THE STRONG AMERICAN VOTER

by

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To Janet and Elizabeth

And Dedicated to the memory of my parents

John Trevor

&

Gladys Mabel

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cake), Will Shelby (for great notes),Erik Davis (for college football chats), Mike Brownstein (for login information) and last but certainly not least Elis Vallasi (the most genuine of all people, a calming voice in many a storm).

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ABSTRACT

The dissertation seeks to meld the two dominant competing theories of party identification in the US context: the expressive view, where Party ID is seen as a long standing psychological attachment to a political party; and the instrumental view, where Party ID is subject to reevaluation. Using ANES panel data, the paper examines both expressive and instrumental elements of partisanship. In keeping with past research, it finds strong evidence for the expressive understanding of Party ID; partisan groupings tend to be highly stable. However, the strength of identifications varies considerably over time, with perceptions of candidates, presidential approval, policy preferences, and ideological orientations driving these changes. These results are in keeping with an instrumental conceptualization of partisan identities.

1. INTRODUCTION

"Modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of parties"

Schattschneider, 1942

1.1 The importance of party identification

In the 2020 election between incumbent President Donald Trump and former Vice President Joe Biden, each candidate received over 92% of the vote of party identifiers and leaners,[1] confirming party identification as one of the best, if not the best, predictors of political activity. Party identification predicts voting better than age, income, education level, and race (Meier (1975); Bonneau and Cann (2015)). Although this dissertation will concentrate on party identification in the American context, scholars over the years have shown that the variable is robust in its predictive power in most established democracies (Lewis-Beck (1990); Budge et al. (2010); Lijphart (1982); Kim and Fording (2002)).

1.2 Differing conceptualizations of party identification

Whilst there is little, if any, argument about the importance of party identification as a central factor in any empirical political science research, there is much debate as to what, at its core conceptualization, party identification actually is. Two broad explanations of party identification exist in the literature. In one view, partisanship is seen as a core social identity (Greene (1999) ;Huddy et al. (2015)). It is largely stable, unaffected by candidates, the party's performance in government, or any preference toward one policy or ideology over another. The other view sees party identification as far less stable and influenced by a myriad of factors, including current events, ideology, and appraisals of performance in government (Key et al. (1966); Fiorina (1981)).

The two contrasting views of party identification logically result in very different perspectives on the nature of an individual's engagement in the political process. In one view,

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[1] ↑https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2021/06/30/behind-bidens-2020-victory/ accessed 9/12/2021

the electorate is largely captured and caged; voters are not motivated by policy preference but by a desire for their political tribe to beat the other tribe. Political parties, by and large, assured of the support of a good proportion of the electorate, do not concern themselves with sticking to any set of policy beliefs or even delivering upon the promises made at election time. The other interpretation of party identification is much more optimistic, ascribing more agency to the electorate. The parties, not guaranteed the support of the base must both stick to the party's ideals and deliver on electoral promises whilst in government or risk losing electoral support.

These two dominant paradigms, at first sight, appear incompatible. One sees politics as almost an unthinking tribal activity, whereas the other sees politics as a broadly rational activity. One suggests the electorate is concerned with a sense of belonging and winning, whilst the other suggests the electorate is concerned with policy outcomes. Both explanations can point to evidence to support their version. On the one hand, social identity theorists point to the fact that party identification is highly stable, often unchanging throughout the lifespan of an individual (A. Campbell et al. (1960)). However, those of a different persuasion point to the indisputable fact that elections at national, state, district, and local levels do not always see the same party being successful. They argue that, if party identification is fixed, we should see less turnover at elections than we do (Key (1959)).

1.3   Theoretical contribution

The dissertation fills a void in the literature; whilst the academic discussion on what makes an individual a Republican or Democrat is voluminous, the question of what makes an individual a strong party identifier, or not, is largely under-theorized. The dissertation seeks to meld the two seemingly contradictory views of party identification. I suggest that looking at the evidence, it is reasonable to argue that both the expressive (social identity) and instrumental explanations of party identification play a part in determining the overall level of partisanship an individual displays. Using ANES panel data, I show, in keeping with

previous research, that an individual's party identification is highly stable. However, the strength of an individual's attachment to a party varies over time.

1.4   Party identification, stability with variance

Table 1.1. Party identification in the panels

Panel Years	% of Panel with consistent party identification	% of Panel with consistent strength of identification
1956-58-60	94.39	56.72
1972-74-76	94.12	56.30
1992-94-96	94.85	55.15
2000-02-04	96.96	63.11

Table 1.1 shows a remarkable degree of consistency across four three-wave panel studies, which form the backbone of the dissertation's data. Over a period spanning nearly half a century, approximately nineteen out of twenty panelists consistently identified as either Republican or Democrat in the three-wave panel studies, each covering two presidential elections and the intervening midterms. Whilst there is little variation in the direction of an individual's party identification, there is much greater variation in the strength of attachment. Generally, nine out of twenty panelists who consistently identify as Democrats or Republicans altered the intensity of their attachment to the party at least once over the three waves.

1.5   Different components, different factors

This dissertation reasonably suggests that the choice of direction of party identification and the strength of that attachment to the party are driven by different factors. The direction of party identification is determined by expressive factors and largely immune to updating, just as support for a college or professional sports team is likely to be determined by where

one went to college, or the team one's parents supported and remains fixed throughout one's life. However, the intensity of one's party attachment is determined by instrumental factors, such as perception of candidates, policy preferences, ideology, and performance whilst in government. Similarly, the strength of the support given to one's *alma mater's* football team could be influenced by various factors, such as a recruiting violation or a losing season. Individuals that have a stronger party identification show more commitment to the party. They are more likely to vote, vote straight-ticket, and make campaign contributions than those who identify less strongly (Hershey (2007); Beck et al. (1992)). Maintaining the sports analogy, more committed fans are more likely to attend games, buy merchandise, Et cetera, than the alum who just watches out for the score on a Saturday. As such, political parties have an incentive to cultivate strong party identifiers. This is achieved, I suggest, through the nomination of presidential candidates acceptable to the party faithful, adherence to a certain set of policy positions, and ideology broadly in line with the general traditions of the party, as well as demonstrating an ability to deliver on election promises whilst in office.

Figure 1.1. Relative effect of instrumental factors on the two components of party identification

Figure 1.1 illustrates the theory regarding the effect that instrumental factors play on party identification. Factors such as presidential candidates, policy preferences, ideology, and retrospective evaluations have a minimal role, if any, in determining whether individuals consider themselves a Democrat or Republican. However, these same factors play a substantive part in determining if individuals see themselves as strong or weak party identifiers.

1.6 Outline of dissertation

The dissertation will proceed as follows: The next chapter examines nearly eighty years of literature on the nature of party identification. The two major paradigms, the expressive and the instrumental, will be discussed in detail. The review will demonstrate that there has been very little theoretical development in the study of party identification since Fiorina (1981). The following methods chapter will describe the data and justify the use of multinomial logit as the main analytical tool. This chapter will also describe earlier empirical studies which, serve as the rationale for the hypotheses in the main body of the dissertation. The findings of the dissertation are contained in the subsequent four chapters, each looking at a different element that, according to the literature, influences party identification. Chapter four looks at the role that candidate evaluations have on party identification. Hogg (1996) notes the important role that leaders play in strengthening attachment to a group. The dissertation finds strong evidence that evaluations of presidential candidates play only a minor part in determining whether one leaves a political party but have a significant influence on how strongly one identifies with a party. Chapter five looks at political ideology and party identification. The dissertation shows that, in line with Grossmann and Hopkins (2016), Republicans are influenced much more than Democrats by ideology. Chapter six follows Fiorina (1981) and looks at how individuals hold parties accountable for the actions of a president. We find very little updating of party identification as a result of evaluations of the president, but do see, particularly among Democrats, updating of the strength of support. However,

surprisingly, the dissertation finds no evidence that individuals update either the direction or intensity of support for a party based upon whether their economic situation is improving or worsening. The final analytical chapter will look at the role that policy preferences play in determining the direction and strength of party identity across four broad policy issues: government intervention in the economy, racial policy, health care, and abortion. We find minimal updating of either direction or intensity of support based on an individual's policy preference *per se*. However, we find updating the strength of party identification when we compare the policy preference of respondents to the two parties' position. This is particularly true for Republicans. The concluding chapter summarizes the findings and offers some thoughts about the present state of party identification in the United States. It suggests in the wake of the Trump Presidency; the model described in the dissertation may soon only be applicable to the Democratic Party.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

Those studying the important phenomenon of party identification fall into one of two camps. One camp, which can be broadly termed the Michigan camp, sees party identification as a psychological attachment to a political party, with loyalty assured regardless of policy. The other camp, what might be termed that of Fiorina, who built on earlier work of Key et al. (1966) and Downs (1957), sees party identification as a running tally of experienced-based evaluations of a party's performance.

These different perspectives of party identification led to very different conclusions about the nature of democracy in the United States. The Michigan Model results in a pessimistic view of democracy. Party leaders are largely assured of the support of party loyalists, and as such, do not have to be responsive to the needs and wishes of the electorate. The model put forward by Fiorina offers more hope for democracy; voters have a degree of agency, leaders are not guaranteed support simply because of a party label, and are held accountable for their performance in office.

This dissertation aims to synthesize the two dominant theoretical views of partisanship, producing an empirically plausible and theoretically pleasing view of partisan identity, which allows for shifting partisan loyalties, whilst maintaining the central premise of the Michigan Model.

2.2 Columbia studies

A precursor to the formal study of party identification can be found in the Columbia studies of the elections of 1940 B. Lazarsfeld and Berelson (1944) and 1948 Berelson et al. (1954). These panel studies were originally designed to measure changes in voter intentions over the course of the presidential election campaign. What the studies found, however, was a general fixity of individuals voting intentions. The Columbia studies argued that voting

choice was not affected by the campaign but instead was largely influenced by an individual's prior commitments, similar to a brand loyalty towards either of the major parties. This loyalty had its basis in social class and religion and was reinforced further through interactions with co-workers, friends, and family. These groups were, according to the Columbia researchers, homogeneous. As such, individuals identified (although the Columbia studies did not use the word) as Republican or Democrat because "people like me are Democrat/Republican." The Columbia studies concluded that an individual's political preferences are not carefully calculated but should be analogized to tastes in music, dress, or recreational activities, both having origins in family traditions, with stability being based on sentiment rather than reason, and wishful expectation rather than a "careful prediction of consequences." So, perhaps for the first time, the American electorate was portrayed as a close to unthinking mass, unconcerned with policy, voting the same way election after election simply because people with whom they identify voted in a similar manner.

2.3   The Michigan School and the expressive view

This viewpoint was reinforced over the next decade by the scholars of Michigan Universities Survey Research Center. Originally setting themselves the task of researching Americans' attitudes toward foreign policy, they started the longest-running research project within the field of political science. Using national survey data from the presidential elections of 1952 and 1956, they produced the landmark work *The American Voter* A. Campbell et al. (1960). They found in studying elections that "Few factors are of greater importance …than the lasting attachments of tens of millions of Americans to one of the parties. These loyalties establish a basic division of electoral strength" A. Campbell et al. (1960)[p 121]. This lasting attachment can be defined as party identification. This psychological attachment to the institution of a political party is formed in the early years, with the family playing a particularly important role. It should be noted that this attachment is not of what could be termed a political nature; it is learned before individuals form their own political opinions. Campbell et al(1960) found that over three-quarters of children whose parents shared

a party identification would take on that identity themselves. This psychological attachment was durable; more than nine out of ten Democrats and close to eight out of ten Republicans had never identified with the other party . Individual partisan loyalties over a lifetime were characterized more by "stability than change, not by rigid, immutable fixation on one party rather than the other, but by a persistent adherence and resistance to contrary influence." (Campbell et al. 1960 p 146. quoted in Bartels 2008). Although individuals could change their party identification, something dramatic would have to happen for this to take place, i.e., "only an event of extraordinary intensity can arouse any significant part of the electorate to the point that its established political loyalties are shaken" A. Campbell et al. (1960). For the authors of *The American Voter*, the loyalties which were being observed in 1950's America were first established in the wake of the Great Depression, and the establishment of Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal coalition, and in the South, the psychological attachment to the Democratic party can be dated to the Civil War.

The further findings by the Michigan School supported the idea that party identification was unrelated to any policy preference. Furthermore, not only was party identification unrelated to policy preference, but many people also did not even know of the existence of any of the major issues of policy disagreement. As such, Campbell et al. argued that the changing electoral fortunes of the parties did not represent a change in the ideological leanings of the country. They noted, "when we examine the attitudes and beliefs of the electorate as a whole over a broad range of policy questions…we do not find coherent patterns of belief. The common tendency to characterize large blocs of the electorate as "liberal" or "conservative" greatly exaggerates the actual amount of consistent patterning one finds…our surveys emphasize the general impoverishment of political thought; in a large proportion of the electorate" (Campbell et al 1960, p 543). Thus, although most people consistently identified with one party, this identification had little actual political meaning. These findings were supported by Converse (1964), who analyzed open-ended interview questions to ascertain the true level of political knowledge in 1950's America. Converse argued that ideas of "liberal" and "conservative" are abstract ideas that the average American does not fully understand. Converse found that not only was the public, in general, not able to place a political can-

didate on the correct side of the liberal/conservative ideological continuum but it also was not uncommon for an interviewee to incorrectly place themselves on the continuum, given their answers to previous questions. Converse also found that individuals lack consistency in their policy preferences, changing their position from one interview to another, even though the very same individuals displayed a remarkable degree of consistency regarding their party identification.

The findings of what was to become known as the Michigan School hold serious implications for the nature of democracy in the United States. For a democracy to be effective even in the broadest terms, there must be a mechanism for translating the policy preferences of the governed into some form of public policy. If the Michigan School portrait of American democracy is accurate, the American voter doesn't even know what the policy alternatives are, let alone be able to judge the merits of these policies. Instead of a democracy where individuals cast ballots to bring about policy change, we have a system where individuals identify and vote unthinkingly for their tribe, not out of reason but due to a psychological identity.

2.4 Key, Fiorina & the instrumental view

An altogether more optimistic viewpoint of American democracy was articulated in *The Responsible Electorate*, Key et al. (1966). In this relatively short volume, Key makes the assertion "that voters are not fools."(p 123) In earlier work, Key (1959) had stressed the importance of partisans in the political process, arguing that party leaders would amount to nothing without their following of faithful partisans. Key describes this partisanship among ordinary Americans as "a psychological attachment of remarkable durability" (Key (1959, p232)). In this regard, Key can be said to predate the Michigan School in attaching importance to partisanship, and noting a certain stickiness about it, finding that "even if the party member is an unfaithful attendant at party functions and is an infrequent contributor to its finances, he is likely to have a strong attachment to the heroes of the party, to its principles

as he interprets them, and to its candidates on election day" (Key (1959, p 233)). This passage also differentiates Key from the Michigan School. It implies that, at least in part, an individual's attachment to either of the parties is based on an ideology and tied to a sense of the party's history. The Michigan Model does not recognize that part of an individual's attachment to a party is driven by principles. Thus, for Key, unlike the Michigan School, there is a route for an individual to alter their party identification, that route being when the individual perceives that the party no longer adheres to its principles. This theme was developed in *The Responsible Electorate*, in work published after his death. Key notes that elections throw up different results; a county or state may vote Democrat for president in one election, and Republican in the next. According to (a caricature of) the Michigan Model, this could only occur if a wave of new voters moved into the area, all with a Republican party identification, or a wave of Democrat identifiers left the area. For Key, the obvious answer is that a certain number of individuals change their party identification and vote based on their parties' assessment. Key divided the electorate into three categories: "stand patters" who voted for the same party or candidate in successive elections, "switchers" who change the party they vote for from one election to the next, and "new voters" who are entering the electorate for the first time. Key's focus of research is why some voters stay loyal to a party whilst others are prepared to cross party lines. Key notes that the "switchers" in the electorate amount to up to twenty percent of all voters, a proportion higher than predicted by the Michigan Model. Key also found no difference in the educational achievement or the level of interest in politics between "stand patters" and "switchers." This is in stark contrast to Berelson et al., who argued that those switching parties were the least intelligent, with the least knowledge and interest of the electorate. Key argues that the differences between "stand patters" and "switchers" are different opinions on broad political issues, not any psychological reasons of lack of attachment. Republicans change to Democrats, and Democrats switch to Republicans to give their support to public policies with which they agree. He notes, "in American Presidential campaigns of recent decades the portrait of the American electorate that develops from the data is not one of an electorate straight-jacketed by social determinants or moved by subconscious urges. It is rather one of an electorate moved by concern about central and relevant questions of public policy" (Key 1966, p 23). Key returns

to his earlier (1958) work in acknowledging that many individuals will continue to support a single party steadfastly throughout their lifetime, regardless of the candidate, but for Key, the origin for this loyalty is political, not psychological, as identified by Campbell et al. It stems from considerations about what is good for the country. Thus, for Key, those with a strong and lasting party identification have it because they agree broadly with the policies of that party. Key believes that if the arguments of the Columbia and Michigan schools were correct, the free government in the United States would not exist. Free men would appear to be automatons, responding only to their pre-programmed party identification. However, Key is optimistic, believing that the American electorate is willing to resist the attachment to a party and, at a minimum, recognize rascals and throw them out of office. Moreover, he argues that Americans have the mental capacity to distinguish between the two parties' policies and identify with the party whose policies they believe are best for the country. In short, the American electorate was rational.

Key et al. (1966) can be seen as a practical application of Downs (1957) work *An Economic Theory of Democracy.* Although largely ignored political science for half a dozen years, this work became one of the most influential works in the discipline in the latter half of the twentieth century. In the work, Downs introduces the concept of spatial models. Individuals, Downs suggests, have a distinct set of policy preferences, each individual occupying a given location on a unidimensional Liberal-Conservative continuum. An individual will identify with the party whose perceived position on the continuum is closest in proximity to his or her own. As such, party identification becomes a heuristic that enables individuals to decode which of the candidate's policy positions is closest to the individual's ideal point. Somewhat ironically, the logical extension of the argument that voters are rational and identify themselves with the party that is ideologically closest to them; results in a situation where policy differences between the parties in a two-party system (like the United States) are relatively small. Rational parties seeking to win an election should position themselves ideologically as close as possible to the median voter. As a result, the rational voters at election time, given that there is little to choose between the parties' policies, evaluate whether they are better off since the last election. Thus, party identification becomes a retrospective act of

evaluating a party's performance whilst in government.

The notion of considering retrospective evaluations of parties' performances was developed further by Fiorina (1981) in *Retrospective Voting in American National Elections*, which reconceptualizes party identification of an individual as a running tally of retrospective evaluations of both parties. In a work written two decades later, Fiorina (2002) describes the motivation to write *Retrospective Voting* came from a desire to bring studies of partisanship and voting in line with the realities of the time. The dominance of the Michigan School was squarely at odds with the world he was observing. Fiorina observed a public that was interested and engaged in political events. Fiorina recalls his summer job whilst an undergraduate working at a steel mill, where blue-collar workers, he noted, took a keen interest in political events, notably Vietnam and urban unrest. This hardly fits the model of a uniformed electorate blindly towing the party line. Fiorina argues that, even if the public were as uninformed and disinterested in politics as Converse suggests, people would still have an opinion about whether their lot has improved or gotten worse under the current administration. Whilst accepting that things not directly in an individual's political experience could shape an individual's party identification, e.g., the party ID of the individual's parents undoubtedly acts as some form of the antecedent, the overriding factor in determining an individual's party ID comes from retrospective evaluations of "the postures and performance of the contending parties tallied over one's past electoral experiences" Fiorina (1981)[p89]).

Thus, two views of party identification dominate the literature. An expressive view postulated by the Michigan School sees party identification as a form of psychological attachment only to be questioned in the wake of an "event of extraordinary intensity." The other view, more instrumental, sees an individual's party identification as being constantly reassessed in the light of current events and the performance of the parties in power.

2.5 Party identification and policy preference

At the heart of the ongoing debate between the expressive and instrumental schools of party identification is the extent to which issues affect party identification–whether individuals' party identification determines their policy preferences or if policy preferences are antecedent to an individual developing a party identification. Those questioning the Michigan School argued that the SRC findings were time-bound to the America of the 1950s when the general postwar consensus on government policy still held. Scholars such as Pomper (1972) and Bennett (1973) claimed that issues mattered much more to the American electorate in the 1960s and early 1970s. The civil rights movement had pricked the conscience of many Northern whites; demonstrations surrounding Vietnam forced Lyndon Johnson (who had, in 1964, gained the largest share of the popular vote in history) not to seek reelection, and the Watergate scandal had removed Richard Nixon from the Oval office. These events, which saw millions engaging in politics, indicated to some that the American electorate was changing, taking more interest in politics. Nie et al. (1976), in *The Changing American Voter* argued that, over the period 1964-1972, the American people had become increasingly consistent in their views on matters of public policy. Also, the authors found that individuals' policy preferences showed signs of being constrained by their other policy choices; in short, Nie, Verba, and Petrocik believed that the American public was becoming ideological. Highton and Kam (2011) also see a shift to a more issue-based electorate, but they claim this took place a decade later than claimed by *The Changing American Voter*. They find that, from 1973 to 1982, partisanship caused alterations in issue orientations; from 1982 to 1997, the causal arrow was reversed, and individuals' policy preferences drove their partisanship.

These findings were not without critics. Bishop et al. (1978) and E. R. Smith (1989), argue that the ideological coherence reported by Nie, Verba, and Petrocik was due to a change in the wording of the question, not a fundamental restructuring of political attitudes. moreover, support for the Michigan model came from a study of the 1972-74-76 ANES panel survey, the first major panel study of the electorate since the 1956-58-60 panel, which provided the data for Converse's 1964 work. Converse and Markus (1979) found that, although

there had been a slight decline in the average level of party loyalty, the stability of individual partisanship was as great in the 1970s as it was in the 1950s. So, a period seeing the resignation and pardoning of a Republican President saw the same level of stability in individual party identification that was observed in a period when the country "liked Ike." Converse and Markus, when looking at policy preference questions common to both panels, found that the level of consistency of preference from one wave to the next was no greater in the 1970s than in the 1950s. As such, Converse and Markus were able to reject the criticism of *The American Voter* as being strictly a period piece noting "there has been scarcely any change in the comparative continuity of party and issue positioning between the two eras, despite manifold reasons to expect not only change but the change of major proportions" (Converse and Markus (1979,p 45) quoted in Bartels 2008). So, in the 1970s, despite the tumultuous events of the previous decade and a half, party identification continued to be more stable than individual issue preferences.

Whether party identification shapes policy preferences or itself is shaped by them may seem a chicken and egg question; however, it has resulted in a great deal of research. The initial Michigan model framework offered the "funnel of causality" to explain the voting decision of individuals. The final event (the vote) could be explained by the series of events leading up to the vote. For instance, the evaluation of current presidential candidates can be explained in terms of more general partisan loyalties, which existed before the candidates had even thought about running. Goldberg (1966) used a recursive causal model to examine vote choice; whilst noting that a rational calculus was not absent from the decision-making process, he found that party identification held a pivotal position in the voting decision. Advances in methodology allowed for reciprocal influences between party identification and policy preferences to be modeled. Jackson (1975), the first to undertake such a study, found that individuals' party identification is influenced by their policy preferences. This back-and-forth nature of the debate perhaps reached its crescendo in 1979, when the *American Political Science Review* published, in the same issue, articles by Page and Jones (1979) and Markus and Converse (1979). Both studies examined the interactive effects of vote choice, party identification, issue preferences, and candidate evaluation. The papers studying broadly the

same phenomena and using very similar methodologies reached markedly different conclusions, particularly regarding the role played by party identification. Markus and Converse found that party identification had a strong influence throughout the whole voting process, arguing that, although party identification does not dominate the process at any given point, during the candidate evaluation process, "these [party] loyalties appear to make repeated inputs of substantial magnitude throughout the process" Markus and Converse (1979, p 1069). Page and Jones found that party loyalty and policy preferences each affected the other, but the policy preference exerted a stronger influence on party identification than party preference did on policy choice. They note that "[party] loyalties can themselves be affected by attitudes towards the current candidates and party affiliations are effects as well as causes in the electoral process" (Page and Jones 1979,p 1088). So, the editor of APSR left it to the readers to decide which theory they believed was more plausible. This sentiment was picked up by Fiorina (1981) when presenting his running tally theory: "to previous evidence that party ID shapes the interpretation of political events and conditions, we now add equally suggestive evidence that such events and conditions modify party ID. Can we ever sort out the causal links? On purely statistical grounds, the answer is probably no" (p 89). Writing a quarter of a century later, Brandenburg (2011) notes that "a conclusive empirical judgment about the greater validity of either theory remains elusive " (p. 4).

The debate has continued into the 21st-century. Lewis-Beck, Norpoth, et al. (2008) in *The American Voter Revisited* replicated the 1950s studies of the Michigan School regarding the election of 2004. Lewis-Beck found that, although there had been an increase in issue-based voting, the basic "funnel of causality" identified in *The American Voter* was still applicable as a means to explain the 2004 presidential vote. In short, the voter of the early twenty-first century was remarkably similar to the voter at the midpoint of the twentieth century. Both evaluated candidates through the prism of party identification. Bafumi and Shapiro (2009), however, found the 21st century voter to be a very different animal to the one identified in *The American Voter*. Bafumi and Shapiro argue that voting has become much more ideological, based on the liberal-conservative continuum. Partisan voting exists in so much as there is a clear link now between policy preference and party. Garner and

Palmer (2011) also see an increasingly politically polarized United States but find that voters today base their policy preferences more closely on their core political predispositions (party identification, group interests, and core values) than they have done in any time in the past.

2.6 Party identification as social identity

The Michigan model has found support among scholars who applied the work on social identity of Tajfel et al. (1979) and Tajfel (1981) to that of party identification. Tajfel sees social identity as an internalized, subjective sense of belonging to a group. There is also a desire to differentiate positively one group from others. Scholars argue that party identification forms a component of individuals' overall social identity, which they suggest is expressive rather than instrumental in nature (Greene (1999); Greene (2004); Green et al. (2004); Fowler and Kam (2007); Huddy et al. (2015); Huddy and Bankert (2017); Bankert et al. (2017); West and Iyengar (2020)). For instance, Huddy et al. (2015) accepts that America has become politically polarized; they employ social identity theory to examine if this polarization can be attributed to an expressive (Michigan model) or instrumental (Fiorina type) causal mechanism. They find that strongly identifying partisans feel angrier than weakly identifying partisans who hold the same ideological beliefs when faced with the prospect of electoral defeat. The authors suggest that party identification is expressive in nature, as emotions are driving campaign activity to stave off the prospect of defeat.

D. E. Campbell et al. (2011) employ social identity theory and reinforce the findings of the Columbia School of seventy years earlier. Campbell, Green, and Layman found that identifying a candidate as evangelical increased Republican support for and Democratic opposition to the candidate. This links to Berelson et al. (1954) findings that individuals are voting for candidates "like me" whom they identify with on a group identity level, not on a policy level. Scholars, such as Lenz (2009) and Gerber and Huber (2010) present research demonstrating that party loyalty moves both policy preferences and the assessment of the economic situation. Lenz suggests that so-called "media priming" is a myth. When the me-

dia presents a new issue, Lenz argues that the candidate puts out a message, and partisans learn from it and adopt the candidate's position as their own. Gerber and Huber use panel data from around the time of the 2006 midterms. Before the elections, Republicans had a positive assessment of the economy and an optimistic outlook; this contrasted with the pessimistic view of the economy held by the Democrats. After the Democrats took over the legislative branch, these assessments changed based on perceptions of the economic competence of the two parties. This falls into social identity theory's premise that the in-group will be seen favorably and the out-group disfavorably. Cohen (2003), in a widely cited piece, presents evidence that suggests individuals take their cues on policy preferences from party elites. Democrats, he shows, were more likely to support a welfare proposal if they believed it came from a Democrat, when in fact, the actual relatively conservative proposal came from a Republican. Similarly, Cohen found Republicans would support a generous increase in welfare provision if they believed the proposal came from a member of the GOP, but not if they thought the proposal originated from the other side of the aisle. Others find that party identification constrains an individual's core political values (Goren (2005)). These values, such as principles of equal opportunity, traditional family values, moral tolerance, and the role of government, which are all found to be less stable than party identification, do not constrain party identification. For some individuals, party identification is their predominant identity, so much so that they switch other identities, such as ethnicity, religion, and class, to bring it into line with their party identification (Egan (2020)).

2.7 Who leaves the party?

Another body of literature examines who and under what circumstances has a fluid party identification and who the party loyalists are. Neundorf et al. (2011) found that there are distinct subpopulations in the electorate that each has their own partisan stability level. Brandenburg (2011), whilst claiming to be agnostic in the debate over the stability of party identification, seems to harken back to the "stand patters" and "switchers" of V.O. Key when he argues that some individuals are party loyalists, whilst others are prepared to

switch parties. The role played by parents in the political socialization of their children is one area of research that has attempted to explain who "stands pat" and who "switches." *The American Voter* noted the importance of parents in determining the party identity of their children. Developments in both psychology and neuroscience lend support to the importance of parental influence. In a classic study (Milgram (1963)) noted the willingness of individuals to accept the position of those in authority. For a child, parents represent the ultimate authority figures, so it would appear natural to adopt their party identification. Others go further and suggest that humans are predisposed to accepting statements as true (S. Harris et al. (2008)). Using neuroimaging, Harris saw a spike in activity in the brain area associated with reward when individuals were presented with true statements, while an increase in activity in the area associated with pain was noted when individuals were presented with false statements. Harris suggests, therefore, that it is easier and more rewarding to accept statements on any issue when you first hear them. He also suggests that once an idea is accepted, it takes more cognitive effort and is emotionally distressing to reevaluate it. As a child's first exposure to an opinion of a political party is likely to come from a parent, the implication for a child's long-term party identification seems obvious. Other scholars, however, suggest that parental influence varies. Niemi and Jennings (1991) noted that parents play an influential role in determining the original political direction of their offspring, a role that remains significant, although diminishing, over the course of their lifetime. Achen (2002) attempted to explain this within a rational choice framework. Before new voters can evaluate the performance of the parties in government, as espoused by Key and later Fiorina, they need some prior beliefs to help them become oriented to politics; the partisanship of their parents provides such a mechanism. Jennings et al. (2009) and Dinas (2014) observe that children are more likely to adopt the political orientation of their parents if the family is highly politicized. Kroh and Selb (2009) find that those children who come to their initial identity with a party through parental socialization are likely to remain party loyalists throughout their lives. Children who do not share the same party identification as their parents are likely to use the "running tally" and constantly update their partisanship. Dinas (2014) directly contradicts these findings, arguing that those children who take on their parents' party affiliation are more likely to come from households where politics is im-

portant. These children, he argues, will grow up to become more politically engaged adults ,which, he says, results in their being more likely to abandon their initial party ID. Others argue that the degree to which a person is politically informed affects the role played by party ID. Kam (2005) argues that the more politically aware a person is, the less likely he or she is to take note of party cues on an issue and form an opinion. Carsey and Layman (2006) also argue that awareness about policy differences between the parties increases the probability of an individual switching party identification. However, Lupu (2013) argues that it is the less informed that are more likely to switch parties. Settle et al. (2009) note the correlation between parent and child partisan behavior, using data from Twins Days Festival, they postulate that genetics can explain half the variance of the strength of party attachment. This supports earlier work by Alford et al. (2005) and Hatemi et al. (2009), which showed a relationship between genetics and strength of party attachment.

An individual's personality type has also been linked to his or her strength of party attachment. Personality traits of extraversion, agreeableness, and openness predict the strength of one's party identification (Gerber and Huber (2010), Webster (2018)). However, others suggest that personality type affects the decision to "switch" or "stand-pat" (Bakker et al. (2016)). Those who exhibit openness are more likely to switch parties, whilst extroverts will stay loyal to a party.

Bakker et al. (2015) appear to go even further and argue that personality traits affect the strength of party attachment and are also related to the party with which one identifies. Schreiber et al. (2013), when examining 82 subjects performing a risk-taking activity, found that the cognitive process taking place was different in Democratic voters than GOP supporters.

2.8 Time to leave the party?

The final section of the literature to be examined concerns when individuals may alter their party identification. The state of the economy does seem to have an effect on an individual's party identification. MacKuen et al. (1989) and Lewis-Beck, Nadeau, et al. (2008)

note the importance of economic perceptions, with a poor economy weakening the partisan ties for those identifying with the incumbent party and strengthening those of the party in opposition. Grynaviski (2006) and Lupu (2013) note the importance of party dynamics in the strength of partisan ID. Grynaviski argues that when party unity is high, partisanship will be strengthened, as the party label becomes a more useful signal to voters about the qualities of a candidate. Similarly, Lupu suggests that partisan strength will be diminished as parties converge. When individuals are aware that there are differences between the parties, then party-switching may occur, according to Carsey and Layman (2006), only when the issue is of particular salience to the individual. If the issue is not important to the individual, then he or she is likely to fall in line with the party's position on the issue.

Finally, Lyons (2011) and MacDonald and Franko Jr (2008) note the importance of societal forces in shaping an individual's party identification. By examining county-level data, Lyons finds that those identifying with a minority party in the county are much more likely to alter their party than those with the majority party. As the imbalance between the parties increases, so does the probability of a minority party identifier switching parties. MacDonald and Franko find that migrants alter their party identification towards the majority party of their new state.

2.9   Melding the expressive & instrumental approaches

Whilst the methodology used in analyzing the nature of party identification has grown increasingly sophisticated; theoretically, there has been little advance in the debate since Fiorina published *Retrospective Voting*. One is still faced with the choice of seeing party identification as a lens through which all things are altered or a running tally of one's experiences and perceptions. There is evidence to support both sides–party identification remains highly stable, yet we see different parties winning elections at the county, district, and state levels. As Fiorina wrote forty years ago, conclusive proof one way or another is unlikely to be found, with the conventional wisdom being that the expressive and instrumental views of party identification are largely incompatible. I seek to meld the two theories and argue

that both play a role in determining a broader concept of partisanship in the electorate. The Survey Research Center , as well as chronicling the direction of an individual's party identification, also asks whether respondents identify strongly or not strongly with their chosen party. I suggest that the direction of party identification is largely a product of expressive factors, whilst the strength of party identification is influenced mainly by instrumental considerations. Although scholars have noted the differences between strong and weak party identifiers, strong party identifiers are more likely to vote (Hershey (2007)), vote straight-ticket (Beck et al. (1992)), and contribute time and financial resources (McCann (1996)). However, surprisingly little scholarship exists explaining what determines if an individual is a strong or weak party identifier. It is this void in the literature that this dissertation seeks to fill. Party elites, I suggest, gain an electoral advantage if they are able to foster a strong party identity. Drawing upon social identity theory, we see that two of the key processes in attaining a strong group identity are group assimilation and inter-group bias (Leaper (2011)), which can be seen as an internal commitment to group norms and favoring the in-group(seen positively) over the out-group (seen negatively). Thus, whereas Downs (1957) argues that party elites should seek to obfuscate differences to attract the medium voter, I suggest that minimizing differences demotivates the party faithful. While still identifying as Democrats or Republicans, they will do so less than wholeheartedly, resulting in a lower proportion of party identifiers voting for and donating to the party. The factors which mobilize party identifiers into strong party identifiers, I argue, are instrumental. These factors, I demonstrate, only have a limited effect on the direction of party identification. They do, however, drive the strength of attachment to either of the parties, which ultimately determines electoral success. Parties that stick to their perceived core values and that are able to clearly distinguish themselves for the other party will be rewarded with a greater preponderance of strong identifiers within their ranks. Similarly, a party trying to broaden its appeal in search of attracting the median voter runs the risk of a demotivated base keeping their checkbooks in their pockets during the campaign and staying home on polling day.

3. DATA AND METHODS

3.1 Data

The benefits of panel data

The data used comes from the Gold Standard of Political Science data, the ANES studies. This data set has rightly gained an excellent reputation for its accuracy, and it has become the workhorse of research on an entire range of topics in political science. The ANES is best known for producing its cross-sectional studies coinciding with US national elections. These polls, along with the vast majority of polling done in the United States and the rest of the world, provide just a snapshot. Whilst this cross-sectional data undoubtedly can and has been used to test theory; it is often beset with endogeneity issues. If we are concerned with cause and effect, although perhaps obvious, Hume (2000) notes one of the features of causes is they precede effects. Thus, inherent in any cause-and-effect relationship is the concept of time. One-shot polls cannot capture this temporal element of cause and effect; however, if we follow the same individuals over a period of time, we are better able to distinguish inter-individual differences from intra-individual differences and to construct the proper recursive structure for studying the issue in question through a before and after effect(Hsiao (1985) 125]). Using panel data helps to address endogeneity biases, which strengthens causal inferences. In the modeling used in the dissertation, the dependent variable (strength of party attachment) is regressed on its lagged values. It is highly probable that partisanship influences the views of candidates, presidential approval, and views of the nation's economic performance. However, the dissertation is interested in how these instrumental factors influence partisanship. Lagging the partisanship dependent variable enables us to escape from this "chicken and egg" situation. In effect, the lagged value of partisanship controls for the possibility that partisanship affects the instrumental factors. As well as controlling for potential endogeneity bias, the use of panel data renders the model explicitly dynamic. By controlling for pre-existing level of partisanship, we gauge for inertia in the dependent variable. Anything leftover once the stability of partisanship has been accounted for is change. The dissertation links this change in partisan commitment to views of candidates, ideology, retrospective evaluations, and policy preference.

The use of panel data as a tool of social inquiry was first proposed by and developed by Lazafeld(P. Lazarsfeld and Fiske (1938) P. F. Lazarsfeld (1940)), and it formed the methodological backdrop to work on the 1940 election discussed in the previous chapter. There is a downside to panel data– panel attrition may introduce bias into findings, there may be an element of conditioning that takes place based on the initial questions that were asked, thus planting seeds in the minds of respondents. Finally, panel studies are expensive to administer, with resources having to be expended to keep an up-to-date registry of the whereabouts of panel members. [1]

3.1.1   The ANES panels

Fortunately, the ANES has occasionally produced panel research data. These surveys covering the periods 1956-1960, 1972-1976, 1992-1996 and 2000-2004 will be utilized in this study. Thus, I shall test my theory over a period of close to half-a-century, a period which witnessed not only great societal change, from the civil rights movement to the Vietnam War protests, through to the War on Terror, but also saw a dramatic change in the nature of party politics and partisanship in the United States.

3.1.2   Party system in the 1950s

The first panel, with waves taken in 1956, 1958 and 1960, covers Eisenhower's second term and the election of Kennedy. In the words of Janda and Coleman, this was the "Golden Age" for political parties (Janda and Colman (1998)). This was the time of the original *American Voter* study, an era of "ideologically innocent party voting" (Bafumi and Shapiro (2009)). Scholars who differ with the Michigan School on the wider implications of *The American Voter* study (Nie et al. (1976),Bafumi and Shapiro (2009), Highton and Kam (2011)) accept this was a time of highly stable party identity. There was a general consensus, at the elite level, about politics (Pells (1989), Wall (2009)), perhaps typified by Democratic Senate Majority Leader Johnson's close working relationship with Republican President Eisenhower (Gaskin (1994)). However, the general public was largely disengaged from politics having "a

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[1]↑For a fuller explanation of the benefits of panel data see Bartels (2006) Hsiao (2014) Prior (2018).

remarkably unsophisticated view of political matters characterized by an inability to consider such matters in broad, abstract terms." Nie et al. (1976, p18)

3.1.3   Party system in the 1970s

The second panel of the study had waves administered in 1972, 1974 and 1976, covering the reelection of Nixon, the Watergate crisis, and the Ford /Carter election. The parties faced a very different America. Trust in government declined sharply in the wake of the American experience in Vietnam and the Watergate scandal (Dalton (2005), Lipset and Schneider (1983),Chanley (2002)). The parties themselves were also undergoing a transformation; in the wake of the tumultuous events at the 1968 Democratic Party National Convention in Chicago, the Democrats implemented the McGovern-Fraser reforms. The resultant extended use of primaries removed control of the nominating process out of the hands of party elites and placed it in the hands of activists. *The Party's Over* (Broder (1972)) summed up the prevailing view that political parties were becoming irrelevant. An increase in electoral volatility was observed with elections based on candidates rather than parties, and a resultant increase in split-ticket voting and a reduction in the proportion of the population identifying with either of the major parties (Pomper (1972), Pomper (1975), Wattenberg (2009), Clarke and Stewart (1998), Everson (1982)). Through the 1960s into the 1970s, the public was becoming more ideological (Pierce (1970)), and the parties were not, at that time, seen as ideological institutions.

3.1.4   Party system in the 1990s

The third panel encompassed waves in 1992, 1994 and 1996, covering the two election victories of Bill Clinton, with him obtaining less than 50% of the popular vote on both occasions. The politics of the 1990s was very different from that of earlier eras. Whereas the 1950s had been a period in which there was a "domestic consensus on an enlarged American welfare state compared to the pre-New Deal era"(Bafumi and Shapiro (2009)), the 1990s

was a period of polarization between the two major parties. Roll-call analysis showed the parties increasingly moving away from each other (Rohde (1991), Aldrich et al. (1995)). It is, perhaps, more accurate to describe this phenomenon as asymmetric polarization. Republican elites and activists moved further to the median voter's right than Democrats moved to the left (Saunders and Abramowitz (2004).) Moderate Republicans exiting congress were replaced with a more conservative cohort (Baldassarri and Gelman (2008)). The philosophy of these more aggressively conservative Republicans was summed up in *The Contract With America* (Gingrich, Armey, et al. (1994)), a document signed by all but two Republican candidates standing in the House midterms of 1994 and credited (in part) with the Republicans taking control of the House of Representatives for the first time in forty years. Faced with what he viewed as a new political reality, President Clinton adopted a policy of "triangulation"(Shughart (2004)) involving the President attempting to find a winning coalition at the midpoint of the two parties' ideological positions. As the Republicans had already moved to the right, this inevitably found Clinton moving to the right on certain issues, a move that angered Congressional Democrats, the majority of whom outperformed Clinton at the polls in both 1992 and 1996 (Nelson (1998)).

3.1.5 Party system in the 2000s

The final panel of the study had waves in 2000, 2002 and 2004; this covered the narrow election of George W. Bush over Al Gore and his reelection over John Kerry. Unsurprisingly, the party system in the first decade of the new Millenium can be seen as an extension of the system in place during the 1990s. Party unity in Congress reached new levels of consistency (Theriault (2008); McCarty et al. (2016)). This consistency wasn't just seen at an elite level. In 2004, a record 91% of all individuals who identified with a party voted for the presidential candidate of that party (A. I. Abramowitz and Webster (2016)). Eight years later, another record was set with 89% of all party identifiers voting straight-ticket (A. Abramowitz and Webster (2015)). This Renaissance of party-based voting did not coincide with a resurgence in the popularity of the parties as institutions, with the average ANES feeling thermometer

score for both parties falling by ten points in the thirty years up to 2010 (A. I. Abramowitz and Webster (2018)). Abramowitz and Webster argue that negative partisanship, partisanship not driven by support for ones own party but driven by a dislike or even contempt for the other party, has become the mechanism driving this polarization of American politics (Iyengar et al. (2019) Mason (2018)). Disdain for what can be termed the out-group (Tajfel et al. (1979)) has reached such a depth that many partisans of both parties would be distressed if their offspring married a supporter of the other party (Mason (2018)).

3.1.6 Theory comparison

Thus, I aim to test my theory across a set of very different party systems. The highly stable system of the 1950s, the party in crisis of the 1970s and the highly polarized systems of the 1990s and 2000s. If my theory is correct, it will not be open to the same criticism leveled by some at *The American Voter* (Nie et al. (1976);Bafumi and Shapiro (2009), and others) that its findings were only applicable to the 1950s and the post-World War Two consensus.

3.2 Method, Variables & Hypothesis

3.2.1 Dependent Variable

The variable of interest for the project comes from a two-part question asked by ANES of respondents since 1952. Firstly, the question "Do you consider yourself a Democrat, Republican, or something else?" and, secondly, the follow-up question "Do you consider yourself a strong or not so strong Democrat/Republican?" From these responses, I construct a three categorical variable of strong identifier, not a strong identifier, or no longer identifying with the previous party. I plan to study only those respondents who identified themselves with the same party in both previous rounds of the three-wave panel. This covers over 95% of all panelists. As the dependent variable is categorical, the study will use multinomial logit analysis. Multinational logit regression models the probability of being in one category ver-

sus falling into another category based on a set of independent predictors (e.g. candidate evaluation, policy preferences, ideology, and presidential approval rating). The notion for multinomial logit is :

$$\mu_{ij} = log\frac{\pi_{ij}}{\pi_i J} = \alpha_j + x'_j\beta_j$$

Where α_j is a constant, and β_j is a vector of regression coefficients for $j = 1, 2, ...J - 1$ with J equal to the number of response categories.

The estimation of effects is undertaken through maximum likelihood. The method assumes "Independence of irrelevant alternatives" i.e., if A is preferred over B when there are only two options, and if A is preferred over C in a contest between A and C, the introduction of C into the contest between A and B should not change the rank ordering of A over B.

The magnitude of these effects is not readily interpretable by simply using the coefficients of the multinomial regression output. So *Spost*(Long and Freese (2006)) will be used to aid with the interpretation of the results. Using *Spost* enables predicted probabilities of the three possible outcomes to be calculated across the range of values of the independent variables. This allows for a more substantive discussion of the role that the variables described below play in determining the strength of party attachment.

Given the nature of the dependent variable, it may appear that ordered logit regression, instead of multinomial logit, would be a more appropriate statistical method to conduct the inquiry. However, analysis of the data using the Brant test Brant (1990) revealed the data violated the proportional odds assumption necessitating the use of multinomial logit. A breakdown of the leave category, presented in appendix C, shows the composite nature of this category. While originally a partisan group, party leavers splintered into party leaners, independents, a number identified strongly with the other party, whilst some became "apolitical." The wide range of new "party identifications" contained within the leave category confirms the results of the Brant test that the use of ordered logit regression is inappropriate

in this situation, and multinomial logit is the correct tool for the analysis. If the theory is correct, and, indeed, party identification does form part of an individual's social identity, we should observe little change in the probability of leaving a political party as instrumental factors vary. Similarly, if the strength of attachment to either party is driven by instrumental evaluations, then the likelihood of being a strong party identifier should be responsive to changes in instrumental factors. This leads to:

H_1 There is greater variation in an individual's strength of party identification (strong/not strong) than the variance in party identification (Democrat/Republican).

3.2.2 Independent Variables

I propose to test this hypothesis across four factors identified in the literature as affecting party identification, namely candidate evaluations, ideology, retrospective evaluations, and specific policy preferences.

3.2.3 Candidate Evaluation

Self-categorization theorists have argued that identification with and positive feelings towards a prototypical group member will enhance an individual's attachment to a group (Hogg (1996), Hogg and Hains (1998)). During presidential elections, the candidates become the very face of the Democrat and Republican parties. Thus, if an individual perceives one candidate in a much more positive light than their opponent, then that respondent's party identification should become stronger. Similarly, if an individual discerns little difference between the two candidates, then their party affiliation should be weaker. By the same token, others argue that individuals compare presidential candidates to their preconceived ideas of what a president should be like (Popkin (2020)). Again, the closer an individual's candidate is to this idealized norm compared to other parties, the more likely that individual is to be a strong party identifier. This leads to:

H_2 The greater the difference in relative candidate evaluation, the greater the probability of an individual being a strong partisan.

Candidate evaluations will be operationalized in two ways. In the 1950s, 1970s, and 1990s ANES asked respondents to name something that they like/dislike about the two presidential candidates. If an answer is given, they are asked to give another reason, up to a maximum of five answers for each. A candidate's score is calculated by subtracting the number of reasons to dislike a candidate from the reasons to like the candidate. The candidate evaluation score is obtained by subtracting the score for the Republican candidate from that of the Democrat. Possible candidate evaluation scores range from minus to plus ten. In the 1970s, 1990s and 2000s ANES asked respondents to place the candidates on a feeling thermometer scale from 0 to 100, with 50 being a neutral score. The evaluation for each candidate is obtained by subtracting one of these scores from the other. Possible values for this method range from minus to plus 100.

We expect to find that the candidate effect of having its greatest impact in the 1970s when candidate-centered politics was at its height (Aldrich et al. (1995)) (at least in terms of the four panels of this study).

3.2.4 Ideology

Social identity theorists argue that "groups are social constructions that need to be imbued with meaning" Huddy (2013, p 21). In the case of this study, being a Republican or Democrat must mean something. Scholars from the 1970s (Nie et al. (1976), Page and Jones (1979)) through to the 2000s (Bafumi and Shapiro (2009), Levendusky (2009)) have reported a growing link between party identification and a liberal to conservative ideology. For these scholars, the group label Democrat increasingly means "liberal" and Republican means "conservative." As such, the greater the adherence is to the ideology, which gives meaning to the group membership, the more individuals concerned see themselves as a stronger member of the group. So, we would expect to find:

H_3a The more conservative a Republican identifier is, the greater the probability of him or her being a strong Republican in subsequent elections.

H₃b The more liberal a Democrat identifier is, the greater the probability of him or her being a strong Democrat in subsequent elections.

Again, two measures will be utilized to operationalize the concept of ideology. Starting in 1972, the ANES asked respondents to place themselves on a seven-point ideological scale ranging from extremely liberal to extremely conservative. Unfortunately, ANES did not ask the panel members this question. However, ANES did ask members of the three most recent panels to rate liberals and conservatives on a scale of 0 to 100; subtracting one of these scores from the other gives us a liberal/conservative rating which will be used to complement the self-placement measure. We expect to find that ideology will have a greater effect upon the strength of party identification in the more recent panel studies. Furthermore, we expect ideology to have a greater influence on Republicans. Literature suggests that Republicans are far more ideologically cohesive than Democrats (Grofman et al. (1999), Grossmann and Hopkins (2015), Grossmann and Hopkins (2016), Mayhew (1966), Polsby (2008), Freeman (1986)).

3.2.5   Retrospective Evaluations

As noted, the last major theoretical contribution to the party identification debate came with the concept of a running tally of retrospective evaluations, of promises made and promises kept (Fiorina (1981)). Others suggest that party identification is updated based not on whether a president delivers on his promised agenda but based on a sense of "what have you done for me lately" (Ferejohn (1986)). While the public accepts that many things are outside the president's control, they hold the president responsible for how the government responds to a crisis (Healy, Malhotra, et al. (2010), see (Kellner (2007)) on the effect Bush's response to Hurricane Katrina had on his approval ratings). We would expect that strong perceived performance of the president would strengthen party identification of supporters of the president's party whilst loosening those of the opposition, with the reverse also being true:

H_4 Retrospective approval of a president from one's own party, or disapproval of a president from the other party will lead to stronger partisan identification in the subsequent election cycle.

In 1972, ANES asked, "Do you approve or disapprove of the job the president is doing?" Since 1992, the question has allowed respondents to indicate whether they strongly approve/disapprove of the presidents' job performance. Fiorina noted that, even if one has no interest in politics or current events, one would still have a basic idea of whether one's lot in life is getting better or worse under the current government (Fiorina (1981) Fiorina (1978)). Others have suggested that the overall state of the economy plays a major role (Lewis-Beck (1990), Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2000), Lohmann et al. (1997).)Therefore:

H_5a Positive retrospective economic evaluations lead to stronger partisan identifications in the subsequent election cycle if the respondent's party controls the White House.

H_5b Negative retrospective economic evaluations lead to stronger partisan identifications in the subsequent election cycle if the respondent's party does not control the White House.

Since its inception, ANES has asked the question, "Are you better off, worse off, or about the same compared with this time last year?" We expect to find that retrospective evaluations have the greatest effect in the 2004 panel, in that year as the White House and Congress were controlled by the same party, making it easier for voters to apportion blame or give credit. However, some suggest that even in times of divided government, voters hold the president ultimately responsible (Norpoth (2001)).

3.2.6 Policy preferences

One of the functions of political parties is the formulation of public policy (Merriam (1923)). Every four years, parties present these policies to the electorate in the form of the party platform. Several scholars, who subscribe to the instrumental school of party identification (Jackson (1975), Page and Jones (1979),Bafumi and Shapiro (2009)), argue that individuals alter their party affiliation to bring it in line with their policy preferences. G.

Layman (2001) argues that certain areas of public policy have become lines of demarcation between the two parties. Both economic and social issues distinguish support for both parties.

The theory shall be tested against four contentious policy areas: the role of government in the economy, issues of racial equality, healthcare provision, and abortion.

Role of government in the economy

Within the economic sphere, the Republican party has been seen as the party of less government intervention in the economy since the time of the New Deal, being reactive against the expansion of welfare programs (Gould (2007)). The GOP has traditionally distrusted and viewed the state "with suspicion even when in power. Since Republicans as individuals control most of the major private institutions, particularly economic ones, a strong central government is seen as a threat to their power" (Freeman (1986, p 336)). However, the Republican policy in the 1950s attempted to stop further expansion of central government, rather than rolling back its frontiers (Hart (1998)). The break with the post-war consensus, excepting the blip of Goldwater's 1964 candidacy, came with the economic rhetoric (if not the policies) of the Reagan Presidency (Aden (1989)). For Reagan, "Government was the problem," not the solution. The rhetoric from the Republicans that they are the party of small government continues to this day; however, some authors note a difference between rhetoric and the reality of Republican administrations (Béland and Waddan, 2008; Tanner, 2007; Krugman, 2012). In contrast, over the last ninety years, the Democrats have been seen as the party of "Big Government" being at the forefront of expanding the role of the state, exemplified by the "New Deal" programs of F.D.R. and the "Great Society" envisioned by L.B.J. Although the Reagan revolution, perhaps, forced the so-called "New Democrats" of the 1990s to tone down their rhetoric; they remained committed to the belief that "government is a positive good that should intervene actively in economic and social matters to ensure economic growth and equal opportunity" (Hale (1995)). Thus:

H_6a A desire to reduce the role of the government in the economy among Republicans results in stronger partisan identification in the subsequent election cycle.

H_6b A desire to increase the role of the government in the economy among Democrats results in stronger partisan identification in the subsequent election cycle.

Unfortunately, the ANES has not consistently asked the same question on this matter. In 1960, ANES sought endorsement or non-endorsement of the following: "The government should guarantee that everyone has a job." This is measured on a five-point scale from strongly agree to disagree strongly. In 1976 and 1996, the survey asked respondents to place themselves on a scale ranging from (1) Government should ensure that everyone has a good standard of living to (7) Government should let each person get ahead on his own. In 1996 and 2004, ANES respondents place themselves on a scale ranging from (1) Government should reduce spending and services a lot to (7) Government should increase spending and services a lot. We expect to find government intervention in the economy to have a greater impact on the strength of party identification of Democrats. Grossmann and Hopkins (2016) and Polsby (2008) argue that Democrats can be understood as a coalition of social groups seeking concrete government action. Also, as noted by Tanner (2007) and others, the Republican position on government intervention in the economy is not totally clear, with some suggesting that both Democrats and Republicans are either supportive or neutral on government activism (Klein and Stern (2004)). We also expect to see the variable have its greatest effect upon Republicans in the 1996 study, as that is the only year of the study with a sitting Democrat president; as such Republican identifiers would not feel constrained by the realities of the policies of a Republican president.

Racial Equality

There can be no issue that has tested the principles outlined in the Declaration of Independence to the extent that race has. From the Civil War through the Jim Crow South, the Civil Rights movement to the present day, the issue of race and the quest for more than one-in-eight Americans to enjoy the fruits of liberty has been a constant thorn in the side of the nation. The politics of race that is applicable to this study started in 1936 when Northern

blacks left the party of Lincoln and formed the final block in F.D.R.'s New Deal coalition (Weiss (2021)). This helped Democrats win six of the next eight Presidential elections and control the House of Representatives for all but four of the next sixty years. However, being part of a coalition controlling the White House and Congress did not put the needs of black Americans at the top of the Democrat agenda. Throughout the 1950s, Southern whites accounted for a quarter of the Democrat voting block, four times the size of the black vote (A. I. Abramowitz (2018)). As such, elites in the party were not inclined to promote a civil rights agenda. In 1957, the first piece of civil rights legislation for nearly 100 years was passed, largely thanks to Republicans who supported the bill 168 to 19 in the House, with House Democrats opposed to the bill 103-110. In the Senate, Republicans voted 43-0 in favor while Democrats supported it 29-18 (Stern (1995)). Senate Majority leader Lyndon Johnson steered the bill through the Senate and ensured that "no politician got hurt too much by" (Stern (1991)), temporarily preserving the New Deal coalition, but the bill did little to advance the cause of African Americans. However, the New Deal coalition was not able to survive the passage of two major pieces of legislation that dramatically improved a lot of African Americans, namely The Civil Rights Act (1964) and The Voting Rights Act (1965). Once again, a greater proportion of Republican legislators voted for these bills than Democrats (Walton Jr (1997)); however, it was future Democratic Party candidates that were to pay the price. President Johnson said he had just "lost the South for a generation" upon signing the Civil Rights Act (Purdum (2014)). Johnson was to lose five Southern states in the 1964 election (Black et al. (2009)), as a major pillar of the New Deal coalition began to crack. In 1968, of the Southern states, only Texas voted for the Democratic candidate, and by 1972 all the states of the old Confederacy voted for Nixon. The "Southern Strategy " of subtle (and sometimes unsubtle) appeals to the racial resentments of Southern whites was a successful electoral ploy, with the Republican nominee winning five out of the six presidential elections up to 1988 (Carter (1996), Aistrup (2014), Frymer and Skrentny (1998)). After the 1964 election, black voters became the most reliably Democratic voting bloc in the nation and a vital component of the party's electoral coalition (A. I. Abramowitz (2018)). Southern whites drifted away from the Democratic party, with that social group identifying more with Republicans than Democrats in the 1990s (Knuckey (2005)); others also note a drift away

from the Democrats in this timeframe among non-southern whites (Carmines and Stanley (1992), Brewer and Stonecash (2001)). Many scholars argue that the cause of this is racial resentment (Knuckey and Kim (2015), Tuch and Hughes (2011), C. W. Smith et al. (2020) Stephens-Dougan (2016)). However, other scholars suggest that this shift is not a result of school busing or affirmative action, but due to white America becoming more conservative (A. I. Abramowitz (1994), Knotts et al. (2005)). Therefore:

H_7a Opposition to policies designed to help African Americans, among, Republicans, leads to stronger partisan identity in the subsequent election cycle.

H_7b Support for policies designed to help African Americans, among, Democrats, leads to stronger partisan identity in the subsequent election cycle.

The ANES captures attitudes towards two different aspects of racial policy; unfortunately, neither of these aspects is covered across all four studies. We are able to gauge attitudes towards school desegregation in 1960 and 1976. In 1960, respondents were asked if they agreed with the statement "The Government should NOT desegregate schools." In 1976, respondents were asked to place themselves on a seven-point scale regarding school busing, from (1) use school busing to integrate schools, to (7) keep children in local schools. The other aspect of racial policy studied is that of aid to minorities. In 1976, 1996, and 2004 ANES asked slightly different questions regarding the level of federal funding for blacks/minorities. In 1976, respondents were asked if the government should help minorities and place themselves on a scale ranging from (1) government should help minorities, to (7) minorities should help themselves. In 1996, a similar question was asked, but with the wording "blacks" as opposed to "minorities." In 2004, respondents were asked if federal aid to blacks should be cut, kept the same, or increased. In the first two studies, we do not anticipate a great deal of variation in the strength of party attachment. In 1960 and 1976, both parties (outside the South) broadly supported civil rights, although the 1976 Republican platform explicitly stated it was opposed to school busing (Peters and Woolley (2020)). Nixon, despite using his Southern strategy to ensure reelection, supported affirmative action (Kotlowski (1998)). In later studies, we expect the racial issues to have a greater effect on Republicans than

Democrats. If the GOP had become the party of racial resentment, we would expect to find a stronger reaction against policies that favor the out-group.

Health Care

The United States is the wealthiest nation on the planet without universal health- care (Lorenzoni et al. (2014)). Healthcare provision in the United States, certainly in the last thirty years, has become an area of intense policy debate between the two parties (Patel and Rushefsky (2019)). Democrats and Republicans at the non-elite level, whilst not experiencing differences in quality of care, differ dramatically in their views of the state of the nation's healthcare and what needs to be done (Scott et al. (2016), Henderson and Hillygus (2011)). Although reform to the healthcare system has been on the political agenda since the 1950s (Jacobs (2019)), President Johnson, with Medicare and Medicaid, was the only president to pass any meaningful healthcare legislation over the course of this study. Whilst a majority of Republican legislators did vote for Johnson's legislation (T. R. Oliver et al. (2004)) when over a quarter of a century later, President Clinton took on healthcare reform, his plan was met with near-universal Republican opposition (Rockman (1995)). Although outside the scope of this study, it is worth noting that the Affordable Care Act (2010) didn't receive one vote from a Republican (Oberlander (2020)). Therefore:

H_8a Among Republicans, opposition to publicly funded healthcare leads to stronger partisan identification in the subsequent election cycle.

H_8b Among Democrats, support for publicly funded healthcare leads to stronger partisan identification in the subsequent election cycle.

In 1960, ANES asked if respondents approved or disproved of government funding for Medicare. In 1976 and 1996, respondents were asked their ideal healthcare system, ranging from (1) Government-run health system, to (7) a Completely private system. Unfortunately, the ANES did not ask a question on healthcare to the panel in 2004.

We expect to find that healthcare had its greatest effect on the strength of party identification in the 1996 study. In the 1970s, healthcare reform was largely seen as a non-starter in the wake of the oil price shock of 1973 (Birn et al. (2003)). Whereas, in the early 1990s, healthcare was at the center of partisan politics, in 1992, healthcare reform formed a major part of the Clinton platform (Reynolds (1992)). Clinton's proposals were partly to blame for Democrats losing the House for the first time in over a generation (Lavanty (2018)), ensuring that healthcare remained politically salient during the 1996 study.

Abortion

One explanation of the supposed polarization in the United States has been the "Culture Wars" phenomenon (Hunter (1992), Gitlin (1995), A. I. Abramowitz (2010)). America, according to the theory, is beset by a series of cultural schisms which have their roots in conceptions of cultural and moral order that are non-negotiable. These issues include affirmative action, abortion, and LGBT rights, which tend to polarize opinion resulting in "the erosion of a common ground for reasoned, ethical debate makes it difficult to resolve politicized moral issues" (Mouw and Sobel (2001)). In other words, Americans share fewer common values than in the past. Others have criticized this argument (Brint (1992), Fiorina et al. (2008), DiMaggio (2003)), suggesting that Americans typically do not hold extreme views and that the "war" is driven by political elites (Fiorina and Levendusky (2006), Fiorina and Abrams (2012), Evans and Pearson-Merkowitz (2012)). While some argue that there is a culture war on certain issues and among certain religious groups (G. C. Layman and Green (2006)), others, whilst being generally skeptical about the "culture war," accept that on the issue of abortion the United States is polarized (DiMaggio et al. (1996),G. C. Layman et al. (2010), Fiorina et al. (2005)). However, even here there is disagreement, with certain scholars noting that even on this emotive issue the majority of Americans are not entirely pro-life or pro-choice (Mouw and Sobel (2001), Blake and Del Pinal (1981), Dillon (1996)).

Despite this apparent ambiguity about the position of the American people on this issue, there is little debate that the Republican party is pro-life, whilst the Democratic party is

pro-choice (Carmines et al. (2010), Adams (1997)). The clear demarcation line between the two parties on the issue was not always so obvious. In the years immediately after the landmark *Roe v. Wade* decision, Republicans were on average more pro-choice than Democrats (Williams (2011)). Up to 1980, there was no difference in abortion attitudes of activists of both parties (Carmines and Woods (2002)), as the parties took up ambiguous positions on the issue (Levendusky (2009)). Yet, by 1992 abortion attitude had become a better predictor of candidate choice than perceptions of the state of the economy (A. I. Abramowitz (1995)).

During his presidency, Ronald Reagan published *Abortion and the Conscience of the Nation* (Reagan et al. (1984)). While Reagan may have made appeals to Republicans and the nation's conscience (Flowers (2018), Rose (2011)), some suggest that the change in the Republicans' stance on the issue was a cynical attempt to win votes from Catholics and evangelicals (Williams (2011),Reichley (1987)).

During the 1990s, with the partisan lines drawn in the abortion debate, individuals, according to some scholars, began to alter their party identification to bring it into line with their stance on abortion (A. I. Abramowitz (1995), Killian and Wilcox (2008)). So, we would expect stronger Republicans to be more pro-life and stronger Democrats to be more supportive of a woman's right to choose. Therefore:

H_9a Among Republicans, support for restrictions on abortion leads to stronger partisan identification in the subsequent election cycle.

H_9b Among Democrats, opposition to restrictions on abortion leads to stronger partisan identification in the subsequent election cycle.

In 1976, respondents were asked which of the following positions on abortion was closest to their own:(1) Abortion should never be permitted, (2) abortion should be permitted only if the life and health of the woman are in danger, (3)Abortion should be permitted if, due to personal reasons, the woman would have difficulty caring for the child, and (4)Abortion

should never be forbidden. In 1996 and 2004, the wording of options (2) and (3) had changed to (2) abortion should be permitted in the case of rape, incest, or danger to the woman's life, and (3) abortion should be permitted when there is a clear need. We expect to find that abortion had a more substantial effect on the strength of party identification in 1996 than in both 1976 and 2004, with a greater effect being noticed in 2004 than 1976. As stated, there was no real difference between the parties on the abortion issue in 1976. Whereas, in 1996, as discussed, some of the literature argues that this was when party sorting on the issue of abortion took place. Furthermore, we expect abortion to have a more significant effect upon the strength of Republican identity rather than Democrats. Again, following (Grossmann and Hopkins (2016)), we suggest that Republicans are more driven by ideology than Democrats, and a pro-life position is now interpreted as a conservative one (Greeley and Hout (2008)).

Spatial Hypothesis

In 1976 and 1996, as well as asking respondents where they stood on particular issues, the ANES also asked respondents what they perceived was the position of the two parties', or in some cases the presidential candidate's, position on an issue. As such, we are able to determine which party or candidate is closer to the respondent's preferred policy position. Downs (1957) proposed the theory of spatial voting, which suggests that a voter will select the party that is closest to his or her ideal position. Down's theory has been applied to the elections of 1968 to 1980. Poole and Rosenthal (1984) found strong evidence of spatial voting. (Jessee (2009), Jessee (2010)) who only observes spatial voting in independent voters during the elections of 2004 and 2008; as such, he argues, party identifiers are not spatial voters. I suggest that if a party identifier's preferred position matches that of the party, they are more likely to be strong identifiers. Therefore:

*H*10*a* Limited intra-party policy differences leads to stronger partisan identification in the subsequent election cycle.

*H*10*b* Increasing inter-party policy differences leads to stronger partisan identification in the subsequent election cycle .

The spatial analysis will be undertaken for the 1976 and 1996 studies only. In 1976, respondents were asked their preferred position and where they thought the parties stood on the issues of government intervention, racial equality, and healthcare. Each of these attitudes and perceptions was measured on a seven-point scale. For each of these issues, the absolute difference between the respondent's position and each of the party's positions was calculated. Total intra- and inter- party differences are then tallied. For the 1996 study, a similar process is undertaken; however, abortion is added to the list of variables for which we have spatial data. As the abortion viewpoint is measured on a four-point scale, absolute differences on abortion are weighted before being added to the intra- and inter-party differences tally. We expect to find that the strength of party identity for Republicans is driven to a greater extent by both intra- and inter- party differences than it is for Democrats. Again, following Grossmann and Hopkins (2016), we suggest that Republicans are more driven by policy than Democrats. We also expect that inter-party differences will have a greater effect than intra-party differences. Following A. I. Abramowitz and Webster (2016), we expect that negative views of the opposition parties' policies will drive partisan intensity to a greater degree than would support for the policies of one's own party.

3.2.7 Control variables

For each of the studies, I control for the respondent's strength of party identification in the first (four years earlier) and second (two years earlier) panel waves. Respondents that classified themselves as strong party identifiers are coded (1), with those identifying as not strong coded (0). Including these control variables allows the study to make stronger causal inferences. These controls give a baseline for the level of partisanship. As such, they help to address potential endogeneity issues, as we are able with more confidence to say that any change in the strength of partisanship observed was as a result of changes in the instrumental factor, as opposed to the level of partisanship altering candidate evaluations, retrospective opinions of presidential performance, and the like.

It is expected that a history of being a strong identifier will have a positive effect on the

probability of being a strong identifier in the study, with strength from the second wave having the greater impact.

4. CANDIDATE EFFECT

4.1 Introduction

The effect of candidate perception and evaluations have on the strength of party identification supports H_1 and H_2. Perceptions of the candidates, operationalized through either the likes/dislikes metric or the feeling thermometer method, consistently have a statistically significant effect on the strength of an individual's attachment to a political party. While candidate evaluations do, on occasions, influence the direction of party identification, this effect is generally not as significant as the impact on the strength of party identification. Across the four elections studied, we can make the following generalizations.

- For most individuals faced with a decision to leave their previous party or remain and identify weakly or strongly, changing one's party affiliation is the least likely outcome.

- In most cases, there is a greater change in the probability of being a strong party identifier, than there is a change in the probability of altering party identification.

The magnitude of the effect, however, varies significantly throughout the four ANES studies. For instance, in 1996, among Democrats, the probability of being a strong identifier was 60% higher among those who had the highest candidate evaluation rating than those who had the lowest rating. In 1960, however, the probability of been a strong Democrat changed by close to 80% across the range of evaluation ratings.

The effect of candidate evaluation on the strength of party identification differs between the parties but not consistently. In 1960 the change in probability of being a strong identifier was 11% greater for Democrats than Republicans, across two standard deviations above and below the mean. In 1996 the difference in the change in probability, across a similar spread of two, between the two parties was 31%, with Republicans exhibiting the greater variance. Of the four elections studied in this project, Democrat identifiers were influenced more by candidate evaluations than Republicans in 1960 and 2004. In 1976 and 1996, GOP supporters' strength of support was swayed more by candidate evaluations.

4.2 1960

Introduction

The 1960 election between Massachusetts Senator Kennedy and Vice President Nixon provides strong support for H_1 and H_2. For both Democrats and Republicans, the relative effect that candidates' evaluations have upon the strength of party identification exceeds its impact on party choice.

Findings

The Multinomial logit results for the 1960 election are shown in Table 4.1. The table shows that for both Democrats and Republicans, a statistically significant relationship, in the predicted direction, exists between candidate evaluations and if an individual considers themselves a strong or weak party identifier. However, candidate evaluations do not significantly impact previously identifying Democrats' decision to defect from the party, lending more robust support to H_1. There is a statistically significant relationship, however, for Republicans in this regard.

Table 4.1. 1960 Candidate Evaluation

	Democrats $N = 429$		Republicans $N = 269$	
	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong
candidate evaluation	-0.12 (0.07)	0.23* (0.04)	-0.25* (0.08)	0.14* (0.06)
strength 1956	-1.53* (0.66)	1.05* (0.25)	0.48 (0.46)	0.98* (0.32)
strength 1958	0.81 (0.45)	1.26* (0.25)	0.16 (0.51)	1.65* (0.33)
$Pseudo R^2$	0.20		0.19	
$* = p \leq 0.05$				

The results of the *spost* analysis are shown in Table 4.2 and also in figure 4.1. In this and all subsequent probability calculations, the strength of party identification in the last two elections is set at their mean values.

Figure 4.1 illustrates that leaving the party is the least likely option for Democrats at all levels of candidate evaluation above negative seven; this represents 98% of the Democrat panel. For Republicans leaving the party becomes the lowest probability for candidate evaluations greater than minus two; again, this represents a very high proportion of the Republican panel at 94%, for Democrats who self-identified as Democrats in 1956 and 1960, the probability of leaving the party peaks at around a one-in-five chance. The 94% of Republicans with a candidate evaluation rating of minus two or higher have the highest probability of leaving GOP of less than one-in-three.

Figure 4.1. 1960 Candidate Effect

Across the whole range (-10 to 10) of candidate evaluations, the probability of previously identifying Democrats leaving the party changes by 25%; at the same time, there is a 77% change in the likelihood of being a strong Democrat. For Republicans, we observe an 82%

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change in the probability of leaving and a 70% change in the probability of being a strong Republican. However, suppose we were to restrict our analysis to the 94% of Republicans with only slightly negative evaluations of Nixon. In that case, we find that the probability of leaving the GOP changes by close to 31% whilst the probability of being a strong supporter of the Republican Party changes by 43%, giving support to H_2.

Table 4.2. 1960 Change in Predicted Probability Candidate Evaluation

	Democrats			Republicans		
	Leave	Weak	Strong	Leave	Weak	Strong
	$p - value$	$p - value$	$p - value$	$p - value$	$p - value$	$p - value$
-10 to -5	-.114	-.037	.151	-.296	.164	.137
	.158	.636	<.001	<.001	.001	<.001
-5 to 0	-.082	-.146	.228	-.334	.106	.228
	.045	.001	<.001	.001	.123	<.001
0 to 5	-.045	-.180	.231	-.152	-.043	.195
	<.001	<.001	<.001	<.001	.380	<.001
5 to 10	-.017	-.148	.165	-.040	-.104	.144
	.002	<.001	<.001	<.001	.015	.001
-10 to 10	-.258	-.516	.775	-.822	.123	.700
	.040	<.001	<.001	<.001	.350	<.001

Table 4.2 and figure 4.2 show that the effect of candidate evaluation upon the probabilities of leaving the party or identifying either weakly or strongly varies across the range of evaluations.

Candidate evaluations have the most significant effect on the decision to leave a party in the negative range of candidate evaluations. Among Democrats, an individual with a negative evaluation of Kennedy of minus five would be 8% more likely to defect from the party than a neutral individual in their candidate evaluation. A Democrat with a candidate evaluation of plus five would only be 4% less likely to defect than the aforementioned neutral Democrat. A Republican with a negative five evaluation of Nixon was 33% more likely to no longer identify with the GOP than a previous Republican who was neutral between Nixon and Kennedy. The Republican who evaluates the candidates evenly is 15% more likely to alter

their party identification than a Republican with a Nixon evaluation rating of five.

Figure 4.2. 1960 Marginal Effects of Candidate Evaluation

Compared to the probability of leaving the party, the change in the likelihood of being a strong party identifier is more consistent across the range of candidate evaluations. Among Democrats, a move from a candidate evaluation of minus five to zero increases the probability of being a strong Democrat by just under 23%. Democrats who have a plus-five candidate evaluation are just over 23% more likely to be strong identifiers than those who are neutral. A similar pattern is observed among Republicans. Those with a plus-five candidate evaluation are 19% more likely to be strong identifiers than those that rate the candidates evenly, who in turn are 23% more likely to be strong identifiers than those with a candidate evaluation of negative five.

Summary of 1960

The close-fought election between Kennedy and Nixon leads strong support to both H_1 and H_2 and underpins further the work of The Michigan School. Party identification,

especially for Democrats, is stable in the face of different evaluations of the parties' candidates for the highest office in the land. However, the strength of attachment to the party is not immune to differing perceptions of the candidates. The greater the difference in the evaluation of candidates results in a higher probability of being a strong party identifier. Thus concerning candidate evaluation, the theory is supported in what Janda & Coleman termed "The Golden Age" of parties; we now turn to a stiffer test as we look at the 1970s.

4.3 1976

Introduction

The election of 1976 between the non-elected incumbent Gerald Ford, and the former Governor of Georgia, Jimmy Carter, lends further support to H_1 and H_2. Although this support is more qualified than the results from 1960, and as we shall see the 1996 and 2004 studies, under both metrics of candidate evaluation and feeling thermometer differences, for both parties, we find a statistically significant relationship between candidate ratings and the direction as well of strength of party identification.

Findings

The multinominal regression outputs for the 1976 election are shown in a Table 4.3 (for candidate evaluation) and Table 4.4 (for Feeling Thermometer). The tables show a statistically significant relationship between candidate evaluations operationalized through likes and dislikes, and the feeling thermometer metric, in both direction and strength of party identification. The 1976 findings differ from the 1960 study when no relationship between candidate evaluations and direction of party identification was found among Democrats. Again, *spost* has been used to produce predicted probability graphs Figure 4.3 and predictive Table 4.5 for the candidate evaluation method, and Figure 4.4 and Table 4.6 for the feeling thermometer metric. Figure 4.3 shows that for both Democrats and Republicans, the point at which leaving the party becomes the least likely option is at an evaluation of plus one, compared to minus eight for Democrats and minus two for Republicans in 1960. As a result, the proportion of the two panels whose least likely option is to defect from their previous

party identification is dramatically reduced to 50% (from 98%) for Democrats and 59% (from 94%) for Republicans. Further, leaving the party becomes the most likely outcome for the approximately one in eight Democrats and Republicans, who have a candidate evaluation rating below minus two. Figure 4.4 shows that using the feeling thermometer metric, leaving the party is the least likely option for Democrats at values lower than minus 30, and for Republicans, the value is minus 25. As such leaving the party is the least likely outcome for a higher proportion of the sample (91% for Democrats, 92% for Republicans) than the likes/dislikes method observed. Even so, the probability of leaving either party was higher in 1976 than it was in 1960. This finding supports (Abramson (1976); Broder (1972);Wattenberg (2009)) who argue politics became more candidate-centered during the 1960s and 70s. As such, we would expect to observe the direction of party identification being more responsive to assessments of the candidates, which indeed we do.

Table 4.3. 1976 Candidate Evaluation

	Democrats $N = 505$		Republicans $N = 297$	
	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong
candidate evaluation	-0.16*	0.20*	-0.25*	0.23*
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)
strength 1972	0.42	1.23*	0.45	1.06*
	(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.32)	(0.34)
strength 1974	0.44	1.68*	0.23	1.46*
	(0.24)	(0.27)	(0.38)	(0.33)
$PseudoR^2$	0.16		0.18	
$* = p \leq 0.05$				

Table 4.4. 1976 Candidate Feeling Thermometer

	Democrats N = 394		Republicans N = 245	
	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong
feeling therm difference	0.018* (0.005)	0.014* (0.004)	-0.011* (0.001)	0.018* (0.005)
strength 1972	-0.022 (0.404)	1.290* (0.267)	0.456 (0.450)	0.909* (0.343)
strength 1974	-0.198 (0.372)	1.75* (0.270)	-0.231 (0.491)	1.385* (0.338)
$PseudoR^2$		0.21		0.16

$* = p \leq 0.05$

Figure 4.3. 1976 Candidate Effect

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Figure 4.4. 1976 Candidate Feeling Thermometer

Looking at the relative changes in predicted probabilities of direction and strength, the two methods on face value yield contradictory results. As As Table 4.5 shows, for Democrats across the full range of candidate evaluations, we note a 78% change in the predicted probability of leaving the party, compared to a 70% variation for the strength component. Among Republicans, a 90% range in predicted probabilities for leaving the party is observed, compared to a 77% range in the strength component. Looking at the feeling thermometer metric Figure 4.4 and Table 4.6 across the observed range (-97 to 97 for Dems, -67 to 97 for Reps), we see a 55% variance in the predicted probability for leaving the party, compared to a 53% change in the predicted probability of being a strong Democrat. Across the narrower observed range for Republicans, we see a 33% change in the probability of leaving the party compared to a 57% change in the predicted probability of being a strong Republican. So some divergence in the two methods is observed. However, restricting the analysis to the 95% of panelists with the highest rating, the results of candidate evaluation and feeling thermometer methods converge and fall closer in line with those from 1960. For Democrats in this range

of candidate evaluation, there is a just under 60% change in the predicted probability of leaving the party, with a 64% change in the expected probability of being a strong Democrat observed. For Republicans, there is a variance of 57% probability of defecting compared to 68% variance in the predicted probability of being a strong identifier of the GOP. Using the highest 95% of feeling thermometer scores, we see a greater change in predicted probabilities for leaving the parties and being a strong identifier. For Democrats, there is a 30% change in the probability of leaving the party and a 40% change in the probability of being a strong Democrat. For Republicans, the difference in probabilities is starker, with a 48% change in the chances of being a strong Republican identifier in contrast to the 26% change in the likelihood of leaving the GOP. Thus, even in an election cycle where perceptions of the candidates had an unusually great effect on inter-party choice, the effect of candidates on intra-party sorting was greater.

Table 4.5. 1976 Change in Predicted Probability Candidate Evaluation

	Democrats			Republicans		
	Leave	Weak	Strong	Leave	Weak	Strong
	$p-value$	$p-value$	$p-value$	$p-value$	$p-value$	$p-value$
-10 to -5	-.182	.122	.059	-.190	.149	.040
	<.001	<.001	<.001	<.001	<001	.016
-5 to 0	-.269	.098	.172	-.365	.176	.189
	<.001	.013	<.001	<.001	.002	<.001
0 to 5	-.225	-.023	.248	-.267	-.035	.301
	<.001	.531	<.001	<.001	.513	<.001
5 to 10	-.104	-.117	.221	-.074	-.164	.238
	<.001	.001	<.001	<.001	<.001	<.001
-10 to 10	-.779	.080	.699	-.895	.126	.769
	<.001	.434	<.001	<.001	.243	<.001

Looking at the marginal effects of candidate evaluations on direction and strength of party identity, we note that the greatest change in probability of leaving the party occurs with negative evaluations. A Democrat rating Ford five points higher than Carter was 27% more likely to leave the party than a Democrat who rated the candidates evenly. In turn, the "even rater" was 22% more likely to defect than a Democrat rating Carter five points higher than Ford. Using the feeling thermometer metric, we see a Democrat who rated Ford 50

Table 4.6. 1976 Change in Predicted Probability Feeling Thermometer

	Democrats			Republicans		
	Leave	Weak	Strong	Leave	Weak	Strong
	$p-value$	$p-value$	$p-value$	$p-value$	$p-value$	$p-value$
-100 to -50	-.244	.130	.144	-.160	-.068	.092
	<.001	.016	<.001	.125	.504	<.001
-50 to 0	-.185	.041	.144	-.137	-.022	.159
	.001	.367	<.001	.092	.760	<.001
0 to 50	-.097	-.048	.145	-.090	-.105	.196
	<.001	.162	<.001	.007	.054	<.001
50 to 100	-.040	-.096	.136	-.047	-.141	.187
	<.001	.006	<.001	<.001	.004	<.001
observed range	-.550	.024	.526	-.326	-.245	.571
D -97 to 97, R -67 to 97	<.001	.857	<.001	.029	.157	<.001

points higher than Carter was 18% more likely to leave the party than a Democrat who had equally warm feelings toward Ford and Carter. However, a Democrat rating Carter 50 points higher than Ford is only 9% less likely to defect than the Democrat rating Ford and Carter equally. Among Republicans, an individual rating Carter five points higher than Ford is 36% more likely to leave the party than a Republican who sees the candidates evenly. Someone who rates Ford five points higher than Carter is 27% less likely to leave the party. Looking at the feeling thermometer method, we see minor changes in the probability of leaving the party. Republicans rating Ford at negative 50 are 14% more likely to leave the party than those Republicans who rate Ford and Carter evenly. There is a further 9% reduction in the probability of defecting if this rating changes to 50.

As observed in 1960, we note that the marginal effect of candidate evaluation on the strength of party ID is greatest in the positive evaluation range. A Democrat rating Carter and Ford evenly is 17% more likely to be a strong identifier than a Democrat who rated Ford five points higher than Carter. A Democrat rating Carter five points higher was 25% more likely to be a strong identifier than the neutral Democrat. Among Republicans, again, the contrast is starker with a 30% difference in probability of being a strong identifier between a rating of zero to five and a 19% difference between ratings of minus five and zero. Figure 4.6

shows that the marginal effect of the feeling thermometer rating upon Democrats' decision to identify strongly is close to constant across all ranges of feeling thermometer ratings. Indeed Table 4.6 shows less than 1% variance in effect this metric has on the probability of being a strong Democrat across each quartile range. Greater variance is observed among Republicans, although across the three upper quartiles (which contain over 97% of all values), the variance is less than 4%.

Figure 4.5. 1976 Marginal Effects of Candidate Evaluation

Figure 4.6. 1976 Marginal Effects of Candidate Feeling Thermometer

Summary of 1976

The 1976 election between Ford and Carter again lends strong support to H_1 and H_2. Although the election took place when the literature argues that dissatisfaction with the parties among the public was at its height, we still find a greater degree of intra-party variance of the strength of support than we see inter-party swapping. Whilst the individual's choice party was more susceptible to candidate evaluations than we saw in 1960. This change represents a loosening of the mooring rope of party identification instead of a slippage entirely of the anchor. We do not observe this phenomenon continuing in subsequent studies. The relative increase in the propensity to leave the party resulted in narrowing the differences between intra-party sorting and inter-party switching. Again this narrowing is not repeated in subsequent studies. Neither does the narrowing undermine the general premise of H_1. We still note more variance in the degree of attachment to the Democrats or Republicans than in the initial direction of party identification. Further, evidence supports H_2; again, the

greater the difference in how the candidates are rated, the greater the probability of being a strong party identifier. While party identification was not as rigid in the 1970s as it was in the years of "The American Voter," as we shall see, in the studies of the 1990s and 2000s, this period of political turmoil was the exception, not the rule.

4.4 1996

Introduction

The 1996 election between incumbent President Clinton and Senator Dole of Kansas offers the strongest support yet for $H_1 \& H_2$. Indeed for Democrats, as in 1960, we find no evidence that candidate evaluations affect the decision to defect from the party, yet they play an important role in identifying as a strong or weak Democrat.

Findings

The multinomial logit results are displayed in Table 4.7 for the likes/dislikes and Table 4.8 for the feeling thermometer metric. They show that for Democrats, there was no statistically significant relationship between candidate evaluations, measured in terms of likes/dislikes or feeling thermometer, and the decision to no longer identify as a Democrat. A significant relationship does exist across both measures between candidate evaluations and the strength of Democrats' attachment to the party. Among Republicans, a statistically significant relationship exists be- tween the decision to leave the GOP and the likes/dislike method of candidate evaluation, but not using the feeling thermometer method. Both forms of candidate evaluation show a statistically significant relationship with the weak/strong decision.

Again using *spost*, we are able to put the flesh on the bones of the multinational outputs. Figure 4.7 shows that for Democrats, leaving the party is the least likely option across all values of candidate evaluation. For Republicans, leaving the party becomes the least likely option at a value of minus one (a reduction of two from 1976); this covers 86% of previous consistent Republicans in the panel. Regarding the feeling thermometer measure, figure 4.8

Table 4.7. 1996 Candidate Evaluation

	Democrats N = 429		Republicans N = 269	
	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong
candidate evaluation	0.07 (0.12)	0.21* (0.09)	-0.29* (0.09)	0.21* (0.07)
strength 1992	0.04 (0.65)	1.36* (0.45)	-0.95 (0.71)	0.97* (0.45)
strength 1994	0.73 (0.67)	2.30* (0.45)	0.82 (0.63)	1.73* (0.46)
$PseudoR^2$	0.23		0.25	

$* = p \leq 0.05$

Table 4.8. 1996 Feeling Thermometer

	Democrats N = 152		Republicans N = 137	
	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong
feeling thermometer	0.01 (0.02)	0.03* (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.03* (0.01)
strength 1992	0.14 (0.65)	1.36* (0.46)	-0.44 (0.63)	0.70 (0.47)
strength 1994	0.76 (0.68)	0.47 (0.47)	0.48 (0.58)	1.68* (0.49)
$PseudoR^2$	0.25		0.22	

$* = p \leq 0.05$

shows that leaving the party becomes the least likely option for Democrats at values above minus 40; this covers the entire sample as the lowest observed value using this method was minus 30. For Republicans leaving the GOP becomes the least likely option at a zero rating, approximately 82% of the sample, a proportion similar to that found using the likes/dislikes method. Thus in 1996, we observed a greater proportion of Democrats than we did in 1976, for whom leaving the party is the least likely option. Among Republicans, we note, using the likes/dislikes method leaving the party is the least likely outcome for a greater proportion of the sample than it was in 1976. However, using the feeling thermometer, this proportion

decreases from 92% to 82%. It is worth reiterating that the relationship between the feeling thermometer and defection does not meet the threshold of statistical significance.

Figure 4.7. 1996 Candidate Effect

Figure 4.8. 1996 Candidate Feeling Thermometer

Turning our attention to the relative changes in probability for leaving the party and being a strong identifier, we find strong support for $H_1 \& H_2$, especially among Democrats. As previously stated, no statistically significant relationship was found between support for Clinton and continuing to identify as a Democrat. However, the probability of being a strong Democrat changed by close to 60% using both the likes/dislikes measure as shown in Table 4.9 and the feeling thermometer method Table 4.10. For Republicans across the whole range of candidate evaluation, there is more variance in the probability of leaving the GOP than there is in the probability of being a strong identifier, 87% to 77% using the likes/dislikes measure, and 86% to 79% using the feeling thermometer. Limiting the analysis to the 95% of the sample with the highest relative ratings of Dole, we observe a 44% change in probability of leaving the GOP and a 60% change in the probability of being a strong Republican when using the likes/dislikes method. Using the feeling thermometer, the probability of leaving the GOP changed by 54% among the highest 95% of Doles' ratings; however, the probability of identifying as a strong Republican varied by 69%. Thus, in 1996, as in 1960 and 1976, we observed more intra-party sorting than inter-party switching for the vast majority of panelists.

Table 4.9. 1996 Change in Predicted Probability Candidate Evaluation

| | Democrats | | | Republicans | | |
	Leave $p-value$	Weak $p-value$	Strong $p-value$	Leave $p-value$	Weak $p-value$	Strong $p-value$
-10 to -5	.008	-.146	.138	-.274	.190	.084
	.852	.012	<.001	<.001	<001	.039
-5 to 0	-.002	.157	.160	-.376	.147	.229
	.963	.045	.009	<.001	.071	<.001
0 to 5	-.011	-.147	.158	-.185	-.070	.225
	.809	.031	.018	<.001	.267	<.001
5 to 10	-.019	-.123	.142	-.040	-.152	.192
	.557	.003	.007	.013	.003	<.001
-10 to 10	-.024	.574	.598	-.874	.114	.760
	.887	.016	.003	<.001	.390	<.001

Table 4.10. 1996 Change in Predicted Probability Feeling Thermometer

	Democrats			Republicans		
	Leave	Weak	Strong	Leave	Weak	Strong
	$p-value$	$p-value$	$p-value$	$p-value$	$p-value$	$p-value$
-100 to -50	-.087	-.029	.116	-.224	.184	.040
	.648	.882	.011	.002	.002	.157
-50 to 0	-.107	-.111	.218	-.499	.268	.231
	.495	.434	<.001	<.001	.004	<.001
0 to 50	-.083	.156	.240	-.209	-.095	.304
	.263	.065	.003	<.001	.160	<.001
50 to 100	-.048	-.154	.201	-.024	-.199	.222
	.001	.001	<.001	.098	<.001	<.001
observed range	-.195	-.386	.581	-.863	.078	.786
	.250	.046	<.001	<.001	.528	<.001

The marginal effects of 1996 candidate evaluations are shown in figure 4.9 for likes/dislikes and figure 4.10 for the feeling thermometer measure. As described above, the study finds no relationship between the decision to defect using either metric for Democrats and Republicans using the candidate method. Regarding Republican candidate evaluations, we see again that the greatest change in probability of leaving a party is found among negative ratings. A Republican rating Dole and Clinton evenly was 37% less likely to defect from the GOP than a Republican with a rating of negative five. However, a Republican with an evaluation of five is only 23% less likely to leave the party than the neutral rater. The horizontal nature of the" strong party ID" line in figure 4.9 reflects the near consistent marginal effects of candidate evaluations on the probability of being a strong Democrat. A move from a rating of minus five to even increases this by 16%, with a further move to plus five increasing the probability by a similar amount. A final move to the maximum ten rating increases the probability of identifying strongly by another 14%. A similar consistency of marginal effects is observed in the feeling thermometer method. Increasing the rating from minus 50 to zero increases the probability of strongly identifying by 22%, another 50 point increase improves the probability by a further 24%, while moving to the maximum 100 point difference increases the probability by another 20%. The marginal effects of candidate evaluations on the strength of party attachment were almost as consistent for Republicans. A move from a

rating of minus five to zero, or zero to five, saw the probability of being a strong Republican identifier increase by 22%. An increase from five to the maximum ten sees probability increase by an additional 19%. More variation in the marginal effects is observed in figure 4.10. The probability of being a strong Republican improves by 23%, moving from a feeling thermometer rating of minus 50 to zero. Shifting from zero to 50 improves probability by an additional 30%, with the increase in probability falling back to 22% for a subsequent movement to the maximum 100.

Figure 4.9. 1996 Marginal Effects of Candidate Evaluation

Figure 4.10. 1996 Marginal Effects of Candidate Feeling Thermometer

Summary of 1996

The 1996 Clinton-Dole election offers the most robust support yet seen to $H_1 \& H_2$; indeed, for Democrats, we see no statistical relationship between how the candidates are perceived and the decision to remain or stay with the party. This finding strongly contradicts the arguments of Broder (1972) and Abramson (1976), who argue that party ID was losing its influence as politics became more candidate-centered compared to the 1960s. In line with the dissertations theory, we observe a variance of 60% in the probability of being a strong Democrat while not observing any drift away from the party based upon t candidate evaluations. Although we do see a relationship between candidate evaluation and the decision to leave the GOP, this effect is of a lesser magnitude than the effect that candidate evaluations play on how strongly an individual identifies with the party. No relationship is observed using the feeling thermometer metric and leaving the GOP while feeling thermometer ratings of Dole and Clinton affect the probability of being a strong Republican by over 78%. So in

the 1990s, the direction of party identification was largely unaffected by the two candidates, suggesting vigorously that the party was not over. However, candidate selection played a pivotal role in determining how strongly individuals identified with their party.

4.5 2004

Introduction

In 2004 panelists of the ANES study were not asked to name their likes and dislikes of the candidates, so we a left with just the feeling thermometer as a means of assessing attitudes towards the candidates. However, the 2004 election between incumbent President George Walker Bush and Senator John Kerry of Massachusetts still strongly supports H_1 and H_2. In somewhat of a mirror reflection of 1996, the evaluations of an incumbent President and his challenger do not have a statistically significant effect on the decision of prior identifiers to leave the party, while they have a substantive effect on the intensity of identification with the Presidents party. While the party out of the white house, we see a relationship in both direction and strength of attachment. As was the case for Republicans in 1996, candidate evaluations have a greater effect on the strength of attachment to the party than they do on the decision to leave the party or not.

Findings

The multinomial results for the 2004 election are laid out in Table 4.11. It shows that a statistically significant relationship exists, for members of both parties, between the feeling thermometer metric and the decision to identify strongly or weakly with their chosen party. For the first time, we find a relationship among Democrats and the decision to leave the party based on an assessment of the candidates and not one among Republicans.

The *spost* analysis can be found in Table 4.12 and figure 4.11. For Democrats, leaving the party is the least likely option for the feeling thermometer ratings below minus 45;

Table 4.11. 2004 Feeling Thermometer

	Democrats N = 222		Republicans N = 221	
	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong
feeling thermometer	0.026*	0.024*	-0.003	0.020*
	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)
strength 2000	-0.477	0.578	0.598	1.441*
	(0.717)	(0.392)	(0.621)	(0.454)
strength 2002	-0.154	2.378*	0.418	1.912*
	(0.870)	(0.435)	(0.651)	(0.456)
$PseudoR^2$	0.29		0.27	

$* = p \leq 0.05$

for Republicans, the figure is minus 60, representing 96% of Democrats and over 98% of Republicans in the panels. These numbers are remarkably similar to those of the 1960 study. This gives at least an indication that after the relative decline in party stability described in the 1970s, the general stickiness in the direction of party identification was as prevalent in 2004 as it was on the day of *The American Voter.*

Turning to look at the relative changes in probability, we again see strong support for $H_1\&H_2$. Table 4.12 shows the probability of leaving the Democrat party altered by close to 65% across the range of observed values of the feeling thermometer rating. The likelihood of being a strong Democrat varied by 82%; however, if we exclude the nine Democrats on the panel with the lowest ratings, the variance in the probability of leaving the party falls to 20%. There is still a 50% variance in the probability of identifying as a strong Democrat. On the Republican side, as noted, we do not observe a statistically significant relationship between candidate feeling thermometer ratings and the probability of leaving the GOP. However, we find a variance of over 65% in the predicted probability of being a strong Republican.

The Marginal effects of the feeling thermometer rating are shown in figure 4.12. Once again, we see the greatest marginal effects on the probability of leaving a party occurring in the negative evaluation region. A Democrat rating Bush 50 points higher than Kerry was 25% more likely to leave the party than an individual rating Kerry and Bush equally. However,

Figure 4.11. 2004 Candidate Feeling Thermometer

even rating Democrat was only 7% less likely to defect from the Democrats than someone rating Kerry 50 points higher than Bush. We also observe a declining marginal effect on being a strong identifier, although the magnitude of this decline is not as great. The Democrat rating Bush 50 points higher than Kerry is 27% less likely to be a strong Democrat than someone rating the two candidates evenly. Rating Kerry 50 points higher than Bush increases the probability of being a strong Democrat a further 20%. As noted, candidate evaluations (in terms of feeling thermometer measures) had no statistically significant effect on the decisions of previously identifying Republicans to desert the party. We observe declining marginal effects of candidate evaluation on the decision to identify strongly as a Republican. The slope of the "Strong Party ID" curve for Republicans in figure 4.12 reflects the decline in marginal effect is slight compared to Democrats. A Republican rating Kerry 50 points higher than Bush is 19% less likely to be a strong Republican than someone rating them equally. Those rating Bush 50 points higher than Kerry were another 17% more likely to be strong Republicans than the even rater.

Table 4.12. 2004 Change in Predicted Probability Feeling Thermometer

	Democrats			Republicans		
	Leave	Weak	Strong	Leave	Weak	Strong
	$p-value$	$p-value$	$p-value$	$p-value$	$p-value$	$p-value$
-100 to -50	-.382	.159	.223	-.109	-.051	.160
	<.001	.051	<.001	.298	.597	<.001
-50 to 0	-.250	-.024	.274	-.103	.088	.191
	.014	.740	<.001	.217	.201	.001
0 to 50	-.071	-.137	.208	-.074	.102	.176
	.001	.003	<.001	.086	.035	.003
50 to 100	-.012	-.123	.136	-.046	-.100	.145
	.056	<.001	<.001	.001	.002	<.001
observed range	-.647	-.165	.812	-.322	-.338	.659
	.001	.313	<.001	.154	.109	<.001

Figure 4.12. 2004 Marginal Effects of Candidate Feeling Thermometer

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Summary of 2004

The election of 2004 offers strong support for $H1\&H2$, with similar findings to those of 1996. Among Republicans, only the strength of attachment to the party is affected by candidate evaluations, with the probability of being a strong Republican varying close to 66%. While for most Democrats defecting from the party based on candidate evaluations is only a remote possibility, being less than a one in seven chance for the 94% of Democrats with the highest rating. The change in probability of being a strong Democrat for this substantial majority is three times the change in the likelihood of leaving the Democrats.

4.6 Summary of Candidate Evaluations

Table 4.13 collates the four studies, indicating where statistically significant relationships are found.

Table 4.13. Summary of Candidate Effect

	Democrats		Republicans	
	Direction	Strength	Direction	Strength
1960 Candidate Evaluation		x	x	x
1976 Candidate Evaluation	x	x	x	x
1976 Feeling Thermometer	x	x	x	x
1996 Candidate Evaluation		x	x	x
1996 Feeling Thermometer		x		x
2004 Feeling Thermometer	x	x		x

We see robust support for H_2 across all four ANES panel studies; for both parties, using either metric, we find a relationship between how candidates are perceived and the strength of attachment to a party. The view of candidates does not affect party identification direction to the same extent that it moves the strength of attachment. Indeed we see that in two of the elections studied; candidate evaluations did not affect the decision to remain loyal to the Democratic party. In contrast, Republicans are more fickle in their loyalty to the GOP, a statistically significant relationship observed in three of the four elections. However,

in cases where the study found a relationship between leaving either party and candidate evaluations, the magnitude of this effect was, for the vast majority of respondents, less than the corresponding effect on the strength of party identification, supporting H_1.

5. IDEOLOGY

5.1   Introduction

The study of the effect of ideology upon the strength of an individual's strength of party attachment consistently supports $H_1 \& H_3 a$. We find that ideology, measured in terms of self-placement, or feelings toward conservatives and liberals, is an important factor in determining the strength of party attachment of Republicans. For Democrats, the role of ideology in determining the strength of attachment to the party is less clear-cut. In 1976 and 2004, but not 1996, a significant relationship is found between feeling thermometer ratings of liberals and conservatives and strength of attachment; however, this relationship is not found when using the self-placement model. For Republicans, both measures had a statistically significant impact upon the decision to remain loyal to the GOP in 1976 and 1996, but not in 2004. For Democrats, however, ideology wasn't a statistically significant factor in the decision to leave the party across any of the three election cycles studied. These findings reinforce Grossmann and Hopkins, 2016;Mayhew, 1966 ; Polsby, 2008; and others in their observations that Republicans are driven more by ideology than Democrats.

We can make the following observations across the three elections studied (ANES did not ask questions about ideology in the 1960 study).

We can make the following observations across the three elections studied (questions about ideology were not asked in the 1960 study).

- The ideology of previous Republicans plays a role in determining the direction and strength of their party identification.

- The effect of ideology on both direction and strength of attachment for Republicans was greatest in the 1996 study.

- The ideology of previous Democrats does not play a statistically significant role in the direction of their party identification. Only on selective occasions does it affect the strength of attachment.

- For the vast majority of panelists from both parties, a change in party identification for ideological reasons remains the least likely outcome.

- For the vast majority of panelists, there is more variance in the probability of being a strong identifier than in changing party identification.

5.2 1976

Introduction

The 1976 study finds strong support for H_3a across both metrics, the more conservative Republican views themselves, the greater the probability of them being a strong Republican. Among Democrats, we find support for H_3b using the feeling thermometer metric; the more Democrats favor liberals over conservatives, the more likely they are to be strong Democrats. However, the study found no relationship between the strength of attachment to the Democrats and ideological self-placement. The study also found support among supporters of both parties for H_1. Across all values of ideology and feeling thermometer differences, the change in the probability of being a strong party identifier is greater than the change in the likelihood of leaving the party. Contrary to expectations, the study finds a positive relationship between a conservative ideology and the probability of leaving the party of Lincoln.

Findings

The multinomial logit results for the effect of ideology upon party identification are found in Table 5.1 for self-placement and Table 5.2 for the feeling thermometer measure.

They show that ideology plays a statistically significant role in the direction and strength of party identification among Republicans. As noted above, in 1976, we find that the more conservative a Republican was, or the more they rated conservatives over liberals, the greater the probability of them being a strong Republican *and* the greater the likelihood of them leaving the GOP.

Table 5.1. 1976 Ideology Liberal to Conservative

	Democrats N = 264		Republicans N = 197	
	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong
Ideology	0.026	-0.233	0.650*	0.723*
	(0.164)	(0.137)	(0.259)	(0.177)
strength 1972	0.030	1.451*	1.108*	0.738
	(0.497)	(0.338)	(0.546)	(0.398)
strength 1974	-0.553	1.834*	-0.888	1.548*
	(0.482)	(0.336)	(0.628)	(0.399)
$PseudoR^2$	0.20		0.19	
$* = p \leq 0.05$				

Despite this, Figure 5.1 shows that leaving the Republican party is the least likely outcome across the full range of self-placement ideology. The feeling thermometer metric yields similar results as illustrated by Figure 5.2; the graph does show, however, that those Republicans who rated conservatives 80 points higher than liberals were more likely to leave the party than identify weakly as Republicans (they were still three times more likely to identify as strong Republicans), this set of Republicans accounts for approximately 3.5% of the Republicans in the panel.

Table 5.2. 1976 Liberal Conservative FT Difference

|	Democrats N = 360		Republicans N = 223	
	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong
LibCon FT	-0.004	0.014*	0.017*	0.018*
	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.007)
strength 1972	0.185	1.370*	0.509	0.993*
	(0.396)	(0.286)	(0.448)	(0.353)
strength 1974	-0.188	2.008*	-0.313	1.482*
	(0.365)	(0.295)	(0.498)	(0.352)
$PseudoR^2$	0.18		0.15	
$* = p \leq 0.05$				

Figure 5.1. 1976 Ideology Self Placement

Figure 5.2. 1976 Ideology Feeling Thermometer

Although not the purpose of this study, it is worth speculating on possible explantations of the positive correlation between the probability of leaving the GOP and increased conservatism, observed in 1976, and as we shall see, not in 1996 or 2004, one explanation is in the nature of the Democrat party candidate. The 1972 candidate was George McGovern, a liberal northerner, whose nomination may have led to many Southerners leaving their natural party (who tend to be more conservative than the rest of the nation). The nomination of Jimmy Carter, a relatively moderate southerner, may have led these conservative southerners to return (briefly) to the Democrat flock.

However, as shown in both Figures 5.1 and 5.2, this increased probability of leaving the GOP over the range of ideological self-placement and feeling thermometer measurement is not as great as the change in the likelihood of being a strong Republican. In terms of substantive probability, Table 5.3 shows that a previously self-identifying Republican, who considered themselves "Liberal," was 11% less likely to leave the GOP than an individual identifying as "Conservative." However, the "liberal" Republican was also 40% less likely to be a strong Republican than the self-identifying "conservative."

Table 5.3. 1976 Change in Predicted Probability Ideology Self Placement

	Democrats			Republicans		
	Leave	Weak	Strong	Leave	Weak	Strong
	$p - value$	$p - value$	$p - value$	$p - value$	$p - value$	$p - value$
Lib-Con	.049	.109	.153	.113	-.520	.407
	.542	.260	.073	.012	<.001	<.001
Extreme Liberal to Middle of the Road	.033	.084	-.117	.057	.283	.226
	.450	.202	.078	<.001	<.001	<.001
Middle of the Road to Extreme Conservative	.033	.078	-.111	.097	.442	.325
	.610	.323	.063	203	<.001	.001

The greater variance in the strength of attachment, vis-a-vis, change in party identification, is also observed using the feeling thermometer metric see Table 5.4. Over the range of observed values (-70 to 100), individuals with the lowest rating were 16% less likely to leave the GOP than individuals with the highest rating. The highest rating Republican, however, had a 34% higher probability of being a strong Republican than the lowest rating Republican.

Table 5.3 also shows a greater degree of variance in the probability of being a strong Republican in the range of conservative ideologies than there is among liberal ideologies. A Republican describing themselves as "Middle of the Road" is 22% more likely to be a strong Republican than that rare breed an "Extremely Liberal" Republican. An "Extremely Conservative" Republican on the other hand, it is 32% more likely to be a strong Republican than the "Middle of the Road" GOP identifier.

Table 5.4. 1976 Change in Predicted Probability Lib-Con Feeling Thermometer

	Democrats			Republicans		
	Leave	Weak	Strong	Leave	Weak	Strong
	$p-value$	$p-value$	$p-value$	$p-value$	$p-value$	$p-value$
-100 to -50	-.062	-.042	.103	.034	-.187	.136
	.414	.559	<.001	<.001	<.001	<.001
-50 to 0	-.055	-.064	.119	.051	-.187	.136
	.286	.253	.002	.008	.001	.003
0 to 50	-.046	-.079	.124	.061	-.191	.129
	.106	.080	.005	.194	.002	.027
50 to 100	-.036	-.087	.123	.053	-.150	.097
	.001	.020	.003	.433	<.001	.137
observed range	-.180	-.257	.437	.158	-.503	.344
	.205	.144	.002	.207	<.001	.023

Figure 5.3 shows the greatest marginal effect of ideology on the probability of being a strong Republican occurs in the boundary between "Middle of the Road" and "Conservative Leaning." It is also worthy of note that the marginal effect of a move from "Liberal Leaning" to "Middle of the Road" is slightly greater than that of a movement from "Conservative" to "Extremely Conservative" at 10.2% and 9.6% respectfully.

Among Democrats, the study finds that ideology didn't play a statistical significant role in the direction of their party identification in 1976. Regarding the strength of attachment to the party, the study found no significant relationship using the self-placement method, although the relationship was in the theorized direction. However, the study found a statistically significant relationship using the feeling thermometer metric, see Table 5.2. Figure 5.2 shows that for all values of the feeling thermometer measure over -75 leaving

the Democrats is the least likely outcome. However, the lowest rating observed among the Democrat panel members was -30, so leaving the Democrat party was the least likely outcome for all Democrats in 1976. Table 5.4 shows that across a narrower observed range than Republicans, the feeling thermometer measure of ideology had a greater effect upon the strength of attachment to the Democrat party. A Democrat with the lowest rating (-30) was 44% less likely to be a strong Democrat than one with the highest rating. As noted, Republicans with a range of -70 to 100 experienced an increase in the probability of being a strong identifier was 34%.

Figure 5.3. 1976 Ideology Marginal Effects

Summary of 1976

The study from 1976 offers strong support to $H_1 and H_3 a$, with qualified support for $H_3 b$. Greater variance is observed in the probability of being a strong party identifier than the variance in leaving either of the parties, based on ideology.

Leaving the party remains the least likely option for all previously consistent party identifiers, whatever their ideology. However, we see switching in the rank order of likelihood between identifying as a strong or weak Republican. When the literature suggests party loyalty was declining, we find no evidence suggesting that ideology was driving this decline. However, we observe a degree of intra-party sorting along ideological lines, with more conservative Republicans, especially, becoming more committed to the party of Lincoln.

5.3   1996

Introduction

The 1996 study strongly supports $H_3 a$. Once again, an individual's ideology influences the strength of attachment to the Republican party. If measured by self-placement on a seven-point ideological scale or by an individual's relative feelings toward conservatives and liberals. We, however, find no evidence to support $H_3 b$. The study finds no statically significant relationship linking either metric of ideology to the decision to leave the Democratic Party or how strongly individuals identified as Democrats. For Republicans, we again see a relationship between leaving the party and ideology; unlike in 1976, the association is in the hypothesized direction, with more conservative Republicans less likely to leave the GOP.

Findings

The multinomial logit results for ideology's effect on party identification in 1996 are shown in Table 5.5 for self-placement, and Table 5.6 for the feeling thermometer metric. Figures 5.4 and 5.5 show statistically significant relationships among Republicans between

personal ideology and both direction and strength of party identification. Leaving the party is the least likely outcome for the vast majority of Republicans and Democrats.

Table 5.5. 1996 Ideology Liberal to Conservative

	Democrats N = 96		Republicans N = 124	
	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong
Ideology	0.463	-0.110	-0.714*	1.127*
	(0.303)	(0.236)	(0.259)	(0.177)
strength 1992	0.463	1.648*	-0.436	0.929
	(0.780)	(0.575)	(0.688)	(0.489)
strength 1994	0.459	2.189*	0.482	1.405*
	(0.764)	(0.573)	(0.633)	(0.517)
$PseudoR^2$	0.23		0.26	
$* = p \leq 0.05$				

Table 5.6. 1996 Liberal Conservative FT Difference

	Democrats N = 152		Republicans N = 137	
	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong
LibCon FT	-0.004	0.006	-0.039*	0.032*
	(0.013)	(0.009)	(0.014)	(0.009)
strength 1992	0.045	1.303*	-0.434	0.779
	(0.654)	(0.437)	(0.650)	(0.464)
strength 1994	0.750	2.192*	0.637	1.498*
	(0.699)	(0.462)	(0.613)	(0.474)
$PseudoR^2$	0.20		0.26	
$* = p \leq 0.05$				

However, for the less than 5% of previous Republicans who identified themselves as liberal, leaving the party was the most likely outcome. Similarly, when using the feeling thermometer metric, we see that if Republicans rated conservatives higher than liberals, leaving the GOP was the least likely outcome. However, among those Republicans rating liberals at least 20 points higher than conservatives (again 5% of the sample), leaving the

GOP was the most likely outcome. Using this metric for all Democrats, leaving the party was the least likely option, including the 6% of Democrats rating conservatives at least 20 points higher than liberals.

On the self-placement scale, leaving the Democrats was the least likely outcome for 94% of all previous Democrats, including the 13% that classed themselves as "slightly conservative." Whilst the probability of leaving the party, for the 6% Democrats who consider themselves "conservative" does slightly pass the odds of being a "weak Democrat" at 31% to 27%. However, still the most likely outcome for these most conservative Democrats at 41% is a strong Democrat. So we see, at least to the midpoint of the Clinton years, it was still possible to consider oneself both a strong Democrat and a conservative. However, in 1996, there was only a 1% chance that a previously identifying Republican, who thought of themselves as liberal, would identify strongly with the GOP. Indeed by far, the most likely outcome for "liberal" previous Republicans was for them to no longer identify as Republicans at 70%.

Figure 5.4. 1996 Ideology Self Placement

Figure 5.5. 1996 Ideology Feeling Thermometer

Looking at Table 5.7, we note that the vast majority of the change in probability of being a strong Republican occurs in the middle of the road to an extremely conservative region of ideology. Whilst a Liberal Republican is 63% less likely to be a strong Republican than a conservative. We find an extreme conservative is 67% more likely to be a strong Republican than someone seeing themselves as the middle of the road. While the odds of leaving the GOP fall 66% as ideology moves from liberal to conservative, within the middle of the road to extremely conservative region, these odds change by only 31%. As 95% of the Republican panelists fall into the middle of the road to extremely conservative categories, H_1 is confirmed. Table 5.8 reinforces these findings using the conservative/liberal feeling thermometer metric, as 90% of the Republican panelists rate conservatives higher or equal with liberals. Within this group, the odds of leaving the Republican party decline by 28% when one compares an individual who rates conservatives and liberals equally with an individual who rates conservatives 100 points higher than liberals; however, the odds of being a strong Republican increase by 64% over that range. If we look at the close to 30% of Republicans

who rate conservatives 50 or more points higher, the difference is even starker. The odds of leaving the GOP fall by less than 3% as the rating difference between conservatives and liberals increase from 50 to 100 points; a similar increase sees the odds of identifying strongly as a Republican improve by nearly a quarter.

Concerning the Marginal effects of ideology on the probability of being a strong Republican, figure 5.6 shows, as was seen in 1976, that the greatest impact on the likelihood of being a strong Republican takes place on the boundary of "middle of the road" and "conservative-leaning" ideologies. We also note that ideology's substantive effect on both the decision to leave or remain a Republican and the strength of attachment to the GOP was much greater in 1996 than in 1976 (and as we shall see in 2004). For example, looking at the changes in probability between "middle of the road" Republicans and "extremely conservative" Republicans, 1976, saw a variance of less than 10% in the decision to leave the GOP and 32% variance in the probability of being a strong Republican. Twenty years later, the variance in odds of leaving the GOP had more than tripled to 31%, while the probability of being a strong Republican doubled to 66%. Using the feeling thermometer metric, instead, the changes in observed probabilities were even more pronounced. Looking at Republicans who rated conservatives equally with liberals, or fifty points higher, we notice a difference in the likelihood of leaving the GOP in 1996 four times higher than that observed in 1976 (25% to 6%); similarly, the variance in probability of being a strong Republican was three times higher in 1996 as it was in 1976 (39% to 13%).

Table 5.7. 1996 Change in Predicted Probability Ideology Self Placement

	Democrats			Republicans		
	Leave $p-value$	Weak $p-value$	Strong $p-value$	Leave $p-value$	Weak $p-value$	Strong $p-value$
Lib-Con	.251 .096	-.075 .610	-.176 .198	-.663 .001	.033 .871	.630 <.001
Extreme Liberal to Middle of the Road	.109 .009	-.013 .903	-.096 .338	-.515 <.001	.354 .007	.161 .014
Middle of the Road to Extreme Conservative	.275 .147	-.103 .393	-.172 .142	-.309 <.001	-.360 .005	.669 <.001

Table 5.8. 1996 Change in Predicted Probability Lib-Con Feeling Thermometer

	Democrats			Republicans		
	Leave	Weak	Strong	Leave	Weak	Strong
	$p-value$	$p-value$	$p-value$	$p-value$	$p-value$	$p-value$
-100 to -50	-.043	-.022	.064	-.177	.156	.021
	.692	.817	.418	.052	.049	.266
-50 to 0	-.034	-.027	.061	-.507	.283	.224
	.632	.730	.420	<.001	.010	<.001
0 to 50	-.027	-.031	.058	-.255	-.136	.391
	.524	.653	.417	<.001	.100	<.001
50 to 100	-.020	-.034	.054	-.026	-.220	.245
	.318	.589	.409	.115	<.001	<.001
observed range	-.097	-.102	.199	-.662	-.167	.829
	.571	.675	.412	<.001	.283	<.001

Summary of 1996

The study of ideology in 1996 offers the strongest support yet for H_3a, with the magnitude of the effect of ideology on the strength of support for the GOP far out-weighing the impact observed twenty years earlier. The increase in the effect of ideology also influenced the decision to remain loyal or not to the Republican party, which means that support for H_1 in 1996 is not as unequivocal as it was in 1976. In 1976, the change in probability of being a strong Republican was greater than the change in the likelihood of leaving the party across all ideologies. In 1996 the few liberals who remained in the Republican party were more likely to leave the party than change the strength of their attachment to it.

Among Democrats, we see no evidence to support H_3b. Democrats again appear not to be motivated by ideology (Grossmann and Hopkins (2016), Polsby (2008)); further, we see no evidence of conservatives leaving the Democratic Party based on their ideology. It was still possible in 1996 to be a conservative Democrat, with nearly 15% of the Democratic panel classifying themselves as some form of conservative, suggesting that the "Partisan sort" Levendusky (2009) did not occur simultaneously.

Figure 5.6. 1996 Ideology Marginal Effects

5.4   2004

Introduction

The 2004 ANES study did not ask panel members to place themselves of the ideological spectrum, although ANES asked the question to the wider 2004 survey. Based on feeling thermometer ratings for conservatives and liberals, the 2004 study finds that ideology did not play a statistically significant role in deciding to leave their respective parties. However, ideology does, for supporters of both parties, influence the strength of party identification. Thus additional support is lent to H_1 as well as to both H_3a and H_3b.

Findings

The multinomial logit results for 2004 are shown in Table 5.9, with a graphic representation shown in 5.7. As measured through feelings towards liberals and conservatives, ideology does not statistically significantly impact the decision to leave either party. As in 1976 and

1996, party defection was the least likely option across all ranges of feelings toward liberals and conservatives. The flat slope of the "leave party" plot in 5.7 suggests when compared to the similar plot on figures 5.2 and 5.5, that ideology in the first election of the 21st Century played a less substantive role than it had in the last quarter of the 20th Century, in the decision to remain loyal to the party.

However, regarding the strength of attachment, we find that ideology plays a statistically significant role for both parties. Further, unlike in previous studies, ideology has a greater substantive impact upon Democrats than it did on Republicans. Table 5.10 shows that in the range of feeling thermometer evaluations between 0 and 50, in which approximately 70% of both Democrats and Republicans fall, the probability of being a strong Democrat varied by 18% for Democrats compared to 12% for GOP. Across the observed values, Democrats show a variance of 53% in the probability of being a strong Democrat compared to a change of 41% in the likelihood of being a strong Republican.

Table 5.9. 2004 Liberal Conservative FT Difference

	Democrats $N = 207$		Republicans $N = 224$	
	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong
LibCon FT	0.001	0.026*	-0.007	0.014*
	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.007)
strength 2000	0.028	0.766	0.619	1.581*
	(0.676)	(0.392)	(0.623)	(0.446)
strength 2002	0.532	2.386*	0.429	1.903*
	(0.796)	(0.443)	(0.651)	(0.454)
$PseudoR^2$	0.22		0.26	
$* = p \leq 0.05$				

Table 5.10. 2004 Change in Predicted Probability Lib-Con Feeling Thermometer

| | Democrats | | | Republicans | | |
| | Leave | Weak | Strong | Leave | Weak | Strong |
	$p - value$	$p - value$	$p - value$	$p - value$	$p - value$	$p - value$
-100 to -50	-.037	-.169	.206	-.147	-.012	.160
	.716	.110	<.001	.332	.907	.009
-50 to 0	-.038	-.173	.211	-.107	-.043	.150
	.537	.026	.001	.282	.551	.029
0 to 50	-.032	-.150	.182	-.066	-.062	.128
	.157	.001	<.001	.105	.205	.016
50 to 100	-.020	-.091	.110	-.036	-.069	.105
	.004	<.001	<.001	<.001	.047	.005
observed range	-.094	-.432	.525	-.236	-.179	.415
	.297	.001	<.001	.174	.277	.013

Figure 5.7. 2004 Ideology Feeling Thermometer

Summary of 2004

In 2004 we found support for H_1, as was seen in 1976. In each of the four quartiles of the feeling thermometer rating, we observe a greater change in the probability of being a strong party identifier than we do in the likelihood of defection from either party. We also see support for H_3a and H_3b. The greater degree Republicans rate conservatives higher than liberals, and liberals over conservatives for Democrats, the greater the probability they identify strongly with their party. The effect of ideology on the probability of being a strong Republican is reduced dramatically in the eight years between the latest two studies. The observed 41% variance in the probability of being a strong Republican is approximately half that observed in 1996.

5.5   Summary of Ideology Effects

Table 5.11 collates the three studies, indicating where statistically significant relationships are found.

Table 5.11. Summary of Ideology Effect

	Democrats		Republicans	
	Direction	Strength	Direction	Strength
1976 Self Placement			x	x
1976 Feeling Thermometer		x	x	x
1996 Self Placement			x	x
1996 Feeling Thermometer			x	x
2004 Feeling Thermometer		x		x

We see in contrast to the candidate effect; ideology predominantly affects Republicans. Over each of the three studies, there was no significant relationship among Democrats between respondents' ideology and their decision to remain loyal to the party. Republicans, however, were more mercurial, with ideology playing a significant role in the decision to defect from the GOP in two of the three studies. The strength of Republican attachment was also more consistently influenced by ideology. In each study and using both the self-

placement and feeling thermometer measures, the more conservative a respondent, the more likely they are to be a strong Republican. The effect that ideology played on Republican strength of attachment was at its greatest in the 1996 study. The findings are in keeping with the work of a long line of scholars, notably Grossmann and Hopkins (2015) and Polsby (2008), who argue that ideology drives Republicans more than Democrats.

6. RETROSPECTIVE EVALUATIONS

6.1 Introduction

The two variants of retrospective evaluations studied namely presidential approval and a respondent's economic situation, offer mixed results. When examining the effect of presidential approval (or disapproval), the study finds strong and consistent support for H_4. However, regarding respondents' financial situation, the study finds no evidence that this affects either the direction or strength of party ID. Across the three ANES studies that inquired about these retrospective evaluations, we find

- Leaving a political party based on presidential approval is the least likely outcome for all but a small proportion of Republicans in 1996.

- Democrats consistently sort between weak and strong attachment to the party, based on presidential approval, but this does not affect the decision to defect from the party.

- The effect that presidential approval has on the strength of party attachment is greater among Republicans.

- Self-evaluations of respondents' financial situation do not affect the direction or strength of party ID.

6.2 1976

Introduction

The 1976 study gives qualified support for H_4. Evaluations of the unelected President Ford had a statistically significant impact on the strength of attachment to the Democratic Party but did not affect the decision to remain loyal. However, for Republicans, we observe the opposite. Republicans in 1976 give us the only example of a statistically significant relationship not being observed between presidential approval and the decision to be a strong or weak party identifier. Further, this is one of only two examples of a statistically significant relationship between presidential approval and the choice to leave or remain loyal to the party.

Findings

The multinomial logistic results for the 1976 study of presidential approval are shown in Table 6.1 The *spost* analysis of predicted probabilities is shown in Table 6.2, with a visual representation of these depicted in figure 6.1. We observe that for Democrats, a statistically significant relationship exists between approval for President Ford and strength of attachment to the Democratic party; no similar relationship is found regarding the decision to leave the party.

For Republicans, we see a relationship between approval for President Ford on the decision to remain loyal to the party of Nixon, but not a significant relationship between that approval and the choice of strong or weak Republicans. Substantively, using *spost* analysis, we see that a previously identifying Democrat was 18% less likely to be a strong Democrat if they approved of President Ford than if they disapproved.

Figure 6.1 illustrates that evaluations of President Ford had virtually no impact upon the decision to leave the Democratic Party, which was the least likely outcome for both those approving and disapproving of President Ford. For Republicans, we see a decline in the probability of leaving the Republican Party of 17 Figure 6.1 also illustrates the unusual phenomena of both the probability of being a strong Republican and being a weak republican increasing with presidential approval. We would expect to see these probabilities normally go in opposite directions.

We observe that for Democrats, a statistically significant relationship exists between approval for President Ford and strength of attachment to the Democratic Party. Such a relationship is not found when looking at the likelihood of leaving the Democratic Party, although the direction of the relationship is in the expected direction.

For Republicans, we see a relationship between approval for President Ford on the decision to remain loyal to the party of Nixon, but not a significant relationship between that approval and the choice of strong or weak Republican.

Table 6.1. 1976 Ford Approval

	Democrats N = 334		Republicans N = 225	
	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong
Ford Approval	0.05	-1.04*	-1.19*	0.23
	(0.36)	(0.28)	(0.51)	(0.54)
strength 1972	-0.23	1.30*	0.27	1.04*
	(0.44)	(0.28)	(0.48)	(0.35)
strength 1974	-0.32	1.67*	-0.39	1.51*
	(0.40)	(0.29)	(0.55)	(0.34)
$PseudoR^2$	0.19		0.15	

$* = p \leq 0.05$

Table 6.2. 1976 Change in Predicted Probability Ford Approval

	Democrats			Republicans		
	Leave $p-value$	Weak $p-value$	Strong $p-value$	Leave $p-value$	Weak $p-value$	Strong $p-value$
Disap to Approve	.038	.139	-.178	-.168	.068	.101
	.298	.008	<.001	.035	.466	.271

Substantively, using spost analysis, we see that a previously identifying Democrat was 18% less likely to be a strong Democrat if they approved of President Ford than if they disapproved.

Figure 6.1 illustrates that evaluations of President Ford had virtually no impact upon the decision to leave the Democratic Party, which was the least likely outcome for both those approving and disapproving of President Ford. For Republicans, we see a decline in the probability of leaving the Republican Party of 17% among those who approved of President Ford, compared with Republicans who disapproved. As with Democrats, the least probable outcome, irrespective of their views of President Ford, is to leave the party. Figure 6.1 also illustrates the unusual phenomena of both the probability of being a strong Republican and being a weak republican increasing with presidential approval. We would expect to see these probabilities normally go in opposite directions.

Figure 6.1. 1976 Ford Approval

6.3 1996

Introduction

The study of 1996 offers stronger support for H_4. For Democrats, once again, presidential approval has a statistically significant impact upon the strength of attachment to the party, but not on the decision to remain a Democrat. For Republicans, again, we see a statistically significant relationship between presidential approval and the decision to leave the GOP; however, unlike in 1976, we also observe a significant relationship between presidential approval and the choice between identifying as a strong or weak Republican. However, concerning the respondent's view of their financial situation, we find no evidence to support H_5.

Findings

Presidential Approval

The multinomial logit results for 1996 are shown in Table 6.3. Although the relationship, among Democrats, between leaving the party and approval for President Clinton is in the anticipated direction, it fails to reach anything close to statistical significance. However, in line with H_4, a significant relationship is seen with regard to the strength of attachment to the party. For Republicans, statistically, significant relationships are found between approval for President Clinton and both the direction and strength of party identification.

Table 6.3. 1996 Clinton Approval

	Democrats $N = 155$		Republicans $N = 136$	
	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong
Clinton Approval	-0.21 (0.39)	0.88* (0.37)	1.15* (0.39)	-0.89* (0.25)
strength 1992	0.05 (0.65)	1.12* (0.44)	-0.76 (0.65)	0.93* (0.47)
strength 1994	0.70 (0.67)	2.52* (0.47)	0.80 (0.61)	1.42* (0.48)
$PseudoR^2$	0.24		0.27	
$* = p \leq 0.05$				

The *spost* analysis of the results is shown in table 6.4 and figure 6.2. It can be seen that for all but those Democrats who strongly disapproved of Clinton and Republicans who strongly approved of the 42nd President, leaving the party was the least likely outcome. These respondents amounted to under 2% of Democrats and just over 10% of Republican respondents.

A Democrat who strongly approved of President Clinton was 44% more likely to be a strong Democrat than the one in fifty Democrats who disapproved strongly of Clinton.

Within the degrees of approval and disapproval, we see the marginal effects of presidential approval upon the strength of attachment to the Democrats are remarkably similar. A Democrat "only" disapproving of Clinton was 14% more likely to strongly identify as a Democrat than one who "strongly disapproves" of Clinton. Similarly, a Democrat strongly approving of Clinton was close to 15% more likely to be a strong party identifier than the Democrat who "just" approves of Clinton.

As noted, a significant relationship exists among Republicans between the approval of Clinton and both the direction and strength of party identification. For the vast majority of these respondents, the effect on attachment strength outweighs the impact on the direction of their party identification. Overall a Republican who strongly approved of Clinton was 51% more likely to leave the GOP than a Republican who strongly disapproved. Across this same range, a 60% variance in the likelihood of being a strong Republican was noted. A move from strongly disapproving of Clinton to disapproving of him only saw the probability of the Republican leaving the GOP decreased by 5%. However, this move corresponds to a nearly 20% decline in the likelihood of being a strong Republican. Three out of five Republicans in the panel are covered by the "strongly disapprove" and "disapprove" categories. A move from "approve" to "strongly approve" sees a reversal in the magnitude of the relative effects. The probability of leaving the GOP increased by nearly 30%, while the chances of being a strong Republican declined by a more modest, but still substantial, 18%. As stated above, only about 10% of Republican panelists strongly approved of President Clinton. Running a *spost* analysis from the approval category's "strongly disapprove" to "approve," covering nearly 90% of the panel. We find very strong support for H_1; whilst this group of Republicans saw a variance of 22% in the probability of leaving the GOP, the odds of being a strong Republican decreased by 42%.

We also note that the degree to which an individual approves of the president has a greater effect on the probability of being a strong party identifier among Republicans than Democrats. Across the full range of "strongly disapprove" to "strongly approve," the chances of being a great Democrat change by 44%, whereas the figure for Republicans is 60%.

Table 6.4. 1996 Change in Predicted Probability Clinton Approval

	Democrats			Republicans		
	Leave	Weak	Strong	Leave	Weak	Strong
	$p-value$	$p-value$	$p-value$	$p-value$	$p-value$	$p-value$
Disap to Appr	-.189	-.034	.224	.281	.093	-.374
	.255	.839	.187	<.001	.278	<.001
StrDis to StrApp	-.208	-.233	.440	.519	.081	-.600
	.279	.226	.001	<.001	.521	<.001
StrDis to Dis	-.086	-.055	.141	.053	.014	-.192
	.383	.536	<.001	.004	.003	<.001
Appr to StrAppr	-.050	-.096	.146	.298	-.115	-184
	.101	.060	.007	.001	.132	<.001

Figure 6.2. 1996 Clinton Approval

Assessment of Economic Well-being

The 1996 study finds no evidence to support H_5. The multinomial results for the relationship (or lack of) between Party identification strength and if respondents feel they are

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becoming better or worse off are given in Table 6.5.

We see that for supporters of both parties, no statistically significant relationship is found between direction or strength of party identification and if an individual feels better off. Figure 6.3 illustrates the lack of any relationship between economic assessment and either component of party identification.

Table 6.5. 1996 Personal economic appraisal

	Democrats $N = 155$		Republicans $N = 138$	
	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong
Better/Worse off	0.17 (0.39)	0.03 (0.28)	0.42 (0.34)	0.33 (0.28)
strength 1992	-0.00 (0.65)	1.24* (0.43)	-0.53 (0.61)	0.91* (0.43)
strength 1994	0.74 (0.66)	2.36* (0.44)	0.31 (0.55)	1.87* (0.44)
$PseudoR^2$	0.21		0.14	

$* = p \leq 0.05$

We note that leaving the party is the least likely outcome for Democrats and Republicans, for those feeling better and worse off. However, especially for Democrats, we see broadly parallel probability plots for leaving the party, strong party identification, and weak identification.Further, the variance we do observe on the Republican side gives us mixed messages. With a Democrat in the White House, we would expect Republicans to become more attached to their party if they considered themselves worse off than they were previously. While we note that the probability of being a strong Republican increase as Republicans feel worse off, we also note that the likelihood of leaving the party increases under these conditions. This phenomenon will not be repeated in 2004.

Figure 6.3. 1996 Personal economic appraisal

6.4   2004

Introduction

The study of 2004 offers strong support to H_1 & H_4 As in 1996, supporters of both parties, to a statistically significant level, switch the degree of attachment to their party of choice based upon approval levels of the sitting president. However, for the first time, neither party supporters significantly altered the direction of their party identification based upon that criteria. Once again, with regard to if respondents feel better or worse off, the study finds no evidence to support H_5.

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Findings

Presidential Approval

The multinomial logit results for 2004 displayed in Table 6.6 show that whilst the relationship between presidential approval and the propensity to alter party identification is in the expected direction for both parties, the relationship is not statistically significant in neither case. Although for Democrats, the relationship comes close to reaching the common threshold with a *p-value* of 0.08. However, we see a significant relationship between presidential approval and the choice between strong and weak party identifiers.

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Table 6.6. 2004 Bush Approval

	Democrats N = 223		Republicans N = 223	
	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong
Bush Approval	0.45	-0.56*	-0.16	0.80*
	(0.27)	(0.17)	(0.27)	(0.30)
strength 2000	0.18	0.68	0.64	1.50*
	(0.67)	(0.38)	(0.64)	(0.46)
strength 2002	0.29	2.33*	0.65	2.09*
	(0.78)	(0.42)	(0.67)	(0.47)
$PseudoR^2$	0.24		0.27	
$* = p \le 0.05$				

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The substantive results using *spost* analysis are displayed in Table 6.7 and in diagrammatic form in figure 6.4. We note that leaving the party is the least likely option for all supporters of both parties, regardless of how they rated President Bush. Among Democrats, we see a reduction of 32% in the probability of being a strong Democrat as an individuals' move from strongly disapproving of President Bush to strongly approving, which is a reduction from the 44% observed in 1996. As in 1996, the marginal effects of presidential approval on the probability of being a strong Democrat is reasonably consistent. Democrats

strongly disapproving of President Bush were 9% more likely to be a strong Democrat than those the merely disapproved. Similarly, those Democrats strongly approving of the 43rd President were 11% less likely to be strong identifiers than those who approved of George Walker Bush.

Among Republicans, those strongly approving of President Bush are 42% more likely to be strong Republicans than those who strongly disapproved of their party's president; this figure, like that of the Democrats, is a decrease from the variance observed in 1996, the fall for Republicans being from 60% in 1996. Similarly, like the Democrats, the marginal effects of Presidential approval upon the strength of party attachment are remarkably consistent. Within the general approval range (which covers nearly 19 out of every 20 Republicans), we see a variance of almost 13% in the probability of being a strong Republican. Among the generally disapproving set of Republicans, the probability of being a strong identifier only varies by 2% more. We again note, as, in 1996, the effect that Presidential approval plays on the probability of being a strong identifier is greater among supporters of the GOP than it was among Democrats. As stated above, the change in probability among Democrats was 32% compared to 42% with Republicans.

Table 6.7. 2004 Change in Predicted Probability Bush Approval

|	Democrats			Republicans		
	Leave	Weak	Strong	Leave	Weak	Strong
	$p-value$	$p-value$	$p-value$	$p-value$	$p-value$	$p-value$
Dis to Appr	.105	.176	-.282	-.233	-.096	.329
	.041	.012	<.001	.086	.360	.026
StrDis to StrApp	.150	.168	-.318	-.218	-.203	.421
	.030	.044	<.001	.143	.120	.004
StrDis to Dis	.026	.067	-.092	-.094	-.056	.150
	.001	.004	<.001	.204	.327	.001
App to StrApp	.078	.042	-.119	-.051	-.077	128
	.081	.257	<.001	.048	.035	.007

Figure 6.4. 2004 Bush Approval

Assessment of Economic Well-being

As was seen in 1996, the 2004 study finds no evidence to support H_5. Again, no statistically significant relationship is found between how well off respondent feels and their choice of party, and strength of attachment to that party. The multinomial logit results are shown in Table 6.8 and the *spost* findings represented in figure 6.5.

As with the 1996 study, we find that leaving the party is the least likely outcome for both parties, for those feeling worse off and those feeling better off under the Bush administration. Again, very little variance in predicted probabilities is observed, especially for the Democrats, for whom the plotted probabilities are parallel.

Table 6.8. 2004 Personal economic appraisal

	Democrats N = 224		Republicans N = 226	
	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong
Better/Worse off	-0.32	-0.03	-0.71	0.03
	(0.52)	(0.30)	(0.46)	(0.34)
strength 2000	0.06	0.87*	0.42	1.62*
	(0.67)	(0.37)	(0.65)	(0.45)
strength 2002	0.47	2.224*	0.35	2.10*
	(0.78)	(0.41)	(0.67)	(0.45)
$PseudoR^2$	0.19		0.24	

$* = p \leq 0.05$

Figure 6.5. 2004 Personal economic appraisal

As in 1996, for Republicans, there appears to be an anomaly in the direction of one of the plots. We would expect to see the probability of leaving the GOP increase if a Republican

considered themselves to be worse off under a Republican president.

6.5 Summary of Retrospective Evaluations

The summary of the analysis of retrospective evaluations is shown in Table 6.9. We see among Democrats consistent support for H_1 and H_4. Democrats never appear to leave the party based on their perceptions of the president's job. However, these perceptions alter the probability of being a strong Democrat by between 18 and 44%, with the greatest variance seen in 1996. For Republicans, the picture is less clear. Each of the three studies produced different results; in 1976 direction of party identification only was affected by the approval of President Ford. Twenty years later, both the direction and intensity of party identification were altered by opinions of President Clinton. Finally, in 2004, the Republicans matched the Democrats in that approval of President Bush only had an impact on the strength of party identity. On the two occasions when presidential approval affected the strength of attachment for both parties, greater variance in probability was recorded among Republican supporters. Like the Democrats, the 1996 study shows the greatest variance for Republicans, both in terms of staying loyal to the GOP (compared to 1976) and in the strength of attachment (compared to 2004).

Table 6.9. Summary of Retrospective Effect

	Democrats		Republicans	
	Direction	Strength	Direction	Strength
1976 Ford Approval		x	x	
1996 Clinton Approval		x	x	x
1996 Personal economic appraisal				
2004 Bush Approval		x		x
2004 Personal economic appraisal				

Perhaps the most interesting finding of the retrospective evaluations is the complete lack of support for H_5, in contraction to the theory of the instrumental side of the debate, e.g., Fiorina and Downs. The results from 1996 are particularly intriguing, in the context of Clinton defeating President George H W Bush in 1992 under the mantra of" its the economy

stupid." In Fironas' defense, he argues that individuals make their judgment over the whole course of an administration, so we would have to believe that respondents could distinguish their economic four years previously from their current hardship. A more probable explanation is, in 1996 and 2004, the economy was relatively strong. Indeed there is a remarkable similarity between the two years, each having an unemployment rate of 5.4%, inflation at 3.%, and economic growth of 3.3% of GDP (Kimberly (2021)).

We see no evidence of Republicans flocking to Clinton, or Democrats supporting Walker Bush, or either side strengthening their attachment based on economic perceptions. Suggesting that financial considerations are not as important as Fiorina, Key and Downs argue, or that Presidents (and their parties) are not rewarded for a thriving economy but are punished for overseeing a faltering one.

7. POLICY PREFERENCE

7.1 Introduction

The study of policy across four areas yields varied results. Individual's strict policy preferences alone only occasionally play a role in the weak/strong party identifier decision. Even rarer does a policy preference affect the decision to leave the party. Since the 1960 election, we find only two examples where an individual's policy preference, taken in isolation, played a statistically significant role in deciding to leave a political party. Both of these occurred among 1996 Republicans. However, when we examine a respondent's policy preference in relation to their perceptions of the policy position of their party and the opposition party, more relationships come to light. Across the four election studies and four policy areas, we can make the following generalizations.

- Leaving a party based upon a policy position is the least likely outcome for the vast majority of respondents.

- Policy preferences influence Republicans more than Democrats.

- Inter-party differences generally affect the strong/weak dynamic.

- Intra-party differences predominantly affect the direction of attachment.

- Abortion positions, surprisingly, rarely play a role in either the decision to remain with a party or the strength of attachment to a party.

7.2 1960

Introduction

The 1960 study found statistically significant relationships among Democrats in each of the three policy areas studied and among Republicans on the issue of school desegregation. These relationships, however, have a relatively minor substantive effect on both direction and strength of party identification. Also, leaving either political party was the least likely outcome across all policy positions.

Results

Government in the Economy

The 1960 study of the role Government should play in the economy offers evidence refuting H_1. The multinomial logit results displayed in Table 7.1 show a statistically significant relationship between the degree Democrats feel that government should ensure work and the decision to remain loyal to the party. No relationship is found between this variable and the choice of being a strong or weakly identifying Democrat or among Republicans at all. Further, the direction of this relationship is opposite to the anticipated one. We would expect members of the still intact New Deal Democrat coalition to support the government's idea to ensure everybody has a job. Nonetheless, we see the probability of leaving the party of FDR increase as support for a New Deal policy increases. However, as shown in Table 7.2 and figure 7.1 , the substantive effect of this relationship amounts only to a less than 6% increase in the probability of leaving the Democratic party. With the leave option remaining easily the least likely option for Democrats. Figure 7.1 also illustrates that among Republicans, the relationship is in the anticipated direction.

Table 7.1. 1960 Government should guarantee work

	Democrats $N = 410$		Republicans $N = 254$	
	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong
Govt Guarantee work	0.62*	0.02	0.12	-0.14
	(0.28)	(0.08)	(0.15)	(0.09)
strength 1956	-2.27*	1.05*	0.27	1.21*
	(1.06)	(0.24)	(0.49)	(0.33)
strength 1958	0.13	1.36*	-0.39	1.61*
	(0.55)	(0.24)	(0.58)	(0.33)
$PseudoR^2$	0.16		0.15	
$* = p \leq 0.05$				

Table 7.2. 1960 Change in Predicted Probability Support Govt guarantee work

| | Democrats | | | Republicans | | |
| | Leave | Weak | Strong | Leave | Weak | Strong |
	$p-value$	$p-value$	$p-value$	$p-value$	$p-value$	$p-value$
StDisappr to	.058	-.054	.004	.062	.055	-.117
St Approve	.002	.379	.951	.192	.429	.079

Figure 7.1. 1960 Govt should guarantee work

Racial Issues

Six years after Brown v Board of Education, the ANES asked respondents if they agreed that the government should *not* desegregate schools. Four years before the passage of the Civil Rights Act, ANES asked respondents if the government should ensure fairness in housing for blacks. The study found no significant relationship between direction or strength of party ID on the housing question see Table 7.5; thus, no support was found for H_7a or H_7b. However, on the issue of school desegregation, significant relationships were found

among both Republicans and Democrats, see Table 7.3. For Democrats, this offers support to H_7b as Table 7.4 and figure 7.3 show, a Democrat strongly disagreeing with the question of school desegregation was 10% more likely to be a strong Democrat than one who strongly supported the Status Quo. With no significant change in the probability of leaving, the Democrats observed. The opposite, however, is seen among Republicans. As the plot of the Republican section of figure 7.3 shows, the strong/weak identifier decision is largely unaffected by school desegregation opinions. Republicans who were strongly opposed to school segregation were 10% more likely to leave the party than those who, in effect, strongly favored school segregation.

Table 7.3. 1960 Government should not desegregate schools

	Democrats N = 405		Republicans N = 248	
	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong
Sch segregation	-0.26 (0.15)	-0.16* (0.07)	-0.30* (0.15)	-0.00 (0.10)
strength 1956	-2.12* (1.06)	1.12* (0.24)	0.16 (0.48)	1.11* (0.33)
strength 1958	0.26 (0.55)	1.37* (0.24)	0.16 (0.58)	1.87* (0.34)
$PseudoR^2$	0.16		0.18	

$* = p \leq 0.05$

Table 7.4. 1960 Change in Predicted Probability Govt should not desegregate schools

|	Democrats			Republicans		
	Leave $p-value$	Weak $p-value$	Strong $p-value$	Leave $p-value$	Weak $p-value$	Strong $p-value$
StDisapp to St Approve	-.032 .204	.135 .009	-.103 .041	-.101 .026	.058 .391	.043 .510

Figure 7.2. 1960 Govt should not desegregate schools

Table 7.5. 1960 Government should ensure fairness for blacks

	Democrats N = 403		Republicans N = 256	
	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong
Fairness for Blacks	0.06	0.12	0.25	-0.08
	(0.17)	(0.08)	(0.19)	(0.12)
strength 1956	-2.17*	1.13*	0.17	1.10*
	(1.06)	(0.24)	(0.48)	(0.32)
strength 1958	0.29	1.41*	-0.31	1.63*
	(0.55)	(0.24)	(0.58)	(0.32)
$Pseudo R^2$	0.16		0.15	

$* = p \leq 0.05$

Health Care

Table 7.6 shows the government provision of Health Care results, specifically Medicare; the study found a relationship among Democrats only, offering more support for $H_1\%H_8b$. No association between position on Health Care provision and leaving the Democrats is found. However, Table 7.7 shows that an individual is 20% more likely to be a strong Democrat if they strongly support the government provision of Medicare than if they strongly oppose the government providing that particular program. Figure 7.3 shows that unlike governmental intervention in the economy and racial equality issues, where being a strong identifier was consistently the most likely outcome, on the issue of Medicare, there is a change in which outcome is most likely. For Democrats who disagree, strongly or not, that government should support Medicare, about 15% of the sample, being a weak Democrat is the most likely outcome. While for the two-thirds of Democrats supporting the program, the most likely outcome is for them to identify strongly with the Party of the New Deal.

Table 7.6. 1960 Medicare Support

	Democrats $N = 407$		Republicans $N = 255$	
	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong
Medicare Support	0.18	0.27*	0.21	-0.10
	(0.19)	(0.08)	(0.15)	(0.09)
strength 1956	-2.15*	1.04*	0.26	1.09*
	(1.06)	(0.24)	(0.48)	(0.32)
strength 1958	0.26	1.39*	-0.30	1.60*
	(0.55)	(0.25)	(0.58)	(0.32)
$PseudoR^2$	0.17		0.15	
$* = p \leq 0.05$				

Table 7.7. 1960 Change in Predicted Probability Support for Medicaid

| | Democrats | | | Republicans | | |
| | Leave | Weak | Strong | Leave | Weak | Strong |
	$p - value$	$p - value$	$p - value$	$p - value$	$p - value$	$p - value$
StDisapp to	.013	-.218	.205	.087	.019	-.106
St Approve	.619	.001	.001	.065	.784	.124

Figure 7.3. 1960 Medicare Approval

Summary of 1960

A summary of the policy influences on the strength of party support is shown in Table 7.8. There is little evidence to support any hypothesis involving Republicans, indeed with regard to the racial issue of school desegregation, with find evidence contradicting H_1. For Democrats, we find support for H_7b and H_8b regarding racial equality and health care, two policies that remain important components of the Democrat party message over sixty years later.

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Table 7.8. Summary of 1960 Policy Positions

	Democrats		Republicans	
	Direction	Strength	Direction	Strength
Government Intervention	x			
School Desegregation		x	x	
Fairness to Blacks				
Health Care		x		

7.3   1976

Introduction

As well as asking respondents about their policy positions, the 1976 ANES also asked respondents where they thought the two major parties (and Presidential candidates) stood on a variety of matters of public policy. While in the analysis of 1976 and subsequent years, the study finds, only rarely a link between an individuals policy position and either their direction or strength of party ID, comparison between an individual preferred position and the position of their party, and the perceived position of the opposition yields more fruitful results. In 1976 we only found one example, Democrats, on the issue of Government intervention in the economy, where we observe a relationship between the strength of party identity and policy position per se? However, if we look at inter and intraparty differences, we find relationships across this area, racial equality, and health care. Leaving the party remains the least likely option for all Democrats across all policy areas. A similar story is found among Republicans, except the less than 5 % differing dramatically with their belief of where the GOP stood on the issue of government guaranteeing a standard of living and the degree to which the Federal Government should help minorities.

Results

Government in the economy

As stated above, the issue of government intervention in the economy provides the only example of respondents' policy position having a significant impact upon the strength or direction of their party identification. Table 7.9 shows a significant relationship between

weak and strong Democrats on the issue. Table 7.11 shows a Democrat who believes the government should guarantee work is 20% more likely to be a strong Democrat than one who thinks it is the individual's responsibility to find employment. Interestingly, as illustrated by the left-hand panel of 7.4, being a strong Democrat identifier is only the most likely outcome for Democrats taking the "extreme" position on government responsibility, accounting for about one in eight of the sample Democrats. That is nearly half the number who selected the midpoint between the extremes who have a 10% lower probability of being a strong Democrat than the more pro-government wing. No relationship approaching statistical significance exists within the ranks of Republicans, although the relationship between strong and weak identifiers is in the anticipated direction.

A similar picture emerges when examining inter-party differences on the issue. Table 7.10 shows a significant relationship among Democrats on the decision to identify strongly or not and the subject of government intervention in the economy. Table 7.11 shows that the interparty relationship is stronger than the one based purely on a respondent's position. The probability of being a strong Democrat is 27% lower for those whose preferred policy position on the issue is in step with the Republicans compared to those Democrats diametrically opposed to the GOP position. These Democrats have a probability of identifying strongly of near 60% compared to 50% for those who believe that it is the government's responsibility to ensure work regardless of the GOP position. The right-hand panel of figure 7.4 shows the relationships in the forecast direction, with the probability of leaving the party declining as differences with the opposition party increase. The diagram also shows that being a strong identifier is the most likely outcome among Democrats who differ by four points or more, on a seven-point scale, with Republicans, this accounts for over 11% of the sample, a figure very close to the number identified in the strict policy position analysis. Again, no relationship reaching levels of statistical significance is found in the Republican camp. Still, as Table 7.11 shows, all the relationships are in the anticipated direction, with a 20% predicted increase in the probability of being a strong Republican among those diametrically differing with Democrats on the issue, to those in tune with the Democrats, comes very close to statistical

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significance.

Looking at intra-party differences, Table 7.10 shows that no relationship is found among Democrats. However, we see a relationship between differences with the party on policy and a willingness to leave the GOP. Table 7.11 shows that those at the polar opposite of the perceived Republican position on the issue are 39% more likely to desert the GOP than those in step with the policy on this issue. A difference of near 40% was observed between these groups in the probability of being a strong Republican, also. These findings contradict H_1 more variation observed in the probability of leaving a party than in the probability of being a strong identifier. However, a deeper analysis of the results suggests support for H_1. The right-hand panel of figure 7.5 shows that leaving the party no longer becomes the least likely outcome at levels of intra-party differences higher than four representing only 3% of the Republican panel. Whereas over 80% of Republicans fall within a difference of two points on the seven-point scale, and 92% fall within three points. Among these 92%, *spost* analysis reveals a 12% variance in the probability of leaving the GOP, compared to 18% in the probability of being a strong Republican identifier. Thus again, for most individuals, we observe a greater variance in the degree of attachment to a party than we see the variance in the probability of leaving a party.

Table 7.9. 1976 Govt should guarantee a standard of living

	Democrats N = 324		Republicans N = 213	
	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong	Weak v Leave	Weak v Str
Govt ensure to individuals get along	0.16	-0.16*	0.15	0.16
	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.14)	(0.10)
strength 1972	-0.04	1.29*	0.50	0.90*
	(0.43)	(0.29)	(0.49)	(0.36)
strength 1974	-0.22	1.56*	-0.33	1.53*
	(0.39)	(0.29)	(0.55)	(0.36)
$PseudoR^2$	0.16		0.13	
$* = p \leq 0.05$				

Table 7.10. 1976 Spatial Govt Intervention

	Democrats N = 291		Republicans N = 193	
	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong
Inter Party Diff	-0.19 (0.14)	0.22* (0.09)	-0.04 (0.14)	0.23* (0.10)
Intra Party Diff	0.17 (0.11)	-0.02 (0.10)	0.33* (0.16)	-0.31* (0.15)
strength 1972	-0.23 (0.51)	1.32* (0.31)	0.62 (0.52)	0.88* (0.39)
strength 1974	-0.38 (0.43)	1.60* (0.31)	-0.38 (0.57)	1.52* (0.38)
$PseudoR^2$	0.19		0.17	

$* = p \leq 0.05$

Table 7.11. 1976 Change in Predicted Probability Support Govt guaranteed standard of living

|	Democrats			Republicans		
	Leave $p-value$	Weak $p-value$	Strong $p-value$	Leave $p-value$	Weak $p-value$	Strong $p-value$
Respondents	.139 .025	-.065 .452	-.204 .009	.054 .456	-.202 .083	.147 .176
Inter-party diff	-.141 .020	-.130 .196	.271 .004	-.081 .323	-.189 .104	.270 .012
Intra-party diff	.132 .145	-.072 .504	-.060 .510	.390 .026	.007 .968	-.397 <.001

Figure 7.4. 1976 Democrats on Govt should guarantee a standard of living and difference with Reps


Figure 7.5. 1976 Republicans on Govt should guarantee a standard of living and difference with Reps

Racial Issues

The two measures of attitudes toward racial equality used in the 1976 study produced similar but not identical findings. As shown in Table7.12 regarding the question of school busing and Table 7.15 regarding aid to minorities, an individual's policy preference on these issues had a statistically significant effect in neither the direction nor strength of attachment for both Democrats and Republicans. This lack of relationship between an individual's position is illustrated by the relative flat plots of the left-hand graphs in figures 7.6, 7.7 and 7.8.

When we examine inter and intra-party differences, however, relationships come to light. Looking first at school busing, Table 7.13, we see that no relationship exists on this issue concerning inter-party differences. However, intraparty differences are seen to be statistically significant for both Democrats and Republicans. Table 7.14 shows that Democrats who thought that children should go to local schools, *and* believed that the Democrats favored integrating schools, were 20% more likely to leave the party than those whose views on school busing were in step with the Democrats position. Leaving the party was still the least likely outcome for this group. Still, the probability of such an occurrence was 30%, double the probability of those who believe children should be educated locally, without considering their view of where the Democrats stood on the issue. On the Republican side of the issue, internal contradictions result in loosening rather than severing party ties. Whilst, as figure 7.7 shows, the propensity to leave the GOP remains largely unchanged across the range of differences with the party on the issue (and individuals' position per se). The likelihood of being a strong Republican falls over 50% comparing those in step with the party regarding school busing and those at the opposite end of the spectrum.

With regard to aid to minorities, the spatial model results are presented in Table 7.16. It shows that, as was the case for school busing, no statistically significant relationship exists between inter-party differences and any form of party identification. We again see an intraparty difference relationship among Republicans. The probability of being a strong Republican falls 40%, comparing those in step with the Republicans on the issue to those

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with a contrary view . Figure 7.8 shows that leaving the GOP was no longer the least likely option for those Republicans most out of step with the party on the issue; those Republicans sample who differed with the party by three or more points (on a seven-point scale) totaled only 7% of the sample. Unlike school busing, we do not see a significant relationship among Democrats over the somewhat complimentary issue of aid to minorities. This apparent contradiction is perhaps reflective of the shifting alliances within the Democratic party at the time. While generally being supportive of racial equality, certainly since the Johnson administration. Democrats appeared to have been torn regarding racial inequality, broadly supporting civil rights in the south, yet questioning the implementation of policies designed to reduce racial equality on their doorstep, in line with Delmont (2016).

Table 7.12. 1976 support for school busing

	Democrats $N = 345$		Republicans $N = 230$	
	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong
School Busing	0.11 (0.12)	-0.08 (0.08)	0.26 (0.31)	-0.12 (0.16)
strength 1972	-0.18 (0.42)	1.41* (0.29)	0.49 (0.46)	1.15* (0.34)
strength 1974	-0.03 (0.37)	2.00* (0.29)	-0.22 (0.50)	1.48* (0.34)
$PseudoR^2$	0.19		0.13	

$* = p \leq 0.05$

Table 7.13. 1976 School Busing Spatial

	Democrats $N = 261$		Republicans $N = 168$	
	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong
Inter Party Diff	-0.15 (0.11)	-0.04 (0.08)	0.06 (0.16)	0.19 (0.12)
Intra Party Diff	0.32* (0.12)	-0.09 (0.09)	-0.32 (0.18)	-0.59* (0.14)
strength 1972	-0.44 (0.51)	1.31* (0.33)	0.59 (0.55)	0.86* (0.43)
strength 1974	-0.26 (0.46)	2.05* (0.34)	-0.24 (0.58)	1.41* (0.43)
$PseudoR^2$	0.22		0.16	

$* = p \leq 0.05$

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Table 7.14. 1976 Change in Predicted Probability School Busing

	Democrats			Republicans		
	Leave	Weak	Strong	Leave	Weak	Strong
	$p-value$	$p-value$	$p-value$	$p-value$	$p-value$	$p-value$
Respondents	.080	.020	-.099	.106	.071	-.177
	.120	.809	.183	.035	.680	.302
Inter-party diff	-.089	.103	-.014	-.015	-.178	.193
	.185	.258	.863	.879	.178	.105
Intra-party diff	.239	-.090	-.150	-.057	.577	-.520
	.004	.370	.080	.500	<.001	<.001

Figure 7.6. 1976 Democrats Position on school busing and intra-party differences

Figure 7.7. 1976 Republicans Position on school busing and intra-party differences

Table 7.15. 1976 support aid to minorities

	Democrats $N = 328$		Republicans $N = 213$	
	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong
Minority Aid	-0.02 (0.09)	-0.11 (0.07)	-0.01 (0.14)	-0.01 (0.09)
strength 1972	-0.21 (0.43)	1.29* (0.28)	0.51 (0.49)	1.11* (0.36)
strength 1974	-0.16 (0.39)	1.72* (0.29)	-0.62 (0.55)	1.49* (0.35)
$PseudoR^2$	0.16		0.13	
$* = p \leq 0.05$				

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Table 7.16. 1976 Minority Aid Spatial

	Democrats N = 278		Republicans N = 168	
	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong
Inter Party Diff	-0.15 (0.13)	0.05 (0.09)	0.10 (0.16)	0.18 (0.13)
Intra Party Diff	0.24 (0.13)	-0.08 (0.12)	0.22 (0.18)	-0.37* (0.17)
strength 1972	-0.02 (0.47)	1.40* (0.31)	0.55 (0.52)	1.01* (0.41)
strength 1974	-0.15 (0.42)	1.77* (0.32)	-0.78 (0.58)	1.41* (0.41)
$PseudoR^2$	0.18		0.16	

$* = p \leq 0.05$

Table 7.17. 1976 Change in Predicted Probability Aid to Minorities

	Democrats			Republicans		
	Leave $p-value$	Weak $p-value$	Strong $p-value$	Leave $p-value$	Weak $p-value$	Strong $p-value$
Respondents	.007 .916	.097 .245	-.104 .160	-.002 .976	.010 .927	-.008 .939
Inter-party diff	-.104 .135	.019 .849	.084 .357	.025 .812	-.195 .156	.171 .205
Intra-party diff	.229 .063	-.081 .522	-.148 .152	.306 .116	.105 .589	-.411 <.001

Figure 7.8. 1976 Republicans on minority aid and intra-party differences

Health Care

As with the broad issue of racial equality, the debate over how best to supply health care was an issue in 1976, where respondents' position per se did not affect the direction or strength of their party identification see Table 7.18. Again, if we look at spatial differences between an individual's position and their view of where the parties stand, a relationship comes to light. Table 7.19 shows a significant relationship among Republicans and the degree to which they differed with Democrats in this policy area. Republicans favoring private health insurance and believing that the Democrats favored a government-run program were 23% more likely to be strong Republicans than those whose own position matched the Democrats, Table 7.20. Figure 7.9 shows that on this issue, being a strong Republican is only the most likely outcome for those that support strictly private insurance. Using the spatial model, we see that being a strong Republican is the most likely outcome for those

differing from Democrats by more than three points on the seven-point scale.

Table 7.18. 1976 Govt to Private Health Care

| | Democrats N = 303 | | Republicans N = 217 | |
	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong
Govt to Private HC	0.06 (0.08)	0.05 (0.07)	0.04 (0.10)	0.14 (0.08)
strength 1972	-0.33 (0.47)	1.64* (0.31)	0.29 (0.45)	1.12* (0.35)
strength 1974	-0.08 (0.41)	1.89* (0.31)	-0.49 (0.52)	1.42* (0.35)
$PseudoR^2$	0.19		0.14	
$* = p \leq 0.05$				

Table 7.19. 1976 Health Care Spatial

| | Democrats N = 232 | | Republicans N = 158 | |
	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong
Inter Party Diff	-0.16 (0.13)	0.11 (0.09)	0.11 (0.13)	0.26* (0.10)
Intra Party Diff	0.13 (0.14)	-0.04 (0.12)	0.15 (0.17)	-0.25 (0.15)
strength 1972	-0.42 (0.55)	1.64* (0.35)	0.04 (0.54)	0.87* (0.43)
strength 1974	0.05 (0.46)	1.97* (0.37)	-0.06 (0.57)	1.62* (0.44)
$PseudoR^2$	0.22		0.16	
$* = p \leq 0.05$				

Table 7.20. 1976 Change in Predicted Probability Health Care position

	Democrats			Republicans		
	Leave	Weak	Strong	Leave	Weak	Strong
	$p-value$	$p-value$	$p-value$	$p-value$	$p-value$	$p-value$
Respondents	.030	-.065	.035	-.001	-.137	.145
	.582	.360	.574	.897	.138	.082
inter-party diff	-.110	-.024	.133	-.013	-.238	.235
	.112	.810	.127	.876	.026	.026
intra-party diff	.138	-.090	-.048	.224	.013	-.237
	.188	.451	.638	.150	.936	.072

Figure 7.9. 1976 Republicans on Health Care and difference with Democrats

Abortion

Three years after the landmark Supreme Court decision in *Roe v Wade* abortion, in 1976 did not appear to be the divisive issue that many scholars claim it has become in later years. As shown in Table 7.21, the issue had no significant impact on the likelihood of leaving either party or the strength of identification. Figure 7.10 shows the relatively flat plots of

predicted outcomes for Democrats, with the relative rankings unchanged across all abortion opinions. Interestingly, in the context of the party's position four decades later, Republicans believing abortion should never be restricted were less likely to leave the GOP than those who thought abortion was never permissible. However, Republicans opposed to abortion under any circumstances were more likely to be strong identifiers than those who supported a woman's right to choose.

Table 7.21. 1976 Position on Abortion

	Democrats $N = 351$		Republicans $N = 220$	
	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong
Abortion	-0.17	0.01	-0.25	-0.24
	(0.17)	(0.14)	(0.23)	(0.18)
strength 1972	0.14	1.41*	0.41	0.91*
	(0.39)	(0.28)	(0.44)	(0.35)
strength 1974	-0.21	1.94*	-0.12	1.63*
	(0.36)	(0.29)	(0.48)	(0.35)
$PseudoR^2$	0.17		0.13	
$* = p \leq 0.05$				

Table 7.22. 1976 Change in Predicted Probability Abortion

	Democrats			Republicans		
	Leave $p-value$	Weak $p-value$	Strong $p-value$	Leave $p-value$	Weak $p-value$	Strong $p-value$
always/never Permitted	-.064	.035	.029	-.056	.158	-.102
	.276	.646	.660	.473	.117	.298

Figure 7.10. 1976 Abortion

Combined spatial model

The complete spatial model for 1976 combines the inter and intraparty differences for the government in the Economy, School Busing, and Health Care questions. Table 7.23 and figures 7.11 and 7.12 show that for Democrats, although the relationships are in the anticipated direction, they fail to meet the standard requirement of statistical significance. However, for Republicans, the relationship between inter and intra-party differences significantly impacts the strength of party identification supporting H_10a and H_10b. Table 7.24 shows that a Republican who does not have any policy difference with the Democrats across the three policy areas in the model is 38% less likely to be a strong party identifier than one who has the maximum disagreement with the Democrats in each policy area. While a Republican who is in step with the party on every issue is 62% more likely to be a strong identifier than a Republican who differs dramatically on every issue with the GOP.

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Table 7.23. 1976 Spatial

| | Democrats N = 176 | | Republicans N = 129 | |
	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong
Inter Party Diff	-0.14	0.01	0.10	0.15*
	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Intra Party Diff	0.13	-0.08	0.00	-0.30*
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.09)
strength 1972	-0.15	1.51*	0.42	0.46
	(0.59)	(0.43)	(0.62)	(0.50)
strength 1974	0.30	2.11*	0.01	1.72*
	(0.36)	(0.29)	(0.48)	(0.35)
$PseudoR^2$	0.23		0.19	

$* = p \leq 0.05$

Table 7.24. 1976 Change in Predicted Probability Spatial Differences

| | Democrats | | | Republicans | | |
	Leave $p-value$	Weak $p-value$	Strong $p-value$	Leave $p-value$	Weak $p-value$	Strong $p-value$
inter-party diff	-.248	.148	.100	.069	-.452	.383
	.039	.376	.513	.573	.004	.011
intra-party diff	.285	-.053	-.232	.197	.424	-.621
	.045	.752	.099	.227	.018	<.001

Figure 7.11. 1976 Inter Party Differences

Figure 7.12. 1976 Intra Party Differences

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Summary of 1976

The summary of statistically significant relationships between policy preferences is presented in Table 7.25. The table clearly shows, in contrast to 1960, the policy preferences of Republicans have a more consistent effect on the strength of party identity than Democrats. However, it is not the policy position per se that drives changes in the strength of support but how a respondent's preferred position aligns with that of both parties that result in changes in the strength of support. On racial issues, the closer a Republican is to the GOP position, the more likely they are to be a strong Republican. Whereas on healthcare, the further they are from the Democratic party position (as they see it), the greater the probability of being a strong Republican. Surprisingly abortion in 1976, failed to influence the direction or strength of attachment for the supporters of either party. Looking at Democrats, we find support for H_6b. Still, other than on the question of the school busing, we see no evidence that Democrats are motivated to alter either the direction or strength of party attachment based on any policy issue. The next study continues this phenomenon of Republican party identity, in terms of direction and strength being affected more by policy than Democrats.

Table 7.25. Summary of 1976 Policy Positions

	Democrats		Republicans	
	Direction	Strength	Direction	Strength
Government Intervention		x		
Inter Party Difference		x		
Intra Party Difference			x	
School Busing				
Inter Party Difference				
Intra Party Difference	x			x
Aid to minorities				
Inter Party Difference				
Intra Party Difference				x
Health Care				
Inter Party Difference				x
Intra Party Difference				
Abortion				
Inter Party Differences				x
Intra Party Differences				x

7.4 1996

Introduction

The 1996 study, much like that of 1976, finds few examples of where a policy position per se plays a significant role in determining either component of party identification. Further, for Democrats, there is a dearth of issues, outside of the role of government in the economy, on which the policy preferences, inter or intraparty differences play any role in determining either component or party identification. Republicans, however, do alter at least one component of their party identification based on their or the party's position in each policy area studied.

Results

Government in the Economy

For Democrats as Table 7.26 shows, again, the issue of the degree to which government should provide some general safety net is an important policy position, affecting their strength of attachment to the party. As Figure 7.13 shows, an individual's position on the issue does not affect the probability of leaving the party, which remains the least likely outcome across all positions on the issue. We note that the probability of being a strong Democrat declined by over 27% from those that think it is the government's responsibility to ensure work to those that see it as an individual's responsibility. However, unlike in 1976, no inter or intra-party relationship is found, see Table 7.28.

For Republicans, we see a statistically significant relationship in deciding to leave or remain loyal to the GOP (Table 7.26) Contrary to H_1, we observe a 52% drop in the probability of leaving the Republican party as we move from believing the government should ensure work to a position where it is left to the individual. It is perhaps worth noting that the majority of this probability change occurs among non-typical Republicans on this issue. The change in probability of leaving the GOP from believing that the government should ensure a standard of living to the midpoint of the seven-point scale is 35%. However, this range only covers two-in-nine of the Republican sample. The change in probability of leaving the

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GOP, from the midpoint to the belief that it is the individual's responsibility to find work, is 17%. This section accounts for 93% of the GOP sample. Figure 7.13 shows that leaving the party is the least likely option for this large proportion of Republicans. When looking at inter and intra-party differences, we see in Table 7.28 that a significant relationship exists that affects direction and strength of party identification. Regarding inter-party differences, figure 7.14 shows that leaving the GOP is the least likely outcome for all Republicans except those who agreed with President Clinton on this issue; this is the equivalent of 93% of the GOP panel. Table 7.27 shows the probability of leaving the GOP falls 36%, comparing those in step with Clinton to those with the opposite viewpoint. In comparison, the difference in odds of being a strong Republican identifier between these two positions is 41%.

With regard to intra-party differences, the first glance at Table 7.27 and the left hand panel of 7.14 suggests that there is more variance in the direction of party identification than there is in strength. Table 7.27 shows a 70% variance in the probability of leaving the GOP and a 55% variance in the probability of being a strong Republican; figure 7.14 shows that leaving the GOP is only the least likely outcome among Republicans who differ with Dole on the issue by two points or fewer on the seven-point scale. However, close to 95% of Republicans are within 2 points of Senator Dole on this issue. For this vast majority of Republicans, a variance of 18% in the probability of leaving the GOP is noted, compared to over 27% in the probability of being a strong Republican; this gives further support to H_1.

Table 7.26. 1996 Govt should guarantee a standard of living

	Democrats N = 134		Republicans N = 139	
	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong
Govt ensure to individuals	-0.15 (0.21)	-0.32* (0.14)	-0.44* (0.20)	0.21 (0.19)
strength 1992	-0.18 (0.71)	1.39* (0.47)	-0.33 (0.63)	0.98* (0.44)
strength 1994	0.89 (0.71)	2.19* (0.48)	0.50 (0.61)	1.99* (0.46)
$PseudoR^2$	0.23		0.19	

$* = p \leq 0.05$

Table 7.27. 1996 Change in Predicted Probability Support Govt guaranteed standard of living

	Democrats			Republicans		
	Leave $p-value$	Weak $p-value$	Strong $p-value$	Leave $p-value$	Weak $p-value$	Strong $p-value$
Respondents	.002 .986	.272 .042	-.274 .040	-.521 .013	.129 .461	.392 .012
Inter-party diff	-.055 .593	-.220 .154	.275 .077	-.366 .002	-.044 .767	.410 .002
Intra-party diff	.129 .529	-.031 .872	-.099 .587	.704 .003	-.150 .529	-.553 <.001

Table 7.28. 1996 Spatial Govt Intervention

	Democrats N = 131		Republicans N = 127	
	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong
Inter Party Diff	0.04 (0.27)	0.31 (0.20)	-0.57* (0.25)	0.31* (0.14)
Intra Party Diff	0.18 (0.29)	-0.04 (0.21)	0.62* (0.31)	-0.77* (0.32)
strength 1992	-0.48 (0.80)	1.56* (0.51)	-0.45 (0.69)	0.84 (0.48)
strength 1994	1.22 (0.77)	2.24* (0.52)	0.44 (0.65)	2.03* (0.51)
$PseudoR^2$	0.25		0.27	

$* = p \leq 0.05$

Figure 7.13. 1996 Govt should guarantee a standard of living

Figure 7.14. 1996 Republicans Govt should guarantee a standard of living inter/intra

In 1996, ANES asked a question (which is repeated to the 2004 panel) on if respondents would rather see the government reduce spending and services or increase them. The respondent's results are shown in Table 7.29 and in Table 7.30 for the inter and intra-party differences. We see that, somewhat surprisingly, no relationship is found for Democrats across any measure. We find a relationship affecting the strength of party attachment among Republicans and their difference with Democrats on the issue. Table 7.31 shows that a Republican who agreed with the Democrats on government spending was 37% less likely to be a strong Republican than one who was at the opposite end of the seven-point scale to Democrats.

Table 7.29. 1996 Govt Spending

	Democrats $N = 131$		Republicans $N = 133$	
	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong
Govt Spending	0.17	0.18	-0.23	0.22
	(0.26)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.16)
strength 1992	-0.01	1.39*	-0.59	0.92
	(0.72)	(0.49)	(0.62)	(0.44)
strength 1994	0.92	2.49*	0.35	1.77*
	(0.71)	(0.49)	(0.56)	(0.45)
$PseudoR^2$	0.23		0.15	

$* = p \leq 0.05$

Table 7.30. 1996 Spatial Govt Spending

	Democrats N = 130		Republicans N = 132	
	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong
Inter Party Diff	0.15	0.22	0.19	0.30*
	(0.26)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.13)
Intra Party Diff	0.01	-0.52	0.21	0.08
	(0.29)	(0.28)	(0.29)	(0.24)
strength 1992	-0.17	1.37*	-0.77	0.83
	(0.72)	(0.51)	(0.67)	(0.45)
strength 1994	0.91	2.49*	0.32	1.75*
	(0.71)	(0.51)	(0.59)	(0.46)
$PseudoR^2$	0.25		0.17	

$* = p \leq 0.05$

Table 7.31. 1996 Change in Predicted Probability Reduce/increase Govt Spending

	Democrats			Republicans		
	Leave $p-value$	Weak $p-value$	Strong $p-value$	Leave $p-value$	Weak $p-value$	Strong $p-value$
Respondents	-.139	-.018	.156	.348	-.007	-.341
	.357	.922	.404	.092	.970	.041
Inter-party diff	.016	-.171	.154	-.206	-.172	.378
	.891	.252	.316	.061	.234	.005
Intra-party diff	.159	.327	-.486	.145	-.153	-.008
	.542	.236	.019	.578	.512	.974

Figure 7.15. 1996 Republicans Spending and Inter-party Differences

Racial Issues

The issue of school busing was perhaps not as salient in 1996 as it had been twenty years earlier. A series of court rulings had eased the requirements for school districts to integrate schools fully (Billings et al. (2014)). As such, ANES did not ask the previous question regarding school busing. The racial question in the 1990s had changed to one of to what extent should the federal government seek to provide a level economic playing field for African Americans and the degree to which the government should provide aid targeted at minorities. With that in mind, the ANES posed the question, should the federal government help blacks, or should they help themselves? With respondents asked to place themselves on a seven-point scale. The results for the respondent's position are shown in Table 7.32. We can see that no significant relationship exists among Democrats; also the relationship is not in the anticipated direction. Democrats, it appears, are less likely to leave the party and more likely to be strong party identifiers, the less they believe that the government should

help blacks. For Republicans, whilst the direction of the relationship is in the predicted direction, it fails to pass the test of statistical significance.

Table 7.33 shows the results for spatial analysis; again, we see Democrats are influenced neither in direction or strength of party identification on this issue. We observe that Republicans sort themselves into strong and weak identifiers based on inter and intraparty differences. As shown in Table 7.34 a Republican who was at the opposite end of the scale to President Clinton on the issue was nearly 60% more likely to be a strong Republican than one who was in step with the President. Similarly, a Republican at the opposite end of the scale to Senator Dole on the issue of aid to African Americans was 54% less likely to identify strongly with the Republicans than one in step with the Kansas Senator. However, it is noted that the greatest observed difference between the supporters and candidates position on this issue was three points on a seven-point scale. Indeed close to 95% of the sample fell within two points of Dole on this issue. The difference in probability of being a strong Republican among observed values of differences with Dole is 34%. Figure 7.16 shows the relative stability of the probability of leaving the GOP. Leaving the GOP remains the least likely outcome for all but those who agreed with President Clinton on the degree to which African Americans should receive help. Similarly, leaving the GOP was the least likely outcome for all observed differences with Senator Dole.

Table 7.32. 1996 Aid to Blacks

	Democrats $N = 142$		Republicans $N = 134$	
	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong
Aid to Blacks	-0.19 (0.18)	-0.11 (0.13)	-0.35 (0.22)	0.30 (0.18)
strength 1992	-0.01 (0.64)	1.21* (0.45)	-0.33 (0.63)	0.85 (0.44)
strength 1994	0.55 (0.69)	2.34* (0.46)	0.32 (0.57)	2.02* (0.46)
$PseudoR^2$	0.21		0.17	
$* = p \leq 0.05$				

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Table 7.33. 1996 Aid to Blacks Spatial

	Democrats N = 128		Republicans N = 117	
	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong
Inter Party Diff	0.26 (0.23)	0.31 (0.18)	-0.40 (0.22)	0.51* (0.16)
Intra Party Diff	0.21 (0.31)	0.30 (0.23)	-0.11 (0.35)	-0.76* (0.31)
strength 1992	0.05 (0.73)	1.51* (0.52)	-0.47 (0.70)	0.22 (0.51)
strength 1994	1.17 (0.74)	2.71* (0.54)	0.10 (0.61)	2.11* (0.54)
$PseudoR^2$	0.25		0.25	

$* = p \leq 0.05$

Table 7.34. 1996 Change in Predicted Probability Aid to Blacks

	Democrats			Republicans		
	Leave $p-value$	Weak $p-value$	Strong $p-value$	Leave $p-value$	Weak $p-value$	Strong $p-value$
Respondent	-.075 .429	.134 .279	-.059 .624	-.451 .049	.019 .927	.432 .002
Inter-party diff	.042 .699	-.242 .047	.201 .127	-.356 .003	-.236 .108	.592 <.001
Intra-party diff	.018 .901	-.206 .133	.188 .266	.019 .938	.516 .053	-.536 <.001

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Figure 7.16. 1996 Republicans Inter & Intra-party Differences Aid to Blacks

Health Care

It is somewhat surprising, given the central role that Health Care played in the 1992 election, that it appears to play a very limited part, if any, in the choice of direction or strength of party identification in 1996. Table 7.35 shows that no significant relationship is found among supporters of either party concerning their ideal position on health care provision and the two components of party identification.

Table 7.36 shows the spatial analysis; again, no relationship is found among Democrats. However, we see a statistically significant relationship between Republicans' distance from their candidate for the presidency on the issue and the likelihood of them leaving the party. Figure 7.17 shows that leaving the GOP is the least likely outcome for Republicans who differ by two or fewer points with Dole on Health Care; this accounts for seven out of every eight Republicans in the sample. Whilst as Table 7.37 shows, the probability of leaving the

party increases by close to 70% as one moves from agreeing with Senator Dole on Health Care to the opposite end of the spectrum, the change in probability of leaving the party for this vast majority of Republicans is about 14%. It is of interest that those Republicans most at odds with Senator Dole on the issue (those differing by four or five points on a seven-point scale), two-thirds supported a government-funded health care system.

Table 7.35. 1996 Govt to Private Health Care

	Democrats $N = 141$		Republicans $N = 131$	
	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong
Govt to Private HC	-0.21 (0.21)	-0.23 (0.14)	-0.29 (0.16)	-0.02 (0.14)
strength 1992	.08 (0.71)	1.44* (0.46)	-0.34 (0.63)	0.94* (0.45)
strength 1994	0.74 (0.73)	2.55* (0.47)	0.58 (0.58)	2.12* (0.47)
$PseudoR^2$	0.25		0.16	
$* = p \leq 0.05$				

Table 7.36. 1996 Health Care Spatial

	Democrats $N = 127$		Republicans $N = 118$	
	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong
Inter Party Diff	0.17	0.27	-0.27	0.12
	(0.23)	(0.15)	(0.19)	(0.14)
Intra Party Diff	0.07	0.02	0.63*	-0.28
	(0.30)	(0.21)	(0.24)	(0.24)
strength 1992	0.10	1.66*	-0.44	0.88
	(0.79)	(0.50)	(0.70)	(0.48)
strength 1994	0.55	2.53*	0.06	1.87*
	(0.81)	(0.51)	(0.65)	(0.50)
$PseudoR^2$	0.27		0.23	

$* = p \leq 0.05$

Table 7.37. 1996 Change in Predicted Probability Health Care position

	Democrats			Republicans		
	Leave $p-value$	Weak $p-value$	Strong $p-value$	Leave $p-value$	Weak $p-value$	Strong $p-value$
Respondent	-.040	.218	-.177	-.236	.148	.088
	.595	.085	.149	.087	.285	.532
inter-party diff	.018	-.224	.207	-.200	.005	.194
	.839	.085	.103	.083	.974	.188
intra-party diff	.024	-.035	.010	.694	-.246	-.448
	.846	.841	.950	<.001	.147	.001

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Figure 7.17. 1996 Republicans Health Care difference with Dole

Abortion

Surprisingly, as was the case in 1976, individuals view on abortion appears to have only limited influence on both components of party identification. Table 7.38 shows for Democrats no relationship between position on abortion and party identification. This lack of relationship is amply illustrated by the near parallel plots of the left-hand plot of figure 7.18. We see a relationship between the propensity to leave the GOP and Republicans' view of when abortion should be permitted. Table 7.40 illustrates that a Republican who believes that abortion should never be restricted is 21% more likely to leave the Republican party than a Republican who thinks abortion is always impermissible. Interestingly, we find that more than twice as many individuals, who identified as Republican in 1992 and 1994, believe abortion should always be permitted, as those who think abortion should never be allowed. Although as we see in figure 7.18, leaving the GOP remains the least likely outcome. The fact that this substantial proportion of Republican identifiers are the section of the party

most likely to defect might offer some insight into the polarization of the parties on this issue. Whilst, at least in 1996, we see no evidence of pro-life Democrats leaving the party, we see pro-choice Republicans no longer identifying with the GOP. Of those who identified as Republican in 1992 and 1994, who left the party in 1996, two-thirds believed that abortion should always be permitted.

The results for the spatial analysis for abortion attitudes are shown in Table 7.39. We see that no relationship of statistical significance exists for either inter or intra-party differences among the supporters of either party. However, the relationship for Republicans, their perception of the Democrat position, and the weak/strong decision comes frustratingly close with a *zscore* of 1.95 and the accompanying *p-value* of 0.051. Table 7.40 shows that a pro-life Republican who believes that Democrats favor unrestricted abortion access was 30% more likely to be a strong Republican than one whose view of abortion matched their perception of the Democrat's position on this controversial issue.

Table 7.38. 1996 Position on Abortion

	Democrats $N = 150$		Republicans $N = 133$	
	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong
Abortion	0.15 (0.33)	0.14 (0.21)	0.62* (0.29)	-0.21 (0.21)
strength 1992	-0.08 (0.73)	1.29*- (0.46)	0.66 (0.65)	0.95* (0.44)
strength 1994	1.16 (0.78)	2.48* (0.46)	0.36 (0.58)	1.78* (0.45)
$PseudoR^2$	0.23		0.18	

$* = p \leq 0.05$

Table 7.39. 1996 Abortion Spatial

	Democrats N = 135		Republicans N = 121	
	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong
Inter Party Diff	-0.27	0.06	-0.37	0.49
	(0.38)	(0.26)	(0.33)	(0.24)
Intra Party Diff	0.35	-0.54	0.29	0.18
	(0.43)	(0.32)	(0.33)	(0.27)
strength 1992	0.21	1.62*	-0.25	1.08
	(0.77)	(0.50)	(0.68)	(0.48)
strength 1994	1.47	2.53*	-0.22	1.81*
	(0.77)	(0.51)	(0.64)	(0.48)
$PseudoR^2$	0.27		0.20	

$* = p \leq 0.05$

Table 7.40. 1996 Change in Predicted Probability Abortion

|	Democrats			Republicans		
	Leave $p-value$	Weak $p-value$	Strong $p-value$	Leave $p-value$	Weak $p-value$	Strong $p-value$
Respondents	.016	-.067	.050	.212	-.013	-.199
	.793	.484	.595	.003	.910	.074
Inter-party diff	-.062	.004	.058	-.174	-.132	.306
	.421	.966	.604	.054	.313	.014
Intra-party diff	.190	.119	-.310	.076	-.128	.052
	.246	.440	.021	.550	.331	.682

Figure 7.18. 1996 Abortion

Combined Spatial Model

The spatial model for 1996 combines the inter and intraparty differences on the government in the Economy, Federal Aid to Blacks, Health Care, and Abortion questions. As in 1976, Table 7.41 shows no relationship is found among Democrats in relation to their policy preferences vis-a-vis the Democrat's position or that of the Republicans. For Republicans, however, a significant relationship is found regarding inter-party differences and the strength of attachment to the GOP. Table 7.42 shows that a Republican who finds themselves in lockstep with Democrats is 75% less likely to be a strong Republican than one who is diametrically opposed to the Democrats on every issue.Figure 7.19 illustrates the lack of any interparty relationship among Democrats, with the relative ordering of potential outcomes unchanged across all values of policy differences with the Republicans. For Republicans, we see shifts in the ordering of likelihood for each outcome. Leaving the GOP is the least likely outcome for those with more than five policy differences with the Democrats; this amounts

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to 80% of the sample. Weakly identifying as Republican is the most likely outcome for those with total policy difference, with the Democrats of less than twelve accounting for 60% of the sample. The effect of intraparty differences is illustrated in Figure 7.20. The lack of a relationship for both parties is shown via the relative rankings of the outcomes being unchanged, except for those Republicans who differ with the party by more than ten points, representing 2% of all Republicans, who are slightly more likely to be weak as opposed to strong Republicans.

Table 7.41. 1996 Spatial

	Democrats $N = 94$		Republicans $N = 91$	
	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong
Inter Party Diff	0.03	0.08	-0.05	0.20*
	(0.13)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)
Intra Party Diff	0.20	-0.05	0.11	-0.09
	(0.15)	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.11)
strength 1992	-0.44	1.84*	-0.46	0.80
	(1.27)	(0.64)	(0.81)	(0.58)
strength 1994	1.70	2.49*	-0.44	1.96*
	(1.13)	(0.64)	(0.72)	(0.66)
$PseudoR^2$	0.30		0.27	

$* = p \leq 0.05$

Table 7.42. 1996 Change in Predicted Probability Spatial Differences

|	Democrats			Republicans		
	Leave	Weak	Strong	Leave	Weak	Strong
	$p-value$	$p-value$	$p-value$	$p-value$	$p-value$	$p-value$
inter-party diff	-.008	-.191	.198	-.277	-.473	.750
	.951	.412	.393	.156	.004	<.001
intra-party diff	.181	-.008	-.173	.183	.004	-.187
	.206	.962	.356	.253	.983	.321

Figure 7.19. 1996 Inter Party Differences

Figure 7.20. 1996 Intra Party Differences

Summary of 1996

The summary of statistically significant relationships between policy preferences is presented in Table 7.43. Again, it is clear that policy positions among Republicans affect their party identity and degree of attachment across a much wider range of policies than Democrats. We note that the 1996 study of ideology revealed its influence, also only among Republicans; this ideological effect appears to have constrained some policy preferences. Those leaving the party tended to be pro-choice and differ from the party on issues such as government intervention in the economy and health care. The vast majority of previously identifying Republicans remain loyal, however, and sort between strong and weak identifiers based on how close they see themselves to the GOP norms and their distance from the Democrats.

Table 7.43. Summary of 1996 Policy Positions

	Democrats		Republicans	
	Direction	Strength	Direction	Strength
Government Intervention		x	x	
Inter Party Difference			x	x
Intra Party Difference			x	x
Government Services				
Inter Party Difference				x
Intra Party Difference				x
Aid to Blacks				
Inter Party Difference				x
Intra Party Difference				x
Health Care				
Inter Party Difference				
Intra Party Difference			x	
Abortion			x	
Inter Party Difference				
IntraParty Difference				
Inter Party Differences				x
Intra Party Differences				

7.5   2004

Introduction

The 2004 results provide the weakest evidence of a link between policy preferences and either direction or strength of attachment to the Democrats or Republicans. On the issues of Federal Government spending, aid to minorities, and abortion, no relationship was found among supporters of either party. In the one spatial analysis that was possible using the questions asked of the 2004 panel, a relationship was found between the strength of attachment to the Democrat party and the degree to which they differ with Republicans on the level of Government spending. In this and all other areas, each outcome's rank ordering of likelihoods remains unchanged across the full range of policy preferences, with identifying strongly with a party always the most likely outcome and leaving the party always the least likely.

Results

Government in the Economy

The issue of government intervention in the economy is the one that has consistently had an impact upon Democrats. In 2004, although as we see in Table 7.44, an individual's stance per se does not affect direction or strength of attachment. We do see in Table 7.45 that the more Democrats differ from their perceptions of Republicans on the issue, the more likely they are to be strong Democrats. Table 7.46 suggests that a Democrat who thinks government spending and services should be increased "a lot" *and* believes that Republicans wish to cut spending and services "a lot" is 20% more likely to be a strong Democrat than one who agrees with Republicans on the level of services that should be provided. Figure 7.21 shows that the probability of being a strong Democrat is constant at around 68% across all levels of spending preferences. However, if we use interparty differences, this probability increases to nearly 80% for Democrats diametrically opposed to Republican spending plans.

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Among Republicans, no relationship between federal spending preferences and direction or intensity of party attachment is found. We see in Table 7.46 that a Republican who believes that government spending and services should be increased "a lot" is no more likely to leave the GOP than one who believes the should be cut "a lot." Nevertheless, as we saw when examining ideology, in 2004, ideology played an important role in both components of party identification, especially for Republicans. This suggests there is a disconnect between policy and ideology in 2004 among Republicans that was not apparent in 1996.

Table 7.44. 2004 Govt Spending

	Democrats $N = 224$		Republicans $N = 224$	
	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong
Govt Spending	0.12	0.02	-0.01	-0.13
	(0.14)	(0.07)	(0.14)	(0.10)
strength 2000	-0.01	0.86*	0.63	1.65*
	(0.68)	(0.37)	(0.64)	(0.44)
strength 2002	0.44	2.23*	0.39	2.06*
	(0.78)	(0.40)	(0.67)	(0.44)
$PseudoR^2$	0.19		0.24	
$* = p \leq 0.05$				

Table 7.45. 2004 Govt Services Spatial

	Democrats N = 211		Republicans N = 203	
	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong
Inter Party Diff	0.22	0.32*	0.19	0.16
	(0.18)	(0.11)	(0.15)	(0.12)
Intra Party Diff	-0.07	-0.16	-0.15	0.11
	(0.15)	(0.09)	(0.23)	(0.16)
strength 2000	-0.03	0.74	0.32	1.67*
	(0.68)	(0.39)	(0.68)	(0.45)
strength 2002	0.44	2.25*	0.55	2.06*
	(0.79)	(0.43)	(0.69)	(0.46)
$PseudoR^2$	0.21		0.25	

$* = p \leq 0.05$

Table 7.46. 2004 Change in Predicted Probability Reduce/increase Govt Spending

|	Democrats			Republicans		
	Leave $p-value$	Weak $p-value$	Strong $p-value$	Leave $p-value$	Weak $p-value$	Strong $p-value$
Respondent	.033	-.034	.001	.028	.081	-.109
	.416	.587	.982	.656	.298	.180
Inter-party diff	.010	-.217	.207	.016	-.145	.129
	.842	.008	.015	.795	.073	.132
Intra-party diff	.011	.070	-.080	-.059	-.095	.154
	.809	.354	.300	.343	.329	.132

Figure 7.21. 2004 Democrats Spending and Inter-party Differences

Racial Issues

On the issue of racial equality, as measured by support for federal aid to blacks, the study found no relationship in 2004. The results of the multinomial analysis are shown in Table 7.47, although as can be seen in figure 7.22, the relationship is in the anticipated direction for both parties, the relationship fails to meet the required level of statistical significance.

Table 7.47. 2004 Aid to Blacks

| | Democrats $N = 216$ | | Republicans $N = 218$ | |
	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong
Aid to Blacks	-0.31	0.24	0.49	0.35
	(0.60)	(0.34)	(0.54)	(0.38)
strength 2000	0.08	0.78*	0.99	1.73
	(0.68)	(0.38)	(0.67)	(0.46)
strength 2002	0.49	2.24*	0.03	1.95*
	(0.79)	(0.41)	(0.72)	(0.46)
$PseudoR^2$	0.19		0.24	

$* = p \leq 0.05$

Table 7.48. 2004 Change in Predicted Probability Cut/Increase Aid to Blacks

| | Democrats | | | Republicans | | |
	Leave $p-value$	Weak $p-value$	Strong $p-value$	Leave $p-value$	Weak $p-value$	Strong $p-value$
Respondent	-.049	-.047	.097	.045	-.103	.058
	.481	.646	.362	.556	.280	.567

Figure 7.22. 2004 Federal Spending on Blacks

Abortion

Again, surprisingly, no relationship was found between attitudes towards abortion and direction or intensity of party identification see Table 7.50. Figure 7.23 shows that for Republicans, the relationship is in the predicted direction, while for Democrats, the plots parallel to the x-axis illustrate the lack of any relationship between the strength of party identification and abortion viewpoint.

Table 7.49. 2004 Position on Abortion

	Democrats $N = 223$		Republicans $N = 225$	
	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong	Weak v Leave	Weak v Strong
Abortion	0-24	-0.02	0.15	-0.28
	(0.30)	(0.18)	(0.25)	(0.20)
strength 2000	0.11	0.91*	0.57	1.64*
	(0.68)	(0.37)	(0.64)	(0.44)
strength 2002	0.44	2.25*	0.38	2.03*
	(0.78)	(0.40)	(0.67)	(0.45)
$PseudoR^2$	0.20		0.25	

$* = p \leq 0.05$

Table 7.50. 2004 Change in Predicted Abortion Never Allowed/Never Restricted

|	Democrats			Republicans		
	Leave $p-value$	Weak $p-value$	Strong $p-value$	Leave $p-value$	Weak $p-value$	Strong $p-value$
Respondent	-.038	.025	.013	.074	.068	-.142
	.475	.744	.873	.184	.362	.070

Figure 7.23. 2004 Abortion

Summary of 2004

The summary of the disappointing results for the 2004 policy study is shown in table Table 7.51. In contrast to previous studies, we find very little evidence to suggest that supporters of either party are swayed in either the direction or strength of their party identification by policy preferences. Obviously, the fact that the 2004 panel was not asked their opinion of where the parties were on the issues limits the ability of the study to make wider conclusions as to if inter and intra policy differences are declining in importance.

Table 7.51. Summary of 2004 Policy Positions

	Democrats		Republicans	
	Direction	Strength	Direction	Strength
Government Services				
Inter Party Difference		x		
Intra Party Difference				
Aid to Blacks				
Abortion				

7.6 Summary of policy effects

The findings regarding the effect of policy preferences are mixed. Generally, we find only isolated instances, particularly after 1960, where an individual's actual policy position plays a role in the intensity of their party identification. However, we see relationships, especially among Republicans, when we look at differences between respondents' positions and those of the two parties. Whereas Democrats are almost exclusively affected, in their strength of attachment to the party, by the degree they believe the government should involve itself in the economy. Republicans were at different times sorted into strong and weak identifiers, based on their relative policy position across all of the issues of the study. In 1976, most of the significant policy differences driving changes in the strength of attachment were intra-party differences; being closer to the perceived Republican position on an issue makes one more likely to be a strong Republican, regardless of what they thought the policy positions the Democrats were. Twenty years later, inter-party differences played a far greater role in determining the strength of Republicans' attachment. This perhaps indicates that during this period, the Republicans became more cohesive in their policy preferences.

8. CONCLUSION

Partisanship is a fundamental concept within political science. Indeed, it is, perhaps, the concept, certainly in the American political context, with the most predictive power. However, much like physicists grappling with the wave-particle dual properties of light, there is much debate among political scientists as to what, at its core, partisanship actually is.

This dissertation has attempted to reconcile the two dominant paradigms surrounding party identification– the expressive viewpoint espoused by the Michigan School and the instrumental viewpoint articulated by Key, Fiorina, and others. The dissertation suggests that both perspectives play a role in explaining how citizens engage in politics.

The dissertation has demonstrated that an individual's choice of party is highly resilient to updating. As such, it argues that party identification is much like other social identities, such as gender, national or regional origin, and social class– a long-term identity that places an individual within the larger pluralistic public. Although this is true for supporters of both parties, we do find that Democrats are less likely than Republicans to update their party identification. These findings are robust and consistent across four election cycles spanning half a century and within four broad areas of inquiry.

We find only five examples out of a possible fifty-six of a statistically significant relationship between the likelihood of Democrats updating their party identification and the variable under examination. For Republicans, there were seventeen such instances. Significant relationships between updating party identification and evaluation of candidates are often found among supporters of both parties. However, no significant relationships are found between leaving the Democratic party, presidential approval, or ideology. In contrast, six out of the eight studies found a significant relationship between leaving the Republicans and these two factors. Similarly, with regard to policy, Democrats were found to update their party identification only on two occasions, based on their own policy position or the difference between their position and either of the parties. Republicans, however, were found to update their party identification a total of seven times based on policy positions. In keeping with previous literature, we find the greatest number of incidents of individuals updating the direction of their party identification occurred in 1976(Broder (1972), Janda and Colman (1998)). This

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is true for both parties. It also holds if we exclude the studies on policy, which represent two-thirds of the total number of studies.

Whilst showing the relative stability in the direction of party identification, the dissertation reasonably suggests that the salience of party identification is subject to updating. The updating of the magnitude of social identity is based around things related to that identity, such as policy issues and leadership. Just as a change of minister at the Methodist church or Pope Francis softening the position on same-sex relationships is unlikely to change an individual's identity as a Methodist or Catholic, it may result in a drop in attendance or a reluctance to fund the church. The nomination of an unorthodox candidate or a change in a party's platform on Medicare will probably not change one's position as a Republican or Democrat. However, it may well result in a reduction in the amount donated toward the campaign or even a reluctance to turn out to vote.

This dissertation has confirmed H_1; there is far more variance in the strength of an individual's attachment to a political party than in the directional element of party identification. This is evident in two ways; the number of incidences where strength of attachment to a party is affected by one of the independent variables and the magnitude of that effect compared to the effect on direction of party identification. We find seventeen instances among Democrats where one of the variables affects the strength of attachment to the party.This is a dramatic increase compared to the five occasions we saw updating in the direction of party identification.Republicans updated the strength of their attachment to the GOP on more occasions. However, the twenty-three occasions when the strength of attachment to the GOP was updated represents an increase of 35% on the number of occasions where Republicans updated the direction of affiliation, compared to the 240% increase we see among Democrats. As would be expected, with a higher number of incidents, the strength of attachment to either party is affected by a wider range of issues than is the case with the direction of party identification. That being said, we see patterns for both sets of supporters . Candidate evaluations affect the strength of attachment of both parties across all four of the studies. Whereas presidential approval did not impact Democrats' decision to remain loyal to the party in any of the studies, it consistently played a role in the intensity of Democrats' identification with their party. Candidate evaluations and presidential approval

account for over half of the incidents of a statistically significant relationship being found among Democrats, whilst amounting to only 16% of the total number of studies. For Republicans, the variables that affect the intensity of party identification are less concentrated, with the candidate and approval categories accounting for about one-third of the observed instances. Ideology and relative policy positions play a role in influencing the intensity of support for the Republican party that we do not consistently observe with Democrats. For Democrats, again, the mid-1970s saw the greatest number of incidents of updating of the intensity of party identification. However, while Republicans updated the direction of their party identification most in 1976, the dissertation finds that they updated the intensity of their party identification the most times in the 1996 election.

There were fourteen occasions when a variable affected both direction and strength of attachment to a statistically significant level. Seven of these events were connected to candidate evaluations, including the lone instance of the phenomenon occurring among supporters of the Democratic party. When both direction and strength of party identity are affected, in most cases, the magnitude of the effect is greatest in the strength component of party identification. On the occasions where the effect on the direction of party identification is greater than its effect on strength, if we limit observations to the 95% of cases two standard deviations on either side of the mean value, we always find a greater variance in the strength component than we do regarding the initial direction.

Whilst the dissertation has shown the relative stability of direction of party identification and a greater degree of flexibility in the strength component, there are certain areas where the results of this study are not in line with previous theories. The most notable of these is the lack of an apparent link between either direction or strength of party identification and whether an individual feels better or worse off under the administration. This finding contradicts Key et al. (1966) and Downs (1957), who suggest a basic retrospective understanding of their economic situation dictates much of how individuals make political decisions.

Another surprising finding is the paucity of policy issues, particularly among Democrats, which play a role in determining how strongly individuals identify with their party. An individual's position on policies central to Democratic party platforms for decades, such as health care and aid to minorities, does not play a role in determining how intensely one

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identifies as a Democrat. On the issue of abortion, perhaps the issue that divides Republicans and Democrats more than any other, again, we see very little impact on party identification. Although in 1996, we observed pro-choice Republicans leaving the GOP, we do not see supporters of either party dividing into strong/not strong identifiers based upon their view of when or if abortion should be permissible.

It is worth commenting on the possibility that the lack of findings in these areas could result from a lack of statistical power due to relatively small sample sizes. For example, on the issue of Healthcare, 1960 saw a statistically significant relationship among the 407 Democrats, showing a coefficient of 0.27 on the strong, weak decision. In 1996 however, no statistically significant relationship was observed among the 131 Republicans, despite the decision to leave the party having an associated coefficient of 0.29. The significance of one relationship instead of the other is explained by the standard errors 0.08 in 1960 and 0.16 in 1996. As an increased sample size is associated with a smaller standard error and an increased level of statistical significance thus, a larger sample size in 1996 may have revealed a significant relationship. As such several of the non-findings might be type two errors due to the lack of statistical power of the data available. However, as the formula for calculating standard errors is based on the square root of the sample size, the effect of the decrease in sample size from 1960 to 1976 and 1996 may not have played a great role in the resulting lack of significant findings. A more likely explanation is that the relationship between policy position and either component of party identification is tenuous. The relatively low coefficients illustrate this. On only one occasion is the coefficient associated with a non-significant relationship greater than 0.40. In two-thirds of non-significant associations related to policy positions, the coefficients are less than 0.20, suggesting there is a limited, if any, relationship between the strength of party identification and policy.

However, this lack of findings, whilst of interest, does not undercut the central finding of this dissertation. In fact, they mostly strengthen it. The fewer factors that are found to drive the direction of party identification suggest that party identification is an expressive social identity. While we would expect to notice updating of the intensity of support on the Democratic side around certain policy positions, this (lack of) findings does buttress the earlier theories that paint Democrats as a "mosaic of interest groups" (Polsby (2008)). And

as such, we should, perhaps, not expect Democrats ,on the whole, to sort themselves around one specific policy. Whilst individual policy positions are not seen to affect Democrats, the aggregation of those policies, in the form of support for government spending, does lead to sorting into weak or strong identifiers.

In summary, the study has produced robust, consistent findings across half a century and four-panel studies. Defection from a political party is a rare event. However, the salience of party identification is updated. In line with previous theory suggesting that the parties are not mirrored images of each other (Grossmann and Hopkins (2016), Polsby (2008), Hacker and Pierson (2014)), we find that the parties self-sort based on different factors. Comparisons between the four panels are marked by similarities rather than differences suggesting this pattern will continue. However, it is possible to speculate about a potential breakdown in the highly stable model of party identity.

At present , we are witnessing the United States' party system undergoing a systemic change. Whereas there have always been differences between the parties, as noted by Polsby and others, these differences have not been great enough to matter for the purposes of this model. The Democrats remain largely a collection of interest groups with core values forged in the New Deal and Civil Rights eras. The Republicans, on the other hand, appear very different from the Eisenhower Republicans of the first panel of this study and are readily distinguishable from the Republicans in the last panel under George W. Bush. The Republican party has taken on a more populist tone in recent years (Stewart (2020); Shogan (2007)), and simultaneously become more personality-driven under Donald Trump (Galvin (2020) J. E. Oliver and Rahn (2016)). Perhaps not since the time of Andrew Jackson has one person held a political party in his grip as tightly as the 46th President holds the present-day Republican Party. Trump's control appears to be so strong at the moment that fidelity to him is a litmus test of being a "real" Republican. As such, if an ANES panel were set up for 2020-2024, we would expect the leadership effects to be greater among Republicans than on the Democrat side of the political divide. The "Trump effect" may be so great so as to break down the cohesiveness of the Republican party associated with social identity. Long-standing Republicans may start to question that component of their identity if being a Republican

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increasingly means being a Trump supporter. Defections from the Republicans are likely to come from among the college-educated. S. Smith and Doherty (2016) and A. Harris (2018) note that it is college- educated Republicans who are the most uncomfortable with Trump's populist rhetoric. Thus, we may see a greater degree of inter-party switching than we have previously observed, with the level of an individual's education highly correlated with the direction of the switch. Whilst Key (1959) found no educational differences between "stand-patters" and "switchers" as opposed to Berelson, who found the least educated were more likely to swap parties, it is probable that we will see the college-educated appalled by some of Trump's actions, leaving the GOP. To a lesser extent, non-college graduate white Democrats attracted by Trump's populist anti-immigration rhetoric which, as noted by Muravchik and Shields (2020), was Trump's appeal to blue-collar Democrats, may switch their allegiance to the GOP.

This dissertation set out to reconcile the two different approaches to the study of party identification. It did this by suggesting that the direction of party identification was an expressive element of an individual's social identity, whilst instrumental factors determined the intensity of attachment to that party. This was found to be correct for both parties across half a century of data. However, as noted earlier in this chapter, Republicans have tended to be more fickle than Democrats in their support for the party. This fickleness previously was not of such magnitude to detract from the theory. However, if the current trend in Republican party politics continues, it is probable that Republican party identification becomes a function of instrumental factors in the mold of Key and Fiorina. Democratic party identification ,however, remains rooted in the framework outlined by the Michigan school half a century ago.

A. OUTCOMES

A.1 1960

**Figure A.1.** 1960 percentage outcomes

A.2   1976

**Figure A.2.** 1976 percentage outcomes

**Figure A.3.** 1996 percentage outcomes

2004 Outcomes

Dems

Reps

Figure A.4. 2004 percentage outcomes

B. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

B.1 Candidate effect

Table B.1. Candidate evaluations

	Democrats			Republicans		
Year	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD
1960	442	1.50	3.18	269	2.91	3.05
1976	505	1.08	3.04	297	1.65	2.90
1996	155	3.40	2.67	138	2.78	3.60

Figure B.1. 1960 candidate evaluation histogram

**Figure B.2.** 1976 candidate evaluation histogram

Figure B.3. 1996 candidate evaluation histogram

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Table B.2. Candidate feeling thermometer

|		Democrats			Republicans	
Year	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD
1976	394	19.22	35.67	245	26.05	31.67
1996	192	40.34	24.44	137	31.64	38.99
2004	222	36.30	36.97	221	47.49	32.94

**Figure B.4.** 1976 Candidate feeling thermometer histogram

**Figure B.5.** 1996 Candidate feeling thermometer histogram

Figure B.6. 2004 Candidate feeling thermometer histogram

B.2 Ideology

Table B.3. Ideology Self-placement

	Democrats			Republicans		
Year	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD
1976	264	3.90	1.21	197	5.18	1.08
1996	115	2.84	1.74	129	5.08	1.43

Figure B.7. 1976 Ideology Self-placement histogram

1996 Ideology

Figure B.8. 1996 Ideology Self-placement histogram

Table B.4. Conservative-Liberal feeling thermometer

|	Democrats			Republicans		
Year	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD
1976	360	1.76	25.56	223	22.16	27.81
1996	136	11.21	26.04	128	31.64	32.67
2004	210	5.08	23.93	224	34.76	30.94

Figure B.10. 1996 Conservative-Liberal feeling thermometer histogram


Figure B.9. 1976 Conservative-Liberal feeling thermometer histogram

Figure B.11. 2004 Conservative-Liberal feeling thermometer histogram

B.3 Retrospective evaluations

Figure B.12. Ford approval percentages

Figure B.13. Clinton approval percentages

2004 Bush approval

Democracts

Republicans

11.66%

9.417%

13.45%

65.47%

3.139%

3.587%

13%

80.27%

- strong approval
- appove not strongly
- disappove not strongly
- strongly disapprove

Figure B.14. Bush approval percentages

1996 Better or worse off

Democrats

Republicans

18.06%

30.97%

50.97%

26.09%

31.88%

42.03%

- better off
- about the same
- worse off

Figure B.15. Clinton better off percentages

Figure B.16. Bush better off percentages

B.4 Policy preference

Figure B.17. 1960 Govt ensure work percentages

Table B.5. Government in the economy

		Democrats			Republicans		
Year	measure	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD
1976	ensure S of L	324	4.07	1.87	213	5.23	1.63
1996	ensure S of L	139	3.92	1.68	134	5.35	1.33
1996	Govt Services	134	4.38	1.25	136	3.09	1.25
2004	Govt Services	224	3.88	2.46	224	3.23	1.84

Figure B.18. 1960 fairness for blacks percentages

Figure B.19. 1960 school segregation percentages

Table B.6. Racial issues

Year	measure	Democrats			Republicans		
		N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD
1976	school bussing	345	5.82	1.83	230	6.53	1.04
1976	aid to minorities	328	4.23	1.88	213	4.76	1.74
1996	aid to blacks	142	4.21	1.75	134	5.36	1.27

Figure B.20. 2004 aid to blacks percentages

Figure B.21. 1960 Medicare support percentages

Table B.7. Public or private healthcare

	Democrats			Republicans		
Year	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD
1976	303	3.45	2.19	217	4.89	2.13
1996	141	3.29	1.61	131	4.93	1.69

Figure B.22. 1976 abortion percentages

Figure B.23. 1996 abortion percentages

Figure B.24. 2004 abortion percentages

Table B.8. Inter-party difference

	Democrats			Republicans		
Year	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD
1976	178	7.67	3.78	135	10.10	4.39
1996	93	8.45	3.69	105	10.35	4.85

Figure B.25. 1976 inter-party differences histogram

Figure B.26. 1996 inter-party differences histogram

Table B.9. Intra-party difference

| | Democrats | | | Republicans | | |
Year	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD
1976	187	5.47	3.29	134	4.90	2.87
1996	102	4.09	2.55	97	3.82	2.42

Figure B.27. 1976 intra-party differences histogram

Figure B.28. 1996 intra-party differences histogram

B.5 Control variables

Dems

Reps

30.32%

19%

10.18%

40.5%

34.57%

10.04%

18.22%

37.17%

■ weak 56 weak 58   ■ weak56 strong 58   ■ strong 56 weak 58   ■ strong 56 strrong 58

Figure B.29. 1960 strength of previous party ID

Dems

Reps

39.8%

20.79%

10.1%

29.31%

35.02%

11.78%

17.85%

35.35%

■ weak 72 weak 74   ■ weak 72 strong 74   ■ strong 72 weak 74   ■ strong 72 strong 74

Figure B.30. 1976 strength of previous party ID

Figure B.31. 1996 strength of previous party ID

Figure B.32. 2004 strength of previous party ID

C. DESTINATION OF PARTY LEAVERS

C.1 1960

Figure C.1. 1960 party leavers destination

Figure C.2. 1976 party leavers destination

Figure C.3. 1996 party leavers destination

Figure C.4. 2004 party leavers destination

D. EFFECT OF STRONG PARTY ID

D.1   1960

Table D.1. 1960 Engagement

	Democrats					Republicans				
	weak		strong			weak		strong		
engagement	mean	SD	mean	SD	t-test	mean	SD	mean	SD	t-test
straight ticket	.73	.04	.81	.03	1.74	.64	.05	.84	.03	3.42*
influence	.22	.03	.42	.03	4.19*	.37	.05	.52	.04	2.35*
donate	.06	.02	.12	.02	1.85	.12	.03	.38	.04	4.62*
meeting	.02	.01	.08	.02	2.24*	.08	.03	.25	.04	3.47*
party work	.01	.01	.04	.01	2.27*	.05	.02	.11	.02	2.44*
button	.11	.02	.29	.03	4.40*	.22	.04	.44	.04	3.53*
totals	1.22	.08	1.88	.09	5.31*	1.53	.13	2.64	.14	5.55*

* = p< 0.05

D.2   1976

Table D.2. 1974 Engagement

|	Democrats					Republicans				
	weak		strong			weak		strong		
engagement	mean	SD	mean	SD	t-test	mean	SD	mean	SD	t-test
straight ticket	.41	.04	.63	.04	3.99*	.25	.04	.61	.05	5.90*
influence	.11	.02	.23	.03	3.81*	.20	.03	.24	.04	.80
donate	.07	.02	.15	.02	3.13*	.12	.03	.20	.03	1.76
meeting	.05	.01	.09	.02	1.85	.08	.02	.13	.03	1.28
party work	.02	.01	.09	.02	3.25*	.04	.02	.07	.02	1.26
button	.04	.01	.10	.02	2.83*	.06	.02	.11	.03	1.57
totals	.51	.06	1.12	.08	6.10*	.68	.07	1.20	.12	4.02*

*=p<.05

Note ANES did not ask the 1976 panel questions about political engagement the above table represents responses from the second wave of the 3 wave panel.

D.3 1996

Table D.3. 1996 Engagement

| engagement | Democrats | | | | | Republicans | | | | |
| | weak | | strong | | | weak | | strong | | |
	mean	SD	mean	SD	t-test	mean	SD	mean	SD	t-test
vote	.66	.07	.90	.03	3.62*	.87	.05	.92	.03	.98
influence	.18	.05	.24	.04	.82	.25	.06	.51	.06	2.99*
donate (party)	.04	.03	.05	.02	.22	.06	.03	.15	.05	1.68
meeting	.02	.02	.05	.02	.82	.04	.03	.17	.05	2.30*
work	.00	.00	.03	.01	1.58	.00	.00	.03	.02	1.84
button	.06	.03	.10	.03	.73	.08	.04	.22	.05	2.12*
totals	.96	.12	1.39	.10	2.67*	1.28	.12	1.69	.11	3.67*

*=p<.05

D.4 2004

Table D.4. 2004 Engagement

| engagement | Democrats | | | | | Republicans | | | | |
| | weak | | strong | | | weak | | strong | | |
	mean	SD	mean	SD	t-test	mean	SD	mean	SD	t-test
influence	.44	.06	.63	.04	2.47*	.34	.06	.57	.04	2.92*
donate (party)	.03	.02	.17	.03	2.69*	.07	.03	.20	.03	2.34*
meeting	.08	.04	.19	.03	1.91	.02	.02	.16	.03	2.82*
work	.02	.02	.08	.02	1.82	.00	.00	.05	.02	2.15*
button	.11	.04	.26	.04	2.40*	.14	.05	.35	.04	3.09*
totals	.69	.12	1.33	.10	3.62*	.57	.11	1.35	.10	4.52*

* = p<.05

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