere is to be understood in terms of his power over everything. And the second passage seems to explicate even further the specific causal (or power application) relations that God stands in to everything and which

⁵⁶ "Cuius rei significandae gratia, cum ad orationem stamus, ad orientem convertimur, unde caelum surgit; non tamquam ibi habitet Deus, quasi ceteras mundi partes deseruerit qui ubique praesens est, non locorum spatiis, sed maiestatis potential."

⁵⁷ The full passage in Latin runs as follows: "Est ergo Deus per cuncta diffusus. Ipse quippe ait per prophetam: Coelum et terram ego impleo 30; et quod paulo ante posui de sapientia eius: Attingit a fine usque ad finem fortiter, et disponit omnia suaviter 31; itemque scriptum est: Spiritus Domini replevit orbem terrarum 32; eique dicitur in quodam psalmo: Quo abibo a spiritu tuo, et a facie tua quo fugiam? Si ascendero in coelum, tu ibi es; si descendero ad infernum, ades 33. Sed sic est Deus per cuncta diffusus, ut non sit qualitas mundi; sed substantia creatrix mundi, sine labore regens, et sine onere continens mundum. Non tamen per spatia locorum, quasi mole diffusa, ita ut in dimidio mundi corpore sit dimidius, et in alio dimidio dimidius, atque ita per totum totus; sed in solo coelo totus, et in sola terra totus, et in coelo et in terra totus, et nullo contentus loco, sed in seipso ubique totus."

⁵⁸ See for example *Eighty Three Questions*, Question 20, where Augustine claims that what is somewhere is contained in place and what is contained in place is body and further passages such as *Letter 187*, 6.18 wherein Augustine explicates containment as a dependence relation/in terms of ontological dependence.

constitute His presence, namely: “creation”, “ruling” and “containing” (i.e., applying creative, governing, and sustaining power over everything).

Another important passage in Augustine’s works that is perhaps more telling than the two above, against the spatial account and in favor of a causal one, is this passage from *On The Literal Meaning of Genesis*,

...By his immutable and surpassing power, not in any local or spatial sense, he is both interior to every single thing, because in him are all things, and exterior to every single thing because he is above all things (VIII.26.48).⁵⁹

Like the first two passages, this one both denies that God’s presence in all things should be understood in spatial terms, and instead suggests that it should be understood in terms of God being causally related to everything there is (i.e., God is in all things because “in Him are all things” meaning that he causes and sustains or applies His creative and sustaining power to all things).

2.5.3. Interpretive Power

By interpretive power I mean the ability of a secondary account to shed light on or explicate primary claims. The degree of interpretive power a secondary account has is a function (among other things) of the amount, quantity or number of primary data for which it can account. Thus, (assuming other things equal) a secondary account of presence is more powerful than another if it could (easily and intuitively) be applied to, explicate or shed light on a wider variety of Augustine’s presence claims than the other. Understood in this way, CP provides a more powerful account of Augustine’s view of presence than SP and is a more useful theoretical tool with respect to understanding Augustine’s presence-claims in a deeper or more fundamental

⁵⁹ “...nullo locorum vel intervallo vel spatio, incommutabili excellentique potentia et interior omni re, quia in ipso sunt omnia, et exterior omni re, quia ipse est super omnia.”

level of semantic analysis. For beyond the paradigm presence-claims discussed above, Augustine's works contain several further kinds of presence-claims that are easily accounted for and explicated on CP but with which SP is either incompatible, unable to account for, or unable to plausibly, intuitively and easily account for, and thus for which SP is interpretively inert or weak because it is either wholly inapplicable or only unintuitively applicable. Below I present three examples of further kinds of presence-claims of which CP can easily make sense, but SP cannot.

Example 1: The Presence of External Bodily Objects to the Bodily Senses. The first non-paradigmatic kind of presence claim that I'll consider asserts that a presence relation obtains between external bodies and the bodily senses. For example, in *On the Trinity*, 12.14.23, Augustine writes: "...visible and tangible things are present in their places to the senses of the body."⁶⁰ On SP, a presence relation *per se* between x and y consists in x and y being located in the same spatial place. Thus, the account of this presence claim on SP would commit Augustine to holding that external objects that are the (occurrent or possible) objects of the bodily senses, bodily sensations, or bodily sense organs, are located in one and the same spatial place as the bodily senses that (do or can) do detect them. Note that SP would perhaps be applicable to certain instances of a presence relation between an external object and particular senses. For example, an object that contacted the body such that the contact was felt would involve the sensitive body and the external object that contacted it to have some kind of overlap in spatial location at least for the duration of the contact. And in instances involving smell or taste and thus the nose and mouth or tongue (or all if smell and taste are so related) in the case where smelling

⁶⁰The full sentence runs as follows: "*Manent autem, non tamquam in spatiis locorum fixa veluti corpora; sed in natura incorporali sic intelligibilia praesto sunt mentis aspectibus, sicut ista in locis visibilia vel contrectabilia corporis sensibus.*"

or tasting involves parts or particles of the external body being in the nose or in the mouth there would as well be a sharing of the location of the external object or its parts at least with that of the relevant parts of the sensing body. But SP seems to be inapplicable to cases involving the eyes (or organs of sight) and ears (or organs of hearing). For Augustine held a ray theory of vision upon which light from the eyes detects an external object and like radar light then conveys information back to the eyes;⁶¹ thus, there is no overlap of spatial location between bodily eyes and the objects of sight; and furthermore, in several places Augustine explicitly denies that the eyes of the body can see anything which occupies that same place that it does or else it could see it self which it can't;⁶² thus, he concludes that between the eyes and any object of sight (actual or potential) there must be some spatial distance; and it follows from this that there is no overlap between the location of the eyes and the location of the object. Thus, SP would be literally inapplicable in this case or would entail a reading that was inconsistent with his other views and works. Unlike SP, CP is applicable to or able to account for this further kind of presence claim regardless of the particular bodily senses involved in the relation. For remember on CP, presence *per se* or a presence relation between x and y consists in a kind of causal relation obtaining between x and y (namely, a power application relation between x and y) where this neither requires x nor y to stand in a location relation to space. Thus, presence between an external object and the sensing body generally in the case of touch, or the external object and the eyes, nose, mouth, or ears in the case of sight, smell, taste and hearing respectively could be easily construed as consisting in the external object applying its power of being sensible (which is

⁶¹ For examples of Augustine advancing this theory of vision see: *Letter 147*, 17.41f; *Unfinished Literal Commentary on Genesis*, 5.24-5; *The Literal Meaning of Genesis*, VII.13.20; *On the Magnitude of the Soul*, Chapter 23f, and *On Music*, VI.8.21. For secondary discussion of the ray theory in Augustine and previous philosophers see Nash (2003: 48-50).

⁶² See for example *On the Magnitude of the Soul*, Chapters 23-4.

rooted in its being spatially extended) to the bodily senses or in the senses applying their sensitive powers (rooted in their extended nature in conjunction with the animating power of the soul) to the external object or both to each.

Example 2: The Presence of Eternal Truths to Human Souls. The *second* non-paradigmatic kind of presence claim that I'll consider asserts that a presence relation obtains between eternal intelligibles and the rational mind. In *On Free Will*, II.10.28, for example Augustine writes: "...[T]he following propositions are absolutely true, and are present in common to you and me and all who see them: we ought to live justly; the better should be preferred to the worse; like should be compared with like; every man should be given his due..." The reason that SP fails with this kind of presence claim is not only that the eternal intelligibles and the soul are incorporeal and thus incapable of location in space and thus can't meet the basic conditions for presence on SP, but also because Augustine expressly or explicitly denies that the eternal intelligibles are located in space or place. In discussing the form of Unity or Oneness for example, Augustine writes:

...[I]t is with the mind that we see true unity. But where? If it were here where our body is, it would not be visible to a man who in eastern parts judges in the same way about corporeal things. It is not, then, circumscribed by space. It is present wherever anyone judges in this way. It is nowhere present spatially, but its potency is nowhere absent (*On True Religion*, 32.60).

Unlike SP, however, CP is compatible with systematic and textual evidence showing that Augustine did not take the eternal intelligibles or souls to be located in space (or even to be capable of such location); for it allows for but does not require spatially located relata; furthermore, it is able to account for or shed light on what the presence relation between the eternal intelligibles and the soul consists in, namely, the former applying their intelligible light, form, or power to souls or souls applying their power of sight or intellectual vision to the

intelligibles or both. This is also further supported or reflected in the last line of the quotation above that suggests the form of Unity is nowhere present spatially but is present everywhere in respect of power or potency.

Example 3: Self-Presence or The Soul's Presence to Itself. The third non-paradigmatic kind of presence claim that I'll consider asserts that a presence relation obtains between the soul and itself. On this point Augustine writes that "...nothing is more present to [the soul] than itself" (*On the Trinity*: X.10.16). On SP this claim would be read as asserting that *nothing is more located in the space where the soul is located than the soul itself*; and if the manner of location was read into this claim as well then it would be understood as asserting that *nothing is more hollenmerically located in the space that the soul is located than the soul itself*; for while on SP human souls and the bodies they animate are taken to share the same location in space, but the soul is hollenmerically located in that part of space while the body is circumscriptively located there.⁶³

While SP is applicable to this self-presence claim, it does not capture the spirit of the claim given the context in which it is made. Augustine in this context is talking about the soul's ability to perceive itself or ability to be perceived by itself and not about the location of the soul.

⁶³ There is a question about whether this would hold true in the case of God as on SP God is hollenmerically located where the soul is located, so nothing being more located than where the soul is located (i.e., the quantity or degree of location), would also include it's restriction or non-restriction in addition to its mode; in this way, nothing is more present to the soul than itself would be understood as asserting that nothing is more located where the soul is located than the soul itself as while the body and God may also share that particular location, the body does so also only in respect of restriction but not mode and God only in sense of mode but not restriction; for God is hollenmerically located where the soul is but also everywhere else the soul is not; this in effect raises the issue of Augustine's account of the degree or quantity of a presence relation such that one thing could have more or less presence than another; whatever view one had of this it would have to come out that and make sense of Augustine's relativized or comparative presence claims such that nothing is more present to the soul than itself, which is a claim about the presence of the soul to itself relative to the presence of all other things to the soul; it would also have to account for God being more present in world than anything else; generically one could say these are a function of whether presence is restricted or not and mode or manner; God's presence being unrestricted and hollenmeric would be the greatest presence; the soul's presence being restricted and hollenmeric would be an intermediate kind of presence; and the body being restricted and circumscriptive would be weakest kind of presence.

In this way then CP is better able to capture the self-presence claim because the ability to perceive itself or to be perceived by itself consists in its power to apply intellectual perception to itself and its power of intelligibility which consists in its ability to be the subject of intellectual perception. Nothing is more present to the soul than itself on CP would be read as nothing is more able to apply intellectual power to the soul than the soul itself and nothing is more able to be subject to this power (i.e., to be intelligible) to the soul than the soul itself.⁶⁴

Thus, the relative interpretive power of CP and SP with respect to Augustine's claim that nothing is more present to the soul than itself, is not a function of applicability *per se*; for both SP and CP are practically applicable to the self-presence claim; rather it is a function of applicability, plus ability to capture context, both the specific context in which the claim is embedded and the larger context consisting in the totality of Augustine's works, and local and non-local textual coherence or consistence. While SP and CP are both applicable to the self-presence claim, CP better captures the spirit of the claim and is more coherent with Augustine's works.

Also concerning the interpretive or explanatory power of CP consider how it can account for or shed light on Augustine's views on the relation between *presence* and *location* in space (i.e., how it accounts for Augustine's views on the relations between these relations). Given that Augustine takes bodies to be present in space and located in space but given that he takes God and human souls to be present in space in some real sense but not located in space, as I argued above the negative claim follows that on Augustine's view a presence relation *per se* is neither identical to nor reducible to a location relation to space, but what was his positive view on the relation between presence and location? CP suggests that Augustine took location in space to be

⁶⁴ The causal reading is also consistent with Augustine's claims that the soul not in space, etc., whereas SP is not. More on this will be discussed in Chapter 3.

a species of presence, namely, one that involves applying extensional powers to space; hence, physical objects are present in space because they are extended through it, takes up regions of it, and move about in it; while nonphysical objects apply powers (directly or indirectly) to space, they are not extensional powers but powers that do not rely on extension; thus, while both physical and nonphysical objects are present in space in a real sense, physical objects are present via being extended in space, and applying extensional powers to space is to be located in space; but nonphysical objects have nonextended presence, that is, their presence in space is not via being extended through it, and *thus* Augustine's account of spatial location does not entail their being located in it; thus, on Augustine's view, presence is a broader notion than location; for while all things located in space are present in space (e.g., bodies) it's not the case that all things present in space are located in space (e.g., nonphysical objects are present in space, but not located in space). Understanding Augustine in this way then is consistent with the following facts regarding Augustine's views:

- (1) All physical objects are present in space.
- (2) All physical objects are and must be located in space.
- (3) Nonphysical objects such as God and human souls are present in space in a real sense.
- (4) Nonphysical objects are not and cannot be located in space.

And this account is not only consistent with these facts but explains them, (i.e., if Augustine took location in space to be a kind of presence in space via extension, then given his account of location in space, his account of bodies as intrinsically extended in space, and his account of nonphysical objects as necessarily lacking such extension, it follows he would also hold (1) –

(4).)⁶⁵ While there may be other ways that are equally consistent with and explanatory of (1) – (4) I am not aware of any such accounts or even discussions of the issue. For the standard practice of both Augustine scholars and nonscholars alike is to either leave presence unexplicated during their discussions or to read it as involving a location relation to space. While the former approach is consistent with (1) – (4) it leaves us in the dark as to what it consists in; in other words it does not advance our understanding; the latter approach, however, is neither consistent with nor helpful for making sense of (1) – (4). For, it is not compatible with (4) in particular.

2.5.4. Theoretical or Philosophical Robustness

In Chapter 1, I argued that the case for SLI (i.e., the view remember that Augustine took incorporeal objects such as God and souls to be spatially located) assumed that Augustine took there to be a tight connection between “presence” and “being spatially located” and that this assumption faced several counterexamples. In this chapter, I have stated more explicitly what proponents of SLI may take that tight connection to be, namely, that the *presence relation* is identical to or reduces to the relation of *having* or *sharing the same spatial location* (i.e., *SP1*).⁶⁶ The counterexamples I used in Chapter 1 to sever SLI proponents’ assumption of a tight connection between *presence* and *spatial location* also apply to *SP1*. Consider again the video game example: Imagine that a person P is playing a video game and the game character on the screen moves about given the way that P manipulates the buttons and switches on the controller. In this case there is a real sense in which P is present in the avatar, but *pace* SP1 the player and

⁶⁵ Note that this account is also consistent with Augustine’s account of location in space as being extended in space, his account of physical objects and essentially intrinsically extended, his account of nonphysical objects as lacking such extension, etc.

⁶⁶ One could also explicate the tight connection between presence and spatial location assumed in the case for SL in terms of *SP5*: the claim that the generic conditions under which a presence or location relation obtains between x and y are *spatial conditions* (i.e., (i) x is spatially located, (ii) y is located in space, and (iii) x and y have the same spatial location). The same counter examples as those I present for SP1 are also applicable to SP5.

the video game character or avatar do not share the same spatial location (i.e, there is no overlap between the character's spatial location and that of the player's).⁶⁷ And consider again Augustine's claim in *City of God* XII.25-6, that the light that God is first said to have created before everything else symbolically represents the angels. Augustine would also have taken a presence relation to hold between God and the angels (for he takes God to be present in all things) even though space itself had not yet been created; hence, *pace* SP1 the (fundamental) presence relation is not reducible to or identical to a location relation to space or the relation "having the same spatial location as".

In contrast to the spatial account, the causal account (specifically CP1 or CP5) not only admits of and is compatible with the instances of presence described in the above cases, it also easily makes sense of them. For remember on the causal account, the presence relation *per se*, neither requires *space* itself, the obtaining of a *location relation to space*, nor does it *consist in* the sharing of the same spatial location (in some way or other) by the presence *relata*. Thus, concerning the first case, that a presence relation obtains between the game player and the game character while the player and the character do not share the numerically identical spatial location (in any mode or to any extent) is consistent with the causal account. The causal account makes sense of this presence as the obtaining of a casual relation between the game player and the movements of the game character (i.e., as consisting in the game player applying a kind of motive power to the game character, indirectly of course, or in the player being the efficient

⁶⁷ A further contemporary example that may be useful here is from the movie "Interstellar" when the character Joseph Cooper, (played by Matthew McConaughey), falls into a black hole and finds himself outside of three-dimensional space and in something like the fourth dimension; he observes in the "block" of space time where his daughter is, and tries to communicate with her by rapping on the "block", etc. In this case as well, even though Cooper is not in three-dimensional space and even if his daughter doesn't know it is him, it is still the case that he is present there but is not located in that space, (in that particular place in space and time or in the whole of that space time block). Further counterexamples to SPI can be found in the *Avatar* movie the case of guided missiles, remote control cars, the effects of great teachers on students, parents in children, demonic possession, etc.

cause of the character's movements). And concerning the second case, that a presence relation obtained between God and the first creatures, but space did not exist, is consistent with the causal account. The causal account makes sense of this instance of presence as reducible to or identical to the fact that God is the cause of everything that exists and hence to God being the cause of the existence of these angels (i.e., in God applying his non-extensionally rooted creative and sustaining power on them). Thus, the causal account is a theoretically or philosophically robust or defensible account of presence on its own terms but is also so in relation to the spatial account.

2.6. Conclusion

In this chapter, I have explicated what seem to be five generic claims comprising Augustine's views on presence. I have shown that a spatial reading of these claims and thus of Augustine's account of presence as a whole has taken root in contemporary philosophy of religion, and I have argued that the such a reading should be rejected and replaced with a causal understanding of Augustine's account of presence. In the chapters that follow I will carry forward the causal account to shed light on new accounts of several further important topics in Augustine's philosophy. For the causal account has implications for how one understands Augustine's (1) argument from presence to incorporeal souls, (2) his argument from omnipresence to God's incorporeality, (3) his mature dualistic ontology and worldview, and (4) the difference between his mature dualistic view and the competing physicalist view of which he had earlier been a proponent. The implications for (1) will be treated in detail in Chapter 3; the implications for (2) will be treated in Chapter 4, and those for (3) and (4) will be treated in Chapter 5.

PART II
A CAUSAL ANALYSIS OF AUGUSTINE'S ARGUMENTS FROM
PRESENCE TO INCORPOREALITY

CHAPTER 3

REJECTING PSYCHIC PHYSICALISM: A CAUSAL ANALYSIS OF AUGUSTINE'S ARGUMENT FROM PRESENCE TO INCORPOREAL SOULS

The *Argument from Presence* (or *AP*) is the name I give to one of Augustine's main arguments for the incorporeality of human souls. It was the heart of his *personal* transition from a physicalist view of souls to an incorporeal one. It was also central to his *public* case against physicalist views which were widespread both before and during his time. Figuring crucially in the argument is the claim that souls are simultaneously wholly present everywhere in the bodies they animate. Recent commentators have either left this presence-claim uninterpreted or have read it as attributing to souls a manner of spatial location that cannot be realized by physical objects. While such readings may be tempting, they lack positive textual support and are incompatible with various passages found throughout Augustine's writings. This chapter proposes instead that the claim be read as attributing to souls a mode of causation that cannot be realized by physical or spatially extended objects. Like spatial readings, the causal reading goes semantically deeper than surface or generic expressions of the presence-claim, but unlike spatial readings it is both compatible with Augustine's wider corpus and enjoys positive textual support. By reading the presence-claim in this way, we gain not only a better understanding of Augustine's argument from presence to incorporeal souls, but also a better understanding of his *personal* and *public* rejection of *physicalism*. Further implications of this reading will also be discussed.

3.1. Background

Lamenting his early view of the world and view of himself, Augustine writes in *Confessions*, VII.1.2: “I was so gross of mind—*not seeing even myself clearly*—that whatever was not extended in space, either diffused or massed together or swollen out or having some such qualities or at least capable of having them, I thought must be nothing whatsoever.” If we define a *physical* or *bodily* object as one that is extended in the three spatial dimensions, and if we define *physicalism* as the view that all objects are physical ones, then in light of the quotation above, Augustine was a physicalist early in his intellectual career.⁶⁸ Surprisingly, he also believed in the existence of substantial souls during this same period; and thus, in keeping with his early physicalism, he tells us also in the *Confessions* that he viewed the soul as some kind of “subtle body, diffused in local space.”⁶⁹ Thus, if we define *psychic-physicalism* as the view that the soul is a physical substance, then Augustine was also a committed *psychic-physicalist* and this commitment was grounded in part in his commitment to physicalism *per se*.

3.1.1. Philosophical Psychic Physicalism

Augustine was not alone in holding a physicalist view of the soul. As many passages in his works suggest, such views of the soul were prevalent both before and during his time.⁷⁰ In

⁶⁸ For further passages in which Augustine expresses his early commitment to physicalism see: *Confessions* IV.15.24-26; *Confessions*, V.10.19, and *Confessions*, VII.1.1.

⁶⁹ *Confessions*, V.10.20: “*Mentem cogitare non noveram nisi eam subtile corpus esse, quod tamen per loci spatia diffunderetur.*” For further passages in which Augustine grounds his commitment to psychic physicalism in physicalism *per se* see: *Confessions*, IV.15.24-26 and X.40.65.

⁷⁰ As was true in his own case, he took the view to be rooted in and to grow out of a more fundamental commitment to *physicalism* as defined above. Note that if we define a *cognitive model of the origin or etiology* of some belief as one that takes it to arise by way of deduction from other beliefs (or propositional commitments) then Augustine seems to be offering a cognitive model of the origin of psychic physicalism as he suggests that the view falls out of physicalism and belief in substantial souls. Augustine is not explicit as to whether he takes proponents of psychic physicalism to arrive at the view by way of *conscious* or *unconscious* deduction from these other claims or both. Further, (and as is also true regarding *theological physicalism* and its particular instantiations which will be discussed in Chapter 4), Augustine cognitively models as well the etiology of particular versions of psychic physicalism (e.g., the atomistic, elemental, Manichean, and body part identity versions of psychic physicalism, which will be discussed below, as involving a commitment to psychic physicalism (and thus to physicalism), a

fact he identifies at least four specific sub-kinds of psychic physicalism, which I'll call: (i) *body part*, (ii) *atomistic*, (iii) *elemental*, and (iv) *5th element*, psychic physicalism. For example, in a passage regarding the physicalist views of the human soul that had been advanced by earlier philosophers, Augustine writes:

...some...think it to be the blood, others the brain, others the heart;...Others, again, have believed the soul to be made up of very minute and individual corpuscles, which they call atoms, meeting in themselves and cohering. Others have said that its substance is air, others fire...

For as to that fifth kind of body, I know not what, which some have added to the four well-known elements of the world, and have said that the soul was made of this.... (*On the Trinity*, X.7.9)

And as was true in his own case he took a commitment to *psychic physicalism* to originate in, to be rooted in, or to grow out of a more fundamental commitment to *physicalism*:

Now...anyone who sees that the nature of the mind is at once substance, and yet not corporeal—that is, that it does not occupy a less extension of place with a less part of itself, and a greater with a greater—must needs see at the same time that they who are of opinion that it is corporeal do not err from defect of knowledge concerning mind, but because they associate with it qualities without which they are not able to conceive any nature at all. For if you bid them conceive of existence that is without corporeal phantasms, they hold it merely nothing. (*On the Trinity*, X.7.9)

3.1.2. Manichean Psychic Physicalism

Beyond “the philosophers,” Augustine claims that the Manicheans, a religious sect of which he was a member for nine years, took the soul to be physical as well. In particular, he claims that they identified God with a kind of light or “luminous substance” that was spread out

commitment to substantial souls, the view that the soul is the highest most valuable part of a human being, and beliefs about what the highest kind of physical substances is. See for example, *On the Trinity*, X.7.9. These topics have yet to receive significant attention in secondary literature, including the topic whether he is offering a model at all the etiology of these views, and if so whether it is cognitive one, whether he takes there to be non-cognitive but direct ways to arrive at these views (e.g., experience, nativism, etc.). Yet the amount of time he spends discussing the origin of physicalism and its many sub varieties seems to show the topic was important to him and so is worthy of more attention.

through space and bounded only on one side by evil or darkness and they identified individual human souls with bits of that light.⁷¹ In the *Confessions*, it is this view of the soul in particular that Augustine admits to having earlier held when he writes: “I thought that you, Lord God and Truth, were like a luminous body of immense size and myself a bit of that body. What extraordinary perversity. But that is how I was, and I do not blush...”⁷²

⁷¹ See: *Confessions*, V.10.20, and *Against the Fundamental Epistle of Manichaeus*, 15f and 42-3. For secondary discussions of Augustine on the Manichean view of God, see Paulsen (1995-6: 73-6) and Teske (2008: 26-38). On Manicheanism generally see Newman (1956), Lieu (1992) and Tardieu (2008). A complete collection of Augustine’s writings against the Manicheans is contained in Augustine (1956).

In *Contra Faustum*, 8.5, Augustine characterizes the Manichean view as making a more egregious error than pagans who had identified God with and thus worship one of the elements or the Sun or Earth or Moon because while the identity of God with any of these is in error, it is at least the case that such things exist. Whereas in identifying God with a kind of light in a war with darkness, they are identifying God with a phantasm or fable, which has no real existence; though I am not aware of a similar claim regarding Manichean psychic physicalism and that of the philosophers, it seems he would be committed to holding the error of the philosophers’ (except maybe the 5th element version) as being less egregious than the Manichean view as well.

⁷² *Confessions*, IV.16.31. Note further that Augustine rejects Manichean psychic physicalism on several accounts specific only to it given that it involves the identification of human souls with God. For a passage in which Augustine is found rejecting that identity, and thus the Manichean view of souls which presupposes it, on the grounds of God’s condemnation, inability to err, and immutability, see *Sermon* 182. (Of these objections, the one for immutability is the most often made.) Note also that Augustine also rejects the view on account of its identifying God with extended light, and thus having parts, being divisible, changeable etc., but objections on these grounds would also apply to all physicalist views of souls so understood, given that all souls would be extended on any version of psychic physicalism, and so are not exclusive to Manichean psychic physicalism. Hence, while the latter kind of objections would be applicable to all particular varieties of psychic physicalism, (e.g., atomic, elemental, 5th element, Manichean and body-part psychic physicalism), and to psychic physicalism *per se* (i.e., the generic view that human souls are physical objects) the former objections are compatible with the other versions of psychic physicalism and psychic physicalism *per se*; as we’ll see later in this chapter, the Argument from Presence is akin to the latter kind of objection regarding their scope of applicability to psychic physicalism or its many varieties or particular instantiations. That is, if AP is sound, then psychic physicalism *per se* and all its subversions would also be false.

In light of his identifying the four subtypes of psychic physicalism held by the philosophers above, one could ask where if anywhere he took Manichean psychic physicalism to fall? In other words, a question that arises here is how the Manichean view relates to the four of its sub-kinds of psychic physicalism he identifies in the above paragraph. For example, does the view fall under a kind of *elemental* view, specifically the subtype of that view that identified the soul with fire? Or might instead the Manichean view be a version of *5th element psychic physicalism*? Answering these questions, and thus developing a more exhaustive and detailed account of his understanding of and taxonomy of the varieties of psychic physicalism depends in part upon a further account of his view of the elements, (the traditional ones or the mysterious 5th element), which does not seem to have received much secondary attention. For now I will refer to the Manichean brand of psychic physicalism as *Manichean psychic physicalism* and leave open the question of whether it falls under one of the four other kinds of psychic physicalism enumerated above or constitutes a further distinct kind.

3.1.3. Christian Psychic Physicalism

Augustine also numbers both the Christian laity and even some clergy as holding or propounding physicalist conceptions of human soul, and again he takes them to do so out of an underlying commitment to the view that all substances are physical (i.e., to physicalism). For example, and without specifics regarding particular form, Augustine ascribes to the early Church Father Tertullian, a physicalist view of human souls as well:

“Tertullian believed the soul is a body simply because he was unable to conceive its being incorporeal, and therefore feared it would be nothing, if it were not a body...”⁷³

3.1.4. Summary

The fact that there were many varieties of psychic physicalism, that Augustine dedicated much time and ink to discussing it,⁷⁴ and had once been a proponent of the view himself, and the fact that it appeared at different times and across intellectual, popular, secular and religious cultures, suggest that *psychic physicalism* was a widespread and prevailing view during Augustine’s time.⁷⁵ The significance of this is that in coming to a better understanding of Augustine’s case against *psychic physicalism*, we gain not only a better understanding of his

⁷³ *The Literal Meaning of Genesis* X.25.41. See also *On the Soul and Its Origin*, II.9.4. and Grabowski (1954: 86) for Tertullian’s use of “corpus”. Teske (2008: 201-2) suggests the propagation of psychic physicalism amongst intellectual was rooted in Stoic materialism: “The west had clung to stoic materialism long after the Greek church had come under the influence of spiritualism...”. For further insight into the physicalist worldview during, before and after Augustine’s time, see Lange (1866) and Vitzthum (1995). For an analysis of the physicalism in our own time, see Stoljar (2010) and (2015). In comparing contemporary instantiations of physicalism, with the one Augustine suggests he endorsed, the latter are seen to be very crude indeed. I suspect this to be so, at least in part, given that the current instantiations were crafted to avoid or take into consideration various problems like the ones that Augustine had raised for the earlier versions.

⁷⁴ Augustine’s interest in the topic is expected given his statement in Soliloquies I.7 that his two most cherished topics of study are God and the soul. Part of knowing the soul is not only knowing what it is, but also knowing what it is not; and thus, his accounts of physicalist views and arguments against them could be seen as expanding not only positive knowledge regarding the soul but negative knowledge as well.

⁷⁵ The prevalence of psychic physicalism during Augustine’s time suggests that it amounted to, (or was part of), something like a psychological paradigm, (i.e., a view akin to what Thomas Kuhn (1996) calls a *paradigm* in science).

personal rejection of the view but also a better understanding of his public attack on what was effectively a paradigmatic view of the human soul at the time.⁷⁶

3.2. The Argument from Presence

Augustine advanced several different arguments for the human soul's incorporeality.⁷⁷

One of his main arguments, was based on a soul's manner of presence in the body it animates. I call this latter kind of argument *The Argument from Presence* or *AP* to distinguish it from the others found in his works.⁷⁸ While Augustine advanced AP in several places throughout his

⁷⁶ Further, given that the default view today among Christians seems to be that souls are non-physical, if we assume that Augustine or his writings are part of the explanation of that reversal (as Teske for example has argued) then we gain as well a deeper understanding of what amounts not only to one of the most radical changes in Augustine's personal intellectual history but a deeper understanding of what amounts to one of the most radical changes in Christian theological history (i.e., a religious paradigm shift).

⁷⁷ In addition to The Argument from Presence (the analysis of which is the focus of this paper) there are two further arguments for the soul's incorporeality that Augustine's employs throughout his works, what I call: The Argument from Self Knowledge and The Argument from the Capacity to Perceive Incorporeal objects (or The Like Perceives Like Argument). Taken together these three arguments constitute Augustine's major arguments for the soul's incorporeality.

For Augustine's argument for the soul's incorporeality based on its knowledge of itself, see: *The Literal Meaning of Genesis* VII.21.28, *On the Soul and Its Origin*, IV.30, and *On the Trinity* X.10.16; for secondary discussion of this argument as it appears in *On the Trinity*, see Matthews (2005: Chapter 6), Gilson (1960: 46f), Brittain (2012), Niederbacher (2014: 132f). Niederbacher labels this argument *the cognitive access argument*. For earlier expressions of this argument see Cicero, *Tusculan Dispositions*, Book I. Brittain (2012) claims that Augustine's source for this argument from self-knowledge was Cicero.

For his argument for the soul's incorporeality based on its capacity to perceive incorporeal objects such as the squares, lines and circles studied by geometers, see *On the Magnitude of the Soul* 13.22-14.23 and *The Literal Meaning of Genesis* VII.21.27 and XII. 3.7 to 4.13. For earlier instances of this argument see: Plotinus, *Enneads*, 4.7.8; Aristotle's, *De Anima* (409b25f) and *Generation and Corruption* (323b11-15). In the later, Aristotle attributes to Democritus a version of the 'like by like' principle which is similar to the principle that Augustine employs in this argument based on the soul's capacity to perceive incorporeal objects. For secondary discussion of this argument in Augustine's works see: Bourke (1993: 101-3); Nash (2003: 52f); O'Daly (1987: 23), and Portalié (1960: 146). Portalié says of this argument that it is Augustine's best argument for the incorporeality of souls. For secondary discussion of the argument in Plotinus see Gerson (1996: 281) and Corrigan (2004: 35-6).

In addition to Augustine's major arguments for the soul's incorporeality there are also several minor ones, (i.e., arguments for the soul's incorporeality which have singular instances in Augustine's works or argument which he does not develop at length or have received little or no secondary discussion). Arguments of this kind include one based on the soul's superiority to a line in *On the Magnitude of the Soul*, 14.23; an argument based on the human soul being an image of God in *The Literal Meaning of Genesis*, X.24.40; and an argument based on the soul being the subject of memories in *On the Soul and Its Origin*, IV.25, *On the Magnitude of the Soul*, 5.7f; and *Against the Fundamental Epistle of the Manicheans Called Fundaments*, 17. While this last argument does appear in Augustine's works more than once, it has received little if any secondary discussion and he does not develop the argument at length as he does with the three major ones.

⁷⁸ The main expressions of the argument from presence are found in *On the Immortality of the Soul*, XVI.25; *Letter* 166, 2.4, and *Against the Fundamental Epistle of the Manicheans*, 15-17. For further instances of the argument and

works there are two passages that express the argument most clearly and which are most often discussed. The first is found in one of Augustine's earliest works, *On the Immortality of the Soul*, which was drafted in 385AD:

Every mass which occupies a place is not all together in any single part but distributed over all its parts. One part of it is here and one part is there. The soul, however, is totally and simultaneously present not only in the whole mass of the body, but also in every little portion of it.⁷⁹

The second excerpt, written roughly 30 years later in 415AD, is from *Letter*, 166, which was addressed to Jerome:

[T]he soul is not corporeal. For it pervades the whole body which it animates...[and] is in its entirety present both in the whole body and in every part of it....

Now this presence of the mind in all parts of the body at the same moment, so that in every part of the body the whole mind is at the same moment present, would be impossible if it were distributed over these parts in the same way as we see matter distributed in space, occupying less space with a smaller portion of itself, and greater space with a greater portion.⁸⁰

related passages see: *On the Trinity* VI.6.8; *Letter* 118, 24; *City of God*, XI.10; *Letter*, 147; and *On the Soul and Its Origin*, IV.6.

⁷⁹ *On the Immortality of the Soul*, XVI.25.

⁸⁰ *Letter* 166, 2.4. The full passage in Latin runs as follows: "*Incorpoream quoque esse animam, etsi difficile tardioribus persuaderi potest, mihi tamen fateor esse persuasum. Sed ne verbi controversiam vel superfluo faciam, vel merito patiar, quoniam cum de re constat, non est opus certare de nomine: si corpus est omnis substantia, vel essentia, vel si quid aptius nuncupatur id quod aliquo modo est in seipso, corpus est anima. Item si eam solam incorpoream placet appellare naturam quae summe incommutabilis et ubique tota est, corpus est anima; quoniam tale aliquid ipsa non est. Porro si corpus non est, nisi quod per loci spatium aliqua longitudine, latitudine, altitudine ita sistitur vel movetur, ut maiore sui parte maiorem locum occupet, et brevior brevior, minusque sit in parte quam in toto, non est corpus anima. Per totum quippe corpus quod animat, non locali diffusionem, sed quadam vitali intentione porrigitur: nam per omnes eius particulas tota simul adest, nec minor in minoribus, et in maioribus maior; sed alicubi intentius, alicubi remissius, et in omnibus tota, et in singulis tota est. Neque enim aliter, quod in corpore etiam non toto sentit, tamen tota sentit: nam cum exiguo puncto in carne viva aliquid tangitur, quamvis locus ille non solum totius corporis non sit, sed vix in corpore videatur, animam tamen totam non latet; neque id quod sentitur, per corporis cuncta discurrit, sed ibi tantum sentitur ubi fit. Unde ergo ad totam mox pervenit quod non in toto fit, nisi quia et ibi tota est ubi fit, nec ut tota ibi sit, caetera deserit? Vivunt enim et illa ea praesente, ubi nihil tale factum est. Quod si fieret, et utrumque simul fieret, simul utrumque totam pariter non lateret. Proinde et in omnibus simul, et in singulis particulis corporis sui, tota simul esse non posset, si per illas ita diffunderetur, ut videmus corpora diffusa per spatia locorum, minoribus suis partibus minora occupare, et amplioribus ampliora. Quapropter si anima corpus esse dicenda est, non est certe corpus quale terrenum est, nec quale humidum, aut aerium, aut aetherium. Omnia quippe talia maiora sunt in maioribus locis, et minora in minoribus, et nihil eorum in aliqua sui parte totum adest; sed ut sunt partes locorum, ita occupantur partibus corporum. Unde intellegitur anima, sive corpus, sive incorporea dicenda sit, propriam quamdam habere naturam, omnibus his mundanae molis elementis excellentiore substantia creatam, quae veraciter non possit in aliqua phantasia corporalium imaginum, quas per carnis sensus percipimus, cogitari, sed mente intellegi, vitaeque sentiri. Neque haec proinde loquor, ut te*

Despite the 30-year gap between the two passages, Augustine is found offering the same basic argument in each: *The soul is not physical, because it is present in the body it animates in a manner that no physical object or spatially extended object could be, namely, it is simultaneously and entirely present in every extended part of that body* (i.e., it is *holenmerically present* in the body).⁸¹ More explicitly we may reconstruct the argument from presence and label its primary claims as follows:

<p><u>The Generic Account of AP</u>⁸²</p>
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quae tibi nota sunt doceam: sed ut aperiam quid firmissime de anima teneam, ne me quisquam, cum ad ea venero quae requiro, nihil de anima vel scientia vel fide tenere arbitretur."

⁸¹ In some places Augustine also expresses this claim in terms of the soul being simultaneously both wholly present in (a) the whole body and (b) wholly present in every part of the body. But the argument can work on (b) alone and in some places, Augustine states the argument solely in terms of (b). Nothing is gained or lost in terms of the argument's veracity by stating the claim in terms of both (a) and (b) or in terms of (b) alone. And stating the claim in terms of (b) alone is compatible with the truth of (a); that is, it does not entail that Augustine does not hold (a) or that (a) is false. I state the claim in terms of (b) alone to streamline and clarify the discussion (i.e., for ease of discussion).

⁸² I call it this because it expresses the important propositional and conceptual content of the argument, but it leaves the central predicate term – *presence* – uninterpreted. (Of course, there are other logical structures into which AP could be reconstructed besides a syllogism [or maybe rather, besides "sylogistically"], e.g., if the claim in (2) was stated as the conditional – (2*) *If the soul is a physical object, it could not be wholly present in every part of the body simultaneously* – then the generic account would take the modus tollens form; or if the rule of contraposition was applied to (2*) then (2) could be stated in this manner – (2**) *If the soul is/can be wholly present in every part of the body simultaneously, the soul is not a physical object* – and the generic account would take the modus ponens form. The claims I make in this chapter do not depend on whether AP is reconstructed in the spirit of a syllogism as above or in the modus tollens form, the modus ponens form, or in some other logically valid equivalent form. I've stated it in this way because I take it to be the clearest expression of the argument, the one most amenable to ease of discussion, but that still captures and expresses the argument's primary uninterpreted propositional and conceptual content.) In this sense, the generic account of AP is uncontroversial.

It is also uncontroversial because summaries of the argument very much like it, are standard in contemporary discussions of these passages. For example, Teske (2008: 202) summarizes the argument in the *Letter 166* passage, as follows: "Everything that is a body is spread out in space with smaller parts occupying smaller places and with larger parts occupying larger places. That is, all bodies are larger in larger places and smaller in smaller places, and no body is whole in a part of itself. But the soul is whole in the whole body and is whole in each part of the body. Therefore, the soul is not a body." Teske offers the same account in his entry on "soul" in Fitzgerald (1999: 808). Holscher (1986: 46) offers a similar summary of the 166 passage: "So Augustine can draw the following conclusion. Since each body is by nature extended in space (a greater part of it occupying more space than a smaller part) and since it is present only at one place at the same time, the soul cannot be a body. For no body could be present in the human body in the manner that the soul is." Watson (2008: 212-13) as well suggests a similar summary of the argument in the passage from *On the Immortality of the Soul*: There are essential differences between body and soul. Every body which occupies a place is extended over that space in which it finds itself: one part of it is here and one part is there. The soul, however, is different: it is totally and simultaneously present both to the whole mass of the body in which it is present, and also to each individual part of it." And O'Daly (1987: 29) commenting on that same passage writes: "The soul is said to be totally present in every part of the body, a form of presence incompatible with any materially extended presence of soul."

(1) The human soul is simultaneously wholly present in every part of the body it animates. (*The Presence Claim*)

(2) A physical object could not be simultaneously wholly present in every part of the body it animates. (*The Incompatibility Claim*)

Therefore,

(3) The human soul is not a physical object (i.e., it is a non-physical or incorporeal one).⁸³ (*The Incorporeality Claim*)

3.2.1. *The Case for the Presence Claim*

Augustine takes the truth of presence claim to be grounded in or shown by the way the soul can perceive or be aware of changes in distinct parts of the body (i.e., *wholly, immediately, and simultaneously*). Augustine makes this case for the presence claim in *On the Immortality of the Soul* as follows:

The soul...is totally and simultaneously present not only in the whole mass of the body, but also in every little portion of it. For it feels as a whole the suffering of a part of a body, even though the suffering is not in the whole body. For when there is a pain in the foot, the eye looks towards it, the tongue speaks about, and the hand moves toward it. This would not happen unless what there is of soul in those parts also had sensation in the foot. Unless it were present it could not feel what happened there...And so the whole soul is present simultaneously to all the individual parts because it feels as a whole simultaneously in all the parts.⁸⁴

And in *Letter 166* we find the expression of the same basic idea in conjunction with a new example of simultaneously placed pin-pricks in different places on the body:

[The soul] ...it is in its entirety present both in the whole body and in every part of it. For even that which the mind perceives in only a part of the body is nevertheless not otherwise perceived than by the whole mind; for when any part of the living flesh is touched by a fine pointed instrument, although the place affected is not only not the whole body, but scarcely discernible in its surface, the contact does not escape the entire mind, and yet the contact is felt not over the whole body, but only at the one point where it takes place. How comes it, then,

⁸³ In particular it is neither identical to the whole animated body, nor a part of that body (e.g., the heart, brain or total nervous system) and neither is it some other subtle body diffused throughout the whole body or one of its parts as some before and during Augustine's time had held.

⁸⁴ *On the Immortality of the Soul*, XVI.25.

that what takes place in only a part of the body is immediately known to the whole mind, unless the whole mind is present at that part...And if a similar contact takes place in the other parts, and the contact occur in both parts simultaneously, it would in both cases alike be known at the same moment, to the whole mind.⁸⁵

3.2.2. *The Case for the Incompatibility Claim*

Augustine grounds the incompatibility claim on his account of physical objects as objects which are extended in the three spatial dimensions of length, width and height so as to occupy space (and themselves) circumscriptively:

...body is that which has some length, breadth, and height so that with a greater part of itself it occupies a greater part of space, and with a smaller part a smaller part of space, and is in every part of it less than the whole.⁸⁶

⁸⁵ Letter 166, 2.4.

⁸⁶ Letter 166. For similar accounts of *corpus* in Augustine see: *On the Nature and Origin of the Soul*, IV.17., and IV.35; *On the Trinity*, VI.6.8 and X.7.10; *Letter 118*, 4; *Letter 137*, 2; *Letter 148*, 3; *Letter 166*, 4; *Against the Fundamental Epistle of the Manicheans*, 16; *On the Immortality of the Soul*, XVI.25; *Confessions*, III.7.12; *The Literal Meaning of Genesis*, VII, 21; and *Sermon 277*, 13.13. For secondary discussion of this account of *corpus* in Augustine's works see the entry on "Body" in Fitzgerald (1999); Gilson (1960: 46), and the first chapter of Hölscher (1986), which contains the extensive discussion of Augustine's views on the nature and features of corporeal objects.

Note that the theory of corporeality that Augustine advances in *On the Immortality of the Soul*, *Letter 166*, and elsewhere is not idiosyncratic to Augustine, but has been a significant one in western philosophy, being held earlier by Aristotle and famously in the modern period by Descartes, and seemingly also by Kant. It has, however, come under attack in contemporary metaphysics. Markosian (2000) for example has objected to the theory on the grounds that it cannot account for the corporeality of point sized objects such as "quarks". (See also Carrol and Markosian, (2008: 204.) This objection however does not seem to be a conclusive one. First it's not clear there is a strong intuition in favor of the corporeality of point sized objects. As Van Inwagen (1990: 17) writes: "Few philosophers would be perfectly happy about calling a quark or a proton or even a large organic molecule a material object." Note that Augustine himself seems to be such a philosopher as in *On the Magnitude of the Soul*, 14.23 he uses points as examples of incorporeal beings, given that they lack spatial parts. So it seems plausible for a "3d-er" about bodies or corporeal objects such as Augustine is to "bite-the-bullet" (if it is really doing that) in response to the point sized object counter-example and to endorse the non-corporeality of such objects. One worry about this move though is that since quarks, protons, and other point sized objects are taken to be the building blocks of the physical world, then if they're endorsed as incorporeal one also has to endorse the seemingly strange position that the fundamental building blocks of the physical world are non-physical things. Notice however that physicalists about point sized objects seem to be committed to an equally strange position: if point sized objects are corporeal (where Markosian defines a point sized object as "one that has a spatial location, and possibly such other properties as mass, charge, spin, and so on, but that has zero spatial extension"), then since point sized objects such as quarks and protons are taken to be the building blocks of composite corporeal structures, a physicalist about such objects would have to be committed to the view that the fundamental building blocks of the extended objects we see around us are themselves non-extended. The upshot here is that the status of such objects is an open question; and again, the point sized object objection is not a conclusive one.

Let us call this account of physical objects the *3d-extension-thesis*.⁸⁷ In *Letter 166*, 2.4, we see Augustine explicitly arguing from the *3d extension thesis* to the *incompatibility claim*:

Now this presence of the mind in all parts of the body at the same moment, so that in every part of the body the whole mind is at the same moment present, would be impossible if it were distributed over these parts in the same way as we see matter distributed in space, occupying less space with a smaller portion of itself, and greater space with a greater portion.

Given that physical objects by nature are 3d extended, they necessarily are composed of parts that occupy different parts of space (i.e., spatial parts). The pattern of presence between a body and the space that it occupies therefore must be circumscriptive: Bodies are whole in the whole portion of space they occupy and part in the parts of that space, and greater parts of the whole occupy greater parts of space, and smaller parts smaller parts of space, and every part of space occupied by the parts of the body are smaller than the space occupied by the whole body. It follows that no physical object can be *holenmerically everywhere in the body*.⁸⁸ For even if some physical object were diffused or extended through the totality of space that the animated body occupies, at most it would be whole in the whole of body but not whole as well in the parts of the body. Such an object would instead be whole in the whole of the animated body but only partly in the parts of the animated body. A physical object, therefore, no matter its extent could not be *holenmerically* in every part of the body simultaneously but only in every part *circumscriptively*. It follows therefore that if the soul were a physical object it could not be wholly present in every part of the body simultaneously (i.e., it follows that *holenmeric* presence in the body regardless of scope is incompatible with physicality, as the *incompatibility claim* asserts).

⁸⁷ For Augustine's various arguments for the *multiplicity thesis* see: *On True Religion* 32.59; *The Literal Meaning of Genesis* IV.13.7; and *On Free Choice* II.8. For explication and critical discussion of these arguments see Hölsher (1986: 17-21).

⁸⁸ Notice that stating the claim in terms of presence *in the body* instead of presence or location *in space*, or rather that Augustine states it the former way instead of the latter way(s), may be a negative for the spatial reading of the claim but poses no problem for or is congruent with the causal reading, both of which will be discussed below.

3.3. The Spatial Account of AP

While some authors have conducted their entire discussions of AP leaving *presence* uninterpreted,⁸⁹ others have interpreted it but in a semantically opaque or ambiguous and hence unhelpful manner.⁹⁰ Most recently, however, several authors have understood the term as expressing a *location* or *occupation* relation to *space*. Accordingly, they have read the presence-claim as attributing to souls a manner of location in space that is impossible for physical or extended objects to realize. Goetz and Taliaferro (2011: 43-5) read the claim as expressing an *occupation* relation between souls and space:

In contrast to the body that occupies space by means of its parts occupying sub-regions of the space occupied by the whole, so that the whole body is not present in any of the spaces occupied by its parts, the soul is present in its entirety at one time, not only in the entire space that is occupied by its body, but also in each of the sub-regions of space that are occupied by that body's parts....

According to Augustine, then, the soul exists...and is embodied, though it and its body occupy the same place in different ways.⁹¹

Inman (2017: 14-5) reads the claim in terms of a location relation to space:

⁸⁹ Teske (2008: 210-11) for example writes: "Augustine claims that the whole soul could not become aware of what happens in only a part of the body if the whole soul were not *present* there where something occurred. Yet though the whole soul is *present* in that part of the body in which something occurs, the soul is also *present* in the other parts of the body...for the other parts of the body are also living by the soul's *presence* where no such thing has occurred. For, as the principle of life the soul is *present* in all the parts of the living body, and the soul does not leave the other part of the body in order to be whole in the part in which the pain is felt. On the other hand if something were to occur in one or more of those other parts of the body, the soul would notice each such occurrence...that is, if one were to stub his toe and burn his hand at the same time, the whole soul would at the same time become aware of both events. And in order to be aware of both events in the different parts of the body, the whole soul would have to be both in the toe and in the hand at the same time. However, such a simultaneous total *presence* in both places is precisely what no body can achieve. Clearly the crux of Augustine's argument is to show that the whole soul is *present* not merely in the whole body, but in each part of the body" (italics mine). Teske's commentary above, which leaves the sense of presence unexplicated, is representative of his entire essay as a whole. While the essay does provide some insight into the motivation for the presence-claim of AP, in no place does it explicate the content of the claim or explain what it means.

⁹⁰ O'Daly (1987: 29) for example writes: "And this total omnipresence is not spatial but 'tensional': It is spread throughout the entire body which it animates, not through any local extension, but by a kind of vital tension (*intentio*) (ep. 166.4)." But he does not go on to explain what this "tensional" presence amounts to.

⁹¹ Goetz and Taliaferro also suggest Augustine takes souls to occupy space when they write: "Augustine nicely ties together, in the following quote, *his point about how souls occupy space* and his belief that the soul is simple at the level of thinghood but complex at the level of property hood..." (2011: 45; italics mine). These authors follow this sentence with a passage from *On the Trinity*, VI.2.8, which is supposed to be evidence for their claim but the passage seems neither directly nor indirectly to show that Augustine took souls to occupy space.

For Augustine, matter is located in space in such a way that “[e]ach mass that occupies space is not in its entirety in each of its single parts, but only in all taken together. Hence, one part is in one place; another in another” (*Immortality of the Soul*, 16.25); elsewhere he makes the same point that matter is located in space by “every part of it [being] less than the whole” (*Letter* 166.4).

The soul, by contrast is “in any body...whole in the whole and whole also in any part of the body” (*On the Trinity* 6.2.28)....

This capacity for a distinct type of spatial location is partly what sets the soul apart as immaterial for Augustine.

In reading the presence-claim in terms of souls being in space in a real or literal sense of being located in space, having a spatial location, occupying space, etc., these authors advance a spatial account of AP:

The Spatial Account of AP

(S1) The soul is simultaneously and wholly *located in* each part of space in which the parts of the body are located. (*S Presence-Claim*)

(S2) A physical object could not be simultaneously and wholly *located in* each part of space in which the parts of the body are located. (*S Incompatibility Claim*)

Therefore,

(S3) The soul is not a physical object. (*S Incorporeality Claim*⁹²)

3.4. The Case against the Spatial Account of AP

While *the spatial account* has the virtue of explicating AP through a view of presence that is intuitive and perhaps common in contemporary philosophical discussions, there are several textual and systematic facts which show that it does not constitute an accurate interpretation of AP,⁹³ and hence that it should be rejected.

⁹² Notice that on the surface, the conclusion of the *spatial account* appears identical to the conclusion of the *generic account*, e.g., (3) on the generic account reads: The soul is not a physical object (*The Incorporeality Claim*); and on the spatial account it reads: (S3) The soul is not a physical object (*S Incorporeality Claim*). But this surface appearance is deceptive. For while (3) does not clearly attribute an occupation or location relation between the soul and space, on (S3) “soul” given (S1) and (S2) are objects that occupy or are located in space; hence my labeling the claim in (S3) the *S incorporeality claim* to differentiate it from the incorporeality claim in (3).]

⁹³ More strongly I take the spatial account to be an argument that Augustine would neither have recognized as his own nor understood.

3.4.1. A Lack of Positive Textual Support

The *first* is that none of the passages these authors use to support a spatial reading of the presence claim show Augustine claiming (in English or Latin) that souls are “*in space*”, “*located in space*”, “*spatially located*”, “*have spatial locations*”, “*occupy space*”, *etc.* in any mode or manner whatsoever. For example, after raising the question “Why maintain that the soul occupies space in this way?”, Goetz and Taliaferro, cite the following passage from *On the Immortality of the Soul*, XVI.25:

[Because] it is the entire soul that feels the pain of a part of the body, yet it does not feel it in the entire body. When, for instance, there is an ache in the foot, the eye looks at it, the mouth speaks of it, and the hand reaches for it. This, of course, would be impossible, if what of the soul is in these parts did not also experience a sensation in the foot; if the soul were not present, it would be unable to feel what has happened there. [...] Hence, the entire soul is present, at one and the same time, in the single parts, and it experiences sensation as a whole, at one and the same time, in the single parts (43-4).

And Inman, after referencing Goetz and Taliaferro and passage above, writes:

The soul, by contrast, is “in any body...whole in the whole and whole also in any part of the body” (*On the Trinity* 6.2.8). More specifically, For [the soul] pervades the whole body which it animates, not by a local distribution of parts, but by a certain vital influence, being at the same moment present in its entirety in all parts of the body and not less in smaller parts and greater in larger parts, but here with more energy and there with less energy, it is in its entirety present in the whole body and every part of it (Letter 166, 2.4). (2017: 14).

Neither in the passages above, nor in any other passages that these authors cite in their discussions, (nor even in passages elsewhere in Augustine’s works), do we find Augustine claiming that souls are *in space* in any sense, let alone that that they are in space in the literal sense of being located there but in a different manner from the way in which the bodies they animate are located. It is reasonable to suspect that if Augustine held such a view, it would be expressed somewhere in his works and these authors would have used such passages to support

the spatial reading of AP's presence-claim instead of using passages in which Augustine is found suggesting that souls are *present* holonmerically *in bodies*.

3.4.2. Textual Incompatibility

In addition to lacking positive textual support, the spatial account is also directly contradicted by several passages in Augustine's works. The two passages below are exemplary of such passages:

(i) Does not the soul's far superior and almost only sight, reason itself,...prove that it lacks every kind of magnitude by which space is occupied? We must regard the soul as great, great indeed, but not great with any material bulk....⁹⁴

(ii) The soul did not occupy a place, but held the body which was moved by it.⁹⁵

3.4.3. Systematic Incompatibility

In addition to lacking clear textual support, and to standing in direct tension with various passages found throughout Augustine's works, the spatial reading of AP is also indirectly contradicted by several other passages in Augustine's works.

Example 1. The spatial reading of AP is inconsistent with Augustine's own account of spatial location. As I argued for and discussed more thoroughly in Chapter 1, Augustine tells us in *The Literal Meaning of Genesis*, IV.18.34. that he uses location or place (*locus*) in two main ways, properly and improperly:

Proper Use: The use of "place" to refer to space that is occupied by a body.

⁹⁴ *On the Magnitude of the Soul*, 15.24.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.* 32.68. See also *The Fundamental Epistle of the Manicheans*, 15.20 where Augustine writes: "Since [the soul] is all present in the sensations of these places, it proves that *it is not bound by the conditions of space*" (italics mine). Note that "if the soul is not bound by the conditions of space", it would also seem that it is not in space in the same generic literal sense in which bodies are in space; unless it is possible for one and the same object to be literally in space in the same generic sense in which bodies are but yet not be bound by the conditions of space, which seems implausible.

Improper Use: The use of “place” to refer to something other than to space that is occupied by the spatial dimensions of a body.

And corollary to his above distinction *in use* are two basic kinds of place that Augustine includes in his ontology, proper places and improper places (i.e., which he also calls *spiritual* or *non-bodily* places):

Proper Places: Space that is occupied by the length width and height of a body.

Improper Places: Anything which is referred to as a place but that is not a space occupied by the length, width, and height of a body, (e.g., goals or aims, heaven, hell, vision and dreamscapes)

Therefore, on Augustine’s ontology of place or location, every place is either a proper or an improper place. While there are species of improper place (e.g., goals or aims, heaven, hell, vision and dreamscapes) Augustine recognizes no division of kinds for proper places: every proper place, every place in a real or literal sense, is a space that is occupied by the three-dimensional extension of a body. For Augustine, therefore, a spatial location is a *proper place*. It follows from this that incorporeal objects generally and God in particular cannot have spatial locations, be spatially located, be located in space, and so on, in any proper, real or literal sense because, because to be so located or placed in space is to be extended through space (i.e., to be a body) and incorporeal objects by their nature as such lack spatial extension (i.e., are not bodies). So, when Augustine claims that *human souls are wholly present in all parts of the body* simultaneously, this neither means nor implies that Augustine takes human souls to be located in space, to have a spatial location, to be spatially located, etc. Hence, the spatial interpretation of the presence-claim (and more broadly of AP) not only lacks positive textual support and stands in direct tension with several passages in Augustine’s writings, but it is also incompatible with the above textually grounded accounts of his notions of spatial location and incorporeal objects.

Example 2. While discussing God's presence in creation he contrasts it with the presence of human beings:

For man, as regards his body, is in a place, and departs from a place; and when he comes to another place, he will not be in that place whence he came: but God fills all things, and is all everywhere. (*Tractates of Jon*, 30.9)

Augustine is a substance dualist about human beings, (i.e., he takes human beings to be composed of two substances: body or extended substance and a rational soul or mutable incorporeal substance). If Augustine took souls to be located in space as the spatial account of AP suggests, then he would not have qualified or narrowed the scope of "man" so as to include only the bodily part of man. In other words, given that Augustine is a dualist about human beings, if he took both corporeal objects generally and human souls in particular to be in space in the same generic sense of occupying or being located in space as the spatial account of AP holds, then the following claims could be said without qualification:

- (a) Man is in a place, and
- (b) Man departs from a place, and
- (c) Man when he comes to another place will not be in that place from which he came.

That Augustine is careful to emphasize that he is talking about the bodily part of man alone, therefore, tells against the spatial account of the presence-claim and of AP.

Example 3. Related to the example above, (and perhaps supporting that example), the spatial account is also incompatible with Augustine's frequently expressed claim that souls are incapable of movement in space:

... Bodies move in space and change in time, whereas the substance of the soul, that is, of a created spirit, does not indeed move in space, but nonetheless changes in time through the variability of its feelings and thoughts. (*Sermon* 198: 28)⁹⁶

⁹⁶ See also *On True Religion* 30.56 – 31.57 and *The Literal Meaning of Genesis* VIII.22.43. In the latter passage Augustine states again the position that souls are incapable of moving from place to place but also provides the rationale for this view as follows: "But if this is hard to understand, let both these things be believed, both that the spiritual creature moves the body locally without being locally moved itself, and that God without being moved

If Augustine held that souls occupied or were located in space, and more specifically, that they occupied or were located in the very same space in which the bodies they animate are located, then he would also have to take souls move through space when the bodies they animate and immediately govern the movements of so move; but he denies that souls can undergo change of place.⁹⁷

3.5. The Causal Account of AP

On spatial readings, the presence-claim was read as attributing an occupation or location relation between the soul and space. On the causal analysis, however, the presence-claim is not read in this manner but as attributing only a causal relation between the soul and that to which it is present (i.e., the animated body). Thus, on the causal analysis, Augustine's claim that – *the soul is simultaneously wholly present in every extended part of the animated body*, should be understood as asserting that – *the soul is at the same moment wholly causally related to each part of the body (e.g., simultaneously the whole soul applies its animating and sensitive power to every part of the body)*. The further upshot of the causal analysis of the presence-claim is the causal analysis of AP:

The Causal Analysis of AP

- (C1) The soul is entirely causally related to each part of the body simultaneously. (*C Presence Claim*)
- (C2) No physical object could be entirely causally related to each part of the body simultaneously. (*C Incompatibility Claim*)

through time moves the spiritual creature through time. But if you do not wish to believe this about the soul—which in fact you would not only believe but also undoubtedly understand if you could think about its being incorporeal, which it is; anyone could easily see, surely, that something which is not extended through local space can scarcely be moved through space. But whatever is extended through local space is a body; and therefore it follows that the soul cannot be through of as being moved through space if it is not a body.”

⁹⁷ For Augustine's examples showing that it is possible for one thing to move another but not itself move see *The Literal Meaning of Genesis* 8.21.41.

Therefore,

(C3) The soul is not a physical object. (*C Incorporability Claim*⁹⁸)

On the causal analysis of AP then, what differentiates the soul from all physical objects is the manner or way in which the soul can apply causal powers to the animated body; the soul at one and the same moment, and as a whole or in its entirety, may be causally related to the whole body it animates and each part of that body. A physical object on the other hand could be wholly causally related to the whole animated body at one time but only partly causally related to the parts of the body at any one moment. Hence, the soul could not be a physical object of any kind, (e.g., it could neither be the whole animated body, nor a part of that body, nor some separate physical object diffused throughout that animated body).

3.6. Advantages of the Causal Account

There are several advantages that the causal account enjoys over the generic and the spatial accounts.

3.6.1 Depth

While the generic account is accurate so far as it goes, the main problem was that it did not go far enough. In particular it left “presence” – the central notion on which the argument from presence turns – un-explicated. Like the spatial account the causal account goes beyond the generic one by offering (implicitly or explicitly) an account of the notion of presence and reading the presence-claim and the argument as a whole in light of that reading. Unlike the spatial

⁹⁸ Cf. ft.n.26.

account, however, the causal account does so in a manner that is not only compatible with Augustine's wider *corpus* but which enjoys positive textual support and historical precedent.

3.6.2. *Compatibility*

The causal analysis neither requires nor involves attributing an occupation or location relation to hold between incorporeal souls and space; instead it only requires a causal relation to hold between the soul and the animated body to which it is immediately present. Therefore, unlike spatial readings, the causal analysis does not involve interpreting Augustine as attributing spatial location or occupation to souls in some works but then directly or indirectly denying such attributions in other ones as the spatial account did; in other words, it does not involve interpreting Augustine's expressions of AP in such a way that in the broader context of his works he makes incompatible or inconsistent claims.

3.6.3. *Positive Textual Support*

The causal analysis makes more sense of Augustine's own explication of the presence-claim than spatial readings do. For example, in further discussing the soul's presence in the body in *Letter 166*, 2.4, he writes:

It is, of course, stretched out through the whole body that it animates, not by a local diffusion but by a certain vital intention. For it is at the same time present as a whole though all the body's parts, not smaller in smaller parts and larger in larger parts, but more intensely in one place and less intensely in another, both whole in all parts and whole in the individual parts.⁹⁹

Proponents of the spatial reading have a hard time making sense of Augustine explicating the soul's presence in the body in terms of a "vital intention" (*vitali intentione*) instead of in

⁹⁹ Note the *Letter 166* translator in the *Father's of the Church* series, renders *intentione* as "influence", while others including Goetz and Taliaferro translate it as "intention". See, Teske (2008: 205-7) for further discussion of *vitali intentione* in *Letter 166*.

terms of the “the soul occupying the same space that the body occupies” or “the soul being located in the same space in which the body was located”. Goetz and Taliaferro, for example, explicitly state their puzzlement over this very passage during their discussion of Augustine’s claim about the soul’s presence in the body:

It is unclear to us what Augustine has in mind in this passage where he states that the soul is stretched out (present) in the entirety of the body “by a certain vital intention.” (2011:43)

The causal analysis, however, rather than leaving readers completely in the dark or puzzled about Augustine’s meaning in this passage, sheds some light on it: Augustine is claiming that at least one of the relations that holds between the soul and the body and that constitutes its presence in the body is that the soul is a cause or source of its being a living and unified whole. In further confirmation of this reading we see the same idea being expressed in *On the Magnitude of the Soul* where Augustine writes:

The soul *did not occupy a place* but *held the body* which was moved by it. (Italics mine; 32.68)

And a shortly later in that same work writes:

The soul by its presence gives life to this mortal and earthly body; it brings the body together into a unity and keeps it in unity; it prevents the body from breaking up and wasting away. (33.70)

These latter two passages taken together are once again puzzling on a spatial reading, and the first one is especially so on the occupation version of that reading. But they make sense on and are congruent with the causal one. For as Augustine explicitly suggests, the soul’s presence in the body is not to be thought of in terms of a relation to space, but as a causal relation between

souls and the bodies they animate and sustain.¹⁰⁰ In this way, and unlike the spatial reading, the causal account enjoys positive textual support.

3.6.4. *Historical Precedent and Influence*

The causal analysis of AP is also more congruent with certain events that had a major influence in Augustine rejecting psychic-physicalism and endorsing instead the view that human souls are incorporeal objects, namely, his reading of the so called “books of the Platonists”, which he discusses in *Confessions*, VII. While it is unknown exactly which specific books Augustine was referencing, there is general consensus that he had read (if only in translations or in summary form) works by Plato, Plotinus, and Porphyry.¹⁰¹ Each of these philosophers held the view that the incorporeal is outside of space (i.e., not present in space in terms of being located in it, but only in terms of being causally related to space or to the things located in it). Plotinus, for example, suggests that the presence of the soul in the body be conceived in this way, and further that the origin of this conception can be traced back to Plato:

...The soul entire nor any part of it may be considered to be within the body as in a space: space is a container, a container of body; it is the home of such things as

¹⁰⁰ Further revealing the interpretive puzzles (or problems) spatial readings of Augustine’s presence-claim may give rise to, Goetz and Taliaferro write: “Presently, we turn our attention to some of Augustine’s thoughts about how the soul is related to the body and to the spatial realm that the latter occupies. Once again, his thoughts raise interesting and difficult issue. For a start, Augustine maintains that what is not corporeal (bodily) is not in space (Immortality of the Soul, 10.17). Given that the soul is not corporeal in nature, one would expect Augustine to maintain that the soul is not in space. Nevertheless, he affirms that the soul is in space...” (2011: 43).

Additionally, Inman (2017: 15) shares the same puzzlement as Goetz and Taliaferro. He writes: “When discussing the way in which the soul is located in the body in particular, *Augustine is at pains to first distinguish the various ways in which the material and the immaterial are related to space in general*. He states: If matter be used to designate nothing but that which, whether at rest or in motion, has some length, breadth, and height, so that with a greater part of itself it occupies a greater part of space, and with a smaller part a smaller space, and is in every part of it less than the whole, then the soul is not material. (*Letter 166*, 4) For Augustine, then, one of the marks of the material is being located in space in a particular kind of way, namely by being” (Italics mine).

It’s not clear to me that Augustine is at pains to distinguish the various ways the material and immaterial are related to space in this quotation, but rather that proponents of spatial readings are at pains to fit the spatial reading to Augustine’s texts.

¹⁰¹ For secondary discussion of Augustine’s encounter with the works of the Platonists, see for example Brown (2000: 90f).

consist of isolated parts, things, therefore, in which at no point is there an entirety....

Plato therefore is wise when, in treating of the All, he puts the body in its soul, and not its soul in the body.... (Enneads: IV.3.20f)¹⁰²

Therefore the causal analysis is not only more congruent with Augustine's writings than the spatial reading, but it is also more congruent with the works that inspired his use of the concepts expressed in these writings; for all these reasons therefore the causal analysis provides a better understanding of AP than the spatial reading.

3.7. Implications

How one understands AP will impact how one understands several other topics of interest in Augustinian studies. In this section I turn to showing the implications of the causal account for how one understands, (among other things), Augustine's personal intellectual history or philosophical development. Given that the causal account provides a better account of AP, it stands to reason that it will provide a better account of these topics as well.

3.7.1. Augustine's Personal Rejection of Psychic Physicalism

The causal analysis of AP has implications, for example, for how one understands what was one of the most radical transitions in Augustine's intellectual history, namely, his rejection of physicalism about souls and adoption of an incorporeal view of their nature. For Augustine identified the soul with "the self"¹⁰³ and viewed human beings as body-soul compounds. Hence, in coming to believe in the incorporeality of souls, his conception of himself as a soul and as a

¹⁰² For Plato's view on space see *Timaeus*, 48e-52e. For passages in Porphyry congruent with the causal view of presence and more generally for his view of the relation between the incorporeal and corporeal worlds, see his *Sententiae: Auxiliaries to the Perception of Intelligible Natures*, especially section 31.

¹⁰³ See *On the Magnitude of the Soul* 30.61 and *Confessions* VII.1. for examples of Augustine identifying the self and the soul.

human being changed as well. Spatial readings of AP suggest that the transition was from the view that:

(A) Souls are wholly located in the same space the whole body is located, but are only partly located in the parts of space in which the parts of the body are located.

to the view that

(B) Souls are wholly located in the same space in which whole body is located and wholly located in the same space in which the parts of the body are located.

The causal reading, however, provides an alternate account of this transition. While Augustine may have begun with the view of souls expressed above in (A), he abandoned it and adopted the view instead that:

(C) Souls are not located in space at all, but rather are simultaneously wholly causally related to the whole body and to each of its extended parts.

7.2. The Causal Analysis and Augustine's Rejection of Physicalism. The causal analysis also has implications, for how one understands another radical transition in his intellectual development, namely, his rejection of generic physicalism or the belief that all objects are physical ones. For, in coming to believe that souls are incorporeal, Augustine's ontology came also to include, *pace* his earlier physicalism, mutable incorporeal objects. Spatial readings suggest this transition was from an ontology that:

(D) included no objects capable of being wholly located in more than one portion of space at the same time,

to an ontology that

(E) included some mutable objects capable of being wholly located in more than one portion of space at the same time, (i.e., human souls).

The causal reading, however, provides an alternate account of this transition. While Augustine may have begun with ontology expressed above in (D), he abandoned it and adopted the view instead that:

(F) Some mutable objects are not in space at all but still may be simultaneously wholly causally related to the whole body and to each of its extended parts.

The rejection of physicalism on the causal analysis involves no change in his conception of the possible modes of spatial location. The same problems that plagued the spatial reading by itself and hence spoiled its chances for offering an accurate account AP would also seem to apply to the understanding of his rejection of generic physicalism. And in the same way that the causal analysis' ability to avoid these problems but still capture the relevant data showed it to be a better reading of the argument from presence, it is shown to be a better reading and to provide us with a deeper understanding of Augustine's rejection of not only of physicalism about souls but also physicalism.

3.8. Conclusion

I have argued that while AP is one of Augustine's central arguments for the incorporeality of human souls, it has yet to be properly treated or understood. For secondary discussions have either left the argument uninterpreted in terms of its central conception (presence) or have read it without explanation or defense in a way that seems incompatible with Augustine's writings (i.e., in terms of spatial location). Secondary discussions have also not thoroughly treated the case that Augustine offers in support of the premises of AP. In addition to discussing Augustine's case for the premises of AP, in this Chapter I have also argued in support of a causal analysis of AP. The causal analysis models AP, as arguing for the incorporeality of human souls on the basis of human souls in their entirety being causally related to all parts of the bodies they animate simultaneously, which is something no corporeal object could do given the spatially extended nature of such objects. I have also shown the implications of the causal account for Augustine's personal rejection of psychic physicalism and his rejection of

physicalism more generally and adoption of a dualistic ontology which included both corporeal and incorporeal objects (specifically mutable incorporeal objects). In the next chapter, (i.e., Chapter 4), I turn to arguing for a causal analysis of another important argument advanced by Augustine that has yet to be properly treated as well, namely, what I call the *Argument from Omnipresence*, which argues for the Incorporeality of God on the basis of his manner of presence in creation.

CHAPTER 4

REJECTING THEISTIC PHYSICALISM: A CAUSAL ANALYSIS OF AUGUSTINE’S ARGUMENT FROM OMNIPRESENCE TO THE INCORPOREALITY OF GOD

Introduction. The Argument from Omnipresence or *AO* is what I call one of Augustine’s main arguments for the incorporeality of God. The argument was at the heart of Augustine’s *personal* transition from a physicalist view of God to an incorporeal one. It was also central to his *public* case against physicalist conceptions of God which were widespread both before and during his time. Figuring crucially in the argument is what I’ll call *the omnipresence claim* (i.e., the claim that God is wholly present everywhere). Recent commentators have read this claim as attributing to God a mode of *spatial location* that cannot be realized by physical objects. While such readings may be tempting, they lack positive textual support and are incompatible with passages found throughout Augustine’s works. This chapter proposes instead that the omnipresence claim be read as attributing to God a mode of causation that cannot be realized by physical objects. Like spatial readings, the causal analysis goes semantically deeper than the surface or generic expression of the *omnipresence claim*, but unlike spatial readings the causal analysis is both compatible with and supported by Augustine’s wider corpus. By reading the claim in this way, we gain not only a better understanding of *AO* but also a better understanding of Augustine’s personal and public rejection of *theistic physicalism*. Further implications of the causal analysis of *AO* will also be discussed.

4.1. Background

Lamenting his early view of the world, Augustine writes in the *Confessions*: “I was so gross of mind—not seeing even myself clearly—that whatever was not extended in space, either

diffused or massed together or swollen out or having some such qualities or at least capable of having them, I thought must be nothing whatsoever.”¹⁰⁴ If we define a *physical* or *bodily* object as one that is extended in the three spatial dimensions, and if we define *physicalism* as the view that all objects are physical objects, then in light of the quotation above, Augustine was a physicalist early in his intellectual career.¹⁰⁵ What is more, he also believed in the existence of God (i.e., the supreme being) during this same period.¹⁰⁶ In keeping with his commitment to physicalism, he further writes in his *Confessions* that: “When I desired to think of my God, *I could not think of Him save as a bodily magnitude*, for it seemed to me that what was not such was nothing at all.”¹⁰⁷ Thus, if we define *theistic-physicalism* as the view that God is a physical object, then Augustine was also a *theistic-physicalist* and his commitment to this view was grounded in his commitment to physicalism *per se* in conjunction with his belief in God.

4.1.1. *The Prevalence and Varieties of Theistic Physicalism*

Augustine was not unique in conceiving of God as physical. As many passages in his works suggest, such views of God, were prevalent both before and during his time.¹⁰⁸ Though all

¹⁰⁴ *Confessions* VII.1.2.

¹⁰⁵ For further passages in which Augustine expresses his early commitment to physicalism see: *Confessions* IV.15.24-26; *Confessions*, V.10.19 and *Confessions*, VII.1.1.

¹⁰⁶ See for example *Confessions*, II.14.96 where Augustine tells us he never doubted the existence of God.

¹⁰⁷ *Confessions*, V.10.19.

¹⁰⁸ More broadly we could say that Augustine took physicalist views of the *divine* to be widespread before and during his time. For he also took physicalist views of *the gods*, (i.e., *polytheistic physicalism*) to be rampant before and during his time, especially amongst atomists such as Democritus and Epicurus. On Epicurus, for example, he writes: “Epicurus does not maintain anything in the elements of things besides atoms, that is, certain bodies so small that they cannot be divided or perceived by sight or by touch. And he says that the fortuitous coming together of these tiny bodies produces countless worlds, living beings, souls themselves, and the gods, which he locates not in some world, but outside the world and between the worlds in human form. And he absolutely refuses to think of anything besides bodies” (Letter 118, 28). Regarding Democritus, Augustine (Letter 118, 27) takes him to waver between the views that the gods were dependent upon atoms, or bodies composed of them, (i.e., in particular they were images that flow from bodies), and the view that they were identical to bodies, which were composed of atoms. In either way thought they are dependent upon atoms but only on the latter view are they identical to the larger bodily objects composed of atoms and hence were composed of atoms. For more on Democritus’s and Epicurus’ physicalist views of the gods see sections 27-31 of *Letter*, 118.

theistic physicalists believed that God was a physical object they differed over what kind of physical object He was or what specific physical form He had.

(A) *Philosophical/Scientific Theistic-Physicalism*. Augustine, for example, reports that various Pre-Socratic philosophers and later Hellenistic ones identified God with one or another of the four traditional elements (i.e., earth, air, water, and fire). In particular he writes that Anaximenes (d. 528 B.C.) believed “that the infinite air around us is the true God.”¹⁰⁹ And he suggests that the Stoic philosophers on the whole identified God with fire. Regarding Zeno of Citium in particular (334-262 B.C.), the founder of the Stoic school, he writes:

...Zeno became enamored of a certain theory of his own regarding the world and especially the soul (on behalf of which true philosophy is ever vigilant), saying that the soul is mortal, that there is nothing beyond this sensible world, that that nothing transpires in the world except by means of a body – *for he thought that God Himself was fire...*¹¹⁰

Theistic physicalism (generically speaking), however, was not exclusive to philosophers or scientists, but was found across different social groups or cultures including Christianity.

(B) *Christian Theistic Physicalism*. Augustine took anthropomorphic conceptions of God (i.e., belief that God was a physical object with the physical form of a human being) to be common among Christians during this time. This is evidenced by the fact that we find Augustine in his Sermons cautioning his listeners against holding a physicalist view of God generally and against holding an anthropomorphic view in particular:

As for him who made heaven and earth, he is neither heaven nor earth, nor can he be thought of either as anything earthly or anything heavenly; not as anything bodily...can you think of him. God is not that. Don't picture to yourself some

¹⁰⁹ *Letter* 118. 4.23. For a longer discussion of Anaximenes' view see *Against the Fundamental Epistle of Manichaeus*, 15f.

¹¹⁰ *Against the Academicians*, III.17.50; italics mine. For further discussion of the Stoic view generally and Zeno's view see *City of God*, VIII. 5. Note that on either of what we might call the “elemental” versions of theistic physicalism, the specific form of God would be identical, to whatever form either of those elements took in the physical or extended world. Augustine, however, is unclear on whether either philosopher took God to be identical to every instance of the particular element or whether they identified them with some special limited portion.

great big beautiful person. God is not confined in human shape. He is not contained in place, he is not bounded by space.¹¹¹

Without specifics regarding form, Augustine ascribes a physicalist view of souls and of God to the early Church Father Tertullian (155-220, A.D.), when he writes:

Tertullian believed the soul is a body simply because he was unable to conceive its being incorporeal and therefore feared it would be nothing, if it were not a body; and so he was also incapable of having any different idea about God.¹¹²

Hence commitment to theistic physicalism in one variety or another was not only present in Christianity but present throughout the Christian ranks, (i.e., among both layman, clergy, minor and major figures).

(C) *Manichean Theistic Physicalism*. Augustine also claims that the Manicheans, a religious sect gaining followers during his time and of which he was a member for 9 years, identified God with a kind of light or “luminous substance” spread out through space and bounded only on one side by evil or darkness.¹¹³ Augustine suggests that he too, while a

¹¹¹ *Sermon* 4. section 5. For further passages in which Augustine discusses anthropomorphic conceptions of God see: *Confessions*, V.10.19f; *Confessions* VI.3.4f and VII.1.1f; *Tractates of John* 40.4; *Sermon* 23.5f; *Sermon* 4.5; *Letter* 120, 3.14; *Letter* 137, 2.4.8; and *On Christian Doctrine*, I.7.7. For discussion of whether Augustine’s writings license the claim that physicalist views of God were common amongst early Christians see: Paulsen (1990, 1993, 1995-6) and Griffin and Paulsen (2002) who argue for the affirmative position, and Paffenroth (1993) who argues for a negative one. For secondary discussion regarding specifically physicalist views of God held by early Christians, see Paulsen (1995-6: 41-79). For secondary discussions of ancient physicalist worldviews more broadly, see Lange (1866/2017), Vitzthum (1995), and Brown and Ladyman (2019).

The prevalence of physicalist views of God during Augustine’s time suggests that physicalism about God amounts to something like a theological or religious paradigm, i.e., a theological view akin to what Kuhn (1996) calls a scientific paradigm. The significance of this parallel is that in coming to a better understanding of the argument from omnipresence we gain not only a better understanding of Augustine’s personal rejection of his own earlier physicalist view of God and adoption of an incorporeal one, but we also gain to a better understanding Augustine’s impersonal rejection of or attack on a deeply held religious view at the time. Further, given that the default view today among Christians seems to be that God is non-physical, if we assume that Augustine or his writings are part of the explanation of that reversal, then we gain as well a deeper understanding of what amounts not only to one of the most radical changes in Augustine’s intellectual history but a deeper understanding of what amounts to one of the most radical changes in Christian theological history, i.e., a religious paradigm shift.

¹¹² *The Literal Meaning of Genesis*, X.25.41; see also *On the Soul and Its Origin*, II.9.5. For Tertullian’s own discussion of his view of God, see *On the Flesh of Christ*, especially Ch. 11 where he writes: “Nihil est incorporale nisi quod non est.” For secondary discussions of Tertullian’s view see: Paulsen (1995-96: 63-73); Teske (2008: 30) and Stead (1963: 46-66).

¹¹³ For Augustine’s discussion of the Manichean view of God, see: *Confessions*, V.10.20, and *Against the Fundamental Epistle of Manichaeus*, 15f and 42-3. For secondary discussions of Augustine on the Manichean view of God, see Paulsen (1995-96: 73-6) and Teske (2008: 26-38). On Manicheanism generally see the introductory

Manichean, had adopted this view,¹¹⁴ but he eventually rejected it on the grounds that if God were bounded on one side he would not be “infinite”, which at the time he was only thinking about in a physical sense of “being everywhere extended.”¹¹⁵

(D) *Augustine’s Post-Manichean Theistic Physicalism*. In rejecting the Manichean view of God, Augustine did not immediately reject theistic physicalism entirely. Rather he developed (or endorsed¹¹⁶) two further physicalist models of God that allowed him to conceive of God both as a body, and as infinite. In the first, which is distinct from but has remnants of the Manichean view, he conceived of God as an (unspecified) physical object that stands to space and everything else occupying it in the same relation as light stands to air:

In like manner did I conceive of You, Life of my life, as vast through infinite spaces, on every side penetrating the whole mass of the world, and beyond it, all ways, through immeasurable and boundless spaces; so that the earth should have You, the heaven have You, all things have You, and they bounded in You, but Thou nowhere. For as the body of this air which is above the earth prevents not the light of the sun from passing through it, penetrating it, not by bursting or by cutting, but by filling it entirely, so I imagined the body, not of heaven, air, and

essay of Schaff (ed.) (1956); Lieu (1992) and Tardieu (2008). A complete collection of Augustine’s writings against the Manicheans is contained in Schaff (ed.) (1956). One question regarding the Manichean view concerns the relation between it and the that of the fire proponents of the scientific view; namely, the question is this: in identifying God with a luminous substance were the Manicheans essentially proponents of the fire view or a kind of fire view and hence were they scientific or elemental physicalists about God or is the *luminous substance* not identical to fire or any of the other traditional four elements? Further research in this area is needed.

¹¹⁴ Ibid. ft.n. 10.

¹¹⁵ See, for example, *Against the Fundamental Epistle of Manichaeus*, 15f and 42-3. Augustine’s rejection of the Manichean view of God and endorsement of the positions discussed below also coincided with or involved his rejection of a substantial view of evil or darkness. The relation between these two rejections should be marked as further object of research regarding Augustine’s evolving views of God.

¹¹⁶ One question to mark concerning the conceptions which follow is whether or how they were related to the others discussed above, (e.g., are they a subcategory of either of the elemental versions of the scientists or are they distinct)? While one might read the first conception as identifying God with light and the second as identifying God with water, it is important to note that Augustine does neither. Rather, he uses light and its relation to air, and water and its relation to a sponge, to illustrate the manner in which God is related to the spatial world but leaves the particular kind of substance that God is unspecified.

A further question, which follows the first, is if they are distinct were they original to him or did he get them from someone else, and if so whom? The fact that he does not reference gleaning these from another school or person but that he *imagined* them seems to tell in favor of these (in part at least as they may be extensions of the elemental or Manichean views) being novel conceptions of his own. If this is correct and they are original to him, then Augustine was an innovator not only with respect to an incorporeal conception of God, but also with respect to the physicalist conception of God, (i.e., he made innovations in the idea of God under a physicalist paradigm and not just with respect to rejecting it).

sea only, but of the earth also, to be pervious to You, and in all its greatest parts as well as smallest penetrable to receive Your presence.¹¹⁷

On the second, he conceived of God as a physical object that stands to space and everything else occupying it as an infinite ocean would stand to a finite sponge:

...I made one huge mass of all Your creatures, distinguished according to the kinds of bodies—some of them being real bodies, some what I myself had feigned for spirits. And this mass I made huge...yet every way finite. But You, O Lord, I imagined on every part environing and penetrating it, though every way infinite; as if there were a sea everywhere, and on every side through immensity nothing but an infinite sea; and it contained within itself some sponge, huge, though finite, so that the sponge would in all its parts be filled from the immeasurable sea. So conceived I Your Creation to be itself finite, and filled by You, the Infinite. And I said, *Behold God*, and behold what God has created.¹¹⁸

Note that Augustine's post Manichean (but still physicalist) models of God, though they may share features of the other physicalist accounts discussed above, differ from them in at least one respect: they constitute models which both highlight and are compatible with God being physical and maximally infinite in a physical sense of spatial extent.¹¹⁹ On both the "light to space" and "sea to sponge" models, God is conceived of as physical object that is literally spread out or extended through all of space and everything else occupying it, if not beyond; there is no place where God, or at least some extended portion of Him, is not. On the anthropomorphic, the elemental, and the Manichean views, however, God is finite with respect to his occupation of space. On anthropomorphism God is finite in that the bounds of his substance are identical to the bounds of a human body. On both elemental views God is finite in that his bounds do not exceed the bounds of either air or fire¹²⁰; and on the Manichean view, God is in space and the things

¹¹⁷ *Confessions*, VII.1.2.

¹¹⁸ *Confessions*, VII.5.7.

¹¹⁹ They also differ in that the other models specify God as a particular physical object or kind of physical object but Augustine leaves these parameters open.

¹²⁰ A question here is whether the proponents of either elemental view took explicitly took a position on the spatial extent of the respective element they identified with God. A further question is even if they did not explicitly take a position on this issue do either of their views commit them to one?

occupying it, only where “evil” or “darkness” is not; hence, God, on the Manichean view is not infinite in a spatial or extensional sense either.¹²¹ This in fact is why Augustine rejected the previous physicalist views and developed these two further ones.¹²²

4.1.2 Summary

The fact that there were many varieties of theistic physicalism, that Augustine dedicated much time to discussing it¹²³ and had once been a proponent of the view himself, and the fact that it appeared at different times and across different religions and among intellectual and non-intellectual groups suggest that *theistic physicalism* was a widespread and prevailing view during Augustine’s time. The significance of this is that in coming to a better understanding of Augustine’s case against *theistic physicalism*, we gain not only a better understanding of his

¹²¹ It should be noted, however, that the Manichean view did admit of God being infinitely extended in any direction in which evil was not. See for example *Against the Fundamental Epistle of Manichaeus*, Ch. 19. Though this extension would be infinite in certain directions, it would seem in some sense to be less than the maximal infinite extension admitted of on the “analogical views”. For the extension on this view is infinite in all directions.

¹²² See for example, *Letter* 118, 4.23; *Confessions*, V.10.19 and VII.1.1f. Additionally, in this context, it’s worth mentioning another question related to Augustine’s “transition” which again seems unanswered in the contemporary literature. Again, it’s commonplace that Augustine transitioned from a physicalist to a non-physicalist conception of God. But when we say “Augustine was once a physicalist”, what exactly does that amount to, i.e., *what was the specific form of physicalism that he adopted out of the panoply of actual versions he enumerates?* And further, in the same way as Augustine transitioned from physicalism about God, generally speaking, to a non-physicalist view, *did he ever undergo a transition within the panoply of physicalist views?* I’ve suggested above that Augustine was both a Manichean physicalist and a “relational physicalist” and he transitioned from the former to the latter for reasons having to do with limits Manicheanism placed on God. But was Augustine ever an anthropomorphist? There has been some controversy over this latter question, (see for example: Paffenroth (1993) and Griffin and Paulsen (2002)), but the matter for the most part seems unresolved. More work must be undertaken on this issue as well, if we aim to have a deeper and fuller understanding of what was perhaps the most radical transition in Augustine’s intellectual history. In other words his transition from a physicalist conception of God to an incorporeal or non-physical was not one off but came in stages; in the least he transitioned from the Manichean view to the light to air and sea to sponge models, before abandoning theistic physicalism all together; but were there any other transitions that took place in his conception of God withing the physicalist framework. If so, what were they?

¹²³ Augustine’s interest in the topic is expected given his statement in *Soliloquies* I, 7, that his two most cherished topics of study are God and the soul. Part of knowing God is not only knowing what He is, but also knowing what He is not; and thus, his accounts of physicalist views and arguments against them could be seen as expanding not only our positive knowledge regarding God but negative knowledge as well.

personal rejection of the view but also a better understanding of his public attack on what was effectively a paradigmatic view of the God at the time.¹²⁴

4.2. The Argument from Omnipresence

Augustine advanced several different arguments for the incorporeality of God. One of his main arguments for this claim was based on God's manner of presence in creation. I'll call this argument the *Argument from Omnipresence* or *AO* to distinguish it from others found in his works.¹²⁵ A paradigmatic expression of the argument is found in *Sermon 277*:

Have no doubts at all about this: that God is not a body. It is proper to bodies to be spread out through space, to be contained in place, to have parts, halves, thirds, quarters, wholes. Nothing like that with God, because God is whole everywhere, not half of him in one place, with the other half somewhere else; but all of him is in heaven, all of him on earth....¹²⁶

¹²⁴ Further, given that the default view today among most Christians seems to be that God is non-physical, if we assume that Augustine or his writings are part of the explanation of that reversal, as Teske (2008:26f) for example has suggested, then we gain as well a deeper understanding of what amounts not only to one of the most radical changes in Augustine's personal intellectual history but a deeper understanding of what amounts to one of the most radical changes in Christian theological history, i.e., a religious paradigm shift.

A further point of significance regarding the issue concerns Augustine's often made claim that an erroneous conception of God (and self) has disastrous consequences for one's wellbeing; not only epistemologically but also with respect to how one lives his or her life and thus with respect to one's level of happiness. For Augustine's discussions of the import of a proper understanding of God see: *Confessions*, VI.16.26; *On Free Will*, III.21.59; *On the Trinity*, I.3.5; *Sermon 88*, 5; *Sermon 23*, 5-6; and *Against Faustus*, XX.9. For secondary discussion see Nash (2003: 6).

¹²⁵ "Hoc omnino noli dubitare, quoniam non est corpus Deus. Per spatia diffundi, locis capi, habere partes dimidias, tertias, quartas, totas, corporum proprium est. Nihil tale Deus; quia ubique totus Deus: non alibi dimidius, et alibi alio dimidio constitutus; sed ubique totus. Implet coelum et terram: sed totus est in coelo, totus in terra."

Unlike Augustine's argument from presence to incorporeal souls, (the focus of Chapter 3), his argument from omnipresence to God's incorporeality has received little to no discussion until recently and has yet to be treated extensively. The same is true regarding Augustine's other arguments for God's incorporeality. The only paper I've found in which the main focus is explicating such an argument in Augustine works is Teske's "*The Aim of Augustine's Proof that God Truly Is*", which advances an unorthodox reading of Augustine's argument for God from Truth, (which is found in Book II of *On Free Choice*), as being primarily an argument for God's incorporeality and not an argument for God's existence. See Teske (2008: 26-49). For further instances of Augustine arguing for God's incorporeality that seem to be distinct from AO, see especially *On the Immortality of the Soul*, 14-15; see also, *Confessions* X.5.9; *The Literal Meaning of Genesis*, X.24.40; and *Against the Fundamental Epistle of the Manicheans*, 19.21. And for an argument that is distinct but closely related to AO, see *Confessions*, VII.1.1; for further discussion of this latter argument in particular see fn. 29 below.

¹²⁶ *Sermon*, 277, 13. Augustine suggests the argument again in *Letter 137*, 2: "...[B]odies, whether these denser ones like liquid or earth or the more subtle ones like air and light...None of them can be whole everywhere, because a body must have one of its countless parts here and another there, and however large a body might be or however small a particle might be, it occupies an area of place and fills that same place so that it is whole in no part of it." For further instances of AO in Augustine's works or closely related arguments see: *Letter 148*, 1; *Letter 187*, 3.9f;

The argument rests on two main premises: (1) God is simultaneously wholly present everywhere (i.e., is *omnipresent*), and (2) omnipresence is incompatible with physicality. I'll refer to the first claim as the *omnipresence claim* and the second as the *incompatibility claim*. We can therefore state AO more explicitly as follows:

The Generic Account of the Argument from Omnipresence

- (1) God is omnipresent, i.e., wholly everywhere. (*Omnipresence Claim*)
- (2) Omnipresence is incompatible with physicality. (*Incompatibility Claim*)
- Therefore,
- (3) God is not a physical object i.e., God is incorporeal. (*Incorporeality Claim*)¹²⁷

4.2.1. The Case for the Omnipresence Claim

Augustine supports the omnipresence claim in two main ways. The *first* is on the basis of Biblical authority:

...God is spread out through all things. Indeed, he says through the prophet, *I fill heaven and earth* (Jer 23:24) and what I cited a little before concerning his wisdom, *It stretches from end to end mightily and arranges all things pleasingly* (Wis 8:1). Scripture likewise says, *The Spirit of the Lord filled the world* (Wis 1:7), and a certain psalm says to him, *Where shall I hide from your spirit, and*

Confessions, III.7.12; VI.3.4f; VII.1.2; *Literal Meaning of Genesis*, VIII.19.38; and *Against the Fundamental Epistle of Manichaeus*, Ch. 15.

¹²⁷ I call the above reconstruction of AO the *generic account* because it expresses the important propositional and conceptual content of the argument, but it leaves uninterpreted what God's omnipresence or being wholly everywhere consists in. In this way the generic account is uncontroversial. Of course, there are other logical structures into which AO could be reconstructed besides a syllogism (or maybe rather, besides "syllogistically"); for example, if the claim in (2) was stated as the conditional – (2*) *If God were a physical object, He could not be wholly present everywhere simultaneously* – then the generic account would take the modus tollens form; or if the rule of contraposition was applied to (2*) then (2) could be stated in this manner – (2**) *If God is wholly present everywhere simultaneously, God is not a physical object* – and the generic account would take the modus ponens form. The claims I make in this chapter do not depend on whether AO is reconstructed in the spirit of a syllogism as above or in the modus tollens form, the modus ponens form, or in some other logically valid equivalent form. I've stated it in this way because I take it to be the clearest expression of the argument, the one most amenable to ease of discussion, but that still captures and expresses the argument's primary uninterpreted propositional and conceptual content.

*where shall I flee from your face? If I go up to the heavens, you are there; if I go down to the underworld, you are present (Ps 139:7-8).*¹²⁸

Notice that while these passages do lend support to the omnipresence claim, the support is incomplete. This is because they support the claim that *God is everywhere*, and the omnipresence claim could not be true if this was false. But the omnipresence claim also states a position regarding the manner or mode in which God is everywhere, namely, *as a whole* or *in His entirety*. In *Letter 187*, Augustine expands on what being *whole everywhere*, involves:

He is said to be everywhere...because he is absent to no part of reality; he is said to be whole because he does not offer a part of himself as present to part of reality and another part of himself to another part of reality, equal parts to equal parts, but a smaller part to a smaller part and a larger part to a larger part. But he is equally present as a whole not only to the whole of creation but also to each part of it.¹²⁹

Augustine therefore seems to take there to be two possible ways in which an object could be everywhere: (i) while being equally present as a whole not only to the whole of reality but also to each part of it, and (ii) while being wholly present to the whole of reality but only partly present to the parts. Using the terminology set forth in Chapter 2, I'll use the term *holenmeric* presence to refer to the former mode of presence and *circumscriptive* presence to refer to the latter mode. With this terminology in mind, we can say that Augustine intends the omnipresence claim to be read as asserting that God is everywhere *holenmerically*. And while the Biblical passages suggest that God is everywhere, they are open to whether God is everywhere *holenmerically* or not. In this way, therefore, these passages support the omnipresence claim only partially but not completely.

The second way that Augustine supports the omnipresence claim is on the basis of perfect being theology or on his account of God as "that than which nothing can be or can be

¹²⁸ *Letter 187*, 4.14.

¹²⁹ *Letter 187*, 17.

conceived better,”¹³⁰ in conjunction with the claim that God’s failing to be everywhere holonmerically is incompatible with God being such that nothing can be or can be conceived better. As Augustine writes again in *Sermon 277*:

Don’t let us strive to reduce God to a place, and don’t let’s strive to shut God up in a place, don’t let’s strive to spread God out in any kind of bulk through extended space; let us not have the nerve to do that, let’s not even think of it. Let the substance of divinity remain in its own proper dignity. Let us, certainly as far as we can, change for the better; let us not change God for the worse.¹³¹

Consider first the consequences that follow if the omnipresence claim is false and thus God is not everywhere holonmerically. If it is false, then either: (a) God is absent from some part of reality, or (b) God is everywhere *non-holonmerically*. But if either (a) or (b) is true, then God is limited in a way such that (*ceteris paribus*) something can be conceived better. For, if (a) is true and God is absent to some part of reality, then God is limited in respect to His presence to reality in such a way that something can be conceived better, namely, something that was everywhere either in a holonmeric or non-holonmeric sense. And if (b) is true, and God is everywhere non-holonmerically, then again God is limited in such a way that something can be conceived better, namely: something that was everywhere holonmerically. Notice further, if (b) were true, it would also follow that God was manifold in the sense of having different parts present to different parts of reality. In consequence, God would be divisible (both actually and in thought) and thus something better can be conceived, namely: something that was in no way divisible. On any of the consequences that follow if the *omnipresence-claim* is false (and thus God is not everywhere holonmerically) the result is that God is not that than which nothing can be or can be conceived

¹³⁰ *Way of Life of the Manicheans*, Ch 3. For further passages in which Augustine suggests this conception of God see: *On Free Choice*, I.2; *On the Nature of the Good*, paragraph 1; *The City of God* V.11; *The Literal Meaning of Genesis*, VIII.19.38, and *On Christian Doctrine* I.7.7. For a contemporary discussion of perfect being theology see Rogers (2000).

¹³¹ *Sermon 277*.13. For further passages suggesting this argument see: *Against the Fundamental Epistle of the Manicheans*, 19; *Letter 148*, 1; and *Literal Meaning of Genesis*, VIII.19.38f.

better. Thus, Augustine takes it to follow that God is everywhere *holenmerically*. Unlike the first approach then, the second approach supports not only the claim that *God is everywhere* but the claim that *He is everywhere holenmerically* (i.e., He is truly omnipresent).¹³²

4.2.2. The Case for the Incompatibility Claim

Augustine grounds the incompatibility claim on his account of physical objects as objects that “consist of parts, whether greater or less, which occupy greater or smaller local spaces.”¹³³ Let us call this account of physical objects the *multiplicity thesis*.¹³⁴ In *Letter 137*, 2.4, we see Augustine explicitly arguing from the multiplicity thesis to the incompatibility claim:

None of those [i.e., physical objects] can be wholly everywhere, since they are necessarily composed of numberless parts, some here and some there; however

¹³² There are two more, (but perhaps minor), ways that Augustine could be thought to support the omnipresence-claim. So there are four means of support in total; the first two above are the major supports and the second two below, (i.e., the third and fourth ways) are minor ones.

The *third* is related to the perfect being theology approach but at the same time seems to stand on its own. The idea is that if God were circumscriptively (and so not *holenmerically*) present, then various absurdities follow and hence show the error in taking God to be everywhere circumscriptively. As Augustine writes concerning his earlier physicalist view of God as being everywhere circumscriptively: “...it was untrue. For in this way would a greater part of the earth contain a greater portion of You, and the less a lesser; and all things should so be full of You, as that the body of an elephant should contain more of You than that of a sparrow by how much larger it is, and occupies more room...” (*Confessions* VII.1.2).

The *fourth* is based on objects such as Truth, Unity, Light, etc., being simultaneously and wholly available to all human minds independently of the spatial location of their human bodies. For Augustine identifies God with these objects. Hence his argument that these are simultaneously wholly present everywhere and to everyone because they are wholly available to all human minds independently of the spatial location of the human bodies to which those minds are *paired*, is in effect an argument in support of the claim that God is wholly present everywhere simultaneously, (i.e., an argument in support of the omnipresence claim). For examples of Augustine making this latter kind of argument see: *On Free Choice of the Will*, II; *On True Religion*, 32.60; *Sermon 7.7*; *Retractions* 1.4. For secondary discussion relating to the latter argument see: Nash, (2003: 68 and 83-4); Macdonald (2001: 76-7); Cary, (2000: 100-4); and King (2010: p. xxi of the introduction); for critical discussion of the argument see Wierenga’s (2019: 2).

¹³³ *On the Nature and Origin of the Soul*, IV.17. For similar accounts of *corpus* in Augustine see: *On the Nature and Origin of the Soul*, IV.35; *On the Trinity*, VI.6.8 and X.7.10; *Letter 118*, 4; *Letter 137*, 2; *Letter 148*, 3; *Letter 166*, 4; *Against the Fundamental Epistle of the Manicheans*, 16; *On the Immortality of the Soul*, XVI.25; *Confessions*, III.7.12; *The Literal Meaning of Genesis*, VII, 21; and *Sermon 277*, 13.13.

For secondary discussion of this account of body in Augustine’s works see the entry on “Body” in Fitzgerald (ed.) (1999); Gilson, (1960: 46), and the first chapter of Holscher (1986), *The Reality of the Mind*, which contains the extensive discussion of Augustine’s views on the nature and features of corporeal objects.

¹³⁴ For Augustine’s various arguments for the *multiplicity thesis* see: *On True Religion* 32.59; *The Literal Meaning of Genesis* IV.13.7; and *On Free Choice* II.8. For explication and critical discussion of these arguments see Holscher (1986: 17-21).

large or however small the substance may be, it occupies an amount of space, and it fills that space without being entire in any part of it.

Given that physical objects by nature are composed of parts that occupy different parts of space (i.e., are composed of *spatial parts*), it follows that no physical object can be wholly everywhere (i.e., everywhere *holenmerically*). For even if some physical object were diffused or extended through the totality of space, (and all objects that occupy space), at most it would be whole in the whole of space but not whole as well in the parts of space. Such an object would instead be whole in the whole of space but only partly in the parts of space. A physical object, therefore, no matter its extent could not be everywhere *holenmerically* but only everywhere *circumscriptively*. Since being omnipresent in the highest or true sense requires being everywhere *holenmerically*, it follows then that physical objects cannot be omnipresent (i.e., it follows that *omnipresence is incompatible with physicality*, as the *incompatibility-claim* asserts).

4.3. The Spatial Account of AO

The generic account of AO left the omnipresence claim uninterpreted. While this is not strike against the *accuracy* of the generic account, it does mark a limitation in its semantic depth.¹³⁵ For in leaving the claim unanalyzed it leaves open the question of what Augustine means in claiming that *God is wholly present everywhere*. This in turn leaves us with a semantically shallow understanding of AO (and topics related to the argument). Recently, however, (and seemingly going against what they take to be a common primary or secondary view) some authors have understood the omnipresence claim as attributing to God a mode or manner of spatial location that cannot be realized physical objects. To return to some passage

¹³⁵ In making this claim I am assuming that Augustine does not take the presence relation to be a primitive relation. As I argued in Chapter 2 and will also argue in later sections of this paper, there are good reasons to believe what for now is merely assumed.

that we've had occasion to consider repeatedly, Inman (2017: 16-17), for example, reads the claim in this manner:

...[O]ne might think that Augustine's more developed and mature view of God's omnipresence was one that removed God from space entirely...[T]his would be much too quick.... Augustine routinely characterizes God's ubiquitous presence not in terms of his being removed from space altogether but, rather, as a particular way of being located in the totality of space that preserves God's absolute mereological simplicity and thus in direct contrast to the mode of location exhibited by material beings...God alone is "equally present as a whole not only to the whole of the universe, but also to each part of it."

Wierenga (2019: 2) writes:

According to classical theism, God is omnipresent, that is present everywhere. But classical theism also holds that God is immaterial. How can something that is not, or does not have, a body be *located in space*? Early discussions of divine presence typically began by distinguishing God's *presence in space* from that of material bodies. Augustine (354-439) wrote: "Although in speaking of him we say that God is everywhere present, we must resist carnal ideas and withdraw our mind from our bodily senses, and not imagine that God is distributed through all things by a sort of extension of size, as earth or water or air or light are distributed (Letter 187, Ch. 2)." In contrast to material objects, which, having parts in various parts of the space they occupy, are not wholly present at any of those regions, God is wholly present wherever he is.¹³⁶

And while Pasnau (2011: 19) does not specifically name Augustine, he does suggest that medieval philosophers generally, understood God to be literally hollenmerically located throughout space:

Although it is now commonly supposed that God exists outside of space, this was not the standard conception among earlier theologians. Medieval Christian authors, despite being generally misread on this point, are in complete agreement that God is *literally present, spatially, throughout the universe*. One simply does not find anyone wanting to remove God from space, all the way through to the end of the seventeenth century. Of course, no one wanted to say that God has spatial, integral parts. So the universally accepted view was that God exists hollenmerically throughout space, wholly existing at each place in the universe.

¹³⁶ Cf. Grabowski (1954; 82).

In reading the omnipresence claim in terms of God being located in space in a way that no physical object could be, the spatial reading of the omnipresence-claim entails a spatial account of AO:

The Spatial Account of the Argument from Omnipresence

(S1) God is wholly located everywhere in space simultaneously. (*S Omnipresence-Claim*)

(S2) No physical object could be wholly located everywhere in space simultaneously.
(*S Incompatibility-Claim*)

Therefore,

(S3) God is not a physical object, i.e., is incorporeal. (*S Incorporeality-Claim*)

While the generic account was neutral with regard to whether Augustine took God to be spatially located, the spatial account is not neutral on this topic. In fact, what sets it apart from the generic account and defines it as such is that it takes an explicit stance on the issue. For on the spatial account Augustine does take God to be located in space and what marks God as being incorporeal on this account is that His mode or manner of location in space is one that is not realizable by physical objects.

4.4. Problems for the Spatial Account

While the spatial account has the virtue of explicating AO through a view of presence that is intuitive and perhaps common in contemporary discussions, there are several textual and systematic facts which individually cast doubt on the spatial account and which taken together tell strongly against it.

4.4.1. Lack of Textual Support

The *first* problem for the spatial reading is that it lacks positive textual support. That is, none of the passages used to support a spatial reading of the omnipresence claim show Augustine claiming that God is “in space”, “located in space”, “spatially located”, “has a spatial location”, “occupies space”, etc. in any mode or manner whatsoever. Inman (2017: 16-17) for example cited a passage in support of the spatial reading in which Augustine is found claiming that:

[God alone is] *equally present as a whole not only to the whole of the universe, but also to each part of it.*¹³⁷

And Wierenga (2019: 2) cited a passage in which Augustine writes:

Although in speaking of him we say that God is everywhere *present*, we must resist carnal ideas and withdraw our mind from our bodily senses, and not imagine that God is distributed through all things by a sort of extension of size, as earth or water or air or light are distributed.¹³⁸

Neither in the passages above, nor in any other passages that these authors use to support their interpretation of the omnipresence claim (nor elsewhere in Augustine’s works) do we find Augustine claiming that God is in space in any sense, let alone that He is *in space* in the literal sense of being located there but in a different mode or manner from that in which physical objects are located there. It is reasonable to suspect that if Augustine held such a view, it would be expressed somewhere in his works and that these authors would have used such passages to

¹³⁷ Italics are Inman’s. The primary text that Inman quotes is from *Letter 187*, 17. Inman takes this passage (or its full expression) to be “perhaps the clearest statement of Augustine’s positive view of divine omnipresence” (16). One would expect a passage from 187 to be just that given that the *Letter* is essentially a short treatise on God’s omnipresence and hence is Augustine’s most sustained discussion on the topic. The fact that we do not find a spatial explication of the claim there, (or anywhere else in his works), should also serve as evidence against it. Further passages he cites are from: *Letter 187*, 4.11; *Letter 187*, 6.18, and *Sermon 277*, 13.

¹³⁸ The primary quotation is from *Letter 187*, 2. Wierenga also cites primary passages from: *Letter 187*, 7 and *Letter*, 137.

support the spatial account instead of using passages in which Augustine is found claiming that God is everywhere or is wholly present everywhere.¹³⁹

4.4.2. Textual Incompatibility

In addition to lacking clear textual support, the spatial account appears to stand in direct tension with several passages found throughout Augustine's works. The quotations below are exemplary of such passages:

[A] "For Thou, O most high and most near, most secret, yet most present, who has not limbs some larger some smaller, but art wholly everywhere, and nowhere in space..." (*Confessions*, VI.3.4.)

[B] [T]he one true God...is wholly everywhere, included in no space, bound by no chains, mutable in no part of His being, filling heaven and earth with an omnipresent power, now with a need nature. (*City of God*, VII.30)

There are also passages in which Augustine seems not only to deny that God is in located in space but to argue directly against it:

¹³⁹ The presumption in the move from Augustine's omnipresence claim to the spatial reading of that claim seems to be that a *presence* relation between God and creation entails a *location* or an *occupation* relation between God and space. Proponents of the spatial reading offer no explanation for this presumption. However, its source could be that: (i) they take a *presence* relation to be identical to a *location* relation or (ii) they do not but do take the *obtaining* of a presence relation between God and creation to *entail* or be *sufficient* for the obtaining of a location relation between God and space. Both of these possibilities have intuitive appeal but at the same time *prima facie* neither of them seem to express necessary or analytic truths; and furthermore, each seems to be open to counterexamples (such as those discussed in Chapters 1 and 2). But notice that even if such examples could be shown faulty, and further it was shown that an identity or entailment relation holds between presence and location, neither of these findings would be sufficient to establish the presumption involved in the move from Augustine's omnipresence-claim to the spatial reading of that claim; and thus neither of these would be sufficient to establish the spatial account of AO; for the question is not what proponents of the spatial account hold concerning the relation between presence and location; nor is it what the actual ontological facts are concerning their relation; the question is what Augustine's holds their relation to be; and in the same way that proponents of the spatial account have not offered any direct textual evidence for their reading, they have offered no evidence for what Augustine's views are concerning the relation between presence and location; hence, the spatial account lacks not only direct textual support but also indirect/systematic textual support. While the lack of such support in itself does not disprove the spatial reading, it should cast doubt on it and especially so given that the proponents of the spatial reading themselves suggest that it contains primary claims that either are or entail other claims that are not commonly held regarding the relation between incorporeal object and space in general and God and space and particular and which further are not commonly ascribed to Augustine.

[C] God is not anywhere. For what is somewhere is contained in a place and what is contained in a place is body. But God is not body, so He is not anywhere. (*Eighty-Three Different Questions*, Question 20)¹⁴⁰

[D] Reason: Does this proposition seem to you to be true: anything which exists must be somewhere?

Augustine: There is nothing on which I would be more inclined to agree with you.

R: And do you grant that truth exists?

A: I do.

R: We must, therefore, ask where it is. For it is not in place, unless perhaps you think that anything other than a body has existence in place, or you believe that truth is a body.

A: I don't believe either of those propositions. (*Soliloquies*, I.15.29)¹⁴¹

4.4.3. Systematic Incompatibility.¹⁴²

In addition to lacking clear textual support, and to standing in direct tension with various passages found throughout Augustine's works¹⁴³, another problem with the spatial interpretation,

¹⁴⁰ "*De loco Dei: Deus non alicubi est. Quod enim alicubi est, continetur loco; quod continetur loco, corpus est; Deus autem non est corpus.*" Note that Augustine advances a very similar if not semantically identical argument in *Literal Meaning of Genesis*, VIII.19.38, when he writes: "...God...is not contained in any place whether of finite or infinite space...For there is nothing in the substance by which he is God that is smaller in the part than in the whole, as must be the case with all things that are in place."

¹⁴¹ "R. - *Verane tibi videtur ista sententia: Quidquid est, alicubi esse cogitur?*

A. - *Nihil me sic ducit ad consentiendum.*

R. - *Fateris autem esse veritatem?*

A. - *Fateor.*

R. - *Ergo ubi sit, necesse est quaeramus; non est enim in loco, nisi forte aut esse in loco aliquid aliud praeter corpus, aut veritatem corpus esse arbitraris.*

A. - *Nihil horum puto.*"

¹⁴² Notice that one indirect textual fact that is not incompatible with the spatial reading of AO but that was incompatible with the spatial reading of AP (i.e., the argument from presence for incorporeal souls, discussed in Ch. 3) concerns Augustine's position that incorporeal objects are incapable of movement in place. For while he takes physical objects to move both in space and time, he takes souls to move only in time but not in place and he takes God to move in neither place nor space; this was a problem with respect to the spatial reading of AP, which implies he took souls to be spatially located, and in particular, to be located in the very same space in which the bodies they animated are located; it's a problem because bodies move and change place, (on account of the soul's exercising movie power on them); thus, if souls were located in the space that the body was located they would change location as their bodies do; this however is not a problem for the spatial reading because if God was wholly located everywhere in space, (unlike the soul whose location was confined or restricted in scope to the location of the body), then God *could not* move change place because he was already wholly located at every place. Hence, Augustine's denying that God can change place *is* consistent with the spatial reading of the omnipresence-claim.

¹⁴³ The spatial account's lack of direct textual evidence is enough to give one pause about its status. The lack of such evidence in conjunction with passages such as [A-D] above is enough raise doubt. While its proponents do not explain or justify their move from Augustine's omnipresence claim to the spatial interpretation of that claim, Inman at least is aware of passage [C] and offers the following response:

"While it is equally true that Augustine adamantly rejects the notion that God is strictly speaking "in a place", it is important to be clear on what exactly he means by this locution. For an object to be "in a place,"

and perhaps the most serious one, is that it is inconsistent with Augustine's own account of spatial location. (As I argued more thoroughly in Chapter 1) Augustine tells us in *The Literal Meaning of Genesis*, IV.18.34. that he uses location or place (*locus*) in two main ways, properly and improperly:¹⁴⁴

for Augustine, is for it to be "contained" in a place such that the object could not exist without being located at a place. Material objects are "contained" in a place in that their existence depends on their being somewhere. In his own words: "take from bodies their places and they will be nowhere, and because they will be nowhere they will not exist." By contrast, God "is not contained by those things to which he is present, as if he could not exist without them" (Letter 187, 6.18).²⁴

.... Consequently, the reason why God is not "in a place" on Augustine's use of the phrase is that God (unlike material objects) is neither confined to a single place nor metaphysically dependent on space for his existence. (Inman 2017, p. 17-18).

The immediate problem with this response is that it presupposes an account of location in space where being so located does not essentially involve dependence on space and confinement to a single place. This presupposition is not problematic because it is incoherent or cannot be made sense of. It is understandable and further it also perhaps expresses an account of spatial location that is common and has adherents in contemporary philosophical discussions. But its coherence and possible contemporary adherence are moot with respect to the topic at hand: *Augustine of Hippo's* views. That is, in order for this response to clearly show that passages such as [A-D] above are consistent with the spatial reading of the omnipresence-claim, what is needed is evidence which clearly shows that Augustine held the account of spatial location on which the response is based. But instead of primary texts regarding Augustine's views on spatial location, (or even better – primary texts in which he explicitly commits the presupposed view), what was offered were more texts in which Augustine makes claims about God's *presence*, with no textual justification (or even textually independent explanation) of the move from these to the claim that Augustine held the presupposed view of spatial location. The upshot here is that Inman's response fails to alleviate the problem posed by texts such as {A-D} above. It cannot be persuasive so long as it is based on controversial secondary attributions regarding his account of spatial location and his views on the relation between presence and location which either have no textual foundation or which do but proponents of spatial accounts fail to provide; in the next section I will examine Augustine's discussions of location and argue systematically from his views on spatial location in conjunction with his account of incorporeal objects as lacking spatial extension by nature, that the spatial account is incorrect; a further upshot of my discussion is that it provides support for reading passages [A-D] as actually being in direct tension with the spatial account rather than just their seeming to be (*pace* Inman's response). It is one thing to say Augustine *could mean this*, and another to show *that is what he means*; and Inman's response seems only to do the former.

¹⁴⁴ The full passage runs as follows: "*Ac per hoc qualiscumque in eis vespera et mane fuerit, nullo modo tamen opinandum est, eo mane quod post sexti diei vesperam factum est, initium accepisse requiem Dei; ne temporale aliquod bonum illi aeternitati et incommutabilitati accidisse vanitate temeraria suspicemur: sed illam quidem requiem Dei, qua in seipso requiescit, eoque bono beatus est quod ipse sibi est, nec initium eidem ipsi habere nec terminum; consummatae autem creaturae habere initium, eandem requiem Dei. Quoniam rei cuiusque perfectio, non tam in universo cuius pars est, quam in eo a quo est, in quo et ipsum universum est, pro sui generis modulo stabilitur ut quiescat, id est, ut sui momenti ordinem teneat. Ac per hoc ipsa universitas creaturae, quae sex diebus consummata est, aliud habet in sua natura, aliud in ordine quo in Deo est, non sicut Deus, sed tamen ita ut ei quies propriae stabilitatis non sit, nisi in illius quiete qui nihil praeter se appetit, quo adepto requiescat. Et ideo dum ipse manet in se, quidquid ex illo est retorquet ad se; ut omnis creatura in se habeat naturae suae terminum, quo non sit quod ipse est; in illo autem quietis locum, quo servet quod ipsa est. Scio quod non proprie dixerim locum; nam proprie dicitur in spatiis quae corporibus occupantur: sed quia et ipsa corpora non manent in loco, nisi quo sui ponderis tamquam appetitu perveniunt, ut eo comperto requiescant; ideo non incongruenter a corporalibus ad spiritualia verbum transfertur, ut dicatur locus, cum res ipsa plurimum distet.*"

See also *Eighty-Three Different Questions*, Question 20, where Augustine offers the same account of place as in the passage above: "*Locus enim in spatio est quod longitudine, latitudine, altitudine corporis occupatur.*"

Proper Use: The use of “place” to refer to space that is occupied by a body.

Improper Use: The use of “place” to refer to something other than to space that is occupied by the spatial dimensions of a body.

And corollary to his above distinction *in use* are two basic kinds of place that Augustine includes in his ontology, proper places and improper places (i.e., which he also calls *spiritual* or *non-bodily* places):

Proper Places: Space that is occupied by the length width and height of a body.

Improper Places: Anything which is referred to as a place but that is not a space occupied by the length, width, and height of a body, (e.g., goals or aims, heaven, hell, vision and dreamscapes).¹⁴⁵

Therefore, on Augustine’s ontology of place or location, every place is either a proper or an improper place. While there are species of improper place (e.g., goals or aims, heaven, hell, vision and dreamscapes), Augustine recognizes no division of kinds for proper places: every proper place, every place in a real or literal sense, is a space that is occupied by the three-dimensional extension of a body. For Augustine, therefore, a spatial location is a *proper place*. It follows from this that incorporeal objects generally and God in particular cannot have spatial locations, be spatially located, be located in space, and so on, in any proper, real or literal sense because, because to be so located or placed in space is to be extended through space (i.e., to be a body), and incorporeal objects by their nature as such lack spatial extension (i.e., are not bodies).¹⁴⁶ So, when Augustine claims that *God is in all things* or that *God is present everywhere*

¹⁴⁵ A more robust account of Augustine’s view of improper places is needed; in particular a more *positive* or *substantive* one than I give above is needed; but I have seen no such discussions of Augustine’s views on improper place to any degree in secondary commentaries; I can mark here, however, that what does seem to be another positive feature of his account of improper places like heaven and hell is that these *seem to be extended* to those that are “in” them but are not truly extended. See Book 11 of *The Literal Meaning of Genesis*, for examples of Augustine characterizing improper places as seemingly but not truly extended in space.

¹⁴⁶ An interesting point between Augustine’s account of bodies and Markosian’s (2000) and Markosian’s and Carroll’s (2010) exegesis of common theories of physical objects is that while these recognize a distinction between the three dimensional extension view of bodies and a spatial location view of bodies, Augustine recognizes no such distinction. To be a body = to be three dimensionally extended = to be located in space or spatially located. In other

this neither means nor implies that Augustine takes God to be located in space, to have a spatial location, to be spatially located, etc. Hence, the spatial interpretation of the omnipresence-claim, (and more broadly of AO), not only lacks positive textual support and stands in direct tension with several passages in Augustine's writings, it is also incompatible with the above textually grounded accounts of his notions of spatial location and incorporeal objects.¹⁴⁷

4.4.4. Summary

On the spatial reading, Augustine's omnipresence-claim was understood as attributing a location relation between God and space. Because of this the spatial reading was found to lack clear textual support and to stand in tension with both direct quotations found in Augustine's works and with textually grounded accounts of his notions of spatial location and of incorporeal objects. For these reasons a new account of the omnipresence-claim (and hence of AO), which avoids these problems, is needed and will be offered below.

4.5. The Causal Account of AO

On the *causal reading*, the *omnipresence claim* is understood as attributing a causal relation between God and everything else (including space as a whole and all its parts or sub-regions) where the obtaining of such a relation does not require God to be located in space. Thus, on a causal reading, the claim that *the God is simultaneously wholly present everywhere* is analyzed as: *God is wholly causally related to everything simultaneously*, (i.e., as a whole God applies, creative, sustaining, and governing power to all other beings). The causal analysis of

words, the three dimensional extension account and the spatial location account are different descriptions of one and the same fact or different ways of expressing one and the same proposition.

¹⁴⁷ Note that if this objection to the spatial account is sound it also provides evidence for reading the quotations in [A-D] in the spirit in which it seems they are expressed but which Inman denies in his response to the passage from *Eighty-Three Different Questions*.

Augustine's omnipresence claim suggests the following causal analysis of his Argument from Omnipresence to God's Incorporeality:

The Causal Analysis of AO

(C1) God is wholly causally related to everything simultaneously. (*C Omnipresence-Claim*)

(C2) No physical object could be wholly causally related to everything simultaneously.
(*C Incompatibility-Claim*).

Therefore,

(C3) God is not a physical object, i.e., is incorporeal. (*C Incorporeality-Claim*)

While the spatial reading represented Augustine as arguing for God's incorporeality on the grounds that God instantiates, realizes, or exhibits a mode or manner of spatial location that is impossible for physical objects to realize given their extended nature, the causal analysis takes him to be arguing for God's incorporeality on the grounds that God exhibits a mode or manner of causation that is impossible for a physical object to realize, namely, God is at the same moment and in His entirety, causally related to everything. This includes both Himself and creation – spiritual and corporeal or extended; and with respect to extended creation to the whole of space and to each part or subregion of it. But no object that was physical, not even one that was diffused throughout all of space, could be wholly causally related to everything in this manner on account of the extended nature of such objects. It is true that one could imagine a physical object that was extended throughout the whole physical world, as water for example may be so diffused in a sponge; but such an object, in virtue of its extension and the extension of space, must also then have different extended parts filling or contacting different places. Thus, it could not be wholly causally related to all places simultaneously as God is. There are several benefits or

advantages the causal account of AO holds over the spatial account, including textual evidence that clearly supports the account. In the next section I turn to discussing these advantages.

4.6. The Case for the Causal Account

There are several advantages that the causal analysis holds over the generic account (or a reading that takes “presence” to be primitive) and the spatial account.

4.6.1 Depth

While the generic account of AO is accurate so far as it goes, the main problem was that it did not go far enough. In particular it left “presence”, which is the central notion on which the argument turns, un-explicated. Like the spatial account the causal account goes beyond the generic one by offering an account of the notion of presence and reading the omnipresence-claim and the argument as a whole in light of that reading. Unlike the spatial account, however, the causal account does so in a manner that is not only compatible with Augustine’s wider body of works, but which also enjoys positive textual support and historical precedent.

4.6.2. Textual and Systematic Compatibility

Second, the causal analysis neither requires nor involves attributing an occupation or location relation to hold between God and space; instead it only requires a causal relation to hold between the God and everything else that exists. Therefore, unlike spatial readings, the causal analysis does not involve interpreting Augustine as attributing spatial location or occupation to God in some works but then directly or indirectly denying such attributions in other ones as the spatial account does; in other words, it does not involve interpreting Augustine’s expressions of AO in such a way that in the broader context of his works he seems to make inconsistent claims.

For example, unlike the spatial account, the causal account is consistent with quotations [A]-[D] discussed above, and it's also consistent with the view that only corporeal objects or bodies can have spatial locations in a literal or proper sense (i.e., with Modal~SLI, which was argued for in Chapter 1).

4.6.3. Positive Textual Support

Third, in addition to depth and textual compatibility (both direct and indirect or systematic) there is further motivation in support of the causal analysis, namely, that Augustine explicates the omnipresence claims in terms of causation or causal relations between God and everything else and at the same time explicitly denies that God is in space in the sense of being located there, having a spatial location, occupying space, etc:

[E] When we stand at prayer, we turn to the east, whence the heaven rises: not as if God also were dwelling there, in the sense that He who is everywhere present, *not as occupying space* [*non locorum spatiis*], but *by the power of His majesty*, had forsaken the other parts of the world.¹⁴⁸

[F] ...*By his immutable and surpassing power, not in any local or spatial sense* [*nullo locorum vel intervallo vel spatio*], *he is both interior to every single thing*, because in him are all things (Rom 11:36), and exterior to every single thing because he is above all things.¹⁴⁹

[G] ...He...is wholly everywhere, included in no space, bound by no chains, mutable in no part of His being, filling heaven and earth with omnipresent power, not with a needy nature.¹⁵⁰

[H] For He is a certain Form, a Form not formed, but the Form of all things formed; a Form unchangeable, without failure, without decay, without you, *without place, surpassing all things, being in all things, as at once a kind of*

¹⁴⁸ *Sermon on the Mount*, II.5.18.

¹⁴⁹ *Literal Meaning of Genesis*. VIII.26.48. Italics mine.

¹⁵⁰ *City of God*. VII.30 . "...Deus...est ubique totus, nullis inclusus locis, nullis vinculis alligatus, in nullas partes sectilis, ex nulla parte mutabilis, implens caelum et terram praesente potentia, non indigente natura."

*foundation in which they are, and a Head-stone under which they are. If you say that all things are in Him, you lie not.*¹⁵¹

Unlike the spatial reading of AO, the causal analysis is compatible with passages [E] – [H], which explicate the sense he intends the omnipresence-claim to be understood, and also captures, reflects, contains, or expresses the causal spirit that Augustine conveys in them and thus the causal sense in which he aims to show the omnipresence-claim is to be understood. For the first passage [E] suggests that God’s presence everywhere is to be understood in terms of his power over everything, and hence as a kind of causal relation to everything. And the second passage [F] seems to explicate even further the specific causal relations God stands in with respect to everything and which constitute His presence everywhere, namely: “creation”, “ruling” and “containing.” God’s presence everywhere is therefore better understood not as God wholly occupying or being located at every place in space, but rather as His being causally related to all of creation via the subset of causal relations: “creating”, “ruling” and “containing”. Like the first two passages, the third and fourth ones as well (i.e., [G] and [H]), expressly deny that God’s presence in things should be understood in spatial terms and suggest instead that it should be understood in terms of God being causally related to everything there is.

¹⁵¹ *Sermon 67, 3*: “Est enim forma quaedam, forma non formata, sed forma omnium formatorum; forma incommutabilis, sine lapsu, sine defectu, sine tempore, sine loco, superans omnia, existens omnibus et fundamentum quoddam in quo sint, et fastigium sub quo sint. Si dicis quia omnia in illo sunt, non mentiris.”

A further relevant quotation is found in *Letter 187, 3.14*: “God is spread out through all things. Indeed.... But God is spread out through all things not such that he is a quality of the world [as things which occupy space or have locations in them are] *but such that he is the substance that creates the world, rules it without any toil and contains it without any burden.*” For further passages, see: *City of God*. XII.25-6; *Confessions*, I.2-3; and *Expositions on the Psalms*, 122.4. Grabowski (1954: 131) is the source for the *Expositions of the Psalms* reference.

4.6.4. Historical Precedent and Influence

Fourth, and lastly, the causal analysis makes more sense given the variety of passages I've considered so far in this paper, but it also makes more sense in light of some events that had a major influence in Augustine's coming to reject his early physicalist view of God and adopt a non-physicalist one, namely, his reading of the so called "books of the Platonists", which he discusses in *Confessions*, VII. While it is unknown exactly which specific books Augustine had read, there is general consensus that he had read (if only in translations or in summary form) works by Plato, Plotinus, and Porphyry.¹⁵² Each of these philosophers held the view that the incorporeal is outside of space, i.e., not present in space in the literal sense of being located in it, but only in terms of being causally related to space or to the things located in it. Plotinus, for example, suggests that God's presence everywhere be conceived in this way:

....God is sovereignty present through all. We cannot think of something of God here and something else there, nor of all God gathered at some one spot: there is an instantaneous presence everywhere, nothing containing and nothing left void, everything therefore *fully held* by the divine....

*This can mean only that the First is neither remote from things nor directly within them; there is nothing containing it; it contains all.*¹⁵³

Therefore the causal analysis is not only more congruent with Augustine's writings than the spatial reading, but it is also more congruent with the works that inspired his use of the concepts, claims, and arguments expressed in these writings; for these reasons therefore the causal analysis provides a better understanding of the Argument from Omnipresence.

¹⁵² For secondary discussion of Augustine's encounter with the works of the Platonists, see for example Brown (2000: 90f).

¹⁵³ *Enneads*, V.5.9; internet; Oxford translation see pg. 400; #919.4)

4.7. Implications

How one understands AO will impact how one understands several other topics of interest in Augustinian studies. In this section I turn to showing the implications of the causal account for how one understands Augustine's personal intellectual history or philosophical development. Given that the causal account provides a better account of AO, it stands to reason that it will provide a better account of these further topics as well.

4.7.1. *Augustine's (Personal) Rejection of Theistic Physicalism*

The causal analysis of AO has implications, for example, for how one understands what was one of the most radical transitions in Augustine's intellectual history, namely, his rejection of theistic physicalism and simultaneous adoption theistic-nonphysicalism (i.e., the position that God is an incorporeal or nonphysical object). It has implications for our understanding of the transition in two respects: its rational basis and the difference between the starting state and the end state.

Regarding the first aspect, spatial readings of AO suggest that a major rational basis upon which Augustine made this transition, was a new understanding of spatial location and corresponding claims asserting that the manner in which God is located in space is not a manner of spatial location that is realizable by physical objects. The causal analysis, however, provides an alternative account of the rational basis of the transition, namely: Augustine's understanding of location in space did not change; what changed was his understanding of presence *per se* as neither consisting in nor requiring spatial location and corresponding claims asserting that the manner in which God is causally related to all things is one that is not realizable by a physical object, given their extended natures.

Regarding the difference between the initial state and end state of the transition, spatial readings of AO suggest that the transition was from the view that:

(A) God is located everywhere in space circumscriptively, (i.e., He is whole in the whole of space (if not beyond) and his spatial parts are in the parts of space).¹⁵⁴

to the view that

(B) God is simultaneously wholly located in the whole of space and in every part of space.

The causal reading, however, provides an alternate account of the difference. While Augustine may have begun with the view of God expressed above in (A), he abandoned it and adopted instead the view that:

(C) God is not located in space in any proper sense, but rather is simultaneously wholly causally related to the totality creation and to each of its parts.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵⁴ Inman on this point, writes: “Turning now to Augustine’s view of divine omnipresence, he famously records in his *Confessions* his adolescent struggle to conceive of the divine nature as being anything other than extended throughout space “as a great being with dimensions extending everywhere, throughout infinite space, permeating the whole mass of the world...” He writes, “I could not free myself from the thought that you were some kind of bodily substance extended in space, either permeating the world or diffused in infinity beyond it”. He later goes on to acknowledge the error of his adolescent and Manichean ways by saying: “This was the theory to which I held, because I could imagine you in no other way. But it was a false theory.” Once again, one might think that Augustine’s more developed and mature view of God’s omnipresence was one that removed God from space entirely. As was the case with the soul above, this would be much too quick.... As before in the case of the soul and the body, the point of contrast here is between the distinct ways in which God and material objects are each located in space, not between lacking a spatial location and having a spatial location” (2017: 15-17).

¹⁵⁵ Note the claim regarding the difference between Augustine’s physicalist view of God and his mature view, (both on the spatial and the causal statements of the difference), is made from the perspective of Augustine’s post Manichean physicalist view of God; for remember as discussed above, on Manichean theistic-physicalism God is not even everywhere circumscriptively, but only everywhere where evil or darkness is not, (i.e., His presence is restricted in scope).. Hence, while on Augustine’s post Manichean physicalist view of God, God is everywhere circumscriptively, on his earlier Manichean view God was not everywhere circumscriptively. Therefore, if we bracket the question of whether Augustine was ever a proponent of anthropomorphic theistic physicalism, and put aside the spatial vs. causal presence issue, more complete statement of Augustine’s transition from a physicalist to a nonphysicalist view of God would run as follows: Augustine began with a view of God on which His presence was restricted and circumscriptive and moved to the view that God’s presence was unrestricted and circumscriptive; and he settled finally on the view that God’s presence was unrestricted and holo-meric.

4.7.2. Augustine's Rejection of Physicalism

The causal analysis also has implications, for how one understands another radical transition in his intellectual development, namely, his rejection of generic physicalism or the belief that all objects are physical ones. For, in coming to believe that God is incorporeal, Augustine's ontology came also to include, *pace* his earlier physicalism, an immutable incorporeal object (i.e., God). Spatial readings suggest this transition was from an ontology that:

(D) included only physical objects and thus no objects capable of being wholly located in more than one portion of space at the same time,

to an ontology that

(E) included an immutable incorporeal object capable of being wholly located in more than one portion of space at the same time and that was actually so located.

The causal reading, however, provides an alternate account of this transition. While Augustine may have begun with the generic ontology expressed above in (D), he abandoned it and adopted in its place an ontology that:

(F) included an immutable incorporeal object that was not in space at all but was simultaneously wholly causally related to all of creation and each of its parts.

The rejection of physicalism on the causal analysis involves no change in Augustine's conception of the possible modes of spatial location. The same problems that plagued the spatial reading by itself and hence told against its chances for offering an accurate account of AO would also seem to apply to the understanding of his rejection of generic physicalism. And in the same way that the causal analysis' ability to avoid these problems but still capture the relevant data showed it to be a better reading of the AO, it is shown to be a better reading and to provide us with a deeper understanding of Augustine's rejection of not only of theistic physicalism but also physicalism more generally.

4.8. Conclusion

In this chapter, I have argued that while AO is one of Augustine's central arguments for God's incorporeality, it has received little attention in secondary discussions; and where attention has been paid commentators have with minimal explanation or argument understood the central notion of the argument (i.e., presence) in terms of a literal occupation or location relation to space; in so doing these authors have understood the argument in a way that appears incompatible with Augustine's works and views more broadly; secondary literature also stands deficient regarding models of the reasoning that Augustine offers in support of the premises of AO (i.e., the *omnipresence-claim* and the *incompatibility-claim*). In addition to discussing Augustine's case for the premises of AO, in this chapter I have also argued in support of a causal analysis of AO. The causal analysis models AO, as arguing for the incorporeality God on the basis of God as a whole being causally related to the whole of creation and each of its parts simultaneously, which is something no physical object could do given the spatially extended nature of such objects. Unlike the spatial account of AO, the causal account is both consistent with and positively supported by Augustine's works. In this it offers a new and more complete model of AO and one that is better supported than the spatial account. I have also shown the implications of the causal account for understanding Augustine's rejection of *theistic-physicalism* and his rejection of *physicalism* more generally and his adoption of a dualistic ontology which included both corporeal and incorporeal objects and included God as an object of latter kind, (specifically as an immutable incorporeal object).

In the next and final chapter, I turn to working out the implications of the main claims in Chapters 1-4 for how to understand in a more complete and detailed manner Augustine's transition from his early physicalist view of the world to his mature dualistic. In other words, I work out the implications of *Modal-SLI*, *CP*, and the *causal analyses of AP* and *AO* for how to

understand this transition. In so doing I will advance new, more complete and better supported models of: (a) Augustine's mature dualistic view of reality/ontology, (b) the similarities and differences between his mature dualistic view and the physicalist one which was both widespread during his time and of which he had earlier been a proponent, and (c) the master argument behind his rejection of *physicalism* generally and *psychic* and *theistic physicalism* in particular and his adoption of a dualistic view of reality which included both physical and non-physical objects, and included God and human souls as objects of the latter kind.

PART III

IMPLICATIONS

CHAPTER 5

REJECTING PHYSICALISM: A CAUSAL ANALYSIS OF AUGUSTINE'S ARGUMENT FROM PRESENCE TO INCORPOREALITY

Augustine's transition from a physicalist to a dualistic view of the world is a very significant one in his intellectual history. Arguing that others should make the same transition was his central philosophical mission. For these reasons and others, his rejection of physicalism and advocacy for dualism merit not only attention but careful and systematic attention. This chapter aims to shed new light on these topics by way of advancing new models of: (1) his mature dualistic view of reality, (2) the comparative relations between his dualistic view and the physicalist view, and (3) the master argument behind his rejection of the physicalist view and advocacy of the dualistic one. More specifically it aims to advance new models of (1)-(3) in light of the main findings of earlier chapters (i.e., M~SLI, CP, and the causal accounts of AP and AO) and also to contrast these with those suggested by the spatial readings of the topics treated in earlier chapters (i.e., SLI, SP, and the spatial readings of AP and AO). Given the amount of material this chapter aims to cover, the discussion will take more of a summary form than did that of previous chapters and will be mostly exegetical; nevertheless, it stands to reason that if as I have argued that the claims I have advanced in Chapters 1-4 are more congruent with and better supported by Augustine's texts than the competing spatial claims, then so are the models they generate regarding topics (1)-(3). In this way then they offer a better understanding of Augustine's rejection of physicalism and transition to a dualistic view.

5.1. Augustine's Mature Dualistic Ontology

With respect to Augustine's mature view of the world, it is generally agreed upon and uncontroversial that it included the following positions:

The Basic Account of Augustine's Dualistic Worldview

1. *Object Dualism*: There are two non-derived or fundamental kinds of objects: physical objects (i.e., objects that are intrinsically spatially extended), and nonphysical or incorporeal objects (i.e., objects that lack such extension).
2. *Theological Incorporealism*: God is an incorporeal object.
3. *Psychic Incorporealism*: Human souls are incorporeal objects.
4. SLP: All physical objects are and must be located in space.¹⁵⁶

I call the above set of statements *The Basic Account* because it represents the central and distinguishing claims of Augustine's mature view of the world, (claims of which he was at pains to persuade others) but does so at a generic level of detail. In this section I discuss the additional claims that SLI and M~SLI imply should be added to the basic account.

5.1.1. The Spatial Account of Augustine's Mature Dualistic View

As discussed in Chapter 1, several contemporary philosophers of religion have advanced various claims that stand to advance our understanding of Augustine's mature dualistic beyond the basic level of detail with respect to Augustine's views on the relation of incorporeal objects to space. For while it is uncontroversial that Augustine's mature ontology included both *physical* and *nonphysical* objects and that it took all physical objects to be spatially located, his views on the relation of incorporeal objects to space have yet to be extensively treated and lack consensus. These authors advance the position that Augustine took incorporeal objects to be spatially located (i.e., SLI). If this view is right, it advances or extends our understanding of Augustine's mature view of the world. For given that it included physical objects as spatially located, then if

¹⁵⁶ "SLP" is an abbreviation for "the spatial location view of physical objects".

SLI is right it follows that Augustine's view was one on which *all objects were spatially located*, (God and human souls included), and thus spatial location *per se* is neither a mark of the physical nor a part of the physical-nonphysical divide. When it comes to spatial location, what distinguishes physical from nonphysical objects is the manner or mode or way that these objects realize a location relation to space and not whether or not they are located; for while the spatial paradigm takes all objects to be spatially located it takes physical objects to circumscriptively located in space and nonphysical objects are holenmerically located in space. Thus, while spatial location *per se* is neither a mark of the physical nor part of the physical-nonphysical divide, circumscriptive location however and holenmeric location are marks of physical and nonphysical objects respectively; and manner or mode of location therefore is part of the physical-nonphysical divide; for all physical objects are circumscriptively located in space and all nonphysical objects are holenmerically located; in other words the classes of physical and nonphysical objects are coextensive with the classes of circumscriptively and holenmerically spatially located objects. We may therefore characterize the spatial model of Augustine's dualistic view as follows:

Spatial Paradigm's Account of the Dualistic View

1. *Object Dualism*: There are two non-derived kinds of objects: physical objects, (i.e., objects that are intrinsically spatially extended), and nonphysical or incorporeal objects, (i.e., objects that lack such extension)
2. *Theological Incorporealism*: God is an incorporeal object.
3. *Psychic Incorporealism*: Human souls are incorporeal objects.
4. *SLP*: All physical objects are and must be located in space circumscriptively
5. *SLI*: Incorporeal objects are spatial located, (so God and human souls are spatially located).
6. *Universal Spatial Location*: All objects are (or can be) spatially located.
7. Spatial location *per se* is not mark of the physical.
8. There are two modes of spatial location: circumscriptive and holenmeric¹⁵⁷.
9. Physical objects are circumscriptively located in space.
10. Incorporeal objects are holenmerically located in space (if at all).

¹⁵⁷ Inman uses the terms *pretension* and *entension*.

The spatial position also entails several further interesting theses regarding important views of Augustine's mature dualistic ontology. The one I discuss here concerns his anthropology or view of human beings; for while it is well known that Augustine took humans to be compound objects composed of a nonphysical substance and physical substance (i.e., a soul and a body) the spatial position suggests as well that (with respect to its composing substantial parts anyway), a human is entirely spatially located, because both parts are spatially located. But while the human being as a whole or with respect to both of its substantial parts is spatially located, the human being is an object that is both circumscriptively and holo-merically located in space; that is in addition to being composed of both non-derived kinds of substances that are included on the mature ontology, human beings also realize both modes of spatial location included on the spatial system.

5.1.2. *The M~SLI Account of Augustine's Dualistic View*

In contrast to the spatial account of Augustine's mature dualistic view, the account entailed by Modal~SLI is significantly different. For my account holds that Augustine's dualistic view of the world while including both physical and nonphysical objects, included objects that are and must be spatially located and objects that are not and cannot be spatially located; thus, again *pace* the spatial reading, spatial location itself *is* a mark of the physical and thus is a part of the physical and nonphysical divide. Furthermore, it rejects the view that there are different modes of spatial location; while objects that are spatially located may differ in the extent of scope, all objects that are spatially located are circumscriptively located in space; for that is the

¹⁵⁸ Note that spatial location could still be related to the divide (since only incorporeal objects can exist without spatial location; see the parenthetical phrases in claims 6 and 10.

only pattern of location that is included on Augustine's ontology; thus, manner or mode of spatial location is not part of the physical-nonphysical divide either; furthermore, in including human souls and God as nonphysical objects, Augustine's mature ontology viewed these as being incapable of spatial location and thus as objects that lack spatial location. We may summarize the account of Augustine's dualistic view that is suggested by the Modal~SLI account as follows:

Modal~SLI Account of Augustine's Dualistic View

1. *Object Dualism*: There are two non-derived kinds of objects: physical objects (i.e., objects that are intrinsically spatially extended) and nonphysical or incorporeal objects (i.e., objects that lack such extension)
2. *Theological Incorporealism*: God is an incorporeal object.
3. *Psychic Incorporealism*: Human souls are incorporeal objects.
4. *SLP*: All physical objects are and must be located in space circumscriptively
5. *M~SLI*: Incorporeal objects are not and cannot be spatially located, (so God and human souls cannot be spatially located).
6. It's not the case that all objects are spatially located, some are (the physical ones) and some are not (the incorporeal ones)
7. Thus spatial location itself *is* a mark of the physical and part of the physical-nonphysical divide.
8. There is only one mode of spatial location: circumscriptive.
9. Mode of spatial location is not part of the physical-nonphysical divide, but rather mode of causation is.

Regarding Augustine's mature anthropology, again in contrast to the spatial account, my account holds that human beings are not wholly spatially located; rather one substantial part is and must be spatially located, (i.e., the body) and the other substantial part is not and can't be (i.e., the soul); thus, Augustine's ontology does not include compound objects that are wholly located in space but partly located in different modes as on the spatial account; rather it includes compound objects that are partly spatially located and partly not (but both are present in the same region).

5.2. The Comparative Relations between the Dualistic and Physicalist Views of the World

It is generally agreed upon that Augustine's early physicalist view of the world, a view which was also held by many during his time, included the following positions:

The Physicalist View of the World

1. *Object Physicalism*: There is only one kind of non-derived object, physical or intrinsically spatially extended objects.
2. *Theistic Physicalism*: God is a physical object.
3. *Psychic Physicalism*: Human souls are physical objects.
4. *SLP*: All physical objects are spatially located.
5. *Universal Spatial Location*: All concrete objects are spatially located (God and human souls included).
6. There is only one mode of spatial location: circumscriptive.

By considering how the physicalist view of the world compares to the basic model of the dualistic view discussed above, we may generate a basic account of the comparative relations between the dualistic and physicalist views of the world (i.e., an account that is generally agreed upon and uncontroversial). For both views were similar in that they each included physical objects, God, and human souls in their ontologies; and both took physical objects to be spatially located. But the views were different in that the physicalist view only included physical objects in its ontology (of objects), but the dualistic view included both physical and nonphysical objects; and while the physicalist view included God and human souls as physical objects, the dualistic view included these as nonphysical objects.

The spatial model of Augustine's dualistic view and the M~SLI model allow us to go beyond the basic model of the comparative relations between Augustine's dualistic view and the competing physicalist view of which he was earlier a proponent. As we'll see below, in addition to going beyond the basic account of the comparative relations by bringing Augustine's views on

the relation between incorporeal objects and space into play, they also generate significantly different models from each other in that they hold significantly different positions on this issue.

5.2.1. The Spatial Account of Dualism vs. Physicalism

If we compare the spatial account of the dualistic view of the world with the physicalist view of the world it follows that beyond the similarities suggested on the basic account of the comparative relations, these views were also similar in that they included God and human souls as spatially located, and thus both included all objects as spatially located; but Augustine's dualistic view and the physicalist view differed in that while the physicalist view included only one mode of spatial location, circumscriptive, and thus took God and human souls to be spatially located in this way, the dualistic view included two modes of spatial location, circumscriptive and holenmeric, and took physical objects circumscriptively located in space, but God and human souls to be holenmerically spatially located.

5.2.2. The M~SLI Account of Dualism vs. Physicalism

In contrast to the spatial account of the comparative relations between the dualistic and physicalist views of the world, my account rejects that the dualist and physicalist views were similar in both including all objects as spatially located and both including God and human souls in particular as spatially located. For it holds that a *difference* between the physicalist and dualistic accounts is that while on the physicalist account all objects are spatially located on the dualistic view some objects are some are not and can't be and it numbers God and human souls as objects of the latter kind. My account also rejects that a difference between the physicalist and dualistic view is that the former included only one mode of spatial location, circumscriptive, while the latter included two modes, circumscriptive and holenmeric; it advances instead *that a*

similarity between the dualistic and physicalist views is that each includes only one mode of spatial location: circumscriptive. Given that there are more differences between the physicalist and dualistic views of the world on the account I offer, it models Augustine's transition from a physicalist to a dualistic view as being more radical than does the spatial account.

5.3. The Master Argument behind Augustine's Rejection of Physicalism

AP and AO figured centrally in Augustine's rejection of psychic and theistic physicalism and case for psychic and theistic nonphysicalism. In so doing they figured centrally in Augustine's rejection of object physicalism (the view that all objects are physical objects) and in his case for object dualism, (the view that reality includes both physical objects and nonphysical objects). In this section I trace the relation of AP and AO to both functions in more detail. I also argue that figuring more fundamentally than each of these particular arguments in Augustine's rejection of the physicalist world view was what I'll call *Master AP* which is an abstract argument schema of which both AP and AO are particular instances. Master AP is *The Argument from Presence to Incorporeality* in the truest sense and was most truly at the heart of his rejection of physicalism and case for dualism. While the spatial reading suggests a spatial account of Master AP, my account suggests a causal reading; Given that the later reading unlike the former one is both consistent with Augustine's works and enjoys positive textual support, it stands to reason the causal account of Master AP does so as well. In this way it offers a better account of the master argument behind Augustine's rejection of theistic and psychic physicalism, and through these the rejection of object physicalism and the physicalist worldview more broadly.

As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, AP and AO figured centrally in A's rejection of psychic and theistic physicalism and his case for psychic and theistic nonphysicalism. On the

assumption that God and human souls exist as objects (i.e., substantially), which is an assumption that Augustine seems never to have doubted nor did those of his interlocutors¹⁵⁹, AP and AO in showing human souls and God are nonphysical objects would be sufficient to show object physicalism false; for if God and human souls exist as nonphysical objects, then it would not be the case that all objects are physical objects as the physicalist principle asserts. And the soundness of either AP or AO individually would be sufficient as well, (as all it would take would be the reality of one such object). Thus given that each figure centrally in Augustine's rejection of psychic and theistic physicalism and case for psychic and theistic nonphysicalism they figure centrally in his rejection of physicalism about objects; and as they figure centrally in his case for psychic and theistic nonphysicalism they form part of his case for the dualist view; for again if we assume that physical objects exist as neither Augustine nor his interlocutors seemed to doubt, then in showing that God and human souls were nonphysical objects, reality would be understood to include both physical and nonphysical objects which is what the dualistic principle asserts.

They are by no means Augustine's complete case against psychic, theological, and object physicalism and for psychic and theological incorporealism and object dualism; for there are other arguments he advances against the physicalist views and other arguments for the nonphysicalist views of God and human souls and dualism; a complete case would include a discussion of his complete case for the existence and substantial nature of each, (i.e., all the arguments he advanced for these claims or a statement of what he did not argue for but merely assumed).¹⁶⁰ But AO and AP figure centrally in that complete case.

¹⁵⁹ For the issue was what was the nature of God and human souls and not whether they exist.

¹⁶⁰ On the relation of AP or AO to the existence of God and human souls it may be that there is another form of argument which also works on presence for the existence of these; whereas we call the arguments discussed in this work the arguments from presence or omnipresence to incorporeality we can call the other argument the arguments

Figuring perhaps more centrally or at least more fundamentally, with respect Augustine's rejection of the physicalist positions and case for the dualistic one is an abstract argument schema of which AP and AO are both instances and which I call *Master AP*. It may be stated as follows:

Master AP¹⁶¹

1. X is holonumerically present in the physical world to some degree of scope Y. (*M Presence Claim*)
2. No physical object could be holonumerically present in the physical world in any degree of scope. (*M Incompatibility Claim*)
3. Thus, X is a nonphysical object. (*M Incorporeality Claim*)

What differentiates AO and AP from each other is how they instantiate X and Y of Master AP. For AO instantiates X with *God* and Y with *everywhere* or a presence unrestricted in scope. AP, however, instantiates X with *human souls* and Y with *the human body as a whole and each of its parts*, (i.e., a restricted scope).

In the same way that the spatial account and my account entailed different analyses of AO and AP, they also entail different analyses of Master AP. For a spatial understanding of Augustine's notion of presence entails that the schema be understood as resting on premises

from presence to existence; for if it is the case that x stands in a presence relation to y, then it would follow x exists, and Augustine does seem to argue this way without leaning on the mode of presence as the arguments from presence to incorporeality do; on the causal analysis of presence AP-Existence would be understood to rest on causal claims as well; for if x is causally related to y, x exists as well (at least at the time of the causation anyway). With respect to proving the substantial nature of the soul it could be that the manner of its presence in the body shows it to be substantial, (i.e., as ruling and controlling the body and thus of being superior to it).

¹⁶¹ There are several questions here including: Why think there is such a schema, and if there is why thing Augustine used it, and if he did was it conscious or unconscious, etc.?

That there is such a schema is evidenced by the fact that A makes arguments from presence to God's incorporeality, the incorporeality of human souls, truths, numbers, etc. That is, he instantiates X with various objects;

which stand to attribute a manner of *location in space* to X that cannot be realized by a physical object.

The Spatial Account of Master AP

1. X is simultaneously holenermerically located in more than one part of space to some degree of scope Y. (*SM Presence Claim*)
2. No physical object could be holenermerically located in more than one part of space in physical creation in any degree of scope). (*SM Incompatibility Claim*)
3. Thus, X is a nonphysical object. (*SM Incorporeality Claim*)

In contrast to the spatial account, the causal account of Augustine's notion of presence entails that the schema be understood as resting on premises which stand to attribute a manner of *causation in physical creation* that cannot be realized by a physical object.

The Causal Account of Master AP

1. X is simultaneously holenermerically causally related to the physical world to some degree of scope Y. (*CM Presence Claim*)
2. No physical object could be simultaneously holenermerically causally related to the physical world in any degree of scope. (*CM Incompatibility Claim*)
3. Thus, X is a nonphysical object. (*CM Incorporeality Claim*)

The spatial and causal accounts of Master AP differ not only with respect to the manner in which *presence* is explicated but also with respect to how the term of the presence relation is understood; for the spatial account understands the presence to express a location relation and takes the term of the relation to be *space*, but the causal account understands presence as expressing a causal relation and does not automatically take space to be the term of the causal relation; for the term could be any physical or spatially extended object such as the physical

objects that occupy space or space itself or its parts; it therefore leaves *physical world* which expresses the term of the presence relation in the basic account of Master AP unspecified.

5.4. Conclusion

The aim of this dissertation was to understand Augustine's mature dualistic view of the world, the comparative relations between it and the physicalist view, and the master argument he advanced in support of it and against physicalist one; more specifically it was to understand these topics in light of Augustine's view on the relation of incorporeal objects to space, in a light that was both compatible with and positively supported by Augustine's works. May this chapter serve as the realization of that aim.

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